ÿWPC, ?# ‚UN %Û 0oáUFPw@–4Öêù 0³ 0D´ 0Jø 0TB 0^– 0hô 0r\ 0|Î 0†J 0Ð 1u` 0dÕ UF9  B‡ ¤ U >¬ ê U 6ò B)( DCQ AM” U*á _ ðjUZL¯ýû|øit!Ýêþwè AQ_"ư" 0Dv# 0@º# 0Dú# D/>$ Bm$ D3Š$v~½$vÓ;&˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(GŠ7$¡¡Ô€XkUXXXÔÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  Ó<4šÛ 9Z ‹.Courier New Regular ---- -D - - -Pe -Ó€-ê‚_#P 3|x-(c(3¶û$¤¤Ý ƒŠ7!ÝÔ€X[!XXXÔÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ<4šÛ 9Z ‹.Courier New Regular d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd46&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial UÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ5"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌJuneÏ22,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó ó æÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóMr.€Alexander€died€after€the€first€trial€of€this€case.Ì KÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIn€addition,€Alexanderððs€partner,€attorney€Ernest€W.ÏWilliams,€contributed€substantially€to€the€representation.€ÏWilliams€is€not€a€party€to€this€suit.€€Ì BÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThis€figure€consists€of€the€original€$10,000€retainer€fee,Ïplus€the€$149,000€paid€after€the€divorce€trial€was€concluded.Ì óÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAccording€to€the€Court€of€Appeals,€the€attorney€whose€fee€inÏa€divorce€case€is€based€on€a€contingency€must€demonstrate,€inÏaddition€to€the€requirements€for€all€attorney€fee€agreements:€€ÌÌà8 à(1)€that€the€client€is€currently€or€will€be€unable€toÏpay€a€reasonable€fixed€fee,€or€that€the€opposing€partyÏcannot€pay€reasonable€òòpendente€liteóó€attorneysðð€fees€orÏan€award€for€attorneysðð€fees€at€the€conclusion€of€theÏcase;€€ÌÌà8 à(2)€that€the€attorney€has€explained€all€relevantÏconsiderations€to€the€client,€including€the€availabilityÏof€other€fee€or€payment€arrangements€and€the€clientððsÏright€to€seek€independent€legal€advice;€andÌÌà8 à(3)€that€the€attorney€has€agreed€to€credit€any€court„awarded€fees€against€his€or€her€final€fee.€ÌÌòòSeeóó€òòAlexanderóó,€903€S.W.2d€at€699.€Ì rÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòBut€seeóó€òòState€ex€rel.€Oklahoma€Bar€Assn,€v.€Faginóó,€848€P.2dÏ11€(Okla.€1992)€(because€state€rules€prohibit€any€fee€which€hasÏsome€aspect€of€a€contingency€involved,€any€enhancement€of€a€feeÏbased€on€a€favorable€result€is€contingent);€òòSalerno€v.€Salernoóó,Ï575€A.2d€532,€533€(N.J.€Super.€Ct.€Ch.€Div.€1990)€(an€agreementÏfor€an€hourly€rate€plus€a€bonus€based€on€a€percentage€of€the€awardÏis€a€contingent€fee).€€Ì _Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€addition,€because€we€find€that€the€fee€is€not€contingent,Ïthe€recent€case€òòWhite€v.€McBrideóó,€937€S.W.2d€at€803,€isÏinapplicable€to€this€case.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWith€respect€to€time€and€labor,€we€disregard€the€attemptedÏreconstruction€of€the€attorneysðð€time€records€and€the€allegationsÏof€over„staffing€and€duplicative€services.€€There€is€no€need€toÏreconstruct€the€exact€hours€spent€on€the€case,€because€the€fee€wasÏnot€controlled€by€the€attorneysðð€hourly€rates.€€Rather,€theÏparties€clearly€intended€some€leeway€beyond€the€hourly€rates.€€TheÏtime€devoted€to€the€case€is€but€one€of€several€factors€determiningÏthe€overall€reasonableness€of€the€fee€charged.€€Because€it€isÏclear€that€the€attorneys€put€innumerable€hours€into€Inmanððs€case,Ïthe€time€and€labor€factor€suggests€that€the€$501,514.50€fee€isÏreasonable.€€Of€course,€as€this€case€illustrates,€it€is€preferableÏfor€an€attorney€to€maintain€reliable€time€records,€regardless€ofÏthe€kind€of€fee€arrangement€the€attorney€has€with€the€client.€€Ì àÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€the€instant€case,€Inmanððs€own€expert,€Rose€Palermo,€aÏlawyer€who€handles€divorce€cases€involving€large€estates,Ïtestified€that€in€such€cases€the€spouse€who€was€not€the€primaryÏwage„earner€typically€receives€approximately€thirty„five€to€fortyÏpercent€of€the€marital€estate.Ì mÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€47„14„123€(1988)€provides:ÌÌà8 àà àPre„judgment€interest,€i.e.,€interest€as€an€elementÏof,€or€in€the€nature€of,€damages,€as€permitted€by€theÏstatutory€and€common€laws€of€the€state€as€of€April€1,Ï1979,€may€be€awarded€by€courts€or€juries€in€accordanceÏwith€the€principles€of€equity€at€any€rate€not€in€excessÏof€a€maximum€effective€rate€of€ten€percent€(10%)€perÏannum;€.€.€.€.€€€Ì45678Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó99'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxdPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÑ Œ ÑÑ d ÑÓ` °‚X˜XÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Ñ7€ÉXXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñœ›Þ ÞÌÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌÌDAVID€A.€ALEXANDER€and€€€€€€€€€€€€à à)€€€FOR€PUBLICATIONÌMACLIN€P.€DAVIS,€JR.,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€FILED:€œJUNE€22,›€1998Ì€€€€€Plaintiffs„Appelleesà àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€HON.