ÿWPCåX »C¢Ù÷ îÿ˜Ssù¹¡TþxÉ”ðŽ·Dµ!Ì"ôÜÒ œ2@0 §O¢¸tå[zæ3v¼x ¤ûxý¤å{óžEÎÄHzžI:’¤m‹…®è“¾~áG7¶Ý‚º|y7àÛ̉ž_¥pÛÄÙ³„ý1¥·åØr4ìÞYBRl+Ó1-¢/G©z֣ݯ~j¢T{„IfpÊÛ%?rL›ß55}:«í… óÕ•Ûæˆ¹ŸòÔ2ê µ/ô"®ÛF|ø~G´.Gdd´ÙÚït‘Ûž=ñs·dæ Ç<õýx™§¤%Iÿi8ºRígÝm8¦T†päx¯òDUÞäL5‚6ÉN6¾ ïP'bP¤hÕù-ó «8ª~Â>b¥\ |7ŒñLðÞìJ!´R8ð6;-ü)hØ 0¨ÂˆèôWâÑSgâÃ,61gsShbŸ¼I#¶ÑÐr!°ÌÆ$ ùy A6Dó(®[µñóã(më¦c‡¦½¥Ú)ÜQ·%ß5›Kx§×òåÄÍôÉyÑ[i:òq?ÌþTý£*ô+`^n‘Š@wœHѧ9&Ü܈ .⟗íåÞ (a‰+ÈP,-xqÐiƒÌ™€ŒÛ“A¡ì9”½Å/£pm %ö^ ü 0ˆUNwÞ4âö z Ò Q mS #Áj + Æ3 Æù Æ¿ Æ…U@KN‹ 1‡ 72EF 1uH 72½ 0cïÅR9 0DPÈ”\ír _! 0ôy+;m,-¨, 0ñÕ, 0îÆ- 0ë´. 0èŸ/ 0å‡0 0âl1 0ßN2 0Ü-3 0â 4 0ßë4bÊ5 0ÜÒ5 0Ù®6 0Ö‡7 0Ó]8 0Ð09 0Í: 0ÊÍ: 0á—; 0Þx< 0ÛV= 0Ø1> 0Õ ? 0ÒÞ? 0ϰ@ 0ÌA 0ÉKB 00C 0<DC 0¾€C 0>>D 0v|D 0`òD 0`RE 0`²E 0`F 0`rF 08ÒF 0Ò G 02ÜG 0üH 0: I 0YDI 0_I 0 üI 0jK 0ëpL 0„[M B*ßN D/ O B8O 0„UO 0¤ÙP D3}Q D-°Q 0KÝQ D/(R ASWRƪR 0¤pS 0DT A«XT 0ÎU 06ÑU 0V 0:W 0^IW 0<§W 0NãWU61XU>gXU*¥XÏX»m~E+s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularj5+ê:i¢Ø+003|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0 Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(ÆúI Z‹(Times New Roman (нCEKQW]cioAutoList1A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à »Ý ƒRlV$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¶Eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€parties€refer€to€this€as€a€ð ðpost„conviction€proceeding,ðð€which€it€is,€although€in€federal€practiceÔ‡&K’ %òô¶EÔ€it€is€calledÐ ° Ða€habeas€proceeding.Ô€&K’ % %&K’Ô€€Ô#†ô¶Eò %&K’ê#ÔOf€course,€since€the€drug€conviction€was€in€the€federal€system,€there€were€no€state€post„Ð ˆØ Ðconviction€proceedings€under€the€Tennessee€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„30„201€òòet€seqóó.Ð `° Ð(1997€Repl.).€€Nevertheless,€it€is€worth€emphasizing€that€our€holding€today€applies€to€both€federal€and€state€post„Ð $t Ðconviction€proceedings,€for,€as€is€clear€from€our€discussion€of€the€exoneration€requirement,€there€is€no€reason€toÐ è8 Ðdistinguish€between€the€two€in€this€context. /Ñ ° ÑÑ#€CXÿÿd#Ñ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ¾Ý ƒRlV$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¶Eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô¶Eòòô¶EÔThis€rationale€of€our€holding€today€rests€on€the€principle€that€legal€malpractice€claims€should€not€be€allowedÐ ° Ðif€they€call€into€question€previously€decided€post„conviction€judgments€ð!ð€a€principle€that€applies€to€both€state€and€federalÐ tÄ Ðjudgments.€€We€therefore€do€not€address€the€issue€of€whether€federal€common€law€would€prohibit€us€from€allowing€aÐ 8ˆ Ðlawsuit€to€proceed€in€state€court€that,€in€effect,€implied€the€invalidity€of€a€federal€judgment.€€òòSeeóó€òòSemtek€Intððl€Inc.€v.Ð üL ÐLockheed€Martin€Corp.óó,€531€U.S.€497,€121€S.€Ct.€1021,€1027„28,€149€L.€Ed.€2d€32€(2001).€€Neither€the€parties€nor€theÐ À Ðcourts€below€addressed€this€issue,€but€it€is€a€serious€one,€with€constitutional€implications. Ñ ° Ñ ãÝ ƒRlV$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¶Eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô¶Eòòô¶EÔIndeed,€as€stated€in€footnote€two€of€this€opinion,€it€may€be€that€the€state€courts€òòmustóó€apply€federal€collateralÐ ° Ðestoppel€law,€since€the€issue€at€the€heart€of€the€preclusion€inquiry€has€been€determined€by€the€federal€courts.€€We€do€notÐ tÄ Ðdecide€this€issue,€except€to€note€that€òòÔ_ÔSemtekÔ_Ôóó,€and€the€cases€discussed€therein,€strongly€suggest€that€federal€law€controls.€Ð 8ˆ ÐòòSeeóó€òòÔ_ÔSemtekÔ_Ôóó,€121€S.€Ct.€at€1027„28€(ð ðòò[Ô_ÔW]hetherÔ_Ô€a€Federal€judgment€has€been€given€due€force€and€effect€in€the€state€courtÐ üL Ðis€a€Federal€question€Ô_ÔreviewableÔ_Ô€by€this€courtóó,€which€will€determine€for€itself€whether€such€judgment€has€been€givenÐ À Ðdue€weight€or€otherwise.ðð)€(quoting€òòDeposit€Bank€v.€Frankfortóó,€191€U.S.€499,€514,€24€S.€Ct.€154,€48€L.€Ed.€276€(1903)Ð „Ô Ð(emphasis€added)).€€Moreover,€it€appears€likely€that€federal€courts€would€apply€collateral€estoppel€here.€€òòSeeóó€òòLevineóó,€123Ð H ˜ ÐF.3d€at€583€(ð ðIf€[the€plaintiffððs]€Ô_ÔpostconvictionÔ_Ô€attacks€on€the€conviction€fail,€then€he€cannot€bring€a€malpractice€suit€evenÐ  \ Ðif€he€is€prepared€to€present€evidence€that€he€was€innocent€in€fact,€and€his€conviction€was€therefore€unjust.€€For€byÐ Ð  Ðoperation€of€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel,€a€valid€criminal€conviction€acts€as€a€bar€to€overturning€that€convictionÐ ” ä  Ðin€a€civil€damages€suit.ðð);€òòsee€generallyóó€òòBurlington€Northern€R.R.€Co.€v.€Hyundai€Ô_ÔMerchÔ_Ô.€Marine€Co.óó,€63€F.3d€1227,Ð X ¨  Ð1231„33€(3rd€Cir.€1995)€(discussing€issue€preclusion).  Ý ƒRlV$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¶Eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô¶Eòòô¶EÔIn€support€of€his€argument€that€collateral€estoppel€should€not€apply,€Gibson€cites€òòOffice€of€DisciplinaryÐ ° ÐCounsel€v.€McKinneyóó,€668€S.W.2d€293€(Tenn.€1984),€where€we€held€that€post„conviction€court€opinions€granting€reliefÐ tÄ Ðto€criminal€defendants€could€not€be€used€as€evidence€in€later€Board€of€Professional€Responsibility€disciplinary€actionsÐ 8ˆ Ðagainst€their€defense€lawyers.€€òòMcKinneyóó,€however,€is€inapposite;€indeed,€attorney€disciplinary€matters€are€very€differentÐ üL Ðthan€tort€suits.€€€Our€principal€concern€in€òòMcKinneyóó€was€that€the€attorney€never€had€the€opportunity€in€a€previousÐ À Ðpreceding€to€litigate€the€issue€of€whether€his€representation€amounted€to€misconduct.€€As€we€stated,€ð ðMcKinney€isÐ „Ô Ðentitled€to€his€ððday€in€courtðð€on€the€allegations€of€professional€misconduct,€and€the€opportunity€to€answer€the€chargesÐ H ˜ Ðleveled€against€him€by€the€Board€of€Professional€Ô‡&K’ %òô¶EÔResponsibility.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€296„97.€€Ô#†ô¶Eò %&K’£#ÔGibson,€of€course,€has€already€hadÐ  \ Ðhis€day€in€court.€Ð ä 4 ÐÌà  àGibson€also€cites€a€Court€of€Appealsðð€decision,€òòGrange€Mutual€Casualty€Co.€v.€Walkeróó,€652€S.W.2d€908,€910Ð l ¼   Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983).€€In€òòGrangeóó,€the€defendant€pled€guilty€to€voluntary€manslaughter.€€The€plaintiff/insurance€companyÐ ° Ðsought€a€declaration€that€the€defendant€was€not€entitled€to€benefits€relating€to€damages€he€suffered€during€the€killing.€Ð tÄ ÐThe€court€declined€to€apply€collateral€estoppel,€stating€that€a€guilty€plea€is€generally€not€conclusive€on€an€issue€in€aÐ 8ˆ Ðsubsequent€civil€action.€€Among€other€differences€between€òòGrangeóó€and€the€case€at€bar,€we€note€that€òòGrangeóó€involvedÐ üL Ðð ðoffensiveðð€collateral€estoppel€(where€the€plaintiff€attempts€to€prevent€the€defendant€from€Ô_ÔrelitigatingÔ_Ô€an€issue),€whichÐ À Ðhas€always€been€viewed€less€favorably€than€ð ðdefensiveðð€collateral€estoppel€(as€in€Gibsonððs€case).€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòÔ‡&K’ %òô¶EÔÔ_ÔBeatyÔ_Ôóó,€15Ð „Ô ÐS.W.3d€at€824„25.€Ô#†ô¶Eò %&K’{ #Ô2J+M ÿÿ0_level1Ó ¨ý ÓÓ X ÓÓ2( ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 2ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó 1Ñ#€CXÿÿd#ÑØØ #Ñ#€CXÿÿd#Ñ2G+M ÿÿ0_level2Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ° ÓÓ/%` ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ /ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2D+M ÿÿ0_level3Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ,"¸ ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ ,ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2A+M ÿÿ0_level4Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ` ÓÓ) hÀpÈ xÐ )ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2>+M ÿÿ0_level5Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ¸ ÓÓ&hhÀpÈ xÐ &ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2;+M ÿÿ0_level6Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ#ÀÀpÈ xÐ #ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó28+M ÿÿ0_level7Ó ¨ý ÓÓ h ÓÓ pÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó25+M ÿÿ0_level8Ó ¨ý ÓÓ À ÓÓppÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó22+M ÿÿ0_level9Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓÈÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2JM ÿÿ0_levsl1Ó ¨ý ÓÓ X ÓÓ2( ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 2ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2GM