ÿWPC¾C îÝŹ5®œ›Y¤Þ« ó,ôtð–*úa³Ö Žt‰;t—[e¨·f[‰‘ÒÊ~[aŽ»ö¶“½/Ü1ª”@‘hà å·pebN²/ßH<œóqiãÃØÍv·Õßùs$¯â;ÒÎzGå{[•ÿÖûd)ÿôíd?G…kY*0¹JµIdPÝ%ç à9¥:âU»­áÛI¨7„XÕšùëÅÝRxm0L9‹(nÕºNþÐm¦¬€ o,/²Z!ƌ;Zˆ9¥oé‡jÊ÷xn]Åæ¯ÙMœ—€ìœÃÏ*+ü«M¹ñ»;gêaÉÇp:yxKÄQD±`Ý”ÚL[•ÚÿDØÙýáhÍZºö‡¹7ÖQ5^@rô5 N—ŸÒvHEóù<Ëbí§0&Y%ŠzåƵPç7¾Ö7óQñ×ÁßEFÙ£lÚ SšÈ¼´ ‚²|iåŽYN&'óßÏÀàgéÔø ` sk!œuí*·¶5ýÕ³üPÝy™Ž¸¸©Éû­¹'›Ü‰¸¿8(Õ` ™G¶åßR®AÁ´‘,d¥6>èœÓ0Žcº@í'CIçôJ@³Æ(ge^¤\k.Ë.ˆ±üYSÅØpGxbÌ™ž-£7¥Š³ hIJ%Ž#ÁÄ %… ^ ‹ 0ˆ— w U1N# 4q z… Òÿ Ñ à mâ öù ÆïƵÆ{ÆAAN †E—ã™™ |2>(>(>(U@p*p*p*°*sÆ*t9.Þ­1­1Š‹6‹6‹6‹6‹6‹6 0 D>>>bY>Y>Y>Y>Y>Y>Y>Y>Y>Y>Y>Y>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a>a> 0 íi>i>i>i> BV?V? 0¤s? D5@ D-L@ 0Ky@y@ ASÄ@ÆA 0¤ÝA 0DB A«ÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBÅBUNpC˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 6ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»š©h+s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularWF]+ê:i Hï£ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ìÝ ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔòòSee€alsoóó€òòKennedy€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Kennedyóó,€No.€M1997-00219-COA-R3-CV,€2000€WL€1753074€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€filedÐ ° Ðat€Nashville,€Nov.€30,€2000);€òòHorn€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Hornóó,€No.€02A01-9401-CH-00011,€1995€WL€290475€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€filed€atÐ tÄ ÐJackson,€May€15,€1995).Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 þÝ ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔMost€importantly€for€purposes€of€this€case,€the€parties€agreed€to€an€equal€division€of€the€value€of€Mr.€BoganððsÐ ° Ðretirement€plan€as€it€stood€on€the€date€of€the€decree.€This€provision€was€implemented€by€a€Qualified€Domestic€RelationsÐ tÄ ÐOrder€(QDRO)€entered€on€September€4,€1991.€€The€QDRO€named€Ms.€Bogan€as€an€alternate€payee€on€the€KodakÐ 8ˆ ÐRetirement€Income€Plan,€and€it€provided€that€upon€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€and€his€reaching€pay€status,€Ms.€Bogan€wouldÐ üL Ðreceive€50%€of€the€gross€amount€of€the€monthly€retirement€benefit€as€calculated€on€July€11,€1991.€ Ñ ' Default0Default .    ÙÝ ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔNothing€we€have€said€would€prevent€parties€from€deciding€for€Ô_ÔthemselvesÔ_Ô€the€effect€of€a€bona€fide€retirementÐ ° Ðon€spousal€support€payments.€€Indeed,€because€voluntary€retirement€is€usually€always€foreseeable€in€some€sense,€partiesÐ tÄ Ðare€especially€encouraged€to€make€arrangements€for€this€occasion€in€the€marriage€dissolution€agreement.€€Moreover,Ð 8ˆ Ðalthough€not€critical€to€our€analysis,€we€note€that€a€majority€of€jurisdictions€addressing€this€issue€also€only€require€aÐ üL  Ðreasonable,€good€faith€retirement.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòMisinonile€v.€Misinonileóó,€645€A.2d€1024,€1027€(Conn.€Ct.€App.€1994);Ð ° ÐòòSilvan€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Sylvanóó,€632€A.2d€528€(N.J.€Super.€Ct.€App.€Div.€1993);€òòPimm€v.€Pimmóó,€601€So.€2d€534,€537€(Fla.€1992);Ð tÄ ÐòòMcFadden€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€McFaddenóó,€563€A.2d€180,€183€(Pa.€Super.€Ct.€1989);€òòSmith€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Smithóó,€419€A.2d€1035,€1038€(Me.€1980).Ð 8ˆ Ð ¸ Ý ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔWhile€the€primary€purpose€of€the€retirement€cannot€be€to€defeat€the€support€obligation,€we€cannot€furtherÐ ° Ðrequire€that€an€obligor€be€ignorant€of€the€effects€of€his€or€her€retirement€upon€the€receiving€spouse.€€òòSeeóó€òòSmithóó,€419€A.2dÐ tÄ Ðat€1038.€€In€most€cases,€if€not€all,€the€obligor€will€undoubtedly€be€aware€that€retirement€will€affect€the€income€availableÐ 8ˆ Ðto€pay€his€or€her€support€obligations,€but€mere€knowledge€of€this€fact€alone€will€generally€be€insufficient€to€find€that€theÐ üL Ðretirement€was€taken€primarily€as€an€effort€to€avoid€support€obligations.€Ð À Ðà  àÔ‡ô>òòô>ÔFurthermore,€the€dissent€has€taken€the€approach€of€several€states€and€has€adopted€a€list€of€nine€factors€toÐ „Ô Ðdetermine€whether€a€retirement€constitutes€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.Ô#†ô>òòô>&#Ô€€òòCf.óó€òòPimmóó,€601€So.€2dÐ H ˜ Ðat€537;€òòÔ_ÔSilvanóó,€632€A.2d€at€530;Ô_Ô€òòÔ_ÔIn€re€Marriage€of€Colomboóó,€555€N.E.2d€56,€57€(Ill.Ô_Ô€App.€Ct.€1990).€€We€decline€toÐ  \ Ðfollow€suit,€because€many€of€these€factors€seem€designed€only€to€lead€to€the€conclusion€that€the€retirement€was€voluntary.€Ð Ð  ÐFor€example,€the€lack€of€advanced€age€or€the€good€health€of€the€obligor€essentially€proves€nothing€more€than€that€theÐ ” ä  Ðobligor€chose€to€retire€free€from€any€physical€compulsion€to€do€so.€€As€we€do€not€consider€the€voluntariness€of€theÐ X ¨  Ðretirement€as€a€factor,€many€of€these€factors€may€be€relevant€only€to€the€extent€that€they€tend€to€show€that€the€retirementÐ  l  Ðwas€taken€in€bad€faith€to€defeat€the€support€obligation.Ð à 0  ÐÔ‡ô>òòô>Ôà  àThe€dissent€also€opines€that€we€have€given€no€guidance€to€the€trial€courts€to€determine€when€Ô_Ôa€retirementÔ_Ô€mayÐ ¤ô  Ðbe€deemed€objectively€reasonable.€€To€the€contrary,€we€believe€that€the€objectively€reasonable€standard€providesÐ h¸  Ðsufficient€guidance€to€the€trial€courts,€which€are€experienced€in€handling€questions€of€reasonableness€on€a€daily€basis.€Ð ,|  ÐThe€absence€of€a€long€list€of€factors€is€simply€a€recognition€that€trial€judges€are€fully€capable,€on€their€own,€of€analyzingÐ ð@  Ðthe€reasonableness€of€a€retirement€decision€from€the€totality€of€the€circumstances.€Ô#†ô>òòô>Ï#Ô (Ý ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔIn€September€1990,€Eastman€Chemical€created€a€new€retirement€scheme€offering€full€retirement€benefits€toÐ ° Ðemployees€who€obtained€85€points€based€upon€the€sum€of€the€employeeððs€age€and€years€of€service.