€ROBERT€S.€BRANDT,ÌJULIA€ANN€WHITE€INMANà àà àà à)à à€€€CHANCELLORÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà à)Ì€€€€€Defendant„Appellant€€€€€€€à à)€€€NO.€01„S„01„9705„CH„00103ÌÙ€4ÙœßR€')&A1-j|ßóI` 9. `€€@ÿRß›ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantóó:òòà àà àà àà àà àà àFor€Appelleesóó:ÌÌHARLAN€DODSON,€III€€€€€à àà àà àà àWARD€DEWITT,€JR.ÌANNE€C.€MARTINà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TNÌNashville,€TNÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àòòOPINIONÌÌÌÌÌÌóóÌÌÌÌÌÌREVERSED€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBIRCH,€J.ÌÓÓÌœÇÑ7€[!XXdÖXXdð7Ñ›à àWe€granted€permission€to€appeal€under€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï11€to€the€appellant,€Julia€Ann€White€Inman,€in€order€to€determineÏthe€amount€of€attorneysðð€fees,€if€any,€that€the€appellees,Ïattorneys€David€A.€Alexander× ƒ* ××  ×€and€Maclin€P.€Davis,€Jr.,€areÏentitled€to€recover€from€Inman,€their€former€client,€pursuant€to€aÏwritten€fee€agreement.€€ÌÌà àUnder€the€circumstances€presented€herein,€we€concludeÏthat€(1)€the€agreement€is€not€a€contingent€fee€arrangement;€(2)Ïthe€attorneys€and€Inman€shared€the€same€understanding€of€theÏagreement;€and€(3)€the€fee€charged€is€reasonable.€€Consequently,Ïwe€hold€that€the€attorneys€have€satisfied€their€high€fiduciaryÏduty€of€good€faith€in€the€formation€of€the€agreement.€€We€concludeÏalso€that€the€attorneys€did€not€violate€the€terms€of€theÏagreement.€€Accordingly,€we€hold€that€the€agreement€isÏenforceable,€and€the€attorneys€are€entitled€to€recover€the€fullÏamount€requested.€€Finally,€the€attorneys€are€not€entitled€toÏprejudgment€interest.€€ÌÌà@ àI€Ìà@ àÌà àAfter€releasing€her€first€attorneys,€Inman€engaged€DavisÏand€Alexander€on€September€6,€1988,€to€represent€her€in€a€fiercelyÏcontested€divorce€action€which€had€already€been€set€for€trial€onÏOctober€5,€1988.€€During€the€September€6€meeting€between€AlexanderÏand€Inman,€Alexander€requested€a€$10,000€retainer€but€did€notÏdiscuss€any€other€billing€arrangements.€€He€also€recommendedÏassociating€Davis€to€assist€with€the€representation,€and€InmanÏagreed.× ƒ+ ××  ×€€Because€the€attorneys€were€engaged€only€one€month€beforeÏthe€trial€date,€they€obtained€a€continuance,€and€the€trial€wasÏreset€for€November€15,€1988.€€Once€the€trial€was€reset,Ïapproximately€eight€weeks€were€available€to€prepare€for€trial.€€ÌÌà àThe€parties€entered€into€the€fee€agreement€in€dispute€onÏSeptember€22,€1988.€€Neither€Alexander€nor€Davis€explained€theÏagreement€to€Inman,€although€she€admitted€at€trial€to€having€readÏthe€agreement€before€signing€it.€€The€agreement€provides:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àà àThe€amount€of€the€final€fee€toÏbe€paid€by€Client€for€legal€servicesÏof€Attorneys€and€lawyers€and€clerksÍunder€their€supervision€shall€be€aÏreasonable€amount€taking€intoÏconsideration€the€time€and€laborÏrequired,€the€novelty€and€difficultyÏof€the€questions€involved,€the€skillÏrequired€to€perform€the€servicesÏproperly,€the€amount€involved€andÏresults€obtained,€and€other€relevantÏfactors.€€Said€final€fee€shall€notÏexceed€15%€of€the€total€sum€(inÏmoney€and€property)€awarded€toÏClient€after€commencement€of€theÏtrial€of€said€action€for€divorce€forÏalimony€òòin€solidoóó,€for€five€years€ofÏalimony€òòin€futuroóó,€and€distributionÏand€division€of€property,€or€10%€ofÏsuch€total€sum€awarded€to€Client€byÏsettlement€prior€to€the€commencementÏof€such€trial,€provided€that€saidÏfee€shall€in€no€event€be€less€thanÏ(a)€$10,000;€or€(b)€the€total€amountÏon€a€time€basis€for€work€ofÏAttorneys€and€other€attorneys€andÏclerks€under€their€supervision€atÏtheir€usual€hourly€charges€for€work.€Ìà8 àà8 àÌà8 àà8 àà àSaid€retainer€feel€[sic]€shallÏbe€credited€toward€the€total€chargesÏto€Client.€€If€the€charges€for€workÏexceed€$10,000,€Attorneys€shall€billÏClient€for€said€excess€chargesÏwithin€a€reasonable€time.ÓÓÌÌà àIn€the€days€before€the€trial,€the€attorneys€examined€theÏfiles€from€Inmanððs€previous€attorneys,€subpoenaed€bank€records,Ïamended€the€pleadings,€and€assembled€the€necessary€evidence.€€TheyÏalso€requested€the€court€to€re„open€discovery€and€to€order€InmanððsÍspouse€to€answer€several€interrogatories€propounded€by€herÏprevious€attorneys.ÌÌà àBecause€Inman€suspected€that€her€spouse€had€not€beenÏhonest€about€the€existence€and€value€of€all€marital€assets,€aÏgreat€deal€of€time€was€devoted€to€identification€and€re„evaluationÏof€the€marital€estate.€€The€trial€court€declined€to€re„openÏdiscovery,€so€an€extensive€search€of€various€documents€and€bankÏrecords€became€necessary.€€With€Inmanððs€assistance,€they€locatedÏat€least€one€undisclosed€asset€and€proved€that€the€value€of€theÏmarital€estate€was€approximately€$1,666,000€more€than€InmanððsÏspouse€had€estimated.€€The€attorneys€testified€that€they€toiledÏmany€evenings€and€weekends€to€prepare€for€trial€and€that€theyÏdevoted€considerable€time€to€meeting€or€talking€with€Inman.€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€was€conducted€on€November€15,€16,€and€17,Ï1988.