ÿWPCH2 òìáÔD_šÑ¾êNrˆÑÓ(_^rYç5€8„â¡BlæTõ’ ¦ù_Ê § ï[Sò)\ ï šKö|.?þúŒNÆ£°¨ýŽ[T‹ý±§×Õ;àƒÍÊyëkôäq·üBS‹A£ûxãiZD]î‰s²²™JbNÁÓHj±ó} Å&G²k1ÄÔ·¥Xè”ü…Uó '~Ð *Ôõ°åäYî*xéGG¨UUè¢v¿_? 'GÐ$bOË÷úOh»}†<\–:X 1HÍí¿&~Œ Ë%q8¶•’²ôæXä g+ìñC*˜&øIôò5ÏIŸÏqKBíIl•wªE0JÁç9ZÐe^«C…Ñu^Éí8y›Ó+Fü‡Ic ºô ç¹­´¨*%ã!Íêw¡{Í¥NŒ#«\™&Ž4:Ÿ»û¼ÆÀ5'—þGÈÛNЊÅh®Ïv„Ï\xfâzb¡kù¼=ç1hV “HiþËîåbòô¾ÜhÖûÅlù}ëC¶~})¦ôj‹†ˆ[hµ¥@ˆË öá!¹¨¶Ó‰«K.cŸ¹·i4í ǵö’x‡/eB&„X+ª$Ð ’@oþëíkèDÚÌ…# F %Q n­W 0P UBT U :– w@Ð 4 $ T3 0 °‡ 0 D7U:{‰µU:>xY€-ÙæRìÌ>U: D 0ƒLÏ’×ýii f!s"U:…$U:¿$UNù$¾G%U:+ B?+\+U:t-®-®- 0DÀ/ D3000 0l70707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070 AO£0Æò0ò0 0D¸1 D/ü1 B+2˜HP LaserJet 4HPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLNÎX«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@((Ë$¡¡Ò°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  Ó<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi,ó‚ AZ"Arial Regular 9:;<D=>{?@IAUBîf|œ$‚ t´p´p´3|xB JÝ ƒ ~†$ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€XKáXXXÔÔ€&_w&XXKáÔSubsection€(a)(1)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208€provides€in€pertinent€part:€€à8 @Ê! àð ðIf€an€employeeÐ ° Ðhas€previously€sustained€a€permanent€physical€disability€from€any€cause€or€origin€and€becomesÏpermanently€and€totally€disabled€through€a€subsequent€injury,€such€employee€shall€be€entitled€toÏcompensation€from€such€employeeððs€employer€or€the€employerððs€insurance€company€only€for€theÏdisability€that€would€have€resulted€from€the€subsequent€injury,€and€such€previous€injury€shall€not€beÏconsidered€in€estimating€the€compensation€to€which€such€employee€may€be€Ô& Ð Ôentitled€.€.€.€.ððÔ'Ð 'Ô(`(2~†$¤¤Ý ƒË!ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(3Ã$òòÚ  Ú8Ú  Úóó,@ÓÐAZ‹"Arial Regular Ý ƒ ~†$ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€&÷ &XXÔÔ€ &üí & &&÷ÔA€similar€question€was€presented€in€òòSweeten€v.€Trade€Envelopes,€Inc.óó,€938€S.W.2d€383Ð ° Ð(Tenn.€1996).€€In€òòSweetenóó,€the€employer€settled€with€a€permanently€and€totally€disabled€employeeÐ ŠÚ Ðfor€75€percent€based€upon€400€weeks,€and€then€at€trial€the€Second€Injury€Fund€was€held€liable€forÏthe€remaining€benefits€to€age€65.€€This€Court€did€not€reach€the€issue,€however,€because€we€setÏaside€the€settlement.€€Thus,€while€òòSweetenóó€and€the€case€at€bar€present€the€same€scenarioÐ h Ðinvolving€the€Fund€being€held€responsible€for€all€benefits€beyond€400€weeks,€the€present€case€isÏthe€first€time€this€Court€has€squarely€addressed€the€issue., øð AZ‹"Arial Regular OÝ ƒ ~†$ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€XKáXXXÔÔ€&_w&XXKáÔSubsection(b)(1)(A)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208€provides:€€ð ðIn€cases€where€the€injuredÐ ° Ðemployee€has€received€or€will€receive€a€workersðð€compensation€award€or€awards€for€permanentÏdisability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€and€the€combination€of€such€awards€equals€or€exceeds€oneÏhundred€percent€(100%)€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€the€employee€shall€not€beÏentitled€to€receive€from€the€employer€or€its€insurance€carrier€any€compensation€for€permanentÏdisability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€that€would€be€in€excess€of€one€hundred€percent€(100%)€permanentÏdisability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€after€combining€awards.ðð #Ñ#€Xÿÿd#Ñ ÜÝ ƒ ~†$ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ‡ XKáXXXÔÔ‡ &_w&X XKáÔSubsection€(a),€unlike€subsection€(b),€also€requires€the€employer€to€have€had€actualÐ ° Ðknowledge€of€the€employeeððs€prior€permanent€physical€disability€prior€to€the€subsequent€injury.€ÏòòBurris€v.€Cross€Mountain€Coal€Co.óó,€798€S.W.2d€746,€748€(Tenn.€1990).c:\office\wpwin\template\legal\opcir.wpt ÂÝ ƒ ~†$ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€XKáXXXÔÔ€&_w&XXKáÔòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)(providing€that€compensation€for€permanent€totalÐ ° Ðdisability€ð ðshall€be€paid€during€the€period€of€such€permanent€total€disability€until€the€employeeÏreaches€the€age€of€65.€.€.€.€ð ð)., øð AZ‹"Arial Regular(D35Ú$¥¥Ý ƒË!ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.bomely with page 11 long footnote. Î -& ' IB011S50IB011S5.Bomely    óÝ ƒ ~†$ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ‡&÷ &XXÔÔ‡ &_w& &&÷ÔAn€employee€is€considered€totally€disabled€when€an€injury€ð ðtotally€incapacitates€theÐ ° Ðemployee€from€working€at€an€occupation€which€brings€such€employee€an€income.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(B).Ô#†&÷ && &_w¦#ÔÔ#†Xæ"X &&÷‡#Ô Ô‡ XKáXXXÔÔ‡ ¸ X XKáÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ#† XKáX  ¸#ÔÐ  ÐÌò òJune€1,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ‡ ô91 ôX XKáÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó Ý ƒ ÌX$ÝÔ‡ ô%ÚôXXÔÑ@°ÑÑ@°ÑÒ4°ÒÒ„°Òà Œ àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€à8 ä àÔ‡ô%Úôôô%ÚÔIf€an€employee€has€previously€sustained€a€permanent€physical€disabilityÐ  Ðfrom€any€cause€or€origin€and€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabledÏthrough€a€subsequent€injury€.€.€.Ð ä ü!ä ü! ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)(1).Ô#‡ ô%Úôôô%Ú¨#ÔÔ‡!ô^@ôôô%ÚÔ, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular,æ™) AZ"Arial Regular(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman Regular ´Ý ƒ ~†$ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Ô€#XcgXXXÔÔ€#&üí &X#XcgÔIn€òòLove€v.€American€Olean€Tile€Companyóó,€òò€€€€€óó€S.W.2d€òò€€€€€€óó€(Tenn.€1998),€a€companionÐ ° Ðcase€to€the€one€at€bar,€the€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€held€that€awards€ofÏpermanent€total€disability€are€subject€to€the€maximum€total€benefit€provision€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€50„6„102(a)(6).€€Judge€Joe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€speaking€for€the€Special€Workersðð€CompensationÏAppeals€panel€in€òòLoveóó,€is€of€the€view€that€permanent€total€benefits€are€payable€to€age€65,€but€mayÐ h Ðnot€exceed€the€maximum€total€benefit.€€This€view€is€based€on€the€belief€that€the€legislature€did€notÏintend€to€financially€burden€the€Second€Injury€Fund€and€perhaps€result€in€the€employeeððs€socialÏsecurity€disability€benefits€being€reduced.€€òòSeeóó€42€U.S.C.€ðð€424(a).€€As€our€opinions€in€the€presentÐ ¦ ö Ðcase€and€in€òòLoveóó€demonstrate,€we€do€not€agree€with€the€Panelððs€holding€in€òòLoveóó,€but€we€doÐ € Ð Ðrecognize€that€our€resolution€of€these€cases€will€result€in€the€Second€Injury€Fund€paying€largerÏmonetary€awards.€€Once€again,€however,€these€are€arguments€that€should€be€addressed€to€theÏlegislature€since€that€body,€not€the€courts,€brought€about€the€change€in€the€law., øð AZ"Arial Regular d Ý ƒ ~†$ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ‡&XcgXXXÔÔ‡&&üí &X&XcgÔIn€òòHale€v.€CNA€Ins.€Companiesóó,€799€S.W.2d€659€(Tenn.€1990),€subsection€(a)€was€notÐ ° Ðpursued€because€the€record€failed€to€›reflect€ð ðknowledgeðð€on€the€part€of€the€employer€of€the€1972Ïinjury.€€Therefore,€we€applied€subsection€(b).Ô#†&XcgX &&&üí¦#ÔÔ#†Xæ"XX&Xcg‡#Ô, øð AZ"Arial Regular Ý ƒ ÌX$ÝÔ‡ ô%ÚôXXÔÑ@°ÑÑ@°ÑÒ4°ÒÒ„°Òà Œ àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€à8 ä àÔ‡ô%Úôôô%ÚÔIf€an€employee€has€previously€sustained€a€permanent€physical€disabilityÐ  Ðfrom€any€cause€or€origin€and€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabledÏthrough€a€subsequent€injury€.€.€.Ð ä ü!ä ü! ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)(1).Ô#‡ ô%Úôôô%Ú¨#ÔÔ‡!