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U *T B)~ DC§ AMê å7v~vÓš˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎX- ù-($¡¡, øð AZ"Arial Regular jkDlUmDno+ep«qDrÓ€|ê‚_#3|x|(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó<77D¡:QuickFormat1Ô€XÔÔ€XÿÿXÔÔ  ÔÔ€XÔÔ€XÿÿXÔÔ  Ô(3¯$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ! #$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd""""'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d----7Border 1dd!#.Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ÛÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ "ÝÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€,XÔÌÌMarch€30,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿáùEG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€_ãXXdædÈ7ÑØ ØÓ&€XÐd&ÓÞ ÞÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòò òFOR€PUBLICATIONóóó óÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òòòFiled:€€March€30,€1998ó óóóÌÌÌÌMICHAEL€SCOTT€EVANS,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àPetitioner/Appellant,à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àJUVENILEÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€ANDREW€J.ÌKAREN€MARIE€BISSON€STEELMAN,à à)à àSHOOKHOFF,€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àRespondent/Appellee,à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNO.€01S01„9701„JV„00019ÌÙ€!ÙßR€/0.A1-j|þG` ç `€€@ÿRßà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌÌòòandóóÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àÌIN€THE€MATTER€OF:€SEAN€MICHAELà à)à àÌCRAWFORD,€A€CHILD€UNDER€18à à)à àÌYEARS€OF€AGE,€THOMAS€MICHAELà à)ÌCIHLAR,à àà àà àà àà à)à àDAVIDSON€CIRCUITÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPetitioner/Appellant,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€THOMAS€W.€BROTHERS,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà à€€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌMARY€ANN€CRAWFORD€andà àà à)à àÌRONALD€SHANE€CRAWFORD,à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àRespondents/Appellees.à àà à)€€€à àNO.€01S01„9703„CV„00046ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àÇÑ€ÑÑ7€_ãXXdæXXdæ7ÑÌòòò òAttorneys€for€Appellant€Evans:à àà àAttorneys€for€AppelleeÏSteelman:ó óóóÌÌClark€Lee€Shawà àà àà àà àPhilip€W.€DuerÌNashville,€Tennessee€à àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMary€Arline€EvansÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€ÌòòÌò òÌÌAttorney€for€Appellant€Cihlar:à àà àAttorney€for€AppelleesÏCrawford:óóó óÌà àÌWayne€Detringà àà àà àà àJohn€L.€SchlechtyÌHendersonville,€Tennessee€à àà àNew€York,€New€YorkÌÌÌòòÌò òAttorney€for€Amicus€Curiae,à àà àAttorney€for€the€State€of€Tennessee:ÌSamuel€T.€Bartle,€M.D.:óóÌó óR.€Miles€Masonà àà àà àà àJohn€Knox€WalkupÌMemphis,€Tennessee€à àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌÌOf€Counsel:à àà àà àà àà àMichael€E.€MooreÌProfessor€Barbara€Kritchevskyà àà àSolicitor€GeneralÌMemphis,€Tennesseeà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àLinda€A.€RossÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssociate€Solicitor€GeneralÌà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àKimberly€M.€FraynÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€Ìà àò òÌòòó óÌóóà@ àà àà àà àòòÌóóÌÔ€,„Ôò òÌÌÌÌÌà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ€,XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ` °‚X˜XÓÌÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€AFFIRMED.à àà àà àà àANDERSON,€C.J.ÌÇÓÓ›à àWe€granted€the€applications€for€permission€to€appeal€andÏconsolidated€these€two€cases€to€decide€whether,€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ36„2„202€(1996€Repl.)(repealed€1997),€a€child€is€ð ðborn€out€of€wedlockðð€when€theÏchildððs€mother€is€married,€but€not€to€the€biological€father,€at€the€time€of€the€childððsÏbirth.€€If€not€ð ðborn€out€of€wedlock,ðð€the€biological€father€has€no€standing€to€legitimateÏthe€child.ÌÌà àAt€this€juncture,€we€recognize€that€after€the€granting€of€theÏapplications€in€these€cases,€the€Legislature€repealed€the€statute€underÏinterpretation.€€Moreover,€at€the€same€time€that€it€repealed€the€statute,€it€establishedÏð ða€single€cause€of€action€to€establish€parentage€of€children€.€.€.€.ðð€€Under€the€newÏlegislation,€ð ðchild€born€out€of€wedlockðð€is€specifically€defined€to€mean€ð ða€child€bornÏto€parents€who€are€not€married€to€each€other€when€the€child€was€born.ðð€€The€newÏlegislation,€however,€does€not€apply€to€the€cases€before€the€Court€since€theÏGeneral€Assembly€specifically€declined€to€make€it€retroactive.€€1997€Tenn.€Pub.ÏActs,€ch.€744,€ðððð€1€&€2.ÌÌà àWe€hold€in€the€cases€before€the€Court€that€the€phrase€ð ðnot€born€inÏlawful€wedlock,ðð€as€used€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202(a),€applies€only€to€a€childÏborn€to€an€unmarried€woman.€€We€further€reject€the€contention€that€thisÏinterpretation€violates€due€process€and€equal€protection€principles.€€Consequently,Ïthe€Court€of€Appealsðð€decisions€holding€that€the€putative€fathers€in€these€casesÍhave€no€standing€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202€to€file€a€petition€forÏlegitimation€are€affirmed.ÌÌà@ àò òòòBACKGROUNDó óóóÌà@ àòòEvans€v.€Steelmanóóà àÌà àKaren€Marie€Steelman€married€Jamie€R.€Steelman€in€July€1993.€€InÏJanuary€1994,€Karen€Steelman€left€her€husband.€€The€petitioner,€Michael€ScottÏEvans,€and€Karen€Steelman€moved€into€an€apartment,€after€which€they€regularlyÏhad€sex.€€After€discovering€that€she€was€pregnant€in€March€1994,€SteelmanÏacknowledged€to€Evans€and€his€family,€as€well€as€to€medical€providers€and€otherÏacquaintances,€that€Evans€was€the€childððs€father.ÌÌà àLater,€the€relationship€between€Steelman€and€Evans€deteriorated.€ÏOn€November€24,€1994,€Steelman€gave€birth€to€a€son,€Jacob€Ryan€Steelman.€€SheÏlisted€her€husband,€Jamie€Steelman,€as€the€childððs€father.€€Evans€found€out€aboutÏthe€childððs€birth€and€on€December€13,€1994,€filed€a€petition€to€legitimate€the€child€inÏthe€Davidson€County€Juvenile€Court.€€Karen€Steelman€opposed€the€legitimationÏpetition,€asserting€that€Evans€had€no€standing€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€35„2„202(a)€to€file€such€a€petition€since€Jacob€Steelman€was€born€in€lawful€wedlock.€€ÏOn€June15,€1995,€Evans€filed€a€formal€acknowledgment€that€he€was€JacobððsÏbiological€father€with€the€Putative€Father€Registry€maintained€by€the€TennesseeÏDepartment€of€Human€Services.€€Thereafter,€the€juvenile€court€judge€dismissed€theÍlegitimation€petition€on€the€grounds€that€Evans€had€no€standing.€€A€majority€of€theÏCourt€of€Appeals€affirmed,€while€Judge€Koch€dissented.ÌÌà@ àòòIn€the€Matter€of€Sean€Michael€CrawfordóóÌà àMary€Ann€Crawford€and€Ronald€Sean€Crawford€were€married€in€JulyÏ1988.€€In€early€1991,€during€a€period€in€which€the€Crawfords€were€separated,€MaryÏCrawford€and€the€petitioner,€Thomas€Cihlar,€had€a€romantic€relationship;€CihlarÏasserts€that€Crawford€lived€with€him€for€approximately€four€months,€during€whichÏtime€she€became€pregnant.€€Crawford€later€reunited€with€her€husband.€€OnÏNovember€29,€1991,€Crawford€gave€birth€to€a€son,€Sean€Michael€Crawford.ÌÌà àTwo€and€one„half€years€later,€on€July€26,€1994,€Cihlar€filed€a€petitionÏto€legitimate€the€child€alleging€that€he€is€the€father€of€Sean;€that€he€has€at€all€timesÏacknowledged€his€paternity;€that€since€the€childððs€birth,€he€has€exercised€weeklyÏvisitation€with€him;€and€that€he€has€paid€child€support€to€Crawford.€€In€DecemberÏ1994,€after€the€Crawfords€filed€a€response€to€Cihlarððs€petition,€the€trial€court€enteredÏan€agreed€order€granting€Cihlarððs€petition,€establishing€a€visitation€schedule€andÏsetting€child€support.€€In€January€1995,€after€Cihlar€filed€a€petition€seeking€custodyÏof€Sean,€the€Crawfords€moved€to€vacate€the€agreed€order.€€The€trial€court€grantedÏthe€motion€to€vacate€the€agreed€order€except€for€the€provisions€relating€to€visitation;Ïthe€court€also€ordered€that€the€Crawfords€re„pay€Cihlar€all€the€child€support€he€hadÏpaid€and€to€pay€his€attorneyððs€fees.ÌÌà àIn€March€1995,€the€Crawfords€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€theÏlegitimation€petition€on€the€ground€that€the€legitimation€statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ36„2„202€did€not€apply€because€the€phrase€ð ðnot€born€in€lawful€wedlockðð€did€notÏapply€to€Sean.€€They€also€asserted€that€Cihlar€had€no€standing€to€bring€theÏlegitimation€action.€€Cihlar€opposed€the€motion€and€gave€notice€to€the€attorneyÏgeneral€that€he€intended€to€challenge€the€constitutionality€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202.€€The€trial€court€entered€an€order€finding€that€the€statute€was€not€faciallyÏunconstitutional€under€either€the€state€or€federal€Constitutions.€€After€conducting€anÏevidentiary€hearing,€however,€the€trial€court€denied€the€motion€to€dismiss.€€The€trialÏcourt€explained€its€ruling,€stating€that€ð ð[œi]t›€would€be€a€mockery€to€the€concept€ofÏmarriage€to€describe€the€erratic€relationship€of€Mary€Ann€and€Ronald€Crawford€asÏbeing€ððlawful€wedlockðð.ðð€€The€Court€of€Appeals€reversed.ÌÌà@ àòòò òSTANDINGóóó óÌà àPursuant€to€the€common€law,€a€child€born€to€a€married€woman€wasÏpresumed€to€be€her€husbandððs€legitimate€child.€€This€presumption€was€universallyÏaccepted€and€has€been€repeatedly€noted€by€this€Court.€€òòGower€v.€Stateóó,€155€Tenn.Ï138,€290€S.W.€978€(1927);€òòJackson€v.€Thorntonóó,€133€Tenn.€36,€179€S.W.€384Ï(1915);€òòCannon€v.€Cannonóó,€26€Tenn.€410€(1846).€€ÌÌà àActions€for€legitimation€were€unknown€at€common€law.€€òòAllen€v.ÏHarveyóó,€568€S.W.2d€829€(Tenn.€1978);€òòCunningham€v.€Goldenóó,€652€S.W.2d€910,Ï911€(Tenn.€App.€1983),€òòappeal€dismissedóó,€466€U.S.€966,€104€S.Ct.€2336,€80ÍL.Ed.2d€810€(1984).€€Moreover,€children€born€to€unwed€mothers€could€not€inheritÏfrom€their€biological€father;€they€were€considered€to€be€the€children€of€nobody.€ÏòòAllen€v.€Harveyóó,€568€S.W.2d€at€831„32.€€In€order€to€alleviate€these€disabilities,€theÏGeneral€Assembly€enacted€the€first€legitimation€statute€in€1805.€€òòId.óó,€n.€2;€1805ÏTenn.€Pub.€Acts,€ch.€2,€ðð€1.€€In€1858,€the€legitimation€statute€provided:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àThe€application€to€legitimate€a€child€notÏborn€in€lawful€wedlock€is€made€by€aÏpetition€in€writing,€signed€by€the€personÏwishing€to€legitimate€such€child,€andÏsetting€forth€the€reasons€therefore.€ÌÌÌ€1858€Code€of€Tennessee,€ðð€3640€(1858).€€ÌÌÌÝ‚ÿÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,XÔÝ  ÝÓÓà àThe€statute€under€which€the€petitions€in€this€case€were€brought,€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202,€has€practically€the€identical€language€of€the€1858€statute.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202€provides€in€part:Ý‚ÿÝÝ  ÝÌÝ‚ÿÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,XÔÝ  ÝÓÓÌà8 àà8 à(a)€An€application€to€legitimate€a€child€notÏborn€in€lawful€wedlock€is€made€by€petition,Ïin€writing,€signed€by€the€person€wishing€toÏlegitimate€such€child,€and€setting€forth€theÏreasons€therefor€and€the€state€and€date€ofÏthe€child's€birth.ÌÌÓÓÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€has€previously€construed€the€phrase,€ð ðchild€notÏborn€in€lawful€wedlockðð€to€mean€a€child€born€to€an€unmarried€woman.€ÏòòCunningham€v.€Goldenóó,€652€S.W.2d€at€911„12.€€The€Court€recognized€the€nature€ofÏlegitimation€statutes€as€being€abrogations€of€the€common€law€and€noted€that€for€theÍð ðpresumption€of€legitimacy€to€make€sense€a€child€born€in€wedlock€must€mean€aÏchild€born€to€a€married€woman€and€a€child€born€out€of€wedlock€one€born€to€anÏunmarried€woman.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€912.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòCooper€v.€Thompsonóó,€710€S.W.2d€944,Ï946€(Tenn.€€App.€1985)(ð ðThe€legitimation€statutes€are€for€the€protection€of€the€child,Ïand€are€not€for€the€purpose€of€allowing€parents,€biological€or€otherwise,€to€stake€outÏclaims€to€the€child.ðð).ÌÌà àAfter€the€òòCunninghamóó€and€òòCooperóó€decisions,€the€LegislatureÏamended€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202€in€1992€and€1994,€prior€to€its€completeÏrepeal€in€1997.€€The€Legislature€did€not€change€the€language€ð ðnot€born€in€lawfulÏwedlockðð€in€either€1992€or€1994.€€We€agree€with€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€€conclusionÏthat€this€failure€to€change€the€language€of€€the€statute€evidences€an€intent€on€theÏpart€of€the€Legislature€to€keep€the€scope€of€the€legislation€narrow.€€òòHamby€v.ÏMcDanielóó,€559€S.W.2d€774€(Tenn.€1974)€(ð ð[œt]he›€legislature€is€presumed€to€know€theÏinterpretation€which€courts€make€of€its€enactments.ðð).€€€Moreover,€such€a€conclusionÏis€consistent€with€the€public€policy€of€the€state€as€it€existed€during€the€time€of€theÏstatuteððs€existence.€€As€the€Court€of€Appeals€noted€in€òòCunninghamóó,ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à[The€legislature]€did€not€intend€that€aÏmarried€woman€living€happily€with€herÏhusband€and€three€children€should€beÏforced€into€court€to€respond€to€a€petition€ofÏthis€type€filed€by€a€man€who€might€allegeÏonly€a€single€isolated€indiscretion.ÌÌÌòòCunninghamóó,€652€S.W.2d€at€913.ÌÌÓÓÌà àWe€therefore€hold€that€the€Court€of€Appeals€correctly€concluded€thatÏthe€petitioners€in€these€cases€lack€standing€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202€to€file€legitimation€petitions.ÌÌà@ àò òòòDUE€PROCESSÌà àó óóóThe€petitioners€assert€that€the€interpretation€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202€denying€their€standing€violates€their€procedural€and€substantive€due€processÏrights€by€denying€them€a€fair€hearing€and€opportunity€to€establish€a€legalÏrelationship€with€their€children.€€The€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€rejected€thisÏargument€as€it€applies€to€the€federal€constitution.€€In€òòMichael€H.€v.€Gerald€D.óó,€491ÏU.S.€110,€109€S.Ct.€2333,€2341„42,€2345,€105€L.Ed.2d€91€(1989),€the€Court€foundÏno€violation€of€procedural€due€process€under€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€theÏUnited€States€Constitution.€€With€regard€to€substantive€due€process,€the€CourtÏstated:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à[œT]he›€Due€Process€Clause€affords€onlyÏthose€protections€ð ðso€rooted€in€theÏtraditions€and€conscience€of€our€people€asÏto€be€ranked€as€fundamental.ðð€.€.€.€Thus,€theÏlegal€issue€in€the€present€case€reduces€toÏwhether€the€relationship€between€personsÏin€the€situation€of€Michael€and€Victoria€hasÏbeen€treated€as€a€protected€family€unitÏunder€historic€practices€of€our€society,€orÏwhether€on€any€other€basis€it€has€beenÏafforded€special€protection.€€We€think€itÏimpossible€to€find€that€it€has.€€In€fact,€quiteÏto€the€contrary,€our€traditions€haveÏprotected€the€marital€family€(Gerald,ÍCarole,€and€the€child€they€acknowledge€toÏbe€theirs)€against€the€sort€of€claim€MichaelÏasserts.€.€.€.€It€is€a€question€of€legislativeÏpolicy€and€not€constitutional€law€whetherÏCalifornia€will€allow€the€presumedÏparenthood€of€a€couple€desiring€to€retain€aÏchild€conceived€within€and€born€into€theirÏmarriage€to€be€rebutted.ÌÌÓÓÌà àThe€petitioners€also€assert€that€the€interpretation€of€the€statute€in€thisÏmanner€€violates€their€due€process€rights€under€Article€I,€ðð€8€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution.€€The€issue€for€us€to€determine,€as€it€was€for€the€Supreme€Court€underÏthe€Fourteenth€Amendment,€is€whether€the€parent„child€relationship€under€theÏcircumstances€of€the€legitimacy€statute€rises€to€the€level€of€a€protected€interestÏdeserving€of€due€process€protection.€€We€hold€that€it€does€not.ÌÌà àWe€acknowledge€that€the€parent„child€relationship€implicates€a€rightÏof€privacy€guaranteed€by€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€òòHawk€v.€Hawkóó,€855€S.W.2dÏ573€(Tenn.€1993).€€Moreover,€the€parent„child€relationship€may€give€rise€to€a€libertyÏinterest.€€òòNale€v.€Robertsonóó,€871€S.W.2d€674€(Tenn.€1994).€€The€statute€in€this€case,Ïhowever,€does€not€remove€a€parent„child€relationship€where€one€existed;€it€seeksÏto€create€such€a€relationship.€€In€other€words,€the€statute€creates€rights€for€putativeÏfathers;€it€does€not€take€them€away.€€Since€there€are€no€protected€interestsÏimplicated,€there€is€no€due€process€violation.ÌÌà@ àò òòòEQUAL€PROTECTIONÌó óóóà àThe€petitioners€contend€that€the€interpretation€placed€upon€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202€violates€the€equal€protection€provisions€of€the€FourteenthÏAmendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€the€equal€protection€provisionsÏof€the€Tennessee€Constitution,€Article€1,€ðð€8€and€Article€11,€ðð€8.€€This€Court€hasÏtraditionally€utilized€the€framework€developed€by€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏfor€analyzing€equal€protection€claims.€€òòNewton€v.€Coxóó,€878€S.W.2d€105,€109€(Tenn.Ï1994),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€513€U.S.€869,€115€S.Ct.€189,€130€L.Ed.2d€122€(1994);ÏòòTennessee€Small€School€Systems€v.€McWherteróó,€851€S.W.2d€139,€152„54€(Tenn.Ï1993).€€€The€concept€of€equal€protection€guarantees€that€persons€similarly€situatedÏshall€be€treated€alike.€€òòIdóó.€at€153.€€Equal€protection€analysis€requires€strict€scrutinyÏof€a€legislative€classification€only€when€the€classification€interferes€with€theÏexercise€of€a€ð ðfundamental€rightðð€or€operates€to€the€peculiar€disadvantage€of€aÏð ðsuspect€class.ðð€òòNewton€v.€Coxóó,€878€S.W.2d€at€109.€€If€no€fundamental€right€orÏsuspect€class€is€affected,€the€court€must€determine€whether€there€is€some€rationalÏbasis€to€justify€a€classification€set€out€in€a€statute.€€òòIdóó.€at€110.ÌÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€statute€in€the€present€case€does€not€affect€aÏfundamental€right€or€a€suspect€class€and€that€the€Stateððs€interest€in€preserving€theÏintegrity€of€the€family€is€a€rational€basis€for€the€statute€that€overrides€the€interest€ofÏthe€putative€father.€€òòSeeóó€òòIn€the€Matter€of€ð ðAððóó,€735€S.W.2d€232,€237€(Tenn.€App.Ï1987)(finding€three€State€interests€which€justify€prohibition€of€suits€seeking€toÏestablish€paternity€by€persons€such€as€petitioners:€marital€harmony,€preservation€ofÏthe€family€unit,€and€the€best€interests€of€the€child).€€Moreover,€we€agree€that€with€theÍCourt€of€Appeals€that€ð ða€person€seeking€to€legitimate€a€child€born€to€a€marriedÏwoman€is€also€in€a€fundamentally€different€position€from€a€man€seeking€toÏlegitimate€a€child€born€to€an€unmarried€woman.ðð€€Accordingly,€the€classificationÏcreated€by€the€statute€does€not€treat€òòsimilarlyóó€òòsituatedóó€persons€differently.€€WeÏtherefore€find€no€equal€protection€violation€in€our€interpretation€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ïðð36„2„202.ÌÌà@ àò òòòCONCLUSIONó óóóÌà àFor€the€reasons€discussed€above,€the€judgments€of€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€are€affirmed.€€Costs€are€taxed€to€petitioners,€Michael€Scott€Evans€andÏThomas€Matthew€Cihlar,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÓÓÌà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àRILEY€ANDERSON,€Chief€JusticeÌÌÌÌò òCONCUR:ó óÌÌDrowota,€Reid,€Birch,€and€Holder,€JJ.Ìà8 àà8 àÌÌÝ‚ÿÝÝ  ÝÝ‚ÿÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,XÔÝ  ݂݀ÿÝÝ  Ý