€€In€December€1988,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€value€ofÏthe€marital€estate€was€approximately€$8,000,000€and€entered€anÏorder€awarding€the€divorce€to€Inmanððs€spouse€on€the€grounds€ofÏcruel€and€inhuman€treatment.€€Additionally,€the€court€awardedÏInman€$2,300,200€of€the€marital€estate.€€In€January€1989,€InmanÍreceived€partial€payment€of€the€judgment;€with€it€she€paid€theÏattorneys€$149,000€in€fees€and€approximately€$16,000€in€expenses.€ÏShe€did€not€ask€for€an€explanation€of€how€the€fee€was€calculatedÏor€what€services€were€included.€€ÌÌà àThe€attorneys€continued€to€represent€Inman€on€theÏappellate€level.€€On€October€18,€1989,€the€Court€of€AppealsÏreversed€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€and€held€that€Inman€wasÏentitled€to:€€(1)€the€divorce,€on€grounds€of€adultery,€(2)€anÏadditional€$1,043,230€of€the€marital€estate,€(3)€$5,000€in€alimonyÏper€month,€and€(4)€50%€of€her€attorneysðð€fees€accruing€at€trialÏand€75%€of€her€attorneysðð€fees€accruing€on€appeal.€€The€Court€ofÏAppeals€also€removed€$850,000€from€her€spouseððs€separate€propertyÏand€added€it€to€the€marital€estate,€for€a€total€marital€estate€ofÏ$8,850,000.€€€€ÌÌà àInmanððs€spouse€then€applied€for€permission€to€appeal€toÏthis€Court,€and€we€granted€his€application.€€On€April€22,€1991,Ïthe€Court€reversed€the€Court€of€Appealððs€award€of€alimony€andÏattorneysðð€fees,€affirmed€the€award€of€the€divorce€to€Inman€andÏthe€$1,043,230€increase€of€her€share€of€the€marital€property,€andÍremanded€the€cause€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings.€€OnÏJuly€1,€1991,€the€Court€denied€Inmanððs€petition€to€rehear.€€ÌÌà àOn€remand,€the€attorneys€continued€to€represent€Inman,Ïat€least€at€first.€€They€requested€the€trial€court€to€awardÏinterest€and€income€from€certain€real€estate,€stocks,€bonds,€andÏother€property€that€had€been€awarded€to€Inman€yet€remained€in€herÏspouseððs€possession.€€On€August€16,€1991,€the€trial€courtÏdismissed€the€motion,€and€the€attorneys€advised€Inman€to€appealÏthis€ruling.€ÌÌà àMeanwhile,€Davis€had€written€a€letter€to€Inman€on€JulyÏ10,€1991,€explaining€that€the€attorneysðð€fee€would€be€15%€of€herÏ$3,343,430€award,€a€total€of€$501,514.50.€€Because€she€had€alreadyÏpaid€$159,000,× ƒ, ××  ×€the€attorneys€requested€the€balance€of€$342,514.50.€ÏAlthough€Inman€was€distressed€by€the€amount€requested,€she€waitedÏuntil€late€August€1991€to€respond€that€she€was€unwilling€to€payÏit.€€Consequently,€the€attorney„client€relationship€was€severed,Ïand€Inman€retained€other€counsel€to€represent€her€in€allÏsubsequent€proceedings.€€ÌÌà àThe€attorneys€sued€Inman€for€the€unpaid€fee€on€DecemberÏ13,€1991.€€Inman,€alleging€that€the€fee€agreement€wasÏunenforceable€and€the€fee€was€clearly€excessive,€counterclaimedÏfor€a€portion€of€the€$159,000€she€had€already€paid.€€On€March€3,Ï1993,€following€a€three„day€trial,€the€jury€returned€a€verdict€forÏthe€attorneys€in€the€amount€of€$263,985,€to€be€paid€in€addition€toÏthe€$159,000€already€paid.€€ÌÌà àInman€appealed€the€verdict,€and€on€February€8,€1995,€theÏCourt€of€Appeals€reversed€and€remanded€for€another€trial.€ÏòòAlexander€v.€Inmanóó,€903€S.W.2d€686€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€TheÏCourt€of€Appeals€opinion€provided€comprehensive€guidance€to€theÏtrial€court€on€evidentiary€issues,€jury€instructions,€and€the€lawÏrelating€to€contingent€fees€in€domestic€relations€cases.€€OnÏremand,€the€parties€agreed€to€a€bench€trial€on€the€record€of€theÏoriginal€trial.€€€€€ÌÌà àA€bench€trial€ensued,€and€on€January€29,€1996,€the€trialÏcourt€ruled€that€the€attorneys€had€violated€the€fee€agreement€byÏfailing€to€bill€Inman€within€a€reasonable€time€and€thatÍ$501,514.50€is€an€unreasonable€fee€under€the€circumstancesÏpresented.€€Upon€analyzing€the€factors€determining€reasonableness,Ïthe€trial€court€concluded€that€$300,000€is€a€reasonable€fee€andÏawarded€the€attorneys€the€unpaid€portion€of€this€amount„„$141,000.€ÏThe€trial€court€also€denied€the€attorneysðð€request€for€prejudgmentÏinterest.€€Inman€appealed€this€ruling,€and€the€cause€came€beforeÏthe€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€second€time.€€ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€held€that€the€fee€agreement€isÏcontingent€and€unenforceable.€€However,€because€the€court€foundÏthat€the€fee€requested€was€not€ð ðclearly€excessive,ðð€the€attorneysÏwere€allowed€to€recover€in€òòquantum€meruitóó€for€the€reasonable€valueÏof€their€services.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€determined€that€theÏreasonable€value€of€their€services€was€$280,757.25.€€Since€InmanÏhad€already€paid€$159,000,€the€attorneys€were€awarded€$121,757.25Ïplus€interest,€to€begin€accruing€February€13,€1996,€the€date€ofÏentry€of€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€on€remand.€€Judge€KochÏdissented€from€the€Court€of€Appeals€decision,€noting€that€theÏappropriate€fee€as€determined€by€the€majority,€$280,757.25,€wasÏmerely€an€average€of€the€highest€and€lowest€fees€suggested€byÏexpert€witnesses.€€Koch€found€the€value€of€the€attorneyððs€servicesÍto€be€$166,252.50,€which,€after€credit€for€the€$159,000€alreadyÏpaid,€would€result€in€a€judgment€of€$7,252.50.