ÿWPCCF f %¤jª 0(F<‚w@Š4ÊbÞ B-æ 0Â Õ U4ä 0D UN\ 0Jª Fô 0T: 0DŽ 0^Ò U:0 0hj BÒ Cï AM ÆV 0@ 0K\ D3§Ú AMâÆ/ 0Dõ D+9 AQd 0rµ 0|'Æ£ 0Di D/­ 0DÜ B  0 â=fb! 0†) 0¯Æ?Æ 0DË 1uUHŒbÔ 0dÜ h„@U>ÄU.*U*,B)VDC AOÂ5öF<ZÙ13$5d'f™(D+›(aÆ(òÚ(xÌ*U6D+5z+/¯,ûÞ/\Ù255·Å7v|:v~ò>vÓp@XMemo - Traditional  ' '  0 .   ($¡¡c:\wpwin60\template\memo\memo1.wpt 3*[4*«5*Ó€B*VC*(îD*Ó€P*Q*VR*îS*Ó€Ft‹#Ä3Ø'°°- ù-)Hairline dF>> 4_HeadingsHeadingsÔ€XzXXXÔÔ€ò¤òXXzÔÔ€XzXXXÔÔ€ò¤òXXzÔ3|x^*0²ž]A ‹Arial Bold(2¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(@øÐ Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ôc:\wpwin60\template\memo\memo1.wpt2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(-Ã$òòÚ  Ú5Ú  Úóó2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d÷ÿdÿÿÿd !A<< CÿÿLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'ÿÿdxd$%&Aýÿ<< Cÿÿ„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$••ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'ÈÈÈÈdxd*+,Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxd(3¯$§§Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝüÿP Pd(sG2|$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑ,°ÑÑü°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€Xñ‘XXXÔà Ø àÔ€ôÙôXXñ‘ÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ- ù-2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý()56 ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)<à09Z 0Courier (WT) Regular- ù-P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ333333ÐTABLE A3< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 dNNNN7Border 1dd* OCþÿ << Gÿÿ +Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€IÔÔ€IÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€IXÔÌÌò òDecember€31,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€IôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ìÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝRule€37(b)(2)(I),€Tenn.€R.€Crim›.€P.,€provides€in€pertinent€part€as€follows:Ìà8 àà8 à(b)€An€appeal€lies€from€any€order€or€judgment€in€a€criminalÏproceeding€where€the€law€provides€for€such€appeal,€and€from€anyÏjudgment€of€conviction:€(2)€Upon€a€plea€of€guilty€or€noloÏcontendere€if:€(I)€Defendant€entered€into€a€plea€agreement€underÏRule€11(e)€but€explicitly€reserved€with€the€consent€of€the€state€andÏof€the€court€the€right€to€appeal€a€certified€question€of€law€that€isÏdispositive€of€the€case.€.€.€.Ì “Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€Fourth€Amendment€is€applicable€to€the€states€through€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€ÏòòMapp€v.€Ohioóó,€367€U.S.€643,€655,€81€S.Ct.€1684,€1691,€6€L.Ed.2d€1081€(1961).Ì PÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝCompare€cases€where€the€officer€actually€felt€the€contraband€itself€or€felt€the€contrabandÏthrough€packaging€that€did€not€conceal€the€contentsðð€nature,€e.g.,€òòUnited€States€v.€Craftóó,€30€F.3dÏ1044,€1045€(8th€Cir.€1994)€(bulges€of€heroine€packages€around€defendantððs€ankles);€òòUnited€StatesÏv.€Hughesóó,€15€F.3d€798,€802€(8th€Cir.€1994)€(ð ðsmall€lumpsðð€of€crack€cocaine);€òòTrineóó,€673€A.2d€atÏ1111€(rock€of€cocaine€in€pocket);€òòPeople€v.€Mitchellóó,€650€N.E.2d€1014,€1024€(Ill.€1995)€(piece€ofÏð ðrockðð€cocaine€inside€baggie);€òòState€v.€Wilsonóó,€437€S.E.2d€387,€389€(N.C.€App.€1993)€(ð ðlumpsðð€inÏpackage€in€breast€pocket);€òòCommonwealth€v.€Dorseyóó,€654€A.2d€1086,€1087€(Pa.€Super.€1995)Ï(ð ðlumpðð€in€plastic€bag);€òòState€v.€Buchananóó,€504€N.W.2d€400,€404€(Wis.€App.€1993)€(plastic€bagÏcontaining€cocaine€in€waistband).€Ì 'Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€defendant€did€not€contend€that€the€Tennessee€Constitution€affords€greaterÏprotection€against€searches€and€seizures€than€does€the€federal€constitution€with€regard€to€the€plainÏfeel€doctrine.€€The€plain€feel€doctrine€as€formulated€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€inÏòòDickersonóó€is€consistent€with€principles€enunciated€by€this€Court€in€interpreting€Article€I,€Section€7.ÏòòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Roodeóó,€643€S.W.2d€651,€653€(Tenn.€1982).€€Consequently,€that€doctrine,€withÏits€specific€limitations€will€be€applied€in€appropriate€cases€in€this€state.€€Ì +Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€IÔÔ€IÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€IXÔÌÌò òDecember€31,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€IôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó'ÿÿddTABLE_A èÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€record€in€this€case€is€by€no€means€a€textbook€example€or€a€model€of€clarity.€€No€implicitÏconclusion€would€have€been€necessary€had€the€State,€at€the€suppression€hearing,€simply€askedÏOfficer€Blackwell€to€describe€his€experience€in€prior€drug€cases.Ì nÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ:)ÝÝ  ÝÌÌ< Œ 9p`(Courier New +Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€IÔÔ€IÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€IXÔÌÌò òDecember€31,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€IôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó %Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€\ÔThe€Fourth€Amendment€provides€that€ð ð[t]he€right€of€the€people€toÏbe€secure€in€their€persons,€houses,€papers,€and€effects,€againstÏunreasonable€searches€and€seizures,€shall€not€be€violated,€and€noÏwarrants€shall€issue,€but€upon€probable€cause,€supported€by€oath€orÏaffirmation,€and€particularly€describing€the€place€to€be€searched,€andÏthe€persons€or€things€to€be€seized.ðð€€The€Fourth€Amendment€is€applicableÏto€the€states€through€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€€òòMapp€v.€Ohioóó,€367€U.S.Ï643,€655,€81€S.€Ct.€1684,€1691,€6€L.€Ed.€2d€1081€(1961).Ì ñÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€\ÔArticle€I,€Section€7,€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€providesÏð ð[t]hat€the€people€shall€be€secure€in€their€persons,€houses,€papers€andÏpossessions,€from€unreasonable€searches€and€seizures;€and€that€generalÏwarrants,€whereby€an€officer€may€be€commanded€to€search€suspected€places,Ïwithout€evidence€of€the€fact€committed,€or€to€seize€any€person€or€personsÏnot€named,€whose€offences€are€not€particularly€described€and€supported€byÏevidence,€are€dangerous€to€liberty€and€ought€not€to€be€granted.ððÌ RÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€\ÔThe€State€did€not€present€this€argument€in€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals;€however,€this€was€the€primary€argument€made€to€the€trial€court,Ïwhich€found€the€ð ðòòarrestóó€and€friskðð€of€the€defendant€supported€byÏð ðarticulable€facts.ðð€€The€trial€court€made€no€finding€concerning€theÏapplication€of€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine.Ì †Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€\ÔWhen€an€arrest€is€made,€an€officer€may€search€the€person€arrestedÏin€order€to€remove€any€weapons€that€the€arrestee€might€try€to€use€toÏresist€arrest€or€effect€an€escape.€€In€addition,€the€officer€may€ð ðsearchÏfor€and€seize€any€evidence€on€the€arresteeððs€person€in€order€to€preventÏits€concealment€or€destruction.ðð€€òòChimel€v.€Californiaóó,€395€U.S.€at€762„63,€89€S.€Ct.€at€2040.Ì ­Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€\ÔThe€validity€of€the€initial€detention€in€òòDickersonóó€was€notÏcontested.€€However,€Justice€Scalia€stated,€ð ðMy€problem€with€the€presentÏcase€is€that€I€am€not€entirely€sure€that€the€physical€search„the€ð ðfriskðð„that€produced€the€evidence€at€issue€here€complied€with€[the]Ïconstitutional€standard.ðð€€òòDickersonóó,€508€U.S.€at€_____,€113€S.Ct.€atÏ2139€(J.€Scalia,€concurring).€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì lÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ , ÑÑ ü ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€IÔà àÔ€IôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€\ÔCompare€cases€where€the€officer€actually€felt€the€contrabandÏitself€or€felt€the€contraband€through€packaging€that€did€not€conceal€theÏcontentsðð€nature,€e.g.,€òòUnited€State€v.€Craftóó,€30€F.3d€1044,€1045€(8thÏCir.€1994)€(bulges€of€heroine€packages€around€defendantððs€ankles);€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Hughesóó,€15€F.3d€798,€802€(8th€Cir.€1994)€(ð ðsmall€lumpsðð€ofÏcrack€cocaine);€òòState€v.€Trineóó,€673€A.2d€at€1111€(rock€of€cocaine€inÏpocket);€òòPeople€v.€Mitchellóó,€650€N.E.2d€1014,€1024€(Ill.€1995)(piece€ofÏð ðrockðð€cocaine€inside€baggie);€òòState€v.€Wilsonóó,€437€S.E.2d€387,€389€(N.C.ÏApp.€1993)€(ð ðlumpsðð€in€package€in€breast€pocket);€òòCommonwealth€v.€Dorseyóó,Ï654€A.2d€1086,€1087€(Pa.€Super.€1995)€(ð ðlumpðð€in€plastic€bag);€òòState€v.ÏBuchananóó,€504€N.W.2d€400,€404€(Wis.€App.€1993)€(plastic€bag€containingÏcocaine€in€waistband).€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€GÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€IÔÑ\R AØ'\ћрÑÑ7€¼~XXdìdÈ7ÑØ ØÓ&€KKXÐd&Ӝـ*ÙßR€PQOA1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àà àà àà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à àà àà à)à àœò òFiled:€December€31,€1997›ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHENRY€CRIMINALà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌRAY€ANTHONY€BRIDGES,à àà à)à à€Hon.€Julian€P.€œGuinn›,à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€€€€ÏJudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant„Appellant.à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€02S01„9606„CC„00053à àÔ€GÔÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€ÌÌÔ€IÔÌÓÓòòÌÌFor€Plaintiff„Appellee:à àà àà àà àFor€Defendant„Appellant:ÌÓÓóóJohn€Knox€Walkupà àà àà àà àà àLarry€E.€FitzgeraldÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àà àMemphis,€TennesseeÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌMichael€E.€MooreÌSolicitor€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌGordon€W.€SmithÌAssociate€Solicitor€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌG.€Robert€ð ðGusðð€RadfordÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌHuntingdon,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€I¼Ôò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€IXÔÌÌÌÌÌJUDGMENT€OF€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€ÌREVERSED;€CONVICTION€VACATED;ÌCHARGE€DISMISSED.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAM.ÇÑ , ÑÑ ` ÑÓÓà àThe€primary€issue€in€this€appeal€is€whether€the€warrantless€seizure€ofÏcocaine€from€the€defendantððs€person€during€a€detention€and€frisk€wasÏconstitutionally€permissible€under€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€or€ð ðplain€touchðð€doctrineÏexpounded€in€òòMinnesota€v.€Dickersonóó,€508€U.S.€366,€113€S.Ct.€2130,€124ÏL.Ed.2d€334€(1993).€€In€this€case,€the€trial€court€denied€the€defendantððs€motion€toÏsuppress,€and€thereafter,€the€defendant€pled€guilty€to€possession€of€cocaine€withÏintent€to€sell,€but€reserved€the€right€to€appeal€the€constitutionality€of€theÏwarrantless€seizure€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37(b)(2).× ƒR ××  ×€€The€Court€ofÏCriminal€Appeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€motion€to€suppress.€ÏThereafter,€we€granted€permission€to€appeal.ÌÌà àA€majority€of€this€Court€has€determined€that€the€initial€stop€and€frisk€wasÏbased€upon€reasonable€suspicion€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts.€ÍHowever,€a€majority€of€this€Court€has€also€concluded€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€officer€had€probable€causeÏto€believe€the€object€felt€during€the€frisk€was€contraband.