ÿWPCb0 E# ÖU:á % 0(!4I]lw@t 0 §´ 0D[ AQŸ 0@ð 0J0bz D3‚ 0Tµ 0^  0hgÏ 0r× 0|I BÅ Æâ 0D¨ 0†ì 0Dr 0¶ D/F Bu 1u’ 0d U!*k B)• DC¾ AMN=l£©ÆL{†‰Šœà&9 g?!¦%¾'U6Û(v~)vÓ*˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡WX$xtÔôÔô3|x( z(D{(D|(U}(Ó€‰(‹(Œ(Ž(V(V(î(W(2©U$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ4°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ôl‹ôXXÔà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó !#%Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô- ù-'ÿÿdxd2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô'''÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd"$ ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d22227Border 1dd 3Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€1ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€1XÔÌÌò òMarch€30,€1998ÌÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€1ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó 3Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€We€have€consolidated€these€cases€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€16(b),€because€theyÏcontain€a€common€question€of€law.Ì ™Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€The€plaintiff€acknowledged€that€she€suffered€from€several€medical€ailments,€some€ofÏwhich€resulted€in€occasional€fainting€or€dizziness.€€She€did€not€testify€that€she€had€such€a€spell€onÏthe€day€and€time€in€question.€€Ì ¼Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€29„20„201(a)(Supp.€1997)(governmental€immunity)€and€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€€ðð€29„20„203(a)(Supp.€1997)(removal€of€immunity€for€ð ðdefective,€unsafe,€orÏdangerous€condition€of€any€street,€alley,€sidewalk€or€highway....ðð).Ì qÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€The€Court€of€Appeals€therefore€did€not€address€the€defendantððs€contentions€with€regardÏto€the€governmental€immunity€provisions€of€the€Tennessee€Government€Tort€Liability€Act.Ì |Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€The€Court€initially€indicated€that€the€open€and€obvious€rule€was€subsumed€byÏcomparative€fault€principles.€€òòBroyles€v.€City€of€Knoxvilleóó,€No.€03A01„9505„CV„00166€(Tenn.ÏApp.,€E.S.,€Aug.€30,€1995);€òòCooperwood€v.€Kroger€Food€Stores€Inc.óó,€No.€02A01„9308„CV„00182€(Tenn.€App.,€W.S.,€Dec.€30,€1994).€€Subsequent€decisions€indicated€that€the€open€andÏobvious€rule€was€not€changed€by€òòMcIntyreððsóó€adoption€of€comparative€fault.€€òòTracy€v.€Exxon€Corp.óó,ÏNo.€02A01„9512„CV„00277€(Tenn.€App.,€W.S.,€Dec.€31,€1996);€òòJones€v.€Exxon€Corp.óó,€No.Ï02A01„9507„CV„00159€(Tenn.€App.,€W.S.,€Aug.€27,€1996);€òòShope€v.€Radio€Shackóó,€No.€03A01„9508„CV„00288€(Tenn.€App.,€E.S.,€Dec.€7,€1995).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€We€have€since€distinguished€comparative€negligence€from€comparative€fault.€€TheÏformer€is€the€measure€of€the€plaintiffððs€negligence€in€percentage€terms€that€reduces€the€plaintiffððsÏrecovery.€€The€latter€encompasses€the€determination€of€how€to€apportion€damage€recoveryÏamong€multiple€or€joint€tortfeasors€according€to€the€percentage€of€fault€attributable€to€each.€ÏòòOwens€v.€Truckstops€of€Americaóó,€915€S.W.2d€420,€425€n.€7€(Tenn.€1996).Ì €Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€At€one€time,€there€was€a€distinction€in€the€duty€owed€to€a€licensee€as€opposed€to€anÏinvitee.€€This€distinction€has€since€been€abolished.€€òòHudson€v.€Gaitanóó,€675€S.W.2d€699€(Tenn.Ï1984).€Ì ÖÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€òòSeeóó€òòRegency€Lake€Apartments€Association,€Ltd.€v.€Frenchóó,€590€So.2d€970€(Fla.€App.Ï1991);€òòHarrison€v.€Tayloróó,€768€P.2d€1321€(Idaho€1989);€òòWard€v.€K€Mart€Corp.óó,€554€N.E.2d€223€(Ill.Ï1990);€òòKonicek€v.€Loomis€Brothers,€Inc.óó,€457€N.W.2d€614€(Iowa€1990);€òòBertrand€v.€Alan€Ford,€Inc.óó,Ï537€N.W.2d€185€(Mich.€1995);€òòTharp€v.€Bunge€Corp.óó,€641€So.2d€20€(Miss.€1994);€òòParker€v.ÏHighland€Park,€Inc.óó,€565€S.W.2d€512€(Tex.€1978);€òòLaesch€v.€L€&€H€Ind.,€Ltd.óó,€469€N.W.2d€655Ï(Wis.€Ct.€App.€1991).Ì /Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòHarrison€v.€Tayloróó,€768€P.2d€at€1321;€òòTharp€v.€Bunge€Corpóó.,€641€So.2d€at€25.Ì ]Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€òòSeeóó€òòRegency€Lake€Apartments€Association€Ltd.€v.€Frenchóó,€590€So.2d€at€973Ï(comparative€negligence€applied€where€plaintiff€tripped€over€exposed€tree€roots€within€apartmentÏcomplex);€òòWard€v.€K€Mart€Corp.óó,€554€N.E.2d€at€231€(court€applied€comparative€negligence€whereÏplaintiff€walked€into€concrete€column€while€carrying€large€object€from€defendantððs€store);€òòKonicekÏv.€Loomis€Brothers,€Inc.óó,€457€N.W.2d€at€618€(comparative€negligence€where€plaintiffððs€injuryÏresulted€from€open€and€obvious€hole€in€roof);€òòParker€v.€Highland€Park,€Inc.óó,€565€S.W.2d€at€517Ï(court€employed€comparative€negligence€where€plaintiff€injured€falling€on€dark€stairway);€òòLaesch€v.ÏL€&€H€Industries,€Ltd.óó,€469€N.W.2d€at€659€(open€and€obvious€defense€rejected€under€restatementÏapproach);€òòcf.óó€òòBuechelers€v.€Chicago€Park€Dist.óó,€665€N.E.2d€826€(Ill.€1996)(no€duty€to€warnÏagainst€diving€into€open€waters).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€1ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€We€believe€these€facts€distinguish€this€case€from€the€pre„òòMcIntyreóó€cases€cited€by€theÏdefendant€for€the€proposition€that€a€city€or€municipality€has€no€duty€or€liability€to€ensure€againstÏinjuries€from€cracks€or€imperfections€in€sidewalks.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòCity€of€Knoxville€v.€Hoodóó,€97€S.W.2dÏ446€(Tenn.€App.€1936).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€1ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€1XÔÌÌò òMarch€30,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€1ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó< Œ 9p`(Courier NewPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€1ÔÝ  ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ7€ÇõXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÞ ÞÌ€›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœ€€òòò òFOR›€PUBLICATIONóóó óÌœHAZEL›€MAXINE€COLN€andà àà à)Ìhusband,€CARL€F.€COLN,à àà àà à)à àœò òòòFiled:€€March€30,€1998ó ó›óóÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellants,à àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€HARDIN€LAWÌœVs.›à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)€€€€HON.€JULIAN€P.€GUINN,€JUDGE›ÌCITY€OF€SAVANNAH,€TENNESSEE,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌÙ€ ÙœßR€453A1-j| ÿG` ¯ `€€@ÿRß›à àà àAppellee.à àà àà à)€€€€€€No.€02„S„01„9702„CV„00008ÌÌòòandóóÌÌDEBBIE€VANCLEAVE,à àà àà à)Ìœ›à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellant,à àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€MADISON€LAWÌœVs.›à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)ÌMATTHEW€MARKOWSKI€andà àà à)€€€€€€HON.€WHIT€LAFON,€JUDGEÌwife,€DIANE€MARKOWSKI,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellees.à àà àà à)€€€€€€No.