WPCq_ 7P8C`-Xv~x+; U`p.p\%^bפ2yܯېХr 11.xb×VaȄP,,}= xWA z5UYbvbx? 0? 0P@ 0A 0A 0B 0rC 0MD 0%E 0E 0F 0G 0gH 00I 0IIJJJJJNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN 0 mRZSZSZS BJUJU 0gU D5 V D-@V 0KmVmV ASV W 0W 0DuX AXXXXXXXXXXdYdYdYdYdYdYdYdYdYdYdYdYdYdYdYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlYlY;6]HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5e,,,,0s5) (`$..8;uXXdd8    ("  Z6Times New Roman Regular~&):i+00 C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xU  R?$      1  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙMorespecifically,theappelleewassentencedtoserve4yearsforpossessionofmarijuanawithintentto  resell,alongwithaconcurrentsentenceof11months,29daysforpossessionofdrugparaphernalia.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#$  0    ; ' tg0tg .    Y R?$      2  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙThetrialcourtalsofoundthatincarcerationwasneededsoastoavoiddepreciatingtheseriousnessofthe  offense.TheCourtofCriminalAppeals,however,foundthisgroundtobeinapplicableonthefactsofthiscase,because  possessionof21poundsofmarijuanaisnot especiallyviolent,horrifying,shocking,reprehensible,offensive,or ` otherwiseofanexcessiveorexaggerateddegree.TheStatedoesnotchallengetheproprietyofthisholding,andwe $t f  g reach_Ԁnodeterminationastowhetherthisgroundwasproperlyusedtodenytheappelleealternativesentencing.(uH Z(Times New Roman   R?$      4  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙSection402904(a)(1),whichfurnishedgroundsforgrantingordenyingprobation,wasrenumberedas  TennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection4021104(Supp.1984),_and_Ԁwaslaterrepealedbythe1989CriminalSentencing  ReformAct.See1989Tenn.Pub.Actsch.591,7. b R?$      9  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙԀAlthoughPerryisapretrialdiversioncase,deterrenceinpretrialdiversioncasesisguidedbythesame  considerationsasdeterrenceinprobationcases.SeeStatev.Hammersley,650S.W.2d352,354(Tenn.1983)  ( DeterrencetoothersshouldnotbeeliminatedasamatteroflawandinallcasesfromconsiderationbytheDistrict ` AttorneyGeneralorbythetrialjudgeindecidingwhethertogrant_pretrialdiversion_;deterrenceeitheroftheindividual $t orofothersisasrelevanthereasingrantingordenyingprobation.).f  g _Ԁ  R?$      5  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙAsthisCourtstatedinMichael,  Inmakingthepointthatsomedeterrenceispresentineverycasewedidnotintendtosaythatthe  factorofdeterrencehasexactlythesameweightineverycase.Anelementofdeterrenceispresent ` ineverycasebutthedegreeofsignificanceofthisfactorinrestrainingtheoffenderorcurbingthe $t  propensityforcriminalactivityinothers,varieswidelywiththeclassofoffenseandthefactsofeach  case. t 629S.W.2dat14(referringtoMoten).Wefurtherstatedthat thecaselawandthelegislativedeclarationenvisionan 8 examinationofthedeterrencefactorinthecontextofeachcaseandassigningitsuchweight,creditandvalueasthe L _circumstances_Ԁwarrant.Id.at15.   ~ R?$      10  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙMoreover,othercaseshaveaffirmeddenialofprobationupondeterrencegroundsbecausetheneedfor  deterrencewas obvioustotheappellatecourt,eventhoughtherewasnoproofofthisfactintherecord.See.e  .eStatev.  Leggs,955S.W.2d845,851(Tenn.Crim.App.1997)#.e  .e#.e  .eԀ( Itisouropinionthattheneedtodeterviolent,unlawfulbehavior ` bythoseindividualsentrustedwiththecustodialcontroloverothers,especiallythoseincapacitatedbymentalretardation, $t isobvious.)#.e  .e-#.e  .e;#.e  .et#ԀseealsoStatev.Lutry,938S.W.2d431,.e  .e435(Tenn.Crim.App.1996)#.e  .e#.e  .e( Wehaveheldthattheseoffenses, 8 by_their_Ԁverynature,neednoextrinsicprooftoestablishthedeterrentvalueofpunishment.Casesinwhichfraudis  involved,includingforgerycases,seemtocomposesuchacategory.#.e  .eK#.e  .e).#.e  .e#.e  .eԀ p    Tobecertain,partofthereasonfortheinconsistentapplicationofthelawinthisareabeforethe1989Criminal 4  SentencingReformAct#.e  .e#.e  .eԀmaybeattributabletotheabuseofdiscretionstandardofreview.See#.e  .e#State_v._ԀBell,664S.W.2d  H 288,290(Tenn.1984).e  .eԀ(_stating_Ԁthat#.e  .e# appellatecourtsarenotauthorizedtoweighthefactorsandsubstitutetheirjudgment    forthatofatrialjudge,butmustaffirmunlessanabuseofdiscretionhasoccurred);seealsoTenn.CodeAnn.4021    104(Supp.1988),repealedby1989Tenn.Pub.Actsch.591,7( Thejudgmentofthetrialcourtshallbepresumed D   tobecorrectandshallnotbereviewableuponappealexceptforanarbitraryorcapriciousabuseofdiscretion.).  R?$      6  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙSeealsoState_v._ԀBrooks,943S.W.2d411,413(Tenn.Crim.App.1997)(_affirming_Ԁdenialofprobationwhen   theproofclearlyshowedthatdrugsaleswererampantinthiscommunity,therebycallingfortheneedforgeneral  deterrence.);Statev.Purkey,689S.W.2d196,201(Tenn._Crim._ԀApp.1984)(_affirming_Ԁdenialofprobationupontrial ` courtsfindingsthat publiccorruptionhasbeenrampantinthatareainrecentmonths...