WPC k:6 3^RW V_3Yɠio+`x,jZ@sі]4J 0'KxHJBDvInQ5D%E^(R̳4zVugBU9%iI ,-D"pܐ8D'$R$Y+˸HWd^s<&G + ( a8/D0@4pOb\߳Z)ZV_-0S&:beBˏ//3ze bthl9 Ք= sg PFbnjtn)3:$OrnU͞W0ZM@:I?Ӂ ;NȸN5U̫u_B(0t/% Jsnn!:19;-.%^ߕr<+1b9k+CM~XL јk\Z{Y1W#UN % 0: UN U>g 1u 72 ^ L wX 4\ p  m N 0D E 0C 0# 0 0 0 0m 08 0- 1eW 0(((( B\\IB01S01\CLERK1NAS,,,,0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,("  Z6Times New Roman Regular\  `&Times New Roman3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)f/ d/:i+003|xU(#$  0  * (_1723  Ԁ*GM (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *DM (_15   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *AM (_14  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *>M (_13   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *;M (_12   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *8M (_11  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *5M (_10   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5   ##Xd#"#$%&'() 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.  R}$USUS.,    1   XX  _Spouseswhowishtolegallyseparateandhavetheirpropertydividedwithoutdivorcecandoso.  TennesseeCodeAnnotated364121(b)(1)(A)(2001)providesthat [_i]n_ԀthecaseofaK Ԁ# Kt#complaintforlegal t  separation,thecourtK Ԁ# K#maymakeafinaldispositionofthemaritalpropertyeitheratthetimeofenteringanorderof  legalseparationoratthetimeofenteringafinaldivorcedecree,ifany.Ifthemaritalpropertyisdividedaspartof  theorderoflegalseparation,anypropertyacquiredbyaspousethereafterisdeemedseparatepropertyofthat  spouse.Becausewehavedefinedmaritaldebttocorrespondwiththestatutorydefinitionofmaritalproperty,it J followsthatdebtisseparateifitisincurredafteranorderoflegalseparationthatincludesafinalpropertydivision.(.G2}$ !USUS.,      0   XX d !USUS.,  _XXXX   KXX8XXdd8=XXdd=Ӏ@ #XXKt#YXXINTHESUPREMECOURTOFTENNESSEE  @WW$ATKNOXVILLE#XXY>#Ԉ &   KXXSeptember3,2003Session#XXK# L  KXXSTANLEYDAVID_ALFORD_Ԁv.PAMELAWARD_ALFORD_ #XXKk# J @@ AppealbypermissionfromtheCourtofAppeals,EasternSection  J DomesticRelationsCourtfor_Hamblen_ԀCounty@@  6 No.4940JoyceMillsWard,Judge  " @@*AV) ` dE<` A   @@TTNo.E200102361SCR11CVFiledNovember6,_2003_   AV) ` dE<h` A i     KXX  #XXK#Wegrantedpermissiontoappealinthisdivorcecasetodetermine:(1)whethertheCourtof P Appealserredinapplyinga jointbenefitdefinitionofmaritaldebtandholdingthatdebtincurred < byWifeduringthepartiestenyearseparationwasmaritaldebt;and(2)whethertheCourtof (x AppealscorrectlyallocatedthisdebtwhenitheldthatHusbandshouldberequiredtopayWifes d maritaldebts.Weholdthatdebtsincurredbyeitherorbothspousesduringthecourseofamarriage P areproperlyclassifiedasmaritaldebt;thereforethedebtsatissueinthiscasearemarital.In < allocatingmaritaldebts,trialcourtsshouldconsiderthefollowingfourfactors:(1)thedebts ( purpose;(2)whichpartyincurredthedebt;(3)whichpartybenefittedfromincurringthedebt;and  (4)whichpartyisbestabletorepaythedebt.dBecausetherecorddoesnotcontainsufficient  evidencetodeterminehowthedebtsinthiscaseshouldbeallocated,thiscaseisremandedtothe  trialcourttodeterminetheproperallocationofthemaritaldebts.Thetrialcourtsdetermination  shallbeguidedbythefourfactorssetoutabove.d t  Tenn.R.App.P.11;JudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsAffirmedinPart;ReversedinPart; 8!  andRemandedtotheTrialCourt  $"t!   FrankF.Drowota,III,C.J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichE.RileyAnderson, #L# _Adolpho_ԀA.Birch,Jr.,JaniceM.Holder,andWilliamM.Barker,JJ.,joined. $8 $ JaniceH.Snider,_Morristown_,Tennessee,fortheappellant,StanleyDavid_Alford_. &"& DouglasR._Beier_,_Morristown_,Tennessee,fortheappellee,PamelaWard_Alford_. (#(   \+&+ _ԇ@@OO& OPINION        FactualandProceduralBackground  t =XXdXXd=  Thepartiesinthiscase,PamelaWardAlford( Wife)andStanleyDavidAlford L  ( Husband)#XXXX=#haveanunusualmaritalhistory.TheyweremarriedXXXXonNovember2,1979#XXXXȎ#,remained 8  marriedformorethantwentyyears,buttheyspentabouthalfofthattimelivingapart,separatingin $ t 1989.Theyhadonedaughter,whoisnowanadult.XXXXԀ#XXXXȱ#Aftertheyseparated,Wifefiledfordivorcein  ` 1990,butwithdrewthedivorcecomplaint.Thepartiesagreedtoremainmarried innameXXXXԀ#XXXXȓ#onlyfor  L  theirdaughterssake.dBothpartiesagreethatHusbandsincomewasandissignificantlygreater  8  thanWifes.dNoformalagreementwasreachedastochildorspousalsupportd.dHusbandvoluntarily $  paid$200permonthinchildsupportuntiltheirdaughterturnedeighteen.Healsomaintainedhealth   insuranceontheirdaughter,paidhermedicalbills,andpaidforhercollegetuition.Wifeagreesthat   Husbandtypicallygaveheranyfinancialassistancesherequested.   XXXX  HusbandfiledfordivorceonJuly1,1999.ThedivorcetrialwasheldonJanuary12,2001 p andafinaljudgmentwasenteredApril20,2001,grantingHusbandadivorceonthegroundof \ inappropriatemaritalconduct,specifically Wifesdeceptioninjointfinancialmatters.Thetrial H courtnotedthat [s#XXXXV#]hehad,withouthisknowledgeorconsent,acquiredasecondmortgageontheir 4 homeofapproximately$10,000....Aftertheactionfordivorcewasfiled,HusbandlearnedthatWife  p hadobtainedcreditcardsinhisname,madesubstantialchargesanddefaultedonthepayments.  \ ЀXXXX  Thetrialcourtsjudgmentawardedeachpartyanautomobileandthefurnishingsand 4 householdgoodsineachpartyspossession.ThetrialcourtorderedthatWifesdebtsbepaidout   ofthemaritalestateandthatmaritalassetsbedividedequally.       Husbandfiledamotiontoalteroramendthejudgment,andthetrialcourtmodifiedits  judgmentsuchthatHusbandwasorderedtopayWifesdebtsupto$9,000.Afterthedebtswere  paid,thepartiesweretoaddthevaluesoftheirseparate401(k)sandinvestmentaccounts,and l  transfersufficientsharesfromHusbandtoWifetoreflectequalvaluetobothparties. X    Oneofthedebts#XXXXs#HusbandwasorderedtopaywasaVISAcreditcarddebt,nottoexceed 0"  $3,500.Husbandallegesthatthisdebtwasincurredin1999or2000,afterthepartiesdaughterhad #l! turnedeighteenonJune15,1998.Wifedisputesthatclaiminhertestimony: $X" 8  Wife:Someofitwasdebttoreplacedebt,essentially.Youcanmoveacardbalance %0!$ fromoneaccounttoanother,likeIhaveapreviousbalance....&"%   8  TheCourt:So,eventhoughthesedebtswereincurredin99and00,youresaying '#& itspossiblethatdebtwasincurredactuallybeforethattimeandyouwerejust (#' juggling?)$(      Wife:Thatiscorrect.Thatsabsolutelycorrect. |*%)   Wifedidnotproduceanycreditcardstatementsattrial.Theonlyevidenceregardingthe   purposeofthecreditcarddebtwashertestimonythat insomecases,Itransferredoversomedebts  tothenewaccount,previousdebts.Iboughtsomegiftsforfamily,mydaughter,thingsformyself.  Useditonbusinessacoupleoftimes.  HusbandwasalsoorderedtopayaCommercialCredit t Planloan,nottoexceed$1,000.Wifeobtainedthisloaninhersolenamearound1997.No ` evidencewasintroducedconcerningthepurposeoftheloan.XXXX L    #XXXX0"#  Finally,HusbandwasorderedtopayaloanagainstWifes401(k),nottoexceed$4,500. $ t Thisloanwastakenin1998.Attrial,Wifetestifiedthatshe usedittopayoffsomebillsthatIhad  ` incurred.Idontrecallnowwhatit!whattheywere.However,nodocumentsorotherevidence  L  wereintroducedtoshowthepurposeofthedebt.XXXXԀ p   8      TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedthejudgmentofthetrialcourt.Husbandfiledforpermission   toappealtothisCourtandpermissionwasgranted.      @ @@!dStandardofReview p d^%  Definingmaritaldebtanddeterminingwhatfactorsshouldguidetheallocationofmarital H debtarequestionsoflaw.Wereviewquestionsoflawdenovowithnopresumptionofcorrectness. 4 UnionCarbideCorp.v.Huddleston,854S.W.2d87,91(Tenn.1993).Ourreviewoffindingsoffact  p isdenovoupontherecord,withapresumptionofcorrectness,unlesstheevidencepreponderates  \ otherwise. #XXXXE$#XXXXTenn.R.App.P.13(d);Hassv.Knighton,676S.W.2d554,555(Tenn.1984).#XXXX'#XXXX  H    @  @`  @  @  @h Analysis    (    6zlTheCourtofAppealsrelieduponMondelliv.Howard,780S.W.2d769(Tenn.Ct.App.  1989),forguidanceinidentifyingandallocatingmaritaldebt.TheMondelliopinionstatedthat   [i]ndualpropertyjurisdictionslikeTennessee,thecourtsalsodistinguishbetweenmaritaland l separatedebtsanddivideonlythemaritaldebts....Maritaldebtsarethosedebtsincurredduring X  themarriageforthejointbenefitoftheparties,...ortheacquisitionofmaritalproperty. D! Mondelli,780S.W.2dat773.Mondelliadoptedthefollowingfactorstobeusedfordividing 0"  maritaldebtbetweenthedivorcingspouses:(1)thedebtspurpose;(2)whichpartyincurredthe #l! debt;(3)whichpartybenefittedfromincurringthedebt;and(4)whichpartyisbestabletorepay $X" thedebt.Mondelli,780S.W.2dat773. $D #   Applyingthesestandardstothepresentcase,theCourtofAppealsfoundthat thereisno &"% questionthatthesedebtswereproperlyclassifiedbythetrialcourtasmarital....WhileWifes '#& testimonyastothepurposeofthedebtswassomewhatvague,thetrialcourtfoundthat[h]er (#' creditcarddebtswereincurredtomaintainlivingexpensesandpaymentobligations.After )$(  consideringthefourMondellimaritaldebtallocationfactors,theCourtofAppealsheldthatthe |*%) 6zl 68XXdXXd8 6  evidencedidnotpreponderateagainstthetrialcourtsfindingthatHusbandshouldbe  responsibleforrepayingthedebts.     Aftercarefullyconsideringthematter,werejecttheMondellianalysistotheextentthatit t requiresatrialcourttoengageinapreliminarydeterminationofwhetherdebtincurredduringa ` marriageismaritalorseparatebasedona jointbenefittest.Webelievethatsuchatestwould L  createsubstantialconfusionanddifficultyindeterminingwhatdebtswouldmeetthestandard. 8  Forexample,ifonespouseincursdebtduringthemarriagetopurchaseanewautomobile,would $ t thepurchasebeforthejointbenefitofbothparties?Iftheautomobilewasusedtodrivechildren  ` toschool,wouldthatchangetheresult?The jointbenefittestwouldrequiretrialcourtstogo  L  throughadifficultandunnecessaryinquiry,andwedeclinetoadoptit.  8    MaritaldebtisnotdefinedbyanyTennesseestatuteandhasneverbeforebeendefined   bythisCourt.However,maritaldebtsaresubjecttoequitabledivisioninthesamemanneras   maritalproperty.Cutsingerv.Cutsinger,917S.W.2d238,243(Tenn.Ct.App.1995);Mondelli,   780S.W.2dat773.Wetakethisopportunitytodefine maritaldebtconsistentwiththe   definitionof maritalpropertyinTennessee. Maritalpropertyisdefinedbystatuteas allreal p andpersonalproperty,bothtangibleandintangible,acquiredbyeitherorbothspousesduringthe \ courseofthemarriageuptothedateofthefinaldivorcehearingandownedbyeitherorboth H spousesasofthedateoffilingacomplaintfordivorce....Tenn.CodeAnn.364121(b)(1)(A) 4 (2001).Wenowholdthat maritaldebtsarealldebtsincurredbyeitherorbothspousesduring  p thecourseofthemarriageuptothedateofthefinaldivorcehearing.  \   Otherjurisdictions,suchasMontanaandMissouri,haveusedasimilarapproach 4 developingabrightlinedefinitionofmaritaldebtbyreferencingthestatesdefinitionofmarital   property.#XXXXȏ(#Forexample,inInreMarriageofScoffield,theMontanaSupremeCourtbeganits   discussionofmaritaldebtbyexaminingMontanasdefinitionofmaritalproperty,which   includespropertyacquiredbyeitherpartyduringthemarriage.InreMarriageofScoffield,852  P.2d664,667(Mont.1993).Itthendefinedmaritaldebtas alldebtincurredbyeitherparty  duringthemarriage.Id.ThedebtsatissuewereincurredtosupportWifeschildrenfrom l anothermarriage,andwereheldtobemaritaldebts.TheMissouricourtshavelikewiserelied X  uponthestatesdefinitionofmaritalproperty, allpropertyacquiredbyeitherspousesubsequent D! tothemarriage,todefinemaritaldebtas debtincurredsubsequenttothemarriage.InreXXXX 0"  #XXXXj>#MarriageofWelch,795S.W.2d640,643(Mo.Ct.App.1990).XXXXԀ #l!   Accordingly,thedebtsincurredbyWifeinthepresentcasearemaritalbecausetheywere $D # incurredduringthecourseofthemarriage.Unlessacourthasmadeprovisionsforthe %0!$ distributionofpropertyinadecreeoflegalseparation,aperiodofseparationbeforedivorcehas &"% noeffectontheclassificationofdebtasmaritalorseparate.Q #  1      ׀Separatedpartiesarestillmarried. '#& Asthetrialcourtinthiscasestated,#XXXX?#XXXXԀ#XXXXȰA#XXXX [t]heycannotbebothmarriedanddivorced.Courtsshould  notconcernthemselveswiththetypeoflivingarrangementschosenbyadultpartiestothe  union.Thesepartieschosetoremainmarriedformanyyearsalthoughtheylivedapartanddid  notseekalegalseparation.Thedebtstheyincurredduringthattimeremainmaritaljustasthe t propertytheyacquiredduringthattimeremainsmarital. S#XXXXA#XXXX `  H"#$%&'()(03#XXXX3D#XXXX  Havingdeterminedthatthesearemaritaldebts,wenextconsiderhowthedebtsshouldbe  . allocatedbetweenHusbandandWife.Tennesseecourtsshouldusethefourfactorslistedin   Mondelliasguidelinesintheequitabledistributionofmaritaldebt:(1)thedebtspurpose;(2)   whichpartyincurredthedebt;(3)whichpartybenefittedfromincurringthedebt;and(4)which    partyisbestabletorepaythedebt.Mondelli,780S.W.2dat773.Acarefulapplicationofthese   factorswillinsurethefairestpossibleallocationofdebt.Itwillalsoprotectthespousewhodid z  notincurthedebtfrombearingresponsibilityfordebtsthataretheresultofpersonalexcessesof f  theotherspouse. R    TherecordinthiscaseisdeficientwithrespecttotwooftheMondellifactors.Whileitis   clearthatWifeincurredthedebtsandthatHusbandisthepartybestabletorepaythedebts,there   is notsufficient evidenceintherecordindicatingthepurposeofthedebtsorwhobenefittedfrom  incurringthedebt.Thus,weremandthiscasetothetrialcourttodeterminehowthemarital  debtsaretobeallocatedbetweentheseparties.Inmakingthisdetermination,thetrialcourt  shouldbeguidedbytheMondellifactorsandshouldrequirethepartiestopresentmoreevidence p relevanttothefactorssetoutabove.Wenotethatthetrialcourthasbroaddiscretionandshould \ doequityinallocatingdebtasonepartoftheoveralldistributionofmaritalproperty.Because H therelevantfinancialliabilitiesofeachofthepartiesisoneofmanyrelevantfactorsforthecourt 4 toconsiderinmakinganequitabledivisionofmaritalproperty,onremandthetrialcourtshould  p reconsideritsequitabledistributionofthepartiesmaritalproperty.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.36  \ 4121(c)(2).#XXXX E# `   H   XXXX `     h    @  @`  @  @ Conclusion  ! N  Weholdthatalldebtsincurredbyeitherorbothspousesduringthecourseofthe "D marriageuptothedateofthefinaldivorcehearingareproperlyclassifiedasmaritaldebts. #0 Accordingly,thedebtsincurredbyWifeinthiscasearemaritaldebts.Inallocatingmarital $  debts,courtsshouldapplythefourMondellifactors.Becausetherecordinthiscasecontains %!!  insufficient proofrelevanttotwoofthefourMondellifactors,thiscaseisremandedtothetrial  courtforallocationofthemaritaldebts,consistentwiththisopinion.Thecostsofthisappealare  assessedagainstMr.Alford.   h      p      x       `      RӀ   `     h ___________________________________ B     `     h FRANKF.DROWOTA,III,CHIEFJUSTICE#XXXX_N#