ÿWPCc ¥yƒ „“š¦Ì ì2•ͧ ŠˆÜK” L2"3‡oýì´íʇÙèNŸ4s"­ÊˆQÌ_D4ÌH݇vt°ÞGnkXñò¤Å7/¬¼³ÖëIÔëâWˆ„:`ä’f×I¸ÔÜz’§2jáqG^|DãÙi躌HmiúâKŽWuF«¯ÔÌCãªþðl_X«nFZn8r¤áççø-½·nd¢uBtæ]ƒ •¤Øòìå=øÒP1¥¼ #3«0yk©ˆÒSTå´]»³?û¡Ü®S{[Çè3û¾SøEÜøÐÃ{A°>›²«ž µ•˜'¶_²ÅÉø ô<ŠS£Úx@ßCpIj¤íÓHº™!p}:ì¹ՄêšÏùA‡ˆµ=ÕxøHSú»žP~‰J^â"óÛ\%›ÁÿX§Ôåy€FPeŠAoK멸æ"JÚòE—d.C’êñ飑qÍrãýl’âô|²„åsßi>ER"Yìä”Èêåâ½ mÏx’·!üYMê¾ñçëtÓ É›xÎÂèPº…m¢ŒRü»øG·¦¿ž€Ø·û#DˆîäkˆD忨cô²!K§¦÷·Ò¤!¤-–&¯Ç/yÄZ#ÁìU"N­ %û 0F NG ^ I wU 4Y m | m~ ´• 0ŠI 0DÓ „  ¯› bJˆRRUNÚ©((EÑÓU@ÛÛÛÛ.111ç_____________________________________________________ BF˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0(uHš Z‹6Times New Roman RegularX(…ÿ$¡¡ÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  ÓCŠ) õ}|) œ3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ªÝ ƒ ¦‹$ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ô-òXXÔThe€other€count€charges€Harris€with€aggravated€assault,€punishable€either€as€a€Class€C€or€Class€D€felony.Ô#†XÔ2Xòô-q#Ô€€òòÔ‡ô-òXXÔ2ÔSeeóóÐ ° ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„102€(1997€Repl.).Ô#†XÔ2Xòô-!#Ô(:(3¦‹$¤¤Ý ƒ…ÿ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó zÝ ƒ ¦‹$ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô-òXXÔÔ‡ô-òòô-ÔThe€record€in€this€case€is€unusually€meager.€€All€proceedings€were€conducted€in€the€absence€of€an€officialÐ ° Ðreporter;€we€have€no€verbatim€transcript.Ô#†ô-òòô-#Ô ¥Ý ƒ ¦‹$ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ô-òXXÔThe€Latin€phrase€ð ðòònolle€prosequióóðð€literally€means€ð ðI€am€unwilling€to€prosecute.ðð€€òòKorematsu€v.€United€Statesóó,Ð ° Ð584€F.€Supp.€1406,€1410€(N.D.€Cal.€1984).€€Ô#†XÔ2Xòô-q#ÔÔ‡ô-òXXÔ2ÔThis€Court€defined€òònolle€prosequióó€ð ðas€being€a€formal€entry€of€record€by€theÐ tÄ Ðattorney„general€by€which€he€declares€that€he€will€no€longer€prosecute€the€case.ðð€€òòDearborne€v.€Stateóó,€575€S.W.2d€259,Ð 8ˆ Ð263€(Tenn.€1978).- ù- ~Ý ƒ ¦‹$ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô-òXXÔòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„105(a)(1)(B)(i)(c)€(Supp.€1999)€(providing€in€pertinent€part€that€a€prosecutionÐ ° Ðmay€not€be€suspended€by€pretrial€diversion€when€the€defendant€is€charged€with€a€Class€A€or€B€felony).(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular ŸÝ ƒ ¦‹$ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô-òXXÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„7„106(a)€(1993€Repl.)€provides:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àIf€the€district€attorney€general€.€.€.€is€disqualified€from€acting,€.€.€.€the€court€shall€appoint€some€otherÐ 8ˆ Ðattorney€to€supply€such€district€attorney€generalððs€place€temporarily.€€The€acts€of€such€district€attorneyÐ üL Ðgeneral€pro€tem€shall€be€as€valid€as€if€done€by€the€regular€officer,€and€the€district€attorney€pro€tem€shallÐ À Ðbe€entitled€to€the€same€privileges,€and€emoluments. (ÆúI Z‹(Times New Roman  Ñ ° Ñ $Ý ƒ ¦‹$ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô-òXXÔAs€a€preliminary€matter,€Harris€challenges€the€timeliness€of€the€Stateððs€appeal.€€Like€the€Court€of€CriminalÐ ° ÐAppeals,€we€conclude€that€the€interests€of€justice€merit€our€consideration€of€the€substantive€issues€in€this€case;€therefore,Ð tÄ Ðwe€need€not€discuss€whether€the€notice€of€appeal€was€timely€filed.