€€€€€€€€ÌÌà àBefore€this€Court,€Inman€contends€that€the€requestedÏ$501,514.50€fee€is€a€clearly€excessive€contingent€fee€and,€underÏòòWhite€v.€McBrideóó,€937€S.W.2d€796€(Tenn.€1996),€the€attorneys€areÏnot€entitled€to€recover€any€fee€at€all.€€Rather,€she€insists€thatÏshe€is€entitled€to€recover€the€$159,000€already€paid.€ÏAlternatively,€she€urges€that€a€reasonable€fee€in€this€case€isÏ$60,000€and€that€she€is€entitled€to€recover€$99,000€from€theÏattorneys.€€The€attorneys€assert€that€the€fee€agreement€isÏenforceable,€that€the€fee€requested€is€reasonable,€and€that€theyÏare€entitled€to€an€award€of€prejudgment€interest.ÌÌà àIn€our€view€of€the€cause,€we€find€the€dispositive€issuesÏto€be:€€(1)€whether€the€fee€provided€for€in€the€agreement€is€aÏcontingent€fee;€(2)€whether€the€attorneys€satisfied€theirÏfiduciary€duty€of€good€faith€with€respect€to€the€formation€of€theÏfee€agreement;€(3)€whether€the€attorneys€violated€the€terms€of€theÏagreement;€and€(4)€whether€the€attorneys€are€entitled€toÏprejudgment€interest.€€Our€review€of€all€findings€of€law€will€beÍòòde€novoóó,€with€no€presumption€of€correctness.€€Any€findings€of€factÏwill€be€afforded€a€presumption€of€correctness,€unless€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï13(d);€òòCampbell€v.€Florida€Steel€Corp.óó,€919€S.W.2d€26,€35€(Tenn.Ï1996).€€€€€ÌÌà@ àII€ÌÌà àAs€a€general€rule,€contingent€fee€agreements€areÏbegrudgingly€permitted€in€domestic€relations€cases.€€BecauseÏpublic€policy€favors€marriage€and€discourages€attorneys€fromÏpromoting€bitter€divorce€battles€for€financial€gain,€contingentÏfees€are€subjected€to€enhanced€scrutiny€and€rarely€are€found€to€beÏjustified.€€As€a€matter€of€fact,€so€unsavory€are€contingent€feesÏin€domestic€relations€cases€that€a€higher€quantum€of€proof€isÏnecessary€to€enforce€a€contingent€fee.€€òòAlexanderóó,€903€S.W.2d€atÏ698„99.× ƒ- ××  ×€€Thus,€our€initial€task€is€to€determine€whether€the€feeÍagreement€before€us€describes€a€contingent€fee.€€The€Court€ofÏAppeals€found€the€fee€to€be€one€based€upon€a€contingency.€€UponÏcareful€analysis,€however,€we€find€otherwise.Ì€€Ìà àIn€òòEckell€v.€Wilsonóó,€597€A.2d€696€(Pa.€Super.€Ct.€1991),Ïòòappeal€deniedóó,€607€A.2d€253€(Pa.€1992),€a€Pennsylvania€courtÏanalyzed€whether€a€fee€based€upon€the€ð ðreasonable€valueðð€ofÏattorney€services,€with€a€minimum€fee€calculated€at€an€hourlyÏrate,€was€contingent.€€The€court€found€that€the€fee€was€not€trulyÏcontingent€because€the€attorneys€were€guaranteed€paymentÏregardless€of€the€outcome€of€the€litigation.€€In€contrast,€ð ð[a]Ïcontingency€fee€agreement€carries€a€risk€that€an€attorney€will€notÏbe€paid€if€the€outcome€of€the€litigation€is€unsuccessful.€€No€suchÏrisk€is€found€here.ðð€€€€òòId.óó€at€700„01.€€Other€courts€haveÏsimilarly€defined€ð ðcontingent€feeðð:€€€€€€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àà àA€contingent€fee€contract€byÏdefinition€is€one€that€provides€thatÏa€fee€is€to€be€paid€to€the€attorneyÏfor€his€services€òòonlyóó€in€case€heÏwins,€that€is,€òòa€fee€which€is€madeÏto€depend€upon€the€success€orÏfailure€to€enforce€a€supposed€rightóó,Ïand€which€fee€is€generally€paid€outÏof€the€recovery€for€the€client.€€ÌÓÓòòÌPocius€v.€Halvorsenóó,€195€N.E.€137,€139€(Ill.€1964)€(emphasisÏadded).€€ð ðThe€usual€meaning€of€ððcontingent€feeðð€is€that€theÏattorney€will€be€paid€òòonlyóó€if€the€case€is€won.ðð€€òòV.W.€v.€J.B.óó,€629ÏN.Y.S.2d€971,€973€(N.Y.€Sup.€Ct.€1995)(emphasis€added).× ƒ. ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€fee€agreement€in€the€instant€case€closely€parallelsÏthe€agreement€in€òòEckellóó,€in€that€both€use€the€term€ð ðreasonableðð€inÏdescribing€the€fee,€and€both€state€a€minimum€fee€to€be€charged.€ÏIn€addition€to€these€common€elements,€the€agreement€in€the€instantÏcase€states€a€maximum€fee€to€be€charged.€€This€addition,€however,Ïdoes€not€alter€our€analysis,€for€under€the€terms€of€the€agreementÍbetween€Inman€and€the€attorneys,€there€is€no€question€that€theyÏwould€be€paid€regardless€of€the€outcome€of€the€case.€€PaymentÏitself€is€certain;€only€the€òòexactóó€amount€of€payment€is€uncertain.€ÏThe€percentage€of€the€total€award€merely€marks€the€upward€limitÏfor€the€fee€to€be€charged,€and€it€is€not€the€sole€basis€for€theÏfee.€€Therefore,€we€find€that€this€arrangement€is€not€a€contingentÏone,€and€any€enhanced€considerations€applicable€to€contingent€feesÏare€not€relevant€here.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€Rather,€the€criteria€generally€applicableÏto€attorney€fee€agreements€must€be€employed.€€ÌÌà@ àIII€ÌÌà àWe€move€now€to€the€second€issue:€€whether€the€attorneysÏsatisfied€their€duty€of€good€faith€when€they€entered€into€theÏagreement€in€dispute.€€The€relationship€of€attorney€and€client€isÏð ðextremely€delicate€and€fiduciaryðð;€therefore,€attorneys€must€dealÏwith€their€clients€in€utmost€good€faith.€€This€level€of€good€faithÏis€significantly€higher€than€that€required€in€other€businessÏtransactions€where€the€parties€are€dealing€at€armððs€length.€ÍòòCooper€&€Keys€v.€Bellóó,€127€Tenn.€142,€150,€153€S.W.