[,andthat]thepublicright $t toresponsiblepublicofficialsmustbevindicatedandthatcriminalmisconductmustbepunishedtodeterthosesimilarly 8 situated....).Thisrationalehasbeenusedtorejectincarcerationwherethe defendantsplaceofresidence[wasin]  amediumcrimearea.State_v._ԀVance,626S.W.2d287,290(Tenn.Crim.App.1981);seealsoState_v._ԀJenkins,733 p  S.W.2d528,535(Tenn.Crim.App.1987)( Thetrialcourtisapparentlyoftheopinionthattraffickinginmarijuanais 4  notaparticularprobleminCockeCounty.Thus,thedenialofprobationinthisinstanceisnotnecessarytodeterthe  H conductofothersinthecommunity.).2G+J 0_level1  X /%4 4 <DL/23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2D+J 0_level2   ," <DL,23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2A+J 0_level3   ) <DL)23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2>+J 0_level4  ` &<<DL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2;+J 0_level5   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  28+J 0_level6    DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  25+J 0_level7  h DDL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  22+J 0_level8   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2/+J 0_level9    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levsl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levsl2   ," <DL,23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levsl3   ) <DL)23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levsl4  ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  - -2;J 0_levsl5   #DL#23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levsl6    DL 23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levsl7  h DDL23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levsl8   L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levsl9    L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levnl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23   2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levnl2   ," <DL,23   2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levnl3   ) <DL)23   2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levnl4  ` &<<DL&23   2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levnl5   #DL#23   2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levnl6    DL 23   2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levnl7  h DDL23   2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levnl8   L23   2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levnl9    L23   2( 4 <DL2    R?$      12  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙFurthercomplicatingthisissueisthefactthatthestatuteatissueinthiscasefocusesonlyuponthatmarginal  deterrenceprovidedbyincarcerationwhichdoesnotalreadyexistuponthreatorexpectationofalternativesentencing.  Itiscertainlyconceivablethatinsomecases,effectivedeterrenceofothercrimesmaybeachievedbytheotheraspects ` ofthecriminaljusticesystem,suchasarrest,trial,orevenalternativesentencingitself.Nevertheless,becauseitmay $t beextremelydifficulttopracticallyevaluatethemarginaldeterrenceprovidedbyincarceration,wecanonlyrequirethat 8 theincarcerationofadefendant rationallyserveasadeterrenttootherssimilarlysituatedandlikelytocommitsimilar   crimes.  R?$      8  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙSeealsoState_v._ԀJenkins,733S.W.2d528,535(Tenn.Crim.App.1987)(denyingincarcerationondeterrence  grounds,butstating [i]fmarijuanatraffickingwasaparticularprobleminCockeCounty,theStatecouldhavepresented  alawenforcementofficertorelatethisfact);State_v._ԀWhite,649S.W.2d598(Tenn.Crim.App.1982)(_deterrence_Ԁwas ` supportedbytestimonyoflocalsheriffthat thedefendantsincarcerationwoulddeterlikecrimesandmadereference $t 9 tothenumerousworthlesscheckviolationsthatoccurredinLincolnCounty).(|I2?$ !.8)XXdd8         0  X)XԀ  R?$      7  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙf  g The_ԀBryantcourtfoundthatdeterrencedidnotwarrantadenialofprobationafteraconvictionforautomobile  theft,becausethese offenses,althoughseriousinnature,arenotpeculiartoanyparticularjurisdiction.775S.W.2d  at6. d(|3$ !.8)XXdd8     VVVV)!dxdx)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3$ !.8)XXdd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK   R?$      3  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙTheCourtofCriminalAppealsdisagreedthatthesentencingjudgecompliedwiththeproperstatutory  sentencingguidelines,anditdidnotthereforeapplythepresumptionofcorrectness.Theintermediatecourtdidnot  f  g f  g explainhowf  g Ԁthetrialcourtfailedtocomplywiththeguidelines,althoughittookissuewiththeamountofproof ` supportingdeterrence.Respectfully,however,ourownreviewoftherecordrevealsthatthesentencingcourtdid $t properlyconsiderthefactorsandprinciplessetforthinthe1989CriminalSentencingReformAct,andwetherefore 8 reviewtheappelleessentencewithapresumptionofcorrectness. 1 R?$      11  XٙXԀ  _.e XXٙWesimplycannoteliminatedeterrenceasagrounduponwhichtodenyalternativesentencing,because   mattersrelatingtopunishmentandprobationaretheprerogativeoftheLegislature,and...itspronouncementssolong  astheypass_Constitutional_ԀmustermustbehonoredbytheCourts.Horne,612S.W.2dat187. !.8ٙXXdd8     _  @ INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTENNESSEE  @kk$ATNASHVILLE & #Զ#  f  g May2000Session L #Ԧ#uf  g   STATEOFTENNESSEEv.DARYLHOOPERXٙX   p &@   Appealf  g byPermissionf  g fromthef  g CourtofCriminalAppeals  p   f  g CircuitCourtfor_Humphreys_ԀCounty  \ @@ No.8995Hon.AllenW.Wallace,Judge  H @*AV) ` dE<` A߈   @Z Z No.M199700031SCR11CD#XXٙV#f  XٙXg ԀFiledSeptember21,_2000_Ԉ   f  g    `     h      AV) ` dE<` A    #XXٙ#XٙXThesingleissueinthisappealiswhethertheproofintroducedatthesentencinghearingissufficient v tosupportadenialofprobationbasedsolelyupontheneedfordeterrence.TheCourtofCriminal b Appealsinitiallyaffirmedthesentenceandheldthatproofofdeterrencewasnotneededbecause N druguseandpossessioncasesare _deterrable_Ԁperse.Uponthedefendantspetitiontorehear, : however,theintermediatecourtreverseditself,holdingthata perseruleofdeterrenceis &v inconsistentwiththeholdingofthisCourtinStatev._Ashby_,823S.W.2d166(Tenn.1991).The b StateappealedtothisCourt.Forthereasonsgivenherein,weholdthattheproofinthiscaseis N sufficienttojustifydenialofprobationonthesolegroundofdeterrence.ThejudgmentoftheCourt : ofCriminalAppealsgrantinganalternativesentenceisreversed,andthedefendantsoriginalterm & ofincarcerationisreinstated.