ÿWPCB+ E# ÖUNá %/ 0 P5w@…UFÅ4 .6 0”> 0DÒ 0D BZwLË AQÓÆ$ 0Dê 0@. n 0Jv D/À 0Tï 0^C D3¡ 0hÔ 0r< 0|® 0†* B° 0Í 1u] 0dÒ U>6U6tB)ªDCÓ AMU*cSåà¤ÅÜ iBE j‡"v~ñ#vÓo%˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX((>R$¡¡Ó  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°Ò rDstuvwexyzÓ€†”.Courier New RegularWX$3|x†(D(3G¾$¤¤Ý ƒ>R!ÝÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óüÿP PdC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT !"%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô'÷ÿ dxd2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô----'ÿÿdxd26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô$&')*+,. ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d99997Border 1dd ":Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial IÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€<ÔÔ€<ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€<XÔÌÌò òJulyÏ6,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€<ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó ÛÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€8ÔOn€May€1,€1998,€Tennesseeððs€General€Assembly€passed€PublicÏChapter€No.€1041,€an€amendment€to€ðð€40„35„201€which€deletesÏsubsection€(b)€in€its€entirety€and€substitutes€the€following:ÌÌà8 àà8 àIn€all€contested€criminal€cases,€except€forÏcapital€crimes€which€are€governed€by€theÏprocedures€contained€in€TCA€ðððð€39„13„204€andÏ39„13„205,€and€as€necessary€to€comply€withÏArticle€VI,€Section€14€of€the€Constitution€ofÏthe€State€of€Tennessee€and€TCA€ðð€40„35„301,Ïthe€judge€shall€not€instruct€the€jury,€norÏshall€the€attorneys€be€permitted€to€comment€atÏany€time€to€the€jury,€on€possible€penaltiesÏfor€the€offense€charged€nor€all€lesserÏincluded€offenses.€€ÌÌThis€amendment€will€apply€to€all€trials€occurring€after€the€actððsÏeffective€date.€€€€€Ô€7ÔÌ šÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÔ€8Ôà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóOne€commits€aggravated€burglary€who€unlawfully€enters€aÏhabitation€without€consent€of€the€owner€with€intent€to€commitÏtheft.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„14„402€and€403€(1991).€€AggravatedÏburglary€is€a€Class€C€felony.€€òòId.óó€€€€€Ì Ò Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÔ€8Ôà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„201(b)€provides:ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€(b)(1)€In€all€contested€criminal€cases,Ïexcept€for€capital€crimes€which€are€governedÏby€the€procedures€contained€in€ðððð€39„13„204Ïand€39„13„205,€upon€the€motion€of€eitherÏparty,€filed€with€the€court€prior€to€theÏselection€of€the€jury,€the€court€shall€chargeÏthe€possible€penalties€for€the€offense€chargedÏand€all€lesser€included€offenses.ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€(2)(A)(i)€When€a€charge€as€to€possibleÏpenalties€has€been€requested€pursuant€toÏsubdivision€(b)(1),€the€judge€shall€alsoÏinclude€in€the€instructions€for€the€jury€toÏweigh€and€consider€the€meaning€of€a€sentenceÏof€imprisonment€for€the€offense€charged€andÏany€lesser€included€offenses.€€SuchÏinstruction€shall€include€an€approximateÏcalculation€of€the€minimum€number€of€years€aÏperson€sentenced€to€imprisonment€for€theÏoffense€charged€and€lesser€included€offensesÏmust€serve€before€reaching€such€person'sÏearliest€release€eligibility€date.€€SuchÏcalculation€shall€include€such€factors€as€theÏrelease€eligibility€percentage€established€byÏðð€40„35„501,€maximum€and€minimum€sentenceÏreduction€credits€authorized€by€ðð€41„21„236Ïand€the€governor's€power€to€reduce€prisonÏovercrowding€pursuant€to€title€41,€chapter€1,Ïpart€5,€if€applicable.ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€(ii)€Such€instructions€to€the€jury€shallÏalso€include€a€statement€that€whether€aÏdefendant€is€actually€released€fromÏincarceration€on€the€date€when€such€defendantÏis€first€eligible€for€release€is€aÏdiscretionary€decision€made€by€the€board€ofÏparoles€based€upon€many€factors,€and€that€suchÏboard€has€the€authority€to€require€theÏdefendant€to€serve€the€entire€sentence€imposedÏby€the€court.Ìà àÌà8 àà8 à€€(B)€On€an€annual€basis,€the€department€ofÏcorrection€shall€provide€each€judge€exercisingÏcriminal€trial€court€jurisdiction€with€theÏapproximate€calculation€required€inÏsubdivision€(2)(a).€€Such€calculation€shall€beÏbroken€down€to€show€the€effect€of€each€factorÏused€in€making€such€calculation.€€If€theÏcalculation€provided€by€the€department€to€theÏjudges€changes€because€of€a€change€in€the€lawÏor€correctional€policy,€court€intervention,Ïthe€governor's€prison€overcrowding€policy€orÏany€other€such€circumstance,€the€departmentÏshall€send€a€revised€calculation€to€the€judgesÏas€such€changes€occur.ÌÓÓÌ 8Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÔ€8Ôà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIn€his€application€for€permission€to€appeal,€the€appellantÏalso€made€a€passing€assertion€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€violated€his€right€to€an€impartial€jury€under€Tenn.ÏConst.€Art.€I,€ðð€9.€€However,€the€jury€instruction€given€underÏ(b)(2)€did€not€contain€anything€that€would€cause€the€jury€to€beÏbiased€or€prejudiced€against€the€appellant.€€This€assertion€isÏwithout€merit.€€Ì `Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÔ€8Ôà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€majority€of€the€Court€struck€down€the€provision€in€òòFarrisóóÏbecause€the€act€was€broader€than€its€caption€and€thusÏunconstitutional€under€Tenn.€Const.€Art.€II,€ðð€17.€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€7ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÑ7€M’XXdÖXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ` °‚X˜XÓÑ  ÑÔ€8Ô›Þ ÞÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÙ€ ÙœßR€;=:A1-j|U` ‚- `€€@ÿRß›Ìà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEà àà àà àà à)à àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àAppelleeà àà àà àà à)à àFILED:€œ€JULY€6,€1998›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌV.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àSHELBY€COUNTY€€à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€JOSEPH€B.€DAILEY,ÌHOWARD€E.€KING€€€€€€à àà àà à)à àà àJUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellantà àà àà àà à)à àNO.€02„S„01„9703„CR„00021ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellant:à àà àà àà àà àFor€Appellee:óóÌÌA.€C.€WHARTON,€JR.à àà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUP€€€ÌPublic€Defender€€€€€€à àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌÌWALKER€GWINNà àà àà àà àà àMICHAEL€E.€MOOREÌAssistant€Public€Defenderà àà àSolicitor€GeneralÌMemphis,€TennesseeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àLINDA€A.€ROSSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssociate€Solicitor€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TennesseeÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€L.€GIBBONSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€C.€HENRY€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àòòOPINIONÌÌÌÌÌÌóóÌÌÌAFFIRMED€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àà àBIRCH,€œJ.òò›ÇÓÓà àœóóWe›€granted€permission€to€appeal€under€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï11€to€Howard€E.€King,€the€appellant,€in€order€to€address€theÏconstitutionality€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€(Supp.Ï1994),œ× ƒ> ××  ×›€which€requires€trial€courts€to€instruct€juries€regardingÏparole€and€release€eligibility€when€a€jury€instruction€on€theÏsentencing€range€is€requested€by€either€party.