€844,€846Ï(1913);€òòAlexanderóó,€903€S.W.2d€at€693.€€The€client€must€be€able€toÏtrust€the€attorney€to€deal€fairly€at€all€times,€including€duringÏthe€negotiation€of€the€attorneyððs€terms€of€employment.€€òòCummingsÏv.€Pattersonóó,€59€Tenn.€App.€536,€541,€442€S.W.2d€640,€643€(1968).€€ÌÌà àIn€this€context,€this€Court€has€long€held€that€anÏattorney€is€entitled€to€compensation€in€the€amount€agreed€upon€byÏcontract,€provided€that€the€contract€is€fair€at€its€inception€andÏentered€into€in€good€faith.€€òòPeoples€Natððl€Bank€of€Washington€v.ÏKingóó,€697€S.W.2d€344,€346€(Tenn.€1985).€€In€order€to€prove€suchÏgood€faith€and€fairness,€an€attorney€seeking€to€enforce€a€contractÏfor€attorneyððs€fees€must€show:€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à(1)€the€client€fully€understood€theÏcontractððs€meaning€and€effect,€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€the€attorney€and€client€sharedÏthe€same€understanding€of€theÏcontract,€and€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(3)€the€terms€of€the€contract€areÏjust€and€reasonable.€€òòÌÓÓÌCooper€&€Keysóó,€153€S.W.€at€846€(citing€òòPlantersðð€Bank€of€TennesseeÏv.€Hornbergeróó,€44€Tenn.€531,€573€(1867)).€€ÌÌà àWe€will€analyze€the€first€two€criteria€together.€€OurÏanalysis€begins€with€the€inescapable€and€obvious€conclusion€thatÏthe€attorneys,€as€authors€of€the€agreement,€understood€it€to€allowÏthem€to€charge€up€to€fifteen€percent€of€Inmanððs€total€award.€€TheÏdispositive€question,€then,€is€whether€Inman€had€the€sameÏunderstanding€of€the€agreementððs€meaning€and€effect.€€In€herÏtestimony,€Inman€admitted€that€she€read€the€agreement€beforeÏsigning€it.€€She€testified€also€that€she€was€unable€to€recallÏwhether€she€understood€it€at€that€time.€€Yet,€the€language€of€theÏagreement€plainly€stated€that€the€fee€could€be€as€much€as€fifteenÏpercent€of€the€total€award.€€ÌÌà àAdditionally,€the€record€reveals€that€Inman€is€anÏexperienced€realtor,€well„acquainted€with€contracts€of€varyingÏcomplexity€and€their€interpretation.€€Indeed,€from€the€recordÏbefore€us€we€easily€conclude€that€she€is€a€highly€intelligent,Ïself„reliant€person€who€possesses€acumen€and€tenacity€in€suchÏmeasure€as€to€enable€her€to€succeed€in€the€extraordinarilyÏcompetitive€field€of€real€estate.€€As€an€example€of€her€financialÏsophistication,€Inman€refused,€on€at€least€one€occasion,€to€followÍher€attorneysðð€advice€that€she€accept€cash€equivalents€in€lieu€ofÏproperty.€€She€was€also€actively€involved€in€the€management€of€herÏdivorce€case,€helping€the€attorneys€to€uncover€valuable€assetsÏbelonging€to€the€marital€estate.€€Moreover,€the€record€contains€noÏsuggestion€of€undue€influence€or€fraud.€€Thus,€we€discern€noÏplausible€basis€for€concluding€that€Inman€did€not€understand€theÏwords€ð ðSaid€final€fee€shall€not€exceed€15%€of€the€total€sum€(inÏmoney€and€property)€awarded€to€Clientðð€when€she€read€them.€€€€ÌÌà àInman€places€a€great€deal€of€reliance€upon€the€fact€thatÏthe€attorneys€did€not€ð ðwalk€her€throughðð€the€fee€agreement€inÏdetail€and€explain€its€terms€and€conditions€to€her.€€ThisÏomission,€Inman€argues,€prevents€the€attorneys€from€demonstratingÏthat€she€understood€the€agreement.€€However,€this€position€is€notÏwell„taken.€€If€we€were€to€accept€her€argument,€then€nothing€wouldÏbe€gained€by€reducing€fee€agreements€to€writing.€€This€is€trueÏbecause€a€client€could€make€a€òòprima€facieóó€case€of€breach€ofÏfiduciary€duty€by€simply€denying€that€the€attorney€explained€theÏagreement€before€the€client€signed€it.€€òòSeeóó€òòMaksym€v.€Loeschóó,€937ÏF.2d€1237,€1243€(7th€Cir.€1991).€€ÌÌà àIn€òòMaksymóó,€a€client€attempted€to€defend€against€herÏattorneyððs€claim€for€fees€by€alleging€fraud€in€the€inducement.€ÏBecause€her€claim€of€fraud€was€not€supported€by€the€proof,€theÏclient€argued€that€all€contracts€between€lawyers€and€clients€areÏpresumptively€fraudulent€if€the€lawyer€benefits€from€the€contract.€ÏòòId.óó€at€1241.€€While€Inman€has€not€resorted€to€the€use€of€the€termÏð ðfraud,ðð€her€argument€is€strikingly€similar.€€Because€theÏattorneys€did€not€explain€the€fee€agreement€to€her,€Inman€claimsÏthat€they€cannot€prove€she€understood€it,€which€under€applicableÏcase€law€would€mean€that€the€attorneys€violated€their€fiduciaryÏduty€of€good€faith€towards€their€client.€€òòSeeóó€òòCooper€&€Keysóó,€127ÏTenn.€at€150„51,€153€S.W.€at€846.€€ÌÌà àYet,€the€failure€of€one€party€to€explain€the€terms€of€aÏwritten€contract€to€the€other€is€not€alone€a€violation€of€theÏfiduciary€obligation€of€good€faith,€even€if€the€contract€isÏbetween€attorney€and€client.€€The€argument€that€a€fee€agreement€isÏunenforceable€unless€verbally€explained€to€the€client€wouldÏeffectively€create€a€presumption€that€all€attorneyððs€fee€contractsÏare€unenforceable.€€òòSeeóó€òòMaksymóó,€937€F.2d€at€1241„43.€€We€do€notÏfind€such€a€presumption€appropriate.ÌÌà àCertainly,€an€attorney€should€reach€a€clear€agreementÏabout€fees€with€the€client€and€should€explain€the€reasons€forÏpreferring€one€arrangement€over€another.€€Ethical€Consideration€2„19,€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8.