€€At€the€time€of€hisÐ tÄ Ðretirement,€Mr.€Bogan€was€about€three€weeks€short€of€his€sixtieth€birthday,€and€he€had€accumulated€nearly€90€points€inÐ 8ˆ Ðthe€retirement€plan.€(uHš Z‹(Times New Roman  Ñ ° Ñ iÝ ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔMs.€Bogan€argues€that€Eastman€Chemical€had€not€actually€instituted€mandatory€retirements€or€reductions€inÐ ° Ðits€workforce,€and€as€such,€any€compulsion€that€Mr.€Bogan€felt€to€leave€cannot€be€used€to€find€a€substantial€and€materialÐ tÄ Ðchange€in€circumstances.€€While€she€correctly€asserts€that€Eastman€Chemical€did€not€force€its€employees€to€retire,€theÐ 8ˆ Ðrecord€contains€substantial€evidence€that€the€reduction€in€benefits€was€designed,€at€least€in€part,€to€cut€Eastmanððs€laborÐ üL Ðcosts.€€As€such,€the€weight€of€the€evidence€is€not€against€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€Mr.€Bogan€felt€as€though€he€wasÐ À Ðbeing€pressured€by€Eastman€Chemical€to€retire.€ jÝ ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔAdmittedly,€we€find€curious€the€finding€that€Mr.€Bogan€still€has€a€significant€ability€to€pay€support,€especiallyÐ ° Ðgiven€that€his€monthly€income€exceeds€his€expenses€by€less€than€$300€if€no€support€is€paid€to€Ms.€Bogan.€€This€findingÐ tÄ Ðis€even€more€curious€Ô_ÔgivenÔ_Ô€that€his€monthly€expense€estimate€was€calculated€by€the€trial€court€based€on€the€assumptionÐ 8ˆ Ðthat€his€current€wife€would€pay€for€half€of€several€household€expenses.€€It€appears€that€the€trial€court€believed€that€Mr.Ð üL ÐBogan€could€take€steps€to€reduce€his€monthly€expenses,€though€we€note€that€the€court€did€not€expressly€make€such€aÐ À Ðfinding. ÔÝ ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔAt€the€hearing,€Mr.€Boganððs€financial€expert€testified€that€Ms.€Bogan€could€invest€the€lump€sum€payment€fromÐ ° Ðhis€retirement€plan€and€expect€to€earn€between€$14,763.00€and€$16,306.00,€assuming€a€ten„percent€return€and€noÐ tÄ Ðinvasion€of€the€investment€principal.€€Ms.€Boganððs€financial€expert€testified€that€the€rate€of€return€should€instead€beÐ 8ˆ Ðcalculated€at€eight€percent.€€Under€this€calculation,€her€expert€believed€that€her€assets€would€be€depleted€by€her€seventiethÐ üL Ðbirthday€if€the€support€payments€were€completely€terminated.€€However,€the€trial€court€credited€Mr.€Boganððs€expert€overÐ À Ðthat€of€his€former€wife,€and€because€no€clear€and€convincing€evidence€exists€to€show€that€the€court€improperly€creditedÐ „Ô Ðthis€witness,€òòseeóó€òòWells€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Tennessee€Bd.€of€Regentsóó,€9€S.W.3d€779,€783€(Tenn.€1999),€Ô_ÔweÔ_Ô€accept€this€finding€as€theÐ H ˜ Ðmeasure€of€Ms.€Boganððs€reasonable€investment€expectations.€ €Ý ƒRÞ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔConcerning€the€growing€dissatisfaction€with€his€job,€Mr.€Bogan€testified€that€at€the€time€of€the€divorce,€heÐ ° Ðwas€employed€as€the€head€of€Development€and€was€a€Senior€Research€Chemist€supervising€over€40€employees.€€In€1993,Ð tÄ Ðhe€was€ð ðlaterallyðð€moved€to€the€position€of€ð ðGroup€Leaderðð€supervising€twelve€employees,€and€in€1996,€he€was€againÐ 8ˆ Ðmoved€to€the€position€of€ð ðIndividual€Contributorðð€supervising€one€technician.€€Mr.€Bogan€testified€that€although€all€ofÐ üL Ðthese€moves€were€lateral€moves€in€the€sense€that€his€pay€was€not€decreased,€he€felt€as€though€these€moves€were€òòóódemotionsÐ À Ðð ðin€status€and€standing,ðð€given€the€decreasing€level€of€responsibility€associated€with€each€transition.Ð „Ô Ðà  àWith€respect€to€Eastman€Chemicalððs€attempt€to€encourage€employees€to€retire,€the€evidence€shows€that€EastmanÐ H ˜ ÐChemical€planned€to€reduce€its€overall€production€costs€through€a€program€called€Advantage€Cost€2000,€a€part€of€whichÐ  \ Ðwas€the€modification€of€employee€benefits.€€The€evidence€further€suggests€that€Eastman€Chemical€particularly€desiredÐ Ð  Ða€reduction€in€its€workforce€in€order€to€cut€costs,€and€the€Employee€Benefits€Director€of€Eastman€Chemical€testified€thatÐ ” ä  Ðover€2200€other€employees€retired€during€the€two„year€period€preceding€January€1,€1998,€when€the€change€in€employeeÐ X ¨  Ðbenefits€was€to€occur.€€Although€this€witness€also€denied€that€Eastman€Chemical€specifically€encouraged€employees€toÐ  l  Ðretire,€this€level€of€retirement€was€the€highest€for€any€other€two„year€period€in€the€companyððs€history.€(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù- (|I2Þ$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€“»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô>ò»»Ô€€ d(|3Ñd$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€“»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Ñd$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€“»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKK(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€“»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼“»»»ÔÑ8€ËXXdì»»d8ÑÑ€ OYÑà@™ ™ ìàÔ‡îL“ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼“»îîL#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓSeptember€5,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XËX»¼“ÔÌÔ#†¼“»XXË#Ôò òRICHARD€THOMAS€BOGAN€€v.€€DORIS€MAE€BOGANó óÔ‡XËX»¼“ÔÐ úJ ÐÔ#†¼“»XXËv#ÔÔ‡XËX»¼“ÔÌò òAppeal€by€Permission€from€the€Court€of€Appeals,€Eastern€SectionÐ ú J ЀÔ#†¼“»XXËÍ#ÔÔ‡XËX»¼“ÔChancery€Court€for€Sullivan€CountyÐ æ 6 Ðà@@øøìàNo.€21988(T)€€€€€€Hon.€John€S.