ô^@ôôô%ÚÔ($Ó$‘‘òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó$$$$'ÿÿdxd(D3-¦$££Ý ƒË!ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒË!ÝÒ°°ÒÒ°°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ý›Ñ` °ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€úÑÔ€X“gXXXÔÑ7€&XXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñò òÓ=€&X°XdÐd=ÓIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÐ `  ÐAT€KNOXVILLEó óÐ P ð Ðò ò(HEARD€IN€NASHVILLE)ó óÐ @ à Ðòòò òÌÓzÓÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àFOR€PUBLICATIONÌÓcO°X°` ¸ h ¡Ð (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXcÓó óóóROBERT€HAROLD€BOMELY,€JR.,òòò òà Û àóóó ó)à q à€€€€€€€ò òFiled:ó ó€œñ>ññ=ñJuneñ=ññ>ññ>ñJuneñ>ññ=ñ€ñ=ññ?ñ1,€1998ñ?ññ@ñMay›€26,€1998ñ@ñÐ   Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiff/Appellee,à à àà 8 àà Û à)à q àKnox€ChanceryÐ à€ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)à q àÐ Ðp  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)à q àHon.€Frederick€D.€McDonaldÐ À`  Ðv.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)€€ChancellorÐ °P  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)€ÌMID„AMERICA€CORPORATION,à Û àà q à)€No.€03„S„01„9605„CH„00059Ð 0  Ðd/b/a€BURGER€KING,à à àà 8 àà Û à)Ð €  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)Ìà Ø àDefendant/Appellee,à 8 àà Û à)Ð ` Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)Ìandà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)Ð @à Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)ÌLARRY€BRINTON,€JR.,à à àà 8 àà Û à)Ð  À ÐDIRECTOR€OF€THE€DIVISION€OFà Û à)Ð ° ÐWORKERSðð€COMPENSATION,€à 8 àà Û à)Ð   ÐTENNESSEE€DEPARTMENT€OF€à Û à)Ð ð ÐLABOR,€SECOND€INJURY€FUND,à Û à)Ð à€ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à)Ìà Ø àDefendant/Appellant.à 8 àà Û à)Ð À!` Ðà Ø àÌÌÌòòÓ<°,X†X ¡Ð ŽX°‡X ¡Ð ŽX<ÓFor€Appellee€Bomelyóó:à à àà 8 àà Û àòòà q àà è àFor€Appellee€Mid„AmericaóóÐ €%  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û àòòà q àà è àCorporation,€d/b/a€Burger€Kingóó:Ð p& ÐDavid€H.€DunawayÌDunaway€&€Associatesà à àà 8 àà Û àà q àà è àSteven€JohnsonÐ P(ð! ÐLaFolletteà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û àà q àà è àButler,€Vines€and€BabbÐ @)à" Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û àà q àà è àKnoxvilleÌÓ<X‡Xc‚–(#ŽX°,X†X ¡Ð ŽX<ÓÌÌòòFor€Appellant:Ð - #& ÐÌóóJohn€Knox€WalkupÐ à.€%( ÐAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌÌDianne€Stamey€DycusÌSenior€CounselÌNashvilleòòÐ 30*- ÐÌò òà@))(ÌàóóÔ‡¶†%¶XX“gÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nòòó óÔ#†X“gX¶¶†%##ԈРp5,/ ÐÌóóÌÌTRIAL€COURT€REVERSED€IN€à€øøB$àDROWOTA,€J.ˆÐ ¼9\03 ÐPART€AND€AFFIRMED€IN€PART.Ð  ¬:L14¬ ÐÑúÑÑ7€æ"XXdÈXXdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑѰ` ÑÓÓà Ø àà 0 àIn€this€workersðð€compensation€action€the€Second€Injury€Fund,Ïdefendant„appellant,€has€appealed€from€a€judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€of€KnoxÏCounty€which€found€the€employee,€Robert€Bomely,€plaintiff„appellee,€to€be€totally€andÏpermanently€disabled.€€The€award€was€apportioned€65€percent€to€the€employer,€Mid„¼America€Corporation,€d/b/a€Burger€King,€defendant„appellee,€and€35€percent€to€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(b).€€The€trial€court€assessedÏthe€employerððs€liability€based€on€400€weeks€of€benefits€and€held€the€Second€InjuryÏFund€liable€for€the€remaining€938€weeks€of€benefits€(until€the€employee€reached€theÏage€of€65׃×Ý ƒ 3ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×).€€Thus,€the€employerððs€liability€was€limited€to€65€percent€of€400€weeksÐ ° Ðrather€than€65€percent€of€the€total€number€of€weeks€to€age€65.€€We€transferred€thisÏcase€from€the€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€to€decide€whether€itÏwas€proper€to€have€limited€the€employerððs€liability€in€this€fashion.€€After€carefullyÏexamining€the€record€before€us€and€considering€the€relevant€authorities,€we€concludeÏthat€the€award€should€be€apportioned€between€the€employer€and€the€Second€InjuryÏFund€based€on€the€total€number€of€weeks€to€age€65€rather€than€limiting€theÏemployerððs€liability€to€a€percentage€of€400€weeks.€€Accordingly,€that€portion€of€the€trialÏcourtððs€judgment€is€reversed.€€We€shall€also€address€(1)€whether€an€award€ofÏpermanent€total€disability€is€subject€to€the€monetary€cap€imposed€by€the€400€weekÏmaximum€total€benefit€provision€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(6)€and€(2)€whetherÏthe€apportionment€of€benefits€between€the€employer€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€inÏthis€case€is€controlled€by€subsection€(a)€or€(b)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208.ÌÌà@ÿÿ)ÌàòòBACKGROUNDóóˆÐ ð-@), ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€1993€and€again€in€1994,€the€employee,€Robert€Bomely,€was€workingÏas€an€assistant€manager€for€Burger€King€when€he€injured€his€neck€and€back€in€theÏcourse€and€scope€of€his€employment.€€He€had€an€extensive€history€of€prior€back€andÐ p5À04 Ðneck€injuries,€both€work„related€and€nonwork„related.€€These€include€aÏnoncompensable€back€injury€in€1982;€a€work„related€back€injury€in€1983€that€resultedÏin€a€court€approved€settlement€for€25€percent€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€aÏwhole;€a€work„related€back€injury€in€1988€for€which€a€settlement€was€reached€andÏapproved€by€the€court€for€10€percent€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole;€andÏa›€noncompensable€neck€injury€resulting€from€a€car€accident€in€1989.€€Accordingly,€theÏemployee€has€received€workersðð€compensation€awards€totaling€35€percent€permanentÏdisability€to€the€whole€body€prior€to€the€1993€and€1994€work„related€back€and€neckÏinjuries€which€precipitated€this€suit.€€The€employee€was€able€to€return€to€work€afterÏeach€injury,€but€has€not€been€able€to€return€to€work€since€his€last€injury€in€1994.€€ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àDr.€William€Kennedy,€an€orthopedic€surgeon,€testified€that€the€employeeÏsustained€a€29€percent€permanent€anatomical€impairment€to€his€neck€and€a€26Ïpercent€permanent€anatomical€impairment€to€his€back€for€a€total€of€47€percentÏimpairment€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Dr.€Kennedy€attributed€33€percent€of€the€totalÏanatomical€impairment€of€47€percent€to€the€1993€and€1994€injuries,€which€equatesÏto€15.6€percent.€€A€psychiatrist€testified€the€employee€has€permanent€and€severeÏdepression€related€to€his€injuries€which€prevent€him€from€being€gainfully€employed.€ÏA€vocational€disability€expert€concluded€that€the€employee€is€totally€and€permanentlyÏvocationally€disabled.€€ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€trial€court€found€the€employee€to€be€permanently€and€totallyÏdisabled,€€a€finding€that€the€parties€do€not€contest€on€appeal.€€The€court€also€foundÏthat€only€20€percent€of€the€employeeððs€permanent€and€total€disability€was€attributableÏto€the€last€injury.€€The€court€further€determined€that€the€employee€was€entitled€toÏworkersðð€compensation€benefits€until€he€reached€the€age€of€65€(he€was€42€years€oldÏat€the€time€of€trial).€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i).€€The€trial€court€thenÐ p5À04 Ðapportioned€the€award€65€percent€to€the€employer€and€35€percent€to€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(b).€€The€court€assessed€theÐ 09€48 Ðemployerððs€liability€based€on€65€percent€of€400€weeks€of€benefits€for€a€total€of€280Ïweeks€(or€$81,640)€and€held€the€Second€Injury€Fund€liable€for€the€remaining€938Ïweeks€of€benefits€(or€$294,532).