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€4(a);€òòState€v.€Burrowóó,€769Ð 8ˆ ÐS.W.2d€510,€511€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1989)(ð ðThe€notice€of€appeal€can€be€waived€by€this€Court€ððin€the€interest€of€justiceððÐ üL Ð.€.€.€without€regard€to€whether€it€is€the€defendant€or€the€state€seeking€waiver.ðð). ÝÝ ƒ ¦‹$ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô-òXXÔòòSeeóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Edwardsóó,€777€F.2d€644,€649€(11th€Cir.€1985). dÝ ƒ…ÿ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€¼‹f»XXÔÑ8€Ô2XdìdÈ8ÑÔ€¼‹f»»¼‹fÔÑ€OYÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ€Ñà@7 7 ìàIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@§§$ìàAT€NASHVILLEˆÐ  Ðà@ÙÙ ìàMay€24,€2000€SessionˆÐ Ô$ ÐÔ‡XÔ2X»¼‹fÔÌò òÔ#†¼‹f»XXÔ2±#ÔÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE€v.€KENNETH€BRYAN€HARRISÔ‡XÔ2X»¼‹fÔó óÐ Ò" ÐÓ÷ÓÌà@ ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsˆÐ Ò " Ðà@ìàCriminal€Court€for€Wilson€CountyˆÐ ¾  Ðà@3 3 ìàNos.€96„0710,€96„0710A,€96„0710B€€€€€Bobby€Capers,€JudgeˆÐ ª ú ÐÌÌà@ìì*ìàßA€Y) °°` d€÷E<m` A߈Ð n¾  ÐÌà@w w ìàNo.€M1998„00325„SC„R11„CD€„€Filed€December€13,€Ô_Ô2000Ô_ԈРi¹  Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌßA€Y) °°` dE<@` AßÐ A‘  Ðó óÌÔ#†¼‹f»XXÔ2-#ÔÔ€XÔ2X»¼‹fÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2ÔWe€grant€permission€to€appeal€as€requested€by€Kenneth€Bryan€Harris€in€order€to€review€the€judgmentÐ <Œ Ðof€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals.€€The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€found€that€the€trial€court€had€erredÐ (x Ðin€making€the€following€rulings:€€(1)€overruling€the€Stateððs€motion€to€enter€a€òònolle€prosequióó€on€anÐ d Ðindictment€for€aggravated€assault;€(2)€dismissing€a€superseding€indictment€for€attempted€first€degreeÐ P Ðmurder€and€aggravated€assault;€and€(3)€reversing€the€district€attorney€general€òòpro€temporeóóððs€rejectionÐ ì< Ðof€the€defendantððs€application€for€pretrial€diversion€on€the€original€indictment.€€Accordingly,€theÐ Ø( ÐCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€reversed€each€ruling€and€remanded€the€cause€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÐ Ä Ðproceedings.€€After€careful€consideration,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€overruling€theÐ ° ÐStateððs€motion€for€a€òònolle€prosequióó€on€the€original€indictment.Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ô€We€conclude€also€that€the€trial€courtÐ œì Ðerred€in€dismissing€the€superseding€indictment€for€attempted€first€degree€murder€and€aggravatedÐ ˆØ Ðassault.€Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2n #ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ô€Moreover,€because€the€superseding€indictment€contains€a€count€charging€Harris€with€anÐ tÄ Ðoffense€for€which€pretrial€diversion€is€not€available,€we€need€not€consider€the€question€of€pretrialÐ `° Ðdiversion.€€Based€on€these€conclusions,€we€affirm€the€decision€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€andÐ Lœ Ðremand€the€cause€to€the€trial€court€for€proceedings€on€the€superseding€indictment.Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2h #ÔÐ 8ˆ ÐÌÓ  Óò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€Appeal€by€Permission;€Ð !