€€Because€we€findÏthat€the€statute€does€not€violate€the€separation€of€powersÏdoctrine€or€deprive€the€appellant€of€his€due€process€right€to€aÏfair€trial,€we€conclude€that€the€statute,€as€applied€under€theÏcircumstances€of€this€case,€is€constitutional.€€ÌÌà@ àIÌÌà àThe€appellant€was€indicted€on€a€single€count€ofÏaggravated€burglary.× ƒ? ××  ×€€The€State€filed€a€notice€of€intent€to€seekÏenhanced€punishment€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„202Ï(1990),€on€the€grounds€that€the€appellant€is€a€persistentÏoffender.€€Under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„107(c)(1990),€aÏpersistent€offender€faces€a€Range€III€sentence,€which€prescribes€aÏmore€lengthy€sentence€than€does€Range€I,€the€shorter€sentencingÏrange€for€standard€offenders.€€Ìà àPrior€to€trial,€the€appellant€filed€a€motion€requestingÏthe€trial€court€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€range€of€punishmentÏfor€aggravated€burglary€and€all€lesser€included€offenses,€pursuantÏto€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(1).× ƒ@ ××  ×€€At€the€same€time,€however,Íhe€requested€the€trial€court€to€refrain€from€instructing€the€juryÏon€parole€eligibility,€as€required€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€whenever€an€instruction€is€given€under€(b)(1).€€TheÏtrial€court€granted€the€motion€to€instruct€as€to€range€ofÏpunishment,€but€denied€the€motion€to€exclude€an€instruction€onÏparole€eligibility.€€Ìà àThe€case€was€thereafter€tried,€and€at€the€conclusion€ofÏall€the€proof,€the€jury€was€instructed€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àà àThe€jury€will€not€attempt€toÏfix€any€punishment€or€sentence€forÏthese€offenses.€€However,€for€yourÏinformation€only,€you€are€informedÏthat€the€ranges€of€punishment€as€toÏthe€offenses€are€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 àAGGRAVATED€BURGLARY„„imprisonment€for€not€lessÏthan€three€(3)€nor€moreÏthan€fifteen€(15)€years.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àYou€are€further€informed€thatÏthe€minimum€number€of€years€a€personÏsentenced€to€imprisonment€for€theseÏoffenses€must€serve€before€reachingÏthe€earliest€release€eligibilityÏdate€(RED)€is:ÌÌÓ  ÓòòAGGRAVATED€BURGLARYóóÌÌÓ  Óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò3€YEARSóóÌÌà àà àRED%à àà àà àà àà à30%Ìà àà àRED%€APPLIEDà àà àà à0.90€yrsÌà àà àW/MAX€CREDITSà àà àà à0.59€yrsÌà àà àSAFETY€VALVEà àà àà à0.54€yrsÌà àà àSAFETY€VALVE€à àà àà à0.35€yrsÌà8 àà8 àà à&€MAX€CREDITSÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àà8 àà àWhether€a€defendant€isÏactually€released€from€incarcerationÏon€the€date€when€first€eligible€forÏrelease€is€a€discretionary€decisionÏmade€by€the€Board€of€Paroles€and€isÏbased€on€many€factors.€€The€Board€ofÏParoles€has€the€authority€to€requireÏa€defendant€to€serve€the€entireÏsentence€imposed€by€the€Court.ÌÓÓÌThe€jury€found€the€appellant€guilty€of€aggravated€burglary.€€AfterÏa€sentencing€hearing,€the€trial€court€sentenced€him€as€a€Range€IIIÏpersistent€offender€to€thirteen€years€in€the€Department€ofÏœCorrection.›€€The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€affirmed€the€judgmentÏof€the€trial€court.œ›ÌÌà@ àIIÌÌà àThe€appellant€contends€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€violates€two€constitutional€principles:€€separation€ofÏpowers€and€due€process.× ƒA ××  ×€€As€questions€of€law,€we€review€theseÏconstitutional€issues€òòde€novoóó€with€no€presumption€of€correctness.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Winninghamóó,€958€S.W.2d€740,€742„43€(Tenn.€1997);ÏòòState€v.€Lewisóó,€958€S.W.2d€736,€738€(Tenn.€1997).€€€€ÌÌà@ àAÌÌà à€We€first€address€the€separation€of€powers€issue.€ÏArticle€II,€ðð€1€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€provides:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€powers€of€the€Government€shallÏbe€divided€into€three€distinctÏdepartments:€€the€Legislative,ÏExecutive,€and€Judicial.ÓÓÌÌArticle€II,€ðð€2€provides:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àNo€person€or€persons€belonging€toÏone€of€these€departments€shallÏexercise€any€of€the€powers€properlyÏbelonging€to€either€of€the€others,Ïexcept€in€the€cases€herein€directedÏor€permitted.ÌÓÓÌThe€separation€of€powers€doctrine€arises€from€the€precept€thatÏð ð[i]t€is€essential€to€the€maintenance€of€republican€governmentÏthat€the€action€of€the€legislative,€judicial,€and€executiveÏdepartments€should€be€kept€separate€and€distinct.ðð€€òòRichardson€v.ÏYoungóó,€122€Tenn.€471,€492,€125€S.W.€664,€668€(1910).€€The€Court€ofÏAppeals€has€summarized€the€doctrine€as€follows:€€€€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àIn€general,€the€ð ðlegislative€powerððÏis€the€authority€to€make,€order,€andÏrepeal€law;€the€ð ðexecutive€powerðð€isÏthe€authority€to€administer€andÏenforce€the€law;€and€the€ð ðjudicialÏpowerðð€is€the€authority€to€interpretÏand€apply€law.€€The€TennesseeÏconstitutional€provision€prevents€anÏencroachment€by€any€of€theÏdepartments€upon€the€powers,Ïfunctions€and€prerogatives€of€theÏothers.€€The€branches€of€government,Ïhowever,€are€guided€by€the€doctrineÏof€checks€and€balances;€the€doctrineÏof€separation€of€powers€is€notÏabsolute.€òòÌÓÓÌState€v.€Brackettóó,€869€S.W.2d€936,€939€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993)Ï(citations€omitted).€€Thus,€while€the€three€branches€of€governmentÏare€independent€and€co„equal,€they€are€to€a€degree€interdependentÏas€well,€with€the€functions€of€one€branch€often€overlapping€thatÏof€another.€€òòUnderwood€v.€Stateóó,€529€S.W.2d€45,€47€(Tenn.€1975).€Ïð ð[B]ecause€the€defining€powers€of€each€department€are€not€alwaysÏreadily€identified,€recognizing€an€encroachment€by€one€departmentÏupon€another€is€sometimes€difficult.ðð€€òòSummers€v.€Thompsonóó,€764ÏS.W.2d€182,€189€(Tenn.)(Drowota,€J.,€concurring)€òòcert.€dismissedóó,Ï488€U.S.€977,€109€S.€Ct.€523,€102€L.€Ed.2d.€556€(1988).ÌÌà àAccording€to€the€appellant,€the€Tennessee€LegislatureÏviolated€the€separation€of€powers€doctrine€by€enacting€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2),€which,€he€contends,€improperly€encroachesÏupon€the€judicial€function€of€determining€the€law€appropriate€forÏjury€consideration€in€each€case.€€Essentially,€by€enacting€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(1)€&€(2)€the€legislature€has€deemedÏsentence€and€parole€information€relevant€to€the€determination€ofÏguilt€or€innocence.€€Yet,€a€trial€judge€is€obligated,€as€part€ofÏthe€judicial€function,€to€afford€a€fair€trial€by€determiningÍrelevancy€on€a€question„by„question€basis.€€Moreover,€relevance€isÏcontrolled€by€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence.€€A€legislativeÏpredetermination€of€relevancy,€then,€suggests€a€collision€betweenÏthe€judicial€and€legislative€functions.€€ÌÌà àHowever,€we€have€previously€recognized€that€the€firstÏsubsection€of€the€same€statute,€which€provides€for€a€range€ofÏpunishment€instruction€when€requested€by€either€party,€is€a€properÏexercise€of€the€legislative€function.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(1);€òòState€v.€Cookóó,€816€S.W.2d€322,€326„27€(Tenn.€1991).€ÏThe€addition€of€information€on€the€shortest€length€of€time€aÏdefendant€may€serve€is€merely€a€refinement€on€that€instruction.€Ïœ›Admittedly,œ›€the€statute€constitutes€an€overlapping€of€theÏlegislative€power€with€that€of€the€judiciary,€and€it€may€indeed€beÏclose€to€an€improper€infringement.€€Yet,€having€alreadyÏacknowledged€the€authority€of€the€legislature€to€provide€a€rangeÏof€punishment€instruction,€we€must€also€acknowledge€that€anÏexplanation€of€the€reality€of€early€release€and€parole€is€noÏfurther€an€encroachment€into€the€judicial€function.€€The€jury€mustÏstill€decide€the€issue€of€guilt€or€innocence,€and€the€trial€courtÏmust€still€decide€the€ultimate€sentence€to€be€imposed.€€Therefore,Íwe€conclude€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€does€notÏviolate€the€Separation€of€Powers€Clauses€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution.€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌœÌ›à@ àBÌà àÌà àNext,€we€consider€the€appellantððs€assertion€that€hisÏright€to€due€process€was€violated.€€Article€I,€ðð€8€of€theÏTennessee€Constitution€provides:ÌÓÓœ›à8 àà8 àThat€no€man€shall€be€taken€orÏimprisoned,€or€disseized€of€hisÏfreehold,€liberties€or€privileges,Ïor€outlawed,€or€exiled,€or€in€anyÏmanner€destroyed€or€deprived€of€hisÏlife,€liberty€or€property,€but€byÏthe€judgment€of€his€peers€or€the€lawÏof€the€land.ÌÓÓÌThe€Fourteenth€Amendment,€ðð€1,€to€the€United€States€ConstitutionÏprovides:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à[N]or€shall€any€state€deprive€anyÏperson€of€life,€liberty,€orÏproperty,€without€due€process€ofÏlaw;€nor€deny€to€any€person€withinÏits€jurisdiction€the€equalÏprotection€of€the€laws.€€€ÌÓÓÌThe€appellant€contends€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)Ïdeprived€him€of€the€due€process€right€to€a€fair€trial€in€threeÏways:€€(1)€the€statute€is€impermissibly€vague,€(2)€the€statuteÏrequires€a€misleading€jury€instruction,€and€(3)€the€statuteÏrequires€a€jury€instruction€on€matters€irrelevant€to€a€defendantððsÏguilt€or€innocence.€€ÌÌà àTurning€to€the€vagueness€question,€the€appellant€reliesÏon€òòFarris€v.€Stateóó,€535€S.W.2d€608€(Tenn.€1976),€to€support€hisÏcontention€that€this€provision€is€unconstitutionally€vague€andÏimpossible€to€apply.€€In€òòFarrisóó,€two€members€of€the€Court€foundÏthat€a€statute€requiring€jury€instruction€on€parole€eligibility,Ïthe€powers€and€duties€of€the€Board€of€Pardons€and€Paroles,€theÏeffect€of€a€prisoner's€good€behavior,€and€the€allowance€of€goodÏtime€credits€was€unconstitutionally€vague.× ƒB ××  ×€€òòId.óó€at€612„13.€€ThatÏstatute€provided:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àà àIt€shall€be€the€further€dutyÏof€the€trial€judge€charging€jurorsÏin€cases€of€criminal€prosecutionsÏfor€felony€offenses€to€charge€theÍsaid€jury€as€to€the€provisions€ofÏthis€section€and€as€to€theÏprovisions€of€ðððð€€40„3612,€40„3613,Ï41„332€and€41„334,€whereverÏapplicable.ÌÓÓÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„2707€(1975).€€ÌÌà àThe€difference€between€the€above€statute€and€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€is€readily€apparent.€€An€instruction€givenÏpursuant€to€ðð€40„2707€provided€no€reasonable€guidance€as€to€theÏramifications€of€the€parole€system€in€any€particular€case,€otherÏthan€to€suggest€œthat›€at€some€future€date€the€defendant€may€receiveÏthe€benefits€of€parole.€€A€jury€was€simply€supplied€with€a€mass€ofÏgeneral€information,€in€the€form€of€a€statutorily„derivedÏnarrative€concerning€the€operation€and€possible€effects€of€theÏparole€system,€and€was€left€to€decipher€that€information€andÏcompute€the€length€of€time€a€defendant€would€serve€as€best€itÏcould.€€In€contrast,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€does€notÏleave€a€jury€to€speculate€about€release€eligibility€dates,€goodÏtime€credits,€and€safety€valve€release€provisions.€€Rather,€itÏrequires€the€experts€at€the€Department€of€Correction€to€computeÏthe€figures€so€that€the€jury€is€supplied€with€concrete,€specificÏfigures€reflecting€application€of€the€various€factors€relevant€toÍrelease€eligibility.€€Jurors€are€not€left€on€their€own€to€decipherÏthe€intricacies€of€parole€law.€€We€conclude€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ40„35„201(b)(2)€provides€explicit,€objective,€and€unambiguousÏguidance€sufficient€to€overcome€any€allegation€of€vagueness.ÌÌà àThe€appellantððs€second€due€process€argument€is€that€theÏjury€instruction€given€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€wasÏimpermissibly€inaccurate€and€misleading,€thus€depriving€him€of€aÏfair€trial.€€The€instruction€at€issue€informed€the€jury€as€to€theÏshortest€possible€sentence€for€aggravated€burglary€under€Range€IÏ(three€years),€and€the€longest€possible€sentence€under€Range€IIIÏ(fifteen€years).€€The€jury€was€additionally€instructed€that€theÏminimum€portion€of€the€sentence€that€a€defendant€must€serve€beforeÏbecoming€eligible€for€parole€is€thirty€percent,€which€is€theÏapplicable€percentage€under€a€Range€I€sentence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ40„35„112.€€Once€the€sentence€reduction€credits€and€the€safetyÏvalve€provisions€were€applied€to€the€shortest€sentence€under€RangeÏI,€the€shortest€possible€period€of€incarceration€was€approximatelyÏfour€months.€€€ÌÌà àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€above€information€wasÏmisleading€because€the€State€had€already€filed€a€notice€of€intentÏto€seek€enhanced€punishment€under€Range€III.€€Hence,€the€actualÏminimum€he€was€facing€was€ten€years,€not€three,€and€the€releaseÏeligibility€he€was€subject€to€was€forty„five€percent,€not€thirtyÏpercent.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„35„112(c)€and€„501(e)€(1990).€ÏFurther,€he€argues€that€the€safety€valve€provision€should€not€haveÏbeen€utilized€in€the€jury€instruction,€because€its€application€toÏhis€sentence€is€uncertain.€€ÌÌà àHe€compares€his€situation€to€òòState€v.€Cookóó,€816€S.W.2dÏ322,€a€case€in€which€the€defendant€was€convicted€of€multipleÏcounts€of€aggravated€rape€and€aggravated€sexual€battery€of€a€childÏunder€the€age€of€thirteen.€€Because€of€the€age€of€the€child,€theÏoffense€was€statutorily€deemed€an€ð ðaggravated€offense,ðð€requiringÏsentencing€as€a€Range€II€offender.€€However,€the€State€did€notÏtimely€file€a€notice€of€intent€to€seek€enhanced€punishment.€€TheÏtrial€court€erroneously€assumed€that€the€Stateððs€failure€to€fileÏsuch€notice€foreclosed€the€possibility€of€a€Range€II€sentence€andÏinstructed€the€jury€only€as€to€punishment€under€Range€I.€€òòId.óó€atÏ323.€€This€Court€held€that€regardless€whether€the€State€had€filedÍthe€required€notice€of€intent,€the€law€required€that€the€defendantÏbe€sentenced€as€a€Range€II€offender.€€Because€the€jury€needed€toÏknow€the€true€range€of€punishment€before€deciding€guilt€orÏinnocence,€the€case€was€remanded€for€resentencing.€€òòId.óó€at€326„27.€€Ìà àWe€find€òòCookóó€to€be€inapposite.€€The€jury€in€òòCookóó€was€notÏinstructed€as€to€the€proper€range€of€punishment.€€The€jury€in€thisÏcase€was€properly€instructed€that€the€overall€range€of€punishmentÏfor€aggravated€burglary,€from€Range€I€to€Range€III,€was€three€toÏfifteen€years.€€Furthermore,€the€instruction€regarding€ð ðtheÏòòminimumóó€number€of€years€a€person€sentenced€to€imprisonment€forÏthese€offenses€must€serve€before€reaching€the€òòearliestóó€releaseÏeligibility€dateðð€was€accurate,€because€the€actual€decisionÏwhether€to€permit€enhancement€does€not€occur€until€afterÏconviction€at€the€sentencing€hearing.€€The€minimum€the€appellantÏwas€facing€at€the€time€the€jury€received€this€instruction€òòwasóóÏthree€years€at€thirty€percent,€despite€the€fact€that€the€State€hadÏfiled€a€notice€of€intent€to€seek€enhanced€punishment.€€This€is€inÏmarked€contrast€to€the€òòCookóó€case,€where€the€defendant€wasÏstatutorily€ineligible€for€any€sentence€less€than€Range€II€ifÏconvicted.€€ÌÌà àWe€find€the€instant€case€more€factually€similar€to€òòStateÏv.€Smithóó,€926€S.W.2d€267€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€The€defendantÏin€òòSmithóó€was€charged€with€forgery,€a€Class€E€felony;€thus,€fromÏRange€I€to€Range€III€the€possible€sentences€were€from€one€to€sixÏyears.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„112.€€The€State€filed€a€notice€ofÏintent€to€seek€enhancement€to€Range€II;€if€they€were€successful,ÏSmith€would€be€facing€two€to€four€years.€€The€trial€courtÏinstructed€the€jury€that€the€defendant€was€facing€one€to€fourÏyears.€€On€appeal,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€noted:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àWhether€the€defendant€qualified€asÏRange€I€or€Range€II€depended€uponÏthe€proof€offered€at€any€subsequentÏsentencing€hearing.€€Thus,€the€juryÏwas€aware€of€the€possible€range€ofÏpunishment€that€could€have€resultedÏfrom€their€verdict.€€In€our€view,Ïthe€instructions€were€accurate.€€ÌÓÓÌòòId.óó€at€271€(citation€omitted).€€We€likewise€find€the€instructionsÏto€be€accurate€in€this€case.€€While€it€might€be€more€desirable€toÏhave€the€jury€informed€as€to€the€minimum€sentences€and€theirÏrespective€release€eligibility€percentages€in€each€range€for€whichÏthe€defendant€qualifies,€that€is€not€what€the€statute€requires.€ÏWe€are€reluctant€to€add€another€layer€that€would€only€complicateÏthis€issue€for€the€jury.ÌÌà àThe€appellantððs€final€argument€is€that€paroleÏeligibility,€sentence€reduction€œcredits,€and›€related€matters€areÏentirely€irrelevant€to€the€jury's€ultimate€function:€€theÏdetermination€of€guilt€or€innocence.€€Therefore,€he€argues,Ïinstructing€juries€on€such€matters€violates€his€due€process€rightÏto€a€fair€trial€because€the€jury€is€allowed€to€base€its€decisionÏon€facts€other€than€those€relating€to€guilt€or€innocence.€ÏœHowever,›€we€disagree€with€the€characterization€of€the€sentencingÏand€parole€information€as€entirely€irrelevant.€€While€it€may€notÏbe€relevant€in€the€strictest€sense,€it€does€have€a€measure€ofÏrelevance.€€And€as€we€previously€explained,€the€legislature€hasÏdetermined€for€us€the€relevancy€of€sentencing€and€paroleÏœinformation.›€ÌÌà àœMoreover,›€providing€the€jury€with€such€information€doesÏnot€violate€the€appellantððs€constitutional€rights.€€In€òòShannon€v.ÏUnited€Statesóó,€512€U.S.€573,€114€S.€Ct.€2419,€129€L.€Ed.2d€459Ïœ(1994),›€the€œ›United€States€Supremeœ€Court›€held€that€federal€courtsÏare€not€òòrequiredóó€to€instruct€non„sentencing€juries€on€the€actualÏconsequence€of€a€ð ðnot€guilty€by€reason€of€insanityðð€verdict;€theÍCourt€did€not€hold€that€it€would€be€unconstitutional€to€do€so.€ÏRather,€the€decision€was€primarily€based€on€the€fact€that€theÏfederal€statute€governing€the€insanity€defense€did€not€authorizeÏsuch€an€instruction.€€òòId.óó€at€580„87,€114€S.€Ct.€at€2425„28,€129€L.ÏEd.2d€at€467„71.€€In€this€case,€however,€the€statute€not€onlyÏexplicitly€authorizes€the€jury€instruction,€but€indeed€requiresÏit.€€€€€€€ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€considered€theÏconstitutional€ramifications€of€a€similar€jury€instruction€inÏòòCalifornia€v.€Ramosóó,€463€U.S.€992,€103€S.€Ct.€3446,€77€L.€Ed.2dÏ1171€(1983).€€In€that€case,€the€Court€upheld€California's€practiceÏof€informing€juries€about€the€Governorððs€power€to€commute€a€lifeÏsentence€without€the€possibility€of€parole€to€a€life€sentence€withÏthe€possibility€of€parole,€even€though€it€was€the€jury€who€imposedÏthe€sentence.€€The€defendant€asserted€that€the€instruction€wasÏunconstitutional€because€it€was€irrelevant€to€the€sentencingÏdecision€and€too€speculative€an€element€for€the€juryððsÏconsideration.€€The€Court€disagreed€and€found€that€the€juryððsÏconsideration€of€possible€commutation€was€not€prohibited€by€theÏUnited€States€Constitution.€€€The€Court€concluded€that€ð ðthe€wisdomÍof€the€decision€to€permit€juror€consideration€of€possibleÏcommutation€is€best€left€to€the€States.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€1014,€103€S.€CtÏat€3460,€77€L.€Ed.2d€at€1189.ÌÌà àThe€people€of€this€State,€through€the€members€of€theÏGeneral€Assembly,€have€indicated€a€desire€for€truth€in€theÏsentencing€process.€€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€isÏa€reflection€of€that€desire.€€œAs›€a€matter€of€policy,€theÏlegislature€has€decided€that€the€sentencing€information€isÏrelevant€œbecause›€jurors€are€better€off€having€concrete€informationÏon€these€issues€rather€than€being€left€to€speculate€on€their€own.€ÏThe€rationale€for€permitting€an€instruction€on€the€range€ofÏpunishment,€even€though€the€jury€does€not€impose€the€sentence,€isÏthat€in€reality,€ð ðjurors€will€consider€punishment€anyway€andÏwithout€direction€may€speculate€to€the€possible€detriment€of€aÏdefendant.€€If€nothing€else,€the€instruction€impresses€upon€theÏjurors€the€consequences€of€a€guilty€verdict.ðð€€11€David€Raybin,ÏòòCriminal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€30.73€(1985).€€ÌÌà àThe€jurors€in€this€case€were€properly€instructed€thatÏthe€State€must€prove€each€element€of€the€charged€offense€beyond€aÍreasonable€doubt.€€Significantly,€they€were€additionallyÏinstructed€that€they€were€not€to€attempt€to€fix€punishment€for€theÏoffense€and€that€the€sentencing€information€was€ð ðfor€yourÏinformation€only.ðð€€When€the€trial€court€explains,€as€it€did€here,Ïthat€the€sentencing,€parole,€and€early€release€information€is€notÏto€be€considered€in€the€determination€of€guilt€or€innocence,€thenÏcertainly€no€due€process€violation€has€occurred.€€A€jury€isÏpresumed€to€have€followed€the€law€as€instructed.€€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,Ïœ839›€S.W.2d€54,€72€(Tenn.€1992).€€We€have€no€reason€to€suspect€thatÏthe€jury€failed€to€heed€the€instructions€given€by€basing€itsÏverdict€on€irrelevant€considerations.€€While€some€may€prefer€aÏð ðpureðð€system€where€juries€are€wholly€unaffected€by€considerationsÏother€than€those€œstrictly›€relevant€to€guilt€or€innocence,€theÏreality€is€that€jurors€bring€their€experience€and€knowledge€intoÏthe€courtroom€with€them.€€We€do€not€quarrel€with€those€who€feel€itÏis€better€for€them€to€be€accurately€informed€rather€than€left€toÏspeculate.€€ÌÌà àFinally,€because€Tennesseeððs€trial€courts€no€longerÏoperate€under€a€system€of€jury€sentencing,€an€instruction€underÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)€does€not€permit€a€jury€to€impose€aÍsentence€based€on€how€much€time€they€speculate€that€a€defendantÏwill€actually€serve.€€As€this€Court€stated€in€òòFarrisóó,€ð ð[a]€greaterÏdefect€in€the€law€stems€from€the€fact€that€jurors€tend€to€attemptÏto€compensate€for€future€clemency€by€imposing€harsher€sentences.ðð€Ï535€S.W.2d€at€614;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€698€S.W.2d€631,€632Ï(Tenn.€1985),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€476€U.S.€1130,€106€S.€Ct.€1998,€90€L.ÏEd.2d€679€(1986).€€Now€that€the€judge€imposes€œthe€sentence,›€theÏrisk€of€such€compensation€no€longer€exists.€€œIn›€sum,€under€theÏcircumstances€presented€we€find€that€the€jury€instruction€givenÏunder€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€did€not€deprive€theÏappellant€of€his€due€process€right€to€a€fair€trial.€€€ÌÌòòà@ àóóIIIÌÌà àWe€conclude€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b)(2)€doesÏnot€violate€the€Separation€of€Powers€Clauses€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution.€€Neither€is€the€statute€impermissibly€vague,€norÏdoes€it€require€a€misleading€jury€instruction.€€œAdditionally,›€weÏare€satisfied€that€the€jury€based€its€verdict€upon€the€law€andÏevidence,€in€accordance€with€the€instructions€of€the€trial€court.€ÏThus,€we€find€that€neither€the€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€UnitedÍStates€nor€the€Tennessee€Constitution€was€violated€by€the€juryÏinstruction€given€pursuant€to€the€statute.€€The€convictions€andÏsentence€imposed€by€the€trial€court€are€affirmed.ÌÓÓòòÌÌÌóóà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àADOLPHO€A.€BIRCH,€JR.,€JusticeÌÌœCONCUR:›ÌÌAnderson,€CJ.ÌDrowota,€Holder,€JJ.ÌReid,€S.J.Ì