€€Nothing,€however,€suggests€that€a€writtenÏretainer€agreement€cannot€satisfy€this€ethical€consideration.€€InÏfact,€reducing€the€agreement€to€writing€is€ideal.€€Here,€theÏattorneys€amply€demonstrated€that€Inman€understood€the€agreementÏshe€signed€and€that€the€attorneys€shared€the€same€understanding;ÏInman€adduced€no€evidence€to€suggest€otherwise.€€Therefore,€weÏfind€that€the€attorneys€have€satisfied€the€first€and€secondÏcriteria€of€òòCooper€&€Keysóó€for€showing€good€faith€in€dealingsÏbetween€attorney€and€client.€€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àUnder€the€third€and€last€criterion€for€an€attorneyÏseeking€to€enforce€a€contract€for€fees,€the€terms€of€the€contractÏmust€be€just€and€reasonable.€€òòCooper€&€Keysóó,€127€Tenn.€at€150,€153ÏS.W.€at€846.€€On€its€face,€the€agreement€between€Inman€and€theÏattorneys€requires€a€reasonable€fee,€based€upon€expressed€factors.€ÏIn€general,€an€agreement€which€utilizes€broad€terms€and€does€notÏfix€an€exact€fee€is€still€acceptable.€€This€Court€has€allowed€aÍlaw€firm€to€enforce€a€promissory€note€created€pursuant€to€aÏsimilarly€worded€fee€agreement.€€òòSeeóó€òòWaller,€Lansden,€Dortch,€&ÏDavis€v.€Haneyóó,€851€S.W.2d€131,€132€(Tenn.€1992)€(the€retainerÏagreement€provided€that€the€firm€be€paid€a€reasonable€fee€based€onÏthe€amount€involved,€the€time€expended,€the€novelty€of€theÏtransaction,€and€the€deadlines€imposed€upon€counsel).€€Moreover,Ïthe€agreement€here€is€just€and€reasonable€because€it€provides€forÏa€minimum€and€maximum€fee€to€be€charged.€€Indeed,€the€maximum€feeÏprovided€a€protection€to€Inman€by€defining€the€limit€beyond€whichÏthe€fee€could€not€rise.ÌÌà àOf€course,€the€use€of€the€word€ð ðreasonableðð€and€theÏprovision€of€a€minimum€and€maximum€fee€will€not€alone€make€theÏagreement€enforceable.€€We€must€also€determine€whether€the€feeÏultimately€charged€was€a€reasonable€fee,€as€is€required€by€theÏterms€of€the€agreement€and€by€case€law.€€We€begin€by€noting€that,Ïas€a€practical€matter,€no€court€can€divine€from€the€range€ofÏreasonable€fees€the€one€that€is€ð ðmost€reasonable.ðð€€Indeed,€thoseÏwho€have€already€opined€a€reasonable€fee€in€this€case€have€arrivedÏat€different€figures.€€There€is€no€need€to€second„guess€theÏreasonable€fees€proposed€because€we€hold€that,€under€theÍcircumstances,€$501,514.50€is€within€the€range€of€reasonableness.€ÏWe€reach€this€conclusion€upon€a€careful€analysis€of€the€factorsÏdetermining€the€reasonableness€of€an€attorneyððs€fee.ÌÌà àPursuant€to€the€fee€agreement,€the€factors€to€beÏconsidered€in€determining€the€reasonableness€of€a€fee€are€ð ðtheÏtime€and€labor€required,€the€novelty€and€difficulty€of€theÏquestions€involved,€the€skill€required€to€perform€the€servicesÏproperly,€the€amount€involved€and€results€obtained,€and€otherÏrelevant€factors.ðð€€These€factors€essentially€mirror€thoseÏenumerated€by€this€Court€in€òòConnors€v.€Connorsóó,€594€S.W.2d€672,Ï676€(Tenn.€1980).€€Additional€factors€relevant€to€reasonablenessÏof€a€fee€include:€€the€time€limitations€imposed€by€theÏcircumstances,€the€fee€customarily€charged€in€the€locality€forÏsimilar€legal€services,€and€the€experience,€reputation,€andÏability€of€the€lawyer€performing€the€legal€service.€€òòId.óó€€€ÌÌà àIn€our€consideration€of€what€is€a€ð ðreasonable€fee,ðð€weÏhave€relied€on€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact.€€First,€withÏrespect€to€time€and€labor€devoted€to€Inmanððs€representation,€weÏagree€with€the€trial€court€that€considerable€amounts€of€each€wereÍexpended.€€While€divorce€cases€are€more€often€disposed€of€withoutÏa€contested€trial,€Inmanððs€case€required€a€three„day€trial,€anÏappeal€to€the€intermediate€court,€and€an€appeal€to€this€Court.€ÏThe€appeal€to€the€intermediate€court€was€based€on€factual€issues,Ïand€the€preparation€of€a€brief€in€such€a€case€is€a€time„consumingÏtask,€in€that€bits€and€pieces€of€evidence€adduced€during€theÏthree„day€trial€had€to€be€organized€and€restated€understandablyÏand€persuasively.€€In€sum,€this€was€no€ordinary€divorce€case€inÏterms€of€the€time€required€of€the€attorneys.× ƒ0 ××  ×€ÌÌà àAs€an€added€consideration,€the€fact€that€Inman€retainedÏthe€attorneys€a€scant€month€before€the€initial€trial€court€dateÏimposed€a€severe€burden€on€them.€€They€were€able€to€obtain€aÏcontinuance€to€November€15,€1988,€but€even€so,€they€had€preciousÍlittle€time„„two€months„„to€prepare€for€trial.€€Because€theÏattorneys€came€into€the€case€so€late,€they€had€to€prepare€moreÏintensely€than€they€would€have,€had€they€been€representing€herÏfrom€the€beginning.Ì€Ìà àWe€move€now€to€a€consideration€of€the€novelty€andÏdifficulty€of€the€questions€involved€and€the€skill€required€toÏrender€effective€representation.€€According€to€the€trial€court,Ïthere€was€nothing€novel€or€difficult€about€the€issues€raised€inÏthis€divorce€case.€€The€trial€court€further€explained€that€divorceÏcases€are€not€particularly€difficult€compared€to€other€types€ofÏcases,€because€they€usually€involve€factual€situations€with€whichÏthe€trier€of€fact€is€familiar.€€Yet,€the€time€constraints,€theÏnumber€of€issues,€and€the€value€of€the€marital€estateÏsignificantly€increased€the€difficulty€of€this€case.