ÿÿ0_levsl2Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ° ÓÓ/%` ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ /ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó- ù-2DM ÿÿ0_levsl3Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ,"¸ ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ ,ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2AM ÿÿ0_levsl4Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ` ÓÓ) hÀpÈ xÐ )ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2>M ÿÿ0_levsl5Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ¸ ÓÓ&hhÀpÈ xÐ &ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2;M ÿÿ0_levsl6Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ#ÀÀpÈ xÐ #ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó28M ÿÿ0_levsl7Ó ¨ý ÓÓ h ÓÓ pÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó25M ÿÿ0_levsl8Ó ¨ý ÓÓ À ÓÓppÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó22M ÿÿ0_levsl9Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓÈÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2JM ÿÿ0_levnl1Ó ¨ý ÓÓ X ÓÓ2( ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 2ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2GM ÿÿ0_levnl2Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ° ÓÓ/%` ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ /ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2DM ÿÿ0_levnl3Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ,"¸ ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ ,ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2AM ÿÿ0_levnl4Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ` ÓÓ) hÀpÈ xÐ )ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2>M ÿÿ0_levnl5Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ¸ ÓÓ&hhÀpÈ xÐ &ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó2;M ÿÿ0_levnl6Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ#ÀÀpÈ xÐ #ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó28M ÿÿ0_levnl7Ó ¨ý ÓÓ h ÓÓ pÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó25M ÿÿ0_levnl8Ó ¨ý ÓÓ À ÓÓppÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó22M ÿÿ0_levnl9Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓÈÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó0ÿÿ.Normal<ÿÿ:Definition T<AAÿÿ:Definition LÓ , ÓÓ5+Ü Ü` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5Ó8ÿÿ6Definitionòòóó(''ÿÿ&H1ò òÔ  ÔÔ‡°°°ÔÔ‡XXXÔó óÔ  Ô(ÿÿ&H2ò òÔ‡„„„ÔÔ‡XXXÔó ó(ÿÿ&H3ò òÔ‡¼¼¼ÔÔ‡XXXÔó ó(ÿÿ&H4ò òÔ‡XXXÔó óÔ‡XXXÔ(ÿÿ&H5ò òÔ‡ôôôÔÔ‡XXXÔó ó(ÿÿ&H6ò òÔ‡ÔÔ‡XXXÔó ó2ÿÿ0Addressòòóó8MMÿÿ6BlockquoteÓ , ÓÓ , ÓÓ5+Ü Ü` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5Ó,ÿÿ*CITEòòóó,dlÿÿ*CODEÔ‡ôôôÔÔK‡i<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔ‡XXXÔÔS‡jô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔ4ÿÿ2Emphasisòòóó6ÿÿ4HyperlinkóóòòÔ ÿ ÔóóÔ  Ô<ÿÿ:FollowedHypeóóòòÔ €€ ÔóóÔ  Ô4goÿÿ2Keyboardò òÔ‡ôôôÔÔK‡i<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔ‡XXXÔÔS‡jô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔó ó<“›ÿÿ:PreformattedÓ/%° °Ïî ,KkŠ©È %#/ÓÔ‡ôôôÔÔK‡i<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔ‡XXXÔÔS‡jô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔÓ/%° °Ïî ,KkŠ©È %#/Ó(|G2lV$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€m»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¶Eò»»Ô<š®ÿÿ:z©Bottom of Ó7€U(€X7ÓÓ  ÓÔ‡ÔÔ?‡k%ä2¼A`‹Arial?ÔÓ  ÓÔ‡XXXÔÔS‡jô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔÓ7€Z(€X7Ó&ÿÿ  d dT)1dxd d<š®ÿÿ:z©Top of ForÓ7€\(€X7ÓÓ  ÓÔ‡ÔÔ?‡k%ä2¼A`‹Arial?ÔÓ  ÓÔ‡XXXÔÔS‡jô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔÓ7€Z(€X7Ó(|3k$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€m»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó óT)2dxd^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3k$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€m»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKK0KSÿÿ.SampleÔK‡i<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔS‡jô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔ0ÿÿ.Strongò òó ó8dlÿÿ6TypewriterÔ‡ôôôÔÔK‡i<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔ‡XXXÔÔS‡jô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔ4ÿÿ2Variableòòóó: ÿÿ8HTML MarkupÔB  ÔÔ ÿ ÔÔ  Ô2 ÿÿ0CommentÔB  Ô(ÍO$——ÔÿÔòòóóÔÿÔ<þ6X9`(‹Courier Newô\  `‹&Times New Roman%ä2¼A`‹Arial Ñ ° ÑÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€m»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼m»»»ÔÑ8€_aXXdì»»d8ÑÑ€"ôÑÑ€#û#ÑÑ€uî ÑÑ€OYÑÑ€lOYÑÔ€¼m»»¼mÔÓ=€m»Ð»dÐd=Óà@™ ™ ìàÔ‡îÇ1mÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼m»îîÇ1½#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  Óà @ àJune€13,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡X_aX»¼mÔÌò òÔ#†¼m»XX_aª#ÔÔ_ÔJOHNIEÔ_Ô€N.€GIBSON€v.€DOUGLAS€TRANT,€ET€AL.òòó óóóÔ‡X_aX»¼mÔÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Knox€County€Ð ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€3„399„93€€€Wheeler€A.€Rosenbalm,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M1999„00390„SC„R11„CV€„€Filed€October€5,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_Ô€€€€òòóóÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÔ#†¼m»XX_aB#ÔÔ€X_aX»¼mÔThis€case€presents€the€question€whether€a€criminal€defendant€must€obtain€post„conviction€relief€inÐ xÈ  Ðorder€to€maintain€a€legal€malpractice€action€against€his€defense€lawyer€(what€is€often€referred€to€asÐ d´ Ða€ð ðcriminal€malpracticeðð€action).€€The€trial€court€held€that€he€must.€€Since€the€plaintiff€in€theÐ P  Ðmalpractice€case€here€was€denied€post„conviction€relief,€the€court€dismissed€his€claim€against€hisÐ <Œ Ðformer€defense€lawyers.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed.€€We€now€affirm.€€Along€with€the€largeÐ (x Ðmajority€of€courts€to€address€this€issue,€we€adopt€the€rule€that€a€plaintiff€in€a€criminal€malpracticeÐ d Ðaction€must€show€he€has€been€exonerated.€€€To€meet€this€requirement,€the€plaintiff€must€obtain€post„Ð P Ðconviction€relief.€€Because€the€plaintiff€did€not€obtain€such€relief,€the€courts€below€correctly€ruledÐ ì< Ðthat€the€defendants€are€entitled€to€summary€judgment.Ð Ø( ÐÌÌÓiÓò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€Application€for€Permission€to€Appeal;€Judgment€of€the€Ð œì ÐCourt€of€Appeals€Affirmedó óÐ ˆØ ÐÌÓ  ÓòòFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,€C.Jóó.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€whichòò,€Riley€Anderson,€Ð `° ÐJanice€M.€Holder,€óóandòò€William€M.€Barker,€JJ.óó,€joined.òò€Ô_ÔAdolphoÔ_Ô€A.€Birch,€Jr.€óófiled€aÐ L œ Ðconcurring/dissenting€opinion.Ð 8!ˆ  Ðà  àÌGerald€C.€Russell,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Johnie€N.€Gibson.Ð #`" ÐÌJeffrey€A.€Woods,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellees,€Douglas€Trant€and€Jerry€Cunningham.Ð è$8 $ ÐÓl ÓÌÓÓÌà@@OO&ìàò òOPINIONó óÐ ˜(è#( Ðòòò òBackgroundóóó óÐ p*À%* ÐÓ  ÓÓÓà  àOn€August€16,€1989,€Ô_ÔJohnieÔ_Ô€N.€Gibson€(ð ðGibsonðð),€along€with€numerous€co„defendants,€wasÐ H,˜', Ðcharged€with€committing€drug„related€offenses€in€a€multi„count€indictment€in€the€U.S.€District€CourtÐ 4-„(-ý7 ÐÑ"ôÑâ "âÑ8€_aXXdìXXdì8ÑØØâ "âÑ  Ñfor€the€Eastern€District€of€Tennessee.€€Gibson€hired€Jerry€Cunningham€(ð ðCunninghamðð)€to€representÐ ° Ðhim,€and€Cunningham€brought€in€Douglas€Trant€(ð ðTrantðð)€to€assist€with€the€case.€Ð œì Ðà  àGibson€alleges€that€Trant€and€Cunningham€asked€him€to€persuade€his€co„defendants€to€hireÐ ˆØ Ðthem€as€well,€ð ðtelling€[Gibson]€that€none€of€the€Co„Defendants€could€plead€out€and€testify€againstÐ tÄ Ðhim€if€they€were€under€Trant€and€Cunninghamððs€representation€.€.€.€that€if€they€could€get€the€otherÐ `° ÐCo„Defendants€ððunder€the€same€umbrellaðð€they€would€united€stand€[sic].ðð€€A€total€of€seven€co„Ð L œ Ðdefendants€ultimately€hired€Trant€and€Cunningham€to€represent€them.€€Gibson€alleges€that€this€jointÐ 8 ˆ Ðrepresentation,€engendered€through€unethical€persuasive€tactics,€created€a€ð ðsevereðð€conflict€ofÐ $ t Ðinterest.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àGibson€further€alleges€that€Trant€and€Cunningham€pressured€him€to€plead€guilty.