€02„S„01„9704„CV„00026ÌÌÌòòÌò òFor€Appellants,€Coln:óóà àà àà àòòFor€Appellee,€City€of€Savannah:óóó óÌEdward€L.€Martindale,€Jr.à àà àà àJames€A.€HopperÌDREW€AND€MARTINDALEà àà àSavannah,€TennesseeÌJackson,€TennesseeÌÌòòò òFor€Appellant,€Vancleave:óóà àà àòòFor€Appellees,€Markowski:óóó óÌJames€H.€Bradberryà àà àà àRussell€E.€ReviereÌJAMES€H.€BRADBERRYà àà àà àBradford€D.€BoxÌ€€€&€ASSOCIATESà àà àà àà àRAINEY,€KIZER,€BUTLER,€REVIEREÌDresden,€Tennesseeà àà àà à€€€&€BELL,€P.L.C.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJackson,€TennesseeÌÌò òòòFor€Amicus€Curiae,€Tennesseeà àà àFor€Amicus€Curiae,ÏTennesseeÌTrial€Lawyers€Association:à àà àMunicipal€Attorneys€Association:ó óóóÌJohn€A.€Dayà àà àà àà àà àTodd€MooreÌDonald€Capparellaà àà àà àà àHAYNES€&€FREEMAN,€PLCÌNashville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àGoodlettsville,€TennesseeÌ€€€€€€€€òòandóóÌJeffrey€A.€GarretyÌJackson,€TennesseeÌÌÌÔ€1„Ôò òà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ€1XÔÌÌÌÓ` °‚X˜XÓòòCOLN:óó€COURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSED€ANDÌTRIAL€COURT€JUDGMENT€REINSTATED.ÌÌòòVANCLEAVE:óó€€COURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSEDÌAND€CASE€REMANDED€TO€TRIAL€COURT.à àà àà àANDERSON,€C.J.ÇÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ ° ÑÓÓÑ€Ñà àWe€granted€permission€to€appeal€in€two€premises€liability€cases€toÏdetermine€a€common€question€to€both€„€whether€and€to€what€extent€theÏtraditional€open€and€obvious€rule€eliminating€a€landownerððs€duty€to€one€injuredÏas€a€result€of€an€open€and€obvious€danger€continues€to€be€viable€after€theÏadoption€of€comparative€fault€in€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó,€833€S.W.2d€52€(Tenn.Ï1992).× ƒ6 ××  ×ÌÌà àIn€the€first€premises€liability€case,€òòColn€v.€City€of€Savannahóó,€theÏtrial€judge€implicitly€found€a€landowner€duty€and,€applying€comparative€faultÏprinciples,€found€that€the€injured€plaintiff,€who€tripped€over€brick€pavers€installedÏin€the€sidewalk€by€the€City,€was€30€percent€negligent€and€the€City€was€70Ïpercent€negligent,€and€awarded€damages€accordingly.€€The€Court€of€AppealsÏreversed,€implicitly€acknowledging€a€duty€owed€by€the€City€but€finding€that€theÏplaintiff€was€at€least€50€percent€negligent€because€ð ðthe€condition€of€the€sidewalkÏwas€obvious€to€the€extent€that€a€reasonably€prudent€person€should€haveÏrecognized€the€potential€hazard€that€it€presented.ðð€€ÌÌà àIn€the€second€case,€òòVancleave€v.€Markowskióó,€the€trial€judge,Ïimplicitly€finding€no€landowner€duty,€granted€summary€judgment€to€theÏlandowner€after€finding€that€the€opening€in€a€pool€deck€on€which€the€plaintiff€fellÍand€was€injured€was€ð ðclearly€visible€and€not€concealed€and€that€anyoneÏwalking€on€the€premises€should€have€been€able€to€observe€it.ðð€€The€Court€ofÏAppeals€affirmed.ÌÌà àAfter€reviewing€the€two€cases€before€us,€the€extensive€literature,Ïour€Tennessee€cases€on€the€subject,€and€cases€from€other€jurisdictions,€weÏconclude€that€an€open€and€obvious€danger€does€not€automatically€result€in€aÏfinding€of€no€duty€and€therefore€no€landowner€liability.€€As€in€any€negligenceÏaction,€we€think€a€risk€is€unreasonable€and€gives€rise€to€a€duty€to€act€with€dueÏcare€if€the€foreseeable€probability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€by€a€defendantððsÏconduct€outweigh€the€burden€upon€the€defendant€to€engage€in€alternativeÏconduct€that€would€prevent€the€harm.€€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150€(Tenn.Ï1995).€€€Applying€this€analysis,€if€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€byÏthe€defendantððs€conduct,€even€if€ð ðopen€and€obvious,ðð€outweigh€the€burden€uponÏthe€defendant€to€engage€in€alternative€conduct,€the€defendant€has€a€duty€to€actÏwith€reasonable€care€and€the€comparative€fault€principles€apply€under€òòMcIntyreÏv.€Balentineóó,€òòsupraóó.€€ÌÌà àAfter€reviewing€the€record€in€each€case€and€applying€this€rule,€weÏreverse€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€judgment€in€òòColn€v.€City€of€Savannahóó€andÏreinstate€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€awarding€damages.€€We€also€reverse€theÍCourt€of€Appealsðð€summary€judgment€in€òòVancleave€v.€Markowskióó€and€remand€toÏthe€trial€court€for€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€ÌÌà@ àò òòòBACKGROUNDó óóóÌòòò òà@ àColn€v.€City€of€Savannahó óóóÌà àIn€June€of€1992,€the€City€of€Savannah€(ð ðCityðð)€contracted€to€haveÏdecorative€brick€pavers€installed€in€front€of€the€entrance€of€its€City€Hall€building.€ÏThe€brick€pavers€were€installed€on€top€of€a€bed€of€sand€in€an€areaÏapproximately€thirteen€and€one„half€feet€wide€by€sixteen€and€one„half€feet€long;Ïthe€surface€of€the€pavers€when€installed€was€below€the€level€of€the€adjacentÏconcrete€sidewalk€that€led€to€the€door€of€the€City€Hall€building.€€ÌÌà àOn€November€2,€1992,€the€plaintiff,€Hazel€Coln,€who€was€68€yearsÏof€age,€walked€across€the€brick€pavers€toward€the€entrance€of€the€building€andÏtripped€on€the€lip€of€the€concrete€sidewalk€adjacent€to€the€brick€pavers.€€She€fell,Ïinjuring€her€left€wrist€and€arm.€€Coln€conceded€that€the€weather€had€been€clearÏand€sunny,€and€that€nothing€prevented€her€from€seeing€the€brick€pavers€or€theÏsidewalk.× ƒ7 ××  ×€€ÌÌà àWilliam€Gilchrist,€the€landscape€designer€who€installed€the€brickÏpavers,€testified€that€there€was€a€deviation€approximately€three„eighths€of€anÏinch€between€the€pavers€and€sidewalk€when€the€pavers€were€installed.€ÏGilchrist€testified€that€the€deviation€was€due€to€the€settling€of€sand€beneath€theÏpavers,€as€well€as€a€hump€in€the€concrete€sidewalk.€€When€he€installed€the€brickÏpavers,€Gilchrist€told€Bill€Fox,€the€assistant€manager€for€the€City,€that€a€deviationÏexisted€and€that€half€of€the€pavers€would€have€to€be€replaced€to€correct€theÏdeviation.€€ÌÌà àFox€testified€that€he€knew€about€the€deviation€between€the€paversÏand€the€sidewalk,€but€felt€that€it€was€acceptable€and€should€not€be€corrected.€ÏPaul€Lebovitz,€a€landscape€architect,€testified€that€it€is€reasonable€to€expectÏsome€deviation€between€the€two€surfaces€when€pavers€are€installed€near€aÏconcrete€sidewalk€but€that€pavers€are€accepted€in€the€industry€as€a€safeÏwalkway€material.€€€There€was€also€evidence€that€the€size€of€the€deviation€wasÏseveral€inches€greater€at€the€time€the€plaintiff€was€injured.ÌÌà àThe€plaintiffs€alleged€that€the€City€ð ðhad€negligently€and€carelesslyÏleft€[the€area€of€the€new€brick€pavers]€defective€and€in€disrepairðð€and€that€theÏCity€€had€created€ð ða€dangerous€condition€for€the€plaintiff€and€any€other€personÏwalking€down€said€sidewalk.ðð€€The€trial€court€rejected€the€Cityððs€reliance€onÍgovernment€immunity€provisions× ƒ8 ××  ×›€after€finding€that€the€sidewalk€was€defective,Ïunsafe,€and€dangerous:ÌÓÓÌà8 à[The€defendant]€surprisingly€knew€of€[the€deviation]€inÏits€inception,€but€accepted€it€and€made€no€attempt€toÏcorrect€it.€.€.€.They€created€and€maintained€theÏdefective,€unsafe€and€dangerous€condition€and€.€.€.