€€Based€upon€aÏconsideration€of€those€factors,€it€is€clear€to€us€that€only€thoseÏattorneys€with€extraordinary€skill€and€specialized€experienceÏwould€have€been€able€to€properly€represent€Inman€and€manage€herÏcase.ÌÌà àFurthermore,€considering€the€criteria€of€experience,Ïreputation,€and€ability€of€the€attorneys,€we€do€not€hesitate€toÏconclude€that€these€attorneys€were€exceptionally€well„qualified€toÏhandle€such€a€difficult€case.€€The€quality€of€their€representationÏis€evidenced€by€their€unflagging€persistence€and€consummate€skill.€ÏExpert€witnesses€testified€that€each€of€Inmanððs€attorneysÏpossessed€an€extraordinary€degree€of€expertise€and€enjoyed€anÏexcellent€reputation€in€the€area€of€domestic€relations.€€The€trialÏjudge,€on€remand,€agreed€that€Inmanððs€attorneys€were€ð ðveteranÏtrial€lawyers€with€reputations€for€tenacity€and€competence.ðð€ÏFurthermore,€there€is€an€abundance€of€proof€in€the€record€that€theÏattorneys€represented€Inman€to€the€best€of€their€skills€andÏabilities.€€This€was€what€she€expected€of€them,€and,€indeed,€thisÏis€what€she€received.ÌÌà àWith€respect€to€the€results€obtained€by€the€attorneys,Ïthe€trial€court€concluded€that€the€results€were€not€particularlyÏgood.€€On€this€point,€we€differ.€€Admittedly,€Inmanððs€objection€toÏthe€fee€charged€stems€from€a€dissatisfaction€with€the€results.€ÏShe€insists€that€the€results€obtained€were€not€favorable€becauseÏshe€was€awarded€much€less€than€fifty€percent€of€the€maritalÍestate,€the€amount€to€which€she€considered€herself€entitled.€€Yet,Ïthe€attorneys€managed€to€convince€the€Court€of€Appeals€to€reverseÏthe€trial€court€ruling€which€awarded€the€divorce€to€her€spouse„„noÏsmall€feat.€€Even€more€important,€the€Court€of€AppealsÏsubstantially€increased€the€amount€awarded€to€Inman€by€the€trialÏcourt.€€In€addition€to€having€been€advanced€to€the€position€of€theÏprevailing€party€in€this€bitter€divorce€action,€Inman€was€alsoÏawarded€an€additional€$1,043,230€of€the€marital€estate,€increasingÏher€total€award€to€$3,343,430„„approximately€thirty„eight€percentÏof€the€marital€estate.€€This€increase€is€particularly€impressiveÏin€light€of€the€fact€that€she€was€not€shown€by€the€evidence€to€beÏthe€primary€wage„earner.× ƒ1 ××  ×€€òòSeeóó€òòInman€v.€Inmanóó,€811€S.W.2d€870,€870„71€(Tenn.€1991).€€Moreover,€the€dollar€amount€of€marital€assets€isÏalso€a€significant€factor€in€the€fee„determination€process.€ÏBecause€the€essence€of€the€dispute€concerned€the€distribution€ofÏan€almost€nine€million€dollar€estate,€Inmanððs€attorneys€areÏentitled€to€a€proportionally€larger€fee.ÌÌà àThere€is€countervailing€proof€regarding€theÏreasonableness€of€the€fee.€€Evidence€of€the€smaller€fee€charged€byÏthe€attorney€for€Inmanððs€spouse€and€the€expert€testimony€of€oneÏwitness,€taken€together,€permit€the€inference€that€for€similarÏservices€other€attorneys€have€charged€or€may€charge€less.€€ThatÏinference€notwithstanding,€just€as€no€two€cases€are€the€same,€noÏtwo€lawyers€are€the€same,€and€unless€the€legal€profession€decidesÏto€operate€under€a€ð ðuniform€feeðð€system,€no€two€fees€will€be€theÏsame.€€Thus,€the€fact€that€other€lawyers€may€have€performedÏsimilar€services€for€less€does€not€undermine€the€reasonableness€ofÏthe€fee€charged€by€Inmanððs€attorneys.€€ÌÌà àWhile€no€single€factor€determines€reasonableness,€onÏbalance€we€conclude€that€the€fee€of€$501,514.50€is€reasonable.€€ÏIn€sum,€because€the€fee€agreement€provided€both€a€minimum€fee€andÏa€protective€cap€on€the€fee,€and€because€the€fee€ultimatelyÏcharged€was€based€on€the€reasonable€value€of€services€rendered,Ïthe€attorneys€have€satisfied€the€third€criterion€of€òòCooper€&€Keysóó,Ïthat€the€terms€of€the€agreement€be€just€and€reasonable.€€The€feeÏagreement€thus€conforms€to€case€law€and€the€code€of€professionalÏresponsibility.€€To€conclude,€with€all€three€òòCooper€&€KeysóóÍcriteria€satisfied,€the€attorneys€have€shown€that€they€fulfilledÏtheir€high€fiduciary€duty€of€good€faith€toward€Inman€in€theÏformation€of€the€fee€agreement€between€them.€€€€€€ÌÌà@ àIV€Ì€Ìà àWe€need€not€dwell€at€length€on€the€third€issue:€€whetherÏthe€attorneys€violated€the€terms€of€the€fee€agreement.€€TheÏattorneys€waited€until€the€entry€of€the€final€judgment€of€thisÏCourt,€in€July€1991,€to€send€Inman€the€bill.€€According€to€theÏtrial€court,€this€delay€violated€the€fee€agreement,€which€requiredÏð ðIf€the€charges€for€the€work€exceed€$10,000,€Attorneys€shall€billÏClient€for€said€excess€charges€within€a€reasonable€time.ðð€€ÌÌà àClearly,€this€agreement€does€not€require€periodic€orÏinterim€billing,€which€is€the€customary€method€when€the€fee€isÏcalculated€solely€on€a€per„hour€basis.€€Further,€Inman€neverÏinquired€about€the€lack€of€billing€during€the€three€years€theÏappellees€represented€her.€€Even€when€the€attorneys€requested€aÏpayment€of€$149,000€in€attorneysðð€fees€after€the€trial,€she€didÏnot€request€an€accounting€or€explanation€of€the€fees.€€BecauseÍneither€the€language€of€the€agreement€nor€the€conduct€of€theÏparties€indicated€a€need€for€interim€billing,€we€conclude€that€noÏsuch€requirement€existed.