€€Consequently,€theÏjudgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€upholding€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€theÏmotion€to€suppress€is€reversed.€€The€defendantððs€conviction€is€vacated,€and€theÏcharge€is€dismissed.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òBACKGROUNDÌóóó óà àThe€proof€at€the€suppression€hearing€showed€that€at€2:47€p.m.€onÏDecember€23,€1993,€Officer€D.W.€Blackwell€of€the€Paris€Police€Department€had€aÏphone€conversation€with€a€confidential€informant€who€had€provided€reliableÏinformation€in€the€past€leading€to€a€conviction€on€a€cocaine€charge.€€According€toÏthe€informant,€the€defendant,€Ray€Anthony€Bridges,€was€selling€crack€cocaineÏð ðright€thenðð€at€a€club€called€ð ðPreacherððs.ðð€€The€informant€further€said€that€Bridges,Ïwas€carrying€cash€and€drugs€on€his€person.€Officer€Blackwell€had€previouslyÏreceived€ð ðhalf€a€dozen€or€soðð€tips€regarding€the€defendantððs€dealing€crackÍcocaine€in€that€area.€€Officer€Blackwell€proceeded€to€Preacherððs,€arrivedÏapproximately€thirty€minutes€later€at€3:21€p.m,€and€found€Bridges€sitting€at€a€tableÏinside€Preachers€engaged€in€conversation.€€Aware€that€Bridges€previously€hadÏbeen€convicted€of€felony€assault€and€recently€had€been€involved€in€an€armedÏaltercation€with€police,€Officer€Blackwell€identified€himself€and€ordered€Bridges€toÏstand€against€the€wall.€€€Officer€Blackwell€then€patted€down€the€outside€of€BridgesÏclothing€to€ensure€he€was€not€carrying€weapons.€€During€the€patdown,€OfficerÏBlackwell€felt€a€small€object€ð ðin€the€shape€of€a€pill€bottleðð€in€the€defendantððs€rightÏjacket€pocket€and,€recognized€it€as€ð ðthe€kind€that€a€lot€of€other€crack€dealers€willÏuse€to€keep€their€crack€in.ðð€€Officer€Blackwell€seized€the€bottle,€and€uponÏinspection,€determined€that€it€contained€crack€cocaine,€and€he€also€found€a€knifeÏin€the€defendantððs€right€pants€pocket.€€As€a€result,€Bridges€was€arrested,€and€aÏfurther€search€was€conducted€of€the€defendantððs€person,€during€which€OfficerÏBlackwell€discovered€a€plastic€bag€of€cocaine€ð ðin€the€same€pocketðð€from€whichÏthe€pill€bottle€containing€crack€had€been€removed.€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€€denied€the€defendantððs€pretrial€motion€to€suppress€theÍevidence,€and,€upon€appeal,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€affirmed€the€denial.€ÏFor€the€reasons€hereafter€explained,€a€majority€of€this€Court€now€concludes€thatÏseizure€of€the€pill€bottle€violated€the€defendantððs€constitutional€rights.€ÏAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€upholding€the€trialÏcourtððs€denial€of€the€motion€to€suppress€is€reversed.ÌÌà@ àòòò òSTANDARD€OF€REVIEWó óóóÌà àThis€case€involves€the€review€of€a€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€and€law€inÏdisposing€of€a€motion€to€suppress.€€In€òòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18€(Tenn.Ï1996),€this€Court€clarified€the€standard€to€be€applied€by€an€appellate€court€whenÏreviewing€a€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€on€suppression€issues.à8 àÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àQuestions€of€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€theÏweight€and€value€of€the€evidence,€and€resolution€ofÏconflicts€in€the€evidence€are€matters€entrusted€to€theÏtrial€judge€as€the€trier€of€fact.€€The€party€prevailing€inÏthe€trial€court€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€viewÏof€the€evidence€adduced€at€the€suppression€hearingÏas€well€as€all€reasonable€and€legitimate€inferencesÏthat€may€be€drawn€from€that€evidence.€€So€long€as€theÏgreater€weight€of€the€evidence€supports€the€trialÏcourtððs€findings,€those€findings€shall€be€upheld.€€InÏother€words,€a€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€in€aÍsuppression€hearing€will€be€upheld€unless€theÏevidence€preponderates€otherwise.ÌÓÓÌòòIdóó.€at€18.€€However,€the€application€of€the€law€to€the€facts€found€by€the€trial€court€isÏa€question€of€law€which€this€Court€reviews€de€novo.€€òòState€v.€Yearganóó,€___ÏS.W.2d€___,€___€(Tenn.€1997).Ì̛̜à@ àòòò òCONSTITUTIONAL€PROVISIONSó óóóÌà àWe€begin€our€analysis€of€the€issue€in€this€appeal€with€the€text€of€theÏapplicable€constitutional€provisions.€€The€Fourth€Amendment€× ƒS ××  ×€to€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àò òà8 àUnreasonable€searches€and€seizures.€„€ó óTheÏright€of€the€people€to€be€secure€in€their€persons,Ïhouses,€papers,€and€effects,€against€unreasonableÏsearches€and€seizures,€shall€not€be€violated,€and€noÏwarrants€shall€issue,€but€upon€probable€cause,Ïsupported€by€oath€or€affirmation,€and€particularly€Ïdescribing€the€place€to€be€searched,€and€the€personsÏor€things€to€be€seized.ÌÓÓÌSimilarly,€Article€1,€Section€7€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€guaranteesÌÓÓà8 àà8 àthat€the€people€shall€be€secure€in€their€persons,Ïhouses,€papers€and€possessions,€from€unreasonableÏsearches€and€seizures;€and€that€general€warrants,Ïwhereby€an€officer€may€be€commanded€to€searchÏsuspected€places,€without€evidence€of€the€factÏcommitted,€or€to€seize€any€person€or€persons€notÏnamed,€whose€offences€are€not€particularly€describedÏand€supported€by€evidence,€are€dangerous€to€libertyÏand€ought€not€to€be€granted.ÌÓÓÌThe€purpose€of€the€prohibition€against€unreasonable€searches€and€seizuresÏunder€the€Fourth€Amendment€is€to€ð ðsafeguard€the€privacy€and€security€ofÏindividuals€against€arbitrary€invasions€of€government€officials.ðð€€òòCamara€v.ÏMunicipal€Courtóó,€387€U.S.€523,€528,€87€S.Ct.€1727,€1730,€18€L.Ed.2d€930€(1967).€Ïð ð[A]rticle€I,€section€7€is€identical€in€intent€and€purpose€with€the€FourthÏAmendment.ðð€€òòState€v.€Downeyóó,€945€S.W.2d€102,€106€(Tenn.€1997),€quotingÏòòSneed€v.€Stateóó,€221€Tenn.€6,€13,€423€S.W.2d€857,€860€(1968).ÌÌà àConsequently,€under€both€the€federal€and€state€constitutions,€aÍwarrantless€search€or€seizure€is€presumed€unreasonable,€and€evidenceÏdiscovered€as€a€result€thereof€is€subject€to€suppression€unless€the€StateÏdemonstrates€that€the€search€or€seizure€was€conducted€pursuant€to€one€of€theÏnarrowly€defined€exceptions€to€the€warrant€requirement.€€òòCoolidge€v.€NewÏHampshireóó,€403€U.S.€443,€454„55,€91€S.Ct.€2022,€2032,€29€L.Ed.2d€564€(1971);ÏòòState€v.€Bartramóó,€925€S.W.2d€227,€229„30€(Tenn.€1996).ÌÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€no€exceptions€to€the€warrant€requirement€areÏapplicable€in€this€case€and€that€Officer€Blackwell€had€no€right€to€detain€or€searchÏhim.€€The€State,€on€the€other€hand,€argues€that€Officer€Blackwell€had€probableÏcause€to€arrest€the€defendant€and€that€the€search€of€the€defendantððs€person€wasÏpermissible€as€a€search€incident€to€an€arrest,€an€exception€to€the€warrantÏrequirement.€€Alternatively,€the€State€contends€that€the€initial€detention€andÏpatdown€search€were€valid€as€a€stop€and€frisk€under€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€88ÏS.Ct.€1868,€20€L.Ed.2d€889€(1968),€and€the€seizure€of€the€evidence€permissibleÏunder€the€plain€touch€doctrine.ÌÌà@ àòòò òSEARCH€INCIDENT€TO€A€LAWFUL€ARRESTóóó óÌà àBecause€a€search€incident€to€a€lawful€arrest€is€an€exception€to€the€warrantÏrequirement€which€would€independently€support€the€warrantless€search€of€theÏdefendantððs€person€and€seizure€of€the€pill€bottle,€we€first€determine€whether€theÏsearch€and€seizure€in€this€case€was€pursuant€to€a€lawful€arrest.€€òòSee€Chimel€v.ÏCaliforniaóó,€395€U.S.€752,€762„63,€89€S.Ct.€2034,€2040,€23€L.Ed.2d€685€(1969);ÏòòState€v.€Marshallóó,€870€S.W.2d€532,€540€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).ÌÌà àBoth€the€Fourth€Amendment€and€Article€I,€Section€7,€require€the€existenceÏof€ð ðprobable€causeðð€for€making€an€arrest€without€a€warrant.€€òòBeck€v.€Ohioóó,€379ÏU.S.€89,€91,€85€S.Ct.€223,€225,€13€L.Ed.€2d€142€(1964);€òòState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778ÏS.W.2d€430,€431€(Tenn.€1989);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€GÔððÔ€IÔ€40„7„103(a)(officersÏmay€make€a€warrantless€arrest€when€they€have€probable€cause€to€believe€thatÏthe€arrestee€has€committed€or€is€committing€a€felony).€€Probable€cause€for€anÏarrest€without€a€warrant€exists€if,€at€the€time€of€the€arrest,€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€within€the€knowledge€of€the€officers,€and€of€which€they€hadÏreasonably€trustworthy€information,€are€ð ðsufficient€to€warrant€a€prudent€man€inÍbelieving€that€the€[defendant]€had€committed€or€was€committing€an€offense.ðð€ÏòòBeckóó,€379€U.S.€at€91,€85€S.Ct.€at€225;€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€638€S.W.2d€342,€350Ï(Tenn.€1982).€€In€addition,€before€a€finding€of€probable€cause€may€be€based€uponÏan€informantððs€tip,€the€basis€of€the€informantððs€knowledge€and€the€informantððsÏcredibility€must€also€be€established.€€òòState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€430,€432„436Ï(Tenn.€1989).€€In€this€case,€the€officer€acted€in€response€to€a€informantððs€tip;Ïtherefore€we€must€apply€the€two„pronged€test€to€evaluate€the€reliability€of€the€tip.ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case€the€informant€who€provided€the€tip€about€theÏdefendantððs€criminal€activity€had€assisted€Officer€Blackwell€on€a€caseÏapproximately€eight€years€earlier€in€which€an€arrest€and€conviction€were€madeÏon€a€cocaine€charge.€€Blackwell€had€known€this€informant€for€a€number€of€yearsÏand€said€this€informant€had€ð ðalways€been€very€straightforward€and€very€honestÏand€very€reliableðð€with€him.€€€These€facts€minimally€satisfy€the€credibility€prong€ofÏthe€òòJacuminóó€test.€ÌÌà àHowever,€the€evidence€is€deficient€as€to€the€second€prong€of€òòJacuminóó.€InÍother€words,€there€is€no€evidence€of€the€basis€of€the€informantððs€knowledge,€thatÏis,€how€the€informant€knew€that€Bridges€was€at€Preacherððs€selling€cocaine.ÏNonetheless,€where€a€tip€fails€under€either€or€both€of€the€two€prongs,€probableÏcause€may€still€be€established€by€independent€police€investigative€work€thatÏcorroborates€the€tip€to€such€an€extent€that€it€supports€the€inference€that€theÏinformant€was€reliable€and€that€the€informant€made€the€charge€on€the€basis€ofÏinformation€obtained€in€a€reliable€way.€€òòSeeóó€òòSpinelli€v.€United€Statesóó,€393€U.S.Ï410,€417„18,€89€S.Ct.€584,€589„90,€21€L.Ed.€2d€637€(1969);€òòJacuminóó,€778€S.W.2dÏat€436.€€Here,€the€State€argues€that€the€tip€was€sufficiently€corroborated€toÏovercome€any€deficiency.€€First,€the€State€points€out€that€Officer€Blackwell€hadÏreceived€a€half€dozen€prior€tips€that€the€defendant€had€engaged€in€similar€illegalÏactivity€at€this€specific€location.€€Second,€the€State€argues€that€Blackwell€knewÏthat€the€defendant€was€a€convicted€drug€dealer.€€Third,€the€State€argues€thatÏOfficer€Blackwell€found€the€defendant€at€Preacherððs€exactly€as€the€informant€hadÏsaid€he€would€be€soon€after€Blackwell€received€the€tip.€€These€facts,€however,€areÏinsufficient€corroboration€to€allow€an€arrest€under€the€circumstances€of€this€case.€€ÌÌà àA€police€officerððs€knowledge€of€a€suspectððs€reputation€is€not€alone€enoughÏto€constitute€probable€cause€to€arrest.€€òòState€v.€Kimbroóó,€496€A.€2d€498,€505Ï(Conn.€1985).€€ð ðSomething€more€substantial€than€a€casual€rumor€.€.€.€or€anÏaccusation€based€merely€on€an€individualððs€general€reputationðð€should€beÏshown.€€òòSpinellióó,€389€U.S.€at€416,€89€S.Ct.€at€589.€€In€the€present€case,€the€onlyÏfact€given€by€the€informant€corroborated€by€police€investigation,€other€thanÏdefendantððs€reputation,€was€that€the€defendant€was€present€at€Preacherððs€place.€ÏWhile€this€fact€may€indicate€that€the€basis€of€the€informantððs€knowledge€wasÏeyewitness€observation,€this€corroboration€is€insufficient€to€establish€the€reliabilityÏof€the€informantððs€tip€and€therefore,€probable€cause.