€Ô_ÔMcLellanÔ_Ô,€III,€ChancellorÐ Ò " ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<•` AßÐ –æ  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E1998„00060„SC„R11„CVÔ#†¼“»XXËh#ÔÔ‡XËX»¼“Ô€„€Filed€November€8,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_ÔÐ ‘á  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<h` AßÐ i¹  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÌThe€sole€question€in€this€appeal€is€whether€an€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ôððs€retirement€constitutes€a€substantial€andÐ P  Ðmaterial€change€in€circumstances€so€as€to€permit€modification€of€a€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€obligation.€€TheÐ <Œ Ðtrial€court€held€that€the€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ôððs€retirement€did€constitute€a€substantial€and€material€change€inÐ (x Ðcircumstances,€but€the€Court€of€Appeals€reversed,€finding€that€because€the€retirement€was€voluntaryÐ d Ðand€foreseeable,€the€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ô€could€not€seek€modification€of€the€original€alimony€award.€€We€grantedÐ P Ðpermission€to€appeal€and€hold€that€a€bona€fide€retirement€need€only€be€objectively€reasonable€underÐ ì< Ðthe€totality€of€the€circumstances€to€constitute€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.€Ð Ø( ÐIn€so€holding,€we€reject,€in€the€retirement€context,€the€traditional€test€requiring€an€involuntary€andÐ Ä Ðunforeseeable€change€in€circumstances€to€modify€a€support€award.€€We€further€hold€that€theÐ ° Ðretirement€in€this€case€was€objectively€reasonable€and€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretionÐ œì Ðin€modifying€the€support€award.€€We€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€and€reinstate€theÐ ˆØ Ðtrial€courtððs€modification€of€the€support€award.Ð tÄ Ѐò òÔ#†¼“»XXËö#ÔÔ‡XËX»¼“ÔÐ `° ÐÓ  ÓTenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€Application€for€Permission€to€Appeal;€Ð L œ ÐJudgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€ReversedÔ#†¼“»XXËä #ÔÔ‡XËX»¼“Ôó óÐ 8!ˆ  ÐÓ ÓÌòòÔ#†¼“»àXË¿ #ÔÔ‡XËX.¼“ÔWilliam€M.€Barker,€Jóó.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòFrank€F.€Ô_ÔDrowotaÔ_Ô,€III,Ô#†¼“»àXË- #ÔÔ‡XËX.¼“Ô€C.J.,Ð #`" Ðóóand€òòE.€Riley€Anderson,€Ô#†¼“»àXËï #ÔÔ‡XËX.¼“ÔJ.,€óójoined.€€òòÔ_ÔAdolphoÔ_Ô€A.€Birchóó,€òòJróó.,€J.,€filed€a€concurring€and€dissentingÐ ü#L# Ðopinion.€€òòJanice€M.€Holderóó,€J.,€filed€a€dissenting€opinion.€Ô#†¼“»XXËi#ÔÔ‡XËX»¼“ÔÐ è$8 $ ÐÌThomas€F.€Bloom,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Richard€Thomas€Bogan.Ð À&"& ÐÌWilliam€Stephenson€Todd,€Jr.,€Kingsport,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Doris€Mae€Bogan.Ð ˜(è#( ÐÌÌÓ  Óò òOPINIONó óÐ \+¬&+ Ðâ âÔ#†¼“»XXËz#ÔÓÓòòóóÔ‡XËX»¼“ÔÐ H,˜',ý÷ ÐÔ_ÔÔ#†¼“»XXËò#ÔÔ€XËX»¼“Ôò òÓ  ÓÔ& Ä Ôâ ââ âFACTUAL€BACKGROUNDÐ ° Ðó óÌÓÓà  àOn€July€11,€1991,€the€Sullivan€County€Chancery€Court€granted€the€parties€in€this€case€aÔ'Ä°‹ÔÐ ˆØ Ðdivorce€after€nearly€thirty€years€of€marriage.€€The€final€decree€dissolving€the€marriage€was€enteredÐ tÄ Ðon€July€24,€1991,€and€the€decree€incorporated€a€Marital€Dissolution€Agreement€(MDA)€signed€byÐ `° Ðthe€parties.€€According€to€the€MDA,€the€parties€agreed€to€an€equitable€division€of€all€of€the€maritalÐ L œ Ðproperty,׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€Mr.€Bogan€further€agreed€to€pay€Ms.€Bogan€monthly€support€payments€in€the€amountÐ 8 ˆ Ðof€$2,300.00,€which€were€to€cease€upon€her€remarriage€or€upon€the€death€of€either€party.€€The€MDAÐ $ t Ðmade€no€specific€reference€to€modification€of€Mr.€Boganððs€support€payments€in€the€event€of€hisÐ  ` Ðretirement.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àOn€August€25,€1997,€Mr.€Bogan€filed€a€petition€to€terminate€his€support€obligation€allegingÐ Ô$  Ðtwo€substantial€and€material€changes€in€circumstances:€(1)€that€he€would€obtain€retirement€status€onÐ À  ÐSeptember€1,€1997,€with€his€employer,€Eastman€Chemical,€and€that€as€a€result,€he€would€no€longerÐ ¬ü  Ðreceive€a€wage€from€his€employer;€and€(2)€that€because€of€his€retirement,€Ms.€Bogan€would€noÐ ˜è  Ðlonger€need€support€payments,€as€she€would€receive€half€of€his€retirement€income€pursuant€to€theÐ „Ô  ÐMDA€and€the€Qualified€Domestic€Relations€Order.€€Ms.€Bogan€answered€that€because€the€retirementÐ pÀ Ðwas€voluntary€and€foreseeable€at€the€time€of€the€MDA,€no€legally€cognizable€change€inÐ \¬ Ðcircumstances€had€occurred€warranting€modification€or€termination€of€the€support€payments.€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àAfter€holding€hearings€on€the€petition€on€February€19€and€April€12,€1998,€the€chancery€courtÐ  p Ðfound€that€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€was€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances€thatÐ  \ Ðwarranted€a€reduction€in€his€support€payments.€€More€specifically,€the€court€found€the€followingÐ øH Ðfacts:€€(1)€that€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€was€motivated€by€his€own€dissatisfaction€with€his€job€and€byÐ ä4 ÐEastman€Chemicalððs€attempt€to€downsize€its€workforce€by€encouraging€employees€to€retire׃%d×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×;€(2)€thatÐ Ð  ÐMr.€Bogan€was€qualified€for€full€retirement€under€Eastman€Chemicalððs€then€current€point€system,Ð ¼  Ðhaving€nearly€five€more€points€than€was€needed€for€retirement€with€full€benefits׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×;€(3)€that€if€Mr.Ð ° ÐBogan€retired€after€January€1,€1998,€his€lump„sum€retirement€benefits€would€decrease€in€value,€toÐ œì Ðbe€replaced€by€monthly€annuity€payments,€and€that€he€would€lose€value€in€his€joint€survivor€and€lifeÐ ˆØ Ðinsurance€benefits;€(4)€that€Mr.€Boganððs€income€after€his€retirement€was€fifty€percent€of€his€incomeÐ tÄ Ðat€the€time€of€the€divorce;€(5)€that€Ms.€Boganððs€need€for€support€had€decreased€because€she€couldÐ `° Ðearn€substantial€annual€investment€income€between€$14,736.00€and€$16,306.00€from€the€lump€sumÐ L œ Ðpayment€of€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€benefits;€and€(6)€that€since€the€partiesðð€divorce€in€1991,€Ms.