€€The€employerððs€liability€was€thus€limited€to€65Ïpercent€of€400€weeks€rather€than€65€percent€of€the€total€number€of€weeks€to€age€65Ï(1,218€weeks).€ÌÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€The€primary€question€on€appeal€is€whether€it€was€proper€to€haveÏassessed€the€employerððs€liability€based€on€a€percentage€of€400€weeks.׃×Ý ƒ 3ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€€AÐ Ð  Ðsecondary€but€related€issue€is€whether€an€award€of€permanent€total€disability€isÏsubject€to€the€monetary€cap€imposed€by€the€400€week€maximum€total€benefitÏprovision€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(6).€€A€final€question€is€whether€theÏapportionment€of€benefits€between€the€employer€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€in€thisÏcase€is€controlled€by€subsection€(a)€or€(b)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208.ÌÌÓ  ÓI.ÌÓã%Óà Ø àà 0 àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€limiting€theÏemployerððs€liability€to€65€percent€of€400€weeks.€€Citing€òòReagan€v.€AmericanÐ °"  ÐPolicyholdersðð€Ins.óó,€842€S.W.2d€249€(Tenn.€1992),€the€Fund€contends€that€theÐ $à" Ðemployerððs€liability€should€be€calculated€based€upon€the€total€amount€of€benefitsÏawarded€to€age€65.€€According€to€the€Fund,€the€workersðð€compensation€law€containsÏno€indication€that€the€legislature€intended€to€limit€an€employerððs€liability€under€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208€to€400€weeks.€€Rather,€the€legislature€expressed€its€intentÏthrough€the€enactment€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)€in€1992€thatÏemployers€can€be€held€liable€for€benefits€to€age€65€if€the€employee€is€permanentlyÏand€totally€disabled.€€Ð °1-0 Їà Ø àà 0 àIn€response,€the€employer€argues€that€to€hold€it€liable€for€more€than€400Ïweeks€of€benefits€would€undermine€the€purpose€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund€to€Ïencourage€employers€to€hire€injured€workers€because€employers€will€not€risk€havingÏto€pay€benefits€to€age€65.€ÌÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€In€òòReagan€v.€American€Policyholdersðð€Ins.óó,€842€S.W.2d€249€(Tenn.Ð `  Ð1992),€the€employee€fell€through€a€floor€in€the€course€and€scope€of€his€employmentÏwhich€left€him€totally€and€permanently€disabled.€€He€had€previously€settled€a€workersððÏcompensation€claim€for€15€percent€permanent€impairment€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€ÏDue€to€his€low€average€weekly€wage,€the€employee€was€entitled€to€an€award€of€550Ïweeks€rather€than€the€typical€400€weeks€of€benefits€provided€at€that€time€forÏpermanent€total€disability.€€The€employer€in€òòReaganóó€argued€that€its€liability€wasÐ P  Ðlimited€to€85€percent€of€400€weeks€and€that€the€Second€Injury€Fund€should€be€liableÏfor€the€rest€of€the€award.€€This€Court€rejected€the€€employerððs€argument€and€held€thatÏthe€apportionment€should€be€based€on€the€total€amount€of€money€awarded€to€theÏemployee.€€òòReaganóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€251.€€We€reasoned€that€apportioning€the€awardÐ Ð  Ðin€this€manner€was€the€only€equitable€thing€to€do.€€òòIdóó.Ð °"  ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€employer€in€the€case€at€bar€argues€that€òòReaganóó€is€ð ðwhollyÐ p&À!$ Ðunrelated€to€the€issues€in€the€present€caseðð€because€it€was€decided€before€the€1992Ïchange€to€the€workersðð€compensation€law€providing€that€a€permanently€and€totallyÏdisabled€worker€is€entitled€to€receive€benefits€until€age€65.€€It€is€true€that€whenÏòòReaganóó€was€decided€an€award€for€permanent€total€disability€was€based€on€400Ð ð-@), Ðweeks€of€benefits€rather€than€the€current€payment€of€benefits€until€age€65.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð Ð/ +. ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i).€€As€such,€òòReaganóó€does€not€address€theÐ °1-0 Ðapportionment€of€benefits€until€age€65.€€ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àNonetheless,€we€are€persuaded€that€the€principle€of€equitableÏapportionment€adopted€in€òòReaganóó€applies€with€equal€force€to€the€case€at€bar.€€It€isÐ 09€48 Ðnot€equitable€to€cap€the€employerððs€liability€at€400€weeks€and€require€the€Fund€to€payÏthe€bulk€of€the€award€in€light€of€the€fact€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(6)(C)Ïspecifically€exempts€permanent€total€disability€awards€from€the€400€week€maximumÏtotal€benefit€limitation€and€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)€authorizes€benefitsÏto€age€65€in€cases€of€permanent€and€total€disability.€€There€is€no€indication€in€theÏworkersðð€compensation€law€that€the€legislature€intended€to€limit€an€employerððs€liabilityÏunder€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208€to€400€weeks.€€In€fact,€the€legislature€hasÏexpressed€its€intent€through€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)€that€employers€canÏbe€held€liable€for€benefits€to€age€65€if€an€employee€is€totally€and€permanentlyÏdisabled.€€If€the€legislature€had€wanted€to€cap€an€employerððs€liability€at€400€weeksÏwhere€benefits€are€awarded€to€age€65€in€cases€involving€the€Second€Injury€Fund€itÏcould€have€easily€done€so.€€ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àFurthermore,€we€note€here€as€we€did€in€òòReaganóó€that€the€ð ðobjective€ofÐ ` Ðthe€legislation€creating€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€to€limit€the€liability€exposure€of€theÏemployer€by€holding€it€responsible€only€for€the€employeeððs€first€100€percent€ofÏworkersðð€compensation€disability,€thereby€encouraging€the€employment€of€injuredÏworkers.ðð€€òòReaganóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€250.€€ð ðIn€other€words,€the€employer€is€responsibleÐ $à" Ðfor€the€employeeððs€first€100€percent€of€benefits€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€isÏresponsible€for€the€rest.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€250„251.€€Under€our€holding€today€the€employerððsÐ P( #& Ðexposure€to€liability€is€still€limited€to€the€first€100€percent€of€Bomelyððs€permanent€totalÏdisability.€€If€Bomely€is€able€to€rehabilitate€himself€and€return€to€work€and€then€getsÏinjured€again,€the€employer€would€pay€nothing€in€benefits.€ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€sum,€we€are€persuaded€that€the€equitable€division€rationale€that€weÏadopted€in€òòReaganóó€should€apply€in€this€case.€€We€find€no€statutory€or€equitable€basisÐ 3à.2 Ðfor€using€400€weeks€as€the€basis€of€apportionment€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€50„6„¼208€and€50„6„207(4)(A)(i).€€In€reaching€this€conclusion,€we€are€cognizant€of€theÏemployerððs€argument€that€if€an€employerððs€liability€is€not€limited€to€a€percentage€ofÐ 09€48 Ð400€weeks,€some€employers€might€resist€hiring€young€workers€with€disabilities€in€lightÏof€the€legislation€extending€benefits€to€age€65€for€permanent€total€disability.€ÏWhatever€the€merits€of€this€argument,€it€should€be€addressed€to€the€legislature€sinceÏthat€body,€not€the€courts,€brought€about€the€change€in€the€law.ÌÌà@xx-ÌàII.ˆÌÌà Ø àà 0 àAn€issue€necessarily€related€to€the€apportionment€question€is€whatÏeffect,€if€any,€the€maximum€total€benefit€provision€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„¼102(a)(6)€has€on€awards€of€permanent€total€disability€made€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i),€which€makes€benefits€payable€to€age€65.€€The€question€hasÏconsiderable€practical€significance€because€limiting€benefits€to€the€maximum€totalÏbenefit€could€substantially€reduce€the€amount€of€compensation€paid€to€the€worker.