Ïthis€condition€was€the€proximate€cause€of€the€injuriesÏsuffered€or€experienced€by€the€Plaintiff€wife.ÌÌÌÓÓAccordingly,€the€trial€court€apportioned€30€percent€of€the€negligence€to€theÏplaintiff€and€70€percent€to€the€City.ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€the€City€contended€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€findingÏthat€the€sidewalk€was€defective,€unsafe,€or€dangerous,€and€that€the€trial€courtÏshould€have€found€that€the€plaintiff€was€at€least€50€percent€negligent€becauseÏthe€condition€of€the€sidewalk€was€ð ðopen€and€obvious.ðð€€€The€Court€of€AppealsÏnoted€that€the€ð ðopen€and€obviousðð€rule€traditionally€removed€any€duty€owed€by€aÏdefendant€to€a€plaintiff€who€is€injured€as€a€result€of€dangerous€conditions€thatÏare€open€and€obvious,€but€said€that€the€rule€was€subsumed€by€the€comparativeÏfault€system€adopted€in€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó,€òòsupraóó.€€Thus,€the€court€held:ÌÓÓÌÓ  Óà8 àWe€adhere€to€the€concept€that€there€is€no€liability€onÏthe€person€or€entity€in€control€of€premises€if€a€personÍlawfully€thereon€fails€to€exercise€reasonable€care€forÏhis€or€her€own€safety€or€for€dangers€that€are€obvious,Ïreasonably€apparent,€or€as€well€known€to€the€injuredÏparty€as€to€the€owner,€operator€or€person€in€control€ofÏthe€premises,€so€long€as€the€plaintiffððs€negligence€isÏequal€to€or€greater€than€the€defendantððs€negligence.€.Ï..€Otherwise€stated,€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€theÏduty€of€the€plaintiff€has€not€been€changed€butÏplaintiffððs€failure€to€meet€her€duty€must€be€comparedÏto€the€negligence€of€the€tortfeasor.€.€.€.ÌÌÓÓÌÓ  ÓThe€court€then€concluded€that€plaintiff€Coln€was€at€least€50€percent€negligentÏunder€the€facts€of€this€case,€and€reversed€the€judgment.× ƒ9 ××  ×ÌÌò òòòà@ àVancleave€v.€MarkowskiÌà àó óóóIn€October€of€1993,€the€plaintiff,€Debbie€Vancleave,€was€a€guest€atÏthe€home€of€the€defendants,€Matthew€and€Diane€Markowski.€€According€to€theirÏdepositions,€Vancleave€and€Diane€Markowski€went€into€the€backyard€to€theÏdeck€area€around€a€swimming€pool,€where€they€walked,€talked€and€surveyedÏthe€landscaping€in€the€yard.€€Vancleave,€who€was€walking€behind€Markowski,Ïfell€into€an€opening€in€the€deck€area€that€was€eighteen€inches€wide€and€threeÏfeet€long.€€The€opening€normally€contained€a€skimmer€used€for€cleaning€theÏpool,€but€it€had€been€removed€for€the€fall€and€winter€months.€€Vancleaveððs€rightÏknee€went€into€the€opening,€and€she€also€injured€her€left€ankle.ÌÌà àThe€plaintiff€filed€suit€alleging€negligence,€and€the€landownersÏfiled€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€on€the€basis€that€the€opening€in€the€deckÏwas€an€open€and€obvious€condition.€€The€trial€court€agreed,€finding€that€ð ðtheÏplaintiff€was€injured€on€an€opening€in€the€deck€which€was€clearly€visible€and€notÏconcealed€and€that€anyone€walking€on€the€premises€should€have€been€able€toÏobserve€it.ðð€€The€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€order€granting€summaryÏjudgment€to€the€defendants.ÌÌò òòòà@ àSUMMARYó óóóÌà àIn€each€of€these€premises€liability€cases,€the€plaintiff€contends€thatÏthe€open€and€obvious€rule€does€not€preclude€finding€a€duty€owed€by€theÏdefendant€landowner€and€that€an€open€and€obvious€danger€is€merely€a€factorÏfor€consideration€in€determining€comparative€fault€under€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó.€ÏThe€landowner€defendants€in€both€cases€maintain€that€the€rule€is€intact:€€thatÏthere€is€no€duty€of€care€when€an€open€and€obvious€condition€results€in€injury€toÏthe€plaintiff.€€The€City€of€Savannah€in€òòColnóó€also€contends€that€the€plaintiff€was€atÏleast€50€percent€€negligent,€barring€recovery€under€comparative€fault.€€€TheÍCourt€of€Appealsðð€analysis€in€each€case€reflects€the€conflicting€views€about€dutyÏand€comparative€fault€it€has€expressed€in€a€series€of€its€unpublished€decisions.× ƒ: ××  ×ÌÌà àWe€granted€and€consolidated€these€appeals€to€resolve€theÏconflicting€views€and€to€determine€the€viability€of€the€ð ðopen€and€obviousðð€ruleÏafter€òòMcIntyreóó;€specifically,€whether€an€ð ðopen€and€obviousðð€condition€relieves€aÏdefendantððs€duty€of€care€or€whether€it€merely€is€considered€in€assessing€theÏcomparative€fault€of€the€parties.òòò òÌÌà@ àNEGLIGENCE€PRINCIPLESó óóóÌà àA€negligence€claim€requires€proof€of€the€following€elements:€(1)€aÏduty€of€care€owed€by€the€defendant€to€the€plaintiff;€(2)€conduct€by€the€defendantÏfalling€below€the€standard€of€care€amounting€to€a€breach€of€that€duty;€(3)€anÏinjury€or€loss;€(4)€causation€in€fact;€and€(5)€proximate€or€legal€cause.€€òòBradshawÏv.€Danielóó,€854€S.W.2d€865,€869€(Tenn.€1993).ÌÌà àThe€initial€requirement,€the€existence€of€a€legal€duty,€is€a€questionÏof€law€for€the€court€which€requires€consideration€of€whether€ð ðsuch€a€relationÏexists€between€the€parties€that€the€community€will€impose€a€legal€obligationÏupon€one€for€the€benefit€of€others€„„€or,€more€simply,€whether€the€interest€of€theÏplaintiff€which€has€suffered€invasion€was€entitled€to€legal€protection€at€the€handsÏof€the€defendant.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€870€(quoting,€W.€Page€Keeton,€òòProsser€&€Keeton€on€theÏLaw€of€Tortsóó,€ðð€37€at€236€(5th€ed.€1984)).€€ÌÌà àIn€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€òòsupraóó,€we€explained€that€ð ða€risk€isÏunreasonable€and€gives€rise€to€a€duty€to€act€with€due€care€if€the€foreseeableÏprobability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€by€defendantððs€conduct€outweigh€theÏburden€upon€defendant€to€engage€in€alternative€conduct€that€would€haveÏprevented€the€harm.ðð€€Among€the€factors€for€consideration€areÌÓÓÌà8 àthe€foreseeable€probability€of€the€harm€or€injuryÏoccurring;€the€possible€magnitude€of€the€potentialÏharm€or€injury;€the€importance€or€social€value€of€theÏactivity€engaged€in€by€defendant;€the€usefulness€ofÏthe€conduct€to€defendant;€the€feasibility€of€alternative,Ïsafer€conduct€and€the€relative€costs€and€burdensÏassociated€with€that€conduct;€the€relative€usefulnessÏof€the€safer€conduct;€and€the€relative€safety€ofÏalternative€conduct.ÌÌÓÓ913€S.W.2d€at€153.€€ÌÌà àThe€determination€of€whether€a€duty€is€owed€requires€a€balancingÏof€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€the€potential€harm€against€the€burdenÏimposed€in€preventing€that€harm.€€òòMcClung€v.€Delta€Square€Ltd.€Partnershipóó,Ï937€S.W.2d€891,€901€(Tenn.€1996).€€Assuming€a€duty€of€care€is€owed,€be€it€aÏduty€to€refrain€from€creating€a€danger€or€a€duty€to€warn€against€an€existingÏdanger,€it€must€then€be€determined€whether€a€defendant€has€conformed€to€theÏapplicable€standard€of€care,€which€is€generally€reasonable€care€under€theÏcircumstances.€€ð ðOrdinary,€or€reasonable,€care€is€to€be€estimated€by€the€riskÏentailed€through€probable€dangers€attending€to€the€particular€situation€and€is€toÏbe€commensurate€with€the€risk€of€injury.ðð€€òòDoe€v.€Linder€Const.€œCo.,›€Inc.óó,€845ÏS.W.2d€173,€178€(Tenn.€1992).