Ð 8 ˆ ÐBoganððs€opportunity€to€gain€addition€income€had€increased€because€her€business€had€improved€itsÐ $ t Ðearning€potential.€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àThe€chancery€court€also€found€that€the€parties€did€not€address€the€effect€of€Mr.€BoganððsÐ è 8  Ðretirement€in€the€MDA€and€that€they€did€not€foresee€the€change€in€retirement€benefits€that€wouldÐ Ô$  Ðoccur€on€January€1,€1998,€which€eliminated€the€lump€sum€payments€and€reduced€the€value€of€theÐ À  Ðbenefits€from€the€retireesðð€life€insurance€and€survivor€income€plans.€€Nevertheless,€the€courtÐ ¬ü  Ðconcluded€that€because€Ms.€Bogan€still€had€financial€need€and€because€Mr.€Bogan€retained€someÐ ˜è  Ðability€to€provide€support,€his€request€to€terminate€his€obligation€should€be€denied.€€Instead,€basedÐ „Ô  Ðupon€its€factual€findings,€the€chancery€court€concluded€that€a€reduction€in€support€payments€wasÐ pÀ Ðmore€appropriate,€and€it€reduced€Mr.€Boganððs€monthly€support€obligation€from€$2,300.00€toÐ \¬ Ð$945.00.€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àMs.€Bogan€appealed€to€the€Court€of€Appeals,€arguing€that€because€her€former€husbandððsÐ  p Ðretirement€was€voluntary€and€foreseeable,€and€because€his€retirement€was€contemplated€in€the€MDA,Ð  \ Ðno€material€change€in€circumstances€had€occurred€warranting€a€modification€of€the€support€benefits.€Ð øH ÐA€majority€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€agreed,€and€it€reinstated€the€original€award€of€$2,300.00.€Ð ä4 ÐAlthough€the€majority€concluded€that€retirement€may€not€always€be€a€foreseeable€event,€it€found€thatÐ Ð  ÐMr.€Boganððs€voluntary€retirement€was€in€fact€foreseeable€at€the€time€of€the€MDA,€and€consequently,Ð ¼  Ðno€material€change€in€circumstances€had€occurred.€€However,€writing€in€dissent,€Judge€SusanoÐ ¨ø Ðexpressed€his€belief€that€retirement€is€usually€always€voluntary€and€foreseeable€and€that€these€twoÐ ”ä Ðfactors€should€not€preclude€a€finding€of€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.€€Instead,Ð €Ð ÐJudge€Susano€believed€that€retirement€should€be€considered€a€substantial€and€material€change€inÐ l¼ Ðcircumstances€so€long€as€it€is€taken€in€good€faith€and€without€intent€to€defeat€the€support€obligations.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àMr.€Bogan€then€requested€permission€to€appeal€to€this€Court,€primarily€on€the€issue€ofÐ 0"€  Ðwhether€a€good„faith€retirement,€though€voluntary€and€foreseeable,€may€constitute€a€substantial€andÐ #l! Ðmaterial€change€in€circumstances€warranting€a€reduction€in€spousal€support€obligations.€€This€CourtÐ $X" Ðinitially€heard€oral€argument€in€this€case€during€our€September€2000€session€in€Knoxville,€and€theÐ ô$D # Ðpanel€hearing€this€case€consisted€of€then€Chief€Justice€Anderson,€Justice€Birch,€Justice€Holder,€andÐ à%0!$ ÐJustice€Barker.€€Following€oral€argument,€and€upon€further€consideration€of€the€record€in€this€case,Ð Ì&"% Ðwe€requested€reargument€before€the€full€panel€of€this€Court€at€our€September€2001€session€inÐ ° ÐKnoxville.€€We€now€hold€that€an€objectively€reasonable€retirement,€taken€in€good€faith€and€withoutÐ œì Ðintent€to€defeat€the€support€obligation,€does€constitute€a€substantial€and€material€change€inÐ ˆØ Ðcircumstances€so€that€a€modification€of€support€obligations€may€be€considered.€€We€also€hold,Ð tÄ Ðhowever,€that€actual€modification€of€the€award,€if€any,€is€addressed€to€the€trial€courtððs€discretion€afterÐ `° Ðconsidering€the€relevant€factors€listed€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€36„5„101(d).€€TheÐ L œ Ðjudgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€is€reversed.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌÔ& Ä ÔÓ  Óò òSTANDARD€OF€APPELLATE€REVIEWó óÐ  ` ÐÌÓu/Óà  àBecause€modification€of€a€spousal€support€award€is€ð ðfactually€driven€and€calls€for€a€carefulÔ'Ä i/ÔÐ è 8  Ðbalancing€of€numerous€factors,ðð€òòCranford€v.€Cranfordóó,€772€S.W.2d€48,€50€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989),Ð Ô$  Ða€trial€courtððs€decision€to€modify€support€payments€is€given€ð ðwide€latitudeðð€within€its€range€ofÐ À  Ðdiscretion,€òòseeóó€òòSannella€v.€Sannellaóó,€993€S.W.2d€73,€76€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€In€particular,€theÐ ¬ü  Ðquestion€of€ð ð[w]hether€there€has€been€a€sufficient€showing€of€a€substantial€and€material€change€ofÐ ˜è  Ðcircumstances€is€in€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.ðð€€òòWatters€v.€Wattersóó,€22€S.W.3d€817,€821Ð „Ô  Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999)€(citations€omitted).€€Accordingly,€ð ð[a]ppellate€courts€are€generally€disinclinedÐ pÀ Ðto€second-guess€a€trial€judgeððs€spousal€support€decision€unless€it€is€not€supported€by€the€evidenceÐ \¬ Ðor€is€contrary€to€the€public€policies€reflected€in€the€applicable€statutes.ðð€€òòKinard€v.€Kinardóó,€986Ð H˜ ÐS.W.2d€220,€234€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòGoodman€v.€Goodmanóó,€8€S.W.3d€289,€293€(Tenn.Ð 4„ ÐCt.€App.€1999)€(ð ðAs€a€general€matter,€we€are€disinclined€to€alter€a€trial€courtððs€spousal€supportÐ  p Ðdecision€unless€the€court€manifestly€abused€its€discretion.ðð).€€When€the€trial€court€has€set€forth€itsÐ  \ Ðfactual€findings€in€the€record,€we€will€presume€the€correctness€of€these€findings€so€long€as€theÐ øH Ðevidence€does€not€preponderate€against€them.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòCrabtree€v.€Crabtreeóó,€16€S.W.3d€356,€360Ð ä4 Ð(Tenn.€2000);€òòsee€alsoóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).