€ÏÌÌà Ø àà 0 àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)€provides€that€compensation€forÏpermanent€total€disability€ð ðshall€be€paid€during€the€period€of€such€permanent€totalÏdisability׃×Ý ƒ 3ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€until€the€employee€reaches€the€age€of€sixty„five.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ $à" Ð50„6„207(4)(B)€provides€that€in€cases€of€permanent€total€disability€an€employee€is€toÏbe€compensated€as€provided€for€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)€„€to€age€65€„Ïð ðprovided,€that€the€total€amount€of€compensation€payable€hereunder€shall€not€exceedÏthe€maximum€total€benefit,€exclusive€of€medical€and€hospital€benefits.ðð€€At€firstÏglance,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(B)€appears€to€place€a€monetary€cap€onÏawards€of€permanent€total€disability.€However,€this€is€not€the€case.€€The€statutoryÏdefinition€of€ð ðmaximum€total€benefitðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(6)€providesÏthat€ð ðmaximum€total€benefit€means€the€sum€of€all€weekly€benefits€to€which€a€workerÏmay€be€entitled.ðð€€The€maximum€total€benefit€for€ð ðinjuries€arising€on€or€after€July€1,Ð p5À04 Ð1992,€shall€be€four€hundred€(400)€weeks€times€the€maximum€weekly€benefit€ò òexceptÐ ° Ðin€instances€of€permanent€total€disabilityó ó.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„Ð à Ð102(a)(6)(C)(emphasis€added).€€ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àBecause€the€statutory€definition€of€maximum€total€benefit€exemptsÏpermanent€total€disability€awards€from€the€400€week€limitation,€we€conclude€that€suchÏbenefits€are€to€be€paid€until€age€65€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)Ïwithout€regard€to€the€monetary€cap€imposed€by€the€maximum€total€benefit€provisionÏof€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(6).€€Although€the€400€week€limitation€on€benefitsÏexpressly€applies€in€cases€of€temporary€partial€disability,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„Ð à Ð6„207(2),€and€permanent€partial€disability,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(3)(F),€theÐ pÀ Ðlimitation€does€not€apply€to€permanent€total€disability€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„¼207(4).€€Had€the€legislature€intended€to€limit€permanent€total€disability€awards€to€aÏmaximum€of€400€weeks,€it€could€have€drafted€a€provision€explicitly€doing€so€as€it€didÏfor€temporary€partial€and€permanent€partial€disability.€€Our€conclusion€is€furtherÏbuttressed€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(iii),€which€says€that€ð ð[a]ttorneysððÏfees€in€contested€cases€of€permanent€total€disability€shall€be€calculated€upon€the€firstÏfour€hundred€(400)€weeks€of€disability€only.ðð€€If€the€legislature€had€intended€to€limitÏpermanent€total€disability€benefits€to€400€weeks€of€compensation€under€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(6),€it€would€not€have€been€necessary€to€provide€that€attorneyððsÏfees€be€calculated€only€upon€the€ò òfirst€ó ó400€weeks€of€compensation.€Ð 0*€%( ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€sum,€we€hold€that€awards€of€permanent€total€disability€are€payableÏto€age€65€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)€and€are€not€subject€to€theÏmonetary€cap€imposed€by€the€400€week€maximum€total€benefit€provision€of€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(6).€€Our€holding€on€this€point€is€a€reasonable€constructionÏâ âof€statutory€language€which€avoids€statutory€conflict€and€provides€for€the€harmoniousÐ p5À04 Ðoperation€of€the€laws€in€question.׃"×Ý ƒ 3ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòSeeóó€òòCronin€v.€Howeóó,€906€S.W.2d€910,€912€(Tenn.Ð ° Ðâ â1996).€€We€further€find€that€when€liability€is€apportioned€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund,Ïpayments€by€the€Fund€do€not€begin€until€ð ðafter€completion€of€the€paymentsðð€by€theÏemployer.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)(1).€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòPerry€v.€Sentry€Ins.€Co.óó,€938Ð P   ÐS.W.2d€404,€408€(Tenn.€1996).€€ÌÌÓ  ÓIII.à@@DD/Dà¹ÓONÓà Ø àà 0 àFinally,€we€must€address€the€employerððs€argument€that€the€trial€courtÏshould€have€apportioned€the€award€between€it€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€underÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)׃ È ×Ý ƒ 3ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€rather€than€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(b).׃p×Ý ƒ 3ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Рà ÐThe€basis€for€the€employerððs€argument€is€that€subsection€(a)€and€subsection€(b)€ofÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208€are€mutually€exclusive.€€ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àAfter€this€case€was€tried€and€the€employer€filed€its€brief€in€this€Court€inÏwhich€it€contended€that€subsection€(a)€and€subsection€(b)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„¼208€are€mutually€exclusive,€this€Court€decided€òòPerry€v.€Sentry€Ins.€Co.óó,€938€S.W.2dÐ Ð  Ð404€(Tenn.€1996).€€In€òòPerryóó,€we€noted€œ(and€reiterate€here)€that›€the€Second€InjuryÐ ° ÐFund€is€liable€under€subsection€(a)€if€(1)€the€employee€has€previously€sustained€aÏpermanent€physical€disability€from€any€cause€or€origin,€either€compensable€orÏnoncompensable,€and€(2)€the€employee€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabledÏas€the€result€of€a€subsequent€compensable€injury.׃×Ý ƒ 3ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòIdóó.€at€407.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòSweetenóó,Ð 0 € Ð938€S.W.2d€at€385.€€In€such€a€case,€the€employer€pays€only€for€the€disability€thatÏresults€from€the€subsequent€injury€that€rendered€the€employee€permanently€andÏtotally€disabled,€without€consideration€of€any€prior€injuries.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„¼208(a)(1).€€In€other€words,€an€employer€under€subsection€(a)€is€responsible€only€forÏthat€disability€that€would€have€resulted€from€the€subsequent€injury€had€the€earlierÏinjury€or€injuries€not€existed.€€òòPerry€v.€Sentry€Ins.€Co.óó,€938€S.W.2d€404€(Tenn.€1996);Ð pÀ ÐòòCameron€v.€Kite€Painting€Co.óó,€860€S.W.2d€41€(Tenn.€1993);€òòAllkins€v.€ThomasÐ P  ÐFurniture€Co.óó,€762€S.W.2d€557€(Tenn.€1988);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòMinton€v.€State€Industries,€Inc.óó,Ð 0€ Ð825€S.W.2d€73,€76„77€(Tenn.€1992).€€Accordingly,€it€is€important€for€trial€courts€toÏmake€an€explicit€finding€of€fact€regarding€the€extent€of€vocational€disability€attributableÏto€the€subsequent€or€last€injury,€without€consideration€of€any€prior€injuries.€€This€theÏtrial€judge€did€in€this€case,€making€a€finding€of€20€percent€vocational€disabilityÏattributable€to€the€last€injury.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWe€further€indicated€in€òòPerryóó€œ(and€again€reiterate€here)€that›€anÐ P( #& Ðemployee€will€also€have€met€the€requirements€for€recovery€under€subsection€(b)€if€theÏemployee€has€received€or€will€receive€workersðð€compensation€awards,€including€theÏlast€one,€for€permanent€disability€to€the€whole€body€which€exceed€œ100€percent›€whenÏcombined.€€òòPerryóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€407.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòSweetenóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€385;Ð Ð/ +. ÐòòHenson€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€851€S.W.2d€809,€812€(Tenn.