€Ð è 8  ÐSpecifically,€he€claims€that€Trant€told€him€that€a€failure€to€plead€guilty€would€cause€the€federalÐ Ô$  Ðprosecutors€to€file€charges€against€his€elderly€father.€€Gibson€claims€he€agreed€to€plead€guilty€toÐ À  Ðavoid€this€result.€€Trant€also€allegedly€told€him€not€to€tell€the€federal€district€court€judge€€during€theÐ ¬ü  Ðplea€hearing€that€the€government€threatened€to€prosecute€his€father;€if€he€did€mention€the€threat,€theÐ ˜è  Ðjudge€would€not€accept€the€guilty€plea€and€the€government€would€carry€out€its€threat.€€Finally,Ð „Ô  ÐGibson€alleges€that€Trant€told€him€he€would€receive€a€sentence€of€eight€to€ten€years.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àAfter€Gibson€entered€the€guilty€plea,€the€district€court€sentenced€him€to€twenty€years€withoutÐ H˜ Ðthe€possibility€of€probation€or€parole,€the€minimum€sentence€according€to€the€federal€sentencingÐ 4„ Ðguidelines.€€Gibson€alleges€that€once€he€pled€guilty,€Trant€and€Cunningham€ð ðstarted€taking€the€otherÐ  p ÐCo„Defendants€down€like€dominos,€by€pleading€them€guilty,€because€[he]€was€out€of€the€way.ðð€Ð  \ ÐÌà  àGibson€filed€a€civil€complaint€in€state€court€alleging€that€Trant€and€CunninghamððsÐ ä4 Ðmisconduct€constituted€legal€malpractice.€€He€also€raised€allegations€of€gross€negligence,€outrageousÐ Ð  Ðconduct,€and€fraud,€based€on€the€same€conduct.€€In€1993,€Trant€and€Cunningham€moved€to€dismissÐ ¼  Ðthis€complaint,€a€motion€the€court€denied€a€year€later.Ð ¨ø Ðà  àÌà  àGibson€also€attempted€to€have€his€plea€vacated€on€the€ground€that€it€was€involuntary,€byÐ €Ð Ðfiling€a€motion€for€habeas€corpus€relief€in€federal€district€court€pursuant€to€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2255.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€TheÐ l¼ Ðdistrict€court€denied€his€motion,€thereby€holding€that€his€plea€was€voluntary.€€In€1995,€the€partiesÐ X ¨ Ðfiled€an€agreed€order€in€the€state€trial€court€indicating€that€Gibsonððs€habeas€petition€had€been€deniedÐ D!” Ðbut€that€he€intended€to€appeal€to€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€Sixth€Circuit.€Ð 0"€  ÐSignificantly,€the€agreed€order€stated€that€ð ðthe€relief€sought€under€[the€habeas€statute]€is€for€the€sameÐ #l! Ðaction€complained€of€in€the€instant€case,€and€the€parties€agree€that€it€will€be€to€everyoneððs€advantageÐ $X" Ðâ âto€take€this€case€off€the€trial€docket€until€after€the€said€appeal€is€over.ðð€€The€order€provided€thatÐ ô$D # ÐGibsonððs€legal€malpractice€case€would€not€be€put€back€on€the€jury€trial€docket€until€his€Sixth€CircuitÐ ° Ðappeal€was€decided,€unless€either€party€moved€for€an€earlier€court€date.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àThe€Sixth€Circuit€affirmed€the€district€courtððs€denial€of€habeas€relief.€€Gibson€did€not€seekÐ tÄ Ðreview€in€the€United€States€Supreme€Court.€€Ô_ÔTrantÔ_Ô€and€Cunningham€then€filed€a€second€motion€toÐ `° Ðdismiss€in€state€court.€€Pursuant€to€Rule€12.02(6)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€theyÐ L œ Ðasserted€that€Gibsonððs€complaint€failed€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€could€be€granted€becauseÐ 8 ˆ Ðhe€ð ðsuffered€no€damages€as€a€proximate€result€of€the€alleged€breach€of€the€Defendantððs€duty€ofÐ $ t Ðrepresentation€.€.€.€.ðð€€The€defendants€aver€that€since€the€Sixth€Circuit€affirmed€the€district€courtððsÐ  ` Ðdenial€of€post„conviction€(in€this€case,€habeas)€relief,€the€federal€courts€have€already€determined€thatÐ ü L  ÐGibsonððs€guilty€plea€was€valid;€Gibson€cannot€now€recover€damages€based€on€the€claim€that€his€pleaÐ è 8  Ðwas€invalid.€€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àThe€state€court€granted€Trant€and€Cunninghamððs€motion€to€dismiss.€€In€its€order,€the€courtÐ ¬ü  Ðstated:€€ð ðThis€Court€has€determined€that€in€light€of€the€Federal€Courtsðð€holding€that€Mr.€GibsonððsÐ ˜è  Ðplea€of€guilty€was,€in€fact,€voluntary,€and€there€exists€no€right€or€recovery€in€this€action€in€this€court,Ð „Ô  Ðmandating€dismissal€of€this€case.ðð€€In€making€this€determination,€the€court€recognized€that€itsÐ pÀ Ðknowledge€of€what€occurred€in€the€federal€habeas€proceedings€was€limited,€for€the€documents€in€thatÐ \¬ Ðcase€were€placed€under€seal.€€The€record€does€not€reveal€the€reason€for€the€seal,€but€at€oral€argumentÐ H˜ Ðbefore€this€Court€Gibsonððs€counsel€suggested€that€Gibson€himself€moved€to€have€the€record€sealed.€Ð 4„ ÐWhatever€the€reason€for€the€seal,€the€record€of€the€federal€proceedings€is€limited€to€an€oral€stipulationÐ  p Ðthe€parties€made€during€the€hearing€on€the€second€motion€to€dismiss.€€That€stipulation,€which€wasÐ  \ Ðincluded€in€the€trial€courtððs€order,€states€as€follows:Ð øH ÐÓ XÓÌà0  àà ` àIn€the€United€States€District€Court€For€The€Eastern€District€of€Tennessee,€theÐ Ð  Ðplaintiff€entered€a€plea€of€guilty€to€a€single€count€of€engaging€in€a€continuing€criminalÐ ¼  Ðenterprise€in€violation€of€21€U.S.C.€ðð€848.€€After€the€trial€Courtððs€acceptance€of€theÐ ¨ø Ðplaintiffððs€plea€and€the€imposition€of€sentence,€a€ð ðMotion€under€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2255€toÐ ”ä ÐVacate,€Set€Aside,€or€Correct€[a]€Sentence€by€a€Person€in€Federal€Custodyðð€was€filed.€Ð €Ð ÐThe€Federal€Court€placed€that€file€under€ð ðSEALðð€and€it€remains€sealed€to€this€day.Ðl¼Ð Ð  Ðà  àÌà0  àà ` àThe€ðð€2255€motion€allegedly€[sic]€breach€of€plaintiffððs€Plea€Agreement€by€theÐ D!” ÐUnited€States,€that€his€plea€of€guilty€was€involuntary,€that€the€defendants€encounteredÐ 0"€  Ðan€actual€conflict€of€interest€in€representing€Mr.€Gibson€but€nevertheless€containedÐ #l! Ð[sic]€multiple€representation€of€him€and€his€six€(6)€co„defendants€and€that€theÐ $X" Ðdefendants,€Cunningham€and€Trant,€were€ineffective€in€representing€the€defendantÐ ô$D # Ðin€connection€with€the€foregoing.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€plaintiffððs€request€forÐ à%0!$ Ðrelief€and€dismissed€his€action€after€an€evidentiary€hearing.€€The€case€was€appealedÐ Ì&"% Ðto€the€United€States€Sixth€Circuit€Court€of€Appeal€which€affirmed€the€trial€court.€€NoÐ ¸'#& Ðapplication€for€a€Writ€of€Certiorari€to€the€Supreme€Court€was€filed€and€the€timeÐ ¤(ô#' Ðlimitation€for€doing€so€has€long€expired.Ð)à$(Ð Ð  Ðâ âÓ Xu'ÓÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àGibson€appealed€to€the€Court€of€Appeals,€which€affirmed€the€trial€court.€€The€Court€ofÐ ° Ðâ âAppeals,€after€surveying€the€case€law€from€other€jurisdictions,€reasoned€as€follows:Ð œì ÐÌÓ XÓà0  à[T]he€anomaly€of€allowing€this€suit€to€go€forward€is€obvious.€€The€voluntary€plea€ofÐ tÄ Ðguilty€to€a€criminal€charge€was€the€proximate€cause€of€any€injury€or€loss€suffered€asÐ `° Ða€result€of€the€conviction,€and€the€appellant€must€obtain€post„conviction€relief€as€aÐ L œ Ðcondition€precedent€to€the€maintenance€of€this€action.€€The€majority€rule€is€clear:€€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðguilty€person€is€not€entitled€to€civil€damages€for€being€found€guilty€notwithstandingÐ $ t Ðhis/her€lawyersðð€negligence.€€We€agree€with€the€argument€of€the€appellees€that€theÐ  ` Ðallowance€of€this€action€would€shock€the€public€conscience,€engender€disrespect€forÐ ü L  Ðthe€judicial€system€and€generally€discredit€the€concept€of€justice.Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÓ Xj/ÓÌà  àGibson€filed€an€application€in€this€Court€seeking€review€of€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€judgment.€Ð À  ÐWe€granted€permission€to€appeal€and€now€affirm€that€courtððs€decision.€€Specifically,€we€hold€thatÐ ¬ü  Ða€plaintiff€must€obtain€post„conviction€relief€in€order€to€maintain€a€legal€malpractice€claim€againstÐ ˜è  Ðhis€defense€lawyers.€€Because€Gibson€cannot€meet€this€standard,€the€courts€below€correctly€ruled€thatÐ „Ô  ÐTrant€and€Cunningham€are€entitled€to€summary€judgment.Ð pÀ ÐÌÓ  Óò òòòAnalysisóóó óÐ H˜ ÐÓ5Óà  àAppellate€review€of€this€question€of€law€is€de€novo,€without€a€presumption€of€correctness€ofÐ 4„ Ðthe€Court€of€Appealsðð€judgment.€€òòSeeóó€òòNelson€v.€Wal„Mart€Stores,€Inc.óó,€8€S.W.3d€625,€628€(Tenn.Ð  p Ð1999);€òòOwens€v.€Truckstops€of€Americaóó,€915€S.W.2d€420,€424€(Tenn.€1996).€Ð  \ ÐÌà  àAlthough€the€issue€before€us€first€came€to€the€trial€court€on€Trantððs€and€CunninghamððsÐ ä4 Ðmotion€to€dismiss,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6),€the€parties€and€the€court€considered€matters€outsideÐ Ð  Ðthe€pleadings,€namely,€the€stipulation€quoted€above.€€Therefore,€the€Court€of€Appeals€properlyÐ ¼  Ðtreated€the€motion€as€one€for€summary€judgment.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.03€(ð ðIf,€on€a€motion€forÐ ¨ø Ðjudgment€on€the€pleadings,€matters€outside€the€pleadings€are€presented€to€and€not€excluded€by€theÐ ”ä Ðcourt,€the€motion€shall€be€treated€as€one€for€summary€judgment€and€disposed€of€as€provided€in€RuleÐ €Ð Ð56€.€.€.€.ðð).€€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àRule€56.04€provides€that€summary€judgment€is€appropriate€where:€€(1)€there€is€no€genuineÐ D!” Ðissue€with€regard€to€the€material€facts€relevant€to€the€claim€or€defense€contained€in€the€motion,€andÐ 0"€  Ð(2)€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law€on€the€undisputed€facts.€€òòSeeóó€òòStaplesÐ #l! Ðv.€CBL€&€Associates,€Inc.óó,€15€S.W.3d€83,€88€(Tenn.€2000);€òòBain€v.€Wellsóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622Ð $X" Ð(Tenn.€1997).€€ð ðCourts€must€view€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€partyÐ ô$D # Ðand€must€also€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€in€the€nonmoving€partyððs€favor.ðð€€òòStaplesóó,€15€S.W.3dÐ à%0!$ Ðat€89.€€ð ðCourts€should€grant€a€summary€judgment€only€when€both€the€facts€and€the€inferences€to€beÐ Ì&"% Ðdraw€from€the€facts€permit€a€reasonable€person€to€reach€only€one€conclusion.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ ¸'#& ÐÌà  àThe€specific€issue€before€us€is€one€of€first€impression€for€our€Court.€€The€closest€precedentÐ )à$( Ðis€òòSanjines€v.€Ortwein€&€Assocs.óó,€984€S.W.2d€907€(Tenn.€1998),€which€addressed€òòóóthe€issue€ofÐ |*Ì%) Ðwhether€a€plaintiff€who€files€a€malpractice€claim€against€his€defense€lawyer€has€a€right€to€a€stay€ofÐ h+¸&* ÐÑ#û#Ñâ #âÑ8€_aXXdìXXdì8Ñâ #âÑ  Ñthat€claim€until€all€his€post„conviction€proceedings€are€complete.€€We€held€that€he€does€not.€€òòId.óó€atÐ ° Ð911;€òòseeóó€òòLogan€v.€Winsteadóó,€23€S.W.3d€297,€302€(Tenn.€2000)€(ð ðWhile€the€òòSanjinesóó€case€dealt€withÐ œì Ða€plaintiffððs€filing€of€simultaneous€civil€and€post„conviction€actions,€its€language€makes€clear€thatÐ ˆØ Ðincarcerated€plaintiffs€do€not€have€a€constitutional€right€to€a€stay€of€their€civil€proceedings.ðð).òòóó€€WeÐ tÄ Ðfurther€held€that€it€is€ð ðwithin€the€trial€courtððs€discretion€to€determine,€on€a€case„by„case€basis,€howÐ `° Ðto€effectively€move€both€cases€through€the€€system€at€the€same€time.ðð€€òòSanjinesóó,€984€S.W.2d€at€911.€Ð L œ ÐòòóóThe€rationale€of€this€holding,€in€part,€was€that€a€trial€court€should€have€the€discretion€to€dismissÐ 8 ˆ Ðfrivolous€cases€on€the€pleadings,€or€on€summary€judgment€motions,€rather€than€having€to€keep€suchÐ $ t Ðclaims€on€the€docket€for€years,€to€the€detriment€of€the€defense€attorney€who€may€well€have€done€anÐ  ` Ðexemplary€job€representing€the€client.€€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àToday€we€are€faced€with€a€case€where€the€trial€court€decided€not€to€dismiss€the€malpracticeÐ Ô$  Ðcase€at€the€outset.€€The€court€instead€waited€until€the€post„conviction€proceedings€were€complete,Ð À  Ðand€then,€considering€the€outcome€of€those€proceedings,€dismissed€the€case.€€The€question€presentedÐ ¬ü  Ðis€whether,€as€the€Court€of€Appeals€held,€€the€trial€courtððs€reason€for€dismissing€the€case€was€proper,Ð ˜è  Ðnamely,€that€a€plaintiff€cannot€maintain€a€malpractice€claim€against€his€criminal€defense€lawyerÐ „Ô  Ðunless€he€first€prevails€in€his€post„conviction€proceeding.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àWe€begin€our€analysis€by€listing€the€elements€of€a€malpractice€claim.€€In€order€to€make€outÐ H˜ Ða€prima€facie€legal€malpractice€claim,€the€plaintiff€must€show€(1)€that€the€accused€attorney€owed€aÐ 4„ Ðduty€to€the€plaintiff,€(2)€that€the€attorney€breached€that€duty,€(3)€that€the€plaintiff€suffered€damages,Ð  p Ð(4)€that€the€breach€was€the€cause€in€fact€of€the€plaintiffððs€damages,€and€(5)€that€the€attorneyððsÐ  \ Ðnegligence€was€the€proximate,€or€legal,€cause€of€the€plaintiffððs€damages.€€òòSeeóó€òòLazy€Seven€Coal€Sales,Ð øH ÐInc.€v.€Stone€&€Hindsóó,€813€S.W.2d€400,€403€(Tenn.€1991);€òòHorton€v.€Hughesóó,€971€S.W.2d€957,€959Ð ä4 Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€òòóóAs€with€any€tort€claim,€the€plaintiff€has€the€burden€of€proving€each€of€theseÐ Ð  Ðelements.€€One€way€of€framing€the€question€presented€in€this€case€is€whether€the€tort€of€legalÐ ¼  Ðmalpractice€requires€any€additional€elements€if€the€plaintiff€is€a€criminal€defendant€who€is€suing€theÐ ¨ø Ðlawyer€who€represented€him€in€the€criminal€case.€€Specifically,€must€a€plaintiff€prove€ð!ð€in€additionÐ ”ä Ðto€the€five€basic€elements€ð!ð€that€he€obtained€relief€in€a€final€post„conviction€judgment?€€For€a€numberÐ €Ð Ðof€compelling€reasons,€we€hold€that€a€plaintiff€in€what€courts€often€call€a€ð ðcriminal€malpracticeððÐ l¼ Ðaction€€must€prove€this€additional€element.€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àThe€large€majority€of€courts€to€address€this€issue€have€held€that€some€form€of€exonerationÐ 0"€  Ðis€a€precondition€to€maintaining€a€criminal€malpractice€claim.€€A€plaintiff€must€meet€this€exonerationÐ #l! Ðrequirement€before€he€can€sue€his€defense€lawyer.€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àSome€courts€hold€that€a€plaintiff€must€be€exonerated€through€post„conviction€relief.€€òòSeeóóÐ à%0!$ ÐòòShaw€v.€Stateóó,€816€P.2d€1358,€1360€(Alaska€1991)€(òòShaw€Ióó);€òòSteele€v.€Kehoeóó,€747€So.2d€931,€933Ð Ì&"% Ð(Fla.€1999);€òòLevine€v.€Klingóó,€123€F.3d€580,€583€(7th€Cir.€1997)€(applying€Illinois€law);€òòBerringer€v.Ð ¸'#& ÐSteeleóó,€758€A.2d€574,€597€(Md.€Ct.€Spec.€App.€2000);€òòMorgano€v.€Smithóó,€879€P.2d€735,€737€(Nev.Ð ¤(ô#' Ð1994);€òòStevens€v.€Bisphamóó,€851€P.2d€556,€566€(Or.€1993);€òòBailey€v.€Tuckeróó,€621€A.2d€108,€115€(Pa.Ð )à$( Ð1993);€òòPeeler€v.€Hughes€&€Luceóó,€909€S.W.2d€494,€497„98€(Tex.€1995);€òòAdkins€v.€Dixonóó,€482€S.E.2dÐ |*Ì%) Ð797,€801€(Va.€1997).€€òòCf.óó€òòHeck€v.€Humphreyóó,€512€U.S.€477,€486„87,€114€S.€Ct.€2364,€2373,€129€L.Ð h+¸&* ÐEd.€2d.€383€(1994)€(ð ðWe€hold€that,€in€order€to€recover€damages€for€allegedly€unconstitutionalÐ ° Ðconviction€or€imprisonment,€or€for€other€harm€caused€by€actions€whose€unlawfulness€would€renderÐ œì Ða€conviction€or€sentence€invalid,€a€ðð€1983€plaintiff€must€prove€that€the€conviction€or€sentence€hasÐ ˆØ Ðbeen€reversed€on€direct€appeal,€expunged€by€executive€order,€declared€invalid€by€a€state€tribunalÐ tÄ Ðauthorized€to€make€such€determination,€or€called€into€question€by€a€federal€courtððs€issuance€of€a€writÐ `° Ðof€habeas€corpus,€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2254.ðð).Ð L œ ÐÌÓ=€m»Ð»d»Ð»d=Óà  àSome€courts€ð!ð€a€number€of€which€are€also€in€the€first€category€ð!ð€hold€that€the€exonerationÐ $ t Ðrule€requires€a€plaintiff€to€be€actually€innocent€of€the€criminal€conduct€underlying€his€conviction.€Ð  ` ÐòòSeeóó€òòShaw€v.€Stateóó,€861€P.2d€566,€572€(Alaska€1993)€(holding€that€actual€innocence€is€relevant€andÐ ü L  Ðthat€the€defense€lawyer€may€raise€the€issue€of€the€plaintiffððs€guilt€as€an€affirmative€defense)€(òòShawÐ è 8  ÐIIóó);€òòÔ_ÔCosciaÔ_Ô€v.€McKenna€&€Ô_ÔCuneoÔ_Ôóó,€108€Cal.€Ô_ÔRptrÔ_Ô.€2d€471,€475„76€(Cal.€2001);€òòWiley€v.€County€ofÐ Ô$  ÐSan€Diegoóó,€966€P.2d€983,€991€(Cal.€1998)òòóó;€òòGomez€v.€Petersóó,€470€S.E.2d€692,€695€(Ga.€Ct.€App.Ð À  Ð1996)òòóó;€òòLevineóó,€123€F.3d€at€582;€òòRay€v.€Stoneóó,€952€S.W.2d€220,€224€(Ky.€Ct.€App.€1997)òòóóòòóóòòóó;€òòGlenn€v.Ð ¬ü  ÐAikenóó,€569€N.E.2d€783,€788€(Mass.€1991)€(holding€that€a€plaintiff€must€prove€actual€innocence,€butÐ ˜è  Ðnot€deciding€whether€this€is€required€in€a€case€involving€the€defense€lawyerððs€ð ðclear€negligenceÐ „Ô  Ðwhose€causal€connection€to€the€conviction€is€clearðð)òòóó;€òòRodriguez€v.€Nielsenóó,€609€N.W.2d€368,€374Ð pÀ Ð(Neb.€2000);€òòMorganoóó,€879€P.2d€at€738;€òòCarmel€v.€Lunneyóó,€511€N.E.2d€1126,€1128€(N.Y.€1987);Ð \¬ ÐòòMahoney€v.€Shaheen,€Cappiello,€Stein€&€Gordonóó,€727€A.2d€996,€998„99€(N.H.€1999)òòòòóóóó;€òòBaileyóó,€621Ð H˜ ÐA.2d€at€113òòóó;€òòPeeleróó,€909€S.W.2d€at€497„98;€òòAdkinsóó,€482€S.E.2d€at€801.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àOnly€a€few€courts€have€rejected€the€exoneration€requirement,€or€implied€that€they€would€inÐ  \ Ðan€appropriate€case.€€òòSeeóó€òòMylar€v.€Wilkinsonóó,€435€So.2d€1237,€1239€(Ala.€1983)€(confronting€aÐ øH Ðplaintiff€who€had€obtained€post„conviction€relief,€but€suggesting€there€is€no€difference€between€civilÐ ä4 Ðand€criminal€malpractice€cases);€òòÔ_ÔGebhardtÔ_Ô€v.€OððRourkeóó,€510€N.W.2d€900,€906€(Mich.€1994);€òòDuncanÐ Ð  Ðv.€Campbellóó,€936€P.2d€863,€866„68€(N.M.€Ct.€App.€1997)€(confronting€a€plaintiff€who€had€obtainedÐ ¼  Ðpost„conviction€relief,€but€rejecting€the€reasoning€behind€the€exoneration€rule);€òòòòóóKrahn€v.€Kinneyóó,€538Ð ¨ø ÐN.E.2d€1058,€1061€(Ohio€1989).€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòòòóóÔ_ÔJepsonÔ_Ô€v.€Stubbsóó,€555€S.W.2d€307,€313„14€(Mo.€1977)Ð ”ä Ð(confronting€a€plaintiff€who€had€obtained€post„conviction€relief,€but€stating€directly€that€there€is€noÐ €Ð Ðdifference€between€civil€and€criminal€malpractice€cases).€€òòBut€seeóó€òòState€ex€rel.€OððBlennis€v.€Adolfóó,Ð l¼ Ð691€S.W.2d€498,€504€(Mo.€Ct.€App.€1985)€(relying€on€collateral€estoppel€and€public€policyÐ X ¨ Ðarguments€consistent€with€the€exoneration€requirement).€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àCourts€rejecting€the€exoneration€requirement€essentially€reason€that€a€criminal€defenseÐ #l! Ðlawyerððs€wrong€advice€can€cause€her€client€harm,€just€as€a€civil€lawyerððs€advice€can;€since€a€plaintiffÐ $X" Ðin€a€criminal€malpractice€case€may€be€able€to€meet€his€burden€of€proof,€no€justification€exists€for€aÐ ô$D # Ðbright„line€exoneration€rule€denying€recovery;€each€case€should€be€given€a€full€hearing,€and€onlyÐ à%0!$ Ðfrivolous€cases€should€be€dismissed.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòÔ_ÔGebhardtÔ_Ôóó,€510€N.W.2d€at€906;€òòKrahnóó,€538€N.E.2dÐ Ì&"% Ðat€1061.€€Moreover,€since€criminal€defense€lawyers€can€indeed€harm€clients,€to€impose€barriersÐ ¸'#& Ðagainst€tort€recovery€on€the€ground€that€civil€malpractice€and€criminal€malpractice€cases€are€differentÐ ¤(ô#' Ðin€some€respects,€is€to€enshrine€ð ðlegal€fictionsðð€into€the€law.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòDuncanóó,€936.€P.2d€at€867„68.€Ð )à$( ÐPerhaps€the€most€forceful€articulation€and€analysis€of€the€minority€view€can€be€found€in€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðconcurring€opinion€in€òòStevensóó:€€Ð h+¸&* ÐÓ XÓà0  àI€believe€that€plaintiff€and€other€persons€convicted€of€a€crime€will€be€astonished€toÐ ° Ðlearn€that,€even€if€their€lawyerððs€negligence€resulted€in€their€being€wrongly€convictedÐ œì Ðand€imprisoned,€they€were€not€harmed€when€they€were€wrongly€convicted€andÐ ˆØ Ðimprisoned€but,€rather,€that€they€are€harmed€only€if€and€when€they€are€exonerated.€Ð tÄ ÐSuch€persons€will€be€no€less€astonished€because€of€the€majorityððs€insistence€that€itsÐ `° Ðrule€is€simply€a€legal€definition€of€harm€(i.e.,€a€legal€fiction).€€Such€attempts€toÐ L œ Ðdivorce€the€law€from€reality€should€be€avoided.Ð8 ˆÐ Ð  ÐÌÓ X¡eÓòòStevensóó,€851€P.2d€at€566€(Unis,€J.,€concurring).Ð  ` ÐÌà  àAs€we€explain€below,€this€reasoning€is€flawed.€€It€fails€to€adequately€account€for:€€equitableÐ è 8  Ðprinciples;€the€difficulties€of€proving€causation€and€damages€in€a€criminal€malpractice€case,€whereÐ Ô$  Ðthe€plaintiff€has€not€yet€been€exonerated;€the€existence€of€comprehensive€post„conviction€review,Ð À  Ðwhich€obviously€has€no€counterpart€in€civil€law;€collateral€estoppel;€and€the€need€to€encourage€theÐ ¬ü  Ðthorough€representation€of€indigent€criminal€defendants.€€But€the€reasoning€fails€on€perhaps€an€evenÐ ˜è  Ðmore€fundamental€level.€€The€minority€of€courts€that€reject€the€exoneration€requirement,€in€effect,Ð „Ô  Ðhold€that€someone€unquestionably€guilty€of€a€crime€(even€the€most€serious€of€violent€crimes),€whoseÐ pÀ Ðconviction€is€upheld,€may€nevertheless€sue€his€defense€lawyer€and€recover€damages€for€the€time€heÐ \¬ Ðspent€in€jail.€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àThe€soundness€of€this€result€is€open€to€serious€doubt;€indeed,€it€may€well€be€indefensible.€Ð  p ÐThis€is€not€simply€because€of€the€ethical€maxim€that€a€criminal€should€not€profit€from€hisÐ  \ Ðwrongdoing,€òòseeóó€òòHicks€v.€Boshearsóó,€846€S.W.2d€812,€814€(Tenn.€1993);€òòAdkinsóó,€482€S.E.2d€at€802,Ð øH Ðor€that€convicts€should€not€be€allowed€to€recover€from€their€defense€counsel,€thereby€shiftingÐ ä4 Ðresponsibility€away€from€their€crime,€òòsee,€e.g.,óó€òòShawóó,€861€P.2d€at€571;€òòMahoneyóó,€727€A.2d€at€999;Ð Ð  ÐòòPeeleróó,€909€S.W.2d€at€498,€or,€as€the€Court€of€Appeals€below€thought,€because€it€would€ð ðshock€theÐ ¼  Ðpublic€conscience,€engender€disrespect€for€courts€and€generally€discredit€the€administration€ofÐ ¨ø Ðjustice,ðð€òòState€ex€rel.€OððBlennisóó,€691€S.W.2d€at€504€(quotation€omitted).€€Apart€from€these€ethicalÐ ”ä Ðconcerns,€there€is€a€serious€analytical€flaw€in€the€minority€rule.€€As€the€court€in€òòLevineóó€stated€(afterÐ €Ð Ðnoting€that€a€plaintiff€must€prove€he€would€have€been€acquitted€in€order€to€establish€causation)òòóó:Ð l¼ ÐÓ XÓÌà0  à[B]ecause€of€the€heavy€burden€of€proof€in€a€criminal€case,€an€acquittal€doesnððt€meanÐ D!” Ðthat€the€defendant€did€not€commit€the€crime€for€which€he€was€tried;€all€it€means€isÐ 0"€  Ðthat€the€government€was€not€able€to€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€heÐ #l! Ðcommitted€it.€€On€[the€plaintiffððs]€view€there€would€be€cases€in€which€a€defendantÐ $X" Ðguilty€in€fact€of€the€crime€with€which€he€had€been€charged,€and€duly€convicted€andÐ ô$D # Ðimprisoned€(perhaps€after€a€retrial€in€which€he€was€represented€by€competentÐ à%0!$ Ðcounsel),€would€nevertheless€obtain€substantial€damages€to€compensate€him€for€theÐ Ì&"% Ðloss€of€his€liberty€during€the€period€of€his€rightful€imprisonment.и'#&Ð Ð  Ðà0  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà0  àà ` àNot€only€would€this€be€a€paradoxical€result,€depreciating€and€in€some€casesÐ )à$( Ðwholly€offsetting€the€plaintiffððs€criminal€punishment,€but€it€would€be€contrary€toÐ |*Ì%) Ðfundamental€principles€of€both€tort€and€criminal€law.€€Tort€law€provides€damagesÐ h+¸&* Ðonly€for€harms€to€the€plaintiffððs€legally€protected€interests,€Restatement€(Second)€ofÐ ° ÐTorts,€ðð€1€comment€d,€ðð€7(1)€(1965),€and€the€liberty€of€a€guilty€criminal€is€not€one€ofÐ œì Ðthem.€€The€guilty€criminal€may€be€able€to€obtain€an€acquittal€if€he€is€skillfullyÐ ˆØ Ðrepresented,€but€he€has€no€right€to€that€result€(just€as€he€has€no€òòrightóó€to€have€the€juryÐ tÄ Ðnullify€the€law,€though€juries€sometimes€do€that),€and€the€law€provides€no€relief€if€theÐ `° Ðð ðrightðð€is€denied€him.ÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÓ XªqÓòòÌLevineóó,€123€F.3d€at€582.€€The€California€Supreme€Court€recently€found€this€analysis€€persuasive,Ð $ t ÐòòWileyóó,€966€P.2d€at€990,€and€so€do€we.€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àFor€this€fundamental€reason€alone€we€reject€the€minority€rule.€€The€question€becomes,Ð è 8  Ðtherefore,€which€form€of€the€exoneration€rule€do€we€adopt.€€Because€of€the€procedural€posture€of€thisÐ Ô$  Ðcase,€we€need€not€address€whether€a€plaintiff€must€prove€actual€innocence.€€Gibson,€as€discussed,Ð À  Ðhas€already€attempted€to€vacate€his€guilty€plea€as€being€involuntary,€and€the€federal€courts€haveÐ ¬ü  Ðrejected€his€arguments.€€Thus,€he€has€not€been€exonerated€through€post„conviction€relief,€whichÐ ˜è  Ðmeans€that€he€is€deemed€guilty€of€violating€federal€drug€laws.Ð „Ô  Ðà  àÌà  àThere€are€several€reasons€supporting€the€exoneration€rule€in€general,€and€the€requirement€thatÐ \¬ Ðplaintiffs€first€obtain€post„conviction€relief€in€particular.€€Among€the€most€persuasive€reasons,€whichÐ H˜ Ðseveral€courts€have€relied€on,€is€the€perplexing€problem€of€how€a€criminal€defendant€could€everÐ 4„ Ðprove€that€his€lawyer€caused€him€any€legally€cognizable€injury,€and€the€related€problem€of€how€heÐ  p Ðcould€prove€damages.€€These€are€requirements€of€any€tort€action,€including€legal€malpractice.€€òòSeeóóÐ  \ ÐòòLazy€Seven€Coal€Sales,€Inc.óó,€813€S.W.2d€at€403.€€The€issue€may€be€framed€with€reference€toÐ øH ÐGibsonððs€case.€€He€claims€that€were€it€not€for€the€defendantsðð€statements€about€the€prosecutorððs€intentÐ ä4 Ðto€file€charges€against€his€father,€or€their€statements€concerning€his€possible€maximum€sentence,€heÐ Ð  Ðwould€not€have€been€injured.€€But€for€these€statements,€Gibson€claims,€he€would€have€rejected€theÐ ¼  Ðplea€bargain€and€gone€to€trial.€€Yet€this€argument€is€insufficient.€€Gibson€must€also€prove€that,€atÐ ¨ø Ðtrial,€he€would€have€been€acquitted,€or,€if€found€guilty,€he€would€have€received€a€sentence€less€thanÐ ”ä Ðwhat€he€did€receive,€which€was€twenty€years.€€We€do€not€see€how€he€could€possibly€meet€thisÐ €Ð Ðburden.€€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àNevertheless,€if€the€difficulties€of€proving€causation€were€simply€due€to€the€unique€natureÐ D!” Ðof€Gibsonððs€case,€it€would€not€be€appropriate€to€adopt€a€bright„line€rule,€as€we€do€today.€€But€theseÐ 0"€  Ðdifficulties€arise€in€virtually€every€criminal€malpractice€case.€€The€reason,€in€part,€has€to€do€with€theÐ #l! Ðstandard€of€proof€in€criminal€cases,€as€opposed€to€civil€cases,€namely,€the€state€must€prove€theÐ $X" Ðdefendantððs€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€As€one€court€has€stated,€the€plaintiff€ð ðmust€prove€byÐ ô$D # Ða€preponderance€of€the€evidence€that,€but€for€the€negligence€of€his€attorney,€the€jury€could€not€haveÐ à%0!$ Ðfound€him€guilty€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ðð€€òòShaw€IIóó,€861€P.2d€at€573.€€In€most,€if€not€theÐ Ì&"% Ðoverwhelming€majority€of€cases,€we€think€this€standard€will€prove€unmanageable.€€òòSeeóó€òòWileyóó,€966Ð ¸'#& ÐP.2d€at€990;€òòGlennóó,€569€N.E.2d€at€787„88.€€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðà  àÌà  àThe€dilemma€of€proving€causation€is€not€simply€a€matter€of€the€complexity€of€the€task€facingÐ |*Ì%) Ðjurors.€€Rather,€it€highlights€a€basic,€theoretical€distinction€between€civil€and€criminal€malpracticeÐ h+¸&* Ðactions€that,€in€terms€of€the€causation€requirement,€strongly€supports€treating€these€cases€differently.€Ð ° ÐThe€California€Supreme€Court€discussed€the€issue€as€follows:Ð œì ÐÌÓ XÓà0  àIn€a€civil€malpractice€action,€the€focus€is€solely€on€the€defendant€attorneyððs€allegedÐ tÄ Ðerror€or€omission;€the€plaintiffððs€conduct€is€irrelevant.€€In€the€criminal€malpracticeÐ `° Ðcontext€by€contrast,€a€defendantððs€own€criminal€act€remains€the€ultimate€source€ofÐ L œ Ðthis€predicament€irrespective€of€counselððs€subsequent€negligence.€€Any€harm€sufferedÐ 8 ˆ Ðis€not€ð ðonly€because€ofðð€attorney€error€but€principally€due€to€the€clientððs€antecedentÐ $ t Ðcriminality.€€Ð `Ð Ð  ÐÌÓ XˆÓòòWileyóó,€966€P.2d€983,€988òòòòóóóó;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòBerringeróó,€758€A.2d€at€597€(ð ðIf€a€potential€criminal€plaintiff€isÐ è 8  Ðunsuccessful€in€obtaining€relief€from€conviction,€then€it€would€seem€that€the€attorneyððs€conduct€wasÐ Ô$  Ðnot€the€proximate€cause€of€the€conviction€or€injury.ðð);€òòRodriguezóó,€609€N.W.2d€at€373;€òòPeeleróó,€909Ð À  ÐS.W.2d€at€497.€€Therefore,€the€Court€in€òòWileyóó€concluded,€ð ðit€is€not€at€all€difficult€to€defend€aÐ ¬ü  Ðdifferent€rule€because€criminal€prosecution€takes€place€in€a€significantly€different€procedural€context,Ð ˜è  Ðððand€as€a€result€the€elements€to€sustain€a€cause€of€action€must€likewise€differ.ðððð€€òòWileyóó,€966€P.2d€983,Ð „Ô  Ð988€(quoting€òòBaileyóó,€621€A.2d€at€114).òòóóÐ pÀ ÐÌà  àSimply€put,€criminal€malpractice€actions€arise€out€of€criminal€convictions,€and€the€validityÐ H˜ Ðof€criminal€convictions€are€not€designed€to€be€tested€in€the€civil€tort€arena.€€òòóóThey€are€not€so€designedÐ 4„ Ðfor€two€reasons.€€First,€depending€on€the€relief€sought,€civil€damage€remedies,€if€awarded,€mayÐ  p Ðnecessarily€imply€that€the€criminal€courts€reviewing€the€conviction€erred.€€€òòSeeóó€òòHeckóó,€512€U.S.€atÐ  \ Ð486,€114€S.€Ct.€at€2371€(invoking€the€ð ðhoary€principle€that€civil€tort€actions€are€not€appropriateÐ øH Ðvehicles€for€challenging€the€validity€of€outstanding€criminal€judgmentsðð);€òòClay€v.€Allenóó,€242€F.3dÐ ä4 Ð679,€682€(5th€Cir.€2001)€(discussing€this€principle,€in€a€òòHeckóó€analysis);€òòOlsen€v.€Correiroóó,€189€F.3dÐ Ð  Ð52,€68„69€(1st€Cir.€1999)€(same).€€Gibsonððs€suit,€if€allowed€to€proceed,€would€violate€this€principle.€Ð ¼  ÐThe€federal€courts€have€already€determined€that€his€plea€was€voluntary.€€This€finding€necessarilyÐ ¨ø Ðencompasses€the€rejection€of€Gibsonððs€allegations€against€Trant€and€Cunningham:€€if€the€evidenceÐ ”ä Ðshowed€that€he€pled€guilty€not€because€he€was€guilty€but€because€of€€threats€(those€of€the€prosecutor,Ð €Ð Ðas€relayed€to€him€by€his€lawyers)€and€misrepresentations€(the€gross€miscalculation€of€his€possibleÐ l¼ Ðmaximum€sentence),€we€must€presume€that€the€federal€courts€would€have€granted€him€relief.€€ForÐ X ¨ Ðthe€jury€to€allow€Gibson€to€recover€damages,€however,€would€require€it€to€find€that€these€sameÐ D!” Ðallegations€are,€in€fact,€true.€€This€would€be€in€direct€contradiction€to€the€federal€courtsðð€judgments.Ð 0"€  ÐWe€should€not€allow€a€tort€suit€to€undermine€the€post„conviction€process€by€overruling€itsÐ #l! Ðjudgments.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð $X" Ðâ âà  àà ` àà ¸ àÐ ô$D # ÐÑuî Ñâ âѰ°ÑÑ8€_aXXdìXXdì8Ñâ âÑ  Ñà  àThe€second€reason€is€that€the€ð ðcriminal€justice€system€itself€provides€adequate€redress€for€anyÐ ° Ðâ âerror€or€omission,ðð€and€the€many€safeguards€in€the€system€ð!ð€the€requirement€of€proof€beyond€aÐ œì Ðreasonable€doubt,€the€exclusionary€rule,€the€right€to€counsel,€etc.€ð!ð€are€designed€to€ensure€thatÐ ˆØ Ðallegations€such€as€Gibsonððs€do€not€go€unremedied.€€òòWileyóó,€966€P.2d€at€988„89;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòMahoneyóó,Ð tÄ Ð727€A.2d€at€999;€òòStevensóó,€851€P.2d€at€561;€òòBaileyóó,€621€A.2d€at€114.€€The€post„conviction€processÐ `° Ðis€an€essential€part€of€this€system,€providing€another€level€of€court€review€after€the€defendantððs€directÐ L œ Ðappeals.€€The€purpose€of€post„conviction,€after€all,€is€to€prevent€the€wrongly€accused€and€unjustlyÐ 8 ˆ Ðconvicted€from€suffering€undeserved€criminal€penalties,€and€to€enforce€the€constitutional€guaranteesÐ $ t Ðof€a€fair€trial.€€Tort€law€cannot€possibly€serve€these€ends.€€It€is€therefore€reasonable€and€fair€to€requireÐ  ` Ðcriminal€defendants€to€look€to€the€legal€process€designed€to€provide€redress€for€wrongful€convictions,Ð ü L  Ðand€then€to€respect€the€outcome€of€that€process€once€it€has€concluded.€€As€one€court€has€conciselyÐ è 8  Ðstated,€ð ðit€is€the€public€policy€of€this€state€to€treat€any€person€who€has€been€convicted€of€any€criminalÐ Ô$  Ðoffense€as€validly€convicted€unless€and€until€the€personððs€conviction€has€been€reversed€.€.€.€.ðð€Ð À  ÐòòStevensóó,€851€P.2d€at€561.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àAnother€reason€that€courts€have€prevented€criminal€malpractice€actions€from€proceedingÐ „Ô  Ðabsent€post„conviction€relief€is€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel€(also€called€ð ðissue€preclusionðð).€Ð pÀ Ðð ðOnce€an€issue€has€been€actually€or€necessarily€determined€by€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction,€theÐ \¬ Ðdoctrine€of€collateral€estoppel€renders€that€determination€conclusive€on€the€parties€and€their€priviesÐ H˜ Ðin€subsequent€litigation,€even€when€the€claims€or€causes€of€action€are€different.ðð€€òòState€ex€rel.€CihlarÐ 4„ Ðv.€Crawfordóó,€39€S.W.3d€172,€178„79€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);€òòseeóó€òòÔ_ÔMassengillÔ_Ô€v.€Scottóó,€738€S.W.2dÐ  p Ð629,€631€(Tenn.€1987);€òòBlue€Diamond€Coal€Co.€v.€Holland„America€Ins.€Co.óó,€671€S.W.2d€829,€832Ð  \ Ð(Tenn.€1984);€òòBeaty€v.€McGrawóó,€15€S.W.3d€819,€824€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€The€doctrine€promotesÐ øH Ðfinality,€conserves€judicial€resources,€and€prevents€inconsistent€decisions.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€ex€rel.€Cihlaróó,Ð ä4 Ð39€S.W.3d€at€178;€òòBeatyóó,€15€S.W.3d€at€824.€€It€applies€to€issues€of€law€and€to€issues€of€fact.€€òòStateÐ Ð  Ðex€rel.€Cihlaróó,€39€S.W.3d€at€179€(citing€Restatement€(Second)€of€Judgments€ðð€27€(1982)).€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àWe€have€never€before€considered€the€preclusive€effect€of€a€post„conviction€courtððs€findingÐ ”ä Ðthat€a€guilty€plea€was€entered€into€voluntarily.€€Nor€have€we€found€any€precedent€in€Tennessee€thatÐ €Ð Ðoffers€guidance€on€the€application€of€collateral€estoppel€in€the€context€of€a€criminal€malpractice€case,Ð l¼ Ðespecially€where€the€later€civil€suit€is€based€on€the€exact€same€allegations€made€in€the€post„Ð X ¨ Ðconviction€proceedings.Ô_Ô׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€There€can€be€no€dispute€that€this€is€an€accurate€description€of€the€factualÐ D!” Ðand€procedural€background€of€Gibsonððs€case.€€His€malpractice€case€against€Ô_ÔTrantÔ_Ô€and€CunninghamÐ ° Ðseeks€recovery€on€the€theory€that€they€induced€him€to€plead€guilty€involuntarily.€€Specifically,€heÐ œì Ðalleges€they€told€him€that€the€federal€prosecutor€would€file€charges€against€his€father€if€he€did€notÐ ˆØ Ðaccept€the€plea€and€that€he€would€only€receive€eight€to€ten€years€if€he€pled€guilty€(though€theÐ tÄ Ðminimum€sentence€was€twenty€years).€€Yet€Gibson€has€already€made€these€allegations€before€theÐ `° Ðfederal€courts.€€Moreover,€as€he€was€facing€a€twenty„year€jail€term,€he€had€òòevery€incentiveóó€to€proveÐ L œ Ðthese€allegations€and€to€raise€other€allegations€relating€to€his€claim€that€he€pled€guilty€based€on€hisÐ 8 ˆ Ðlawyersðð€willfully€erroneous€advice.€€In€finding€that€his€guilty€plea€was€voluntary,€those€courtsÐ $ t Ðnecessarily€considered€and€rejected€these€allegations.€€Under€these€circumstances,€their€judgmentsÐ  ` Ðshould€be€given€preclusive€effect.Ô_Ô׃Ø×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€€€€€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àThis€conclusion€was€strongly€stated€by€Professor€Geoffrey€C.€Hazard,€a€well„known€scholarÐ Ô$  Ðof€civil€procedure:Ð À  ÐÌÓ XÓà0  àThe€clearest€case€for€such€an€estoppel€is€where€a€defendant€pleads€guilty€to€aÐ ˜è  Ðsubstantial€criminal€charge€and€then€seeks€in€civil€litigation€concerning€the€sameÐ „Ô  Ðtransaction€to€assert€that€he€did€not€commit€the€criminal€act.€€Particularly€galling€isÐ pÀ Ðthe€situation€where€a€criminal€convicted€on€his€own€guilty€plea€seeks€as€plaintiff€inÐ \¬ Ða€subsequent€civil€action€to€claim€redress€based€on€a€repudiation€of€the€confession.€Ð H˜ ÐThe€effrontery€or,€as€some€might€say€it,€òòchutzpahóó,€is€too€much€to€take.€€ThereÐ 4„ Ðcertainly€should€be€an€estoppel€in€such€a€case.Ð pÐ Ð  ÐÓ Xs«ÓÌòòRayóó,€952€S.W.2d€at€224€(a€Kentucky€Court€of€Appeals€case)€(quoting€Hazard,€òòRevisiting€the€SecondÐ øH ÐRestatement€of€Judgements;€Issue€Preclusion€and€Related€Problemsóó,€66€Cornell.€L.€Rev.€564,€578Ð ä4 Ð(1981)).€€Numerous€other€courts€have€applied€this€reasoning€to€hold€that€the€failure€to€obtain€post„Ð ° Ðconviction€relief€precludes€a€criminal€malpractice€claim€concerning€the€same€issues.€€òòSeeóó€òòShaw€Ióó,Ð œì Ð816€P.2d€at€1361€(ð ðThe€requirement€of€post„conviction€relief€promotes€judicial€economy€becauseÐ ˆØ Ðmany€issues€litigated€in€the€quest€for€post„conviction€relief€will€be€duplicated€in€the€legal€malpracticeÐ tÄ Ðclaim.ðð);€òòSanders€v.€Malikóó,€711€A.2d€32,€33„34€(Del.€1998);€òòLevineóó,€123€F.3d€at€583€(ð ð[Ô_ÔB]yÔ_ÔÐ `° Ðoperation€of€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel,€a€valid€criminal€conviction€acts€as€a€bar€toÐ L œ Ðoverturning€that€conviction€in€a€civil€damages€suit.ðð);€òòBrewer€v.€Hagemannóó,€771€A.2d€1030,€1033Ð 8 ˆ Ð(Me.€2001)€(ð ðWhen€the€malpractice€plaintiff€has€every€incentive€in€his€post„conviction€petition€toÐ $ t Ðfully€litigate€the€issue€of€whether€his€attorneyððs€malfeasance€caused€him€any€prejudice,€collateralÐ  ` Ðestoppel€is€appropriate.ðð);€òòSchlumm€v.€OððHaganóó,€433€N.W.2d€839,€845€(Mich.€Ct.€App.€1989)€(ð ðTheÐ ü L  Ðjudicial€system€made€a€full€and€fair€determination€that€plaintiff€received€effective€assistance€ofÐ è 8  Ðcounsel€through€the€plea„taking€stage.€€Plaintiff€had€the€opportunity€to€fully€present€his€case€at€hisÐ Ô$  Ðmotion€for€new€trial.ðð);€òòState€ex€rel.€OððBlennisóó,€691€S.W.2d€at€503€(ð ðIn€this€case€involving€defensiveÐ À  Ðinvocation€of€collateral€estoppel€[the€plaintiffððs]€guilty€plea€precludes€him€from€denying€his€guilt€ofÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€assault€charge.€€That€plea€decided€the€same€issue€of€fact€present€in€his€malpractice€case;€itÐ ˜è  Ðresulted€in€a€judgment€on€the€merits;€[the€plaintiff]€is€a€party€to€both€cases;€he€had€a€full€and€fairÐ „Ô  Ðopportunity€to€litigate€his€guilt€or€innocence.ðð);€òòCarmel€v.€Lunneyóó,€119€A.D.2d€50,€53€(N.Y.€App.Ð pÀ ÐDiv.€1986);€òòStevensóó,€851€P.2d€at€562€(ð ð[T]o€allow€a€person€convicted€of€a€criminal€offense€to€sueÐ \¬ Ðthat€personððs€lawyer€without€having€first€overturned€the€conviction€would€mean€that€the€courts€wouldÐ H˜ Ðbe€permitting€relitigation€of€a€matter€that€is€supposed€to€be€settled€.€.€.€.ðð).€€It€is€true€that€not€all€courtsÐ 4„ Ðreadily€apply€collateral€estoppel€in€these€circumstances.€€òòSeeóó€òòGomezóó,€470€S.E.2d€at€695;€òòKrahnóó,€538Ð  p ÐN.E.2d€at€1063.€€But€we€think€that€the€better€rule€is€to€recognize€that€criminal€defendants€who€seekÐ  \ Ðto€overturn€their€convictions,€as€they€have€every€incentive€to€do,€may€not€relitigate€their€claims€inÐ øH Ða€malpractice€suit.€€Preventing€such€an€outcome€is€the€purpose€of€the€collateral€estoppel€doctrine.€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àAs€we€have€already€explained,€a€criminal€defendant€who€believes€he€has€been€wronglyÐ ¼  Ðconvicted€should€seek€redress€through€the€post„conviction€process,€not€through€a€legal€malpracticeÐ ¨ø Ðaction.€€Collateral€estoppel€provides€that€once€he€does€seek€such€relief,€and€it€is€denied,€he€cannotÐ ”ä Ðthereafter€bring€a€civil€claim€based€on€the€same€allegations€brought€before€the€post„conviction€court.€Ð €Ð ÐIt€seems€to€us€that€the€first€conclusion€leads€ineluctably€to€the€second.€€If€the€criminal€courts€are€theÐ l¼ Ðmechanisms€our€society€relies€upon€to€provide€relief€to€wrongly„convicted€defendants,€it€should€notÐ X ¨ Ðbe€that€civil€courts€may€ignore€the€results€of€the€post„conviction€process€once€it€has€concluded.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àThere€is€one€more€compelling€reason€in€support€of€the€post„conviction€exoneration€rule€weÐ #l! Ðadopt€today:€€encouraging€the€thorough€representation€of€criminal€defendants.€€We€say€ð ðthoroughððÐ $X" Ðbecause€a€rule€allowing€criminal€defendants€to€sue€their€defense€lawyers€may€result€in€the€practiceÐ ô$D # Ðof€ð ðdefensiveðð€law,€in€which€lawyers€spend€time€and€energy€attempting€to€ð ðinsulate€their€trial€courtÐ à%0!$ Ðdecisionsðð€from€attack€in€a€later€malpractice€case.€€òòWileyóó,€966€P.2d€at€991.€€For€example,€as€oneÐ Ì&"% Ðcourt€has€noted,€ð ðan€attorney€who€believes,€based€on€his€professional€experience,€that€a€witnessÐ ¸'#& Ðsuggested€by€the€defendant€will€do€more€harm€than€good€might€nonetheless€accede€to€the€defendantððsÐ ¤(ô#' Ðdesire€to€have€that€witness€testify€rather€than€exercise€his€legal€judgment€to€exclude€him.ðð€€òòBaileyóó,Ð )à$( Ðâ â621€A.2d€at€114.€€ð ð[I]n€our€already€overburdened€system€it€behooves€no€one€to€encourage€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðadditional€expenditure€[of]€resources€merely€to€build€a€record€against€a€potential€malpractice€claim.ðð€Ð ° ÐòòId.óó;òòóó€òòWileyóó,€966€P.2d€at€991.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àEqually€important€is€the€need€to€ensure€the€adequate€supply€of€defense€lawyers€willing€toÐ tÄ Ðrepresent€indigent€clients.€€As€the€Supreme€Court€of€Massachusetts€wrote:Ð `° ÐÓ XÓà0  àMost€criminal€defendants€in€this€Commonwealth€are€represented€by€counselÐ L œ Ðappointed€at€public€expense€or€private€counsel€whose€fees€are€not€substantial.€TheÐ 8 ˆ Ðpublic€has€a€strong€interest€in€encouraging€the€representation€of€criminal€defendants,Ð $ t Ðparticularly€those€who€are€ruled€to€be€indigent.€€The€rule€we€favor€helps€to€encourageÐ  ` Ðthat€kind€of€legal€representation€by€reducing€the€risk€that€malpractice€claims€will€beÐ ü L  Ðasserted€and,€if€asserted,€will€be€successful.Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌÓ X…ÄÓòòGlennóó,€569€N.E.2d€at€788.€€Other€courts€have€emphasized€this€important€public€policy€concern€inÐ À  Ðadopting€the€exoneration€rule.€€òòSeeóó€òòRodriguezóó,€609€N.W.2d€at€374€(ð ð[T]he€public€has€a€strongÐ ¬ü  Ðinterest€in€encouraging€the€representation€of€criminal€defendants,€especially€indigents.ðð);€òòMahoneyóó,Ð ˜è  Ð727€A.2d€at€100€(the€exoneration€rule€ð ðpromotes€an€ample€defense€bar€by€reducing€the€risk€ofÐ „Ô  Ðmalpractice€claimsðð);€òòBaileyóó,€609€N.W.2d€at€114.€€We€find€this€argument€compelling.€€An€obviousÐ pÀ Ðcounter„argument€is€that€criminal€malpractice€claims€may€deter€bad€lawyering.€€As€discussed,Ð \¬ Ðhowever,€when€that€bad€lawyering€results€in€a€wrongful€conviction€there€are€post„convictionÐ H˜ Ðremedies€available€to€criminal€defendants.€€As€for€deterrence,€the€desire€to€win€cases€and€preventÐ 4„ Ðclients€from€suffering€criminal€penalties€is€sufficient€incentive€to€do€good€work,€at€least€for€the€largeÐ  p Ðmajority€of€lawyers.€€For€those€lawyers€whose€standard€of€representation€falls€short€of€what€the€CodeÐ  \ Ðof€Professional€Responsibility€mandates,€however,€the€Board€of€Professional€Responsibility€can€andÐ øH Ðshould€bring€disciplinary€actions.€€We€should€not€rely€on€legal€malpractice€actions€to€do€the€workÐ ä4 Ðof€the€criminal€justice€system€and€the€Board€of€Professional€Responsibility,€especially€where€doingÐ Ð  Ðso€may€discourage€the€thorough€representation€of€indigent€criminal€defendants.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àBased€on€principles€of€equity,€tort€law,€post„conviction€law,€and€public€policy,€we€hold€thatÐ ”ä Ða€criminal€defendant€must€obtain€post„conviction€relief€in€order€to€maintain€a€legal€malpractice€claimÐ €Ð Ðagainst€his€defense€lawyer.€€Since€Gibson€did€not€prevail€in€his€post„conviction€proceeding,€weÐ l¼ Ðaffirm€the€decision€of€the€€Court€of€Appeals,€which€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summaryÐ X ¨ Ðjudgment€in€favor€of€Trant€€and€Cunningham.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àWe€must€now€address€Gibsonððs€argument€that,€irrespective€of€our€finding€that€the€federalÐ #l! Ðcourt€fully€considered€the€voluntariness€of€his€plea,€other€causes€of€action€€remain€viable.€Ð $X" ÐSpecifically,€he€is€suing€Trant€and€Cunningham€for€gross€negligence,€outrageous€conduct,€and€fraud,Ð ô$D # Ðin€addition€to€legal€malpractice.€He€argues€that€since€the€record€of€the€federal€court€proceedings€isÐ à%0!$ Ðsealed,€and€the€evidence€of€what€occurred€in€those€courts€is€limited€to€a€narrow€stipulation,€we€haveÐ Ì&"% Ðno€basis€for€dismissing€these€other€claims.€€We€disagree.€€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àInitially,€we€note€that€Gibsonððs€lawyer€at€oral€argument€suggested€that€Gibson€himself€movedÐ )à$( Ðto€have€the€federal€record€sealed.€€If€true,€he€is€judicially€Ô_ÔestoppedÔ_Ô€from€arguing€that€he€is€nowÐ |*Ì%) Ðprejudiced€as€a€result€of€the€seal.€€But€there€is€a€more€important€reason€for€rejecting€GibsonððsÐ h+¸&* Ðargument.€€A€close€reading€of€his€complaint€reveals€that€none€of€these€allegations€involve€any€factsÐ ° Ðapart€from€those€underlying€his€malpractice€claim,€namely,€the€circumstances€surrounding€theÐ œì Ðalleged€involuntariness€of€his€plea.€€It€is€apparent€that€Gibson€is€suing€Trant€and€Cunningham€onÐ ˆØ Ðthese€other€causes€of€action€òòpreciselyóó€because€they€allegedly€gave€him€incorrect€advice€about€hisÐ tÄ Ðsentence,€and€that,€due€to€a€conflict€of€interest,€they€employed€unethical€conduct€and€false€pretensesÐ `° Ð(e.g.,€the€prosecutorððs€threat€to€file€charges€against€his€father)€to€force€him€to€plead€guilty.€€There€areÐ L œ Ðno€other€allegations.€€Moreover,€the€parties€stipulated€in€an€agreed€order€that€the€federal€habeas€courtÐ 8 ˆ Ðconsidered€the€same€issues€underlying€Gibsonððs€malpractice€claim;€indeed,€that€is€why€the€trial€courtÐ $ t Ðstayed€the€claim€until€the€outcome€of€the€post„conviction€process.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àWe€therefore€find€that€all€of€Gibsonððs€allegations€can€be€reduced€to€the€charge€that€heÐ è 8  Ðsuffered€damage€because€his€lawyers€induced€him€to€plead€guilty€involuntarily.€€As€we€haveÐ Ô$  Ðexplained,€the€federal€courts€have€considered€and€rejected€this€charge.€€Gibson€is€not€entitled€toÐ À  Ðrelitigate€these€claims€in€the€guise€of€a€malpractice€suit.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àA€final€issue€relates€to€how€our€holding€affects€the€statute€of€limitations€for€bringingÐ „Ô  Ðmalpractice€claims,€which€is€one€year€from€the€time€the€cause€of€action€accrues.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð pÀ Ððð€28„3„104(a)(2).€€ð ðWhen€the€cause€of€action€accrues€is€determined€by€applying€the€discovery€rule.ðð€Ð \¬ ÐòòJohn€Kohl€&€Co.€v.€Dearborn€&€Ewingóó,€977€S.W.2d€528,€532€(Tenn.€1998).€€ð ðUnder€this€rule,€aÐ H˜ Ðcause€of€action€accrues€when€the€plaintiff€knows€or€in€the€exercise€of€reasonable€care€and€diligenceÐ 4„ Ðshould€know€that€an€injury€has€been€sustained€as€a€result€of€wrongful€or€tortious€conduct€by€theÐ  p Ðdefendant.ðð€€òòId.óó;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòFahrner€v.€SW€Mfg.€Incóó.48€S.W.3d€141,143€(Tenn.€2001);€òòShadrick€v.Ð  \ ÐCokeróó,€963€S.W.2d€726,€733„34€(Tenn.€1998).€€Since€we€hold€today€that€a€criminal€defendant€mustÐ øH Ðfirst€obtain€post„conviction€relief,€for€that€is€an€element€of€his€criminal€malpractice€claim,€theÐ ä4 Ðquestion€arises€whether€he€could€òòóóhave€ð ðdiscoveredðð€his€action€prior€to€the€post„conviction€courtððsÐ Ð  Ðruling.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àThe€answer€to€this€question€must€be€in€the€affirmative.€€Otherwise,€a€criminal€defendantÐ ”ä Ðcould€wait€for€years€before€filing€his€malpractice€claim,€depending€on€how€long€it€took€to€commenceÐ €Ð Ðand€decide€the€post„conviction€case.€€This€would€undermine€the€purposes€behind€both€the€discoveryÐ l¼ Ðrule€and€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations.€€òòSeeóó€òòCosciaóó,108€Cal.€Ô_ÔRptrÔ_Ô.€2d€at€483.€€A€defendant€shouldÐ X ¨ Ðnot€have€to€wait€years€before€knowing€whether€he€will€be€sued,€€when€the€plaintiff€already€knowsÐ D!” Ðthe€facts€supporting€his€legal€claim.€€Indeed,€we€have€recently€decided€òòóóthat€€if€a€plaintiff€files€hisÐ 0"€  Ðmalpractice€claim€before€the€post„conviction€proceedings€have€concluded,€a€trial€court€has€theÐ #l! Ðdiscretion€whether€to€allow€that€claim€to€proceed.€€òòSeeóó€òòSanjinesóó,€984€S.W.2d€at€911.€€As€notedÐ $X" Ðabove,€the€clear€implication€of€òòSanjinesóó€is€that€a€court€can€ð!ð€and€should€ð!ð€dismiss€a€frivolousÐ ô$D # Ðmalpractice€claim.€€This€is€necessary€as€a€matter€of€fairness€to€the€defendant.€€It€is€true,€however,€thatÐ à%0!$ Ðif€the€trial€court€decides€that€the€plaintiffððs€claim€should€not€be€dismissed€on€the€pleadings,€or€onÐ Ì&"% Ðsummary€judgment,€the€court€must€await€the€outcome€of€the€post„conviction€proceeding€beforeÐ ¸'#& Ðdeciding€whether€the€case€should€go€to€a€jury.€€Depending€on€the€case,€this€could€take€several€years,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðwhich€means€that€for€the€criminal€malpractice€case€whose€merits€appear€weak€but€not€frivolous,€aÐ )à$( Ðdefense€lawyer€may€have€to€experience€significant€delay€before€the€court€finds€in€his€favor.€€We€seeÐ |*Ì%) Ðno€way€around€this€difficulty.€€Nevertheless,€we€think€that€defense€€lawyers€will€not€frequently€sufferÐ h+¸&* ÐÑOYÑâ âѰ°Ñâ âÑ  Ñfrom€this€outcome,€thereby€causing€the€negative€public€policy€consequences€discussed€above.€€OurÐ ° Ðholding€today€promotes€the€outcome€that€the€only€plaintiffs€in€a€criminal€malpractice€case€who€willÐ œì Ðrecover€are€those€who€truly€deserve€to€win.Ð ˆØ ÐòòóóÌÌÓ  Óò òòòConclusionóóó óÐ L œ ÐÓüçÓà  àFor€the€reasons€discussed€above,€we€hold€that€a€plaintiff€cannot€prevail€in€a€ð ðcriminalÐ 8 ˆ Ðmalpracticeðð€case€against€his€defense€lawyer€unless€he€proves€that€he€has€obtained€post„convictionÐ $ t Ðrelief.€€The€decision€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€is€affirmed.Ð  ` ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  Óà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ pÀ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA,€III,€CHIEF€JUSTICE€Ð \¬ Ðà  à