#XXٙS#Ԁ  XٙX   Tenn.R.App.P.11ApplicationforPermissiontoAppeal;JudgmentoftheCourtof  CriminalAppealsisAffirmedinPart,ReversedinPart;f  g   f  g AppelleesOriginalTermofIncarcerationisReinstated #XXٙR #XٙX   u f  g WilliamM.f  g Barker#Xٙ #XٙX.,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichf  g f  g E.RileyAnderson,C.J.,and p"! FrankF._Drowota_,III,_Adolpho_ԀA.Birch,Jr.,andJaniceM.Holder,JJ.,f  g joined.#XXٙk #XٙX \#" #XXٙ#XٙXPaulG.Summers,AttorneyGeneralandReporter;MichaelE.Moore,SolicitorGeneral;MarkE. 4% $ Davidson,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Nashville,Tennessee,fortheappellant,StateofTennessee.#XXٙM#XٙX  &p!% WilliamH.Farmer,NashvilleTennessee;MarkW.Peters,Nashville,Tennessee,fortheappellee, 'H#' DarylHooper.#XXٙc#XٙX (4$(   f  g OPINION #XXٙ<#XٙX * &* q  OnMay29,1996,anArkansasnarcoticsofficerstoppedavehicleforatrafficviolationon ,', Interstate40nearConway,Arkansas.Uponbecomingsuspiciousthatthevehiclewastrafficking -(- _illegaldrugs,theofficerobtainedwrittenandoralconsenttosearchthecar.Whilesearchingthe  trunkofthecar,theofficerfoundtwentythreeplasticbagscontainingatotalofmorethantwenty  onepoundsofmarijuana.AfterbeingarrestedandtakentotheConwayPoliceStation,thecars  passenger,KennethMcKee,statedthathewastransportingthemarijuanafromAlbuquerque,New t Mexicototheappellee,DarylHooper,inHumphreysCounty,Tennessee.McKeefurtherexplained ` thathewasdeliveringthemarijuanatotheappelleeaspartofanarrangementinwhichtheappellee L  wouldexcusecertaindebtsowedbyMcKee. 8    ShortlyafterMcKeegavehisstatement,heagreedtocooperatewiththepoliceandmakea  `  controlleddeliveryofthemarijuanatotheappellee.PoliceChiefJohnEthridgeinMcEwen,  L  Tennesseewascontactedaboutarrangingthedelivery,andduringtheearlymorningofMay30,  8  McKee,alongwithanundercoverofficerfromtheHumphreysCountyDrugTaskForce,delivered $  themarijuanatotheappelleeathisresidence.Followingashortdiscussionwiththeappelleeonhis   porch,McKeereturnedtothecarandreportedthatthedeliverywascomplete.     AboutthreeminutesafterMcKeeandtheDrugTaskForceOfficerdroveaway,otherofficers   executedasearchwarrantontheappelleesresidenceandrecoveredthedeliveredmarijuana.On p June4,1996,theHumphreysCountyGrandJuryreturnedatwocountindictmentagainstthe \ appelleealleging(1)possessionofmarijuanaovertenpounds,onegram,forresale,and(2) H possessionofdrugparaphernalia.Followingatwodaytrial,ajuryreturnedaguiltyverdictonboth 4 chargedoffensesonJune4,1997.  p   Atthesentencinghearing,theappelleearguedthatheshouldbesentencedtoprobationrather H thantoatermofincarceration.Inarguingthattheappelleeshouldbeconfinedsoastodeterothers 4 fromcommittingsimilarcrimes,theStatecalledChiefEthridgetotestifythatMcEwenhasa rather   serious[drugproblem]forasmalltown,andthatsince1984,morecasesfromMcEwenhavebeen   presentedtothegrandjurythanfromanypartofHumphreysCounty.ChiefEthridgeadmitted,  though,thathedidnotbelievethatthedrugproblemwasanyworseinMcEwenthaninanyother  Tennesseecountyorf  g thatitf  g wasanyworsethanintheUnitedStatesasawhole.    Thetrialjudgedeniedtheappelleesrequestforalternativesentencingandsentencedthe X  appelleeasaRangeIstandardoffendertoserveatotaloffouryearsintheDepartmentof D! Correction.  #  1      ׀Indenyingalternativesentencing,thecourtstatedthattheproofattrialdemonstrated 0"  thattheappelleewasoneofthemajordrugdealersinthecounty,andthat theresawholelotof #l! otherpeopleinthiscountythatsoutherethatswonderingwhatsgoingtohappentoMr.Daryl $X" Hooper[,]because[they]mightwanttoshipin25pounds[ofmarijuana]insteadoffiveorinstead $D # ofone.ReferringtodrugabuseinHumphreysCounty,thetrialcourtalsostatedthat %0!$ IknowitsaprobleminthisCounty.Mr.Ethridgehastestifiedtoit.Weseejust '#& fromtakingthedocketthistimeandineveryothercountyinthiscircuit[that]theres (#' justbecomemoreandmoreandmoredopecases[,]andifwedontdosomething  aboutit,itsgoingtoruinsociety....  N"  TheCourtofCriminalAppealsinitiallyf  g f  g affirmedf  g Ԁtheappelleessentencefindingthatwhile ` theproofofdeterrence wasminimalatbest,f  g Ԁsuchcrimesare deterrableperse,eveninthe L  absenceofarecorddemonstratinganeedfordeterrence. #  2      ׀Ontheappelleespetitiontorehear, 8  however,theintermediatecourtreverseditselfandmodifiedtheappelleessentencesothatthe $ t appelleewouldservetheremainderofhisfouryearsentenceonprobationfollowingninetydays  ` incarceration.Inaddressingtheissueofwhetherdrugsaleorpossessionis deterrableperse,the  L  courtconcludedthatsuchanapproachisinconsistentwiththeholdingofthisCourtinStatev.  8  Ashby,823S.W.2d166(Tenn.1991).TheStatethenrequested,andwegranted,permissionto $  appealonthefollowingissue:whethertheproofinthisrecordissufficienttosupportadenialof   probationbasedsolelyontheneedtodeterothersfromcommittingsimilarcrimes.     STANDARDOFAPPELLATEREVIEW    u)  BecausetheappelleescrimewascommittedafterNovember1,1989,XٙXXXٙreviewofthe \ appelleessentenceisgovernedbytheTennesseeCriminalSentencingReformActof1989.See H Tenn.CodeAnn.40-35-117(1997);seealso,e.g.,Statev.Burdin,924S.W.2d82,84(Tenn. 4 1996).#XٙXXXٙ*#WheneitheradefendantortheStatechallengesthelength,range,ormannerofserviceof  p asentence,thisCourtconductsadenovoreviewoftherecordwithapresumptionthatthe  \ determinationsmadebythesentencingcourtarecorrect.