Ð Ð  ÐÌÔ& ° ÔÓ  Óò òMODIFICATION€OF€SUPPORT€AWARD€BASED€UPON€Ð ¨ø ÐAN€OBLIGORððS€RETIREMENTó óÐ ”ä ÐÌÓ7Óà  àIt€is€well€settled€that€a€court€may€not€modify€or€terminate€a€spousal€support€award€unless€itÔ'°¨7ÔÐ l¼ Ðfirst€finds€that€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances€has€occurred€since€the€entry€of€theÐ X ¨ Ðoriginal€support€decree.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36-5-101(a)(1)€(Supp.€2000).€€In€the€typical€caseÐ D!” Ðinvolving€modification€of€spousal€support€awards,€a€change€in€circumstances€is€considered€to€beÐ 0"€  Ðð ðmaterialðð€when€the€change€(1)€ð ðoccurred€since€the€entry€of€the€divorce€decree€ordering€the€paymentÐ #l! Ðof€alimony,ðð€òòWattersóó,€22€S.W.3d€at€821,€and€(2)€was€not€ð ðanticipated€or€[within]€the€contemplationÐ $X" Ðof€the€parties€at€the€time€they€entered€into€the€property€settlement€agreement,ðð€òòid.óó;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòMcCartyÐ ô$D # Ðv.€McCartyóó,€863€S.W.2d€716,€719€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€òòElliot€v.€Elliotóó,€825€S.W.2d€87,€90€(Tenn.Ð à%0!$ ÐCt.€App.€1991).€€Moreover,€a€change€in€circumstances€is€considered€to€be€ð ðsubstantialðð€when€itÐ Ì&"% Ðsignificantly€affects€either€the€obligorððs€ability€to€pay€or€the€obligeeððs€need€for€support.€€òòSeeóó€òòBowmanÐ ¸'#& Ðv.€Bowmanóó,€836€S.W.2d€563,€568€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àThis€Court€has€not€previously€addressed€whether€an€obligorððs€voluntary€retirement€canÐ |*Ì%) Ðconstitute€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.€€The€general€rule€in€this€state€withÐ h+¸&* Ðregard€to€modification€of€support€awards€has€long€been€that€ð ðobligations€voluntarily€assumed€are€notÐ ° Ðproper€to€be€considered€as€changed€circumstance[s]€to€reduce€support€payments€otherwise€owed,ððÐ œì ÐòòDillow€v.€Dillowóó,€575€S.W.2d€289,€291€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1978),€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€has€appliedÐ ˆØ Ðthis€rule€in€various€contexts€to€deny€modification€of€a€support€award€when€an€obligor€voluntarilyÐ tÄ Ðacted€in€a€way€that€reduced€his€or€her€income€available€for€spousal€support,€òòsee,€e.g.óó,€òòWattersóó,€22Ð `° ÐS.W.3d€at€823;€òòElliotóó,€825€S.W.2d€at€91„92;€òòJones€v.€Jonesóó,€784€S.W.2d€349,€353€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð L œ Ð1989).€€Indeed,€the€intermediate€court€has€applied€this€general€rule€to€deny€modification€of€a€supportÐ 8 ˆ Ðaward€following€an€obligorððs€retirement€when€it€found€that€the€retirement€was€voluntary€andÐ $ t Ðforeseeable.€€òòSeeóó€òòSannella€v.€Sannellaóó,€993€S.W.2d€73€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).׃ ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€At€least€four€otherÐ  ` Ðjurisdictions€have€also€denied€modification€of€support€obligations€when€the€retirement€was€voluntaryÐ ü L  Ðor€foreseeable.€€òòSeeóó€òòWheeler€v.€Wheeleróó,€548€N.E.2d€27€(N.D.€1996);€òòLeslie€v.€Leslieóó,€827€S.W.2dÐ è 8  Ð180,€183€(Mo.€1992);€òòEllis€v.€Ellisóó,€262€N.W.2d€265,€268€(Iowa€1978);€òòShaughnessy€v.€Shaughnessyóó,Ð Ô$  Ð793€P.2d€1116,€1118€(Ariz.€Ct.€App.€1990).Ð À  ÐÌà  àHowever,€when€an€obligor€seeks€bona€fide€retirement,€as€opposed€to€mere€willfulÐ ˜è  Ðunderemployment,€application€of€our€traditional€rules€concerning€modification€of€supportÐ „Ô  Ðagreements€leaves€much€to€be€desired.€€Absent€some€tragedy€or€combination€of€unfortunateÐ pÀ Ðcircumstances,€retirement€from€further€employment€in€the€workforce€is€always€voluntary€andÐ \¬ Ðforeseeable€because,€at€some€point,€every€worker€will€eventually€retire.€€Moreover,€taken€to€itsÐ H˜ Ðlogical€extreme,€this€standard€would€force€an€obligor€to€work€until€physically€incapable€of€doing€soÐ 4„ Ðmerely€to€avoid€the€allegation€that€he€or€she€was€ð ðvoluntarilyðð€avoiding€spousal€obligations.€€WhileÐ  p Ðthe€traditional€standards€regulating€modification€of€support€agreements€should€usually€be€appliedÐ  \ Ðto€motivate€parties€to€provide€for€such€contingencies€in€their€dissolution€agreement,€strict€applicationÐ øH Ðof€these€standards€in€the€retirement€context€can€work€unreasonable€hardships.€€òòCf.óó€òòSifers€v.€Sifersóó,Ð ä4 Ð544€S.W.2d€269,€269„70€(Mo.€Ct.€App.€1976)€(denying€modification€when€obligor€ð ðvoluntarilyððÐ Ð  Ðretired,€even€though€he€was€62,€had€a€malignant€kidney€removed,€and€was€unable€to€findÐ ¼  Ðemployment€in€the€industry€in€which€he€had€worked€all€his€life).€€Ô‡XËXXXËÔAt€some€point,€parties€mustÐ ¨ø Ðrecognize€that€ð ð[j]ust€as€a€married€couple€may€expect€a€reduction€in€income€due€to€retirement,€aÐ ”ä Ðdivorced€spouse€cannot€expect€to€receive€the€same€high€level€of€support€after€the€supporting€spouseÐ €Ð Ðretires.ðð€€òòIn€re€Marriage€of€Reynoldsóó,€74€Cal.€Rptr.€2d€636,€640€(Cal.€Ct.€App.€1998).Ð l¼ ÐÔ#†XËXXXË&J#ÔÌà  àAccordingly,€we€hold€that€when€an€obligorððs€retirement€is€objectively€reasonable,€it€doesÐ D!” Ðconstitute€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstancesð"ðirrespective€of€whether€the€retirementÐ 0"€  Ðwas€foreseeable€or€voluntaryð"ðso€as€to€permit€modification€of€the€support€obligation.׃Ü×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€However,Ð #l! ÐÑ OYÑâ  âÑ°°Ñâ  âÑ  Ñwhile€bona€fide€retirement€after€a€lifetime€spent€in€the€labor€force€is€somewhat€of€an€entitlement,€anÐ ° Ðobligor€cannot€merely€utter€the€word€ð ðretirementðð€and€expect€an€automatic€finding€of€a€substantialÐ œì Ðand€material€change€in€circumstances.€€Rather,€the€trial€court€should€examine€the€totality€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðcircumstances€surrounding€the€retirement€to€ensure€that€it€is€objectively€reasonable.€€The€burden€ofÐ tÄ Ðestablishing€that€the€retirement€is€objectively€reasonable€is€on€the€party€seeking€modification€of€theÐ `° Ðaward,€òòcf.óó€òòSeal€v.