ÌÌà à€The€State€has€failed€to€establish€that€the€information€possessed€by€OfficerÏBlackwell€at€the€time€he€confronted€the€defendant€was€sufficient€to€establishÏprobable€cause€for€a€warrantless€arrest€of€the€defendant;€therefore,€the€ensuingÏsearch€of€the€defendantððs€person€cannot€be€validated€as€a€search€incident€to€aÏlawful€arrest€as€the€State€argues.€€We€must€next€determine€whether€the€initialÏdetention€and€frisk€was€valid€under€òòTerryóó.€ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òREASONABLE€SUSPICIONó óóóÌà àIt€is€well„established€that€a€police€officer€may€make€an€investigatory€stopÏwhen€the€officer€has€a€reasonable€suspicion,€supported€by€specific€andÏarticulable€facts,€that€a€criminal€offense€has€been€or€is€about€to€be€committed.€ÏòòTerryóó,€392€U.S.€at€21,€88€S.Ct.€at€1880;€òòYearganóó,€__€S.W.2d€at€__;€òòState€œv.ÏWatkins›óó,€827€œS.W.2d›€293,€294€(Tenn.€1992).€€Likewise,€a€frisk€is€warranted€underÏòòTerryóó€if€the€police€officer€has€a€reasonable€suspicion€based€on€specific€andÏarticulable€facts€that€the€suspect€is€armed.€€òòIdóó.,€392€U.S.€at€27,€88€S.Ct.€at€1883.ÌÓÓÌà àAs€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€recognized€in€òòAlabama€v.€Whiteóó,€496€ÌÌU.S.€325,€330,€110€S.Ct.€2412,€2416,€110€L.Ed.€2d€301€(1990):ÌÓÓÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[r]easonable€suspicion€is€a€less€demanding€standardÏthan€probable€cause€not€only€in€the€sense€thatÏreasonable€suspicion€can€be€established€withÏinformation€that€is€different€in€quantity€or€content€thanÏthat€required€to€establish€probable€cause,€but€also€inÏthe€sense€that€reasonable€suspicion€can€arise€fromÏinformation€that€is€òòless€reliableóó€than€that€required€toÍshow€probable€cause.ÌÌ(Emphasis€added.)ÓÓÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIn€determining€whether€a€police€officerððs€reasonableÏsuspicion€is€supported€by€specific€and€articulableÏfacts,€a€court€must€consider€the€totality€of€theÏcircumstances.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Cortezóó,€449€U.S.€411,Ï417,€101€S.Ct.€690,€695,€66€L.Ed.€2d€621,€629€(1981).€ÏThis€includes,€but€is€not€limited€to,€objectiveÏobservations,€information€obtained€from€other€policeÏofficers€or€agencies,€information€obtained€fromÏcitizens,€and€the€pattern€of€operation€of€certainÏoffenders.€€òòIdóó.,€449€U.S.€at€418,€101€S.Ct.€at€694,€66ÏL.Ed.€2d€at€629.€€A€court€must€also€consider€theÏrational€inferences€and€deductions€that€a€trainedÏpolice€officer€may€draw€from€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€known€to€him.€€òòTerryóó,€392€U.S.€at€21,€88ÏS.Ct.€at€1880,€20€L.Ed.€2d€at€906.ÌÓÓÌòòWatkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€at€294.€€ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€officerððs€decision€to€initiate€an€investigatory€stop€and€friskÏof€the€defendant€was€based€upon€1)€information€obtained€from€a€confidentialÏinformant€who€had€provided€reliable€information€in€the€past,€2)€ð ðhalf€a€dozen€orÍsoðð€other€tips€regarding€Bridges€dealing€drugs€in€the€same€area,€and€3)€theÏofficerððs€own€observation€of€Bridges€at€the€location€which€had€been€designatedÏby€the€informant€only€thirty€minutes€earlier.€€The€informantððs€tip€did€not€strictlyÏsatisfy€the€basis€of€knowledge€portion€of€the€two„prong€test€of€reliability€underÏòòJacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€at€436,€and€was€insufficient€to€support€a€finding€of€probableÏcause.€€However,€the€tip,€in€conjunction€with€Officer€Blackwellððs€independentÏcorroboration,€was€sufficiently€reliable€to€provide€reasonable€suspicion.ÌÌà àAn€investigative€stop€may€be€based€on€the€tip€of€an€informant€if€theÏinformation€manifests€ð ðenough€indicia€of€reliabilityðð€to€justify€the€stop.€€€òòState€v.ÏPullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€29,€31€(Tenn.€1993);€òòAdams€v.€Williamsóó,€407€U.S.€143,€146„147,€92€S.Ct.€1921,€1923„1924,€32€L.Ed.€2d€612€(1972).€€When€an€informantÏreports€an€incident€at€or€near€the€time€of€its€occurrence,€a€court€can€often€assumeÏthat€the€report€is€first€hand€and€thus€reliable.€€òòPullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€32.€ÏFurthermore,€a€hurried€description€from€a€source€who€insists€on€immediate€actionÏsuggesting€the€source€is€an€eyewitness€is€sufficient€for€further€investigation.€ÏòòLawson€v.€United€Statesóó,€360€A.2d€38,€40€(D.C.€App.€1976).€€In€the€present€caseÍOfficer€Blackwell€was€told€by€the€informant€that€the€defendant€was€at€ð ðPreacherððsððÏselling€ð ðcrack€cocaine€right€then,ðð€and€that€Bridges€was€carrying€the€drug€on€hisÏperson.€€Very€soon€after€receiving€the€tip,€Officer€Blackwell€found€the€defendant€atÏð ðPreacherððs,ðð€where€the€informant€had€told€him€the€defendant€would€be.€OfficerÏBlackwell€previously€had€received€tips€from€other€persons€indicating€that€BridgesÏroutinely€sold€crack€cocaine€in€that€area.€€The€corroboration€of€the€tip,€indicatingÏan€eye„witness€basis€of€knowledge,€and€the€informantððs€demonstrated€pastÏcredibility€are€sufficient€to€satisfy€the€two„pronged€test€of€reliability.€€In€addition,Ïthese€ð ðspecific€and€articulable€factsðð€are€sufficient€to€support€a€finding€ofÏreasonable€suspicion€justifying€the€investigatory€stop€under€òòTerryóó.€ÌÌà àOnce€a€valid€stop€has€been€made,€police€may€pat€a€suspectððs€outerÏclothing€if€the€police€have€a€reasonable,€particularized€suspicion€that€the€suspectÏis€armed.€€òòTerryóó,€392€U.S.€at€27,€88€S.Ct.€at€1883;€òòHughes€v.€Stateóó,€588€S.W.2dÏ296,€304€(Tenn.€1979).€€ð ðThe€purpose€of€this€limited€search€is€not€to€discoverÏevidence€of€crime,€but€to€allow€the€officer€to€pursue€his€investigation€without€fearÏof€violence.ðð€€òòAdamsóó,€407€U.S.€at€146,€92€S.Ct.€at€1923.€€Officer€Blackwell€knewÍthat€Bridges€was€a€convicted€felon€and€drug€dealer€who€had€recently€beenÏcharged€with€a€violent€offense€involving€a€weapon.€In€addition,€Officer€BlackwellÏwas€familiar€with€the€defendantððs€armed€attempt€to€flee€police.€€This€knowledgeÏprovided€a€reasonable,€particularized€suspicion€€that€the€defendant€was€armedÏand€dangerous.€€For€the€protection€of€himself€and€others€in€the€area,€therefore,ÏOfficer€Blackwell€was€entitled€to€conduct€a€carefully€limited€search€of€the€outerÏclothing€of€the€defendant€in€an€attempt€to€discover€weapons€that€might€be€used€toÏassault€him.€€òòSeeóó€òòTerryóó,€392€U.S.€at€30,€88€S.Ct.€at€1884„1885.€€Accordingly,€aÏmajority€of€this€Court€holds€that€the€ð ðstop€and€friskðð€of€Bridges€was€justified€underÏòòTerryóó.€€Having€so€determined,€we€must€next€consider€the€legality€of€the€seizure€ofÏthe€pill€bottle€containing€cocaine.€ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òPLAIN€FEEL€DOCTRINEóóó óÌà àIn€òòMinnesota€v.€Dickersonóó,€508€U.S.€366,€113€S.Ct.€2130,€124€L.Ed.€2dÏ334€(1993),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€if€an€officer€detectsÏcontraband€through€the€sense€of€touch€during€a€valid€òòTerryóó€frisk,€the€officer€mayÍseize€the€contraband.à àIn€that€case,€two€police€officers€observed€DickersonÏleaving€an€apartment€building€known€to€be€a€ð ðnotorious€ððcrack€house.ðððð€As€aÏresult€of€Dickersonððs€suspicious€behavior€when€he€saw€the€officers€observingÏhim,€and€the€community€reputation€of€the€building€as€a€haven€for€cocaine€traffic,Ïthe€officers€stopped€him€and€conducted€a€patdown€search.€€During€the€search,Ïone€of€the€officers€felt€a€small€lump€in€the€front€pocket€of€Dickersonððs€jacket.€€AfterÏfurther€manipulation€of€the€lump,€the€officer€decided€it€was€a€ð ðlump€of€crackÏcocaine€in€cellophane.ðð€€The€officer€then€removed€from€Dickersonððs€pocket€aÏsmall€plastic€bag€containing€one€fifth€of€one€gram€of€crack€cocaine.€€DickersonÏwas€arrested€and€charged€with€possession€of€a€controlled€substance.€€BeforeÏtrial,€he€moved€to€suppress€the€cocaine.€€Upon€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€hisÏmotion,€Dickerson€was€convicted€of€possession€of€a€controlled€substance.€ÏHowever,€the€conviction€was€overturned€upon€the€conclusion€of€the€MinnesotaÏCourt€of€Appeals€and€Supreme€Court€that€the€cocaine€should€have€beenÏsuppressed.€€The€United€States€Supreme€Court€granted€certiorari€review€andÏaffirmed€the€decision€of€the€Minnesota€Supreme€Court.ÌÌà àAlthough€concluding€that€the€evidence€should€have€been€suppressed,€theÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€contraband€detected€through€the€senseÏof€touch€during€a€valid€patdown€search€may€be€admitted€into€evidence.€€InÏenunciating€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine,€the€Court€analogized€to€the€ð ðplain€viewððÏdoctrine.€€Specifically,€the€Court€in€òòDickersonóó€held€thatÌÓÓà8 àIf€a€police€officer€lawfully€pats€down€a€suspectððs€outer€clothing€andÏfeels€an€object€whose€contour€or€mass€makes€its€identityÏimmediately€apparent,€there€has€been€no€invasion€of€the€suspectððsÏprivacy€beyond€that€already€authorized€by€the€officerððs€search€forÏweapons;€if€the€object€is€contraband,€its€warrantless€seizure€wouldÏbe€justified€by€the€same€practical€considerations€that€inhere€in€theÏplain€view€context.€ÌÓÓÌòòIdóó.,€508€U.S.€at€___,€113€S.Ct.€at€2137€(footnote€omitted).ÌÌà àIn€rejecting€the€contention€that€ð ðplain€feelðð€is€not€comparable€to€ð ðplain€viewððÏbecause€the€sense€of€touch€is€inherently€less€reliable€than€the€sense€of€sight,€theÏCourt€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€very€premise€of€òòTerryóó,€after€all,€is€that€officers€willÏbe€able€to€detect€the€presence€of€weapons€through€theÏsense€of€touch€and€òòTerryóó€upheld€precisely€such€aÏseizure.€€Even€if€it€were€true€that€the€sense€of€touch€isÍgenerally€less€reliable€than€the€sense€of€sight,€òòthatÏonly€suggests€that€officers€will€less€often€be€able€toÏjustify€seizures€of€unseen€contrabandóó.€€Regardless€ofÏwhether€the€officer€detects€the€contraband€by€sight€orÏby€touch,€however,€the€Fourth€AmendmentððsÏrequirement€that€the€officer€have€probable€cause€toÏbelieve€that€the€item€is€contraband€before€seizing€itÏensures€against€excessively€speculative€seizures.ÌÌÓÓ508€U.S.€at€€___,€113€S.Ct.€at€2137€(emphasis€added).ÌÌà àBased€upon€the€facts€of€òòDickersonóó,€the€Court€identified€the€dispositiveÏquestion,€as€ð ðwhether€the€officer€who€conducted€the€search€was€acting€within€theÏlawful€bounds€marked€by€òòTerryóó€at€the€time€he€gained€probable€cause€to€believeÏthe€lump€in€respondentððs€jacket€was€contraband.ðð€€508€U.S.€at€___,€113€S.Ct.€atÏ2138.€€Finding€that€the€police€officer€overstepped€the€bounds€of€a€search€forÏweapons€authorized€by€òòTerryóó,€the€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àHere,€the€officerððs€continued€exploration€ofÏrespondentððs€pocket€after€having€concluded€that€itÏcontained€no€weapon€was€unrelated€to€ðð[t]he€soleÏjustification€of€the€search€[under€òòTerryóó:]€.€.€.€theÏprotection€of€the€police€officer€and€others€nearby.ðð€€ItÏtherefore€amounted€to€the€sort€of€evidentiary€searchÏthat€òòTerryóó€expressly€refused€to€authorize,€and€that€weÏhave€condemned€in€subsequent€cases.€ÌÌÌÓÓòòId.óó,€508€U.S.€at€___,€113€S.Ct.€at€2139€(internal€citations€omitted).ÌÌà àBased€upon€the€decision€in€òòDickersonóó€then,€seizure€of€contraband€underÏthe€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine€is€appropriate€if€1)€a€prior€valid€reason€exists€for€theÏintrusion,€i.e.,€the€patdown€must€be€permissible€under€òòTerryóó;€2)€the€contraband€isÏdetected€while€the€òòTerryóó€search€for€weapons€legitimately€is€still€in€progress;€and,Ï3)€the€incriminating€nature€of€the€object€perceived€by€the€officerððs€sense€of€touchÏis€€immediately€apparent€giving€the€officer€probable€cause€to€believe€the€object€isÏcontraband€prior€to€its€seizure.€€òòDickersonóó,€508€U.S.€at€€___,€113€S.Ct.€at€2137;€ÏòòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòArizona€v.€Hicksóó,€480€U.S.€321,€107€S.Ct.€1149,€94€L.Ed.€2d€347€(1987);€ÏòòTexas€v.€Brownóó,€460€U.S.€730,€741„742,€103€S.Ct.€1535,€1543,€75€L.Ed.2d€502Ï(1983);€òòState€v.€Jonesóó,€653€A.2d€1040,€1047„1050€(Md.€App.€1995);€òòseeóóÏòògenerallyóó€3€LaFave,€òòSearch€&€Seizureóó€Ô€GÔððÔ€IÔ7.5(b)€(3d€ed.€1996).ÌÌà àClearly€the€first€two€prerequisites€are€met€in€this€case.€€For€the€reasonsÏpreviously€stated€the€patdown€was€permissible€under€òòTerryóó.€€In€addition,€nothingÍin€this€record€indicates€that€the€officer€exceeded€the€scope€of€a€valid€òòTerryóó€searchÏfor€weapons€in€his€patdown€of€the€defendantððs€person€when€he€detected€theÏbottle.€€òòCompareóó€òòMinnesota€v.€Dickersonóó,€òòsupraóó;€òòState€v.€Wondersóó,€929€P.2d€792Ï(Kan.€App.€1996)(officer€continued€pat€down€of€defendantððs€pocket€after€heÏdetermined€that€it€did€not€contain€a€weapon).ÌÌà àLegality€of€the€seizure€in€this€case€turns€on€the€third€prerequisite.€€TheÏdispositive€issue€is€whether€Officer€Blackwellððs€tactile€perception€of€the€pill€bottleÏgave€him€probable€cause€to€believe€the€object€he€felt€was€contraband€before€heÏseized€it.€€Probable€cause€exists€when€the€facts€and€circumstances€within€theÏofficerððs€knowledge€are€sufficient€to€warrant€a€person€of€reasonable€caution€in€theÏbelief€that€the€item€may€be€contraband.€€òòBrownóó,€460€U.S.€at€742,€103€S.Ct.€atÏ1543.€€Probable€cause€ð ðdoes€not€demand€any€showing€that€such€a€belief€beÏcorrect€or€more€likely€true€than€œfalse.ð𛀀òòIdóó.€€In€determining€whether€probable€causeÏexists,€courts€must€consider€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€including€the€officerððsÏtestimony€and€factual€knowledge€based€upon€prior€law€enforcement€experience.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Rushingóó,€935€S.W.2d€30,€33€(Mo.banc.€1996);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.ÍTrineóó,€673€A.2d€1098,€1100€(Conn.€1996).€€Courts€should€not€surrender€theirÏcommon€sense€assessment€of€the€sensory€capacities€of€human€touch€to€anÏofficerððs€assertion€that€he€or€she€ð ðimmediately€knewðð€the€nature€of€the€objectÏtouched.€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòJones€v.€Stateóó,€682€A.2d€248,€252€(Md.€1996)€(ð ðitððs€not€just€aÏquestion€of€being€an€expert€and€coming€in€and€saying€the€magic€wordsðð).€€TheÏofficerððs€subjective€belief€that€the€object€is€contraband€is€not€sufficient€unless€it€is€Ïobjectively€reasonable€in€light€of€all€the€circumstances€known€at€the€time€of€theÏsearch.€€òòTrineóó,€673€A.2d€at€1109.€€An€officerððs€testimony€is€a€factor€in€determiningÏthe€legality€of€a€seizure€under€the€plain€feel€doctrine,€but€it€is€not€dispositive€andÏdoes€not€end€a€courtððs€inquiry.€€òòWondersóó,€929€P.2d€at€799.€€€€ÌÌà àApplying€these€principles€to€the€record€in€this€case,€a€majority€of€this€CourtÏhas€determined€that€Officer€Blackwell€did€not€have€probable€cause€to€believe€thatÏthe€object€he€felt€was€contraband,€and€that€he€did€not€have€probable€cause€toÏbelieve€that€the€bottle€contained€contraband.€€In€an€affidavit€filed€as€an€exhibit€toÏthe€suppression€hearing€Officer€Blackwell€described€the€patdown€of€theÏdefendant€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àFor€my€protection€I€immediately€identified€myself€andÏfrisked€Bridges€for€weapons.€€òòWhen€I€touched€his€rightÏjacket€pocket€I€immediately€recognized€a€pill€bottle,€inÏthat€pocket,€that€is€used€by€the€majority€of€crackÏdealers€to€hold€their€crack€cocaine.óó€€I€continued€theÏfrisk€and€found€a€knife€in€Bridgesðð€back€pocket.€€TheÏpill€bottle€contained€crack€cocaine.€€I€charged€him€andÏalso€found€a€small€bag€of€crack€cocaine€in€the€sameÏpocket.ÌÓÓÌIn€addition,€Officer€Blackwell€testified€at€the€suppression€hearing,€recounting€theÏdiscovery€of€the€pill€bottle€during€the€patdown€as€follows:€ð ð[w]hen€I€was€friskingÏhim€I€felt€and€immediately€felt€the€pill€bottle€and€knew€that€it€was€the€kind€that€a€lotÏof€other€dealers€will€use€to€keep€their€crack€in.ððÌÌà àWhile€Officer€Blackwell€said€that€he€ð ðimmediately€recognizedðð€the€item€as€aÏpill€bottle,€unless€he€was€clairvoyant,€he€could€not€have€discerned€the€contentsÏfrom€merely€touching€the€container.€€Such€a€bottle,€or€one€resembling€it€by€touch,Ïmay€enclose€legal€medication,€candy,€pins,€film€or€any€number€of€other€smallÏitems.€€Officer€Blackwellððs€testimony€does€not€specify€the€objective€basis€uponÏwhich€he€relied€for€identification€of€the€container€itself€or€its€possible€contents€asÍcontraband.€€The€record€contains€little€evidence€of€Officer€Blackwellððs€experienceÏin€drug€cases€and€no€evidence€as€to€how€he€connected€the€container€with€theÏpossession€of€cocaine.€€òòCompareóó,€òòTrineóó€673€A.2d€at€1111„12€(officer€testified€asÏto€his€experience€with€narcotics);€òòPeople€v.€Championóó,€549€N.W.2d€849,€859Ï(Mich.€1996)€(officerððs€testimony€about€20€years€of€experience€in€narcotics€work).ÌÌà àUnder€the€proof€in€this€record,€it€is€evident€that€it€was€not€immediatelyÏapparent€to€Officer€Blackwell€that€the€bottle€contained€contraband€until€it€wasÏremoved€from€the€defendantððs€pocket.€€This,€however,€is€the€very€type€of€furtherÏmanipulation€forbidden€by€òòDickersonóó.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Rossóó,€827€F.Supp.€atÏ719€(matchbox);€òòState€v.€Parkeróó,€622€So.2d€791,€795€(La.€App.€1993)€(matchbox);ÏòòState€v.€Abramsóó,€471€S.E.2d€716,€718€(S.C.€App€1996)€(Tylenol€bottle);€òòCampbellÏv.€Stateóó,€864€S.W.2d€223,€226€(Tex.€App.€1993)€(film€canister);€òòDavis€v.€Stateóó,€829ÏS.W.2d€218,€220€(Tex.€Crim.€App.€1992)€(matchbox);× ƒT ××  ×€òòcontraóó€òòChampionóó,€549ÍN.W.2d€at€858„59€(pill€bottle€in€groin);€òòRushingóó,€935€S.W.2d€at€30€(cylindricalÏmedicine€bottle).€€€Ìà àÌà àOver€a€quarter€of€a€century€ago,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€warnedÏthat€ð ðthe€ððplain€viewðð€doctrine€may€not€be€used€to€extend€a€general€exploratoryÏsearch€from€one€object€to€another€until€something€incriminating€at€last€emerges.ðð€ÏòòCoolidgeóó,€403€U.S.€at€€466,€91€S.Ct.€at€2038.€€This€admonition€applies€equally€toÏthe€plain€feel€doctrine.€€Applying€the€plain€feel€doctrine€with€the€exactingÏlimitations€stated€in€òòDickersonóó,€it€is€clear€that€the€warrantless€seizure€in€this€caseÏwas€not€constitutionally€permissible.× ƒU ××  ×Ìà àÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àA€majority€of€this€Court€has€determined€that€the€initial€stop€and€frisk€wasÏjustified€by€reasonable€suspicion€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts.€ÏHowever,€a€majority€of€this€Court€also€concludes€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€officer€had€probable€causeÏto€believe€the€object€felt€during€the€frisk€was€contraband.€€Consequently,€theÏjudgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€œupholding€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€theÏdefendantððs€motion€to€suppress€is›€œreversed.€€The›€defendantððs€conviction€isÏvacated,€and€the€charge€is€dismissed.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àò òPER€CURIAMó óÌÓÓÌÌDrowota,€J.€„€Separate€Concurring/Dissenting€OpinionÌReid,€J.€„€Separate€Concurring/Dissenting€OpinionÌHolder,€J.€„€Not€œParticipatingÇÑ  ћр4ÑÑ7€¼~XXdìXXdì7Ñà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌœßJ€PV;+'b|HÿJ` Å `€@ÿJß›Ìà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àà àà àà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à àà àà à)à àò òFiled:€December€31,€1997ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHENRY€CRIMINALà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌRAY€ANTHONY€BRIDGES,à àà à)à à€Hon.€Julian€P.€Guinn,à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€€€€ÏJudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant„Appellant.à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€02S01„9606„CC„00053à àœ›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€ÌÔ*ƒWXY dÔÔ,„dÔÔ,dÔÔ+  ÔÐ ‚‚„„ÐÓ  ÓÔ€GÔÐ ‚‚„„ÐÓ  ÓÐ ‚‚„„ÐÓ  ÓÐ ‚‚„„ÐÓ  ÓÐ ‚‚„„ÐÓ  ÓÐ ‚‚„„ÐÓ  ÓÐ ‚‚„„ÐÓ  ÓÐ ‚‚„„ÐÓ  ÓÐ „„Ðà@ àÔ€IÔòòò òCONCURRING/DISSENTING€OPINIONÔ€GÔó óóóÌÌÔ€IÔœ›à àI€agree€with€the€majority€that€the€initial€stop€and€frisk€of€this€defendant€wasÏconstitutionally€permissible€under€œòòTerry›€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€21,€88€S.Ct.€1868,Ï1880,€20€L.Ed.2d€889,€906€œ(1968).›€€However,€in€my€view,€seizure€of€theÏcontraband€also€was€constitutionally€permissible€in€accordance€with€the€ð ðplainÏfeelðð€doctrine.€€Therefore,€I€respectfully€dissent€from€the€majorityððs€decision€andÏwould€affirm€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appealsðð€judgment€upholding€the€trial€courtððsÏdenial€of€the€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress€and€his€subsequent€conviction.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òPLAIN€FEEL€DOCTRINEóóó óÌà àWhile€the€facts€of€this€case€and€the€parameters€of€the€plain€feel€doctrineÏare€accurately€stated€in€the€majority€opinion,€I€do€not€agree€with€the€application€ofÏthe€doctrine€to€the€facts.€€œAs›€the€majority€recognizes,€legality€of€the€seizure€in€thisÏcase€turns€on€œwhether›€Officer€Blackwell€had€probable€cause€to€believe€the€objectÏhe€felt€was€contraband€before€he€seized€it.€€When€the€facts€and€circumstancesÏwithin€the€officerððs€knowledge€are€sufficient€to€warrant€a€person€of€reasonableÏcaution€in€the€belief€that€the€item€may€be€contraband,€probable€cause€exists.€ÏòòTexas€v.€Brownóó,€460€U.S.€730,€742,€103€S.Ct.€1535,€1543,€75€L.Ed.2d€502Ï(1983).€œProbable›€cause€ð ðdoes€not€demand€any€showing€that€such€a€belief€beÏcorrect€or€more€likely€true€than€false.€€A€ððpractical,€nontechnicalðð€probability€thatÏincriminating€evidence€is€involved€is€all€that€is€required.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€The€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€has€explained€the€assessment€of€probable€cause€as€follows.ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThe€process€does€not€deal€with€hard€certainties,Ïbut€with€probabilities.€€Long€before€the€law€ofÏprobabilities€was€articulated€as€such,€practical€peopleÏformulated€certain€common„sense€conclusions€aboutÏhuman€behavior;€jurors€as€factfinders€are€permitted€toÏdo€the€same„„and€so€are€law€enforcement€officers.€ÏFinally,€the€evidence€thus€collected€must€be€seen€andÏweighed€not€in€terms€of€library€analysis€by€scholars,Ïbut€as€understood€by€those€versed€in€the€field€of€lawÍenforcement.ÌÓÓÌòòBrownóó,€460€U.S.€at€742,€103€S.Ct.€at€1543,€quoting€òòUnited€States€v.€Cortezóó,€449ÏU.S.€411,€418,€101€S.Ct.€690,€695,€66€L.Ed.2d€621€œ(1981).›€€In€evaluatingÏprobable€cause,€therefore,€courts€must€consider€the€totality€of€the€circumstancesÏincluding€the€officerððs€testimony€and€factual€knowledge€based€upon€prior€lawÏenforcement€experience.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Rushingóó,€935€S.W.2d€30,€33€(Mo.banc.Ï1996);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Trineóó,€673€A.2d€1098,€1100€(Conn.€œ1996).›€ÌÌà àWhether,€œunder›€the€plain€feel€doctrine,€an€officer€may€seize€an€objectÏroutinely€used€to€package€or€contain€drugs€is€an€issue€upon€which€courts€haveÏsplit.€€Some€courts€hold€that€only€contraband€or€evidence€which€is€itselfÏrecognized€by€the€officer€may€be€seized.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòCommonwealth€v.€Stackfieldóó,Ï651€A.2d€558,€562€(Pa.€Super.€1994).€€Other€courts€have€held€that€objects€mayÏbe€seized€under€the€plain€feel€doctrine€if€the€officer€has€probable€cause€toÏbelieve€that€the€object€contains€contraband.€€òòSeeóó€òòTrineóó,€673€A.2d€at€1103;€òòStateÏv.€Championóó,€549€S.W.2d€849,€860€(Mich.€œ1996);›€òòRushingóó,€935€S.W.2d€at€33.€ÏThe€majority€adopts€the€second€approach,€but€concludes€that€Officer€BlackwellÍdid€not€have€probable€cause€to€believe€the€item€detected€contained€contraband.€ÏI€disagree€with€the€majorityððs€finding€and€would€hold€that€the€officer€had€probableÏcause€to€believe€the€object€detected€during€the€patdown€contained€œcontraband.›ÌÌà àThis€is€not€a€situation€where€an€officer€frisks€an€unknown€person€on€theÏstreet€and€senses€an€object€shaped€like€a€pill€bottle.€€As€the€majority€recognizes,Ïpill€bottles€do€not€always€contain€contraband,€and€may€contain€legal€substances.€ÏHowever,€in€this€case,€Officer€Blackwell€had€received€information€from€a€reliableÏinformant€that€Bridges€was€selling€crack€cocaine,€ð ð€òòand€that€Bridges€was€carryingÏthe€drug€on€his€personóó.ðð€€While€conducting€a€lawful€òòTerryóó€frisk€of€the€defendant,ÏOfficer€Blackwell€detected€an€object€which,€according€to€his€testimony,€heÏð ðimmediately€recognizedðð€to€be€a€pill€bottle€of€the€type€ordinarily€used€by€crackÏdealers€to€store€their€product.€€Though€he€does€not€explicitly€say€so,€the€implicitÏconclusion€to€be€drawn€from€his€testimony€is€that€his€recognition€of€the€pill€bottleÏas€one€ordinarily€used€to€store€illegal€contraband€was€based€upon€his€priorÍexperience€in€drug€cases.× ƒZ ××  ×€€Had€Officer€Blackwell€been€acting€without€theÏinformantððs€tip€that€the€defendant€was€dealing€crack€cocaine€and€was€carryingÏthe€drug€on€his€person,€the€seizure€of€the€pill€bottle,€perhaps,€would€beÏconstitutionally€suspect.€€We€do€not€have€that€case€before€us,€however.€AfterÏcarefully€reviewing€the€evidence€in€this€record,€I€am€of€the€opinion€that,Ïconsidering€the€facts€and€circumstances,€including€the€tip,€Officer€Blackwell€hadÏsufficient€information€to€warrant€a€person€of€reasonable€caution€in€the€belief€thatÏthe€item€he€detected€contained€contraband.€€œòòSeeóó›€òòChampionóó,€òòsupraóó€(pill€bottle€inÏgroin);€òòRushingóó,€òòsupraóó,€(Life€Saver€Hole€candy€container€in€front€pants€pocket);Ïòòseeóó€òòalsoóó€œòòUnited›€States€v.€Craftóó,€30€F.3d€1044,€1045€(8th€Cir.€1994)€(bulges€ofÏheroine€packages€around€defendantððs€ankles);€òòUnited€States€v.€Hughesóó,€15€F.3dÏ798,€802€(8th€Cir.€1994)€(ð ðsmall€lumpsðð€of€crack€cocaine);€òòTrineóó,€673€A.2d€at€1111Ï(rock€of€cocaine€in€pocket);€òòPeople€v.€Mitchellóó,€650€N.E.2d€1014,€1024€(Ill.€1995)Ï(piece€of€ð ðrockðð€cocaine€inside€baggie);€òòState€v.€Wilsonóó,€437€S.E.2d€387,€389Ï(N.C.€App.€1993)€(ð ðlumpsðð€in€package€in€breast€pocket);€òòCommonwealth€v.ÍDorseyóó,€654€A.2d€1086,€1087€(Pa.€Super.€1995)€(ð ðlumpðð€in€plastic€bag);€òòState€v.ÏBuchananóó,€504€N.W.2d€400,€404€(Wis.€App.€1993)€(plastic€bag€containingÏcocaine€in€waistband).€ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àBecause€I€am€of€the€opinion€that€seizure€of€the€contraband€wasÏconstitutionally€permissible€under€the€plain€feel€doctrine,€I€respectfully€dissentÏfrom€the€majority€decision.€€I€would€affirm€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appealsðð€decisionÏupholding€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress€and€theÏdefendantððs€subsequent€conviction.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA€III,Ìà àà àà àà àà àJUSTICEÌÓÓÌÌœÇÒ 8 ÒÒ ¤ ÒÖ€[ÖÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ 8 ÑÔ€\ԛр>4ÑÑ7€=÷:=XXdÈXXdì7ÑØ ØÓ&€KKXÐd&ÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌœßJ€P];+'b|` Å `€@ÿJß›ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€Henry€CriminalÌÓ` °‚XÙ ¸ ™XÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€Hon.€Julian€P.€Guinn,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€Ô€\&ÔS.€Ct.€No.€02S01„9606„CC„00053Ô€\XÔÌRAY€ANTHONY€BRIDGES,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àDefendant„Appellant.à àà àà à(ÌÌÌÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCURRING€AND€DISSENTING€OPINIONó óóóÌÌÌÌÌÒ 8 ÒÒ À Òà àà àà àThis€case€presents€for€review€the€judgment€of€the€Court€ofÏCriminal€Appeals€affirming€the€trial€courtððs€order€which€overruledÏthe€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress€evidence€obtained€during€a€stopÏand€frisk€of€the€defendant.€€The€defendant€pleaded€guilty€to€oneÏcount€of€possession€of€cocaine€with€intent€to€sell.€€Pursuant€toÏTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37(b)(2),€an€order€was€entered€reserving€for€appealÏthe€issue€of€the€warrantless€search,€determined€to€be€dispositive€ofÏthe€case.€ò ò€ó óThe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€affirmed€the€defendantððsÏconviction.€€In€reaching€its€decision,€the€court€held€that€theÏseizure€of€evidence€found€on€the€defendant€was€permissible€under€theÏð ðplain€feelðð€or€ð ðplain€touchðð€doctrine€expounded€in€òòMinnesota€v.ÏDickersonóó,€508€U.S.€366,€113€S.€Ct.€2130,€124€L.€Ed.€2d€334€(1993).€ÏThe€Court€granted€the€Rule€11€application€to€address€the€legality€ofÏthe€seizure€and€particularly€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine.ÌÌà@ àò òIó óÌÌà àà àà àThe€proof€at€the€suppression€hearing€shows€that€at€2:47Ïp.m.€on€December€23,€1993,€Officer€D.W.€Blackwell€of€the€Paris€PoliceÍDepartment€made€a€telephone€call€to€a€confidential€informant€who€hadÏprovided€reliable€information€in€the€past.€€The€informant€toldÏOfficer€Blackwell€that€the€defendant,€Ray€Anthony€Bridges,€wasÏselling€crack€cocaine€ð ðright€thenðð€at€a€club€called€ð ðPreacherððsðð€inÏthe€ð ðBottom.ðð€€Officer€Blackwell€testified€that€he€had€previouslyÏreceived€ð ðhalf€a€dozen€or€soðð€tips€that€the€defendant€was€dealing€inÏdrugs€in€that€area.€€Blackwell€was€aware€that€the€defendant€hadÏpreviously€been€convicted€of€felony€assault€and€had€been€involved€inÏa€recent€armed€altercation€with€the€police.€€Thirty€minutes€afterÏmaking€the€call,€Officer€Blackwell€found€the€defendant€seated€at€aÏtable€in€Preacherððs€engaged€in€conversation.€€Blackwell€identifiedÏhimself€and€ordered€the€defendant€to€stand€against€the€wall€where€heÏð ðpatted€him€downðð€for€weapons.€€During€the€pat€down,€Blackwell€felt€aÏsmall€object€ð ðin€the€shape€of€a€pill€bottleðð€in€the€defendantððs€rightÏjacket€pocket€and,€in€his€words,€ð ðknew€that€it€was€the€kind€that€aÏlot€of€other€crack€dealers€will€use€to€keep€their€crack€in.ðð€ÏBlackwell€seized€the€bottle€which€upon€inspection€was€found€toÏcontain€crack€cocaine.€€Blackwell€also€found€a€ð ðknife,ðð€not€otherwiseÏdescribed,€in€the€defendantððs€pants€pocket.€€The€record€contains€noÏdescription€of€the€pill€bottle,€or€the€characteristics€thereof,Ïround,€square,€large,€small,€soft,€hard,€or€other.€€The€defendantÏthen€was€placed€under€arrest.€€As€the€result€of€a€further€search€ofÏthe€defendantððs€person,€Officer€Blackwell€discovered€a€plastic€bag€ofÏcocaine€ð ðin€the€same€pocket.ððÌÌà@ àò òIIó óÌÌà àà àà àThis€case€involves€the€review€of€a€trial€courtððs€findingsÏof€fact€and€conclusions€of€law€in€disposing€of€a€motion€to€suppress.€ÏIn€òòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18€(Tenn.€1996),€the€Court€restated€theÏstandard€to€be€applied€by€an€appellate€court€when€reviewing€a€trialÏcourtððs€findings€of€fact€on€suppression€issues.à8 àÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àà àQuestions€of€credibility€of€the€witnesses,Ïthe€weight€and€value€of€the€evidence,€andÏresolution€of€conflicts€in€the€evidence€areÏmatters€entrusted€to€the€trial€judge€as€the€trierÏof€fact.€€The€party€prevailing€in€the€trial€courtÏis€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€ofÏthe€evidence€adduced€at€the€suppression€hearingÏas€well€as€all€reasonable€and€legitimateÏinferences€that€may€be€drawn€from€that€evidence.€ÏSo€long€as€the€greater€weight€of€the€evidenceÏsupports€the€trial€courtððs€findings,€thoseÏfindings€shall€be€upheld.€€In€other€words,€aÏtrial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€in€a€suppressionÏhearing€will€be€upheld€unless€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€otherwise.ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€23.€€However,€the€application€of€the€law€to€the€facts€found€byÏthe€trial€court€is€a€question€of€law€which€this€Court€reviews€deÏnovo.€òòBeare€Co.€v.€Tennessee€Dept.€of€Revenueóó,€858€S.W.2d€906,€907Ï(Tenn.€1993).ÌÌà@ àò òIIIó óÌÌà àà àà àI€concur€in€the€òòperóó€òòcuriamóó€decision€that€there€was€notÏprobable€cause€to€arrest€the€defendant.€ÌÌà àà àà àWhile€the€primary€reason€for€granting€the€application€inÏthis€case€was€to€address€the€ruling€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏon€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine,€this€issue€cannot€be€reached€withoutÏfirst€addressing€the€challenge€raised€regarding€the€legality€ofÏOfficer€Blackwellððs€initial€detention€and€frisk€of€the€defendant.€€AsÏis€clear€from€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€decision€in€òòDickersonóó,Ïthe€plain€feel€doctrine€is€an€extension€of€the€plain€view€doctrineÏand€is€based€on€the€same€rationale.€€òòMinnesota€v.€Dickersonóó,€508€U.S.Ïat€_____,€113€S.Ct.€at€2137.€€Before€an€officer€is€authorized€toÏseize€evidence€in€plain€view,€the€initial€intrusion€that€brings€theÏpolice€within€plain€view€of€the€evidence€must€be€constitutionallyÏvalid.€€òòSeeóó€òòCoolidge€v.€New€Hampshireóó,€403€U.S.€443,€465„466,€91ÏS.Ct.€2022,€2037„38,€29€L.€Ed.€2d€564€(1971).€€Consequently,€it€isÏnecessary€to€determine€the€validity€of€the€defendantððs€detention€andÏthe€ð ðpat€downðð€of€his€person€before€reaching€the€question€of€theÏseizure€under€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine.€€ÌÌà àà àà àOfficer€Blackwell€acted€without€a€warrant.€€The€FourthÍAmendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution× ƒ^ ××  ×€and€Article€I,€SectionÏ7,× ƒ_ ××  ×€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€prohibit€unreasonable€searches€andÏseizures.€€Warrantless€searches€are€presumed€to€be€unreasonable€andÏcannot€be€sustained€unless€they€fall€into€one€of€the€narrowly€definedÏexceptions€to€the€warrant€requirement.€€òòState€v.€Yearganóó,€Ô€\&Ô_____ÏS.W.2d€_____,€_____€(Tenn.€1995)€(Reid,€J.,€concurring)€[slip€op.€atÏ7];€òòState€v.€Bartramóó,€925€S.W.2d€227,€œ229„230Ô€\XÔ›€(Tenn.€1996).€€TheÏdefendant€contends€that€no€exceptions€to€the€warrant€requirement€areÏapplicable€in€his€case€and€that€Officer€Blackwell€had€no€right€toÏdetain€or€search€him.€€The€State,€on€the€other€hand,€argues€thatÏOfficer€Blackwell€had€probable€cause€to€arrest€the€defendant€and€thatÏthe€search€of€the€defendantððs€person€was€permissible€as€a€searchÍincident€to€an€arrest,€an€exception€to€the€warrant€requirement.× ƒ` ××  ×€€€InÏthe€alternative,€the€State€contends€that€the€detention€and€searchÏwere€valid€as€a€stop€and€frisk€under€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€88€S.ÏCt.€1868,€20€L.€Ed.€2d€889€(1968).€€The€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏagreed€with€the€Stateððs€second€argument€and€found€that€the€detentionÏand€search€were€valid€under€òòTerryóó.ÌÌà àà àà àThe€Stateððs€first€argument€must€be€addressed€because€if€theÏCourt€finds€that€the€search€was€incident€to€a€lawful€arrest,€thisÏexception€to€the€warrant€requirement€would€independently€support€theÏsearch€of€the€defendantððs€person€and€the€seizure€of€the€container,Ïand€the€ð ðstop€and€friskðð€and€ð ðplain€feelðð€issues€would€be€moot.× ƒa ××  ×€€òòSeeóóÏòòChimel€v.€Californiaóó,€395€U.S.€752,€762„63,€89€S.Ct.€2034,€2040,€23ÏL.€Ed.€2d€685€(1969);€òòState€v.€Marshallóó,€870€S.W.2d€532,€540€(Tenn.ÏCr.€App.€1993).€The€Fourth€Amendment€and€Article€I,€Section€7,Ïrequire€the€existence€of€ð ðprobable€causeðð€for€making€an€arrestÏwithout€a€warrant.€€òòBeck€v.€Ohioóó,€379€U.S.€89,€91,€85€S.€Ct.€223,Í225,€13€L.€Ed.€2d€142€(1964);€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€638€S.W.2d€342,€350Ï(Tenn.€1982),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€459€U.S.€1137,€103€S.Ct.€770,€74ÏL.Ed.2d€983€(1983);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÔ€IÔ€Ô€\Ô40„7„103(a)€(officersÏmay€make€a€warrantless€arrest€when€they€have€probable€cause€toÏbelieve€that€the€arrestee€has€committed€or€is€committing€a€felony).€ÏIn€order€to€have€probable€cause€for€an€arrest€without€a€warrant,€atÏthe€time€of€the€arrest€the€facts€and€circumstances€within€theÏknowledge€of€the€officers€and€of€which€they€have€reasonablyÏtrustworthy€information€must€be€ð ðsufficient€to€warrant€a€prudent€manÏin€believing€that€the€[defendant]€had€committed€or€was€committing€anÏoffense.ðð€€òòBeckóó,€379€U.S.€at€91,€85€S.€Ct.€at€225;€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,Ï638€S.W.2d€at€350.ÌÌà àà àà àHere,€the€warrantless€arrest€was€based€upon€informationÏprovided€by€an€informant.€€The€test€to€determine€probable€cause€toÏmake€the€arrest€is€the€same€as€that€used€to€determine€whether€thereÏis€probable€cause€to€issue€a€search€warrant.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Yearganóó,Ï_____€S.W.2d€at€_____€(Reid,€J.,€concurring)€[slip€op.€at€12];€òòseeóóÏòòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Pullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€29,€31€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€officerÏmust€know€that€the€informant€is€credible€or€his€information€isÏreliable€and€that€the€informant€has€a€basis€for€the€information€thatÏthe€person€was€involved€in€criminal€conduct.€€òòState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778ÏS.W.2d€430,€432€(Tenn.€1989).€€In€the€present€case,€Officer€BlackwellÏtestified€that€the€informant€had€provided€reliable€information€to€himÍin€a€prior€illegal€drug€case.€€Blackwell€also€testified€that€he€hadÏknown€this€informant€for€a€number€of€years€and€that€this€person€hadÏð ðalways€been€very€straightforward€and€very€honest€and€very€reliableððÏwith€him.€€€These€facts€may€minimally€satisfy€the€first€prong€of€theÏtest€in€òòJacuminóó.€ÌÌà àà àà àHowever,€the€record€definitely€is€deficient€as€to€theÏsecond€prong€of€òòJacuminóó.€€The€informant€did€not€tell€OfficerÏBlackwell€the€basis€of€his€knowledge€that€the€defendant€was€atÏPreacherððs€selling€cocaine.ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àThat€the€informant€has€demonstrated€generalÏreliability€in€the€past,€is€.€.€.€no€index€of€theÏreliability€of€specific€information€he€passes€on;Ïhe€may€have€received€it€from€a€totally€unreliableÏsource.€€There€being€no€presumption€that€theÏinformant€speaks€with€personal€knowledge,€theÏbasis€of€knowledge€test€is,€therefore,€intendedÏto€weed€out,€as€not€of€sufficient€quality,€dataÏreceived€by€the€informant€from€others€who€haveÏnot€themselves€observed€facts€suggestive€ofÏcriminal€activity.€.€.€.€Otherwise€privacy€andÏliberty€may€be€invaded€by€a€warrantless€search€orÏarrest€based€solely€on€the€quality€of€theÏinformant€and€not€at€all€on€the€quality€of€theÏinformation,€i.e.,€its€suggestiveness€of€criminalÏactivity.ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòPeople€v.€Elwellóó,€406€N.E.2d€471,€474„475€(N.Y.€1980)€(citationsÏomitted).Ì€Ìà àà àà àNonetheless,€where€a€tip€fails€under€either€or€both€of€theÍtwo€prongs,€probable€cause€may€still€be€established€by€independentÏpolice€investigative€work€that€corroborates€the€tip€to€such€an€extentÏthat€it€supports€the€inference€that€the€informant€was€reliable€andÏthat€the€informant€made€the€charge€on€the€basis€of€informationÏobtained€in€a€reliable€way.€€òòSeeóó€òòSpinelli€v.€United€Statesóó,€393€U.S.Ï410,€417„18,€89€S.Ct.€584,€589„90,€21€L.€Ed.€2d€637€(1969);€òòJacuminóó,Ï778€S.W.2d€at€436.€€Here,€the€State€argues€that€three€pieces€ofÏinformation€independently€corroborated€the€tip€enough€to€overcome€anyÏdeficiency.€€First,€the€State€points€out€that€Blackwell€received€aÏhalf€dozen€prior€tips€that€the€defendant€had€engaged€in€similarÏillegal€activity€at€this€location.€€Second,€the€State€argues€thatÏBlackwell€knew€that€the€defendant€was€a€convicted€drug€dealer.€ÏThird,€the€State€argues€that€Officer€Blackwell€found€the€defendant€atÏPreacherððs€soon€after€he€received€the€tip.€€These€facts€areÏinsufficient€corroboration€to€justify€an€arrest€of€the€defendant.ÌÌà àà àà àA€basis€of€knowledge€cannot€be€inferred€from€theÏcorroboration€of€facts€related€only€to€innocent€activity€or€mattersÏopen€and€obvious€to€anyone.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Kimbroóó,€496€A.2d€498€(Conn.Ï1985);€òòState€v.€Raheemóó,€464€So.€2d€293,€297€(La.€1985);€òòState€v.ÏRuffinóó,€448€So.2d€1274,€1278€(La.€1984);€òòPeople€v.€Elwellóó,€406ÏN.E.2d€at€475.€€€Likewise,€a€police€officerððs€knowledge€of€aÏsuspectððs€reputation€is€not€enough€to€constitute€probable€cause€toÏarrest.€€òòState€v.€Kimbroóó,€496€A.€2d€at€505.€€ð ðSomething€moreÍsubstantial€than€a€casual€rumor€.€.€.€or€an€accusation€based€merelyÏon€an€individualððs€general€reputationðð€must€be€shown.€€òòSpinelli€v.ÏUnited€Statesóó,€389€U.S.€at€416,€89€S.Ct.€at€589.€€In€the€presentÏcase,€the€only€fact€given€by€the€informant€and€corroborated€by€policeÏinvestigation,€other€than€defendantððs€reputation,€was€that€theÏdefendant€was€present€at€Preacherððs€place.€€This€fact€does€notÏindicate€that€the€defendant€was€engaging€in€any€illegal€activity€thatÏwould€furnish€probable€cause€for€an€arrest;€nor€does€this€factÏð ðpermit€the€suspicions€engendered€by€the€informantððs€report€to€ripenÏinto€a€judgment€that€a€crime€was€probably€being€committed.ðð€€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Spinellióó,€393€U.S.€at€418,€89€S.Ct.€at€590.ÌÌà àà àà àThe€information€possessed€by€Officer€Blackwell€at€the€timeÏhe€confronted€the€defendant€was€insufficient€to€establish€probableÏcause€for€a€warrantless€arrest€of€the€defendant;€therefore,€theÏsearch€of€the€defendantððs€person€cannot€be€validated€as€a€searchÏincident€to€a€lawful€arrest.ÌÌà@ àò òIVó óÌÌà àà àà àI€dissent€from€the€òòperóó€òòcuriamóó€opinion€finding€that€theÏapprehension€of€the€defendant€was€a€valid€investigative€stop.ÌÌà àà àà àProbable€cause€is€not€the€only€basis€on€which€a€person€mayÍbe€detained€by€a€police€officer€without€a€warrant.€€If€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€do€not€warrant€the€reasonable€belief€that€a€crime€hasÏbeen€or€is€being€committed€and,€therefore,€there€is€not€probableÏcause€for€arrest,€those€facts€and€circumstances€may€be€examined€toÏdetermine€if€they€permit€an€investigative€stop.€€This€Court€hasÏpreviously€reviewed€decisions€in€which€the€requirements€for€probableÏcause€and€for€investigative€stops€were€discussed€and€noted€theÏdistinction€between€the€two€principles.€€The€distinction€between€anÏarrest€and€an€investigative€stop€is€stated€in€òòState€v.€Pullyóó,€863ÏS.W.2d€29,€30€(Tenn.€1993):ÌÌÒ P ÒÒ  ÒÓÓIn€general,€although€the€Fourth€AmendmentÏrequires€"probable€cause"€before€an€arrest€isÏdeemed€to€be€reasonable,€the€reasonableness€ofÏseizures€less€intrusive€than€a€full„scale€arrestÏis€judged€by€weighing€the€gravity€of€the€publicÏconcern,€the€degree€to€which€the€seizure€advancesÏthat€concern,€and€the€severity€of€the€intrusionÏinto€individual€privacy.ÌÒ 8 ÒÒ À ÒÌÌÌÓÓConsequently,€under€exigent€circumstances,€a€police€officer€may€makeÏan€investigative€stop€when€the€officer€has€a€reasonable€suspicion,Ïsupported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,€that€a€criminal€offenseÏhas€been€or€is€about€to€be€committed.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àà àà àRecognition€that€an€investigative€stop€may€beÏconstitutionally€reasonable€even€though€an€arrest€would€not€beÏconstitutionally€reasonable€was€not€intended€to€be€a€relaxation€ofÍconstitutional€protection€against€intrusions€by€the€state.€€Instead,Ïit€is€a€recognition€that€a€limited€intrusion€under€exigentÏcircumstances€may€be€justified€as€constitutionally€reasonable.€€òòStateÏv.€Yearganóó,€_____€S.W.2d€at€_____€(Reid,€J.,€concurring)€[slip€op.€atÏ9].€€Two€essential€conditions€characterize€a€valid€investigativeÏstop,€exigent€circumstances€and€limited€intrusion.€€After€reviewingÏdecisions€from€other€jurisdictions€in€which€investigative€stops€wereÏfound€to€be€justified,€the€Court€in€òòPullyóó€stated:€€"These€cases€showÏthat€the€gravity€of€the€perceived€harm€is€a€crucial€element€inÏassessing€the€reasonableness€of€an€investigative€òòTerryóó€stop.ðð€€òòStateÏv.€Pullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€33.€€The€Court€then€approved€this€statementÏfrom€a€concurring€opinion€in€òòUnited€States€v.€Mendenhallóó€,€446€U.S.Ï544,€561,€100€S.Ct.€1870,€1881,€64€L.€Ed.€2d€497€(1980)€(Powell,€J.,Ïconcurring):ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àThe€reasonableness€of€a€stop€turns€on€the€factsÏand€circumstances€of€each€case.€€In€particular,Ïthe€Court€has€emphasized€(i)€the€public€interest€Ïserved€by€the€seizure,€(ii)€the€nature€and€scopeÏof€the€intrusion,€and€(iii)€the€objective€factsÏupon€which€the€law€enforcement€officer€relied€inÏlight€of€his€knowledge€and€experience.€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Pullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€34.€€Ì€€Ìà àà àà àReasonable€suspicion€may€justify€a€limited€intrusion€intoÏthe€defendantððs€security€where€the€circumstances€require€immediateÍaction€by€the€police€officer.€€The€United€States€Supreme€Court€statedÏin€òòAlabama€v.€Whiteóó,€496€U.S.€325,€330,€110€S.Ct.€2412,€2416,€110€L.ÏEd.€2d€301€(1990),€that,ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 à[r]easonable€suspicion€is€a€less€demandingÏstandard€than€probable€cause€not€only€in€theÏsense€that€reasonable€suspicion€can€beÏestablished€with€information€that€is€different€inÏquantity€or€content€than€that€required€toÏestablish€probable€cause,€but€also€in€the€senseÏthat€reasonable€suspicion€can€arise€fromÏinformation€that€is€less€reliable€than€thatÏrequired€to€show€probable€cause.ÓÓÌÌà àà àà àWhile€the€informantððs€tip€and€Officer€Blackwellððs€ownÏknowledge€and€investigation€are€not€sufficient€to€support€a€findingÏof€probable€cause€under€òòJacuminóó,€they€may€be€sufficient€to€provideÏthat€reasonable€suspicion€which€is€one€requirement€for€anÏinvestigative€stop.€€Reasonable€suspicion€may€be€based€on€the€tip€ofÏa€known€informant;€when€the€informer€gives€the€officer€informationÏð ðimmediately€verifiable€at€the€scene,ðð€ððthe€information€may€carryÏððenough€indicia€of€reliabilityðððð€to€justify€the€stop€where€there€isÏð ðan€immediate€threat€of€danger.ðð€€òòState€v.€Pullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€31€Ï(quoting€òòAdams€v.€Williamsóó,€407€U.S.€143,€146„147,€92€S.Ct.€1921,Ï1923„1924,€32€L.€Ed.€2d€612€(1972)).€€The€test€adopted€by€òòJacuminóó€isÏhelpful€in€determining€whether€ð ðspecific€and€articulable€factsððÏjustify€the€reasonable€suspicion€necessary€for€an€investigative€stop.€€ÏòòId.óó€at€32.€€€For€example,€under€a€reasonable€suspicion€analysis,€whenÍan€informant€reports€an€incident€at€or€near€the€time€of€itsÏoccurrence,€a€court€often€can€assume€that€the€report€is€first€handÏand€thus€reliable.€€òòIdóó.€€Furthermore,€a€hurried€description€from€aÏsource€who€insists€on€immediate€action€suggests€that€the€source€is€anÏeyewitness€and€may€be€sufficient€cause€for€further€investigation.€ÏòòIdóó.ÌÌà àà àà àIn€the€present€case,€Officer€Blackwell€was€told€by€theÏinformant€that€the€defendant€was€at€ð ðPreacherððsðð€selling€ð ðcrackÏcocaine€right€then.ðð€€Soon€after€receiving€the€tip,€Officer€BlackwellÏfound€the€defendant€at€ð ðPreacherððs,ðð€where€the€informant€had€told€himÏthe€defendant€would€be.€€If€there€was€ð ðthe€need€for€immediate€policeÏaction€in€response€to€serious€threats€of€harm,ðð€the€informantððs€tipÏwould€justify€an€investigative€stop.€€òòId.óó€at€33.€€However,€theÏinformant€did€not€report€that€the€defendant€was€armed,€though€theÏofficer€had€reason€to€suspect€he€might€be,€nor€did€the€informantÏreport€that€the€defendant€intended€to€do€anything€that€would€createÏan€immediate€danger.€€The€record€shows€that€the€defendant€was€seatedÏat€a€table€in€a€public€place€engaged€in€conversation.€€Despite€priorÏincidents€of€violent€conduct€and€even€though€the€officer€suspectedÏthe€defendant€was€in€possession€of€illegal€drugs,€the€defendant€wasÏnot€at€the€time€Officer€Blackwell€entered€the€club€engaged€in€anyÏsuspicious€behavior€or€unusual€conduct€which€required€or€justifiedÏhis€immediate€detention.€€The€evidence,€considered€in€the€light€mostÍfavorable€to€the€prosecution,€does€not€show€that€Officer€BlackwellÏhad€specific€and€articulable€facts€or€inferences€from€factsÏsufficient€to€generate€a€reasonable€conclusion€that€a€crime€had€been,Ïwas,€or€was€about€to€be€committed.€€And,€further,€the€suspectedÏcriminal€activity€in€this€case,€possession€of€illegal€drugs,€isÏdifferent€in€principle€from€the€suspected€armed€robbery€in€òòTerryóó€andÏthe€aggravated€assault€or€murder€anticipated€in€òòPullyóó.€€The€criminalÏactivity€suspected€did€not€constitute€an€immediate€threat€of€harm€toÏthe€officer€or€others.€€There€was€no€need€for€immediate€policeÏaction.€€Consequently,€the€initial€detention€of€the€defendant€was€notÏjustified.€€€€Ì€Ìà àà àà àWhere€the€investigative€detention€is€justified,€the€policeÏofficer€may€pat€a€suspectððs€outer€clothing€if€the€officer€has€aÏreasonable,€particularized€suspicion€that€the€suspect€is€armed.€ÏòòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€at€27,€88€S.Ct.€at€1883;€òòHughes€v.€Stateóó,Ï588€S.W.2d€296,€304€(Tenn.€1979).€€ð ðThe€purpose€of€this€limitedÏsearch€is€not€to€discover€evidence€of€crime,€but€to€allow€the€officerÏto€pursue€his€investigation€without€fear€of€violence.ðð€€òòAdams€v.ÏWilliamsóó,€407€U.S.€at€146,€92€S.Ct.€at€1923.€€Officer€Blackwell€knewÏthat€the€defendant€was€a€convicted€felon€and€drug€dealer.€€He€knewÏthat€the€defendant€had€recently€been€charged€with€a€violent€offenseÏinvolving€a€weapon€and€was€familiar€with€the€defendantððs€armedÏattempt€to€flee€police.€€Even€though€the€defendant€was€not€in€factÍarmed,€this€knowledge€provided€a€reasonable,€particularized€suspicionÏthat€the€defendant€was€armed€and€dangerous.€€However,€thisÏparticularized€suspicion€cannot€be€the€basis€for€the€initial€stop.€ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àA€valid€investigatory€stop€must€be€justified€atÏits€inception€and€must€be€reasonably€related€inÏscope€to€the€circumstances€that€justifiedÏinterference€by€the€police€with€a€personððsÏsecurity.€€Justification€must€be€based€on€anÏobjective€manifestation€that€the€person€stoppedÏwas€or€was€about€to€be€engaged€in€criminalÏactivity€as€judged€by€those€versed€in€the€fieldÏof€law€enforcement€when€viewed€under€the€totalityÏof€the€circumstances.€€The€detaining€officer€mustÏhave€had€a€particularized€and€objective€basis€forÏthe€suspicion€of€criminal€activity.ÌÌÓÓÌòòPeople€v.€Championóó,€549€N.W.2d€849,€853€(Mich.€1996)€(citationsÏomitted).€ÌÌà àà àà àThe€State€at€a€suppression€hearing€has€the€burden€ofÏshowing€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€that€the€search€wasÏconducted€within€a€recognized€exception€to€the€warrant€requirement.€ÏòòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€293,€295€(Tenn.€1992).€€The€State€hasÏfailed€to€carry€that€burden€in€the€present€case.€€ÌÌà àà àà àThe€conclusion€is€that€since€there€was€no€valid€basis€forÏOfficer€Blackwellððs€initial€detention€of€the€defendant€and,Ïconsequently,€there€was€no€authority€for€the€search€which€producedÏthe€contraband,€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€suppressing€theÍevidence.€€ÌÌà ààH°° °àò òà@ àVÌó óÌà àà àà àI€concur€in€the€òòperóó€òòcuriamóó€decision€that€even€if€theÏdetention€of€the€defendant€was€lawful,€the€evidence€is€not€admissibleÏunder€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine.€€The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals,Ïafter€finding€the€initial€detention€was€valid€under€òòTerryóó,€upheld€theÏseizure€under€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine€of€òòMinnesota€v.€Dickersonóó,Ï508€U.S.€366,€113€S.Ct.€2130€(1993).€€In€that€case€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€held€that€if,€within€the€confines€of€a€valid€òòTerryóóÏfrisk,€an€officer€detects€contraband€through€the€sense€of€touch,€theÏofficer€may€seize€the€contraband.€€Having€found€the€detention€was€notÏa€valid€òòTerryóó€stop,€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€issue€is€moot€in€this€case.€ÏHowever,€since€the€Rule€11€application€was€granted€for€the€purpose€ofÏdiscussing€that€issue,€its€consideration€is€not€inappropriate.ÌÌà àà àà àIn€òòDickersonóó,€two€police€officers€observed€DickersonÏleaving€an€apartment€building€known€to€be€a€ð ðnotorious€ððcrackÏhouse.ðððð€€Based€on€Dickersonððs€suspicious€behavior€when€he€saw€theÏofficers€looking€at€him€and€the€fact€that€he€had€left€a€buildingÏassociated€with€cocaine€traffic,€the€officers€stopped€him€andÏconducted€a€patdown€search,€during€which€one€of€the€officers€felt€aÍsmall€lump€in€the€front€pocket€of€Dickersonððs€jacket.× ƒb ××  ×€€The€officerÏmanipulated€the€lump€with€his€fingers€and€thought€that€it€felt€likeÏð ða€lump€of€crack€cocaine€in€cellophane.ðð€€The€officer€then€reachedÏinto€the€pocket€and€retrieved€a€small€plastic€bag€containing€oneÏfifth€of€one€gram€of€crack€cocaine.€€Dickerson€was€arrested€andÏcharged€with€possession€of€a€controlled€substance.€€Before€trial,€heÏmoved€to€suppress€the€cocaine.€€The€trial€court€denied€his€motion€andÏhe€was€convicted€of€possession€of€a€controlled€substance.€€TheÏMinnesota€Court€of€Appeals€and€the€Minnesota€Supreme€Court,€however,Ïheld€that€the€cocaine€should€have€been€suppressed.€€The€StateÏappealed€to€the€United€States€Supreme€Court,€which€affirmed€theÏMinnesota€Supreme€Court.ÌÌà àà àà àAlthough€concluding€that€the€evidence€should€have€beenÏsuppressed,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€contrabandÏdetected€through€the€sense€of€touch€during€a€pat€down€search€may€beÏadmitted€into€evidence.€€It€based€its€decision€adopting€the€so„calledÏð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine€upon€an€analogy€to€the€ð ðplain€viewðð€doctrine.ÌÌÓÓà0 àà8 àà8 àThe€rationale€of€the€plain€view€doctrine€is€thatÏif€contraband€is€left€in€open€view€and€is€observedÍby€a€police€officer€from€a€lawful€vantage€point,Ïthere€has€been€no€invasion€of€a€legitimateÏexpectation€of€privacy€and€thus€no€ð ðsearchðð€withinÏthe€meaning€of€the€Fourth€Amendment„„or€at€leastÏno€search€independent€of€the€initial€intrusionÏthat€gave€the€officers€their€vantage€point.€SeeÏòòIllinois€v.€Andreasóó,€463€U.S.€765,€771,€103€S.Ct.Ï3319,€3324,€77€L.€Ed.€2d€1003€(1983);€òòTexas€v.ÏBrownóó,€[460€U.S.€730,€740,€103€S.Ct.€1535,€1542,Ï75€L.€Ed.€2d€502€(1983)].€€The€warrantless€seizureÏof€contraband€that€presents€itself€in€this€mannerÏis€deemed€justified€by€the€realization€that€resortÏto€a€neutral€magistrate€under€such€circumstancesÏwould€often€be€impracticable€and€would€do€littleÏto€promote€the€objectives€of€the€Fourth€Amendment.€ÏSee€òò[Arizona€v.€Hicksóó,€480€U.S.€321,€326„327,€107ÏS.Ct.€1149,€1153,€94€L.€Ed.€2d€347€(1987)];ÏòòCoolidge€v.€New€Hampshireóó,€403€U.S.€443,€467„468,Ï469„470,€91€S.Ct.€2022,€2028„2029,€2040,€29€L.ÏEd.€2d€564€(1971)(opinion€of€Stewart,€J.)].€€TheÏsame€can€be€said€of€tactile€discoveries€ofÏcontraband.€€If€a€police€officer€lawfully€patsÏdown€a€suspectððs€outer€clothing€and€òòfeels€anÏobject€whose€contour€or€mass€makes€its€identityÏimmediately€apparentóó,€there€has€been€no€invasionÏof€the€suspectððs€privacy€beyond€that€alreadyÏauthorized€by€the€officerððs€search€for€weapons;€ifÏthe€object€is€contraband,€its€warrantless€seizureÏwould€be€justified€by€the€same€practicalÏconsiderations€that€inhere€in€the€plain€viewÏcontext.€ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€____,€113€S.Ct.€at€2137€(emphasis€added)€(footnote€omitted).ÌÌà àà àà àIn€òòDickersonóó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€rejected€twoÏarguments€against€the€plain€feel€doctrine.€€One€was€that€touch€isÏmore€intrusive€of€oneððs€privacy€than€is€sight.€€The€Court€respondedÏthat€this€argument€was€ð ðinapposite€in€light€of€the€fact€that€theÏintrusion€€.€.€.€has€already€been€authorized€by€the€lawful€search€forÍweapons.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€508€U.S.€at€____,€113€S.Ct.€at€2138.€€A€secondÏargument€against€the€plain€feel€doctrine€was€that€the€sense€of€touchÏis€inherently€less€immediate€and€less€reliable€than€the€sense€ofÏsight.€€In€response,€the€Court€stated€that€òòTerryóó€itself€demonstratedÏthat€the€sense€of€touch€is€capable€of€revealing€the€nature€of€anÏobject€with€sufficient€reliability€to€support€a€seizure.ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àThe€very€premise€of€òòTerryóó,€after€all,€is€thatÏofficers€will€be€able€to€detect€the€presence€ofÏweapons€through€the€sense€of€touch€and€òòTerryóóÏupheld€precisely€such€a€seizure.€€Even€if€it€wereÏtrue€that€the€sense€of€touch€is€generally€lessÏreliable€than€the€sense€of€sight,€òòthat€onlyÏsuggests€that€officers€will€less€often€be€able€toÏjustify€seizures€of€unseen€contrabandóó.€ÏRegardless€of€whether€the€officer€detects€theÏcontraband€by€sight€or€by€touch,€however,€theÏFourth€Amendmentððs€requirement€that€the€officerÏhave€probable€cause€to€believe€that€the€item€isÏcontraband€before€seizing€it€ensures€againstÏexcessively€speculative€seizures.ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€____,€113€S.Ct.€at€2137€(emphasis€added).ÌÌà àà àà àThe€Court€then€proceeded€to€apply€the€principles€of€theÏplain€view€doctrine€to€the€facts€of€òòDickersonóó.€€The€dispositiveÏquestion,€the€Court€wrote,€ð ðis€whether€the€officer€who€conducted€theÏsearch€was€acting€within€the€lawful€bounds€marked€by€òòTerryóó€at€theÏtime€he€gained€probable€cause€to€believe€that€the€lump€inÏrespondentððs€jacket€was€contraband.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€____,€113€S.Ct.€atÏ2138.€€The€Court€found€that€the€officer€in€òòDickersonóó€ð ðoverstepped€theÍbounds€of€the€ððstrictly€circumscribedðð€search€for€weapons€allowedÏunder€òòTerryóó.ðð€€òòIdóó.ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àWhere,€as€here,€ð ðan€officer€who€is€executing€aÏvalid€search€for€one€item€seizes€a€differentÏitem,ðð€this€Court€rightly€ð ðhas€been€sensitive€toÏthe€danger€.€.€.€that€officers€will€enlarge€aÏspecific€authorization,€furnished€by€a€warrant€orÏan€exigency,€into€the€equivalent€of€a€generalÏwarrant€to€rummage€and€seize€at€will.ðð€€òòTexas€v.ÏBrownóó,€460€U.S.,€at€748,€103€S.Ct.,€at€1546„1547Ï(Stevens,€J.,€concurring€in€judgment).€€Here,€theÏofficerððs€continued€exploration€of€respondentððsÏpocket€after€having€concluded€that€it€containedÏno€weapon€was€unrelated€to€ð ð[t]he€soleÏjustification€of€the€search€[under€òòTerryóó:]€.€.€.Ïthe€protection€of€the€police€officer€and€othersÏnearby.ðð€€392€U.S.,€at€29,€88€S.€Ct.,€at€1884.€ÏIt€therefore€amounted€to€the€sort€of€evidentiaryÏsearch€that€òòTerryóó€expressly€refused€to€authorize,Ïsee€òòidóó.,€at€26,€88€S.Ct.,€at€1882,€and€that€weÏhave€condemned€in€subsequent€cases.€€See€òòMichiganÏv.€Longóó,€463€U.S.€[1032,€1049,€n.€14,€103€S.Ct.Ï3269,€3480„3481,€77€L.€Ed.€2d€1201€(1983)];ÏòòSibronóó€[òòv.€New€Yorkóó,€392€U.S.€40,€65„66,€88ÏS.Ct.€1889,€1904,€20€L.€Ed.€2d€917€(1968)].ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€___,€113€S.Ct.€at€2138„39.ÌÌà àà àà àTwo€prerequisites€can€be€gathered€from€òòDickersonóó€forÏallowing€the€seizure€of€contraband€detected€through€a€policeÏofficerððs€sense€of€touch€during€a€protective€pat€down€search€of€aÏsuspect.€€First,€the€scope€of€the€search€must€be€limited€to€thatÏnecessary€to€determine€if€the€suspect€is€armed.€€Second,€theÏincriminating€character€of€the€non„threatening€contraband€detectedÍduring€the€limited€search€must€be€ð ðimmediately€apparent.ðð€€òòUnitedÏState€v.€Rossóó,€827€F.€Supp.€711,€718€(S.D.€Ala.€1993),€òòaffððdóó,€19€F.3dÏ1446€(11th€Cir.€1994);€òòD.D.€v.€Stateóó,€668€N.E.2d€1250,€1252€(Ind.ÏApp.€1996).€€In€the€instant€case,€assuming€that€the€initial€seizureÏwas€justified,€the€first€of€these€prerequisites€is€initially€met.€ÏNothing€in€the€record€indicates€that€the€officer€went€beyond€theÏboundaries€of€a€òòTerryóó€search€for€weapons€in€his€patdown€of€theÏdefendantððs€person€until€he€seized€the€bottle.€€òòCompareóó€òòDickersonóó,Ï508€U.S.€at€_____,€113€S.Ct.€at€2138;€òòState€v.€Wondersóó,€929€P.2d€792Ï(Kan.€App.€1996)€(officer€continued€pat€down€of€defendantððs€pocketÏafter€he€determined€that€it€did€not€contain€a€weapon).€€It€is€theÏlatter€of€these€two€prerequisites€that€fails€in€the€present€case.ÌÌà àà àà àTo€justify€seizure€of€the€pill€bottle,€its€identity€asÏcontraband€must€have€been€ð ðimmediately€apparent.ðð€€The€termÏð ðimmediately€apparentðð€has€been€used€synonymously€with€ððprobableÏcause.ðð€€As€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€wrote€in€òòDickersonóóÏitself,€ð ð[i]f€.€.€.€the€police€lack€probable€cause€to€believe€that€anÏobject€in€plain€view€is€contraband€without€conducting€some€furtherÏsearch€of€the€object„„i.e.,€if€ððits€incriminating€character€[is€not]Ïð ðimmediately€apparent,ðððð„„the€plain„view€doctrine€cannot€justify€itsÏseizure.ðð€€òòIdóó,€508€U.S.€at€____,€113€S.€Ct.€at€2137€(citationsÏomitted).€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòArizona€v.€Hicksóó,€480€U.S.€at€329,€107€S.Ct.€atÏ1154;€€òòTexas€v.€Brownóó,€460€U.S.€at€741„742,€103€S.Ct.€at€1543Í(1983);€òòState€v.€Jonesóó,€653€A.2d€1040,€1047„1050€(Md.€App.€1995);€òòseeóóÏòògenerallyóó€3€Wayne€R.€LaFave,€òòSearch€&€Seizureóó€ðð€Ô€IÔ7.5Ô€\Ô(b)€(3d€ed.€1996).€ÏThe€question€thus€becomes€whether€Officer€Blackwellððs€tactileÏperception€of€the€pill€bottle€gave€him,€without€further€searching,Ïprobable€cause€to€believe€the€object€felt€was€contraband.€ÌÌà àà àà àAn€affidavit€filed€as€an€exhibit€to€the€suppression€hearingÏgives€the€following€account€of€Officer€Blackwellððs€pat€down€of€theÏdefendant:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àFor€my€protection€I€immediately€identified€myselfÏand€frisked€Bridges€for€weapons.€€òòWhen€I€touchedÏhis€right€jacket€pocket€I€immediately€recognizedÏa€pill€bottle,€in€that€pocket,€that€is€used€byÏthe€majority€of€crack€dealers€to€hold€their€crackÏcocaine.óó€€I€continued€the€frisk€and€found€a€knifeÏin€Bridgesðð€back€pocket.€€The€pill€bottleÏcontained€crack€cocaine.€€I€charged€him€and€alsoÏfound€a€small€bag€of€crack€cocaine€in€the€sameÏpocket.ÓÓÌÌOfficer€Blackwell€also€testified€at€the€suppression€hearing€regardingÏhis€discovery€of€the€bottle:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àQ.€€All€right;€what€actually€did€you€take€intoÏpossession€regarding€controlled€substances?ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 àA.€€Took€crack€cocaine€which€was€in€an€amount„„ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 àQ.€€Well,€you€donððt€have€to€give€me€the€amount.€ÏWhere€was€it€located€on€the€defendant?ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 àA.€€It€was€in€his€right€jacket€pocket.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 àQ.€€In€what€kind€of€container?ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 àA.€€Part€of€it€was€in€a€plastic€bag,€part€of€itÏwas€in€a€pill€bottle.€€Thatððs€when€I€seized€it.€ÏòòWhen€I€was€frisking€him€I€felt€and€immediatelyÏfelt€the€pill€bottle€and€knew€that€it€was€theÏkind€that€a€lot€of€other€dealers€will€use€to€keepÏtheir€crack€in.óóÌÌà8 àà8 àÌÌÓÓIn€summary,€the€evidence€shows€that€Officer€Blackwell€felt€an€objectÏthat€he€immediately€recognized€as€a€pill€bottle€when€he€touched€theÏdefendantððs€jacket€in€the€course€of€the€òòTerryóó€weapons€frisk.€Ìò òà àó óÌà àà àà àThe€courts€must€carefully€scrutinize€seizures€supported€byÏthe€plain€feel€doctrine.€€As€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏacknowledged€in€òòDickersonóó,€508€U.S.€____,€113€S.Ct.€at€2137,€to€theÏextent€that€the€sense€of€touch€may€be€less€reliable€in€certainÏcircumstances,€officers€will€€less€often€be€able€to€justify€seizuresÏof€unseen€contraband.€€Courts€should€not€surrender€their€common€senseÏassessment€of€the€sensory€capacities€of€human€touch€to€an€officerððsÏassertion€that€he€or€she€ð ðimmediately€knewðð€the€nature€of€the€objectÏtouched.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòJones€v.€Stateóó,€682€A.2d€248,€252€(Md.€1996)Ï(ð ðitððs€not€just€a€question€of€being€an€expert€and€coming€in€andÏsaying€the€magic€wordsðð).€€The€officerððs€subjective€belief€that€theÏobject€is€contraband€is€not€sufficient€unless€it€is€objectivelyÏreasonable€in€light€of€all€the€circumstances€known€at€the€time€of€theÏsearch.€€òòState€v.€Trineóó,€673€A.2d€1098,€1109€(Conn.€1996).€€AnÍofficerððs€testimony€is€a€factor€in€determining€the€legality€of€aÏseizure€under€the€plain€feel€doctrine,€but€it€is€not€dispositive€andÏdoes€not€end€a€courtððs€inquiry.€€òòState€v.€Wondersóó,€929€P.2d€at€799.€€€ÌÌà àà àà àPractical€and€constitutional€concerns€require€that€theÏplain€feel€doctrine€be€applied€with€caution.€€The€doctrine€has€beenÏcriticized€since€it€may€easily€allowÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 àa€law€officer€to€seize€anything€as€long€as€he€isÏable€to€contend€that€he€could€identify€theÏcontraband€by€merely€touching€the€suspectððsÏclothing.€€Realistically,€no€matter€how€absurd€orÏunsupportable€such€a€contention€may€be,€aÏdefendant€will€not€be€able€to€successfullyÏchallenge€it.€€The€ð ðplain€touchðð€doctrine€willÏencourage€officers€to€investigate€any€lump€orÏbulge€in€a€personððs€clothing€or€pockets€thatÏarouses€their€curiosity€during€the€course€of€aÏpatdown€search.€€If€the€item€turns€out€to€beÏcontraband,€then€its€seizure€can€beÏretrospectively€justified.€€If€it€turns€out€to€beÏsomething€else,€then€there€is€no€case€and€theÏmatter€ends€there.€€In€the€interim,€a€citizen€isÏsubject€to€an€unwarranted€intrusion€into€hisÏpersonal€privacy€far€beyond€the€intrusionÏcontemplated€by€the€weapons€patdown€search.ÌÌÓÓÌòòPeople€v.€Mitchellóó,€650€N.E.2d€1014,€1025€(Ill.€1995)€(Heiple,€J.,Ïdissenting).€€Over€a€quarter€of€a€century€ago,€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€similarly€warned€that€ð ðthe€ððplain€viewðð€doctrine€mayÏnot€be€used€to€extend€a€general€exploratory€search€from€one€object€toÏanother€until€something€incriminating€at€last€emerges.ðð€€òòCoolidge€v.ÏNew€Hampshireóó,€403€U.S.€at€466,€91€S.Ct.€at€2038.€€This€admonitionÍapplies€equally€to€the€plain€feel€doctrine,€which,€if€looselyÏapplied,€could,€as€its€critics€predict,€expand€limited€protectiveÏsearches€for€weapons€under€òòTerryóó€into€general€exploratory€rummagingsÏof€suspectsðð€persons€for€contraband.€€òòSeeóó€Barbara€A.€Doty,€Note,ÏòòMinnesota€v.€Dickerson:€Plain€Touch€Doctrine„„Authorizing€a€TerryÏStop€and€Search€for€Drugs?óó,€1994€Wis.€L.€Rev.€1303€(1994).€ÌÌà àà àà àThe€defendant€did€not€contend€that€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€affords€greater€protection€against€searches€and€seizuresÏthan€does€the€federal€constitution€with€regard€to€the€plain€feelÏdoctrine.€€The€plain€feel€doctrine€as€formulated€by€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€in€òòDickersonóó€is€not€inconsistent€with€principlesÏenunciated€by€this€Court€in€interpreting€Article€I,€Section€7.€òòÔ€\&ÔSeeóóÏòòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Roodeóó,€643€S.W.2d€651,€653€(Tenn.€1982).€ÏœÔ€\XÔConsequently,›€that€doctrine,€with€the€exacting€limitations€stated€inÏòòDickersonóó,€will€be€applied€in€appropriate€cases€in€this€state.€€ÌÌà àà àà àHowever,€the€application€of€these€principles€to€the€recordÏin€this€case€requires€the€finding€that€Officer€Blackwell€did€not€haveÏprobable€cause€to€believe€that€the€object€he€felt€was€contraband.€ÏBased€on€his€testimony,€he€had€a€suspicion€that€the€bottle€containedÏcontraband,€but€even€a€reasonable€suspicion€is€insufficient€toÏsupport€a€seizure€under€the€plain€view€doctrine,€òòArizona€v.€Hicksóó,Ï480€U.S.€at€326„27,€107€S.€Ct.€at€1153,€€and€thus,€by€analogy,€it€isÍinsufficient€to€support€a€seizure€under€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine.€ÏWhile€Officer€Blackwell€testified€that€he€ð ðimmediately€recognizedððÏthe€item€as€a€pill€bottle,€unless€he€was€clairvoyant€the€contentsÏcould€not€be€determined€from€merely€touching€the€container.€€Such€aÏbottle,€or€one€resembling€it€by€touch,€may€enclose€legal€medication,Ïcandy,€pins,€film€or€any€number€of€other€small€items.€Nothing€in€theÏofficerððs€testimony€offers€an€objective€basis€for€identification€ofÏthe€container€itself€or€its€possible€contents€as€contraband.€€NothingÏin€the€record€explains€how€his€touching€the€container€revealed€itsÏcontents€ð ðso€unquestionablyðð€that€no€warrant€requirement€existedÏð ðmerely€because€there€is€a€container€between€the€officer€and€theÏseizable€object.ðð€€3€LaFave,€òòSearch€&€Seizureóó€ðð€5.5Ô€IÔ(Ô€\Ôf).€€€Although€theÏCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€writes€that€Officer€BlackwellððsÏidentification€was€based€upon€his€experience,€the€record€containsÏlittle€evidence€of€Officer€Blackwellððs€experience€in€drug€cases€andÏno€evidence€as€to€how€he€connected€the€container€with€the€possessionÏof€cocaine.€€òòCompareóó,€òòState€v.€Trineóó,€673€A.2d€at€1111„12€(officerÏtestified€as€to€his€experience€with€narcotics);€òòPeople€v.€Championóó,Ï549€N.W.2d.€849,€859€(Mich.€1996)€(officerððs€testimony€about€20€yearsÏof€experience€in€narcotics€work).€€Under€the€proof€in€this€record,€itÏis€evident€that€it€was€not€apparent€to€Officer€Blackwell€that€theÏbottle€contained€contraband€until€it€was€removed€from€the€defendantððsÏpocket.€€This,€however,€is€the€very€type€of€further€manipulationÏforbidden€by€òòDickersonóó.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Rossóó,€827€F.€Supp.€atÍ719€(matchbox);€òòState€v.€Parkeróó,€622€So.€2d€791,€795€(La.€App.€1993)Ï(matchbox);€òòState€v.€Abramsóó,€471€S.E.2d€716,€718€(S.C.€App.€1996)Ï(Tylenol€bottle);€òòCampbell€v.€Stateóó,€864€S.W.2d€223,€226€(Tex.€App.Ï1993)€(film€canister);€òòDavis€v.€Stateóó,€829€S.W.2d€218,€220€(Tex.€Cr.ÏApp.€1992)€(matchbox);× ƒc ××  ×€òòcontraóó€òòPeople€v.€Championóó,€549€N.W.2d€at€858„59€(pill€bottle€in€groin);€€òòState€v.€Rushingóó,€935€S.W.2d€30€(Mo.Ï1996)€(en€banc)€(cylindrical€medicine€bottle).ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà@ àò òVIó óÌÌà àà àà àIn€conclusion,€I€would€hold€that€the€defendantððs€initialÏdetention€was€not€a€valid€òòTerryóó€stop€and,€further,€because€the€searchÏcannot€be€sustained€under€the€ð ðplain€feelðð€doctrine,€the€search€wasÏnot€reasonable€under€the€Fourth€Amendment€and€Article€I,€Section€7.€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àReid,€J.œÔ€IÔ›