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.40-35-401(d), H 4035402(d)(1997).Ifourreview reflectsthatthetrialcourtfollowedthestatutorysentencing 4 procedure,imposedalawfulsentenceafterhavinggivendueconsiderationandproperweighttothe   factorsandprinciplessetoutunderthesentencinglaw,andthatthetrialcourtsfindingsare   adequatelysupportedbytherecord,thenwemaynotmodifythesentenceevenifwewouldhave  preferredadifferentresult.Statev.Pike,978S.W.2d904,92627(Tenn.1998);Statev.Fletcher,  805S.W.2d785,789(Tenn.Crim.App.1991).Afteracarefulreviewoftherecord,weconclude  thatthetrialcourtdidfollowtheproperstatutorysentencingguidelines,andtherefore,ourreview l oftheappelleesoriginalsentenceisdenovowithapresumptionofcorrectness.z #  3      ׀ X    PROOFOFDETERRENCESUPPORTINGINCARCERATION   1  TheStatearguesthatthesentencingcourtproperlydeniedalternativesentencingtothe t appelleesolelyontheneedtodeterothersfromcommittingsimilarcrimes.TheTennesseeCriminal ` SentencingReformActof1989recognizesthelimitedcapacityofstateprisonsandmandatesthat L   convictedfelonscommittingthemostsevereoffenses,possessingcriminalhistoriesevincingaclear 8  disregardforthelawsandmoralsofsociety,andevincingfailureofpasteffortsofrehabilitationshall $ t begivenfirstpriorityregardingsentencinginvolvingincarceration.Tenn.CodeAnn.  ` 40-35-102(5)(1997).Adefendantwhodoesmeetthecriteriaofsection4035102(5)andwhois  L  anespeciallymitigatedorstandardoffenderofaClassC,D,orEfelonyis presumedtobea  8  favorablecandidateforalternativesentencingoptions....Tenn.CodeAnn.40-35-102(6). $    Thisstatutorypresumptionofalternativesentencingisnotconclusive,however,andthe   presumptionmayberebuttedby evidencetothecontrary.Seeid.;Statev.Ashby,823S.W.2d   166,169(Tenn.1991).Guidanceastowhatmayconstitute evidencetothef  g f  g contrary"orf  g Ԁevidence   thatthedefendantisamemberofthepopulationforwhomincarcerationisaf  g f  g priority"isf  g Ԁfoundin p TennesseeCodeAnnotated40-35-103(1997),f  g whichstatesthatacourtmayorderconfinement \ when: H  ` (A) Confinementisnecessarytoprotectsocietybyrestrainingadefendant  p whohasalonghistoryofcriminalconduct;  \  ` (B) Confinementisnecessarytoavoiddepreciatingtheseriousnessofthe 4 offenseorconfinementisparticularlysuitedtoprovideaneffectivedeterrenceto   otherslikelytocommitsimilaroffenses;or    ` (C) Measureslessrestrictivethanconfinementhavefrequentlyorrecently  beenappliedunsuccessfullytothedefendant.  8f  g BoththeStateandtheappelleeconcedethattheappelleeisentitledtothepresumptionofalternative X  sentencingandthatsubsections103(1)(A)and(C)donotapplyinthecasebeforethisCourt. D! Consequently,theonlyissuebeforethisCourtiswhetherthedenialofprobationwassupportedby 0"  sufficientevidencethatconfinement isparticularlysuitedtoprovideaneffectivedeterrenceto #l! otherslikelytocommitsimilaroffenses. $X" f  g   HistoricalUseofDeterrencetoDenyAlternativeSentencing %0!$ =f  g   Thedenialofprobationorotheralternativesentencingbasedsolelyupontheneedfor '#& deterrencehasbeenthesubjectofmuchcontroversyinthejurisprudenceofthisstate.InMotenv. (#' State,559S.W.2d770(Tenn.1977),thisCourtreviewedadenialofprobationthatwasgrounded )$( inpartontheneedtodeterothersfromcommittingsimilarcrimes.Infindingthatdeterrencecould x*%) notserveasthesolegroundsupportingdenialofprobation,thisCourtsaid: d+&* Relianceuponthisfactorwoulddefeatthewholeconceptofprobation.Whilethe  otherfactorslistedinStiller[v.State,516S.W.2d617(Tenn.1974)]mayormaynot  bepresentorapplicableorsignificantinanygivencase,[deterrence]isafactor t whichisuniformlypresent.Thus,evenifallfactorsgravitatein[the]defendants ` favorinagivencase,probationwouldbedefeatedbythefactthattosuspendthe L  sentencewoulddestroytheconvictionsdeterrentvalue.Relianceonthisfactoris 8  nomorerealisticorreasonablethandenyingprobationongroundsthatthedefendant $ t committedacrime.  ` f  g Id.at773.  8    Initsverynextsession,andindirectresponsetoMoten,theGeneralAssemblyamended   TennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection402904(a)(1) #  4      ׀tospecificallyprovidethata trialjudgemay   denyprobationuponthegroundofthedeterrenteffectuponothercriminalactivity.1978Tenn.   Pub.Actsch.911,1.TheGeneralAssemblyalsorecognizedtheprinciplethatdeterrencealone   couldserveasabasisfororderingincarcerationwhenitenactedthe1982CriminalSentencing p ReformAct.Section4043103(1)(B)f  g off  g f  g the1982f  g ԀActprovidedthatconfinementcouldbeordered \ byasentencingcourtwhenconfinementwas particularlysuitedtoprovideaneffective[deterrent] H tootherslikelytocommitsimilaroffenses.Thisexactlanguagewaslaterrecodifiedaspartofthe 4 1989CriminalSentencingReformAct,seeTenn.CodeAnn.4035103(1)(B)(1997),although  p theGeneralAssemblyhasyettogiveanyfurtherindicationofwhenincarcerationwouldbe  \  particularlysuitedtoprovideadeterrenteffect. H   ShortlyaftertheGeneralAssemblysreinstatementin1978ofdeterrenceasagroundupon   whichtodenyprobation,theCourtofCriminalAppealsacknowledgedindictathat adenialonthe   basisofdeterrencealonemustbesupportedbysomeproofthatthesentenceimposedwillhavea  deterrenteffectwithinthejurisdiction.Statev.Horne,612S.W.2d186,187(Tenn.Crim.App.  1980).ThisCourtreaffirmedtheproofrequirementfollowingthepassageofthe1989Criminal  SentencingReformAct,whenweheldthat [t]hefindingofdeterrence[supportingdenialof l alternativesentencing]cannotbeconclusoryonlybutmustbesupportedbyproof.Ashby,823 X  S.W.2dat170.Insoholding,werecognizedthat [a]nelementofdeterrenceispresentineverycase D! butthedegreeofsignificanceofthisfactorinrestrainingtheoffenderorcurbingthepropensityfor 0"  criminalactivityinothers,varieswidelywiththeclassofoffenseandthefactsofeachcase.Id. #l! (citingStatev.Michael,629S.W.2d13(Tenn.1982)). #  5      ׀ $X" Ї  Becausedeterrenceisaconceptthatfrequentlydefiespracticalanalysis,itshouldcomeas  nosurprisethattheappellatecourtsofthisStatehavehadsignificanttroubleindevelopinga  consistentstandardbywhichtodeterminewhenadefendanthasbeenproperlydeniedprobationon  deterrencegroundsalone.XٙXXXٙAtvarioustimes,courtshavestatedthatdeterrencemayonlybeshown t when:(1)#XٙXXXٙP#crime isrampant,oratleastontheincreaseinthearea,Horne,XٙXXXٙԀ612S.W.2dat187#XٙXXXٙQ#;( #  6      XٙXXXٙԀ(2) ` #XٙXXXٙsR#thecrimecommittedwas onefrequentlyrepeatedbylawlessmembersofsociety,Statev.Kirk, L  868S.W.2d739,743(Tenn.Crim.App.1993)XٙXXXٙ;(3)#XٙXXXٙzS#XٙXXXٙthecrimeisonethatisuniquetoaparticular 8  jurisdiction,Statev.Bryant,775S.W.2d1(Tenn.Crim.App.1988);S #  7      ׀or(4)#XٙXXXٙS#thereis somespecial $ t needorconsiderationrelativetothatjurisdictionwhichwouldnotbeaddressedbythenormal  ` deterrenceinherentinanycriminalpenalty.Statev.Hartley,818S.W.2d370,375(Tenn.Crim.  L  App.1991).  8    Inadditiontotheinconsistentstandardusedtodeterminewhetherdeterrenceisproperly   considered,thecourtshavealsobeeninconsistentastowhatkindofproofcansupportadenialof   probationondeterrencegrounds.Somecourtshaveaffirmedadenialofprobationwhena   communitypoliceofficertestifiesastotheneedforincarcerationfordeterrence.SeeStatev.   McColgan,631S.W.2d151,156(Tenn.Crim.App.1981)(affirmingadenialofprobationinpart p ondeterrencegroundswhenthelocalsherifftestifiedthat [Benton]countyhadarealproblemwith \ drugtrafficandtrafficinstolenpropertyandthatrequiringtheappellanttoservehissentencewould H deterothersfromcriminalactivity).C #  8      ׀TXٙXXXٙhisCourt#XٙXXXٙZ#inXٙXXXٙAshby,however,#XٙXXXٙSZ#rejectedincarcerationwhen 4 theonlyproofofdeterrencewasthatdrugs havebecomesuchaproblemnotonlyinthiscounty,  butinthenationasawhole.823S.W.2dat170.TheAshbydecisionseemedtorequireproofthat  theparticulardefendanthadanobservableeffectonthedrugproblembeforedenialofprobationwas  warranted.Id.( Thetrialjudgenotedthatdrugsareaprobleminthiscountrytoday,butthereisno t showingthatthiselderlymanhashadanyincreasingeffectontheproblem.Thereisnoevidence ` thatthoselikelytoviolatethecriminallawswillbedeterredbytheincarcerationof[the] L  appellant.). 8    Moreover,XٙXXXٙtheintermediatecourthasbeendividedastowhetherthesentencingjudgecan  ` providethenecessaryproofofdeterrencethroughhisorherownobservationsoffactssurrounding  L  thecase.Inatleastonecase,theCourtofCriminalAppealshasrejectedadenialofprobationon  8  deterrencegroundswhenthetrialjudgemadehisownobservation thattherehadbeenseveralof $  thesetypecrimesintherecentpast.Statev.Grissom,956S.W.2d514,520(Tenn.Crim.App.   1997)#XٙXXXٙ]#XٙXXXٙ.#XٙXXXٙ`#Inanothercase,however,theCourtofCriminalAppealsaffirmeddenialofpretrial   diversionondeterrencegroundsforaperjurychargedespitethefactthattheonly proofof   deterrencewasthetrialjudgesobservationof thedramaticincreaseinperjuryinthecommunity.   Statev.Perry,882S.W.2d357,360(Tenn.Crim.App.1994).T #  9       p   Perhapsacknowledgingthedifficultyofdeterminingwhethersufficientproofofdeterrence H hasbeenoffered,somecourtshaveeliminatedtheproofrequiremententirelyforcertaintypesof 4 crimes.Forexample,thisCourtinStatev.Cleavor,XٙXXXٙ691S.W.2d541(Tenn.1985),#XٙXXXٙ d#Ԁaffirmedthe  p denialofprobationforaD.U.I.offenderbyfindingthatXٙXXXٙ [t]heneedfordeterrenceisobvious#XٙXXXٙd#,even  \ thoughtheneedfordeterrencewasnotevidentfromtheproofintherecord.691S.W.2dat543. H Inarrivingatthisconclusion,weacknowledgedthattherewas currentlyanincreasedpublic 4 awarenessoftheneedtodeterpersonswhowouldattempttodrivemotorvehicleswhile   intoxicated,aswellasthe growingconcernofcitizensabout [t]herisingnumberofpersonswho   drivewhileintoxicatedandtherisingnumberofdeathscausedbysuchdrivers.Id.    FollowingourdecisioninCleavor,theCourtofCriminalAppealsinStatev.Dykes,803  S.W.2d250,260(Tenn.Crim.App.1990),heldthatoffensesinvolvingthesaleoruseofdrugsare l  deterrableperse.Insoholding,thecourttookjudicialnoticethat thegrosssalesanduseofillicit X  narcoticscontinuetoincreaseannually;andcrimesthataredirectlyrelatedtothesaleanduseof D! illicitnarcoticsalsocontinuetoincrease.Id.at260.Thecourtconcludedbystatingthat 0"  Therehasbeenandisanincreasingpublicawarenessoftheneedtodeterindividuals $X" whoengageinthesaleofillicitnarcotics;andthisawarenesscontinuestobeamatter $D # ofgrowingconcern.Therefore,theappellantisnotentitledtoprobationduetothe  deterrenteffectthatsuchajudgmentwillhaveonthosewhoareengagedinlikeor  similarconduct.  