`  ÐJudgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€Affirmed€and€Remandedó ó€Ð ü!L! ÐÓ  ÓÌòòAdolpho€A.€Birch,€Jr.,óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòò òó óE.€Riley€Anderson,€C.J.,Ð Ø#(# ÐFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,€Janice€M.€Holder,€óóand€òòWilliam€M.€Barker,€JJ.,ò òó óóó€joined.òò€€óóÐ Ä$ $ ÐÌFrank€Ô_ÔLannomÔ_Ô,€Lebanon,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Kenneth€Bryan€Harris.Ð œ&ì!& ÐÌÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2ÔPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter,€Michael€E.€Moore,€Solicitor€General,€Kim€R.Ð t(Ä#( ÐHelper,€Assistant€Attorney€General,€Tom€P.€Thompson,€Jr.,€District€Attorney€General,€and€WilliamÐ `)°$) ÐReed,€Assistant€District€Attorney€General,€for€the€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð L*œ%* ÐÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2ž#ÔÌÌà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ -`(- ЇÑ8€Ô2XXdìXdì8Ñà@üüìàI.€€Facts€and€Procedural€HistoryˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àOur€factual€synopsis€will€be€very€brief€because€of€the€scant€record€before€us׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€because€ofÐ ˆØ Ðour€remand€of€the€case€for€further€proceedings.€€The€salient€facts€gleaned€from€the€record€are€thatÐ tÄ ÐKenneth€Bryan€Harris,€the€defendant,€shot€a€neighbor€three€times.€€One€of€the€bullets€severed€theÐ `° Ðvictimððs€spinal€cord,€resulting€in€permanent€paralysis€below€the€shoulders.€€On€March€18,€1996,€theÐ L œ Ðgrand€jury€returned€an€indictment€charging€Harris€with€aggravated€assault.€€Because€the€districtÐ 8 ˆ Ðattorney€general€òòóówas€disqualified,€the€trial€court€appointed,€on€May€14,€1996,€a€district€attorneyÐ $ t Ðgeneral€òòpro€temporeóó€to€prosecute€the€case.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€On€November€12,€1996,€Harris€applied€for€pretrialÐ  ` Ðdiversion,€and€the€trial€court€ordered€the€preparation€of€a€pre„sentence€report.€€While€the€originalÐ ü L  Ðindictment€and€the€application€for€pretrial€diversion€were€pending,€the€district€attorney€general€òòproÐ è 8  Ðtemporeóó€re„submitted€the€case€to€the€grand€jury.€€Upon€re„submission,€the€grand€jury€returned,€onÐ Ô$  ÐDecember€10,€1996,€an€indictment€in€two€counts:€€attempted€first€degree€murder€and€aggravatedÐ À  Ðassault.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àOn€May€8,€1997,€the€district€attorney€general€€òòpro€temporeóó€sought€leave€of€the€court€to€enterÐ „Ô  Ða€òònolle€prosequióó׃x×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€on€the€original€indictment.€€Harris€responded€eleven€months€later,€on€March€31,Ð pÀ Ð1998,€opposing€the€òònolle€prosequióó€and€noting€that€the€application€for€pretrial€diversion€had€not€beenÐ \¬ Ðacted€upon.€€The€district€attorney€general€òòpro€temporeóó,€also€on€March€31,€1998,€filed€a€letter€in€whichÐ H˜ Ðhe€rejected€Harrisððs€application€for€pretrial€diversion.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àOn€April€14,€1998,€the€trial€court€entered€two€orders.€€In€the€first,€the€trial€court€refused€toÐ  \ Ðallow€a€òònolle€prosequióó€of€the€original€indictment.€€In€the€second,€the€trial€court,€apparently€acting€òòÔ_ÔsuaÔ_ÔÐ øH ÐÔ_ÔsponteÔ_Ôóó,€dismissed€the€superseding€indictment.€€Despite€the€request€of€the€district€attorney€general€òòproÐ ä4 Ðtemporeóó€for€written€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€no€written€response€was€filed€by€the€trialÐ Ð  Ðcourt.€€On€May€6,€1998,€the€trial€court€considered€Harrisððs€writ€of€certiorari€to€review€the€districtÐ ¼  Ðattorney€general€òòpro€temporeóóððs€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€The€trial€court€found€the€denialÐ ¨ø Ðunsupported€by€the€evidence€and€entered€an€order€granting€Harris€pretrial€diversion.€€On€directÐ ”ä Ðappeal,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€vacated€each€of€the€three€orders€entered€by€the€trial€court€andÐ €Ð Ðremanded€the€case.Ð l¼ ЇÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ôà  àWe€find€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€refusing€to€òònolleÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2Ù#Ô€prosequiÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ôóó€the€original€indictmentÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2j#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ô€and€inÐ ° Ðdismissing€the€superseding€indictment.€€Thus,€we€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€with€theÐ œì Ðsuperseding€indictment€as€the€sole€viable€indictment.€€Because€of€our€conclusions,€it€is€unnecessaryÐ ˆØ Ðfor€us€to€address€the€pretrial€diversion€issue€other€than€to€say€that€the€order€granting€pretrial€diversionÐ tÄ Ðwas€linked€to€the€original€indictment,€which€has€now€been€€òòÔ_ÔnolledÔ_Ôóó,€and€that€Harris€is€not€eligible€forÐ `° Ðpretrial€diversion€under€the€superseding€indictment€because€it€contains€a€count€charging€him€withÐ L œ Ða€Class€A€felony.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2Ç#ÔIt€results€that€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€where€the€case€shall€proceedÐ 8 ˆ Ðon€the€superseding€indictment€to€trial€or€other€appropriate€disposition,€with€all€proceedings€to€beÐ $ t Ðconducted€in€the€presence€of€an€official€court€reporter.Ð  ` ÐÌòòóóÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ôà@JJìàII.€€Standard€of€ReviewˆÐ è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€decision€whether€to€dismiss€an€indictment€lies€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€Ð À  ÐòòState€v.€Ô_ÔBennÔ_Ôóó,€713€S.W.2d€308,€311€(Tenn.€1986)€(discussing€dismissal€of€indictments€by€the€trialÐ ¬ü  Ðcourt€under€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€48(b)).€€Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2B##ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2ÔAppellate€courts€ð ðmay€not€interfere€with€a€ruling€made€withinÐ ˜è  Ðthe€discretionary€powers€of€the€trial€court€absent€clear€abuse.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Streetóó,€768€S.W.2d€703,Ð „Ô  Ð709€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€€Therefore,€we€will€not€disturb€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€absentÐ pÀ Ðan€abuse€of€discretion.Ð \¬ ÐÌÓ  ÓIII.€€AnalysisÐ 4„ ÐÓ¨&ÓÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2%#ÔÌà  àThe€Ô_ÔdispositiveÔ_Ô€issue€in€this€case€is€subject€to€misstatement.€€True,€we€are€reviewing€threeÐ  \ Ðrulings€of€the€trial€courtð!ðtwo€of€which€concern€indictments.€€However,€the€rulings€(or€at€least€thoseÐ øH Ðpertaining€to€the€indictments)€are€inter„dependent€and€inextricably€linked.€€Together,€the€rulingsÐ ä4 Ðaccomplish€a€single€purpose:€€forcing€the€Stateòòóó€to€prosecute€the€charge€selected€by€the€trial€court.€Ð Ð  ÐThus,€the€core€issue€is€whether€and€to€what€extent,€under€the€circumstances€here€presented,€the€trialÐ ¼  Ðcourt€may€determine€which€charge(s)€the€State€must€prosecute.׃!×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р¨ø ÐÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2ÔÌà@LLìàA.€€Denial€of€the€Stateððs€Motion€toòò€Nolle€Prosequióó€the€Original€IndictmentˆÐ €Ð ÐÌà  àUnder€common€law,€the€State€was€free€toòò€nolle€prosequióó€a€case€at€any€time€after€a€formalÐ X ¨ Ðcharge€had€been€made€by€indictment€or€information.€€òòSeeóó€4€Wayne€R.€LaFave€et€al.,€òòCriminalÐ D!” ÐProcedureóó€ðð€13.3€(1999).€€However,€over€time,€the€need€to€check€this€ð ðunbridled€discretionðð€resultedÐ 0"€  Ðin€legislation€and€rules€of€court€such€as€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€48(a),€which€provides€that€the€State€ð ðmayÐ #l! Ðòòby€leave€of€courtóó€file€a€dismissal€of€an€indictment€.€.€.€and€the€prosecution€shall€thereupon€terminate.ðð€Ð $X" Ð(Emphasis€added).€€Thus,€under€modern€law,€ð ðwhen€a€criminal€prosecution€has€gone€beyond€theÐ ° Ðcharging€stage,€that€is€to€say,€after€indictment€is€returned,€the€matter€[is€considered€to€have]€left€theÐ œì Ð[sole]€domain€of€the€prosecutor€and€.€.€.€entered€into€the€realm€of€the€court.ðð€€òòPace€v.€Stateóó,€566Ð ˆØ ÐS.W.2d€861,€868€(Tenn.€1978)€(Henry,€C.J.,€concurring).Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àThe€analysis€established€to€consider€a€motion€to€òònolle€prosequióó€seeks€to€balance€the€need€toÐ L œ Ðallow€prosecutors€the€freedom€to€exercise€legitimate€discretion€with€the€need€to€prevent€abuse€of€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðpower€to€dismiss.€€While€Rule€48(a)€grants€the€trial€court€some€control€over€the€prosecutorððsÐ $ t Ðdiscretionary€powers,€that€control€is€limited.€€The€federal€courts,€interpreting€virtually€identicalÐ  ` Ðð ðleave€of€the€courtðð€language€found€in€Fed.€R.€Crim.€P.€48(a),€have€stated:Ð ü L  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àthe€phrase€ð ðby€leave€of€courtðð€.€.€.€was€intended€to€modify€andÐ Ô$  Ðcondition€the€absolute€power€of€the€Executive,€consistently€with€theÐ À  ÐFramerððs€concept€of€Separation€of€Powers,€by€erecting€a€check€on€theÐ ¬ü  Ðabuse€of€Executive€prerogatives.€€But€this€is€not€to€say€that€the€RuleÐ ˜è  Ðwas€intended€to€confer€on€the€Judiciary€the€power€and€authority€toÐ „Ô  Ðusurp€or€interfere€with€the€good€faith€exercise€of€the€Executive€powerÐ pÀ Ðto€take€care€that€the€laws€are€faithfully€executed.€€The€rule€was€notÐ \¬ Ðpromulgated€to€shift€absolute€power€from€the€Executive€to€theÐ H˜ ÐJudicial€Branch.€€Rather,€it€was€intended€as€a€power€to€check€power.€Ð 4„ ÐThe€Executive€remains€the€absolute€judge€of€whether€a€prosecutionÐ  p Ðshould€be€initiated€and€the€first€and€presumptively€the€best€judge€ofÐ  \ Ðwhether€a€pending€prosecution€should€be€terminated.€€The€exercise€ofÐ øH Ðits€discretion€with€respect€to€the€termination€of€pending€prosecutionsÐ ä4 Ðshould€not€be€judicially€disturbed€unless€òòclearly€contrary€to€manifestÐ Ð  Ðpublic€interestóó.м ` x` x ÐòòÌUnited€States€v.€Cowanóó,€524€F.2d€504,€513€(5th€Cir.€1975)€(emphasis€added);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòState€v.Ð ”ä ÐLandersóó,€723€S.W.2d€950,€953€(Tenn.€1987)€(applying€the€ð ðmanifest€public€interestðð€test€to€analysisÐ €Ð Ðof€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€48(a)).€€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àGiven€the€high€threshold€that€the€trial€court€must€meet€before€overruling€the€prosecutorððsÐ D!” Ðdecision€toòò€nolle€prosequióó€an€indictment,€the€broad€discretion€granted€to€the€trial€court€in€otherÐ 0"€  Ðcircumstances,€such€as€evidentiary€rulings,€is€inapplicable€here.€€In€order€for€appellate€courts€toÐ #l! Ðaffirm€that€the€trial€courtððs€discretionary€power€to€deny€a€motion€to€òònolle€prosequióó€is€used€only€whenÐ $X" Ðthe€public€interest€is€at€stake,€the€trial€court€should€provide€a€clear€showing€of€its€reasons€for€denyingÐ ô$D # Ðthe€motion€and€should€ensure€that€the€reasons€are€made€part€of€the€record.€€In€this€case,€the€trial€courtÐ à%0!$ Ðpreserved€no€such€showing€on€the€record.€€The€record€does€not€reflect€any€manifest€public€interestÐ Ì&"% Ðsufficient€to€merit€the€trial€courtððs€restraint€of€the€Stateððs€discretion;€indeed,€the€trial€court€seems€toÐ ¸'#& Ðhave€merely€substituted€its€judgment€for€the€Stateððs€regarding€which€of€the€two€indictments€shouldÐ ¤(ô#' Ðbe€pursued.€€Such€a€unilateral€check€of€prosecutorial€discretion,€without€apparent€or€articulatedÐ )à$( Ðjustification,€is€beyond€the€trial€courtððs€authority.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€abusedÐ |*Ì%) Ðits€discretion€in€denying€the€Stateððs€motion€to€òònolle€prosequióó€the€original€indictment.Ð h+¸&* ÐÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2<*#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ôà@  ìàB.€€Dismissal€of€the€Superseding€IndictmentˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àUnder€the€United€States€Constitution€and€the€law€of€Tennessee,€the€State€is€given€broadÐ ˆØ Ðdiscretion€over€the€control€of€criminal€prosecutions.€€As€stated€by€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÐ tÄ Ðin€òòÔ_ÔBordenkircherÔ_Ô€v.€Hayesóó,€ð ðso€long€as€the€prosecutor€has€probable€cause€to€believe€that€the€accusedÐ `° Ðcommitted€an€offense€.€.€.,€the€decision€whether€or€not€to€prosecute,€and€what€charge€to€file€or€bringÐ L œ Ðbefore€a€grand€jury,€generally€rests€entirely€within€his€discretion.ðð€€434€U.S.€357,€364,€98€S.€Ct.€663,Ð 8 ˆ Ð668€(1978).€€The€decisions€of€our€Court€similarly€provide€that€the€State€has€the€ð ðsole€duty,€authority,Ð $ t Ðand€discretion€to€prosecute€criminal€matters.ðð€€òòState€v.€Ô_ÔSpradlinÔ_Ôóó,€12€S.W.3d€432,€436€(Tenn.€2000);Ð  ` ÐòòRamsey€v.€Town€of€Oliver€Springsóó,€998€S.W.2d€207,€209„10€(Tenn.€1999).Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àThe€power€to€seek€a€superseding€indictment€lies€within€this€broad€discretion€of€the€StateÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2Ñ=#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ô.€€AÐ Ô$  Ðsuperseding€indictment€is€an€indictment€obtained€without€the€dismissal€of€a€prior€indictment.€€41Ð À  ÐAm.€Ô_ÔJurÔ_Ô.€2d€òòIndictments€and€Ô_ÔInformationsÔ_Ôóó€ðð€54€(1995).€€Where€there€has€been€no€jeopardy€on€theÐ ¬ü  Ðfirst€indictment,€a€grand€jury€may€return€a€new€indictment€against€an€accused€even€though€anotherÐ ˜è  Ðindictment€is€pending.€€òòId.óó;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Ô_ÔEshkolÔ_Ôóó,€108€F.3d€1025,€1027€(9th€Cir.€1997).€Ð „Ô  ÐAlthough€the€State€may€not€bring€a€superseding€indictment€to€harass€or€intimidate€the€accused,׃$×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€aÐ pÀ Ðlegitimate€decision€to€bring€a€superseding€indictment€is€uniquely€within€the€Stateððs€authority.€€Thus,Ð \¬ Ðthe€State€may€obtain€a€superseding€indictment€at€any€time€prior€to€trial€without€dismissing€theÐ H˜ Ðpending€indictment€and€may€then€select€the€indictment€under€which€to€proceed€at€trial.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àThough€broad,€the€discretion€of€the€State€is€not€infinite.€€The€Tennessee€Rules€of€CriminalÐ  \ ÐProcedure€authorize€the€trial€court€to€dismiss€an€indictment€under€certain€circumstances.€€ForÐ øH Ðexample,€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€48(b)€preserves€the€accusedððs€right€to€a€speedy€trial€by€providing€thatÐ ä4 Ðthe€trial€court€may€dismiss€an€indictment€ð ð[Ô_Ôi]fÔ_Ô€there€is€unnecessary€delay€in€presenting€the€charge€toÐ Ð  Ða€grand€jury€against€a€defendant€who€has€been€held€to€answer€to€the€trial€court,€or€if€there€isÐ ¼  Ðunnecessary€delay€in€bringing€a€defendant€to€trial€.€.€.€.ðð€€In€addition,€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€12(b)(2)Ð ¨ø Ðimplicitly€allows€the€trial€court€to€dismiss€a€defective€indictment€when€a€motion€is€made€prior€toÐ ”ä Ðtrial.€€Finally,€if€a€defendant€is€indicted€while€a€preliminary€hearing€is€pending,€the€trial€court€mayÐ €Ð Ðdismiss€the€indictment€on€the€defendantððs€motion.€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€5(e).€€Notably,€of€these€rules,Ð l¼ Ðonly€Rule€48(b)€seems€to€provide€for€òòÔ_ÔsuaÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔsponteÔ_Ôóó€dismissal€by€the€trial€court.€€In€contrast,€the€trialÐ X ¨ Ðcourtððs€authority€under€Rule€12(b)(2)€and€Rule€5(e)€is€ordinarily€enabled€by€motion€of€a€party.€€WhileÐ D!” Ðwe€need€not€decide€here€whether€the€trial€court€has€òòanyóó€authority€outside€of€the€provisions€of€RuleÐ 0"€  Ð48(b)€to€dismiss€indictments€on€its€own€motion,€it€is€evident€that€such€a€dismissal€would€be€a€highlyÐ #l! Ðunusual€event€that€would€require€the€trial€court€to€provide,€on€the€record,€clear€justification€for€suchÐ $X" Ða€decision.Ð ô$D # ÐÌà  àThe€record€before€us€does€not€suggest€unnecessary€delay€in€the€proceedings€such€as€wouldÐ Ì&"% Ðjustify€the€trial€court€acting€under€Rule€48(b)€to€dismiss€the€superseding€indictment.€€Nor€does€theÐ ¸'#& Ðrecord€include€a€motion€by€either€counsel€to€dismiss€the€superseding€indictment.€€Moreover,€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðattempt€by€the€district€attorney€general€òòpro€temporeóó€to€ascertain€the€basis€for€the€trial€courtððsÐ )à$( Ðdismissal€of€the€indictment€was€fully€thwarted€by€the€trial€courtððs€rejection€of€his€Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2ÛB#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ôrequest€for€writtenÐ ° Ðfindings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€Thus,€we€are€left€with€no€other€conclusion€but€that€the€trialÐ œì Ðcourt€acted€òòÔ_ÔsuaÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔsponteÔ_Ôóó€in€dismissing€the€superseding€indictment.€€Absent€some€indication€ofÐ ˆØ Ðunnecessary€delay,€a€defect€in€the€indictment,€or€some€articulable€reason€for€dismissal,€a€òòsua€sponteóóÐ tÄ Ðdecision€to€dismiss€the€indictment€clearly€was€beyond€the€authority€of€the€trial€court€and€constitutes,Ð `° Ðtherefore,€an€abuse€of€discretion.€Ð L œ ÐÌà  àBecause€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€dismissing€the€supersedingÐ $ t Ðindictment,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€reinstating€that€indictment.€Ð  ` ÐWe€remand€the€cause€(the€superseding€indictment)€to€the€trial€court,€where€the€matter€shall€proceedÐ ü L  Ðto€trial€or€other€appropriate€disposition.Ð è 8  ÐÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2&Q#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2ÔÌà@••ìàC.€€Pretrial€DiversionˆÐ À  ÐÌà  àHarrisððs€application€for€pretrial€diversion€was€filed€under€the€original€indictment.€€We€haveÐ ˜è  Ðconcluded€that€the€State€should€have€been€allowed€to€òònolle€prosequióó€that€indictment,€and€thus€we€noÐ „Ô  Ðlonger€need€to€address€the€pretrial€diversion€question.Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2¡U#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ô€€Furthermore,€as€a€result€of€our€ruling€today,Ð pÀ Ðthe€only€indictment€still€viable€on€remand€contains€a€count€charging€Harris€with€attempted€firstÐ \¬ Ðdegree€murder,׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€a€Class€A€felony.€€As€long€as€that€charge€remains,€Harris€is€not€eligible€for€pretrialÐ H˜ Ðdiversion.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„105(a)(1)(B)(i)(c)€(Supp.€1999)€(providing€in€pertinent€partÐ 4„ Ðthat€a€prosecution€may€not€be€suspended€by€pretrial€diversion€when€the€defendant€is€charged€withÐ  p Ða€Class€A€or€B€felony).Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2YW#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ô€€Thus,€it€is€unnecessary€for€us€to€address€whether€the€trial€court€abused€itsÐ  \ Ðdiscretion€in€reversing€theÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2/Z#Ô€district€attorney€general€òòpro€temporeóóððÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2Ôs€rejection€of€Harrisððs€applicationÐ øH Ðfor€pretrial€diversion.Ð ä4 ÐÌÓ  ÓIV.€€ConclusionÐ ¼  ÐÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€both€inÐ ”ä Ðdenying€the€Stateððs€motion€to€òònolle€prosequióó€the€original€indictment€charging€only€aggravated€assaultÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2[#ÔÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2ÔÐ €Ð Ðand€in€dismissing€the€superseding€indictment€for€attempted€first€degree€murder€and€aggravatedÐ l¼ Ðassault.€€€Accordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€is€affirmed€as€herein€modified.€Ð X ¨ ÐWe€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€in€accordance€with€this€opinion.€€CostsÐ D!” Ðof€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€Kenneth€Bryan€Harris.Ô#†XÔ2XXXÔ2ú\#ÔÐ 0"€  ÐÔ‡XÔ2XXXÔ2ÔÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð à%0!$ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àADOLPHO€A.€BIRCH,€JR.,€JUSTICEÔ#†XÔ2XXXÔ2þ^#Ô