€1993).€€When€thisÐ °1-0 Ðoccurs,€the€Second€Injury€Fund€pays€benefits€due€the€worker€in€excess€of€œ100Ïpercent›€after€all€compensable€awards,€including€the€last€one,€are€combined.€€òòHill€v.Ð p5À04 ÐEagle€Bend€Mfg.,€Inc.óó,€942€S.W.2d€483€(Tenn.€1997);€òòHuddleston€v.€Hartford€Acc.€&Ð ° ÐIndem.€Co.óó,€858€S.W.2d€315€(Tenn.€1993);€òòFink€v.€Caudleóó,€856€S.W.2d€952€(Tenn.Ð à Ð1993);€òòHenson€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€851€S.W.2d€809€(Tenn.€1993);€òòReagan€v.Ð pÀ ÐAmerican€Policyholdersðð€Ins.óó,€842€S.W.2d€249€(Tenn.€1992);€òòCox€v.€Martin€MariettaÐ P   ÐEnergy€Systemsóó,€832€S.W.2d€534€(Tenn.€1992);€òòHale€v.€CNA€Ins.€Companiesóó,€799Ð 0 € ÐS.W.2d€659€(Tenn.€1990);€òòSims€v.€Bituminous€Cas.€Corp.óó,€798€S.W.2d€751€(Tenn.Ð `  Ð1990);€òòBurris€v.€Cross€Mountain€Coal€Co.óó,€798€S.W.2d€746€(Tenn.€1990);€òòSitz€v.Ð ð@  ÐGoodyear€Truck€Tire€Ctr.óó,€762€S.W.2d€886€(Tenn.€1988).€€We€thus€concluded€in€òòPerryóóÐ Ð  Ðthat€an€injured€worker€may€meet€the€criteria€under€both€subsection€(a)€and€subsectionÏ(b)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208.€€òòPerryóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€407€(ð ð[S]ection€(a)€and€(b)Ð à Ðare€not€mutually€exclusive,€and€an€employee€may€meet€the€criteria€for€recovery€underÏboth€sections.ðð).׃%×Ý ƒ 3ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Thus,€òòPerryóó€resolves€the€argument€of€the€employer€in€the€instantÐ P  Ðcase€that€subsections€(a)€and€(b)€are€mutually€exclusive.€€We€would€add,€however,Ïthat€when€the€facts€satisfy€the€requirements€of€both€subsections,€courts€should€applyÏthe€one€which€produces€a€result€more€favorable€to€the€employer€since€the€goal€of€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€statute€is€to€encourage€the€hiring€of€injured€workers€by€limitingÏemployer€liability.€€òòSeeóó€òòReaganóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€250;€òòBurrisóó,€798€S.W.2d€at€749.€€Ð °"  Мñ<ñÌñ<ñ›à Ø àà 0 àAs€indicated€above,€the€trial€court€in€this€case€apportioned€the€awardÏœ65€percent›€to€the€employer€and€œ35ñ9ñ€ñ9ñpercent›€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund€pursuant€toÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(b).€The€trial€court€as€an€alternative€finding€determinedÏthat€under€subsection€(a)€Bomely€had€sustained€a€œ20percent›€permanent€disability€asÏa€result€of€the€1994€injury.€€Accordingly,€under€subsection€(a),€the€trial€court€foundÏthat€the€employer€would€have€been€responsible€for€œ20€percent›€of€the€award€and€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€responsible€for€the€remaining€œ80€percent›€of€the€award.€€The€trialÏcourt€concluded,€however,€that€it€was€bound€to€apply€subsection€(b)€because€theÏemployee€had€prior€awards€of€benefits.€€At€the€time€the€trial€court€decided€the€caseÏit€did€not€have€the€benefit€of€this€Courtððs€decision€in€òòPerryóó.€Ð p5À04 Їà Ø àThe€facts€in€this€case,€as€we€found€in€òòPerryóó,€satisfy€only€the€requirements€ofÐ ° Ðsection€(a).€€The€employee€has€not€met€the€requirements€of€section€(b)€of€havingÏreceived€awards€for€permanent€disability€which€equal€or€exceed€100€percent.€€TheÏemployee€had€received€prior€workersðð€compensation€awards€totaling€35€percentÏpermanent€disability€to€the€whole€body€prior€to€the€last€work„related€injury€in€1994.€ÏHe€was€found€to€have€sustained€a€20€percent€permanent€disability€as€a€result€of€theÏ1994€injury.€€As€in€òòPerryóó,€the€combined€awards€(55€percent)€do€not€equal€or€exceedÐ ð@  Ð100€percent.ÌÌà Ø àThe€trial€court€œdidñ:ñ,ñ:ñ›€œhoweverñ;ñ,ñ;ñ›€correctly€recognize€that€the€facts€of€this€caseÏsatisfy€the€requirements€of€subsection€(a).€€The€employee€had€sustained€€priorÏinjuries€which€caused€permanent€disability€and€he€subsequently€became€permanentlyÏand€totally€disabled€as€a€result€of€the€1994€compensable€injury.€€As€explained€above,Ïthe€employer€would€pay€only€for€the€disability€that€resulted€from€the€last€injury€whichÏrendered€the€employee€totally€and€permanently€disabled€without€consideration€of€anyÏprior€injuries,€which€the€trial€court€correctly€found€to€be€20€percent.€€The€evidenceÏdoes€not€preponderate€against€this€finding.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(2)€(1997ÏSupp.).€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€would€be€responsible€for€the€remaining€80€percentÏof€the€award.€€The€Fund€will€begin€to€discharge€its€liability€after€the€employer€has€paidÏits€portion€of€the€award.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€inÏpart€and€reversed€in€part€and€the€case€remanded€so€that€the€trial€court€can€rule€onÏa€motion€filed€by€the€employee€to€hold€the€employer€in€contempt€for€failing€to€pay€hisÏmedical€expenses.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€defendant„appellee.€€ÌÌÓÓœà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û à__________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û àFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà Û àJusticeÌò òÌÌConcur:ó óÐ  :p59 ЇAnderson,€C.J.€ÌReid,€Birch,€JJ.€ÌÌHolder,€J€„€Separate€Concurring€and€Dissenting€Opinion€€€ñAñÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ  :p59 ЇñAññBñÒ4€ÒÒ„ÀÒѰÑѰÑÑTR[  AØ'ÿLegal Red[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ  ÔÑ7€æ"XXdÈXXdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñà@PPDàò òIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  Ðßr€*<,(j 8  ` `€€@Eÿ` ttx$7øð àrßà@ff)DàAT€KNOXVILLEˆÌÌÌÌÌÌó óROBERT€HAROLD€BOMELY,€JR.,à@##/Dà)ˆÐ ˜  Ðà Œ àà@##/Dà)ˆÌà Œ àPlaintiff/Appellee,€à@##/Dà)ˆÐ xp  Ðà@##/Dà)ˆÌv.à@##/Dà)ˆà % àÐ XP  Ðà@##/Dà)ˆÌMID„AMERICA€CORPORATION,à@##/Dà)ˆÐ 80  ÐD/B/A€BURGER€KING,à@##/Dà)ˆà % àKnox€ChanceryÐ (  Ðà@##/Dà)ˆÌà Œ àDefendant/Appellee,à@##/Dà)ˆà % àHon.€Frederick€D.€McDonaldÐ  Ðà@##/Dà)ˆà % àChancellorÐ øð Ðandà@##/Dà)ˆÐ èà Ðà@##/Dà)ˆà % àNo.€03„S„01„9605„CH„00059Ð ØÐ ÐLARRY€BRINTON,€JR.,à@##/Dà)ˆÐ ÈÀ ÐDIRECTOR€OF€THE€DIVISION€OFà@##/Dà)ˆÐ ¸° ÐWORKERS'€COMPENSATION,à@##/Dà)ˆÐ ¨  ÐTENNESSEE€DEPARTMENT€OFà@##/Dà)ˆÐ ˜ ÐLABOR,€SECOND€INJURY€FUND,à@##/Dà)ˆÐ ˆ€ Ðà@##/Dà)ˆÌà Œ àDefendant/Appellant.à@##/Dà)ˆÐ h` ÐÌÌÌòòà@$$"Dàò òC€O€N€C€U€R€R›€I€N€G€€€€AND€ˆÐ (#  Ðà@ÛÛDàD€I€œS€S›€E€N€T€I€N€G€€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóˆÐ H$@ ÐÌÌÌÓÓà Œ àI€agree€with€the€majorityððs€holding€that€an€employee€who€is€permanently€andÏtotally€disabled€is€entitled€to€receive€benefits€until€age€65.€€I€dissent,€howeverÏbecause:€€(1)€I€believe€the€majority's€analysis€of€the€proper€division€between€theÏemployer€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€substitutes€a€judicially„created€policy€ofÏ"equitable€division"€for€the€clear€and€established€legislative€policy€that€dictated€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€legislation;€and€(2)€I€disagree€with€the€majority's€approach€inÏfinding€both€subsection€(a)€and€(b)€applicable€in€cases€of€permanent€total€disability.Ìâ âÐ X5P.1— ÐÔ  Ôâ âà@¶ ¶ Dàò òDIVISION€BETWEEN€EMPLOYER€AND€SECOND€INJURY€FUNDó óˆÐ  М̛à Œ àI€disagree€with€the€majorityððs€decision€to€ð ðequitably€divideðð€the€total€awardÏbetween€the€employer€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€and€not€to€limit€theÏemployerððs€liability€to€the€first€400€weeks€of€the€award.€€€Applying€the€majority'sÏanalysis,€employers€will€be€deterred€from€the€hiring€of€the€handicapped.€€ForÏexample:ÌÌÓÓà8 Œ àX€is€20€years€old€and€has€a€prior€non„compensable€disability€of€75€à @¦! à¼percent.