òòò òÌó óóóÌà àIf€the€plaintiff€meets€the€burden€of€establishing€the€defendantððsÏduty€in€a€particular€case,€as€well€as€the€other€elements€of€the€negligence€claim,Ïthe€trier€of€fact€must€apply€the€principles€of€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó,€òòsupraóó.€€In€thatÏcase€we€joined€nearly€every€jurisdiction€in€holding€that€a€plaintiffððs€contributoryÏnegligence€no€longer€would€bar€recovery€against€a€tortfeasor€and€adopting€aÏsystem€of€comparative€negligence€in€which€the€plaintiffððs€negligence€isÏcompared€to€the€fault€of€the€defendant€or€defendants.× ƒ; ××  ×€€A€plaintiff€whoseÍnegligence€is€less€than€that€of€a€tortfeasor€may€now€recover€damages€reducedÏby€a€percentage€of€the€plaintiffððs€own€negligence.€€833€S.W.2d€at€54.€€ÌÌà àOur€holding€in€òòMcIntyreóó€was€a€fundamental€change€in€negligenceÏlaw€in€Tennessee.€€It€was€based€on€considerations€of€fairness€and€consistency,Ïas€well€as€to€avoid€the€inconsistent€and€often€harsh€results€to€plaintiffs€whoseÏnegligence€was€far€less€than€that€of€a€defendant€or€defendants.€€Although€weÏhave€since€analyzed€the€effect€of€adopting€comparative€fault€on€a€number€ofÏcommon€law€negligence€doctrines,€òòseeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòPerez€v.€McConkeyóó,€872€S.W.2dÏ897€(Tenn.€1994)(implied€assumption€of€risk),€we€now€address€for€the€first€timeÏits€effect€on€the€traditional€ð ðopen€and€obviousðð€danger€doctrine.ÌÌà@ àò òòòOPEN€AND€OBVIOUS€DOCTRINEó óóóÌà àIn€premises€liability€cases,€application€of€duty€principles€resulted€inÏimposing€a€duty€on€an€owner€or€possessor€of€premises€to€exercise€reasonableÏcare€under€the€circumstances€to€a€guest€(licensee)€or€business€invitee.× ƒ< ××  ×€€TheÏduty€includes€the€responsibility€of€either€removing€or€warning€against€any€latentÏor€hidden€dangerous€condition€on€the€premises€of€which€one€was€aware€orÏshould€have€been€aware€through€the€exercise€of€reasonable€diligence.€€òòEatonÍv.€McLainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587,€594€(Tenn.€1994);€òòSmith€v.€Inman€Realty€Co.óó,€846ÏS.W.2d€819,€823€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€€ÌÌà àBecause€the€rationale€for€the€imposition€of€this€duty€was€partly€theÏð ðownerððs€superior€knowledge€of€a€perilous€condition€on€his€premises,ðð€a€rule€ofÏno„liability€also€was€derived:€that€a€premises€owner€has€no€liability€for€injuriesÏsustained€from€dangers€that€were€ð ðobvious,€reasonably€apparent,€or€as€wellÏknown€to€the€invitee€[or€licensee]€as€to€the€owner.ðð€€òòKendall€Oil€Co.€v.€Payneóó,Ï293€S.W.2d€40,€42€(Tenn.€App.€1955);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòMcCormick€v.€Watersóó,€594ÏS.W.2d€385,€387€(Tenn.€1980).€€In€many€jurisdictions,€this€so„called€ð ðopen€andÏobviousðð€rule€was€frequently€explained€in€terms€of€duty,€that€is,€a€defendant€hasÏno€duty€to€warn€or€protect€against€a€known€or€obvious€danger.€€OtherÏjurisdictions€analogized€the€open€and€obvious€rule€to€contributory€negligence€orÏassumption€of€risk,€doctrines€that€also€barred€a€plaintiffððs€recovery€forÏnegligence.€€òòSeeóó€Keeton,€òòPersonal€Injuries€Resulting€From€Open€and€ObviousÏConditionsóó,€100€U.€Pa.€L.€Rev.€629€(1952).€€Regardless€of€the€terminology,€theÏresult€was€the€same:€no€recovery.ÌÌà àDespite€its€traditional€application€by€many€courts,€the€open€andÏobvious€doctrine€was€widely€criticized€for€producing€arbitrary€results€and€beingÏð ðwrong€in€policy.ðð€€James,€òòTort€Liability€of€Occupiers€of€Land:€Duties€Owed€toÍLicensees€and€Inviteesóó,€63€Yale€L.J.€605,€628€(1954).€€As€one€commentatorÏsaid:€€ÓÓÌà8 à[T]here€is€perhaps€no€condition€the€danger€of€whichÏis€so€obvious€that€all€[persons]€under€allÏcircumstances€would€necessarily€see€and€realize€theÏdanger€in€the€absence€of€contributory€negligence,Ïand€this€is€particularly€true€if€the€further€principle€soÏoften€repeated€is€accepted€that€the€customer€orÏbusiness€invitee€is€entitled€to€assume€that€theÏpremises€are€reasonably€safe€for€his€use.ÌÌÌÓÓKeeton,€òòsupraóó,€100€U.€Pa.€L.€Rev.€at€642.€€Another€writer€observed€that€the€openÏand€obvious€rule€failed€to€consider€all€the€relevant€circumstances:ÌÓÓÌà8 àAn€undeniable€legal€error€is€committed€every€time€aÏcourt€bars€recovery€to€an€injured€person€based€solelyÏon€the€fact€that€the€perilous€nature€of€the€allegedÏcause€of€harm€was€ððapparent€to€all,ðð€without€anyÏconsideration€of€the€multitude€of€other€factors€whichÏmay€justify€or€excuse€the€plaintiffððs€conduct.ÌÌÌÓÓPhillips,€òòAssumption€of€the€Risk€Returns€in€Disguise€as€the€Open€and€ObviousÏDoctrine€Defenseóó,€30€ISBA€Tort€Trends€4€at€10€(1995).ÌÌà àIn€addition€to€these€criticisms,€the€adoption€of€comparative€faultÏprinciples€led€numerous€jurisdictions€to€reconsider€the€open€and€obvious€ruleÍand€to€conclude€that€it€should€not€automatically€preclude€recovery.× ƒ= ××  ×€€As€theÏMississippi€Supreme€Court€observed:ÌÓÓÌà8 àEmerging€from€other€jurisdictions€is€a€modern€trendÏtoward€holding€that€the€obviousness€of€a€dangerÏdoes€not€necessarily€relieve€the€ownerððs€duty€of€care.€ÏMoreover,€many€states€have€limited€the€use€of€thisÏdoctrine€by€holding€that€a€plaintiffððs€knowledge€or€theÏobviousness€of€a€dangerous€condition€does€notÏpreclude€recovery,€and,€some€instances,€states€haveÏexpressly€abolished€the€open€and€obvious€doctrineÏafter€the€adoption€of€comparative€negligence.ÌÌÌÓÓòòTharp€v.€Bunge€Corp.óó,€641€So.2d€at€24.€€The€Illinois€Supreme€Court€agrees€that€Ïð ð[t]he€manifest€trend€of€the€courts€in€this€country€is€away€from€the€traditional€ruleÏabsolving,€òòipsoóó€òòfactoóó,€owners€and€occupiers€of€land€from€liability€for€injuriesÏresulting€from€known€or€obvious€conditions.€.€.€.ðð€€òòWard€v.€K€Mart€Corp.óó,€554ÏN.E.2d€at€231.ÌÌà àNearly€every€jurisdiction€has€also€relied€upon€the€RestatementÏ(Second)€of€Torts,€ðð€343A,€which€states€the€rule€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 à(1)€A€possessor€of€land€is€not€liable€to€his€invitees€forÏphysical€harm€caused€to€them€by€any€activity€orÍcondition€on€the€land€whose€danger€is€known€orÏobvious€to€them,€òòunless€the€possessor€shouldÏanticipate€the€harm€despite€such€knowledge€orÏobviousnessóó.ÌÌÌÓÓ(Emphasis€added).€€The€word€ð ðððknownðð€denotes€not€only€knowledge€of€theÏexistence€of€the€condition€or€activity€itself,€but€also€appreciation€of€the€danger€itÏinvolves,ðð€and€the€word€ð ðððobviousðð€means€that€both€the€condition€and€the€risk€areÏapparent€to€and€would€be€recognized€by€a€reasonable€man,€in€the€position€ofÏthe€visitor,€exercising€ordinary€perception,€intelligence,€and€judgment.ðð€ÏRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts,€ðð€343A€(comment€b).€€The€restatement€furtherÏprovides€that€the€premises€ownerððs€duty€exists€if€the€harm€can€or€should€beÏanticipated€notwithstanding€the€known€or€obvious€danger:ÌÓÓÌà8 àSuch€reason€to€expect€harm€to€the€visitor€from€knownÏor€obvious€dangers€may€arise,€for€example,€whereÏthe€possessor€has€reason€to€expect€that€the€inviteeððsÏattention€may€be€distracted,€so€that€he€will€notÏdiscover€what€is€obvious,€or€will€forget€what€he€hasÏdiscovered,€or€fail€to€protect€himself€against€it.€€SuchÏreason€may€also€arise€where€the€possessor€hasÏreason€to€expect€that€the€invitee€will€proceed€toÏencounter€the€known€or€obvious€danger€because€toÏa€reasonable€man€in€his€position€the€advantages€ofÏdoing€so€would€outweigh€the€apparent€risk.ÌÌÌÓÓRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts,€ðð€343A€(comment€f).€€As€the€Michigan€SupremeÏCourt€has€said:€€€ð ðIf€the€risk€of€harm€remains€unreasonable,€despite€itsÏobviousness€or€despite€knowledge€of€it€by€the€invitee,€then€the€circumstancesÍmay€be€such€that€the€[defendant]€is€required€to€undertake€reasonableÏprecautions€[and]€the€issue€then..€.is€for€the€jury€to€decide.ðð€€òòBertrand€v.€AlanÏFord,€Inc.óó,€537€N.W.2d€at€187.ÌÌà àAlthough€a€few€courts€have€held€that€comparative€fault€principles€Ïabrogate€the€open€and€obvious€rule€entirely,œ× ƒ> ××  ×›€the€majority€follow€theÏRestatement€position€and€recognize€that€duty€remains€a€necessary€part€of€theÏanalysis.€€In€òòWard€v.€K€Martóó,€òòsupraóó,€for€example,€the€Illinois€Supreme€CourtÏexplained:ÌÓÓÌà8 à[W]e€recognize€that€the€Restatement€speaks€to€theÏmore€general€question€of€liability,€and€not€specificallyÏto€the€existence€of€a€duty.€€òòBut€we€think€the€principlesÏexpressed€there€are€consistent€with€the€general€dutyÏof€reasonable€care€owed€to€invitees€and€licensees,Ïand€they€are€relevant€to€the€resolution€of€whether€anÏinjury€was€reasonably€foreseeableóó.€€We€emphasize,Ïhowever,€that€since€the€existence€of€a€duty€turns€inÏlarge€part€on€public€policy€considerations,€theÏmagnitude€of€the€burden€of€guarding€against€theÏinjury,€and€the€consequences€of€placing€the€burdenÏupon€the€defendant,€as€well€as€the€likelihood€of€injuryÏand€the€possible€serious€nature€of€such€an€injuryÏmust€also€be€taken€into€account.ÌÌÌÓÓ554€N.E.2d€at€232€(emphasis€added).€€The€analysis,€therefore,€as€in€anyÏnegligence€case,€is€first€upon€duty€in€accordance€with€the€foreseeability€andÍgravity€of€harm,€and€the€feasibility€and€availability€of€alternatives;€if€a€duty€isÏimposed,€then€the€surrounding€circumstances€are€analyzed€under€the€principlesÏof€comparative€fault.× ƒ? ××  ×€€ÌÌà@ àò òòòTENNESSEE€LAWó óóóÌà àWe€agree€with€the€rationale€of€the€majority€of€courts€which€haveÏlimited€or€restricted€the€traditional€ð ðopen€and€obviousðð€rule€in€favor€of€theÏRestatement€approach.€€We€also€agree€that€attempting€to€analyze€the€duty€issueÏsimply€by€labeling€some€conditions€ð ðopen€and€obvious,ðð€without€considerationÏof€any€surrounding€circumstances,€promotes€arbitrary€and€inconsistent€results.€ÏMoreover,€the€open€and€obvious€rule€is€inconsistent€with€our€cases€whichÏanalyze€duty€by€balancing€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm€with€feasibility€andÏavailability€of€alternatives€that€would€have€avoided€the€harm.€€ÌÌà àWe€deem€the€Restatement€approach€to€be€the€better€reasonedÏand€more€persuasive€analysis.€€The€principles€stated€in€the€RestatementÍ(Second)€of€Torts,€ðð€343(A)€relate€directly€to€foreseeability€and€facilitateÏconsideration€of€the€duty€issue.€€Whether€the€danger€was€known€andÏappreciated€by€the€plaintiff,€whether€the€risk€was€obvious€to€a€person€exercisingÏreasonable€perception,€intelligence,€and€judgment,€and€whether€there€wasÏsome€other€reason€for€the€defendant€to€foresee€the€harm,€are€all€relevantÏconsiderations€that€provide€more€balance€and€insight€to€the€analysis€thanÏmerely€labeling€a€particular€risk€ð ðopen€and€obvious.ðð€€In€sum,€the€analysisÏrecognizes€that€a€risk€of€harm€may€be€foreseeable€and€unreasonable,€therebyÏimposing€a€duty€on€a€defendant,€despite€its€potentially€open€and€obviousÏnature.€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€while€we€restrict€the€once€broad€application€of€theÏð ðopen€and€obviousðð€doctrine,€we€stress€that€duty€remains€a€separate€componentÏof€a€plaintiffððs€negligence€action.€€As€we€said€in€€òòBlair€v.€Campbellóó,€924€S.W.2dÏ75€(Tenn.€1996),€ð ðour€adoption€of€the€principles€of€comparative€fault€did€not€alterÏthe€analysis€applicable€to€the€common€law€concept€of€duty.€.€.€and€it€is€beyondÏdispute€that€duty€is€a€question€of€law€for€the€trial€courtððs€determination.ðð€€€Thus,Ïonly€after€a€duty€is€established€does€comparative€fault€come€into€play.ÌÌà àWe€believe€our€analysis€is€consistent€with€other€post„òòMcIntyreóóÏcases.€€In€òòPerez€v.€McConkeyóó,€òòsupraóó,€we€addressed€the€effect€of€comparativeÏfault€on€the€assumption€of€risk€doctrine€which,€like€contributory€negligence,€hadÍtraditionally€barred€a€plaintiffððs€recovery.€€After€discussing€the€several€distinctÏtypes€of€assumed€risks,€e.g.,€express€or€implied,€we€held€that€a€plaintiffððs€primaryÏimplied€assumption€of€risk,€in€which€a€plaintiff€assumes€a€known€risk€that€isÏinherent€in€a€particular€activity,€such€as€watching€a€baseball€game€from€anÏunscreened€seat,€should€continue€to€be€analyzed€in€terms€of€duty.€€Conversely,Ïsecondary€implied€assumption€of€risk,€in€which€a€plaintiff€unreasonably€orÏreasonably€confronts€a€known€risk,€should€be€considered€under€comparativeÏnegligence€principles:ÌÓÓÌà8 à[T]he€reasonableness€of€a€partyððs€conduct€inÏconfronting€a€risk€should€be€determined€under€theÏprinciples€of€comparative€fault.€€Attention€should€beÏfocused€on€whether€a€reasonably€prudent€person€inÏthe€exercise€of€due€care€knew€of€the€risk,€or€shouldÏhave€known€of€it,€and€thereafter€confronted€the€risk;Ïand€whether€such€a€person€would€have€behaved€inÏthe€manner€in€which€the€plaintiff€acted€in€light€of€allÏthe€surrounding€circumstances,€including€theÏconfronted€risk.ÌÌ872€S.W.2d€at€905.€€ÌÌÓӜ̛à àWe€also€think€our€analysis€is€consistent€with€òòEaton€v.€McLainóó,Ïòòsupraóó.€€There,€a€guest€in€the€defendantsðð€home€awoke€during€the€night€and€fellÏwhile€trying€to€descend€a€stairway€in€the€dark.€€The€jury€allocated€40€percent€ofÏthe€negligence€to€the€guest€and€60€percent€to€the€homeowners.€€Although€weÏcited€the€traditional€rule€that€the€defendant€has€no€duty€to€warn€against€a€dangerÍthat€is€open€and€obvious,€we€did€so€in€the€context€of€the€specific€facts€of€thatÏcase.€€Our€analysis€of€the€duty€issue€under€the€facts€of€the€case€was€consistentÏwith€the€above€principles:Ì€à8 àÌÓÓà8 àAs€indicated€in€[òòDoe€v.€Linderóó,€òòsupraóó,]€the€question€ofÏwhether€the€[defendantsðð]€general€duty€of€careÏencompasses€the€duty€to€guard€against€the€acts€setÏforth€in€the€complaint€involves€an€analysis€of€theÏforeseeability€of€the€risk€to€which€[the€plaintiff]€wasÏexposed.€€In€other€words,€the€issue€is€whether€[theÏplaintiff]€has€made€ððany€showing€from€which€it€can€beÏsaid€that€the€òòdefendants€reasonably€knew€or€shouldÏhave€known€of€the€probability€of€an€occurrence€suchÏas€the€one€which€caused€[her]€injuries.ðð€€òòóóIdòòóó.ÌÌÌÓÓòòóóœEatonóó,›€891€S.W.2d€at€594€(italics€in€original).€€Although€we€concluded€that,Ïunder€the€specific€facts€of€the€òòEatonóó€case,€no€duty€should€be€imposed,€ourÏholding€recognized€that€the€result€could€easily€have€been€different€and€a€dutyÏcould€have€been€imposed:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àIn€order€for€the€[defendants]€to€be€charged€with€theÏduty€to€leave€on€the€light€in€the€hall€and€to€lock€theÏbasement€door,€they€must€have€been€able€toÏreasonably€foresee€that€[the€plaintiff]€would€get€out€ofÏbed€in€total€darkness,€walk€across€the€hall,€and€stepÏinto€the€basement€stairwell,€all€without€turning€on€anyÏlighting€whatsoever.€€While€our€holding€would€likelyÏbe€different€if€no€lighting€had€been€provided€or€if€itÏhad€been€inoperative,€[the€plaintiffððs]€failure€to€turn€onÏany€lights,€coupled€with€her€willingness€to€open€theÏdoor€and€step€into€an€unfamiliar€area€is€such€aÏradical€departure€from€reasonable€conduct€under€theÍcircumstances€that€the€[defendants]€could€not€haveÏreasonably€foreseen€that€conduct€and€itsÏconsequences.ÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€€at€594.€€Accordingly,€although€we€cited€the€ð ðopen€and€obviousðð€rule,€we€didÏnot€label€the€dark€stairwell€an€open€and€obvious€danger€and€then€hold€that€noÏduty€should€be€imposed;€instead,€the€duty€question€was€analyzed€with€respectÏto€the€traditional€components€of€foreseeability€and€risk€of€harm€as€applied€to€theÏfacts€of€the€case.€€òòIdóó.€at€594.€€€€€ÌÌà àTo€summarize,€we€join€those€jurisdictions€that€have€limited€theÏopen€and€obvious€doctrine€in€favor€of€the€Restatement€approach.€€That€a€dangerÏto€the€plaintiff€was€ð ðopen€or€obviousðð€does€not,€òòipsoóó€òòfactoóó,€relieve€a€defendant€ofÏa€duty€of€care.€€Instead,€the€duty€issue€must€be€analyzed€with€regard€toÏforeseeability€and€gravity€of€harm,€and€the€feasibility€and€availability€ofÏalternative€conduct€that€would€have€prevented€the€harm.€€The€factors€providedÏin€the€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts,€ðð€343(A)€relate€directly€to€theÏforeseeability€question;€in€short,€if€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm€posedÏfrom€a€defendantððs€conduct,€even€if€ð ðopen€and€obvious,ðð€outweighed€the€burdenÏon€the€defendant€to€engage€in€alternative€conduct€to€avoid€the€harm,€there€is€aÏduty€to€act€with€reasonable€care.€€The€circumstances€of€the€case€are€thenÏanalyzed€under€comparative€fault.ÌÌà àWe€reject€the€defendantsðð€contentions€that€restriction€of€the€openÏand€obvious€danger€rule€will€preclude€the€trial€court€from€applying€mechanismsÏsuch€as€summary€judgment€and€directed€verdict€to€evaluate€cases.€€By€retainingÏthe€separate€analysis€of€duty,€and€not€totally€subsuming€all€cases€by€applyingÏcomparative€fault,€the€mechanisms€of€summary€judgment€and€directed€verdictÏremain€viable€to€evaluate€cases€at€preliminary€stages€in€the€proceedings.€€AÏsummary€judgment€remains€appropriate,€for€example,€where€the€plaintiff€has€notÏproduced€sufficient€evidence€to€meet€the€ð ðdutyðð€component,€or€any€otherÏcomponent€of€a€negligence€claim,€as€a€matter€of€law.€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2dÏ208€(Tenn.€1993).€€A€directed€verdict,€on€the€other€hand,€remains€appropriate€ifÏthe€court€evaluates€the€evidence€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€the€plaintiff€andÏdetermines€that€reasonable€minds€could€not€differ€in€finding€that€the€fault€of€theÏplaintiff€was€equal€to€or€greater€than€the€fault€of€the€defendant.€€òòEatonóó,€891ÏS.W.2d€at€590.ÌÌà@ àòòò òAPPLICATIONó óóóÌà@ àò òòòColn€v.€City€of€Savannahóóó óÌà àAlthough€the€trial€court€did€not€apply€a€separate€analysis€of€theÏduty€requirement,€it€implicitly€found€that€the€defendant,€City€of€Savannah,€owedÏa€duty€of€reasonable€care€to€the€plaintiff,€and€it€applied€comparative€faultÏprinciples€in€assessing€70€percent€of€the€negligence€to€the€City€and€30€percentÏof€the€negligence€to€the€plaintiff.€€In€reversing€the€judgment,€the€Court€ofÍAppeals€also€applied€comparative€fault€analysis,€but€found€that€the€plaintiff€wasÏat€least€50€percent€negligent,€barring€recovery.ÌÌà àOur€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€determination€of€duty,€a€question€ofÏlaw,€is€òòdeóó€òònovoóó.€€Our€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact,€on€the€other€hand,Ïis€ð ðòòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€ofÏthe€correctness€of€the€finding,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€isÏotherwise.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).ÌÌà àWe€find€that€the€City€owed€a€duty€of€care€under€the€facts€of€thisÏcase.€€The€deviation€between€the€surface€of€the€brick€pavers€and€concreteÏsidewalk€created€a€foreseeable€probability€of€harm.€€Although€the€deviation€wasÏopen€and€noticeable€to€a€degree,€it€is€significant€that€the€deviation€was€in€anÏarea€that€had€to€be€navigated€in€order€to€gain€access€to€the€City€Hall€building.€€€ItÏis€also€significant€that€the€City€had€actual€knowledge€of€the€deviation€when€theÏpavers€were€installed€and€was€aware€of€the€availability€of€corrective€action.× ƒ@ ××  ×€ÏDespite€such€knowledge€and€the€foreseeable€risk€of€harm€to€persons€whoÏentered€the€City€Hall€building,€the€City€took€no€steps€to€remove€or€warn€againstÏthe€danger.€€In€our€view,€the€risk€of€harm€was€unreasonable€despite€its€openÍand€obvious€nature€and€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm,€therefore,Ïoutweighed€the€burden€imposed€in€protecting€against€that€harm.€€òòSeeóó€òòMcCall€v.ÏWilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€at€153.ÌÌ€à àHaving€found€a€duty€existed€under€the€facts€of€this€case,€we€thinkÏthat€the€trial€court€correctly€analyzed€the€conduct€of€the€plaintiff€and€City€underÏcomparative€fault€principles.€€In€òòEatonóó€we€said€that€relevant€factors€forÏconsideration€include€but€are€not€limited€to:€€(1)€the€relative€closeness€of€theÏcausal€relationship€between€the€conduct€of€the€defendant€and€the€injury€to€theÏplaintiff;€(2)€the€reasonableness€of€the€partyððs€conduct€in€confronting€a€risk,€suchÏas€whether€the€party€knew€of€the€risk,€or€should€have€known€of€it;€(3)€the€extentÏto€which€the€defendant€failed€to€reasonably€utilize€an€existing€opportunity€toÏavoid€the€injury€to€the€plaintiff;€(4)€the€existence€of€a€sudden€emergencyÏrequiring€a€hasty€decision;€(5)€the€significance€of€what€the€party€was€attemptingÏto€accomplish€by€the€conduct,€such€as€to€save€anotherððs€life;€and€(6)€the€partyððsÏparticular€capacities,€such€as€age,€maturity,€training,€education,€and€so€forth.€Ï891€S.W.2d€at€892.€€ÌÌà àA€trial€court€acting€as€trier€of€fact€ð ðhas€considerable€latitude€inÏallocating€percentages€of€fault€to€negligent€parties€.€.€.€[and]€appellate€courtsÏmay€alter€these€findings€if€they€are€clearly€erroneous.ðð€€òòWright€v.€City€ofÏKnoxvilleóó,€898€S.W.2d€177,€181€(Tenn.€1995).€€After€evaluating€the€evidence,Íthe€trial€court€assessed€the€negligence€as€30€percent€to€the€plaintiff€and€70Ïpercent€to€the€City.€€In€our€view,€given€the€evidence€in€the€record,€and€theÏpresumption€of€correctness€afforded,€the€trial€courtððs€findings€were€not€clearlyÏerroneous.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€therefore€erred€in€reversing€the€judgment.€€ÌÌà àAlthough€not€addressed€by€the€Court€of€Appeals,€the€CityÏmaintains€its€reliance€on€immunity€under€the€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act:ÌÓÓÌà8 àExcept€as€may€be€otherwise€provided€in€this€chapter,Ïall€governmental€entities€shall€be€immune€from€suitÏfor€any€injury€which€may€result€from€the€activities€ofÏsuch€governmental€entities€wherein€suchÏgovernmental€entities€are€engaged€in€the€exerciseÏand€discharge€of€any€of€their€functions,€governmentalÏor€proprietary.ÌÌÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€29„20„201(a)(Supp.€1997).€€As€noted€by€the€trial€court,€suchÏimmunity€may€be€removed€under€certain€circumstances,€including€ð ðany€injuryÏcaused€by€a€defective,€unsafe,€or€dangerous€condition€of€any€street,€alley,Ïsidewalk€or€highway,€owned€and€operated€by€such€governmental€entity.ðð€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€€ðð€29„20„203(a)(Supp.€1997).€€Removal€of€immunity€under€thisÏsection,€however,€requires€that€ð ðconstructive€and/or€actual€notice€to€theÏgovernmental€entity€of€such€condition€be€alleged€and€proved.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€29„20„203(b)(Supp.€1997).ÌÌà àThe€question€of€whether€a€particular€site€is€defective,€unsafe,€orÏdangerous€for€the€purpose€of€removing€governmental€immunity€is€a€question€ofÏfact.€€òòHelton€v.€Knox€County,€Tennesseeóó,€922€S.W.2d€877€(Tenn.€1996).€€TheÏtrial€court€found:ÌÓÓÌà8 àThe€threshold€issue€in€this€case€is€the€question€ofÏnotice€or€the€absence€of€notice€and€this€Court€findsÏthat€the€Defendant€City€through€its€relationship€withÏWilliam€Gilchrist€created€a€defective,€unsafe€andÏdangerous€condition.€€They€surprisingly€knew€of€it€inÏits€inception,€but€accepted€it€and€made€no€attempt€toÏcorrect€it.€.€.€.€[T]he€City€then€allowed€this€condition€toÏexist€in€an€ever€worsening€position€or€condition€as€itÏsettled€for€a€period€of€at€least€three€monthsÏdepending€upon€the€precise€date€when€this€portionÏof€the€project€was€completed€and€perhaps€a€period€ofÏas€much€as€four€months€or€in€excess€of€four€months.€ÏThat€is€sufficient€to€avoid€that€notice€thatððs€requiredÏunder€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€29„20„203[b].€€They€createdÏand€maintained€the€defective,€unsafe€and€dangerousÏcondition€and€[]€this€condition€was€the€proximateÏcause€of€the€injuries€suffered.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÓÓ€€€à àThe€evidence€in€this€record,€reviewed€with€the€presumption€ofÏcorrectness,€supports€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€sidewalk€was€defective,Ïunsafe€or€dangerous,€as€well€as€the€finding€that€the€City€had€actual€notice€of€theÏcondition.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).€€Moreover,€because€we€have€held€thatÏcomparative€fault€applies€to€conduct€that€is€broader€than€negligence,€such€asÏstrict€liability€in€tort,€òòseeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòWhitehead€v.€Toyota€Motor€Corpóó.,€897€S.W.2d€684Ï(Tenn.€1995),€we€observe€that€the€trial€courtððs€application€of€comparative€faultÍprinciples€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€29„20„203€was€entirely€consistent€withÏòòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó,€òòsupraóó.€€òòSeeóó€òòBradford€v.€City€of€Clarksvilleóó,€885€S.W.2d€78Ï(Tenn.€App.€1994).ÌÌà@ àò òòòVancleave€v.€Markowskióóó óÌà àAlthough€neither€the€trial€court€nor€the€Court€of€Appeals€indicatedÏthat€it€was€considering€the€ð ðdutyðð€element,€each€implicitly€found€no€duty€when€itÏfound€that€the€opening€in€the€homeownersðð€swimming€pool€deck€was€open€andÏobvious€and€granted€summary€judgment€to€the€homeowners€as€a€matter€of€law.€€ÌÌà àSummary€judgment€is€appropriate€only€if€the€moving€party€showsÏthat€no€genuine€and€material€factual€issue€exists€and€he€or€she€is€entitled€toÏrelief€as€a€matter€of€law.€€In€ruling€on€such€a€motion,€the€court€must€consider€theÏevidence€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€the€non„moving€party€and€must€allow€allÏreasonable€inferences€in€his€or€her€favor.€€A€summary€judgment€may€beÏappropriate,€therefore,€ð ðwhen€there€is€no€dispute€over€the€evidence€establishingÏthe€facts€that€control€the€application€of€a€rule€of€law.ðð€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€atÏ214„215;€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.ÌÌà àAlthough€summary€judgment€is€a€proper€mechanism€with€which€toÏevaluate€the€ð ðdutyðð€component€of€a€negligence€claim,€we€conclude€that€theÏlower€courts€erred€in€their€rulings€in€this€case.€€When€reviewed€with€theÍapplicable€standards,€the€evidence€shows€that€the€homeowners€removed€theÏskimmer€from€their€pool€deck€thereby€creating€a€large€and€dangerous€openingÏin€the€deck€which€they€did€not€elect€to€otherwise€cover.€€The€homeowner€invitedÏthe€plaintiff€onto€the€deck,€where€they€walked€in€close€proximity€while€talkingÏand€looking€into€the€yard.€€Although€the€plaintiff€had€not€previously€visited€theÏhomeowners,€she€was€not€warned€about€the€opening€in€the€deck.€€There€was€aÏfactual€issue€as€to€the€proximity€and€exact€distance€between€the€plaintiff€andÏhomeowner,€their€actions€just€before€the€plaintiff€fell€into€the€opening,€and€theÏexistence€of€conduct€that€may€have€distracted€the€plaintiff.€€ÌÌà àIn€our€view,€the€plaintiff€presented€sufficient€evidence€on€the€issueÏof€whether€the€risk€of€harm€was€unreasonable€despite€its€open€and€obviousÏnature€and€whether€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€the€harm€outweighed€theÏburden€imposed€in€protection€against€that€harm€to€establish€a€duty€on€the€part€ofÏthe€homeowner.€€Accordingly,€the€lower€courts€erred€in€granting€summaryÏjudgment€to€the€homeowners.€€While€we€express€no€view€on€the€relative€fault€ofÏthe€parties,€the€plaintiff€was€entitled€to€proceed€with€her€case.ÌÌà@ àò òòòCONCLUSIONó óóóÌà àWe€conclude€that€an€open€and€obvious€danger€that€causes€anÏinjury€to€a€plaintiff€does€not€automatically€result€in€a€finding€of€no€duty€and€noÏlandowner€liability.€€As€in€any€negligence€action,€a€risk€is€unreasonable€andÍgives€rise€to€a€duty€if€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€by€aÏdefendantððs€conduct,€even€if€open€and€obvious,€outweigh€the€burden€upon€theÏdefendant€to€engage€in€conduct€that€would€have€prevented€the€harm.€€ÌÌà àApplying€this€rule,€we€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€in€òòColn€v.€City€of€Savannahóó,€and€reinstate€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt.€€We€also€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€in€òòVancleave€v.ÏMarkowskióó€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedingsÏconsistent€with€this€opinion.€€Costs€of€the€appeals€in€each€case€shall€be€paid€byÏthe€defendants.ÌÌÓÓ€Ïà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àRILEY€ANDERSON,€CHIEF€JUSTICEÌÌÌò òœCONCUR:›€€œó óÌÌDrowota,›€Reid€and€Birch,€œJJ.›ÌœHolder,›€J.€„€see€separate€concurring€œopinionÇÇÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÑ ` ÑÑ  ÑÑ7€ÇõXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑßJ€4A;+'b|` Å `€@ÿJß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌÌHAZEL€MAXINE€COLN€andà@ à)Ìhusband,€CARL€F.€COLN,à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àHARDIN€LAWÌà àà àAppellants,à@ à)à àÌà@ à)Ìà@ à)ÌV.à@ à)à àHON.€JULIAN€P.€GUINN,€JUDGEÌà@ à)Ìà@ à)ÌCITY€OF€SAVANNAH,€TENNESSEE,à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àNo.€02„S„01„9702„CV„00008Ìà àà àAppellee.à@ à)ÌÌòòandóóÌÌDEBBIE€VANCLEAVE,à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àMADISON€LAWÌà àà àAppellant,à@ à)à àÌà@ à)Ìà@ à)ÌV.à@ à)à àHON.€WHIT€LAFON,€JUDGEÌà@ à)Ìà@ à)ÌMATTHEW€MARKOWSKI€andà@ à)Ìwife,€DIANE€MARKOWSKI,à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àNo.€02„S„01„9704„CV„00026Ìà àà àAppellees.à@ à)ÌÌÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCURRING€OPINIONóóó óÌÌÌÌÓÓà àAlthough€I€concur€in€the€results,€I€write€separately€because€of€myÏdisagreement€with€this€Courtððs€expansive€use€of€the€term€ð ðduty.ðð€€This€Court€hasÏproperly,€in€my€opinion,€used€a€duty€analysis€to€determine€that€class€of€peopleÏto€whom€reasonable€care€must€be€exercised.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.góó.,€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,Ï854€S.W.2d€865€(Tenn.€1993).€€In€my€opinion,€however,€this€Court€has€alsoÏimproperly€used€a€duty€analysis€to€determine€whether€a€party€has€failed€to€useÏreasonable€care.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€€òòEaton€v.€œMcCLainóó,›€891€S.W.2d€587€(Tenn.€1994).€€ÌÌà àOne€commentator€has€stated€that€the€question€of€whether€there€isÏa€duty€has€most€often€seemed€helpful€in€cases€where€the€only€real€issue€isÏwhether€the€defendant€stands€"in€any€such€relation€to€the€plaintiff€as€to€createÏany€legally€recognized€obligation€of€conduct€for€the€plaintiffððs€benefit."€€W.€PageÏKeeton,€òòProsser€&€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Torts,óó€ðð€42€at€274€(5th€ed.€1984).€€€InÏcourts€that€use€"duty"€to€limit€legal€redress€where€causation€is€clear€and€direct,Ïthe€ordinary€usage€of€"duty:"ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àhas€been€to€confine€the€word€"duty"€toÏquestions€of€the€existence€of€someÏrelation€between€the€defendant€and€theÏplaintiff€which€gives€rise€to€theÍobligation€of€conduct€in€the€firstÏinstance,€and€to€deal€with€theÏconnection€between€that€obligation,Ïonce€it€has€arisen,€and€theÏconsequences€which€have€followed€inÏthe€language€of€"proximate€cause."ÌÓÓÌòòÌIdóó.€at€275.Ìà àÌà àThis€Court,€however,€has€followed€the€lead€of€jurisdictions€thatÏhave€expanded€the€use€of€a€duty€analysis€in€premises€liability€cases.€€€TheÏmajority€states:€€ÌÌÓÓà àà8 àThe€analysis,€therefore,€as€in€anyÏnegligence€case,€is€first€upon€duty€inÏaccordance€with€the€foreseeability€andÏgravity€of€harm,€and€the€feasibility€andÏavailability€of€alternatives;€if€a€duty€isÏimposed,€then€the€surroundingÏcircumstances€are€analyzed€under€theÏprinciples€of€comparative€fault.ÌÌÓÓÌà àI€have€no€quarrel€with€an€examination€of€foreseeability€and€theÏgravity€of€harm€to€determine€whether€a€duty€exists.€€Where€I€begin€to€differ€withÍthe€majority€is€in€the€examination€of€the€following€factors€as€part€of€the€analysisÏof€duty:à àwhether€the€danger€was€known€and€appreciated€by€the€plaintiff;Ïwhether€the€risk€was€obvious€to€a€person€exercising€reasonable€perception,Ïintelligence,€and€judgment;€and€whether€there€was€some€other€reason€for€theÏdefendant€to€foresee€the€harm.€€€These€factors€are€more€properly€considered€byÏthe€trier€of€fact€in€determining€whether€a€duty€has€been€breached.ÌÌà àThe€existence€of€a€duty€should€not€be€confused€with€œa€breach€ofÏthat€duty.›€€òòSeeóó€òòShaw€v.€Petersenóó,€821€P.2d€220,€222€(Ariz.€App.€1991)€(holdingÏthat€whether€a€hazard€is€open€and€obvious€is€not€relevant€to€determine€theÏexistence€of€duty,€rather€it€is€relevant€to€determining€if€the€duty€was€breached).€€IÏwould€permit€a€jury€to€decide€if€a€risk€is€unreasonable.€€òòKlopp€v.€œWackenhut›ÏCorpóó.,€824€P.2d€œ293,€298›€(N.M.€1992)€(holding€that€œit›€œis›€for€the€jury€to€decide€inÏvirtually€every€case€whether€a€dangerous€condition€on€the€premises€involved€anÏunreasonable€risk€of€danger€and€whether€the€occupier€should€reasonablyÏanticipate€that€the€visitor€will€not€discover€or€realize€the€"obvious"€danger).€€ÌÌà àUnlike€the€majority€of€this€œCourt,›€I€would€find€that€the€doctrine€ofÏ"open€and€obvious"€has€been€subsumed€into€the€comparative€fault€scheme.€ÍOnce€a€duty€is€found€to€exist€as€to€the€class€of€persons€to€which€the€plaintiffÏbelongs,€the€obviousness€of€the€danger€and€the€plaintiff's€confrontation€of€thatÏdanger€would€be€but€two€additional€factors€for€the€jury€to€consider€inÏdetermining€the€parties'€percentages€of€œfault.€›€Only€if€reasonable€minds€couldÏnot€differ€should€a€motion€œfor›€œsummary›€judgment€or€directed€verdict€be€granted.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòHertelendy€v.€Agway€Ins.€Coóó.,€501€N.W.2d€œ903,€908›€(Wis.€App.€1993)Ï(holding€that€the€application€of€open€and€obvious€danger€doctrine€amounts€to€aÏdetermination€that€the€plaintiff's€negligence€in€confronting€an€open€and€obviousÏdanger€exceeds€the€defendant's€negligence€as€a€matter€of€œlaw).›ÌœÌà àApproaching€the€open€and€obvious€rule€by€analyzing€theÏreasonableness€of€a€party's€actions€is€consistent€with€the€history€of€the€openÏand€obvious€rule€in€Tennessee.€€In€the€early€history€of€"open€and€obvious,"Ïprecluding€recovery€required€analyzing€the€reasonableness€of€the€actions€of€theÏplaintiff€in€confronting€a€risk€or€danger.€€The€earlier€cases€focused€on€theÏplaintiffððs€prior€knowledge€of€the€danger.€€€òòSeeóó€òòBaker€v.€Louisville€&€N.€TerminalÏCo.óó,€106€Tenn.€490,€61€S.W.€1029,€1031€(1901)€("This€was€a€danger€that€wasÏopen€and€obvious€to€plaintiff€the€moment€he€climbed€upon€the€car,€and,€havingÏassumed€the€risk€of€icing€the€car€under€such€conditions,€he€cannot€be€heardÍnow€to€complain");€òòIllinois€Central€R.R.€Co.€v.€Nicholsóó,€173€Tenn.€602,€118ÏS.W.2d€213,€218€(1938)€("And,€hence,€there€is€no€liability€from€dangers€that€òòareÏobvious,€or€as€well€known€to€the€person€injured€as€to€the€owneróó")€(emphasis€inÏoriginal);€òòPark€v.€Sinclair€Refining€Co.óó,€142€S.W.2d€321,€324„25€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1940)€(holding€no€liability€is€established€"when€it€appears€that€the€injuredÏperson's€knowledge€of€the€danger€surpassed€or€equaled€that€of€the€defendant").€Ï›ÌœÌ›à àIn€these€cases,€I€would€find€œthe€defendants€owed€a€duty€to€theirÏrespective€plaintiffs.€€€Once€it€has€been€determined€that€the€plaintiffs€fall€withinÏthe€foreseeable€class€of€persons,€I€would€require€the€evaluation€of€the€danger,Ïthe€reasonableness€of€the€defendants'€actions€and€the€reasonableness€of›€theÏœplaintiffs'›€actions€in€confronting€the€danger€to€be€decided€by€the€trier€of€fact€inÏcomparing€the€fault€of€the€œparties.€€The€relevant€inquiry€is€the€conduct€of€each€ofÏthe€parties€and€whether€that€conduct€falls€below€the€standard€of€care€so€as€toÏbreach€the€duty€owed.›ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àòòà€ àóóÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJanice€M.€Holder,€JusticeÌÌÔ€BÔÔ€BÔœ›