jf  g Dykes,803S.W.2dat260.XٙXXXٙ #  10       ` #XٙXXXٙ[l#  f  g ConflictingGoalsofAlternativeSentencingandIncarcerationBasedonDeterrence 8  mf  g   Thef  g f  g inconsistentf  g Ԁapplicationofthelawafterthe1989CriminalSentencingReformActmay  \ beattributed,atleastinpart,totheapparentconflictbetweenthegoalsoftheActandthepolicies  H  supportingdeterrencetheorygenerally.The1989f  g ԀActisclearthatamongitspurposesisthe  4  eliminationofunjustifieddisparityinsentencingandthegivingof firstpriorityinprison   sentencingto convictedfelonscommittingthemostseriousoffenses.Tenn.CodeAnn.4035   102(2),(5).Therebuttablepresumptionofalternativesentencinginsection4035102(6)was   draftedsoastogiverecognitionf  g andeffectf  g totheseprinciples.Nevertheless,because  someaspect   ofdeterrenceispresentineverycase,ablanketpolicyallowingincarcerationbasedsolelyupon   deterrencecoulddosignificantharmtothesef  g f  g purposesf  g ,ifnoteliminatethemalltogether. l   Inanefforttobalancethesecompetinginterestsandgoals,wereemphasizethattherecord D mustcontainsomeproofoftheneedfordeterrencebeforeadefendant,whoisotherwiseeligiblefor 0 probationorotheralternativesentence,maybeincarcerated.Theproofofdeterrencerequirement, l despiteitsuniqueabilitytoeludedefinition,isperhapstheonlymethodf  g Ԁbywhichf  g Ԁtoprevent X wholesaledamagetothegoalsofthe1989CriminalSentencingReformAct.Inretainingtheproof D requirement,though,wemustnecessarilyoverruleallofthepriorcaseswhichhavefoundcertain 0 crimestobe deterrableperse.Althoughwehavestatedthattheneedfordeterrencevaries  accordingtotheclassoftheoffense,Ashby,823S.W.2dat170,noteveryinfractionofagivenclass  ofoffensessignalsaneedfordeterrence.Seeid.f  g f  g Indeed,suchf  g Ԁarationalef  g f  g isf  g Ԁcontrarytothenotion  ofindividualizedsentencing,whichunderliesalternativesentencingtheoryunderthe1989Act  generally.SeeStatev.Dowdy,894S.W.2d301,305(Tenn.Crim.App.1994). |   h   Nevertheless,becausewerecognizetheGeneralAssemblyscontinuedpolicyofallowing   incarcerationbasedsolelyontheneedfordeterrence,wecannotrequirethattheproofofdeterrence  besooverwhelmingastoeffectivelyremovedeterrenceasaconsideration. #  11      ׀Deterrenceisa  complexpsychologicalprocess,andthefocusondeterrencethroughchangesinthepenaltystructure t orsentencingbehaviorrepresentsbutonepartofthecalculus.f  g f  g Section4035103(1)(B)f  g Ԁrecognizes ` thisrealityasthelanguageoff  g f  g thestatutef  g Ԁrequiresf  g Ԁonlyf  g Ԁthatconfinementbe particularlysuitedto L  provideadeterrenteffect,anditdoesnotrequireproofthatincarceration willor shoulddeter 8  othersfromcommittingsimilarcrimes.Althoughsomecases"mostnotablyStatev.Bingham,910 $ t S.W.2d448(Tenn.Crim.App.1995)andStatev.Bonestel,871S.W.2d163,169(Tenn.Crim.App.  ` 1993)"haverequiredthattherecordshow thatthesentenceimposedwillhaveadeterrenteffect,  L  thisstandardisf  g contrarytothelanguageofthestatute.Therefore,totheextentthatBingham,  8  Bonestel,oranyothercasecanbereadtorequireproofthatincarcerationwillorshouldresultin $  deterrence,itisherebyoverruled.   Ѐ  Althoughresearchonthedeterrenceaspectsofcriminallawhasprogressedsincetheearliest   attemptstoempiricallystudythesubjectfiftyyearsago,wedoubtf  g f  g whetherf  g Ԁthemarginaldeterrence   ofadefendantreceivingincarcerationoverprobationcaneverbeproventotheextentseemingly p requiredbysomeofourcases.XٙXXXٙԀDeterrence involvesundemonstrablepredicationsabouthuman \ behavior,butthetheoryisashardtodisproveasitistoproveforthesamereasons....However, H thestrengthofthetheoryisinitsgenerality;itsfoundationisincommonsenseandthereissome 4 evidencetosupportit.UnitedStatesv.Lucas,2M.J.834,840(A.C.M.R.1976)(citingBaileyand  p Smith,Punishment:ItsSeverityandCertainty,63J.Crim.L.&Criminology530,531(1974)).#XٙXXXٙ#Ԁ  \ Althoughnosystemofpunishmentscaneverensuretotaldeterrence,commonsensetellsusthatthe H riskofunpleasantconsequencesshouldbeaverystrongmotivationalfactorformostpeopleinmost 4 situations.     Becausethe scienceofdeterrenceisimpreciseatbest,thetrialcourtsshouldbegiven  considerablef  g f  g latitudef  g Ԁindeterminingwhetheraneedfordeterrenceexistsandwhetherincarceration  appropriatelyaddressesthatneed.Accordingly,wewillpresumethatatrialcourtsdecisionto  incarcerateadefendantbasedonaneedfordeterrenceiscorrectsolongasanyreasonableperson l lookingattheentirerecordcouldconcludethat(1)aneedtodetersimilarcrimesispresentinthe X  particularcommunity,jurisdiction,orinthestateasawhole,and(2)incarcerationofthedefendant D! mayrationallyserveasadeterrenttootherssimilarlysituatedandlikelytocommitsimilarcrimes.f  g f  g > #  12       0"  f  g   Tobecertain,theGeneralAssemblyhas envision[ed]anexaminationofthedeterrence  factorinthecontextofeachcaseandassigningitsuchweight,creditandvalueasthecircumstances  warrant.Statev.Michael,629S.W.2d13,15(Tenn.1982).Therefore,inordertofacilitatemore t meaningfulappellatereview,andtoensuregreaterconsistencyinthisaspectofsentencing,trial ` courtsshouldconsiderfactorsf  g ,f  g Ԁsuchasthefollowingf  g ,f  g Ԁwhendecidingwhetheraneedfordeterrence L  ispresentandwhetherincarcerationis particularlysuitedtoachievethatgoal: <  f  g 8  f  g  ` 1) Whetherotherincidentsofthechargedoffenseareincreasingly  d presentinthecommunity,jurisdiction,orinthestateasawholef  g f  g . P    f  g   Thisfactorspeakstotheparticularneedfordeterrence,anditisaslightmodificationofone (  standardthathasbeenusedbytheCourtofCriminalAppeals.SeeHorne,XٙXXXٙԀ612S.W.2dat187#XٙXXXٙɎ#;   Vance,626S.W.2dat290.Wenotethatthisstandardhastypicallybeenlimitedtoshowingthat   deterrencewouldoccurinthe jurisdiction.See,e.g.,Statev.Bingham,910S.W.2d448,445   (Tenn.Crim.App.1995);Horne,612S.W.2dat187.Neithersection4035103(B)(1),norour   decisioninAshby,however,supportslimitingthedeterrenteffecttothejurisdictionofthe t sentencingcourt.Indeed,suchalimitationignoresthatmanycrimescanhavetangibleeffectsin ` partsofthestateotherthanwherejurisdictionisfirstobtained.Accordingly,totheextentthatany L casedoesnotpermitproofofdeterrencebeyondthejurisdictionalconfinesofthesentencingcourt, 8 itisoverruled.  $t   Useofstatisticsmaybehelpfulinestablishingthef  g increasingf  g leveloftheparticularcrimein L thecommunity,jurisdiction,orinthestate.SeeStatev.Boggs,932S.W.2d467,477&n.9(Tenn. 8 Crim.App.1996).Wedonotrequiresuchevidence,though,andtestimonybysomeonewithspecial $ knowledgeofthelevelofaparticularcrimewillgenerallybesufficienttoestablishthepresenceof  thisfactor.  Ѐ8   ` f  g 2) Whetherthedefendantscrimewastheresultofintentional,knowing,  orrecklessconductorwasotherwisemotivatedbyadesiretoprofitorgainfromthe p criminalbehaviorf  g f  g .\    f  g   Actionsthataretheresultofintentional,knowing,orrecklessbehaviororthosemotivated 4"  byadesiretoprofitfromillegalactivityareprobablymoredeterrablethanthosewhicharenotthe  #p! resultofaconsciousefforttobreakthelaw.Indeed,thisistheveryrationalethatunderliesthe  $\" deterrenceaspectofpunitivedamagesintortlaw.SeeHodgesv.S.C.Toof&Co.,833S.W.2d896, $H # 901(Tenn.1992).Commonsensetellsusthatwemayhavef  g f  g lessf  g Ԁabilitytodetercrimeswhichare %4!$ theresultofprovocation,suddenandextremepassion,orevennegligentbehavior,irrespectiveof & "% whetherotherswhocommitsimilarcrimesareincarceratedorgivenprobation. ' #&   (#' 8  f  g  ` 3) Whetherthedefendantscrimeandconvictionhavereceived   substantialpublicitybeyondthatnormallyexpectedinthetypicalcase.   f  g f  g   Afundamentalrequirementofdeterrenceisthatothersknowofthepunishmentreceived. t Ifothersaregenerallyunawareofthedefendantsconvictionandsentence,thenthedefendants ` punishmentcannotf  g reasonablyf  g serveasadeterrenttoothers.XٙXXXٙForexample,inStatev.Downey,945 L  S.W.2d102(Tenn.1997),werecognizedthatadvancepublicityofroadblockssignificantlyenhanced 8  theirvalueasdeterrentstointoxicateddrivers.Id.at111(statingthat [w]ebelieveadvance $ t publicityfurthersthedeterrencerationalefortheuseofasobrietyroadblock....TheStates  ` contentionthatadvancedpublicitywasunnecessarybecausetheroadblockwaswell-markedatthe  L  scenecompletelyignoresthedeterrencerationale.)#XٙXXXٙ#.SeealsoXٙXXXٙUnitedStatesv.DanilowPastryCo.,  8  563F.Supp.1159,1167(S.D.N.Y.1983)( Finally,deterrenceisfosteredbythepublicitygarneredf  g  $  bythef  g f  g sentences.);#XٙXXXٙj#ԀUnitedStatesv.Braun,382F.Supp.214,215(S.D.N.Y.1974)(statingthat it   remainsasourceofqueasinesstorealizethatdeterrencemeansmakingexamplesofpeople(despite   themoralandphilosophicquestionsthatraises);[and]thatourrelativelyanonymousdefendantadds   atmosttoamassofindistinguishableexamples).Itshouldbestressed,f  g f  g howeverf  g ,thatinthisage   ofinstantaccesstovirtuallyalltypesofinformation,somethingmorethananewspaperarticleor p televisionreportisnecessarytofulfillthisfactor. \   Thedefendantscrimeandconvictionneednotbeknowntothecommunity,jurisdiction,or 4 stateasawhole,solongastheyareknowntothatdiscretecommunityofindividualslikelyto  p commitsimilarcrimes.Criminalactsbyaprofessionalinhisorherofficialcapacity,forexample,  \ neednotbepublicizedstatewidebeforef  g Ԁdeterrencemayf  g f  g beconsideredasafactor.Inmostcases, H substantialpublicitywithinthedefendantsprofessionalcommunitywouldprobablysufficetomeet 4 thisfactor.   8      8   ` 4) Whetherthedefendantwasamemberofacriminalenterprise,or  substantiallyencouragedorassistedothersinachievingthecriminalobjective.     Otherpersonscommonlyengagedinacriminalenterprisewiththedefendantshouldbeless l likelytoengageinthecriminalconductifthedefendantisconvictedandincarcerated.SeeStatev. X  Boyd,925S.W.2d237,245(Tenn.Crim.App.1995)(upholdingdenialofprobation,inpart,on D! deterrencegroundswhendefendantwasaleaderinacriminalenterprise);seealsoUnitedStatesv. 0"  Sessa,821F.Supp.870,875(E.D.N.Y.1993)(imposinglifeimprisonmentinexcessoffederal #l! sentencingguidelinesbasedondeterrencebecausedefendantswereleadersoforganizedcrime $X" family).Fordeterrencepurposes,thisfactorextendstothosewhoarefollowingthedirectionsof $D # another,aswellastothoseactually leadingthecriminalenterprise. %0!$ 8   ` 5) Whetherthedefendanthaspreviouslyengagedincriminalconduct '#& ofthesametypeastheoffenseinquestion,irrespectiveofwhethersuchconduct (#' resultedinpreviousarrestsorconvictions.)$(     |*%) f  g   Repeatedoccurrencesofthesametypeofcriminalconductbyadefendantgenerallywarrant   amoreemphaticreminderthatcriminalactionscarryconsequences.Althoughthestatutespeaksin  termsofgeneraldeterrence,ithasbeenrecognizedthatgeneraldeterrenceispossibleonlyafter  specificdeterrencehasf  g Ԁfirstf  g Ԁbeenachieved.SeeXٙXXXٙStatev.Jarbath,555A.2d559,564(N.J.1989) t (statingthat theabsenceofanypersonaldeterrenteffectgreatlyunderminestheefficacyofa ` sentenceasageneraldeterrent.Wehaverecognizedrecentlythatgeneraldeterrenceunrelatedto L  specificdeterrencehasrelativelyinsignificantpenalvalue.).#XٙXXXٙj#ԀThisfactorisalsosimilartothe 8  enhancementfactorinsection4035114(1),andfordeterrencepurposes,othersimilarbehaviornot $ t resultinginarrestmaybetakenintoconsideration.Cf.Statev.Robinson,971S.W.2d30,46(Tenn.  ` Crim.App.1997)( ThereisnoperseruleinTennesseeagainstconsideringunadjudicatedconduct  L  [insentencing].Thetrialcourtismerelyprohibitedfromrelyinguponamerearrestrecordto  8  enhanceadefendantssentence.). $    Werecognizethatanyenumerationoffactorsinthisnebulousareaisimperfect,andwedo   notprecludeproofofanyotherfactorsdeemedrelevantbythesentencingcourt.Thesefactorsare   meanttoservef  g onlyf  g asaguide,andacourtneednotfindthatallofthesefactorsaref  g f  g presentbeforef  g    orderingincarcerationbasedonaneedtodetersimilarcrimes.f  g f  g Additionalf  g Ԁfactorsf  g f  g maybef  g Ԁconsidered p bythesentencingcourt,f  g f  g providedthat(1)thesentencingcourtstatestheseadditionalfactorsf  g Ԁonthe \ recordwithspecificityf  g ,f  g Ԁandf  g f  g (2)thepresenceoftheseadditionalfactorsisf  g Ԁsupportedbyatleastsome H proof. 4   f  g f  g ANALYSISOFDETERRENCEINTHEPRESENTCASE  4   Inconductingourowndenovoreviewofthisrecord,weconcludethatthetrialcourtacted   reasonablyinorderingincarcerationbasedsolelyupondeterrencegrounds.Fromtheevidence  elicitedattrial,itisclearthattheappelleeactivelyrecruitedotherstotransportillegaldrugsintothis  stateasapartofanorganizedcriminalplan,andthatdrugswerebroughtintothisstateonatleast  twooccasionsfromNewMexicounderthissamescheme.Onatleastoneofthesetrips,theappellee l financedthetripinpartbypaying$500forthelodgingandfoodexpensesofthef  g f  g personsf  g Ԁtransporting X  hismarijuana.Moreover,theappelleehasrepeatedlyengagedinthesaleofmarijuana,asone D! witnessadmittedinataperecordedstatementthathepurchasedmarijuanafromtheappelleeonat 0"  leastthreeseparateoccasionsandthathesawtheappelleesellmarijuanatoothersaswell. #l!   Itisalsoclearthattheappelleesmotiveinbreakingthelawwastoprofitorgainfromhis $D # illegalconduct.Thisiscertainlynotacasewheretheappelleeresortedtoillegalconductinorder %0!$ tofeedhisfamilyorpayemergencyexpenses.Cf.Statev.Barber,595S.W.2d809,810(Tenn. &"% 1980)(reversingdenialofprobationondeterrencegroundsinpartbecausedefendantsmotivefor '#& sellingmarijuanawas topayhisfamilysimmediatelivingexpensesafterbeinglaidofffromhis (#' job).Tothecontrary,therecordindicatesthattheappelleeadmittedpurchasingatruckwithmoney )$(  fromdrugsales.Wecandivinenomotivefortheappelleesconductotherthangreedorpecuniary |*%) gain,andwef  g findthatthetrialcourtcouldrationallyf  g concludethatsomedeterrencemayf  g beobtained  bytheappelleesincarcerationf  g f  g Ԁbasedf  g Ԁonthisfactorf  g .     WealsofinditsignificantthatthePoliceChiefofMcEwentestifiedthatMcEwenhasa t  ratherserious[drugproblem]forasmalltown.ChiefEthridgehasservedintheMcEwenPolice ` Departmentsince1984,andhestatedthathewasfamiliarwiththedrugprobleminandaround L  McEwen.AlthoughtheStatecouldhaveadmittedstatisticalevidencetoreinforcethetestimonyof 8  ChiefEthridge,itwascertainlynotrequiredtodosogiventhatChiefEthridgeiscertainlyonewho $ t isgenerallyfamiliarwiththedrugprobleminMcEwen.AlthoughChiefEthridgedidnotbelieve  ` thatthedrugproblemwasgreaterinHumphreysCountythaninanyotherpartofTennessee,a  L  communityshouldnotberequiredtowaituntilacrimeproblemisgenerallyworsethaninanyother  8  partofthestatebeforepreventativeactioncanbetaken,solongastheproblemissignificantenough $  tojustifyaneedfordeterrence.     Finally,thetrialjudgealsoremarkedthat theresawholelotofotherpeopleinthis   county...thatswonderingwhatsgoingtohappentoMr.DarylHooper.Althoughproofof   publicityandnotorietyiscertainlyrelevanttotheissueofdeterrence"indeed,itmaybeoneofthe p mostsignificantfactors"weseenoproofofthisfactintherecordotherthanthesestatements. \ Althoughwewillnotautomaticallyprecludeajudgefromtakingjudicialnoticeofsomefacts H necessarytoestablishaneedfordeterrence,particularlyintheareaofpublicity,thisremarkisreally 4 nothingmorethantheresultofthecourtsextrajudicialobservations,whichshouldnotbe  p consideredinsentencing.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.4035210(g)(1997)&SentencingCommission  \ Comments( Implicitlywithinthissubsectionisthatthejudgemaynotconsidermattersotherthan H thosefactorspresentedinopencourt.);seealsoVaughnv.ShelbyWilliamsofTennessee,Inc.,813 4 S.W.2d132,133(Tenn.1991)( Nojudgeisatlibertytotakeintoaccountpersonalknowledge   whichhepossesseswhendecidinguponanissuesubmittedbytheparties.Inotherwords,[i]t   mattersnotwhatisknowntothejudgepersonallyifitisnotknowntohiminhisofficial  capacity.).Consequently,wedonotconsidertheseremarksinconductingourreview.    Basedonourdenovoreviewoftherecordinthiscase,weholdthattheevidenceissufficient l tosupporttheappelleesincarcerationbasedsolelyupondeterrencegrounds.Theproofshowsthat X  thereisaneedtodeterdrugsaleandpossession,atleastinMcEwen;thattheappelleeintendedto D! profitbyhisf  g intentionalandf  g illegalconduct;thattheappelleeactivelyrecruited,organized,and 0"  financedtraffickingofdrugsintothisstate;andthatf  g f  g asf  g Ԁasignificantdrugdealerf  g ,theappellee #l! repeatedlyengagedinthissameillegalconductf  g .Forthesereasons,wereversethatpartofthe $X" intermediatecourtsjudgmentwhichf  g f  g grantedf  g Ԁtheappelleeaprobatedsentence.Weaffirm,however, $D # theholdingoftheCourtofCriminalAppealsfindingthattheappellees sentenceoffouryearsis %0!$ appropriateinthiscase.Therefore,wereinstatetheappelleesoriginaltermofincarceration. &"% f  g f  g @*f  g Ԉ  CONCLUSION  (#'   Insummary,weholdthatatrialjudgemaysentenceadefendanttoatermofincarceration |*%) basedsolelyonaneedfordeterrencewhentherecordcontainsevidencewhichwouldenablea h+&* reasonablepersontoconcludethat(1)deterrenceisneededinthecommunity,jurisdiction,orstate;  and(2)thedefendantsincarcerationmayf  g f  g rationallyf  g Ԁserveasadeterrenttootherssimilarlysituated  andlikelytocommitsimilarcrimes.Basedonourdenovoreviewofthisrecord,weconcludethat  theproofissufficienttojustifyincarcerationbasedsolelyontheneedfordeterrence.Accordingly, t wereversethejudgmentoftheCourtofCriminalAppealsgrantingprobationtotheappellee,and ` wereinstatetheappelleesoriginaltermofincarceration. L    Costsofthisappealshallbepaidbytheappellee,DarylHooper,forwhichexecutionshall $ t issueifnecessary.f  g   `    `     h       L        `     h     ____________________________________      `     h     WILLIAMM.BARKER,JUSTICE    f  g