€€X€sustains€a€compensable€disability€of€25€percent€and€isÏrendered€permanently€and€totally€disabled.Ð Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌà8 Œ àY€is€20€years€old€with€no€previous€disability.€€Y€sustains€the€preciseÏinjury€that€X€sustained.€€Y€receives€a€25€percent€disability€ratingÏand€is€able€to€continue€working.ÓÓÐ Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌAccording€to€the€majority,€an€employer€will€pay€585€weeks€(25%€of€2340€weeks)Ïof€X's€total€compensation.€€Y,€however,€will€receive€only€100€weeks€(25%€of€400Ïweeks)€compensation€for€the€same€injury.€€Under€the€majorityððs€analysis,€X'sÏemployer€has€incurred€an€additional€485€weeks€or€nearly€six€times€the€liability€ofÏY's€employer€by€having€hired€an€employee€with€a€prior€disability€instead€of€anÏemployee€with€no€prior€disability.€€This€result€is€contrary€to€the€clear€purpose€ofÏthe€Second€Injury€Fund€and€will€have€a€devastating€impact€on€the€ability€of€theÏhandicapped€to€obtain€employment.ÌÌà Œ àThe€majority€asserts€that€"[t]here€is€no€indication€in€the€workers'Ïcompensation€law€that€the€legislature€intended€to€limit€an€employer's€liabilityÏunder€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208€to€400€weeks."€€Subsection€(b),€however,Ïexpressly€limits€an€employer's€œliabilityññ€ññññ›ññññ€ññññ›ññtoññ€ññññññ€ññññññ€ññññ"ññone›€œhundredññ€ññññ›ññññ€ññññ›ññpercentññ€ññññ›ññññññ€ññññññ€ññññ›ññññññ"ññññ(100%)›Ïpermanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole."€€Accordingly,€subsection€(b)€doesÏpurport€to€limit€an€employer's€liability.€€The€issue,€therefore,€becomes:€To€whatÐ ˜706 Ðdoes€100€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€equate€in€terms€of€compensability€asÏcontemplated€under€subsection€(b)?ÌÌà Œ àIf€a€worker€has€sustained€prior€permanent€partial€compensable€injuries€toÏthe€body€as€a€whole€of€30€percent€and€70€percent,€the€employer's€liability€isÏlimited€to€the€first€100€percent€or€400€weeks€compensation.€€If€a€worker€has€aÏprior€compensable€disability€of€50€percent€and€subsequently€sustains€aÏcompensable€disability€of€70€percent€but€is€able€to€earn€a€wage,€the€employer'sÏliability€is€still€limited€to€100€percent€or€400€weeks€total€compensation.€ÏAccordingly,€I€would€find€that€the€first€100€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€asÏcontemplated€under€subsection€(b)€equates€to€400€weeks€of€total€compensation.ÌÌò òà@ššDàAPPLICATION€OF€SUBSECTION€(a)€or€(b)ˆÐ h` Ðó óÌà Œ àI€disagree€with€the€majority's€approach€of€finding€both€subsection€(a)€andÏsubsection€(b)€applicable€in€cases€of€permanent€total€disability€and€then€applyingÏthe€subsection€favoring€the€employer.€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€was€createdÏmerely€to€assure€thatÔ‡X*HXXXÔ,€in€cases€of€permanent€total€disability,€Ô#‡ X*HXXX*Hn#Ôan€Ô‡X*HXXX*HÔemployer€incursÐ È(À!$ Ðthe€same€liabilityÔ#‡ X*HXXX*HÝ#ÔÔ‡X*HXXX*HÔ€by€hiring€a€disabled€worker€as€it€incurs€by€hiring€a€healthyÐ ¨* #& Ðworker.€€Accordingly,Ô#‡ X*HXXX*HU#Ô€the€Second€Injury€Fund€should€be€absolved€from€liabilityÐ ˆ,€%( Ðwhen€a€worker€with€a€preexisting€disability€sustains€a€catastrophic€injury€whichÏwould€render€even€a€healthy€worker€permanently€and€totally€disabled.ÌÌà Œ àAssume€Ô‡X*HXXX*HÔa€worker€with€a€preexisting€œññò òññcompensable›€œññó óññdisability›€of€35€percentÐ 4-0 Ðis€hired€by€an€employer.€€The€worker€then€sustains€a€catastrophic€injury€whichÏwould€cause€permanent€total€disability€œññò òññor›€100€percent€vocational€disability€œññó óññabsent›Ð È7À04 Ðany€preexisting€conditions.€€The€majority's€approach€is€as€follows:€€(1)€€underÏsubsection€(a),€the€employer€would€be€responsible€for€100€percent;€€(2)€€underÏsubsection€(b),€add€100€percent€to€the€preexisting€35€percent,€apportioning€65Ïpercent€to€the€employer€and€35€percent€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund;€and€(3)Ïchoose€the€result€favoring€the€employer.€€Accordingly,€the€majority€would€applyÏsubsection€(b)€(65€percent€instead€of€100€percent),€and€the€Second€Injury€FundÏwould€incur€liability€for€an€injury€that€would€have€caused€permanent€totalÏdisability€regardless€Ô#‡ X*HXXX*Hö#ÔÔ‡X*HXXX*HÔof€any€preexisting€condition.Ô#‡ X*HXXX*H·#ÔÔ‡X*HXXX*HÔÐ (  ÐÌÔ  Ôò òÓ  ÓHISTORICAL€ANALYSISÔ#‡ X*HXXX*H#ÔÔ‡X*HXXX*HÔó óÐ èà ÐÓYÓÌà Œ àA€prevailing€view€during€the€development€of€workers'€compensation€lawÏwas€that€an€employer€took€an€employee€as€he€found€him.€€òòE.€I.€du€Pont€deÐ ˆ€ МNemours›€&€Co.€v.€Friaróó,€404€S.W.2d€518,€521€(Tenn.€1966).€€The€employer,Ð h` Ðtherefore,€was€liable€for€all€disabilities€that€resulted€from€an€accident€thatÏaggravated€a€preexisting€physical€impairment.€€òòIdóó.€€Accordingly,€employersÐ (#  Ðassumed€additional€liability€by€hiring€individuals€suffering€physical€impairments.€ÏòòIdóó.€€This€additional€liability€led€to€considerable€resistance€in€the€hiring€of€theÐ è&à" Ðhandicapped.€€òòIdóó.Ð È(À!$ ÐÌà Œ àThe€legislature€recognized€that€employment€of€the€handicapped€was€inÏthe€interest€of€society€and€responded€by€enacting€the€Second€Injury€FundÏlegislation.€€òòIdóó.€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€was€designed€"to€overcome€some€of€theÐ H0@), Ðresistance€to€employment€of€disabled€persons."€€òòIdóó.€€To€overcome€thisÐ (2 +. Ðresistance,€the€Second€Injury€Fund€limited€an€employer's€liability€when€theÏemployer€hired€a€disabled€worker€and€the€worker€subsequently€becameÏpermanently€and€totally€disabled€by€a€compensable€injury.€€òòIdóó.€€Accordingly,€theÐ È7À04 Ðpurpose€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund€legislation€was€"to€encourage€employers€toÏhire€workers€with€an€existing€handicap€which€would€impair€their€competitiveÏposition€as€a€job€seeker."€€òòIdóó.;€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòBrown€v.€John€Martin€Const.€Co.óó,€642Ð È À ÐS.W.2d€145,€147€(Tenn.€1982)€(noting€statute€"seeks€to€reward€the€employer'sÏhumane€gesture"€by€limiting€its€liability).€€The€history€of€legislativeÏencouragement€in€the€hiring€of€the€handicapped€along€with€the€related€conceptÏof€limiting€employer€liability€must€be€considered€when€analyzing€subsection€(a)Ïand€the€later€addition€of€subsection€(b).ÌÌÔ  Ôò òòòÓ  ÓSubsection€(a)óóó óÐ èà ÐÓ{'ÓÌà Œ àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€operates€to€relieve€an€employer€of€liability€whileÏassuring€that€injured€employees€receive€full€compensation.€€The€statutoryÏprovisions€establishing€the€Second€Injury€Fund€are€codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€50„6„208.€€Subsection€(a)€of€ðð€50„6„208€reads€in€pertinent€part:ÌÌÓÓà8 Œ àIf€an€employee€has€previously€sustained€a€permanent€physicalÏdisability€from€any€cause€or€origin€and€becomes€permanently€andÏtotally€disabled€through€a€subsequent€injury,€such€employee€shallÏbe€entitled€to€compensation€from€such€employee's€employer€or€theÏemployer's€insurance€company€only€for€the€disability€that€wouldÏhave€resulted€from€the€subsequent€injury,€and€such€previous€injuryÏshall€not€be€considered€in€estimating€the€compensation€to€whichÏsuch€employee€may€be€entitled€under€this€Chapter€.€.€.Ð Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌÓú(ÓÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)(1).€€Subsection€(a)€also€provides€that:ÌÌÓÓà8 Œ àNothing€in€this€section€shall€be€construed€to€limit€the€employer'sÏliability€as€provided€by€law€for€aggravation€of€preexisting€conditionsÏor€disabilities€in€cases€where€recovery€against€the€second€injuryÏfund€is€not€applicable.Ð Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌÓŠ+ÓÐ È7À04 ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)(4).Ô#‡ X*HXXX*H›#ÔÐ  ÐÌà Œ àReading€subsections€(a)(1)€and€(a)(4)€in€òòparióó€òòmateriaóó,€òòLyons€v.€Rasaróó,€872Ð È À ÐS.W.2d€895,€897€(Tenn.€1994),€I€find€that€under€ðð€50„6„208(a)(1),€an€employer€isÏresponsible€only€for€that€disability€that€the€subsequent€work„related€injuryÏoccasioned.€€The€legislature's€insertion€of€subsection€(a)(4)€prohibitsÏconsideration€of€aggravation€or€exacerbation€of€preexisting€conditions€whenÏdetermining€an€employerððs€liability€under€subsection€(a).€€Accordingly,€anÏemployer€under€subsection€(a)€is€responsible€only€for€that€disability€that€wouldÏhave€resulted€from€the€subsequent€injury€had€the€earlier€injury€not€existed.ÌÌà Œ àThis€interpretation€furthers€the€legislative€purpose€of€enacting€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund.€€To€interpret€otherwise€would€run€counter€to€the€policy€ofÏencouraging€employers€to€hire€the€handicapped.€€I€shall€use€the€followingÏhypothetical€for€illustrative€purposes:ÌÌÓÓà8 Œ àEmployer€hires€two€employees,€X€and€Y.€€X€has€a€congenitalÏcondition€that€causes€a€5€percent€anatomical€disability.€€Y€has€noÏdisabilities.Ð Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌà8 Œ àBoth€X€and€Y€suffer€precisely€the€same€compensable€injury.€€YÏsustains€a€70€percent€vocational€impairment.€€X,€however,€isÏrendered€permanently€and€totally€disabled€when€the€compensableÏinjury€is€superimposed€over€X's€prior€disability.Ð Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌà8 Œ àX€is€entitled€to€benefits€until€age€65.€€Y,€however,€is€entitled€to€70Ïpercent€of€400€weeks,€or€280€weeks€of€compensation.€€The€SecondÏInjury€Fund€does€not€incur€a€portion€of€Y's€award.ÓÝ0ÓÐ Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌThis€example€assumes€that€X€would€have€sustained€only€a€70€percent€vocationalÏdisability€absent€the€preexisting€condition.€€If€the€employer€pays€benefits€aboveÏand€beyond€280€weeks,€the€employer€has€assumed€additional€liability€by€hiringÏan€individual€with€a€preexisting€disability.€€Moreover,€X's€disability€exceeding€70Ð ¸8°15 Ðpercent€is€either€attributable€to€a€preexisting€condition€or€to€an€aggravation€of€aÏpreexisting€disability.ÌÌà Œ àThe€above€result€holds€true€whether€the€employee's€preexisting€conditionÏis€compensable€or€noncompensable€under€the€Act.€€The€inverse,€as€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund€argues,€should€also€be€true.€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€should€not€be€Ïimplicated€if€the€subsequent€injury€would€have€in€and€of€itself€caused€permanentÏand€total€disability.€€òòSeeóó€òòChurch€v.€N.B.C€Co.€Inc.óó,€461€S.W.2d€387,€388€(Tenn.Ð (  Ð1970)€(holding€Second€Injury€Fund€not€implicated€when€"employee€sustainedÏtotal€permanent€disability€œ(100ññ€ññññ›ññññ€ññññ›ññperññ€ññññññ€ññññcent)›€from€the€current€disability€(silicosis)Ïwithout€considering€the€previous€permanent€disability€[of€35€percent]").ÌÌÔ  Ôò òòòÓ  ÓSubsection€(b)óóó óÐ ˆ€ ÐÓX8ÓÌà Œ àI€read€subsection€(b)€as€relying€on€a€mathematical€computation€to€assessÏawards€rather€than€on€the€relative€contribution€of€the€subsequent€injury.€ÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€50„6„208(b)(1)(A)€reads€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 Œ àIn€cases€where€the€injured€employee€has€received€or€will€receive€aÏworkers'€compensation€award€or€awards€for€permanent€disability€toÏthe€body€as€a€whole,€and€the€combination€of€such€awards€equals€orÏexceeds€one€hundred€percent€(100%)€permanent€disability€to€theÏbody€as€a€whole,€the€employee€shall€not€be€entitled€to€receive€fromÏthe€employer€or€its€insurance€carrier€any€compensation€forÏpermanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€that€would€be€in€excessÏof€one€hundred€percent€(100%)€permanent€disability€to€the€body€asÏa€whole,€after€combining€awards.Ð Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌÓ9ÓÌThe€Second€Injury€Fund€shall€pay€any€benefits€in€excess€of€100€percentÏâ âpermanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€after€all€compensable€awards€areÐ è5à.2 Ðcombined.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(b)(1)(B)€(1996€Supp.);€òòHenson€v.€City€ofÐ  ÐLawrenceburgóó,€851€S.W.2d€809,€812€(Tenn.€1993).Ð èà Ðâ âÌà Œ àSubsection€(b)€clearly€limits€an€employer's€exposure€for€all€compensableÏawards€to€the€first€100€percent€of€combined€permanent€vocational€disability.€ÏAssessment€under€subsection€(b)€is€as€follows:€€Employee€has€sustained€twoÏprior€compensable€awards€with€vocational€disabilities€totaling€75€percent€and€aÏnon„compensable€injury€of€5€percent.€€Employee€then€sustains€a€thirdÏcompensable€injury€which€causes€an€additional€30€percent€vocational€disability.€ÏThe€employee,€however,€can€still€perform€light€duty€and€earn€a€wage.€€Under€thisÏscenario,€the€non„compensable€injury€should€be€ignored€and€the€employerÏshould€be€responsible€for€25€percent€of€400€weeks€with€the€Second€Injury€FundÏincurring€the€remaining€5€percent€of€the€400€weeks.ÌÌÔ  Ôò òÓ  ÓApplication€of€subsections€(a)€and€(b)ó óÐ H!@ ÐÓd@ÓÌà Œ àHaving€determined€that€assessment€of€liability€is€different€underÏsubsections€(a)€and€(b),€I€shall€now€address€under€what€circumstances€a€trialÏcourt€applies€either€(a)€or€(b).€€I€believe€that€this€Court's€interpretation€of€bothÏsubsections'€applications€should€further€the€legislative€intent€in€enacting€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund.ÌÌà Œ àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€legislation€was€formerly€codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€50„1027.€€The€1945€amendment€to€ðð50„1027€reads€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 Œ àIf€an€employee€has€previously€sustained€a€permanent€disability€byÏreason€of€the€loss€of,€or€loss€of€use€of,€a€hand,€an€arm,€a€foot,€aÏleg,€or€an€eye€and€becomes€permanently€and€totally€incapacitatedÏthrough€the€loss,€or€loss€of€use€of€another€member,€he€shall€beÐ ¸8°15 Ðentitled€to€compensation€from€his€employer€or€the€employer'sÏinsurance€carrier;€.€.€.€provided,€however,€that€in€addition€to€suchÏcompensation€for€said€subsequent€injury,€and€after€completion€ofÏthe€payments€therefor,€then€such€employee€shall€be€paid€theÏremainder€of€the€compensation€that€would€be€due€for€theÏpermanent€total€disability€out€of€a€special€fund€to€be€known€as€theÏ"second€injury€fund"€herein€created.Ð Œ ü!Œ ü! ÐÌÓ²BÓÌAccordingly,€the€1945€amendment€addressed€only€that€situation€in€which€anÏemployee€was€rendered€permanently€and€totally€disabled€as€the€result€of€aÏsubsequent€injury.€€The€1945€amendment€did€not€contain€a€provisionÏcomparable€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(b)(1)€that€addresses€compensableÏpermanent€partial€vocational€disabilities€exceeding€100€percent€in€the€aggregate.ÌÌà Œ àThe€1945€amendment€is€similar€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)(1).ññ׃×ññññ׃'×ññÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р¨  ÐBoth€statutes€require€a€subsequent€injury€causing€a€permanent€total€disability.€ÏBoth€statutes€further€provide€that€prior€injuries€shall€not€be€considered€whenÏestimating€the€current€award.€€The€1945€amendment,€however,€limited€recoveryÏto€situations€in€which€an€employee€previously€sustained€a€permanent€disability€toÏa€hand,€arm,€foot,€leg,€or€eye€and€subsequently€became€permanently€and€totallyÏdisabled€as€the€result€of€an€injury€to€"another€member."