€Sealóó,€802€S.W.2d€617,€620€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990),€and€the€trial€courtððsÐ L œ Ðdetermination€of€reasonableness€will€not€be€reversed€on€appeal€absent€an€abuse€of€discretion,€òòsee,Ð 8 ˆ Ðe.g.óó,€òòCrabtreeóó,€16€S.W.3d€at€360.€€Although€we€decline€to€confine€this€inquiry€to€consideration€of€aÐ $ t Ðlist€of€factors,€in€no€case€may€a€retirement€be€deemed€objectively€reasonable€if€it€was€primarilyÐ  ` Ðmotivated€by€a€desire€to€defeat€the€support€award€or€to€reduce€the€alimony€paid€to€the€formerÐ ü L  Ðspouse.׃d×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àHowever,€even€when€an€obligor€is€able€to€establish€that€a€retirement€is€objectively€reasonable,Ð À  Ðand€therefore€that€it€constitutes€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances,€the€obligor€is€notÐ ¬ü  Ðnecessarily€entitled€to€an€automatic€reduction€or€termination€of€his€or€her€support€obligations.€€AsÐ ˜è  Ðevidenced€by€its€permissive€language,€the€statute€permitting€modification€of€support€awardsÐ „Ô  Ðcontemplates€that€a€trial€court€has€no€duty€to€reduce€or€terminate€an€award€merely€because€it€findsÐ pÀ Ða€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(2).€€Instead,Ð \¬ Ðthe€change€in€conditions€resulting€from€retirement€merely€allows€the€obligor€to€demonstrate€thatÐ H˜ Ðreduction€or€termination€of€the€award€is€appropriate.€€òòCf.óó€òòMcFaddenóó,€563€A.2d€at€184;€òòSilvanóó,€632Ð 4„ ÐA.2d€at€530.€€Accordingly,€when€assessing€the€appropriate€amount€of€modification,€if€any,€in€theÐ  p Ðobligorððs€support€payments,€the€trial€court€should€consider€the€factors€contained€in€Tennessee€CodeÐ  \ ÐAnnotated€section€36„5„101(d)(1)€to€the€extent€that€they€may€be€relevant€to€the€inquiry.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,Ð ° ÐòòWattersóó,€22€S.W.3d€at€821;€òòSealóó,€802€S.W.2d€at€620;€òòThreadgill€v.€Threadgillóó,€740€S.W.2d€419,€422„Ð œì Ð23€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987).€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àAlthough€section€36„5„101(d)€lists€several€factors€for€consideration,€the€two€most€importantÐ `° Ðconsiderations€in€modifying€a€spousal€support€award€are€the€financial€ability€of€the€obligor€to€provideÐ L œ Ðfor€the€support€and€the€financial€need€of€the€party€receiving€the€support.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòGivler€v.€Givleróó,Ð 8 ˆ Ð964€S.W.2d€902,€906€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€We€must€disagree,€however,€with€the€conclusionÐ $ t Ðarticulated€by€the€Court€of€Appeals€on€several€occasions€that€the€need€of€the€receiving€spouse€is€ð ðtheÐ  ` Ðmost€important€factorðð€to€consider€when€deciding€whether€to€modify€a€support€award.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,Ð ü L  ÐòòSannellaóó,€993€S.W.2d€at€76;€òòCranfordóó,€772€S.W.2d€at€50.€€When€addressing€an€òòinitialóó€award€ofÐ è 8  Ðsupport,€the€need€of€the€spouse€must€necessarily€be€the€most€important€factor€to€consider,€becauseÐ Ô$  Ðalimony€is€primarily€intended€to€provide€some€minimal€level€of€financial€support€for€a€needy€spouse.€Ð À  ÐòòSeeóó€òòLancaster€v.€Lancasteróó,€671€S.W.2d€501,€503€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€Nevertheless,€whenÐ ¬ü  Ðdeciding€whether€to€òòmodifyóó€a€support€award,€the€need€of€the€receiving€spouse€cannot€be€the€single„Ð ˜è  Ðmost€dominant€factor,€as€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances€demands€respect€forÐ „Ô  Ðother€considerations.€€While€the€need€of€the€receiving€spouse€remains€an€important€consideration€inÐ pÀ Ðmodification€cases,€the€ability€of€the€obligor€to€provide€support€must€be€given€at€least€equalÐ \¬ Ðconsideration.€€Accordingly,€to€the€extent€that€any€case€would€compel€giving€more€weight€to€the€needÐ H˜ Ðof€the€receiving€spouse€than€all€other€factors€in€order€òòto€modify€óóa€support€obligation,€it€is€overruled.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àTurning€to€the€facts€of€this€case,€we€agree€with€the€trial€court€that€the€parties€did€notÐ  \ Ðcontemplate€the€effect€of€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€on€his€support€payments.€€Where€parties€contractÐ øH Ðas€to€rights€and€obligations€in€a€marriage€dissolution€agreement,€and€that€agreement€is€incorporatedÐ ä4 Ðinto€the€judgment€of€divorce,€courts€should€construe€the€MDA€like€ð ðother€contracts€[with€respect€to]Ð Ð  Ðits€interpretation,€its€meaning€and€effect.ðð€€òòGray€v.€Estate€of€Grayóó,€993€S.W.2d€59,€63€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ¼  ÐApp.€1998).€€As€such,€where€the€MDA€itself€provides€for€resolution€of€this€issue,€courts€should€deferÐ ¨ø Ðto€the€provisions€of€the€MDA,€unless€it€would€be€unconscionable€to€do€so.€€òòSeeóó€òòTowner€v.€Towneróó,Ð ”ä Ð858€S.W.2d€888,€892€(Tenn.€1993).€€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àThe€MDA€in€this€case,€however,€contains€no€express€provision€dealing€with€modification€ofÐ X ¨ Ðsupport€upon€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement.€€Moreover,€reviewing€the€MDA€as€a€whole,€there€is€noÐ D!” Ðindication€that€the€parties€even€contemplated€this€issue.€€While€Ms.€Bogan€asserts€that€the€divisionÐ 0"€  Ðof€the€retirement€benefits€shows€that€the€parties€contemplated€the€fact€of€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement,€weÐ #l! Ðdisagree€that€this€division€of€marital€property€shows€that€the€parties€specifically€contemplated€theÐ $X" Ðeffect€of€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€on€his€support€payments.€€Consequently,€because€the€parties€did€notÐ ô$D # Ðcontemplate€the€effect€of€retirement€on€the€spousal€support€payments,€the€trial€court€retains€theÐ à%0!$ Ðability€to€alter€or€modify€the€support€payments€upon€a€finding€of€a€substantial€and€material€changeÐ Ì&"% Ðin€circumstances.