€€The€fee€was€ultimately€based€uponÏInmanððs€total€award.€€This€amount€could€not€be€ascertained€beforeÏfinal€judgment.€€Because€the€bill€was€sent€promptly€upon€entry€ofÏthe€final€judgment€of€this€Court,€we€conclude€that€such€billingÏwas€accomplished€within€a€reasonable€time.€€Thus,€the€attorneysÏfulfilled€their€obligations€under€the€agreement.€€€€€€ÌÌà@ àV€ÌÌà àThe€final€issue€is€whether€the€attorneys€are€entitled€toÏprejudgment€interest.€€The€attorneys€insist€that€interest€shouldÏbegin€accruing€on€the€date€they€first€requested€payment€of€theirÏfees,€July€10,€1991.€€The€trial€court€declined€to€awardÏprejudgment€interest€in€this€case,€reasoning€that€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àAlexander€and€Davis€seem€to€haveÏbeen€the€major€cause€for€theirÏfailure€to€be€timely€paid.€€TheirÏcontract€is€vague€and,€mostÏimportantly,€they€did€not€follow€itÏthemselves,€particularly€the€partÏthat€required€them€to€bill€InmanÏwithin€a€reasonable€time.ÓÓÌÌThe€Court€of€Appeals€did€not€disturb€this€ruling,€but€allowedÏinterest€to€begin€accruing€from€the€date€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt€was€entered€on€remand,€February€13,€1996.ÌÌà àPursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„14„123,€prejudgmentÏinterest€may€be€awarded€in€accordance€with€the€principles€ofÏequity.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€In€reaching€an€equitable€decision,€a€court€must€keep€inÏmind€that€the€purpose€of€prejudgment€interest€is€to€fullyÏcompensate€a€plaintiff€for€the€loss€of€the€use€of€funds,€not€toÏpenalize€a€defendant.€€Moreover,€if€a€plaintiffððs€right€toÏrecovery€and€the€amount€of€such€recovery€are€not€disputed€onÏreasonable€grounds,€an€award€of€prejudgment€interest€is€moreÏlikely€to€be€equitable.€€òòMyint€v.€Allstate€Insurance€Co.óó,€___ÏS.W.2d€____€(Tenn.€1998),€1998€W.L.€276184.€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€courtððs€decision€to€award€or€deny€prejudgmentÏinterest€may€be€overturned€only€upon€a€finding€of€a€ð ðmanifest€andÏpalpable€abuse€of€discretion.ðð€€Under€this€deferential€standard,Ïan€appellate€court€may€not€substitute€its€judgment€for€that€of€theÏtrial€court.€€Rather,€an€abuse€of€discretion€occurs€only€when€theÏevidence€does€not€support€the€trial€courtððs€decision.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àWe€have€concluded,€contrary€to€the€trial€courtððs€ruling,Ïthat€Inmanððs€refusal€to€pay€the€attorneysðð€fees€is€notÏattributable€to€the€attorneysðð€conduct.€€Nevertheless,€the€trialÏcourtððs€denial€of€prejudgment€interest€is€not€a€manifest€andÏpalpable€abuse€of€discretion.€€We€reach€this€conclusion€because€anÏadditional€factor€supports€the€trial€courtððs€decision:€both€theÏright€to€recover€the€fees€and€the€amount€of€such€fees€were€quiteÏreasonably€disputed.€€This€fact€is€amply€demonstrated€by€theÏsound,€yet€widely€differing,€conclusions€reached€by€the€severalÏjurists€who€have€analyzed€this€case.€€In€light€of€the€extremeÏuncertainty€of€the€final€disposition€of€this€case,€we€concludeÏthat€an€award€of€prejudgment€interest€would€not€serve€toÏcompensate€the€attorneys€for€loss€of€the€use€of€funds.€€Rather,Ísuch€an€award€would€amount€to€a€windfall.€€Accordingly,€theÏattorneysðð€request€for€prejudgment€interest€is€denied.€€ÌÌà@ àVIÌÌà àIn€conclusion,€we€recognize€that€the€agreement€at€issueÏcould€have€been€more€clearly€drafted.€€Although€language€of€theÏagreement€is€not€ambiguous,€a€more€carefully€crafted€document€mayÏhave€spared€the€parties€protracted€litigation.€€Yet,€under€theÏfacts€and€circumstances€presented,€we€find€that€Inman€neverthelessÏfully€understood€the€agreement€and€had€the€same€understanding€asÏthe€appellees.€€Further,€the€agreement€was€fair€and€reasonable,€asÏwas€the€fee€ultimately€charged.€€Inman€does€not€allege€fraud€orÏundue€influence€in€the€formation€of€the€fee€agreement,€and€thereÏis€no€evidence€of€such€bad€faith€conduct.€€Therefore,€theÏattorneys€satisfied€their€high€fiduciary€duty€of€good€faithÏtowards€Inman€in€the€formation€of€the€fee€agreement.€€Further,€theÏattorneys€did€not€violate€the€terms€of€the€agreement€by€postponingÏthe€billing€until€the€case€was€concluded.€€Finally,€the€attorneysÏare€not€entitled€to€an€award€of€prejudgment€interest.€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€isÏreversed.€€The€fee€agreement€is€enforceable,€and€the€appellees€areÏentitled€to€the€full€amount€requested,€$501,514.50.€€Because€InmanÏhas€already€paid€$159,000€in€attorneysðð€fees,€judgment€for€theÏappellees€is€hereby€entered€in€the€amount€of€$342,514.50,€withÏinterest€accruing€on€and€after€February€13,€1996,€pursuant€to€theÏopinion€of€the€Court€of€Appeals.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€taxed€toÏthe€appellant,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.€€€ÌÓÓÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà à__________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àADOLPHO€A.€BIRCH,€JR.,€JusticeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌAnderson,€C.J.ÌDrowota,€Holder,€JJ.ÌReid,€S.J.Ì