ÌÌà Œ àOur€present€statute,€as€amended,€extends€subsection€(a)'s€coverage€toÏencompass€all€forms€of€preexisting€conditions.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð50-6-208Ð ˆ,€%( Ð(stating€"[i]f€an€employee€has€sustained€permanent€physical€impairment€from€òòanyÐ h.`'* Ðcause€or€originóó€.€.€.")€(emphasis€added).€€Accordingly,€subsection€(a)€shouldÐ H0@), Ðapply€when€a€permanently€and€totally€disabled€worker€has€sustained:€€(1)€€priorÐ (2 +. Ðcompensable€injury(ies);€(2)€€prior€noncompensable€injury(ies);€or€(3)€€aÏcombination€of€prior€compensable€and€non„compensable€injuries.€€TheÏlegislature's€inclusion€of€the€"catch€all"€phrase€in€subsection€(a)€is€an€indicationÏthat€the€legislature€intended€subsection€(a)€to€apply€whenever€a€subsequentÏinjury€causes€permanent€and€total€disability.ÌÌà Œ àBoth€the€inclusion€of€the€"catch€all"€phrase€in€subsection€(a)€and€theÏaddition€of€subsection€(b)€appeared€in€the€1985€amendment.€€I,€therefore,€find€itÏimprobable€that€the€legislature€intended€subsection€(b)€to€apply€to€subsequentÏinjuries€causing€permanent€and€ò òòòtotalóóó ó€disabilities€when€it€simultaneouslyÐ èà Ðbroadened€subsection€(a)€to€encompass€all€permanent€total€disabilitiesÏregardless€of€the€origin€of€the€preexisting€conditions.ÌÌà Œ àI€believe€it€an€untenable€proposition€that€the€legislature€intended€bothÏsubsections€to€apply€to€the€same€case€and€render€a€different€result.œ€€ññò òIn€this€case,Ïan€application€of€subsection€(a)€would€require€the€employer€to€pay€20€percent€ofÏthe€award;€an€application€of€subsection€(b)€would€require€the€employer€to€pay€65Ïpercent€of€the€award.€€ó óññThe›Ïmajority's€solution€is€to€apply€whichever€subsection€is€ð ðfavorable€to€theÏemployer.ðð€€The€statute,€however,€neither€mandates€nor€requires€thisÏconstruction.ÌœÌññò òññà Œ àThe€application€of€both€subsections€may€occur€under€the€majority'sÏanalysisññññ,€for€example,ññññ€whenever€an€employee€becomes€rehabilitated€after€receivingÏpermanent€partial€disability€awards€under€the€workers'€compensation€statute.€ÏññFor€example,€ññññññIfññññ€ññññan€employee€who€has€prior€permanent€partial€compensableÏdisabilities€totaling€80€percent€returns€to€work€and€is€able€to€perform€as€well€asÏprior€to€the€injuries.€€The€€employee€then€sustains€a€work„related€injury€thatÏcauses€the€employee€to€become€permanently€and€totally€disabled.€€The€trialÏcourt€finds€under€subsection€(a)€that€the€last€injury€caused€a€40€percentÐ È7À04 Ðvocational€disability€absent€consideration€of€the€prior€injuries.€€Under€my€analysisÏthe€employee€would€receive€a€40€percent€award€from€the€employer,€with€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€responsible€for€the€remaining€60€percent.€€I€would€not€applyÏsubsection€(b).€€ÌÌà Œ àThe€majority€would€agree€that€the€employer€is€responsible€for€40€percentÏunder€subsection€(a).€€Applying€subsection€(b),€however,€the€majority€would€findÏthe€employer€responsible€for€20€percent€(the€difference€between€the€prior€awardsÏand€100€percent)€and€Second€Injury€Fund€responsible€for€20€percent€(80€percentÏ+€40€percent,€with€that€portion€exceeding€100€percent€apportioned€to€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund).€€Since€the€20€percent€finding€is€more€favorable€to€the€employerÏthan€the€40€percent€finding,€the€majority€would€apply€subection€(b).€€What€theÏmajority€fails€to€address€is€that€the€employee€will€receive€only€40€percent€of€theÏtotal€disability€award€under€the€majority's€analysis.€›Ìœññó óññÌ›à Œ àWe€should€presume€that€the€legislature€did€not€intend€an€absurdity€andÏadopt€a€reasonable€construction€which€avoids€statutory€conflict.€€òòCronin€v.€Howeóó,Ð %  Ð906€S.W.2d€910,€912€(Tenn.€1995);€€òòEpstein,€v.€Stateóó,€211€Tenn.€633,€366Ð è&à" ÐS.W.2d€914€(1963).€€Interpreting€the€subsections€to€be€mutually€exclusive€avoidsÏarbitrarily€deciding€which€subsection€shall€apply.€€I€would€therefore€overrule€thisÏCourtððs€holding€in€òòPerryóó€that€the€subsections€are€not€mutually€exclusive.€€òòPerry€v.Ð ˆ,€%( ÐSentry€Ins.€Co.óó,€938€S.W.2d€404€(Tenn.€1996).Ð h.`'* ÐÌà Œ àUpon€reading€the€statutes€in€òòparióó€òòmateriaóó€and€examining€the€plainÐ (2 +. Ðlanguage€of€the€ðð€50„6„208(a)€&€(b),€I€would€find€that€subsection€(a)€appliesÏwhen€there€is€a€subsequent€injury€and€the€employee€is€rendered€permanentlyÏand€totally€disabled.€€Subsection€(b)€applies€only€when€the€employee€is€still€ableÐ È7À04 Ðto€earn€a€wage€or€be€gainfully€employed€but€has€received€compensableÏvocational€disabilities€which€exceed€100€percent€or€400€weeks€of€compensation.Ô‡X*HXXX*HÔÐ èà ÐÌÔ  Ôà Œ àIn€this€case,€Bomely€was€rendered€permanently€and€totally€disabled€as€aÏresult€of€the€1994€compensable€injury.€€He€previously€had€sustained€bothÏcompensable€and€noncompensable€injuries.€€Because€Bomely€is€no€longer€ableÏto€earn€a€wage,€I€would€hold€that€subsection€(b)€does€not€apply.€€His€employerÏhad€notice€of€his€preexisting€conditions.€€Accordingly,€subsection€(a)€applies.€€IÏwould€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that,€under€subsection€(a),€Bomely€sustainedÏa€20€percent€disability€as€a€result€of€the€1994€injury€and€that€the€liability€of€theÏemployer€is€limited€to€the€first€400€weeks€of€disability.ÌÌà Œ àUnder€subsection€(a)€I€believe€we€should€determine€what€vocationalÏdisability€the€1994€injury€would€have€caused€if€Bomely€had€no€preexistingÏcondition.€€Although€the€trial€judge€erroneously€decided€the€case€underÏsubsection€(b),€he€alternatively€found€that€under€subsection€(a)€Bomely€wouldÏhave€sustained€a€20€percent€vocational€disability€absent€consideration€of€hisÏpreexisting€conditions.€€I€would€find€that€the€trial€judge's€finding€of€20€percent€isÏsupported€by€the€record.€€I€would,€therefore,€apportion€under€subsection€(a)€asÏfollows:€€(1)€€the€employer€is€responsible€for€20€percent€of€400€weeks;€and€(2)€Ïthe€Second€Injury€Fund€is€responsible€for€the€remaining€benefits€until€age€65.ÌÌà Œ àI€am€mindful€that€this€holding€would€have€a€harsh€impact€on€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund€in€light€of€the€legislative€amendment€which€permits€benefits€until€ageÏ65.€€The€legislature,€however,€did€not€amend€the€language€providing€forÏassessment€of€liability€under€subsections€(a)€and€(b)€when€it€amended€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð50-6207(4)(A)(I)€to€permit€benefits€to€age€65.€€Moreover,€the€policyÐ È7À04 Ðwhich€dictated€the€Second€Injury€Fund€has€not€been€altered.€€Accordingly,€IÏbelieve€we€are€constrained€to€interpret€the€statute€in€a€manner€which€furthers€theÏpolicy€that€dictated€the€legislation.€€I€would€overrule€cases€holding€to€theÏcontrary.€€Although€I€fully€subscribe€to€the€need€for€òòstareóó€òòdecisisóó,€I€am€willing€toÐ ¨   Ðabandon€an€analysis€that€in€hindsight€does€not€further€the€purposes€of€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€statute.ÌÌà Œ àThe€majority€bases€its€analysis€on€a€theory€of€equity.€€Equity,€however,€isÏnot€a€policy€that€dictated€the€Second€Injury€Fund€legislation.€€The€Second€InjuryÏFund€was€created€to€encourage€the€hiring€of€the€handicapped.€€The€majority€inÏstriving€for€equity,€however,€has€essentially€altered€or€re„legislated€the€policy€thatÏdictated€the€creation€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund.Ô#‡ X*HXXX*H>\#ÔÐ ¨  ÐÌÌÓÓÌà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àòòà€T$T$MT$àóóˆÐ 8"0 Ðà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àJanice€M.€Holder,€JusticeœÔ†ÿÿÔÔ†ÿÿÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔñBñ