ÿWPC.< ±Ê{PØ[5Ã#")OÁªóçºî,%±JÚ™å6^¿„ÆqŒ ëa§ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ •Ý ƒR®Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔThe€petitioner€also€cites€òòContinental€Insurance€Co.€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€City€of€Knoxvilleóó,€488€S.W.2d€50€(Tenn.€1972),€forÐ ° Ðthe€proposition€that€a€corporation€cannot€avoid€its€obligations€simply€by€dissolving.€€We€note,€however,€that€òòContinentalÐ tÄ ÐInsurance€Co.óó€Ô_ÔprovidesÔ_Ô€no€relief€for€the€petitioner,€because€that€case€involved€a€suit€that€was€properly€commenced€underÐ 8ˆ Ðthe€savings€statute,€òòi.e.óó,€one€that€arose€before€the€dissolution€and€one€that€was€filed€within€the€two„year€survival€period.€Ð üL ÐOnly€under€these€circumstances€will€a€dissolution€not€affect€the€rights€and€remedies€available€to€the€plaintiff.€€ContraryÐ À Ðto€the€petitionerððs€arguments,€therefore,€òòContinental€Insurance€Co.óó€does€not€permit€a€suit€against€a€dissolved€corporationÐ „Ô Ðto€be€filed€outside€the€two„year€survival€period€as€set€forth€in€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed).Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(uHš Z‹(Times New Roman  £ Ý ƒR®Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòGreat€Am.€Ins.€Co.€v.€Byrd€&€Watkins€Constr.€Co.óó,€630€F.2d€460,€461€(6th€Cir.€1980)€(interpretingÐ ° ÐTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1014€and€concluding€that€ð ð[t]he€statute€covers€only€those€claims€which€haveÐ tÄ Ðaccrued€prior€to€dissolution.€€It€does€not€specifically€relate€to€claims€which€arise€after€Ô_Ôdissolution.Ô_Ôðð);€òòBishop€v.€Ô_ÔSchieldÔ_ÔÐ 8ˆ ÐBantam€Co.óó,€293€F.€Supp.€94,€95€(D.€Iowa€1968)€(ð ðIt€is,€therefore,€quite€clear€that€under€the€Model€Business€CorporationÐ üL ÐAct,€and€those€state€statutes€patterned€after€it,€a€corporation€may€be€sued€for€Ô_ÔpredissolutionÔ_Ô€torts€only.ðð€(Ô_ÔcitationÔ_ÔÐ À Ðomitted));€òòÔ_ÔBlankenshipÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔDemmlerÔ_Ô€Mfg.€Ô_ÔCo.óó,€411€N.E.2d€1153,1156€(Ill.Ô_Ô€App.€Ct.€1980)€(Ô_ÔstatingÔ_Ô€that€an€identical€statuteÐ „Ô Ðprovides€ð ðno€basis€for€allowing€a€cause€of€action€which€accrues€after€dissolution€to€be€brought€against€a€dissolvedÐ H ˜ Ðcorporationðð);€òòHunter€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Fort€Worth€Capital€Corp.óó,€620€S.W.2d€547,€552€(Tex.€1981)€(ð ðA€provision€was€included€toÐ  \ Ðprovide€creditors€with€a€statutory€remedy€for€pre-dissolution€claims.€€A€similar€provision€could€have€been€included€toÐ Ð  Ðencompass€post-dissolution€claims€as€well.€€We€believe€the€exclusion€of€such€a€provision€to€be€significant.ðð);€òòsee€alsoóóÐ ” ä   Ð16A€William€M.€Fletcher,€òòCyclopedia€of€the€Law€of€Private€Corporationsóó€ðð€8144.10€(perm.€rev.€ed.€1995)€(Ô_ÔstatingÔ_Ô€thatÐ ° Ðð ðmost€courts€deciding€the€[survival]€issue€have€determined€that€this€type€of€statute€[derived€from€the€MBCA]€does€notÐ tÄ Ðallow€suits€that€arise€after€dissolutionðð);€òòGreen€v.€Ô_ÔOilwellÔ_Ô,€Div.€of€U.S.€Steel€Corp.óó,€767€P.2d€1348,€1350„51€n.1€(Okla.Ð 8ˆ Ð1989)€(ð ðWe€note€many€jurisdictions€have€patterned€their€statutes€after€the€1969€Model€Bus.€Ô_ÔCorp.Ô_Ô€Act€ðð€105[,]€whichÐ üL Ðallowed€corporations,€[Ô_ÔtheirÔ_Ô]€officers,€directors€or€shareholders€to€be€sued€for€pre-dissolution€claims€only.€€The€1984Ð À ÐRevised€Model€Bus.€Corp.€Act€ðð€14.07€now€provides€for€the€commencement€of€post-dissolution€claims€within€the€firstÐ „Ô Ðfive€years€after€published€notice€of€Ô_ÔdissolutionÔ_Ô.ðð€(Ô_ÔcitationsÔ_Ô€omitted)). äÝ ƒR®Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔThe€òòBurnettóó€Court€did€acknowledge€that€corporations€had€to€make€adequate€provisions€for€ð ðcontingentÐ ° Ðclaims,ðð€but€it€interpreted€the€term€ð ðcontingent€claimðð€in€a€narrow€sense€as€being€a€claim€that€accrued€prior€to€theÐ tÄ  Ðdissolution,€but€which€still€awaits€litigation.€€òòSeeóó€700€S.W.2d€at€745.µ3(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular (Ý ƒR®Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_Ô€This€statute€provided€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_Ô€amount€of€any€unpaid€stock€due€from€a€subscriber€to€a€corporation€shall€beÐ ° Ða€fund€for€the€payment€of€any€debts€due€from€the€corporation;€nor€shall€the€transfer€of€stock€by€any€subscriber€releaseÐ tÄ Ðhim€from€payment,€unless€his€transferee€has€paid€up€all€or€any€of€the€balance€due€on€Ô_Ôsaid€original€subscriptionÔ_Ô.ðð€€òòSee€alsoóóÐ 8ˆ ÐòòÔ‡ô6½òòô6½ÔShieldsóó,€94€Tenn.€at€157„58,€28€S.W.€at€676€Ô#†ô6½òòô6½}#Ô(recognizing€that€this€statute€codified€the€trust€fund€doctrine€from€theÐ üL Ðcommon€law,€and€stating€that€the€ð ðclear€and€plain€meaning€of€the€statute€is€that€all€unpaid€stock,€whenever€subscribed,Ð À Ðshall€be€a€fund€for€the€payment€of€all€corporate€debts,€whenever€createdðð). ¦Ý ƒR®Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòÔ_ÔNickeyÔ_Ô€Bros.€v.€Ô_ÔLonsdaleÔ_Ô€Mfg.€Co.óó,€149€Tenn.€391,€258€S.W.€776€(1924);€òòHicks€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Whitingóó,€149Ð ° ÐTenn.€411,€258€S.W.€784€(1924);€òòMechanicsðð€Bank€&€Trust€Co.€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Knoxville,€S.€&€E.€Ry.€Co.óó,€148€Tenn.€113,€251€S.W.Ð tÄ Ð906€(1923);€òòÔ_ÔVoightmanÔ_Ô€&€Co.€v.€Southern€Ry.€Ô_ÔCo.óó,€123€Tenn.€452,€131€S.W.€982€(1910);Ô_Ô€òòÔ_ÔMcClarenÔ_Ô€v.€Union€Roller-MillÐ 8ˆ Ð&€Elevator€Co.óó,€95€Tenn.€696,€35€S.W.€88€(1895);€òòShields€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Clifton€Hill€Land€Co.óó,€94€Tenn.€123,€28€S.W.€668€(1894);Ð üL ÐÔ‡ô6½òòô6½ÔòòÔ_ÔOttarsonÔ_Ô€v.€Dobson€&€Johnson,€Inc.óó,€58€Tenn.€Ô_ÔApp.€408,€430€S.W.2d€873€(1968)Ô#†ô6½òòô6½Ð#Ô.Ô_Ô€µ2 Ý ƒR®Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔWhen€examining€provisions€derived€from€uniform€or€model€acts,€we€may€appropriately€use€interpretationsÐ ° Ðof€similar€provisions€in€other€jurisdictions€as€a€guide€to€interpreting€our€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòHoliday€Inns,€Inc.€v.€Olsenóó,€692Ð tÄ ÐS.W.2d€850,€853€(Tenn.€1985);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Ô_ÔOpatzÔ_Ôóó,€554€N.W.2d€813,€816€(N.D.€1996).€€ êÝ ƒR®Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔThe€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€has€also€designated€the€petitionerððs€wife€as€a€movant€in€this€action.€Ð ° ÐBecause€Ms.€Ô_ÔKradelÔ_Ôððs€claims€are€derivative€of€her€husbandððs€claims,€we€will€refer€only€to€Mr.€Ô_ÔKradelÔ_Ô€as€the€petitionerÐ tÄ Ðfor€sake€of€convenience. Ñ  Ñ Ñ  Ñ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù-  Ý ƒR®Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔòòÔ  ÔSee€also,€e.g.óó,€òòUniversal€Motors,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔNearyÔ_Ôóó,€984€P.2d€515,€517€(Alaska€1999)€(ð ðIn€construing€statutesÐ ° Ðtaken€from€model€acts€we€generally€regard€the€commentary€to€the€model€act€as€a€reliable€guide€to€the€statuteððsÐ tÄ Ðmeaning.ðð);€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Ô_ÔDobertÔ_Ôóó,€963€P.2d€327,€331€(Ariz.€Ô_ÔCt.Ô_Ô€App.€1998)€(ð ðWhen€a€statute€is€based€on€a€uniform€act,Ð 8ˆ Ðwe€assume€that€the€legislature€ððintended€to€adopt€the€construction€placed€on€the€act€by€its€drafters.ðð€Thus,€commentaryÐ üL Ðto€such€a€uniform€act€is€ððhighly€persuasive€unless€erroneous€or€contrary€to€settled€policy€in€this€state.ðððð€(Ô_ÔcitationsÔ_ÔÐ À Ðomitted));€òòIn€re€Ô_ÔNocitaÔ_Ôóó,€914€S.W.2d€358,€359€(Mo.€1996)€(ð ðWhen€ððconstruing€uniform€and€model€acts€enacted€by€theÐ „Ô ÐGeneral€Assembly,€we€must€assume€it€did€so€with€the€intention€of€adopting€the€accompanying€interpretations€placedÐ H ˜ Ðthereon€by€the€drafters€of€the€model€or€uniform€act.ðððð€(Ô_ÔcitationsÔ_Ô€omitted));€òòÔ_ÔClymerÔ_Ô€v.€Summit€Bancorpóó,€758€A.2d€652,Ð  \ Ð653€(N.J.€Super.€Ô_ÔCt.Ô_Ô€App.€Div.€2000)€(ð ðIn€the€absence€of€a€contrary€design,€clearly€articulated,€the€Legislature€is€takenÐ Ð  Ðto€have€adopted€the€expressed€intention€of€the€uniform€act€drafters.ðð);€òòÔ_ÔIn€re€Margaret€Susan€P.óó,€733€A.2d€38,€47€(Vt.Ô_ÔÐ ” ä  Ð1999)€(ð ðWe€are€reluctant€to€conclude,€however,€that€when€the€Legislature€uses€model€language€it€does€so€for€a€purposeÐ X ¨  Ðdifferent€from€the€purpose€in€the€model€act.ðð).(|I2®Ó$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€‹e»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6½ò»»Ô€€ d(|3Ñl$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€‹e»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Ñl$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€‹e»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€‹e»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼‹e»»»ÔÑ8€ÚÙXXdì»»d8ÑÑ€&¿r ÑÑ€%@¸ Ñà@™ ™ ìàԇ‹eÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼‹e»î.#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓOctober€3,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔÌÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙ#Ôò òHARRY€T.€Ô_ÔKRADELÔ_Ô,€òòet€al.óó€€v.€€PIPER€INDUSTRIES,€INC.,€òòet€al.ó óÔ‡XÚÙX.¼‹eÔóóÐ úJ ÐÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙÀ#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔÌò òRule€23€Certified€Questions€of€LawÐ ú J ÐUnited€States€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€Third€CircuitÐ æ 6 ЀÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙ#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔNos.€99„4069,€00„3146Ð Ò " ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<•` AßÐ –æ  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2001„00338„SC„R23„CQÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙá#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔ€„€Filed€November€27,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_ÔÐ ‘á  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<h` AßÐ i¹  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÌPursuant€to€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€Rule€23,€this€Court€accepted€certification€of€five€questionsÐ P  Ðof€law€from€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€Third€Circuit€concerning€Tennesseeððs€lawÐ <Œ Ðof€corporations.Ô#†¼‹e»XXÚÙã#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔ€€For€the€reasons€given€herein,€we€answer€that€the€corporate€statutes€in€effect€beforeÐ (x ÐJanuary€1,€1988,€apply€to€determine€the€rights€and€remedies€available€against€a€corporation€dissolvedÐ d Ðbefore€that€date€and€that€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€applies€to€limit€Piperððs€liability€for€post„Ð P Ðdissolution€claims.€€We€further€answer€Ô#†¼‹e»XXÚÙØ#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔthat€Piper€Industries,€Inc.Ô#†¼‹e»XXÚÙ¤#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔ€did€comply€with€the€dissolutionÐ ì< Ðstatutes€in€effect€before€January€1,€1988,€which€require€provisions€to€ensure€the€final€distribution€ofÐ Ø( Ðcorporate€assets,€but€which€do€not€require€a€corporation€to€establish€a€reserve€fund€for€contingentÐ Ä Ðclaims€arising€more€than€two€years€after€the€dissolution.€€Ô#†¼‹e»XXÚÙ #ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔFinally,€we€answer€that€while€the€trust€fundÐ ° Ðdoctrine€has€been€previously€applied€in€Tennessee€to€solvent€corporations,€its€application€in€this€caseÐ œì Ðis€necessarily€limited€by€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed).€Ô#†¼‹e»XXÚÙ§ #ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔÐ ˆØ ÐÌò òÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙú #ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔÓ  ÓTenn.€Sup.€Ct.€R.€23€Certified€Questions€of€LawÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙU #ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔó óÐ `° ÐÓt ÓÌòòÔ#†¼‹e»àXÚÙÒ #ÔÔ‡XÚÙX.¼‹eÔWilliam€M.€Barker,€Jóó.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòFrank€F.€Ô_ÔDrowotaÔ_ÔÔ#†¼‹e»àXÚÙ@ #ÔÔ‡XÚÙX.¼‹eÔ,€III,€C.J.,Ð 8!ˆ  Ðóóand€òòE.€Riley€AndersonÔ#†¼‹e»àXÚÙü #ÔÔ‡XÚÙX.¼‹eÔ,€Ô_ÔAdolphoÔ_Ô€A.€Birchóó,€òòJróó.,€and€òòJanice€M.€Holderóó,€JJ.,€joined.Ð $"t! ÐÌMatthew€L.€Ô_ÔKurzwegÔ_Ô,€Pittsburgh,€Pennsylvania,€and€Donald€Ô_ÔCapparellaÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€forÐ ü#L# Ðthe€petitioners,€Harry€T.€Ô_ÔKradelÔ_Ô€and€Ô_ÔMarileneÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔKradelÔ_Ô.Ô#†¼‹e»XXÚÙz#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔÐ è$8 $ ÐÌÔ_ÔArndÔ_Ô€N.€von€Ô_ÔWaldowÔ_Ô€and€Wayne€W.€Ô_ÔRingeisenÔ_Ô,€Pittsburgh,€Pennsylvania,€and€Brian€Keith€Jackson,Ð À&"& ÐNashville,€Tennessee,€Ô#†¼‹e»XXÚÙ„#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔfor€the€respondent,€Kent€Reynolds,€as€escrow€agent€on€behalf€of€the€formerÐ ¬'ü"' Ðshareholders€of€Piper€Industries,€Inc.Ô#†¼‹e»XXÚÙÄ#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔÐ ˜(è#( ÐÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙ‹#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eÔÌÌà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙâ#ÔÔ‡XÚÙX»¼‹eԈР\+¬&+ ÐÌÓ  Óò òFACTUAL€BACKGROUNDó óÐ 4-„(-ý ÐÔ_ÔÓ{ÓÌÔ#†¼‹e»XXÚÙE#ÔÔ€XÚÙX»¼‹eÔà  àThis€case€arises€out€of€a€products€liability€action€brought€by€Mr.€Harry€T.€KradelÐ œì Ð(ð ðpetitionerðð)׃ ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€against€several€defendants,€including€Piper€Industries,€Inc.€(ð ðPiperðð),€a€TennesseeÐ ˆØ Ðcorporation€that€filed€Articles€of€Dissolution€in€1986.€€Following€the€petitionerððs€appeal€from€a€grantÐ tÄ Ðof€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€defendants,€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€ThirdÐ `° ÐCircuit€certified€five€questions€to€this€Court€concerning€the€application€of€Tennesseeððs€law€ofÐ L œ Ðcorporations.€€The€relevant€facts€from€which€this€case€arose€are€summarized€in€the€CertificationÐ 8 ˆ ÐOrder:Ð $ t ÐÌà8  àà ` à1.à ¸ àHarry€T.€Kradel€(ð ðKradelðð),€appellant€in€this€action€and€the€party€weÐ ü L  Ðdesignate€the€movant€in€the€certification€pursuant€to€[Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÐ è 8  ÐRule]€23.3(E),€sustained€serious€injuries€to€his€right€leg€in€September€1994€whileÐ Ô$  Ðoperating€a€1970€model€Fox€forage€harvester€with€[a]€multi„row€corn€headÐ À  Ðattachment€on€his€farm€in€western€Pennsylvania.Ьü Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à2.à ¸ àThe€Fox€line€of€farm€equipment€was€manufactured€in€1970€by€theÐ „Ô  ÐKoehring€Company€(ð ðKoehringðð),€a€Wisconsin€corporation.€€Koehring€sold€the€FoxÐ pÀ Ðline€of€farm€equipment€to€Piper€in€February€1981.€€In€that€transaction,€Piper€acquired,Ð \¬ Ðas€an€on„going€business,€all€real€estate,€fixed€assets,€inventory,€sales€orders,€contracts,Ð H˜ Ðtrademarks,€patents,€and€other€intangible€intellectual€property€of€Koehringððs€farmÐ 4„ Ðdivision.€€Piper€also€assumed,€pursuant€to€the€agreement,€the€products€liability€claimsÐ  p Ðof€Koehring€for€claims€arising€out€of€occurrences€after€the€closing€date€for€certainÐ  \ Ðfarm€division€products€already€sold€by€Koehring,€including€the€specific€product€atÐ øH Ðissue.Ðä4Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à3.à ¸ à€In€1986,€Piper€sold€certain€assets€of€the€Fox€line€of€farm€equipmentÐ ¼  Ðto€Hiniker€Company€(ð ðHinikerðð),€a€Minnesota€corporation,€in€an€agreement€thatÐ ¨ø Ðexpressly€provided€for€no€adoption€of€liabilities€by€Hiniker.ДäÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à4.à ¸ àAfter€its€sale€to€Hiniker,€Piper€filed€a€Statement€of€Intent€to€DissolveÐ l¼ Ðwith€the€Tennessee€Secretary€of€State€(ð ðthe€Secretary€of€Stateðð)€on€September€12,Ð X ¨ Ð1986.€€It€then€filed€Articles€of€Dissolution€with€the€Secretary€of€State€on€DecemberÐ D!” Ð31,€1986.€€A€Certificate€of€Dissolution€was€issued€by€the€Secretary€of€State€that€sameÐ 0"€  Ðday.€€In€their€written€consent,€Piperððs€shareholders€resolved€that€Piperððs€officersÐ #l! Ðwould€establish€a€reserve€to€meet€known€liabilities,€liquidating€expenses,€estimated,Ð $X" Ðunascertained€or€contingent€liabilities€and€contingent€expenses,€if€they€deemed€suchÐ ô$D # Ða€reserve€desirable.€€Piper€did€not€establish€a€reserve€for€future,€contingent€orÐ à%0!$ Ðâ âprospective€liabilities€because€the€shareholders€did€not€deem€such€a€reserve€desirable.€Ð Ì&"% ÐPiper,€however,€made€provisions€to€satisfy€its€known€or€existing€claims,€debts€orÐ ° Ðliabilities€and€judgments€in€any€pending€suit.ÐœìÐ Ð  Ðâ âÌà8  àà ` à5.à ¸ àPiperððs€shareholders€entered€into€an€agreement€on€October€31,€1986,Ð tÄ Ðby€which€the€companyððs€assets€were€to€be€distributed.€€Assets€(including€accountsÐ `° Ðreceivable,€real€property,€and€promissory€notes€issued€by€Hiniker€for€future€paymentsÐ L œ Ðon€its€asset€purchase)€were€transferred€to€an€escrow€agent€to€be€held€and€distributedÐ 8 ˆ Ðfor€the€benefit€of€Piperððs€shareholders.€€[Kent]€Reynolds€is€currently€that€escrowÐ $ t Ðagent€and€he€was€permitted€to€intervene€in€the€District€Court€to€assert€the€defensesÐ  ` Ðof€Piperððs€former€shareholders.€€Hiniker€made€periodic€payments€to€the€escrow€agentÐ ü L  Ðin€fulfillment€of€its€obligations€under€the€Piper„Hiniker€agreement,€which€the€escrowÐ è 8  Ðagent€then€distributed€to€Piperððs€former€shareholders.€€In€both€1990€and€1992,Ð Ô$  Ðdisagreements€regarding€Hinikerððs€obligations€under€the€agreement€resulted€inÐ À  Ðsettlement€agreements€between€Hiniker€and€Paul€P.€Piper,€acting€as€trustee€for€theÐ ¬ü  Ðformer€shareholders€of€Piper.€€Pursuant€to€these€settlements,€Hiniker€continues€toÐ ˜è  Ðhold€$1€million€dollars€of€the€asset€purchase€price€that€will€be€distributed€to€PiperððsÐ „Ô  Ðshareholders€upon€the€conclusion€of€this€litigation.€€Piper€has€not€held€property€as€aÐ pÀ Ðcorporate€entity€or€conducted€business€after€December€31,€1986.Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à6.à ¸ àKradel€filed€a€products€liability€action€against€Piper€and€otherÐ 4„ Ðdefendants€in€the€Court€of€Common€Pleas€for€Butler€County,€Pennsylvania€in€1996.€Ð  p ÐShortly€thereafter€the€case€was€removed€to€the€United€States€District€Court€for€theÐ  \ ÐWestern€District€of€Pennsylvania.€€In€an€Order€dated€November€15,€1999,€the€DistrictÐ øH ÐCourt€granted€Piperððs€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€Its€opinion...held€that€PiperÐ ä4 Ðhad€lawfully€dissolved€under€the€laws€of€Tennessee€in€effect€in€1986€and€as€such,Ð Ð  Ðunder€common€law€principles,€could€not€be€sued€for€tort€claims€accruing€after€itsÐ ¼  Ðdissolution.€€The€Court€further€held€that€Piper€had€no€responsibility€under€the€law€ofÐ ¨ø ÐTennessee€to€provide€for€unforeseen€liabilities,€such€as€Kradelððs,€and€by€transferringÐ ”ä Ðthe€right€to€receive€payments€to€its€shareholders,€Piper€complied€with€the€terms€ofÐ €Ð ÐTennesseeððs€corporate€dissolution€statute€in€effect€in€1986.€€In€a€footnote,€the€DistrictÐ l¼ ÐCourt€rejected€the€argument€that€Tennesseeððs€ð ðtrust€fundðð€doctrine€could€apply€toÐ X ¨ Ðpermit€Kradelððs€recovery€of€the€undistributed€assets€of€Piperððs€shareholders.€ÐD!”Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€petitioner€then€appealed€the€grant€of€summary€judgment€to€the€United€States€Court€ofÐ #l! ÐAppeals€for€the€Third€Circuit,€and€on€February€6,€2001,€that€honorable€court€certified€five€questionsÐ $X" Ðof€law€to€this€Court:Ð ô$D # ÐÌà8  à1.à ` àWhat€law€governs€the€making€of€claims€arising€in€1994€against€a€corporationÐ Ì&"% Ðwhich€filed€Articles€of€Dissolution€in€1986:€the€law€of€1986€or€those€revisions€to€theÐ ¸'#& Ðlaw€effective€January€1,€1988,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sections€48„24„101,€òòetÐ ¤(ô#' Ðseq.óó?€€More€specifically,€do€the€saving€provisions€of€section€48„27„103(a)(2),€whichÐ )à$( Ðâ âstate€that€the€repeal€of€the€pre„1988€law€does€not€affect€liabilities€incurred€under€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðstatute€before€its€repeal,€support€the€contention€that€a€liability€incurred€after€the€lawððsÐ ° Ðeffective€date€is€governed€by€the€1988€revision?ÐœìÐ Ð  Ðâ âÌà8  à2.à ` àIf€the€pre„1988€law€applied,€do€the€provisions€of€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÐ tÄ Ðsection€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€apply€to€liabilities€incurred€after€Piper€filed€ArticlesÐ `° Ðof€Dissolution,€and,€if€not,€does€the€common€law€of€Tennessee€bar€such€actions?ÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  à3.à ` àDid€Piper€comply€with€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1007Ð $ t Ð(repealed)?€€If€not,€does€the€manner€in€which€Piper€failed€to€comply€invalidate€anÐ  ` Ðotherwise€lawful€dissolution€and€permit€a€cause€of€action€accruing€eight€years€afterÐ ü L  Ðthe€dissolution€was€filed?Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à4.à ` àDo€the€pre„1988€Tennessee€dissolution€statutes€require€provision€forÐ À  Ðunforeseen€future€liabilities€or€that€the€process€of€asset€distribution€be€final?Ьü Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à5.à ` àCould€Kradelððs€claims€proceed€under€the€ð ðtrust€fundðð€doctrine,€in€the€absenceÐ „Ô  Ðof€corporate€insolvency,€if€other€remedies€are€unavailable€to€Kradel€for€the€claimsÐ pÀ Ðagainst€Piper?Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌÔ% € Ôà  àWe€accepted€the€certification€of€these€questions,€and€for€the€reasons€given€below,€we€answerÐ 4„ Ðthat€the€corporate€statutes€in€effect€before€January€1,€1988,€apply€to€determine€the€rights€andÐ  p Ðremedies€available€against€a€corporation€dissolved€before€that€date€and€that€section€48„1„1013(a)Ð  \ Ð(repealed)€applies€to€limit€Piperððs€liability€for€post„dissolution€claims.€€We€further€answer€that€PiperÐ øH Ðdid€comply€with€the€dissolution€statutes€in€effect€before€January€1,€1988,€which€require€provisionsÐ ä4 Ðto€ensure€the€final€distribution€of€corporate€assets,€but€which€do€not€require€a€corporation€to€establishÐ Ð  Ða€reserve€fund€for€contingent€claims€arising€more€than€two€years€after€the€dissolution.€€Finally,€weÐ ¼  Ðanswer€that€while€the€trust€fund€doctrine€has€been€previously€applied€in€Tennessee€to€solventÐ ¨ø Ðcorporations,€its€application€in€this€case€is€necessarily€limited€by€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sectionÐ ”ä Ð48„1„1013(a)€(repealed).€Ð €Ð ÐÌò òÔ& œ ÔÓ  ÓQUESTION€I:€THE€LAW€GOVERNING€THE€PETITIONERððS€CLAIMSó óÐ X ¨ ÐÓõ;ÓÌà  àThe€first€question€certified€by€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€concerns€the€law€applicableÐ 0"€  Ðto€determine€the€propriety€of€Piperððs€dissolution€and€the€scope€of€the€petitionerððs€remedies€availableÐ #l! Ðagainst€a€dissolved€corporation.€€The€petitionerÔ'œX é;Ô€maintains€that€the€Tennessee€corporate€statutes€inÐ $X" Ðeffect€at€the€time€of€his€1994€injury€govern€his€claim€and€remedy€against€Piper,€but€the€respondentÐ ô$D # Ðasserts€that€the€law€in€effect€at€the€time€of€Piperððs€1986€dissolution€constitutes€the€controllingÐ à%0!$ Ðauthority€in€this€case.€€Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àEffective€after€January€1,€1988,€the€General€Assembly€repealed€the€then„existing€TennesseeÐ ¤(ô#' ÐGeneral€Corporation€Act€(ð ðold€actðð€or€ð ðGeneral€Corporation€Actðð)€and€replaced€it€with€theÐ )à$( ÐTennessee€Business€Corporation€Act€(ð ðnew€actðð),€which€was€patterned€in€large€part€after€the€RevisedÐ |*Ì%) ÐModel€Business€Corporation€Act€of€1984.€€òòSeeóó€1986€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.€887€(codified€as€Tenn.Ð h+¸&* ÐCode€Ann.€ðððð€48„11„101€to€48„27„103).€€Recognizing€that€problems€could€arise€in€the€transitionÐ ° Ðbetween€the€old€act€and€the€new,€the€General€Assembly€enacted€chapter€27€of€Title€48,€which€wasÐ œì Ðsolely€devoted€to€transition€issues.€€In€particular,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„27„101(e)Ð ˆØ Ð(1995)€addresses€the€effect€of€the€new€act€upon€previously€dissolved€corporations,€and€it€providesÐ tÄ Ðthat€the€old€act€ð ðshall€apply€to€any€dissolution€as€to€which€a€statement€of€intent€to€dissolve€has€beenÐ `° Ðfiled€or€a€court€proceeding€filed€before€January€1,€1988.ðð€òòóóÐ L œ ÐÌà  àð ðWhen€the€language€contained€within€the€four€corners€of€a€statute€is€plain,€clear,€andÐ $ t Ðunambiguous,€the€duty€of€the€courts€is€simple€and€obvious,€to€say€òòsic€lex€scriptaóó,€and€obey€it.ðð€€òòATSÐ  ` ÐSoutheast,€Inc.€v.€Carrier€Corp.óó,€18€S.W.3d€626,€630€(Tenn.€2000)€(citation€and€internal€quotationÐ ü L  Ðmarks€omitted).€€Section€48„27„101(e)€is€clear€and€plain€on€its€face,€and€its€language€can€compel€onlyÐ è 8  Ðone€conclusion:€€that€the€old€act€governs€the€dissolution€of€all€corporations€that€filed€a€statement€ofÐ Ô$  Ðintent€to€dissolve€before€January€1,€1988.€€Therefore,€because€Piper€filed€its€Statement€of€Intent€toÐ À  ÐDissolve€on€September€12,€1986,€we€conclude€that€the€old€act€governs€the€propriety€of€PiperððsÐ ¬ü  Ðdissolution€and€the€scope€of€the€petitionerððs€remedies€against€it€in€this€case.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àIn€response,€the€petitioner€cites€the€ð ðsavings€provisionðð€of€the€new€act,€which€provides€thatÐ pÀ Ðthe€repeal€of€the€old€act€does€not€affect€ð ð[a]ny€ratification,€right,€remedy,€privilege,€obligation,€orÐ \¬ Ðliability€acquired,€accrued,€or€incurred€under€the€statute€before€its€repeal.ðð€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ H˜ Ð40„27„103(a)(2).€€The€petitioner€then€argues€that€because€the€savings€provision€only€addresses€claimsÐ 4„ Ðexisting€on€or€before€January€1,€1988,€the€new€act€must€be€applied€to€claims€arising€after€that€date.€Ð  p ÐWe€disagree.Ð  \ ÐÓ  ÓÓ  Óà  àÌà  àA€plain€reading€of€this€statute€indicates€that€it€seeks€only€to€preserve€the€then„existing€òòstatusÐ ä4 Ðquoóó€respecting€any€rights€or€remedies€already€existing€under€the€old€act,€and€this€statute€simply€doesÐ Ð  Ðnot€permit€the€conclusion€that€the€new€act€must€apply€to€rights€and€remedies€against€corporationsÐ ¼  Ðthat€were€dissolved€under€the€old€act.€€Moreover,€courts€do€not€interpret€statutes€in€isolation,€but€ð ðareÐ ¨ø Ðrequired€to€construe€them€as€a€whole,€read€them€in€conjunction€with€their€surrounding€parts,€andÐ ”ä Ðview€them€consistently€with€the€legislative€purpose.ðð€€òòState€v.€Turneróó,€913€S.W.2d€158,€160€(Tenn.Ð €Ð Ð1995).€€To€the€extent€that€the€petitionerððs€construction€would€interfere€with€Piperððs€expectationsÐ l¼ Ðupon€its€dissolution,€it€would€be€contrary€to€section€40„37„103(a)(4),€which€provides€that€the€repealÐ X ¨ Ðof€the€old€act€does€not€affect€ð ð[any]€dissolution€authorized€by€the€board€of€directors,€under€the€statuteÐ D!” Ðbefore€its€repeal,€and€the...dissolution€may€be€completed€in€accordance€with€the€statute€as€if€it€hadÐ 0"€  Ðnot€been€repealed.ðð€€The€petitionerððs€argument€that€this€case€is€properly€decided€under€the€new€actÐ #l! Ðis€without€merit.Ð $X" ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€in€answer€to€the€first€question€certified,€the€General€Corporation€Act,€which€wasÐ à%0!$ Ðin€effect€before€January€1,€1988,€governs€the€propriety€of€Piperððs€dissolution€and€the€scope€of€theÐ Ì&"% Ðpetitionerððs€remedies€available€against€Piper.Ð ¸'#& Ðâ âÓJÓÐ ¤(ô#' Ðò òÔ& œ Ôâ ââ âÓ  ÓQUESTION€II:€THE€EFFECT€OF€TENNESSEE€CODE€ANNOTATED€Ð ° ÐSECTION€48„1„1013(A)€(REPEALED)€AND€TENNESSEE€COMMON€LAWó óÐ œì ÐÓTQÓÌÓ  Óà  àHaving€decided€that€the€provisions€of€the€General€Corporation€Act€govern€the€petitionerððsÐ tÄ Ðclaims€in€this€case,€the€next€question€certified€by€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€isÔ'œ°4QÔ€whetherÐ `° ÐTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€limits€claims€asserted€against€Piper€afterÐ L œ Ðit€filed€its€Articles€of€Dissolution,€and,€if€not,€whether€Tennessee€common€law€otherwise€bars€suchÐ 8 ˆ Ðactions.€€In€relevant€part,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€provides€asÐ $ t Ðfollows:Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àThe€dissolution€of€a€corporation...shall€not€take€away€or€impair€any€remedyÐ è 8  Ðavailable€to€or€against€such€corporation,€its€directors,€officers,€shareholders€orÐ Ô$  Ðmembers,€for€any€right€or€claim€existing,€or€any€liability€incurred,€òòprior€to€suchÐ À  Ðdissolution€if€action€or€other€proceeding€thereon€is€commenced€within€two€(2)€yearsÐ ¬ü  Ðafter€the€date€of€such€dissolutionóó.Иè Ð Ð  ÐÌ(emphasis€added).€€The€petitioner€argues€that€because€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€does€notÐ pÀ Ðaddress€post„dissolution€claims,€this€statute€cannot€bar€his€1994€claim€against€Piper.€€On€the€otherÐ \¬ Ðhand,€the€respondent€maintains€that€the€statute€only€permits€claims€that€arose€before€the€dissolutionÐ H˜ Ðand€that€later€arising€actions€are€barred€by€Tennessee€common€law.€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àBecause€statutes€cannot€often€be€properly€understood€in€the€abstract,€the€historicalÐ  \ Ðbackground€that€gave€rise€to€the€statute€is€often€helpful€in€understanding€its€intended€purpose.€€òòCf.óóÐ øH ÐòòPenley€v.€Honda€Motor€Co.,€Ltd.óó,€31€S.W.3d€181,€186€(Tenn.€2000).€€The€common€law€ofÐ ä4 Ðcorporations€in€Tennessee€has€long€held€that€the€dissolution€of€a€corporation€ends€the€legal€existenceÐ Ð  Ðof€that€corporation.€€Often€referred€to€as€ð ðthe€civil€death€of€a€corporation,ðð€the€dissolution€of€aÐ ¼  Ðcorporation€extinguished€all€ð ðdebts€due€to€and€from€the€corporation,ðð€and€ð ðneither€the€stockholdersÐ ¨ø Ðnor€the€directors€or€trustees€of€the€corporation€can€recover€the€debts,€or€be€charged€with€them€in€theirÐ ”ä Ðnatural€capacity...€.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòWhite€v.€Campbellóó,€24€Tenn.€(5€Hum.)€38,€39€(1844)€(citation€andÐ €Ð Ðinternal€quotation€marks€omitted).€€òòóóAs€a€corollary€to€this€principle,€ð ða€corporationððs€capacity€to€sueÐ l¼ Ðor€be€sued€terminated€upon€the€corporationððs€dissolution.ðð€€òòSwindle€v.€Big€River€Broad.€Corp.óó,€905Ð X ¨ ÐS.W.2d€565,€567€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).Ð D!” ÐÌà  àThe€unyielding€nature€of€the€common€law€rule€would€often€lead€to€inequitable€results€becauseÐ #l! Ða€corporation€could€ð ðlegitimately€dissolve€for€the€sole€purpose€of€eliminating€its€existing,€contingent,Ð $X" Ðand€future€foreseeable€creditor€obligations.ðð€€òòSeeóó€Ann€E.€Conaway€Stilson,€òòReexamining€theÐ ô$D # ÐFiduciary€Paradigm€at€Corporate€Insolvency€and€Dissolution:€Defining€Directorsðð€Duties€toÐ à%0!$ ÐCreditorsóó,€20€Del.€J.€Corp.€L.€1,€67€(1995).€€In€part€to€alleviate€the€harshness€of€this€common€lawÐ Ì&"% Ðrule,€the€General€Assembly€enacted€a€provision€from€the€Model€Business€Corporation€Act€of€1950Ð ¸'#& Ð(ð ðMBCAðð),€which€provides€that€a€corporation€does€not€cease€to€exist€immediately€upon€itsÐ ¤(ô#' Ðdissolution.€€òòSeeóó€òòSwindleóó,€905€S.W.2d€at€567€(acknowledging€that€section€48„1„1003€(repealed)€wasÐ )à$( Ðâ âderived€from€the€MBCA).€€Instead,€after€its€formal€dissolution,€the€corporation€continues€to€existÐ |*Ì%) Ðbriefly€Ô‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔfor€the€purposes€of€prosecuting€and€defending€actions€in€its€corporate€nameÔ#†XÚÙXXXÚÙÆa#Ô.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€CodeÐ ° ÐAnn.€ðð€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed);€òòsee€alsoóó€MBCA€ðð€105.€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àHowever,€as€the€plain€language€of€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€demonstrates,€the€GeneralÐ tÄ ÐAssembly€did€not€intend€for€a€dissolved€corporation€to€otherwise€ð ðliveðð€forever€for€purposes€ofÐ `° Ðdefending€claims€against€it.€€Rather,€the€General€Corporation€Act€expressly€limits€the€types€of€post„Ð L œ Ðdissolution€claims€that€creditors€may€assert€against€a€corporation€to€those€claims€that€(1)€arose€beforeÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€corporation€was€dissolved,€and€(2)€are€brought€within€two€years€of€the€dissolution.€€Unless€aÐ $ t Ðclaim€satisfies€both€of€these€criteria,€then€it€cannot€be€asserted€against€a€corporation€properlyÐ  ` Ðdissolved€under€the€since„repealed€statute.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óóÐ ü L  ÐÌà  àWithin€this€context,€the€petitioner€urges€this€Court€to€hold€that€because€the€statute€onlyÐ Ô$  Ðaddresses€pre„dissolution€claims,€it€cannot€be€read€to€bar€claims€against€a€corporation€arising€afterÐ À  Ðits€dissolution.€€We€disagree€and€observe€that€the€petitionerððs€argument€ignores€that€the€common€lawÐ ¬ü  Ðis€not€displaced€by€a€statute,€except€to€the€extent€necessarily€required€by€the€statute€itself.€€òòSeeóó€òòLavinÐ ˜è  Ðv.€Jordonóó,€16€S.W.3d€362,€368€(Tenn.€2000)€(ð ðWhile€the€General€Assembly€has€plenary€powerÐ „Ô  Ðwithin€constitutional€limits€to€change€the€common€law€by€statute,€the€ðð[r]ules€of€the€common€lawÐ pÀ Ðare€not€repealed€by€implication,€and€if€a€statute€does€not€include€and€cover€such€a€case,€it€leaves€theÐ \¬ Ðlaw€as€it€was€before€its€enactment.ðððð€(citations€omitted)).€€Indeed,€in€the€absence€of€a€clearly€contraryÐ H˜ Ðintent,€courts€should€presume€that€the€legislature€did€not€intend€to€change€the€common€law.€€òòSeeóóÐ 4„ ÐòòJordan€v.€Baptist€Three€Rivers€Hosp.óó,€984€S.W.2d€593,€599€(Tenn.€1999).€€As€such,€we€disagree€withÐ  p Ðthe€petitioner€that€the€General€Assemblyððs€failure€to€mention€later€arising€claims€in€section€48„1„Ð  \ Ð1013(a)€(repealed)€reveals€an€intention€to€permit€these€claims€contrary€to€the€common€law€rule.€Ð øH ÐÌà  àIn€addition,€cases€from€other€jurisdictions€interpreting€similar€statutory€provisions€confirmÐ Ð  Ðthat€the€savings€statute€limits€Piperððs€liability€in€this€case.׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Although€other€jurisdictions€are€split€asÐ ¼  Ðto€whether€provisions€similar€to€MBCA€section€105€prohibit€post„dissolution€claims,€a€clear€majorityÐ ¨ø Ðhas€held€that€suits€against€a€dissolved€corporation€are€permissible€only€when€the€claim€is€one€thatÐ ”ä Ðarose€before€the€dissolution.׃Ü×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€However,€even€when€post„dissolution€claims€have€been€permittedÐ €Ð Ðunder€provisions€similar€to€MBCA€section€105,€courts€have€still€required€that€the€claims€be€broughtÐ ° Ðduring€the€statutory€survival€period.€€òòSeeóó€òòOliver€v.€American€Motors€Corp.óó,€616€F.€Supp.€714,€716Ð œì Ð(E.D.€Va.€1985);€òòNaugher€v.€Fox€River€Tractor€Co.óó,€446€F.€Supp.€1281,€1283€(N.D.€Miss.€1977).׃ °×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀РˆØ ÐApparently,€the€petitioner€would€have€us€hold€that€dissolved€corporations€ð ðliveðð€forever€for€purposesÐ tÄ Ðof€defending€later€arising€claims€and,€in€the€process,€ignore€the€fact€that€he€brought€his€claim€a€fullÐ `° Ðeight€years€after€the€survival€period€expired.€€Such€an€interpretation€is€not€only€contrary€to€the€plainÐ L œ Ðlanguage€of€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed),€it€also€enjoys€no€support€from€any€case€interpretingÐ 8 ˆ Ðprovisions€similar€to€MBCA€section€105.€€Consequently,€we€must€conclude€that€section€48„1„1013(a)Ð $ t Ð(repealed)€limits€the€liabilities€to€which€Piper€may€be€subjected€following€its€dissolution.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€in€answer€to€the€second€question€certified,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sectionÐ è 8  Ð48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€does€apply€to€limit€the€liabilities€incurred€by€Piper€after€it€filed€its€ArticlesÐ Ô$  Ðof€Dissolution.Ð À  ÐÌò òÔ& ˆ ÔÓ  ÓQUESTION€III:€COMPLIANCE€WITH€THE€DISSOLUTION€REQUIREMENTS€OFÐ ˜è  ÐTENNESSEE€CODE€ANNOTATED€SECTION€48„1„1007€(REPEALED)ó óÐ „Ô  ÐÌÓ  Óà  àThe€third€question€certified€by€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€is€whether€Piper€compliedÐ \¬ Ðwith€the€dissolution€requirements€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1007€(repealed),€andÐ H˜ Ðif€not,Ô'ˆl£tÔ€whether€any€of€these€deficiencies€invalidated€Piperððs€dissolution.€€Before€a€corporation€wasÐ 4„ Ðpermitted€to€dissolve€voluntarily€under€the€General€Corporation€Act,€it€had€to€certify€that€it€met€theÐ  p Ðvarious€requirements€listed€in€section€48„1„1007(a)€(repealed).€€The€failure€to€follow€theseÐ  \ Ðrequirements€ð ðvoids€the€dissolution€as€to€a€creditor€whose€rights€have€been€prejudiced,€therebyÐ øH Ðpermitting€the€creditor€to€sue€the€corporation€after€more€than€two€years€following€the€date€ofÐ ä4 Ðdissolution.ðð€€òòSwindleóó,€905€S.W.2d€at€568€(permitting€suit€after€the€survival€period€based€upon€theÐ Ð  Ðcorporationððs€failure€to€give€notice€of€dissolution).€€Therefore,€if€the€petitioner€can€show€that€PiperÐ ¼  Ðfailed€to€follow€the€corporate€dissolution€requirements,€and€that€these€failures€resulted€in€prejudiceÐ ¨ø Ðto€his€rights,€then€Piperððs€dissolution€will€be€invalidated€as€to€his€individual€claims.Ð ”ä Їà  àTo€this€end,€the€petitioner€alleges€that€Piper€failed€to€satisfy€two€dissolution€requirements,Ð ° Ðthereby€rendering€the€attempted€dissolution€void:€(1)€a€failure€to€ensure€that€ð ðall€debts,€obligationsÐ œì Ðand€liabilities€of€the€corporation€[were]€paid€and€discharged€or€that€adequate€provision€has€beenÐ ˆØ Ðmade€therefor,ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€48„1„1007(a)(3)€(repealed);€and€(2)€a€failure€to€ensure€that€ð ðallÐ tÄ Ðthe€remaining€property€and€assets€of€the€corporation€[were]€distributed€among€its€shareholders€inÐ `° Ðaccordance€with€their€respective€rights€and€interests,ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.ðð48„1„1007(a)(4)€(repealed);Ð L œ Ðòòsee€alsoóó€MBCA€ðð€92.€€The€respondent,€on€the€other€hand,€alleges€that€both€contested€conditions€wereÐ 8 ˆ Ðfully€satisfied€under€the€General€Corporation€Act.Ð $ t ÐÌÓ  ÓòòÔ& ° ÔProvisions€for€Unknown,€Prospective,€or€Contingent€ClaimsóóÐ ü L  ÐÓ\~ÓÌà  àThe€petitioner€first€alleges€that€Piper€was€required€to€ð ðadequately€provideðð€for€prospectiveÐ Ô$  Ðclaims,€and€initially,€it€appears€as€though€this€argument€has€some€merit.€€Section€48„1„1007(a)(3)Ô'°ü k~ÔÐ À  Ð(repealed)€requires€that€ð ðallðð€debts,€obligations,€and€liabilities€be€paid,€discharged,€or€have€adequateÐ ¬ü  Ðprovision€made€therefor.€€In€one€recent€case,€we€have€held€that€the€term€ð ðall€liabilities,ðð€when€usedÐ ˜è  Ðin€its€plain€and€ordinary€meaning,€means€exactly€what€it€says:€ð ðòòallóó€liabilities.ðð€€òòCulbreath€v.€FirstÐ „Ô  ÐTenn.€Bankóó,€44€S.W.3d€518,€524€(Tenn.€2001)€(emphasis€in€original).€€Under€this€interpretation,€theÐ pÀ Ðphrase€ð ðall€debts,€obligations€and€liabilitiesðð€does€encompass€prospective€debts,€obligations,€andÐ \¬ Ðliabilities,€and€if€so€interpreted,€then€section€48„1„1007(a)(3)€(repealed)€would€require€a€dissolvingÐ H˜ Ðcorporation€to€make€adequate€provision€for€prospective€liabilities.€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àHowever,€as€we€stated€earlier,€statutory€provisions€cannot€be€interpreted€in€isolation€and€apartÐ  \ Ðfrom€the€remaining€provisions€of€the€statute.€€Notably,€section€48„1„1007(a)(7)€(repealed)€requiresÐ øH Ðonly€that€adequate€provision€be€made€for€lawsuits€ð ðpendingðð€at€the€time€of€the€dissolution,€and€noÐ ä4 Ðrequirement€can€be€found€regarding€lawsuits€that€may€or€may€not€arise€in€the€future.€€Moreover,€inÐ Ð  Ðaddressing€the€procedures€to€be€followed€after€a€Statement€of€Intent€to€Dissolve€is€filed,€TennesseeÐ ¼  ÐCode€Annotated€section€48„1„1004(1)€(repealed)€only€requires€that€notice€of€the€dissolution€beÐ ¨ø Ðmailed€to€each€ð ðòòknown€óócreditor€of€the€corporation.ðð€€(emphasis€added).€€One€court€has€held€thatÐ ”ä Ðbecause€this€language€does€not€require€any€type€of€notice€for€ð ðprospectiveðð€or€ð ðforeseeableððÐ €Ð Ðcreditors,€a€corporation€is€not€obliged€to€make€provision€for€these€creditors€before€effecting€a€properÐ l¼ Ðdissolution€under€the€statute.€€òòSeeóó€òòBlankenship€v.€Demmler€Mfg.€Co.óó,€411€N.E.2d€1153,€1155€(Ill.Ð X ¨ ÐApp.€Ct.€1980).€€Indeed,€it€appears€that€requiring€a€reserve€fund€for€all€future€lawsuits€is€unnecessary,Ð D!” Ðbecause,€as€we€held€earlier,€the€common€law€barred€any€suit€against€a€corporation€filed€more€thanÐ 0"€  Ðtwo€years€after€its€dissolution.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.ðð48„1„1013(a)€(repealed).€€Ð #l! ÐÌà  àOther€states€have€also€held€that€similar€provisions€are€not€intended€to€require€that€adequateÐ ô$D # Ðprovision€be€made€for€future,€contingent,€or€unknown€claims.€€Rather,€the€phrase€ð ðall€debts,Ð à%0!$ Ðobligations,€and€liabilitiesðð€as€used€in€the€MBCA€applies€only€to€òòóóclaims€existing€prior€to€theÐ Ì&"% Ðdissolution.€€òòSeeóó€òòBurnett€v.€Chase€Oil€&€Gas,€Inc.óó,€700€S.W.2d€737,€745€(Tex.€Ct.€App.€1985).׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р¸'#& ÐÑ%@¸ Ñâ %âÑ  Ñâ %âÑ  ÑIndeed,€while€the€MBCA€requires€that€the€dissolving€corporation€certify€that€it€has€discharged€allÐ ° Ðdebts€and€obligations€or€has€made€adequate€provision€therefor,€òòóóthe€MBCA€Ð œì ÐÌà8  àòòdoes€not€require€that€provision€be€made€for€prospective€liabilities€that€mightÐ tÄ Ðforeseeably€ariseóó,€òòsuch€as€product€liability€claimsóó.€Furthermore,€the€provisionÐ `° Ðrequiring€a€certificate€that€there€are€no€suits€pending€against€the€corporation€in€anyÐ L œ Ðcourt,€or€that€adequate€provision€has€been€made€for€the€satisfaction€of€any€judgment,Ð 8 ˆ Ðorder€or€decree€which€may€be€entered€against€it€in€any€pending€suit€òòdoes€not€requireÐ $ t Ðthat€provision€be€made€for€any€suit€that€might€be€filed€in€the€futureóó.€€Ð `Ð Ð  ÐÌòòSeeóó€19€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòCorporationsóó€ðð€2879€(1986)€(emphasis€added).€€Finally,€as€at€least€one€academicÐ è 8  Ðcommentator€has€noted,€the€failure€of€the€MBCA€to€require€provisions€for€contingent€or€prospectiveÐ Ô$  Ðclaims€arising€after€a€dissolution€was€a€primary€motivation€leading€to€the€Revised€Model€BusinessÐ À  ÐAct€of€1984,€which€expressly€makes€a€distinction€between€known€and€unknown€creditors.€€òòSeeóó€Ô‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔJamesÐ ¬ü  ÐP.€Connolly,€òòThe€Post-Dissolution€Products€Liability€Claim€Problem:€A€Statutory€Versus€a€JudicialÐ ˜è  ÐSolutionóó,Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙ4‘#Ô€38€Syracuse€L.€Rev.€1279,€1291€(1987);€òòsee€alsoóó€RMBCA€ðð€14.07;€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€48„Ð „Ô  Ð24„107€(1997).€€Therefore,€presuming€that€the€drafters€of€the€MBCA€did€not€intend€to€require€thatÐ pÀ Ðadequate€provisions€be€made€for€prospective€liabilitiesð"ðand€we€see€no€evidence€to€the€contraryð"ðweÐ \¬ Ðare€reluctant€to€hold€that€the€General€Assembly€somehow€intended€a€different€meaning€through€itsÐ H˜ Ðuse€of€the€model€actððs€language.€€òòSeeóó€òòArmstrong€v.€Pilot€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€656€S.W.2d€18,€28€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð 4„ ÐApp.€1983).׃C×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€Piperððs€dissolution€complied€with€Tennessee€CodeÐ  p ÐAnnotated€section€48„1„1007(a)(3)€(repealed).€Ð  \ Ðà  àÌòòÔ& œ ÔÓ  ÓFinal€Distribution€of€Corporate€PropertyóóÐ ä4 ÐÓŸ•ÓÌà  àThe€petitioner€next€asserts€that€Piper€failed€to€make€proper€provisions€for€the€finalÐ ¼  Ðdistribution€of€its€property.€€However,€while€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1007(a)(4)Ð ¨ø Ðdoes€require€a€corporation€to€ensure€that€ð ðall€the€remaining€property€and€assets€Ô'œô&“•Ôof€the€corporationÐ ”ä Ðare€distributed€among€its€shareholders€in€accordance€with€their€respective€rights€and€interests,ðð€theÐ €Ð Ðpetitionerððs€claim€that€Piper€did€not€satisfy€this€requirement€is€directly€contradicted€by€the€factualÐ ° Ðfindings€submitted€by€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals.€€These€findings€clearly€state€that€ð ðPiperÐ œì Ðhas€not€held€property€as€a€corporate€entity€or€conducted€business€after€December€31,€1986.ðð€Ð ˆØ ÐNevertheless,€because€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€has€specifically€inquired€as€to€the€proprietyÐ tÄ Ðof€Piperððs€dissolution€under€Tennessee€law,€we€undertake€a€more€thorough€analysis€on€this€point.Ð `° ÐÌà  àAlthough€not€directly€stated,€the€petitioner€seems€to€argue€that€because€the€formerÐ 8 ˆ Ðshareholders€of€Piper€have€not€received€all€of€the€corporate€propertyð"ðPiper€was€owed€money€afterÐ $ t Ðits€dissolution,€which,€when€received,€was€placed€in€escrow€for€the€benefit€of€the€shareholdersð"ðtheÐ  ` Ðdissolution€has€yet€to€be€completed.€€We€disagree.€€The€statute€does€not€require€that€PiperððsÐ ü L  Ðshareholders€actually€receive€all€of€the€corporate€property€in€hand€before€the€Articles€of€DissolutionÐ è 8  Ðwere€filed;€it€only€requires€that€Ô‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔthe€property€be€distributed€ð ðin€accordance€with€their€respective€Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙÊœ#ÔÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔrightsÐ Ô$  Ðand€interestsÔ#†XÚÙXXXÚÙP#Ô.ðð€€Because€the€accounts€receivable€from€Hiniker€were€not€due€and€payable€at€the€timeÐ À  Ðof€Piperððs€dissolution,€the€shareholders€possessed€no€right€to€the€actual€monies€owed€by€HinikerÐ ¬ü  Ðimmediately€upon€Piperððs€dissolution;€they€only€possessed€the€right€to€receive€these€monies€at€aÐ ˜è  Ðfuture€date.€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àIn€essence,€the€petitioner€seeks€to€expand€Piperððs€obligation€under€the€statute,€which€was€onlyÐ \¬ Ðto€ensure€that€this€right€to€receive€the€monies€was€distributed€to€the€shareholders€Ô‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔð ðin€accordance€withÐ H˜ Ðtheir€respective€Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙ #ÔÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔrights€and€interestsÔ#†XÚÙXXXÚÙ #ÔÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔ.ððÔ#†XÚÙXXXÚÙæ #Ô€€So€long€as€Piper€held€no€property€in€its€own€name€andÐ 4„ Ðotherwise€transferred€its€interest€in€the€accounts€receivable€to€its€shareholders,€we€cannot€say€thatÐ  p ÐPiper€violated€either€the€letter€or€the€spirit€of€section€48„1„1007(a)(4)€(repealed)€by€requiringÐ  \ Ðpayment€of€those€monies€into€escrow€for€the€benefit€of€its€shareholders.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€thatÐ øH ÐPiperððs€dissolution€complied€with€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1007(a)(4)€(repealed).Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€in€answer€to€the€third€question€certified,€Piper€fully€complied€with€theÐ ¼  Ðdissolution€provisions€of€the€Tennessee€General€Corporation€Act,€effective€prior€to€January€1,€1988.€Ð ¨ø ÐÌÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔÔ&   ÔÓ  Óò òQUESTION€IV:€NECESSITY€OF€DISSOLUTION€PROVISION€ADDRESSINGÐ €Ð ÐUNFORESEEN€FUTURE€LIABILITIESó ó€ò òAND€FINAL€ASSET€DISTRIBUTIONó óÐ l¼ ÐÌÓ  Óà  àÔ#†XÚÙXXXÚÙK¤#ÔThe€fourth€question€certified€by€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€is€whether€Ô‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔTennesseeððsÐ H!˜ Ðcorporate€statutes€in€effect€prior€to€January€1,€1988,€require€the€following€provisions€for€the€properÔ' €j¤ÔÐ 4"„  Ðdissolution€of€a€corporation:€(1)€a€provision€providing€for€unforeseen€future€liabilities,€or€(2)€aÐ  #p! Ðprovision€ensuring€the€final€distribution€of€its€assets.€€Because€we€have€already€discussed€the€answersÐ  $\" Ðto€this€question€in€addressing€the€third€question€certified,€we€answer€respectfully,€and€without€furtherÐ ø$H # Ðcomment,€that€the€General€Corporation€Act€does€not€require€that€adequate€provisions€be€made€forÐ ä%4!$ Ðunforeseen€future€liabilities€to€effect€a€proper€dissolution€under€the€statute.€€In€addition,€we€answerÐ Ð& "% Ðthat€the€General€Corporation€Act€Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙ·¥#ÔÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔdoes€require€a€final€Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙ,©#ÔÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔdistribution€of€corporate€assets€to€shareholdersÐ ¼' #& Ðð ðÔ#†XÚÙXXXÚÙƒ©#Ôin€accordance€with€their€respective€rights€and€interestsÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔ,ðð€a€requirement€that€appears€to€have€beenÐ ¨(ø#' Ðsatisfied€under€the€facts€as€certified.Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙFª#ÔÐ ”)ä$( Ðâ âÐ €*Ð%) ÐÑ&¿r Ñâ &âÑ  Ñâ &âÑ  Ñò òÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔÔ& ° Ôâ ââ âÓ  ÓQUESTION€V:€APPLICATION€OF€THE€ð ðTRUST€FUNDðð€DOCTRINEó óÔ#†XÚÙXXXÚÙk«#ÔÐ ° ÐÌÓ  Óà  àThe€final€question€certified€by€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€is€whether€Tennessee€lawÐ ˆØ Ðpermits€the€petitioner€to€use€the€ð ðtrust€fundðð€doctrine€against€a€dissolved,€but€then„solvent,Ô'°°Š«ÔÐ tÄ Ðcorporation€in€the€absence€of€other€available€remedies.€€The€trust€fund€doctrine€was€developed€byÐ `° Ðthe€courts€primarily€as€an€equitable€rule€to€alleviate€the€harsh€effects€of€the€common€law€principleÐ L œ Ðthat€all€suits€by€creditors€against€a€corporation€are€extinguished€upon€the€corporationððs€dissolution.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐòòSeeóó€òòÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔShields€v.€Clifton€Hill€Land€Co.óó,€94€Tenn.€123,€157,€28€S.W.€668,€676€(1894)Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙ»®#Ô.€€Under€thisÐ $ t Ðdoctrine,€as€it€has€been€applied€in€Tennessee,€the€creditors€of€an€insolvent€or€dissolved€corporationÐ  ` Ðð ðare€entitled€in€equity€to€payment€of€their€debts€before€any€distribution€of€corporate€property€is€madeÐ ü L  Ðamong€stockholders,ðð€and€these€creditors€also€possess€ð ða€right€to€follow€its€assets€or€property€intoÐ è 8  Ðthe€hands€of€[anyone]€who€is€not€a€holder€in€good€faith€in€the€ordinary€course€of€business.ðð€€òòSeeóóÐ Ô$  ÐòòJennings,€Neff€&€Co.€v.€Crystal€Ice€Co.óó,€128€Tenn.€231,€236,€159€S.W.€1088,€1089€(1913).Ð À  ÐÌà  àÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔThe€respondent€alleges€that€the€trust€fund€doctrine€is€unavailable€to€assist€the€petitioner€inÐ ˜è  Ðthis€case€because€he€cannot€establish€that€Piper€was€insolvent€at€the€time€of€its€dissolution,€aÐ „Ô  Ðnecessary€element€to€invoke€the€trust€fund€doctrine.€€The€respondentððs€claim€has€some€merit€becauseÐ pÀ Ðvirtually€every€case€applying€the€trust€fund€doctrine€in€this€State€has€involved€an€insolventÐ \¬ Ðcorporation.׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Indeed,€one€case€from€this€Court€has€specifically€held€that€insolvency€is€a€necessaryÐ H˜ Ðrequirement€for€the€invocation€of€the€trust€fund€doctrine€against€a€corporation.€€òòSeeóó€òòRawlings€v.€NewÐ 4„ ÐMemphis€Gaslight€Co.óó,€105€Tenn.€268,€292,€60€S.W.€206,€212€(1900).Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙå±#ÔÐ  p ÐÌà  àHowever,€as€originally€developed€by€this€Court€in€òòMarr€v.€Bank€of€West€Tennesseeóó,€44€Tenn.Ð øH Ð(4€Cold.)€471€(1867),€the€trust€fund€doctrine€seems€to€have€been€designed€to€provide€relief€toÐ ä4 Ðcreditors€against€corporations€that€were€either€insolvent€or€dissolved,€but€not€òònecessarily€óóboth.€Ð Ð  ÐIndeed,€while€òòMarróó€factually€involved€an€insolvent€corporation,€its€description€of€the€trust€fundÐ ¼  Ðdoctrine€was€not€quite€as€limited:Ð ¨ø ÐòòóóÌà8  àà ` àThe€doctrine,€that€the€assets€of€an€insolvent€or€dissolved€banking,€or€otherÐ €Ð Ðmonied€corporation,€constitutes€a€pledge€or€trust€fund€for€the€payment€of€theÐ l¼ Ðcorporation€debts,€is€now€so€firmly€settled,€upon€the€plainest€principles€of€reason€andÐ X ¨ Ðjustice,€as€well€as€authority,€that€it€cannot€be€shaken,€or€brought€into€doubt.€€TheÐ D!” Ðassets€of€such€an€institution€are€always€liable€for€its€debts;€and€if€they€are€held€by€theÐ 0"€  Ðcorporation€itself,€and€so€invested€as€to€be€subject€to€legal€process,€they€may€beÐ #l! Ðlevied€on€by€such€process.€€But,€if€they€have€been€distributed€among€stockholders,Ð $X" Ðor€gone€into€the€hands€of€others€than€bona€fide€creditors,€or€purchasers,€leaving€debtsÐ ô$D # Ðâ âof€the€corporation€unpaid,€such€holders€take€the€property€charged€with€the€trust,€inÐ à%0!$ Ðfavor€of€the€corporation€creditors;€and€a€Court€of€Equity€will€follow€the€property,€andÐ ° Ðenforce€and€compel€its€application€to€the€corporation€debts.€ÐœìÐ Ð  Ðâ âòòÌMarróó,€44€Tenn.€(4€Cold.)€at€497.€€In€fact,€this€Court€has€applied€the€trust€fund€doctrine€for€the€benefitÐ tÄ Ðof€creditors€against€a€òòsolventóó€corporation€in€at€least€one€case.€€òòSeeóó€òòCrystal€Ice€Co.óó,128€Tenn.€at€233,Ð `° Ð159€S.W.€at€1089€(applying€doctrine€though€the€corporation€possessed€a€net€asset€value€of€$200,000).€Ð L œ ÐAdmittedly,€while€the€doctrine€as€applied€in€òòCrystal€Ice€Co.óó€is€contrary€to€its€usual€applications,€thatÐ 8 ˆ Ðcase€does€demonstrate€that€the€doctrine€is€not€as€limited€as€the€respondent€argues.€€Therefore,€basedÐ $ t Ðon€the€authority€of€òòCrystal€Ice€Co.óó,€we€conclude€that€the€application€of€the€trust€fund€doctrine€inÐ  ` ÐTennessee€is€not€limited€to€insolvent€corporations.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àHowever,€while€the€trust€fund€doctrine€could€be€applied€in€this€state€to€solvent,€but€dissolved,Ð Ô$  Ðcorporations,€we€must€still€recognize€that€the€General€Corporation€Act€has€significantly€restrictedÐ À  Ðthe€application€of€that€doctrine€in€this€case.€€The€trust€fund€doctrine€has€not€always€been€a€creatureÐ ¬ü  Ðof€the€common€law€in€Tennessee,€and€significantly,€the€General€Assembly€codified€this€doctrine€asÐ ˜è  Ðpart€of€the€General€Incorporation€Act€of€1875€to€permit€creditors€to€reach€corporate€assets€throughÐ „Ô  Ðthe€subscribers€of€unpaid€stock.€€òòSeeóó€1875€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.€142,€ðð€5€(codified€originally€at€Tenn.Ð pÀ ÐCode€ðð€Ô‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔ1708Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙ®Â#Ô€(Milliken€&€Vertrees€1884)).׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àWith€the€General€Corporation€Act€of€1968,€however,€the€General€Assembly€repealed€manyÐ 4„ Ðof€the€older€1875€corporate€statutes,€including€the€trust€fund€statute.€€òòSeeóó€1968€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.Ð  p Ð523€ðð€17.02.€€In€its€place,€the€General€Assembly€enacted€section€48„1„1007(a)(3)€(repealed),€whichÐ  \ Ðagain€codified€the€essential€principle,€if€not€the€particulars,€of€the€trust€fund€doctrine,€òòi.e.óó,€that€ð ðððtheÐ øH Ð[corporate]€property€must€first€be€appropriated€to€the€payment€of€the€debts€of€the€company,€beforeÐ ä4 Ðany€portion€of€it€can€be€distributed€to€the€stockholders.ðððð€€òòHicks€v.€Whitingóó,€149€Tenn.€411,€453,€258Ð Ð  ÐS.W.€784,€797€(1924)€(quoting€òòFogg€v.€Blairóó,€133€U.S.€534,€541€(1890)).€€The€enactment,€repeal,€andÐ ¼  Ðmodified€re„enactment€of€the€essential€principles€of€the€trust€fund€doctrine€demonstrate€that€theÐ ¨ø ÐGeneral€Assembly€is€mindful€of€the€doctrine€and€the€role€that€it€plays€within€the€corporate€statutoryÐ ”ä Ðscheme.€€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àEven€with€these€principles€in€mind,€however,€the€General€Assembly€nevertheless€restrictedÐ X ¨ Ðthe€types€of€claims€that€creditors€could€assert€against€dissolved€corporations€to€those€that€arose€priorÐ D!” Ðto€the€dissolution€and€were€filed€within€two€years€of€the€dissolution.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€48„1„Ð 0"€  Ð1013(a)€(repealed).€€No€other€provision€of€the€General€Corporation€Act€permits€creditors€to€reachÐ #l! Ðcorporate€assets€after€the€survival€period,€and€although€the€legislature€could€have€eliminated€the€two„Ð $X" Ðyear€survival€period€altogether,€òòcf.óó€Cal.€Corp.€Codeðð2010(a)€(West€1990),€it€obviously€chose€notÐ ô$D # Ðto€do€so.€€Therefore,€it€seems€that€the€General€Assembly€has€placed€some€degree€of€emphasis€uponÐ à%0!$ Ðfinality€in€the€dissolution€context,€and€as€such,€we€must€conclude€that€the€legislature€did€not€intendÐ ° Ðfor€the€trust€fund€doctrine€to€have€effect€outside€the€confines€of€the€General€Corporation€Act.€Ð œì ÐòòóóÌà  àFurther€evidence€that€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€operates€to€limit€the€application€of€theÐ tÄ Ðtrust€fund€doctrine€within€the€survival€period€may€be€seen€in€the€decisions€of€other€courts€interpretingÐ `° Ðsimilar€statutory€provisions.€€In€òòHunter€v.€Fort€Worth€Capital€Corp.óó,€620€S.W.2d€547,€552€(Tex.Ð L œ Ð1981),€for€example,€the€Texas€Supreme€Court€held€that€a€substantially€identical€statute€did€not€permitÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€trust€fund€doctrine€to€expand€the€limited€survival€period€of€the€corporation€following€itsÐ $ t Ðdissolution.€€As€that€court€candidly€observed,€Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àno€real€purpose€would€be€served€by€the€enactment€of€Article€7.12,€permitting€suitsÐ è 8  Ðagainst€officers,€directors,€and€shareholders€of€a€dissolved€corporation,€unless€theÐ Ô$  Ðlegislature€intended€for€the€statute€to€bar€resort€to€the€trust€fund€theory€apart€from€theÐ À  Ðstatute€in€order€to€enforce€post-dissolution€claims.€€To€hold€otherwise€would€violateÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€rule€of€statutory€construction€that€the€legislature€is€never€presumed€to€do€a€uselessÐ ˜è  Ðact.€Ð„Ô Ð Ð  ÐÌ620€S.W.2d€at€551.€€Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àA€similar€holding€is€also€reflected€in€òòBlankenship€v.€Demmler€Manufacturing€Co.óó,€411Ð 4„ ÐN.E.2d€1153€(Ill.€App.€Ct.€1980),€a€case€in€which€the€plaintiff€sued€the€former€shareholder€of€aÐ  p Ðdissolved€corporation€eight€years€after€its€dissolution.€€Rejecting€a€claim€that€the€former€shareholderÐ  \ Ðwas€liable€under€the€trust€fund€doctrine,€the€Illinois€Appellate€Court€cited€its€version€of€the€MBCAÐ øH Ðsurvival€statute€and€held€that€Ð ä4 ÐÌÔ‡XÚÙXXXÚÙÔà8  à[o]nce€this€[survival]€period€extending€the€existence€of€the€corporation€has€ended,Ð ¼  Ðhowever,€the€corporation€cannot€sue€or€be€sued.€€Consequently,€we€believe€that€theÐ ¨ø Ðsurvival€statute€reflects€a€legislative€intent€to€establish€a€definite€point€in€time€whenÐ ”ä Ða€corporation€ceases€to€exist....In€the€absence€of€a€statute€permitting€a€cause€ofÐ €Ð Ðaction€which€accrues€after€dissolution€to€be€brought€against€a€dissolved€corporation,Ð l¼ Ðplaintiff€has€no€valid€cause€of€action€against€[the€dissolved€corporation].€€Therefore,Ð X ¨ Ðapplication€of€the€trust€fund€doctrine€to€the€assets€held€by€[the€former€shareholder]Ð D!” Ðis€inappropriate.Ð0"€ Ð Ð  ЀÌ411€N.E.2d€1156„57.Ô#†XÚÙXXXÚÙÓ#Ô€€The€court€also€recognized€that€the€ð ðextension€of€the€trust€fund€theory€to€coverÐ $X" Ðplaintiffððs€claim€would€mean€that€the€corporation€could€never€completely€dissolve€but€would€liveÐ ô$D # Ðon€indefinitely€through€its€shareholders.€€We€do€not€believe€that€this€result€would€be€in€accordanceÐ à%0!$ Ðwith€the€spirit€of€the€laws€governing€the€dissolution€of€corporations.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€1156.€€We€agree€withÐ Ì&"% ÐòòHunteróó€and€òòBlankenshipóó€and€conclude€that€their€statements€regarding€the€application€of€the€trust€fundÐ ¸'#& Ðdoctrine€within€the€MBCA€are€accurate€reflections€of€Tennesseeððs€law€as€well.Ð ¤(ô#' Ðà  àÌà  àAccordingly,€in€answer€to€the€final€question€certified,€the€trust€fund€doctrine€has€been€appliedÐ |*Ì%) Ðto€solvent€corporations€under€Tennessee€law,€but€the€application€of€that€doctrine€in€this€case€isÐ h+¸&* Ðnecessarily€limited€by€the€provisions€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed).€Ð ° ÐÌÓ  Óò òÔ& ° ÔCONCLUSIONó óÐ ˆØ ÐÌÓOÛÓÔ% € Ôà  àTo€summarize€our€answers€to€the€five€questions€certified€by€the€United€States€Court€ofÐ `° ÐAppeals€for€the€Third€Circuit,€we€respectfully€answer€that€the€corporate€statutes€in€effect€beforeÔ'°ˆ^ÛÔÐ L œ ÐJanuary€1,€1988,€apply€to€determine€the€rights€and€remedies€available€against€a€corporation€dissolvedÐ 8 ˆ Ðbefore€that€date€and€that€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed)€applies€to€bar€the€petitionerððs€claims.€€WeÐ $ t Ðfurther€answer€that€Piper€Industries,€Inc.€did€comply€with€the€dissolution€statutes€in€effect€beforeÐ  ` ÐJanuary€1,€1988,€which€require€provisions€to€ensure€the€final€distribution€of€corporate€assets,€butÐ ü L  Ðwhich€do€not€require€a€corporation€to€establish€a€reserve€fund€for€contingent€claims€arising€more€thanÐ è 8  Ðtwo€years€after€the€dissolution.€€Finally,€we€answer€that€while€the€trust€fund€doctrine€has€beenÐ Ô$  Ðpreviously€applied€in€Tennessee€to€solvent€corporations,€its€application€in€this€case€is€necessarilyÐ À  Ðlimited€by€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€48„1„1013(a)€(repealed).€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌÔ& $ Ôà  àThe€Clerk€is€directed€to€transmit€a€copy€of€this€opinion€to€the€United€States€Court€of€AppealsÐ „Ô  Ðfor€the€Third€Circuit€and€to€the€parties€in€accordance€with€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€Rule€23(8).€Ð pÀ Ðà  àÌà  àCosts€in€this€Court€are€taxed€to€the€petitioners,€Harry€T.€Kradel€and€Marilene€Kradel.Ð H˜ ÐÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ð Ð  Ѐà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUSTICEÔ'$ „WàÔ