€€òòAccordóó€òòPimmóó,€601€So.€2d€at€537.Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àThe€first€question€to€be€resolved,€therefore,€is€whether€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€wasÐ )à$( Ðobjectively€reasonable€under€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€so€as€to€constitute€a€substantial€andÐ |*Ì%) Ðmaterial€change€in€circumstances.€€We€conclude€that€his€retirement€was€in€fact€objectivelyÐ h+¸&* Ðreasonable.€€First,€there€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€that€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€from€EastmanÐ ° ÐChemical€was€primarily€designed€or€motivated€to€escape€his€spousal€support€obligation.€€Instead,€asÐ œì Ðthe€trial€court€found,€his€retirement€was€due€to€Eastman€Chemicalððs€attempt€to€downsize€itsÐ ˆØ Ðworkforce€by€encouraging€employees€to€retire,€as€well€as€his€own€dissatisfaction€with€his€job.€€TheÐ tÄ Ðfact€that€more€than€2200€other€Eastman€employees€retired€during€this€general€period,€exceeding€anyÐ `° Ðother€level€of€retirement€during€a€similar€period€in€the€companyððs€history,€must€weigh€in€favor€ofÐ L œ Ðfinding€the€retirement€reasonable.׃!×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Moreover,€at€the€time€of€his€retirement,€Mr.€Bogan€had€beenÐ 8 ˆ Ðeligible€to€retire€with€full€benefits€for€some€time€prior,€indicating€that€he€did€not€retire€as€soon€asÐ $ t Ðpossible€to€diminish€his€available€income.€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àArguing€against€finding€a€legally€material€change€in€circumstances,€Ms.€Bogan€takesÐ è 8  Ðsubstantial€issue€with€her€former€husbandððs€age€at€his€retirement,€which€was€less€than€three€weeksÐ Ô$  Ðbefore€his€sixtieth€birthday.€€Several€states€have€held€that€age€sixty„five€is€the€presumptivelyÐ À  Ðreasonable€age€for€retirement,€and€one€state€in€particular€has€held€because€of€ð ðthe€widespreadÐ ¬ü  Ðacceptance€of€sixty„five€as€the€normal€retirement€age,ðð€an€obligor€that€retires€before€that€time€bearsÐ ˜è  Ðð ða€significant€burden€to€show€that€a€voluntary€retirement...is€reasonable.ðð€€òòPimmóó,€601€So.€2d€atÐ „Ô  Ð537.€€Although€an€obligorððs€retirement€age€may€be€considered€in€assessing€the€overall€reasonablenessÐ pÀ Ðof€the€retirement,€we€are€reluctant€to€establish€a€presumptive€age€for€an€objectively€reasonableÐ \¬ Ðretirement.€€All€things€being€equal,€an€obligor€who€retires€at€an€exceptionally€young€age€willÐ H˜ Ðnecessarily€run€a€greater€risk€of€being€unable€to€establish€that€the€retirement€is€objectively€reasonableÐ 4„ Ðso€as€to€demonstrate€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.€€However,€Mr.€BoganððsÐ  p Ðretirement€age,€while€less€than€many€but€more€than€some,€is€not€necessarily€so€young€as€to€beÐ  \ Ðunreasonable,€especially€given€the€particulars€of€his€retirement.€€Accordingly,€based€on€the€totalityÐ øH Ðof€the€circumstances€as€supported€by€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence,€we€conclude€that€Mr.Ð ä4 ÐBoganððs€retirement€was€objectively€reasonable€so€as€to€constitute€a€substantial€and€material€changeÐ Ð  Ðin€circumstances.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àHaving€found€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances,€the€next€inquiry€is€whatÐ ”ä Ðmodification,€if€any,€should€be€made€to€the€support€award.€€As€stated€earlier,€courts€should€consider,Ð €Ð Ðwhere€relevant€to€modification,€many€of€the€same€factors€in€section€36„5„101(d)€that€were€used€toÐ l¼ Ðgrant€the€original€support€award.€€Considering€the€financial€need€of€the€receiving€spouse€first,€theÐ X ¨ Ðtrial€court€found,€and€we€agree,€that€Ms.€Bogan€still€possesses€financial€need€for€the€support€award.€Ð D!” ÐThe€record€indicates€that€her€monthly€expenses,€while€having€increased€by€only€$192.00€since€theÐ 0"€  Ðdivorce€in€1991,€still€amount€to€about€$3,580.00,€and€this€amount€exceeds€her€average€monthlyÐ #l! Ðincome€from€earnings€($735.00)€and€support€($2,300.00)€by€more€than€$500.00.€€To€supplement€herÐ $X" Ðearnings€income,€the€trial€court€found€that€Ms.€Bogan€could€invest€the€lump€sum€payment€receivedÐ ô$D # Ðfrom€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€plan€and€earn€an€extra€$14,763.00€per€year,€assuming€a€ten„percent€rateÐ à%0!$ Ðof€return€and€no€invasion€of€the€investment€principal.׃#×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Therefore,€based€on€all€of€these€calculations,Ð ° Ðwhile€Ms.€Bogan€could€expect€an€average€monthly€income€without€additional€support€of€aboutÐ œì Ð$1,965.25,€including€average€earnings€of€$735.00€and€investment€income€of€$1,230.25,€this€amountÐ ˆØ Ðis€still€about€$1,614.75€short€of€that€needed€for€current€monthly€expenses.€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àWith€respect€to€Mr.€Boganððs€ability€to€provide€support,€the€record€shows€that€his€retirementÐ L œ Ðinvestments€provide€the€only€source€of€his€monthly€income.€€These€investments€yield€a€net€monthlyÐ 8 ˆ Ðincome€of€$3,150.00,€which€is€less€than€half€of€the€income€($6,900.00)€upon€which€the€supportÐ $ t Ðaward€was€originally€based.€€Including€his€monthly€support€obligation€to€Ms.€Bogan€of€$2,300.00,Ð  ` Ðhis€average€monthly€expenses€are€$5,167.51,€and€this€amount€exceeds€his€own€monthly€retirementÐ ü L  Ðincome€by€$2,017.51.€€Consequently,€while€both€lower€courts€found€that€Mr.€Bogan€retains€someÐ è 8  Ðability€to€provide€spousal€support,€his€ability€to€pay€has€been€significantly€diminished€by€hisÐ Ô$  Ðsubstantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.׃"°×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð À  ÐÌà  àConsidering€the€opportunities€for€other€income€as€an€additional€factor,€the€trial€court€foundÐ ˜è  Ðthat€Ms.€Bogan€has€the€opportunity€to€increase€her€earning€capacity€from€her€business€given€that€sheÐ „Ô  Ðnow€possesses€sole€ownership€of€the€enterprise€and€its€assets.€€It€is€true€that€Ms.€Bogan€has€increasedÐ pÀ Ðher€monthly€income€from€her€business€since€the€divorce€by€about€$150,€but€there€is€no€indicationÐ \¬ Ðin€the€record€that€this€income€will€continue€to€increase.€€While€the€court€also€noted€that€Ms.€BoganððsÐ H˜ Ðanticipated€income€from€this€business€should€increase€given€its€increased€earnings€potential€sinceÐ 4„ Ðthe€divorce,€no€evidence€exists€in€the€record€that€actually€supports€this€finding.€€To€the€contrary,€Ms.Ð  p ÐBoganððs€accountant€testified€that€he€counseled€her€to€close€the€business,€which€has€made€a€yearlyÐ  \ Ðprofit€only€once€since€1993.€€Consequently,€any€anticipated€increase€in€Ms.€Boganððs€earning€capacityÐ øH Ðfrom€her€business€appears€to€be€merely€speculative,€and€we€therefore€find€that€it€was€improperlyÐ ä4 Ðconsidered.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àWith€respect€to€the€other€factors€listed€in€section€36„5„101(d),€none€directly€apply€to€theÐ ¨ø Ðmodification€of€the€award€in€this€case.€€Therefore,€considering€the€relevant€factors,€we€are€unableÐ ”ä Ðto€conclude€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€by€reducing€Mr.€Boganððs€monthly€supportÐ €Ð Ðobligation€from€$2,300.00€to€$945.00.€€While€it€is€true€that€Ms.€Bogan€still€has€financial€need,€it€isÐ ° Ðalso€true€that€Mr.€Boganððs€ability€to€provide€that€support€has€been€significantly€reduced.€€In€fact,€itÐ œì Ðappears€that€Mr.€Bogan,€while€able€to€provide€some€level€of€support,€cannot€continue€to€pay€supportÐ ˆØ Ðat€pre„retirement€levels€without€running€a€substantial€monthly€deficit.€€Moreover,€the€proportion€ofÐ tÄ ÐMr.€Boganððs€income€devoted€to€spousal€support€after€the€modification€is€still€roughly€the€same€asÐ `° Ðit€was€before€the€modification.€€A€trial€court€acts€within€its€discretion€when€it€applies€the€correctÐ L œ Ðlegal€standard€and€reaches€a€decision€that€is€not€clearly€unreasonable.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Shirleyóó,€6€S.W.3dÐ 8 ˆ Ð243,€247€(Tenn.€1999);€òòOverstreet€v.€Shoneyððs,€Inc.óó,€4€S.W.3d€694,€709€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€OnÐ $ t Ðthe€facts€of€this€case,€we€cannot€say€that€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€to€modify€the€support€awardÐ  ` Ðwas€contrary€to€law€or€was€otherwise€clearly€unreasonable.€Ð ü L  ÐÌÔ‡XËXXXËÔà  àThe€dissent€in€this€case€expresses€much€concern€that€we€have€ð ðimpoverishedðð€Ms.€Bogan€byÐ Ô$  Ðaffirming€the€reduction€of€her€support€payments.€€The€dissent€also€maintains€that€Ms.€Bogan€ð ðisÐ À  Ðunable€to€support€herself€without€the€original€award€of€alimony€in€futuro.ðð€€Upon€our€review€of€theÐ ¬ü  Ðrecord,€however,€we€find€little€factual€basis€for€such€a€view.€€We€would€note€the€important,€if€notÐ ˜è  Ðoverlooked,€fact€that€Ms.€Bogan€has€received€a€substantial€sum€from€Mr.€Boganððs€retirement€plan,Ð „Ô  Ðan€additional€amount€that€she€was€not€entitled€to€receive€before€his€retirement.€€Combining€thisÐ pÀ Ðinvestment€income€with€the€alimony€payments€that€she€will€continue€to€receive,€the€trial€court€foundÐ \¬ Ðthat€Ms.€Boganððs€monthly€income€will€be€almost€exactly€what€it€was€before€her€former€husbandððsÐ H˜ Ðretirement.€€Therefore,€we€are€unable€to€see€how€our€decision€today€works€to€impoverish€Ms.€Bogan.€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àAs€we€remarked€earlier,€retirement€is€a€unique€circumstance€in€support€modification€cases.€Ð  \ ÐNotwithstanding€the€views€of€the€dissent€to€the€contrary,€retirement€is€simply€not€like€other€formsÐ øH Ðof€voluntary€underemployment.€€Because€retirement€is€somewhat€of€an€entitlement,€the€foreseeabilityÐ ä4 Ðor€voluntariness€of€the€retirement€decision€does€not€affect€the€support€modification€analysis,€and€theÐ Ð  Ðweight€given€to€various€considerations€is€not€precisely€the€same€as€that€given€under€differentÐ ¼  Ðcircumstances.€€So€long€as€the€retirement€is€objectively€reasonable€and€taken€in€good€faith,€we€willÐ ¨ø Ðnot€look€to€the€potential€income€of€the€retired€obligor,€and€we€will€give€the€reduced€ability€of€theÐ ”ä Ðretired€obligor€to€pay€support€at€least€equal€consideration€with€the€need€of€the€receiving€spouse.€Ð €Ð ÐBased€on€the€facts€of€this€case,€we€cannot€hold€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€modifyingÐ l¼ ÐMr.€Boganððs€support€award.€€Ô#†XËXXXË‹#ÔTherefore,€we€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€andÐ X ¨ Ðreinstate€the€award€as€modified€by€the€Sullivan€County€Chancery€Court.Ð D!” ÐÌÔ& Ä ÔÓ  Óò òCONCLUSIONó óÐ #l! ÐÌÓ´”Óà  àIn€summary,€we€hold€that€the€bona€fide€retirement€of€an€obligor€constitutes€a€substantial€andÔ'Ä#¨”ÔÐ ô$D # Ðmaterial€change€in€circumstances€so€as€to€permit€modification€of€a€spousal€support€award€when€theÐ à%0!$ Ðdecision€to€retire€is€objectively€reasonable€considering€the€totality€of€the€circumstances.€€However,Ð Ì&"% Ða€mere€finding€of€such€a€change€in€circumstances€does€not€require€modification€of€the€support€award,Ð ¸'#& Ðand€the€trial€court€should€carefully€consider€the€relevant€factors€of€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÐ ¤(ô#' Ðsection€36„5„101(d)€in€deciding€by€what€amount,€if€any,€the€award€should€be€modified.€€On€the€factsÐ )à$( Ðof€this€case,€though,€we€hold€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€in€reducing€the€amountÐ |*Ì%) Ðof€the€former€husbandððs€support€obligation€following€his€objectively€reasonable€retirement.€€Ð h+¸&* Їà  àCosts€of€this€appeal€are€assessed€to€the€appellee,€Ms.€Doris€Mae€Bogan.Ð ° ÐÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_________________________________Ð L œ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUSTICE