ÿWPC’F b#Ál %-^ 3 0ˆ?UNÇw4 z-Ò§y ˆ mŠ Æ¡ Æg Æ- Æó N¹ 0J» 0T EY 0^[ 0h¹ 0r!“ 0|› 0† 0 1u- 0d¢U*>U*DœnO  0DYû‰˜b!ê)“!ߦ#ô…*xy/—ñ2þˆ8v~†:vÓ< 0í×A BÄB 0XáB D59C D-nC 0K›C ASæCÆ9D 0¤ÿD 0D£E A«çE˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»kP+s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularj5+ê:i¢Ø+00 ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô 2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Times ’Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔThe€parties€have€stipulated€that€Coffee€Medical€Center€Hospital€and€Coffee€Medical€Center€NursingÏHome€are€one€entity€under€the€single€name€of€Coffee€Medical€Center.Ì EÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔMr.€Ô_ÔLimbaughÔ_Ô€originally€filed€this€action€as€the€conservator€for€his€mother.€€While€this€action€wasÏpending,€Emma€Ruth€Ô_ÔLimbaughÔ_Ô€died.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔLimbaughÔ_Ô€moved,€and€was€granted€permission,€to€continue€the€action€asÏthe€executor€of€his€motherððs€estate.Ì(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ñÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔSpecifically,€both€parties€argued€that€the€trial€court€improperly€allocated€fault€among€the€negligent€andÏintentional€defendants.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔLimbaughÔ_Ô€asserted€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€holding€the€nursing€home€liable€forÏthe€entire€amount€of€damages.€€In€the€alternative,€Ô_ÔCMCÔ_Ô€argued€that€it€was€immune€from€suit€under€theÏGovernmental€Tort€Liability€Act,€and€consequently,€it€should€not€have€been€allocated€fault€for€the€intentional€torts€ofÏone€of€its€employees.€€€€à àNotably,€Ms.€Ray€did€not€file€a€notice€that€she€was€appealing€the€trial€courtððs€judgmentÏagainst€her.€€However,€because€both€Mr.€Ô_ÔLimbaughÔ_Ô€and€Ô_ÔCMCÔ_Ô€filed€notices€of€appeal,€Ms.€Ray€was€not€required€toÏfile€a€separate€notice€pursuant€to€Rule€13(a),€which€states€that€ð ðonce€any€party€files€a€notice€of€appeal€the€appellateÏcourt€may€consider€the€case€as€a€whole.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(a)€Advisory€Commission€Comment.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔThe€parties€stipulated€that€Ô_ÔCMCÔ_Ô€is€a€governmental€entity€as€defined€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€29„20„102(3).Ì- ù- àÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔOral€argument€was€heard€on€June€13,€2001,€in€Nashville.€€Although€then€Chief€Justice€Anderson€wasÏunavoidably€absent€from€the€argument,€the€parties€were€informed€in€open€court€of€his€participation€in€the€discussionÏand€in€the€decision€of€this€case€pursuant€to€Rule€1(a)(ii)€of€the€Internal€Operating€Procedures€of€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court:ÌÌà8 àà àAbsent€exceptional€circumstances,€all€members€of€this€Court€shall€participate€in€theÏhearing€and€determination€of€all€cases€unless€disqualified€for€conflicts.€€However,€a€hearing€shallÏproceed€as€scheduled€notwithstanding€the€unavoidable€absence€of€one€or€more€justices.€€Any€justiceÏwho€is€unavoidably€absent€from€the€hearing€may€participate€in€the€determination€of€the€case€eitherÏby€teleconferencing,€videoconferencing,€or€by€reviewing€the€tape€of€oral€argument,€subject€to€theÏdetermination€of€the€Chief€Justice.€€Counsel€shall€be€advised€in€open€court€that€the€absent€justiceÏwill€fully€participate€in€the€discussion€and€decision€of€the€case.Ì ‰Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔThe€Court€of€Appeals€declined€to€directly€address€this€issue,€stating€that€its€reversal€of€the€trial€courtððsÏjudgment€against€Ô_ÔCMCÔ_Ô€rendered€this€issue€moot€as€to€the€medical€center.€€However,€by€affirming€the€$25,000Ïjudgment€against€Ms.€Ray,€the€Court€of€Appeals€implicitly€upheld€the€trial€courtððs€apportionment€of€fault€betweenÏthe€negligent€and€intentional€tortfeasors.€€Ì ÕÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔJustice€Holder,€in€her€concurring€opinion,€disagrees€with€the€majority€on€this€point€and€would€holdÏinstead€that€òòPotteróó€should€be€overruled€in€its€entirety.€€She€argues€that€a€governmental€entity€should€be€held€liableÏð ðfor€its€negligent€employment€practices€regardless€of€the€nature€of€the€underlying€acts€of€the€employee€causing€theÏinjury.ðð€€We€respectfully€disagree€with€this€interpretation€of€the€statute.€€We€re„emphasize€that€the€General€AssemblyÏenacted€Tennesseeððs€Ô_ÔGTLAÔ_Ô€to€codify€the€general€common€law€rule€that€ð ðall€governmental€entities€shall€be€immuneÏfrom€suit,ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„201(a),€subject€to€the€specific€exceptions€contained€within€the€Act.€€One€suchÏexception€is€provided€in€section€29„20„205,€which€waives€immunity€for€ð ðinjury€proximately€caused€by€a€negligentÏact€or€omission€of€any€employee€within€the€scope€of€his€employment.ðð€€If€this€general€waiver€ended€here,€JusticeÏHolderððs€position€would€be€more€persuasive€to€us.€€However,€the€provision€goes€on€to€exempt€from€liability€thoseÏinjuries€ð ðarising€out€ofðð€one€of€several€enumerated€exceptions€to€this€section,€including€the€intentional€tortÏexception.€€As€this€Act€was€created€in€derogation€of€the€common€law,€it€must€be€strictly€construed.€€òòRobertsóó,€963ÏS.W.2d€at€746.€€Therefore,€we€decline€to€impose€blanket€liability€on€a€governmental€entity€for€its€negligentÏemployment€practices€when€one€of€the€exceptions€immunizing€the€entity€is€applicable.Ì êÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔMoreover,€when€we€compare€similarly€worded€statutes€outside€our€jurisdiction,€we€observe€that€the€tortsÏof€assault€and€battery€are€specifically€included€in€the€exceptions€to€the€removal€of€immunity.€€For€example,€theÏFederal€Tort€Claims€Act,€which€waives€the€governmentððs€historic€sovereign€immunity,€allows€recovery€against€theÏUnited€States€for€the€negligent€acts€of€any€of€its€employees€ð ðin€the€same€manner€and€to€the€same€extent€as€a€privateÏindividual€under€like€circumstances.ðð€€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2674€(1994).€€However,€this€waiver€of€immunity€does€not€applyÏto€ð ð[Ô_Ôa]nyÔ_Ô€claim€arising€out€of€assault,€battery,ðð€or€other€enumerated€intentional€torts.€€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2680(h).€ÏSimilarly,€the€Utah€Governmental€Immunity€Act,€which€is€phrased€almost€identically€to€the€Tennessee€Act,€also€hasÏa€provision€barring€recovery€for€claims€arising€out€of€ð ðassault€[or]€batteryðð€and€other€specifically€enumeratedÏintentional€torts.€€òòSeeóó€Utah€Code€Ann.€ðð€63„30„10(2).€€€Ì nÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔInterestingly,€the€issue€of€Ms.€Rayððs€immunity€from€suit€for€her€Ô_ÔtortiousÔ_Ô€actions€committed€as€aÏgovernmental€employee€has€not€been€raised€in€the€trial€court,€the€Court€of€Appeals,€or€in€this€Court.€€Therefore,€anyÏclaims€for€Ms.€Rayððs€immunity€made€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€29„20„310(b)€(ð ðNo€claim€may€beÏbrought€against€an€employee€or€judgment€entered€against€an€employee€for€damages€for€which€the€immunity€of€theÏgovernmental€entity€is€removed€by€this€chapter€unless€the€claim€is€one€for€medical€malpractice€brought€against€aÏhealth€care€practitioner.€.€.€.ðð)€have€been€waived.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔAs€aptly€expressed€by€the€dissenting€opinion€in€a€case€decided€by€the€Wyoming€Supreme€Court,€ÌÌà8 àThe€law€of€intentional€torts€constitutes€a€separate€world€of€legal€culpability.€€It€is€a€system€thatÏbalances€specific€rights€and€obligations,€and€imposes€liability€on€the€basis€of€a€partyððs€intent,Ïrather€than€the€moral€blameworthiness€of€that€partyððs€conduct€by€societal€standards.€€The€realÏqualitative€distinctions€between€intentional€torts€and€other€forms€of€culpable€conduct€share€a€singleÏoriginð!ðthe€ð ðdutyðð€concept.€€Intentional€torts€are€dignitary€by€nature.€€They€are€designed€to€protectÏoneððs€right€to€be€free€from€Ô_ÔunpermittedÔ_Ô€intentional€invasions€of€person€or€property.€€Alternatively,Ïthe€duty€underlying€an€action€in€negligence€or€strict€products€liability€is€to€avoid€causing,€be€it€byÏconduct€or€by€product,€an€unreasonable€risk€of€harm€to€others€within€the€range€of€proximate€causeÏÔ_ÔforeseeabilityÔ_Ô.€€These€distinct€worlds€of€culpability€cannot€be€reconciled.€€€ÌÌòòMills€v.€Reynoldsóó,€807€P.2d€383,€403€(Wyo.€1991)€(Ô_ÔUrbigkitÔ_Ô,€C.J.,€dissenting).€€Ì ôÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€'ôÔ€€Ô_ÔAlthough€statutory€principles€of€contribution€and€indemnity€apply,€there€is€ð ðno€right€of€contribution€inÏfavor€of€any€tort„Ô_ÔfeasorÔ_Ô€who€has€intentionally€caused€or€contributed€to€the€injury.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„11„102(c).ÌPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  Serv Geneva ÒÒ  Serv Geneva Ò(|I2j~$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€B»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôáÝò»»Ô€€ d(0"ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3‰J$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€B»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€'ÔÔ€'¼ÔÑ#€((¼d#ÑÑ#€((¼d#ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ8€YXXdì»»d8Ñà@ àÔ€'îÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÔ€'¼ÔÌÓ  ÓJune€13,€2001€SessionÌÔ€'XÔÌÔ€'¼Ôò òEDDIE€BROWN€Ô_ÔLIMBAUGHÔ_Ô,€Executor€of€the€Estate€of€EMMA€RUTHÏÔ_ÔLIMBAUGHÔ_Ô€€v.€€COFFEE€MEDICAL€CENTER,€òòet€al.óóó óÔ€'XÔÌÌò òAppeal€By€Permission€from€the€Court€of€Appeals,€Middle€SectionÌ€Circuit€Court€for€Coffee€CountyÌNo.€28,936€€€€€€Hon.€John€W.€Rollins,€JudgeÌßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÌÌà@ àNo.€M1999„01181„SC„R11„CV€„€Filed€October€16,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_Ô€ÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` Aßó óÌÓ  ÓThe€plaintiff,€originally€acting€as€the€conservator€for€his€mother,€filed€suit€against€Coffee€MedicalÏCenter€and€its€employee,€nursing€assistant€Louise€Ray,€to€recover€damages€for€his€motherððs€injuriesÏwhen€she€was€assaulted€by€this€nursing€assistant.€€In€his€complaint,€he€alleged€that€the€medicalÏcenter€had€prior€notice€of€Ms.€Rayððs€propensity€for€violence€and€that€it€negligently€failed€to€takeÏprecautionary€measures,€which€proximately€caused€his€motherððs€injuries.€€The€Circuit€Court€forÏCoffee€County,€following€a€bench€trial,€entered€a€judgment€against€Ms.€Ray€for€her€assault€andÏbattery€in€the€amount€of€$25,000€and€against€Coffee€Medical€Center€for€its€negligence€in€theÏamount€of€$40,000.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€judgment€against€Ms.€Ray,€but€it€reversedÏthe€judgment€against€the€medical€center€after€concluding€that€it€was€a€governmental€entity€and€wasÏtherefore€immune€from€suit€under€Tennesseeððs€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act€(Ô_ÔGTLAÔ_Ô).€€We€thenÏgranted€this€appeal€to€determine€the€following€issues:€(1)€whether€a€governmental€entityððsÏnegligence€can€provide€the€basis€for€liability€under€the€Ô_ÔGTLAÔ_Ô€for€injuries€arising€out€of€aÏreasonably€foreseeable€assault€and€battery€by€an€employee€of€that€entity;€and€(2)€whetherÏcomparative€fault€principles€should€apply€when€the€negligent€and€intentional€Ô_ÔtortfeasorsÔ_Ô€are€bothÏmade€parties€to€the€suit.€€After€examining€the€evidence€and€applicable€law,€we€conclude€that€theÏmedical€center€is€not€immune€from€tort€liability€where€the€injuries€at€issue€were€proximately€causedÏby€its€negligence€in€failing€to€exercise€reasonable€care€to€protect€a€resident€from€the€foreseeable€riskÏof€an€employeeððs€intentional€assault€and€battery.€€Furthermore,€we€conclude€that€where€the€harmÏarising€from€the€intentional€acts€of€the€nursing€assistant€was€a€foreseeable€risk€created€by€theÏnegligent€medical€center,€and€all€Ô_ÔtortfeasorsÔ_Ô€have€been€made€parties€to€the€suit,€each€Ô_ÔtortfeasorÔ_Ô€partyÏshall€be€held€jointly€and€severally€liable€for€the€entire€amount€of€damages€awarded.€€Accordingly,Ïwe€reverse€in€part€and€affirm€in€part€the€Court€of€Appeals€and€remand€the€case€to€the€Circuit€CourtÏfor€Coffee€County€to€determine€the€total€amount€of€damages€to€be€awarded€to€the€plaintiff.ÌÓ  ÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€Application€for€Permission€to€Appeal;€Judgment€of€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€Affirmed€in€Part;€Reversed€in€Part;€Case€Remandedó óÌÌÓ  ÓòòÔ_ÔWilliam€M.€Barker,€Jóó.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,€C.J.,Ïóóandòò€E.€Riley€Anderson,€óóandòò€Adolpho€A.€Birchóó,€òòJróó.,€JJ.,€joined.€€òòJanice€M.€Holderóó,€J.,€filed€aÏconcurring€opinion.ÌÌH.€Thomas€Parsons,€Manchester,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Eddie€Brown€Limbaugh,€Executor€ofÏthe€Estate€of€Emma€Ruth€Limbaugh.ÌÌMichael€M.€Castellarin,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Coffee€Medical€Center.ÌÌLouise€Ray,€Manchester,€Tennessee,€Pro€Se.ÌÌJohn€C.€Duffy,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Amicus€Curiae,€Tennessee€Municipal€League€RiskÏManagement€Pool.ÌÌÓ  ÓÌà@ àò òOPINIONó óÔ€'¼ÔÌÌò òÔ€'XÔBACKGROUNDó óÌÌÓ  Óà àThe€events€surrounding€this€case€arose€on€January€19,€1997,€when€an€employee€of€theÏCoffee€Medical€Centerððs€(ð ðCMCðð)€nursing€home,× ƒ) ××  ×€nursing€assistant€Louise€Ray,€physicallyÏassaulted€and€seriously€injured€ninety€year€old€Emma€Ruth€Limbaugh,€one€of€the€nursing€homeððsÏresidents.€€Ms.€Limbaugh€had€been€diagnosed€with€Alzheimerððs€disease€and€was€predominantlyÏconfined€to€her€bed€or€a€wheelchair.€€As€a€result€of€her€mental€and€physical€infirmities,€she€wasÏrequired€to€wear€restraints€for€her€personal€safety€and€was€otherwise€completely€dependent€on€herÏcaretakers€for€all€of€her€personal€needs.ÌÌà àFollowing€the€attack,€Mr.€Eddie€Brown€Limbaugh,€Ms.€Limbaughððs€son,€filed€suit× ƒ* ××  ×€againstÏnursing€assistant€Louise€Ray€for€assaulting€and€injuring€his€mother.€€He€also€filed€a€complaintÏagainst€€CMC,€alleging€that€CMC€had€prior€notice€of€Ms.€Rayððs€propensity€for€violence€andÏtherefore€had€a€duty€to€take€reasonable€precautions€to€protect€its€residents€from€the€foreseeable€actsÏof€a€violent€staff€member.€€Because€CMC€breached€its€duty€to€remove€her€from€direct€contact€withÏpatients,€CMCððs€negligence€proximately€caused€his€motherððs€injuries.€€ÌÌà àIn€support€of€his€allegations€against€CMC,€Mr.€Limbaugh€introduced€at€trial€the€testimonyÏof€Jennie€Louise€Cox,€the€daughter„in„law€of€a€resident€at€the€nursing€home.€€Ms.€Cox€testified€thatÏshe€was€engaged€in€an€altercation€with€Ms.€Ray€just€eighteen€days€prior€to€the€incident€involvingÏMs.€Limbaugh.€€According€to€Ms.€Cox,€on€the€evening€of€January€1,€1997,€she€was€standing€in€theÏhall€talking€with€some€of€the€nurses€before€going€to€visit€her€mother„in„law€in€her€room.€€While€theÏgroup€was€talking,€Ms.€Ray€came€out€of€a€nearby€patientððs€room€and€joined€the€conversation.€€AtÏone€point,€Ms.€Cox€jokingly€pointed€her€finger€at€Ms.€Ray.€€Ms.€Ray€allegedly€responded€byÏgrabbing€Ms.€Coxððs€finger€and€twisting€her€hand,€bending€the€finger€backwards.€€As€she€dug€herÏfingernails€into€Ms.€Coxððs€€hand,€she€warned€Ms.€Cox€never€to€point€her€finger€in€her€face€again.€ÏMs.€Cox€testified€that€at€the€time€of€the€trial,€she€still€had€scars€on€her€hand€from€this€incident.ÌÌà àMs.€Cox€informed€Shirley€Price,€the€Director€of€Nursing,€of€Ms.€Rayððs€outburst€andÏharmful€behavior.€€Ms.€Price,€in€turn,€reported€the€incident€by€filing€a€formal€complaint€withÏWilliam€Moore,€the€CMC€Administrator.€€Included€in€the€report€were€statements€made€by€several€ofÏMs.€Rayððs€colleagues€who€described€her€as€being€ð ðshort€with€residentsðð€and€using€a€tone€of€voiceÏthat€was€ð ðtoo€harsh€at€times,ðð€indicating€Ms.€Rayððs€ð ðillness,€or€lack€of€patience€with€residents.ðð€ÏHowever,€only€after€Ms.€Ray€had€assaulted€Ms.€Limbaugh€did€Mr.€Moore€discipline€the€nursingÏassistant€for€her€behavior€towards€Jennie€Cox€by€placing€her€on€probation€for€one€year.€€ÌÌà àAt€the€conclusion€of€a€bench€trial,€the€trial€court€determined€that€Ms.€Ray€was€ð ðan€accidentÏabout€to€happenðð€and€affirmatively€found€that€CMC€ð ðhad€more€than€ample€forewarning€of€theÏdemeanor,€conduct,€attitude,€belligerence€and€physical€aggressiveness€through€the€incident€with€Ms.ÏCox.ðð€€Accordingly,€the€court€awarded€a€judgment€of€$40,000€against€CMC€for€its€negligence.€ÏThe€court€also€found€that€Ms.€Ray€assaulted€Ms.€Limbaugh€without€justification,€causing€her€toÏsuffer€severe€injuries€to€her€arm€and€face.€€The€court€awarded€a€judgment€of€$25,000€against€Ms.ÏRay.€€ÌÌà àBoth€Mr.€Limbaugh€and€CMC€appealed€the€trial€courtððs€judgment.× ƒ, ××  ×€€The€Court€of€AppealsÏdetermined€that€the€weight€of€the€evidence€supports€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€Ms.€LimbaughððsÏinjuries€were€caused€by€Ms.€Rayððs€assault€and€battery,€and€therefore,€it€affirmed€the€trial€courtððsÏ$25,000€judgment€against€Louise€Ray.€€However,€the€intermediate€court€reversed€the€trial€courtððsÏjudgment€against€CMC.€€The€court€found€that€CMC,€a€governmental€entity,× ƒ- ××  ×€is€subject€to€theÏGovernmental€Tort€Liability€Act€(ð ðGTLAðð),€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€29„20„101€to€„€407€(1999),Ïwhich€waives€governmental€immunity€from€suit€for€any€injury€resulting€from€its€tortious€actsÏsubject€to€the€statutory€exceptions€specifically€enumerated€in€its€provisions.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€29„20„201(a).€€Indeed,€the€Court€of€Appeals€applied€one€of€these€exceptions,€section€29„20„205,Ïwhich€expressly€waives€immunity€for€injuries€proximately€caused€by€a€negligent€act€or€omission€ofÏa€governmental€employee.€€However,€the€court€cited€this€Courtððs€decision€in€òòPotter€v.€City€ofÏChattanoogaóó,€556€S.W.2d€543€(Tenn.€1977),€to€conclude€that€while€CMC€was€in€fact€negligent,€theÏnursing€home€is€nevertheless€immune€from€suit€pursuant€to€subsection€(2)€of€this€provision,€whichÏretains€the€entityððs€immunity€if€the€injuries€at€issue€ð ðarise€out€ofðð€the€intentional€conduct€of€aÏgovernmental€employee.€€Ìà àMr.€Limbaugh€sought€permission€to€appeal,€which€we€granted,× ƒ/ ××  ×€presenting€two€issues€forÍour€review:€(1)€whether€a€governmental€entityððs€negligence€can€provide€the€basis€for€liability€underÏthe€GTLA€for€injuries€arising€out€of€a€reasonably€foreseeable€assault€and€battery€by€an€employee€ofÏthat€entity;€and€(2)€whether€comparative€fault€principles€should€apply€when€the€negligent€andÏintentional€tortfeasors€are€both€made€parties€to€the€suit.× ƒ0 ××  ×€ÌÌà@ àò òSTANDARD€OF€REVIEWó óÌÌà àOur€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€in€this€case€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€theÏtrial€court€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€findings,€unless€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€òòCross€v.€City€ofÏMemphisóó,€20€S.W.3d€642,€644„45€(Tenn.€2000)€(upholding€Rule€13(d)€as€the€applicable€standardÏof€appellate€review€for€findings€of€fact€in€a€bench€trial).€ÌÌÓ  Óò òI.€€LIABILITY€OF€COFFEE€MEDICAL€CENTER,€ÌA€GOVERNMENTAL€ENTITY,€ÌUNDER€THE€GOVERNMENTAL€TORT€LIABILITY€ACTó óÓ  ÓÌà àIn€1973,€the€General€Assembly€enacted€the€Tennessee€Governmental€Tort€Liability€ActÏ(GTLA)€to€codify€the€general€common€law€rule€that€ð ðall€governmental€entities€shall€be€immuneÏfrom€suit€for€any€injury€which€may€result€from€the€activities€of€such€governmental€entities,ðð€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€29„20„201(a),€subject€to€statutory€exceptions€in€the€Actððs€provisions.€€For€instance,€aÏgeneral€waiver€of€immunity€from€suit€for€personal€injury€claims€is€provided€in€section€29„20„205Ïð ðfor€injury€proximately€caused€by€a€negligent€act€or€omission€of€any€employee€within€the€scope€ofÏhis€employment,ðð€unless€the€injury€arises€out€of€one€of€several€enumerated€exceptions€to€thisÏsection,€such€as€the€intentional€tort€exception.€€Specifically,€this€exception€bars€claims€for€injuriesÏarising€out€of€ð ðfalse€imprisonment€pursuant€to€a€mittimus€from€a€court,€false€arrest,€maliciousÏprosecution,€intentional€trespass,€abuse€of€process,€libel,€slander,€deceit,€interference€with€contractÏrights,€infliction€of€mental€anguish,€invasion€of€right€of€privacy,€or€civil€rights.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ29„20„205(2).€€At€issue€in€this€case,€then,€is€whether€the€plaintiffððs€claim€against€CMC€to€recoverÏfor€injuries€arising€out€of€the€nursing€assistantððs€assault€and€battery€is€barred€by€the€intentional€tortÏexception€that€potentially€immunizes€CMC€from€liability.ÌÌà àà@ àò òòòNegligence€of€Coffee€Medical€Centeróóó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àAlthough€the€parties€have€not€raised€the€issue€of€whether€a€nursing€home€is€under€ð ðanÏaffirmative€duty€to€act€to€prevent€[its€residents]€from€sustaining€harm,ðð€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,€854ÏS.W.2d€865,€871€(Tenn.€1993),€we€have€held€that€where€a€special€relationship€exists€between€theÏdefendant€and€ð ða€person€who€is€foreseeably€at€risk€from€.€.€.€danger,ðð€òòid.óó€(citingòò€RestatementÏ(Second)€of€Tortsóó€ðð€315€(1965)),€the€defendant€is€under€an€affirmative€duty€to€take€ð ðwhatever€stepsÏare€reasonably€necessary€and€available€to€protect€an€intended€or€potential€victim.ðð€€òòTurner€v.€Jordanóó,Ï957€S.W.2d€815,€819€(Tenn.€1997)€(quoting€òòNaidu€v.€Lairdóó,€539€A.2d€1064,€1075€(Del.€1988)).€ÏAn€example€of€this€special€relationship,€and€one€most€analogous€to€the€relationship€at€issue€in€thisÏcase,€is€the€physician/patient€relationship€born€out€of€the€physicianððs€assumption€of€responsibilityÏfor€the€care€and€safety€of€another.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòTurneróó,€957€S.W.2d€at€820„21€(holding€that€aÍpsychotherapist€has€an€affirmative€duty€to€protect€a€foreseeable€third€party€when€the€patient€presentsÏan€unreasonable€risk€of€danger€to€that€party);€òòBradshawóó,€854€S.W.2d€at€872€(holding€that€aÏphysician€owes€a€duty€to€warn€identifiable€persons€in€the€patientððs€family€against€foreseeable€risksÏrelated€to€the€patientððs€illness);€òòWharton€Transport€Corp.€v.€Bridgesóó,€606€S.W.2d€521,€526€(Tenn.Ï1980)€(holding€that€a€physician€owed€a€duty€to€a€third€party€injured€by€a€truck€driver€whom€theÏphysician€had€negligently€examined€and€certified).€€It€follows,€then,€that€the€relationship€between€aÏnursing€home€and€its€residents,€where€a€nursing€home€voluntarily€assumes€an€obligation€toÏð ðððprovide€care€for€those€who€are€unable€because€of€physical€or€mental€impairment€to€provide€careÏfor€themselves,ðððð€òòNiece€v.€Elmview€Group€Homeóó,€929€P.2d€420,€424€(Wash.€1997)€(alteration€inÏoriginal)€(citations€omitted),€gives€rise€to€an€affirmative€duty€owed€by€the€nursing€home€to€exerciseÏreasonable€care€to€protect€its€residents€from€all€foreseeable€harms€ð ðwithin€the€general€field€ofÏdanger€which€should€have€been€anticipated.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€427.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€evidence€clearly€reflects€that€the€risk€of€harm€to€Ms.€Limbaugh€was€aÏforeseeable€one.€€First,€several€members€of€the€nursing€home€staff€had€witnessed,€just€eighteen€daysÏprior€to€the€incident€with€Ms.€Limbaugh,€Ms.€Rayððs€physical€outburst€directed€at€visitor€JennieÏCox.€€Second,€Ms.€Limbaugh€herself€was€well€known€by€the€nursing€staff€to€physically€strike€outÏagainst€her€caretakers€as€a€result€of€her€dementia.€€Consequently,€it€was€certainly€foreseeable€thatÏthis€nursing€assistant,€who€had€demonstrated€her€propensity€to€be€physically€aggressive€even€whenÏslightly€provoked,€presented€a€risk€of€harm€to€a€resident€also€known€to€be€combative.€€In€addition,Ïevidence€was€presented€by€Mr.€William€Moore,€the€administrator€of€the€nursing€home€during€Ms.ÏRayððs€employment,€as€to€the€nursing€homeððs€standard€procedure€for€dealing€with€the€errantÏbehavior€of€an€employee.€€He€testified€that€ð ðif€there€was€any€contact€between€any€associate,€[who]Ïis€an€employee€of€the€facility,€that€is€combative€in€any€manner€whatsoever,€it€would€be€reportedÏdirectly€to€the€[S]tate€within€24€hours,€written€up,€and€sent€in.€€That€employee€would€be€sent€homeÏand€placed€on€leave.ðð€€He€further€testified€that€he€would€discharge€any€employee€who€hadÏð ðphysically€assaulted,€battered,€[or]€touchedðð€another€person,€or€who€otherwise€had€demonstrated€aÏpropensity€for€violence.€€We€believe€that€CMCððs€policy€for€disciplining€a€combative€employee,Ïalthough€not€followed€in€this€case,€further€demonstrates€that€physical€abuse€by€staff€membersÏpreviously€known€to€be€physically€aggressive€is€a€foreseeable€danger€against€which€reasonableÏprecautions€must€be€taken.ÌÌà àObviously,€ð ð[t]here€is€€.€.€.€no€liability€when€such€care€has€in€fact€been€used,€nor€where€theÏdefendant€neither€knows€nor€has€reason€to€foresee€the€danger€or€otherwise€to€know€that€precautionsÏare€called€for.ðð€€W.€Page€Keeton€et€al.,€òòProsser€and€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó€ðð€56,€at€385.€ÏHowever,€this€was€not€the€case.€€The€record€indicates€that€on€January€2,€1997,€the€day€after€theÏincident€between€Louise€Ray€and€Jennie€Cox,€the€Director€of€Nursing€filed€a€Record€of€ComplaintÏreporting€Ms.€Rayððs€harmful€behavior,€which€was€submitted€to€Mr.€Moore.€€However,€the€onlyÏevidence€in€the€record€regarding€Mr.€Mooreððs€acknowledgment€of€this€incident€with€Ms.€Cox€is€aÏmemorandum€signed€by€Mr.€Moore€and€dated€January€22,€1997.€€In€this€memorandum,€Mr.€MooreÏexplained€that€he€discussed€this€incident€with€Ms.€Ray€and€put€her€on€probation€for€one€year€ð ðfromÏthe€date€of€this€discussion.ðð€€Although€this€date€is€never€specified,€the€record€reflects€that€Ms.€RayÏwas€working€scheduled€shifts€until€the€date€of€the€incident€involving€Ms.€Limbaugh.€€As€the€trialÏcourt€found,€ÌÌà8 à[T]he€defendant€nursing€home€had€more€than€ample€forewarning€of€the€demeanor,Ïconduct,€attitude,€belligerence€and€physical€aggressiveness€through€the€incident€withÏMs.€Cox€and€the€fitness€reports€.€.€.€.€€It€is€clear[]€Ms.€Ray€was€an€accident€about€toÏhappen.€€The€records€are€barren€of€any€attempts€at€intervention€prior€to€theÏLimbaugh€assault.ÌÌà8 àà àI€find€affirmatively€the€inaction€of€the€nursing€home€and€the€lack€ofÏcorrective€action€involving€this€employee,€Ms.€Ray,€was€the€direct€and€proximateÏlegal€cause€of€the€injury€sustained€by€[Ms.€Limbaugh].Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌWe€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€decision€and€hold€that€CMC€did€indeed€act€negligently€in€failing€to€takeÏreasonable€precautions€to€protect€Emma€Ruth€Limbaugh€from€the€foreseeable€risk€that€she€wouldÏbe€assaulted€by€a€staff€member€known€to€be€physically€aggressive.€€ÌÌà@ àò òòòIntentional€Tort€Exceptionóóó ó€ÌÌà àHaving€determined€that€CMC€was€indeed€negligent€in€failing€to€take€affirmative€action€toÏprotect€Ms.€Limbaugh€from€the€foreseeable€risk€that€she€would€be€harmed€by€Ms.€Ray,€CMC€isÏpotentially€subject€to€liability€pursuant€to€section€29„20„205€of€the€GTLA.€€However,€the€issue€hereÏis€whether€CMC€nonetheless€retains€its€immunity€pursuant€to€the€intentional€tort€exception€to€thisÏprovision,€which€immunizes€the€governmental€entity€from€tort€liability€if€the€injury€arises€out€ofÏð ðfalse€imprisonment€pursuant€to€a€mittimus€from€a€court,€false€arrest,€malicious€prosecution,Ïintentional€trespass,€abuse€of€process,€libel,€slander,€deceit,€interference€with€contract€rights,Ïinfliction€of€mental€anguish,€invasion€of€right€of€privacy,€or€civil€rights.ðð€€The€intermediate€courtÏcited€our€decision€in€òòPotter€v.€City€of€Chattanoogaóó,€556€S.W.2d€543€(Tenn.€1977),€to€hold,€albeitÏreluctantly,€that€CMC€retains€its€immunity€because€Ms.€Ray€Ìà àà8 àÌà8 àcommitted€an€intentional€tort,€assault€and€battery€[sic],€upon€Emma€Ruth€Limbaugh.€ÏInasmuch€as€the€GTLA€does€not€permit€a€plaintiff€to€recover€for€the€intentional€tortsÏof€governmental€employees,€and€inasmuch€as€our€supreme€courtððs€decision€in€òòPotteróóÏdoes€not€permit€a€plaintiff€to€circumvent€the€defense€of€governmental€immunity€byÏasserting€a€claim€for€negligent€hiring€or€retention,€we€conclude€that€the€judgmentÏentered€against€the€Medical€Center€in€this€case€must€be€reversed.ÌÌBecause€our€decision€today€overrules€òòPotteróó€to€the€extent€that€it€retains€immunity€from€liability€forÏthose€tortsòò€not€specifically€enumerated€in€the€intentional€tort€exceptionóó,€we€reverse€the€intermediateÏcourt€and€hold€that€CMC€is€liable€for€the€intentional€assault€and€battery€committed€by€the€nursingÏassistant.€€ÌÌà àThe€factual€background€in€òòPotteróó€involved€the€plaintiffððs€arrest€by€a€City€of€ChattanoogaÏpolice€officer€who€discovered€a€bottle€of€alcohol€in€the€plaintiffððs€vehicle.€€Although€the€officer€didÏnot€test€the€plaintiff€to€determine€whether€she€was€intoxicated,€he€nevertheless€arrested€her€forÏpublic€drunkenness.€€At€the€city€jail,€the€officer€became€irate€when€she€started€to€cry,€whereupon€heÏphysically€assaulted€the€plaintiff€in€her€cell,€causing€her€to€suffer€severe€injuries€including€brokenÏbones€and€bleeding€in€her€ear.€€òòId.óó€at€544.ÌÌà àThe€plaintiff€filed€suit€against€the€city€for€the€intentional€torts€of€false€arrest€and€battery.€€InÏresponse€to€the€cityððs€motion€to€dismiss,€the€plaintiff€amended€her€complaint€to€allege€that€the€cityÏwas€negligent€in€failing€to€ð ðscreen[]€its€employees€to€adequately€determine€the€psychologicalÏcapabilities€of€its€employees€to€handle€the€jobs€to€which€they€were€assignedðð;€consequently,€suchÏnegligence€failed€to€protect€her€from€the€police€officerððs€ð ðberzerk€and€callousðð€actions,€which€theÏcity€ð ðshould€have€known€or€reasonably€could€have€known€were€likely€to€[occur].ðð€€òòId.óó€€WeÏdismissed€the€action€against€the€city,€holding€that€ÌÌà8 àthe€true€bases€of€the€injuries€for€which€recovery€of€damages€is€sought€are€falseÏarrest€and€assault€and€battery.€€The€amendment€to€the€complaint,€while€levellingÏadditional€charges€of€negligence€against€the€City,€does€not€alter€the€fact€that€theÍinjuries€that€are€the€subject€of€the€action€ð ðarose€out€ofðð€the€battery€and€the€falseÏarrest,€and€was€not€effective€to€avoid€the€immunity€granted€the€City€underÏ[Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section]€23„3311.ÌÌòòId.óó€at€545.€€ÌÑ  Ñâ  ââ  âÌà àNotably,€our€decision€relied€in€part€on€two€factually€similar€cases€outside€this€jurisdictionÏthat€addressed€the€same€issue€and€that€ultimately€reached€the€same€results.€€However,€as€theÏrespective€tort€liability€statutes€were€worded€differently,€those€two€decisions€should€have€had€littleÏimpact€in€our€jurisdiction.€€First,€we€cited€òòSalerno€v.€Racineóó,€214€N.W.2d€446€(Wis.€1974),€whereÏthe€plaintiff€sued€the€city€for€the€intentional€torts€committed€by€a€police€officer€and€for€the€cityððsÏnegligence€in€retaining€that€violent€officer.€€The€Wisconsin€Supreme€Court,€applying€the€applicableÏstatute,€found€the€city€to€be€immune€from€suit€on€all€counts.€€The€statute€at€issue€in€that€caseÏprovided€in€pertinent€part:€ð ðNo€suit€shall€be€brought€against€any€[governmental€entity]€for€theÏintentional€torts€of€its€[employees]€nor€shall€any€suit€be€brought€against€[governmental€entities]€orÏagainst€[their€employees]€for€acts€done€in€the€exercise€of€legislative,€quasi„legislative,€judicial€orÏquasi„judicial€functions.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€447€n.1.€€Although€the€statutory€language€plainly€protected€the€cityÏfrom€suit€for€the€officerððs€intentional€assault€and€battery,€the€statute€was€unclear€as€to€whether€aÏgovernmental€entity€could€be€liable€for€its€negligence.€€Accordingly,€the€Wisconsin€Supreme€CourtÏwas€able€to€avoid€addressing€the€issue€of€the€cityððs€negligence€by€deciding€instead€that€the€officerððsÏretention€was€a€quasi„judicial€function€and€the€city€was€therefore€immune€under€the€statute.€ÏConsequently,€the€òòSalernoóó€decision€does€not€provide€adequate€guidance€for€determining€whether€aÏTennessee€governmental€entity€should€be€held€liable€for€negligently€allowing€an€employee€toÏintentionally€proximately€cause€the€plaintiffððs€injuries.€€ÌÌà àWe€also€relied€on€the€decision€in€òòLittle€v.€Schaferóó,€319€F.€Supp.€190€(S.D.€Tex.€1970),Ïwhich€interpreted€the€Texas€Tort€Claims€Act€containing€statutory€language€similar€to€that€in€theÏGTLA€but€expressly€listing€assault€and€battery€in€its€provision€preserving€a€municipalityððsÏimmunity.€€In€òòLittleóó,€the€district€court€rejected€the€plaintiffððs€claim€that€two€Texas€cities€negligentlyÏentrusted€its€police€officers€with€night€clubs.€€The€court€relied€on€the€plain€language€in€the€TexasÏAct,€which€excluded€a€municipality€from€liability€for€ð ð[a]ny€claim€arising€out€of€assault,€battery,Ïfalse€imprisonment,€or€any€other€intentional€tort.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€191.€€The€court€reasoned€that€ð ða€citizenððsÏcomplaint€about€the€negligent€utilization€of€police€officers€has€no€meaning€apart€from€thoseÏofficersðð€acts€or€omissions€which€inure€to€the€detriment€of€the€complainant.€€The€assault€is€the€sineÏqua€non€of€plaintiffððs€knowledge€that€municipal€negligence€exists.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€192.€€While€we€continueÏto€agree€with€that€rationale,× ƒ3 ××  ×€our€statute€does€not€allow€us€to€reach€this€precise€result€if€theÍintentional€torts€committed€are€not€enumerated€in€the€intentional€tort€exception.€€ÌÌà àAs€a€result€of€òòPotteróóððs€overbroad€application€of€the€intentional€tort€exception,€courtsÏfollowing€òòPotteróó€have€subsequently,€albeit€erroneously,€held€that€the€intentional€tort€exceptionÏpreserves€immunity€for€injuries€arising€from€òòallóó€intentional€torts.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòJenkins€v.€LoudonÏCountyóó,€736€S.W.2d€603,€608€(Tenn.€1987)€(stating€that€the€ð ðscope€of€the€GTLA€is€generallyÏintended€to€exclude€intentional€tortsðð);€òòBelk€v.€Obion€Countyóó,€7€S.W.3d€34,€40€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1999)€(stating€that€ð ðneither€intentional€torts€nor€violations€of€civil€rightsðð€give€rise€to€liability€ofÏcounty€and€municipal€governments);€òòRoberts€v.€Blount€Memððl€Hosp.óó,€963€S.W.2d€744,€746€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1997)€(stating€that€it€is€ð ðwell„settled€that€the€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act€has€noÏapplication€to€intentional€tortsðð);€òòGifford€v.€City€of€Gatlinburgóó,€900€S.W.2d€293,€296€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1995)€(ð ð[T]here€is€no€waiver€of€immunity€under€the€[GTLA]€for€intentional€tort.ðð);€òòAndersonÏv.€Hayesóó,€578€S.W.2d€945,€949€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1978)€(stating€that€ð ðit€is€logical€to€conclude€thatÏ[section€29„20„205(2)]€shows€an€obvious€legislative€intention€to€exclude€only€[i]ntentional€tortÏcasesðð).€€While€this€principle€is€òògenerallyóó€accurate,€we€notice€that€conspicuously€absent€from€theÏlist€of€intentional€torts€in€subsection€(2)€are€those€of€assault€and€battery.€€ÌÌà àIt€is€well„settled€that€the€role€of€this€Court€in€construing€statutes€is€ð ðto€ascertain€and€giveÏeffect€toðð€the€legislative€purpose€and€intent€without€unduly€restricting€or€expanding€a€statuteððsÏcoverage€beyond€its€intended€scope.€€òòMooney€v.€Sneedóó,€30€S.W.3d€304,€306€(Tenn.€2000).€€ð ðððTheÏlegislative€intent€and€purpose€are€to€be€ascertained€primarily€from€the€natural€and€ordinary€meaningÏof€the€statutory€language,€without€a€forced€or€subtle€interpretation€that€would€limit€or€extend€theÏstatuteððs€application.ðððð€€òòId.óó€(quoting€òòState€v.€Blackstockóó,€19€S.W.3d€200,€210€(Tenn.€2000)).€ÏCourts€are€not€authorized€to€alter€or€amend€a€statute,€and€must€ð ðððpresume€that€the€legislature€saysÏin€a€statute€what€it€means€and€means€in€a€statute€what€it€says€there.ðððð€€òòId.óó€at€307€(quoting€òòBellSouthÏTelecomm.,€Inc.€v.€Greeróó,€972€S.W.2d€663,€673€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997));€òòGleaves€v.€Checker€CabÏTransit€Corp.óó,€15€S.W.3d€799,€803€(Tenn.€2000)€(ð ðððIf€the€words€of€a€statute€plainly€mean€oneÏthing€they€cannot€be€given€another€meaning€by€judicial€construction.ðððð€(quoting€òòHenry€v.€Whiteóó,Ï250€S.W.2d€70,€72€(Tenn.€1952)).€€This€last€principle€applies€especially€when€analyzing€the€GTLA,Ïas€the€legislature€Ìcreated€this€Act€in€derogation€of€the€common€law,€and€therefore,€the€Act€must€be€strictly€construed.€ÏòòRobertsóó,€963€S.W.2d€at€746€(citing€òòLockhart€ex€rel.€Lockhart€v.€Jackson„Madison€County€Gen.ÏHosp.óó,€793€S.W.2d€943€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990)).€ÌÌà àApplying€the€foregoing€principles€of€statutory€construction,€we€conclude€that€it€was€error€toÏexpand€the€intentional€torts€exception€to€include€the€torts€of€assault€and€battery.€€The€legislativeÏintent€has€been€expressed€in€plain€and€unambiguous€terms,€and€we€are€therefore€required€to€enforceÏthe€statute€as€written.€€The€General€Assembly€expressly€created€section€29„20„205€to€removeÏgovernmental€immunity€for€injuries€proximately€caused€by€negligent€acts;€that€it€wanted€to€thenÏcreate€several€exceptions€to€this€general€waiver€convinces€us€that€additional€exceptions€are€not€to€â âÑ  Ñâ âbeÏimplied€absent€legislative€intent€to€the€contrary.€€òòCf.óó€òòUnited€States€v.€Smithóó,€499€U.S.€160,€167Ï(1991)€(ð ðWhere€Congress€explicitly€enumerates€certain€exceptions€to€a€general€prohibition,Ïadditional€exceptions€are€not€to€be€implied,€in€the€absence€of€evidence€of€a€contrary€legislativeÏintent.ðð).€€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€hold€that€section€29„20„205€of€the€GTLA€removes€immunity€for€injuriesÏproximately€caused€by€the€negligent€act€or€omission€of€a€governmental€employee€except€when€theÏinjury€arises€out€of€òòonly€those€specified€torts€enumerated€in€subsection€(2)óó.€€To€immunize€òòallóóÏintentional€torts€would€result€in€an€overly€broad€interpretation€of€the€statute,€and€there€is€noÏindication€that€the€legislature€intended€such€a€result.€€Indeed,€we€find€it€noteworthy€that€theÏlegislature€excluded€the€two€intentional€torts€most€likely€to€give€rise€to€injury.€€Under€the€maximÍð ðòòexpressio€unius€est€exclusio€alteriusóó,ðð€which€states€the€principle€that€the€€expression€of€one€thingÏimplies€the€exclusion€of€all€things€not€expressly€mentioned,€òòCity€of€Knoxville€v.€Brownóó,€260ÏS.W.2d€264,€268€(Tenn.€1953),€we€are€unable€to€expand€the€intentional€torts€exception€to€includeÏassault€and€battery.€€To€do€so€would€be€to€judicially€create€two€additional€exceptions€giving€rise€toÏan€entityððs€immunity.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€To€the€extent€that€òòPotteróó€and€other€cases€hold€otherwise,€they€are€overruled.ÌÌà àApplying€our€conclusions€to€the€present€case,€we€first€reiterate€that€Ms.€Rayððs€assault€ofÏMs.€Limbaugh€was€a€foreseeable€consequence€of€CMCððs€failure€to€take€reasonable€precautions€toÏprotect€its€residents€from€the€risk€of€abuse€by€this€aggressive€nursing€assistant.€€Based€on€the€plainÏlanguage€of€section€29„20„205,€the€injury€inflicted€on€Ms.€Limbaugh€was€ð ðproximately€caused€byÏa€negligent€act€or€omissionðð€of€this€nursing€homeððs€supervisory€personnel.€€Although€it€is€thatÏnegligence€of€which€the€plaintiff€complains,€it€is€clear€that€Ms.€Limbaughððs€injuries€ð ðarose€out€ofððÏthe€intentional€torts€of€assault€and€battery€committed€by€Ms.€Ray.€€Because€these€torts€areÏconspicuously€absent€from€the€intentional€tort€exception€rendering€governmental€entities€immuneÏfrom€liability€for€injuries,€we€hold€that€the€clearly€negligent€defendant€is€not€immune€under€thisÏexception.ÌÌà@ àò òòòThe€Discretionary€Function€Exception€to€Liability€for€Negligence€Ìà@ àUnder€the€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Actóóó óÌÌà àWe€next€address€whether€CMC€is€nevertheless€immune€from€tort€liability€under€section€29„20„205(1),€the€discretionary€function€exception.€€This€exception€immunizes€local€governmentalÏentities€from€liability€for€an€employeeððs€negligence€if€the€injury€arises€out€of€ð ðthe€exercise€orÏperformance€or€the€failure€to€exercise€or€perform€a€discretionary€function,€whether€or€not€theÏdiscretion€is€abused.ðð€€Essentially,€the€discretionary€function€exception€prevents€the€use€of€tortÏactions€to€second„guess€what€are€essentially€legislative€or€administrative€decisions€involving€social,Ïpolitical,€economic,€scientific,€or€professional€policies€or€some€mixture€of€these€policies.€€òòDoe€v.ÏCoffee€County€Bd.€of€Educ.óó,€852€S.W.2d€899,€907€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992)€(citing€òòUnited€States€v.ÏGaubertóó,€499€U.S.€315,€323€(1991)).€€The€rationale€for€preserving€immunity€for€certain€actsÏperformed€by€governmental€entities€is€that€the€government€should€be€permitted€to€operate€withoutÏundue€interference€by€the€courts,€as€courts€are€often€ð ðill„equipped€to€investigate€and€balance€theÏnumerous€factors€that€go€into€an€executive€or€legislative€decision.ðð€€òòBowers€v.€City€of€Chattanoogaóó,Ï826€S.W.2d€427,€431€(Tenn.€1992)€(quoting€òòWainscott€v.€Stateóó,€642€P.2d€1355,€1356€(AlaskaÏ1982));€òòsee€alsoóó€òòCarlson€v.€Stateóó,€598€P.2d€969,€972€(Alaska€1979).€€€ÌÌà àIn€òòBowers€v.€City€of€Chattanoogaóó,€this€Court€recognized€that€a€more€precise€method€ofÏanalysis€was€needed€for€determining€which€acts€are€entitled€to€discretionary€function€immunity.€ÏConsequently,€we€adopted€the€planning„operational€test€under€which€it€is€the€ð ðnature€of€theÏconduct,ðð€that€is,€the€decision„making€process,€and€not€the€ð ðstatus€of€the€actor,ðð€òòBowersóó,€826ÏS.W.2d€at€430„31,€that€governs€whether€the€exception€applies.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Gaubertóó,Í499€U.S.€315,€322€(1991).€€Under€this€analysis,€a€planning€decision€is€most€likely€to€reflect€aÏcourse€of€conduct€that€was€determined€after€consideration€or€debate€by€those€in€charge€ofÏformulating€plans€or€policies.€€òòBowersóó,€826€S.W.2d€at€430€(citing€òòCarlsonóó,€598€P.2d€at€972„73).€ÏDecisions€that€rise€to€the€level€of€planning€or€policy„making€are€considered€to€be€discretionary€actsÏrequiring€judicial€restraint€and€are,€therefore,€not€subject€to€tort€liability.€€On€the€other€hand,Ïdecisions€that€merely€implement€pre„existing€policies€and€regulations€are€considered€to€beÏoperational€in€nature€and€require€the€decision„maker€to€act€reasonably€in€implementing€theÏestablished€policy.€€If€the€policy,€regulation,€or€other€standard€of€procedure€mandates€specificÏconduct,€then€any€employee€reasonably€complying€with€that€direction€will€not€abrogate€the€entityððsÏimmunity€if€the€action€furthers€the€underlying€policies€of€the€regulation.€€òòSee€generallyóó€òòChase€v.ÏCity€of€Memphisóó,€971€S.W.2d€380,€384€(Tenn.€1998).€€If€such€an€employee€does€not€actÏreasonably€but€pursues€a€course€of€conduct€that€violates€mandatory€regulation,€the€discretionaryÏfunction€exception€will€not€apply€because€the€action€would€be€contrary€to€the€entityððs€establishedÏpolicy.€€òòId.óó;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòGaubertóó,€499€U.S.€at€324.ÌÌà àTurning€to€the€facts€in€this€case,€the€administrator€of€the€nursing€home€at€the€time€of€Ms.ÏLimbaughððs€abuse€testified€as€to€the€existence€of€certain€standards€for€disciplining€an€employeeÏwho€has€exhibited€combative€behavior.€€According€to€Mr.€Mooreððs€testimony,€these€standardsÏrequired€that€the€incident€be€reported€to€the€State€within€twenty„four€hours€of€its€occurrence€and€thatÏthe€offending€employee€be€sent€home€and€ð ðplaced€on€leave,ðð€presumably€also€within€that€twenty„four€hour€period€to€await€the€Stateððs€investigation.€€Applying€the€foregoing€principles,€we€find€thatÏthe€nursing€homeððs€broad€discretion€to€implement€a€policy€governing€the€questions€of€whether€andÏhow€to€discipline€combative€employees€is€indeed€a€policy€determination€that€cannot€give€rise€to€tortÏliability.€€However,€CMC€negligently€failed€to€follow€the€guidelines€designed€to€prescribe€theÏproper€disciplinary€measures€to€impose€upon€Ms.€Ray€after€the€incident€involving€Jennie€Cox.€ÏAccordingly,€the€discretionary€function€exception€to€the€waiver€of€governmental€immunity€does€notÏbar€recovery€for€Mr.€Limbaughððs€claims€against€the€negligent€nursing€home.€€Therefore,€we€reverseÏthe€judgment€of€the€intermediate€court€and€hold€that€CMC€is€liable€for€Ms.€Limbaughððs€injuriesÏproximately€caused€by€its€negligent€acts.ÌÌà@ àò òII.€€APPORTIONMENT€OF€FAULTó óÌÌà àThe€final€issue€presented€for€our€review€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€apportioning€faultÏbetween€the€negligent€and€intentional€defendants€where€the€intentional€conduct€was€the€foreseeableÏrisk€created€by€the€negligent€nursing€home.× ƒ5 ××  ×€€This€question€is€one€of€first€impression€and€requiresÏus€to€review€our€holding€in€òòTurner€v.€Jordanóó,€957€S.W.2d€815€(Tenn.€1997).€€ÌÌà àIn€òòTurneróó,€the€plaintiff,€a€hospital€nurse,€was€assaulted€and€severely€injured€by€TarryÏWilliams,€a€mentally€ill€patient€in€the€hospital€where€she€worked.€€Dr.€Jordan,€Williamsððs€treatingÏpsychiatrist,€had€diagnosed€his€patient€as€ð ðaggressive,€grandiose,€intimidating,€combative,€andÏdangerous,ðð€òòid.óó€at€817€(emphasis€omitted),€but€he€nevertheless€decided€to€discharge€him€from€theÏhospital€by€ð ðallowing€him€to€sign€out€AMA€[Against€Medical€Advice].ðð€€òòId.óó€(alteration€in€original).€ÏAfter€her€attack,€the€plaintiff€brought€suit€against€Dr.€Jordan,€alleging€that€he€violated€his€duty€to€useÍreasonable€care€in€the€treatment€of€his€patient,€which€proximately€caused€her€injuries€and€resultingÏdamages.€€After€determining€that€the€psychiatrist€did€indeed€owe€a€duty€of€care€to€the€plaintiff€nurseÏbecause€he€knew€or€should€have€known€that€his€patient€posed€ð ðan€unreasonable€risk€of€harm€to€aÏforeseeable,€readily€identifiable€third€person,ðð€òòid.óó€at€821,€we€then€held€that€the€ð ðconduct€of€aÏnegligent€defendant€should€not€be€compared€with€the€intentional€conduct€of€another€in€determiningÏcomparative€fault€where€the€intentional€conduct€is€the€foreseeable€risk€created€by€the€negligentÏtortfeasor.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€823.ÌÌà àWe€held€the€defendant€responsible€for€the€entire€amount€of€the€plaintiffððs€damages€forÏseveral€reasons.€€First,€we€determined€that€the€legal€conception€of€ð ðfaultðð€necessarily€precluded€theÏallocation€of€fault€between€negligent€and€intentional€actors€because€ð ðnegligent€and€intentional€tortsÏare€different€in€degree,€in€kind,€and€in€societyððs€view€of€the€relative€culpability€of€each€act.ðð€€òòId.óó× ƒ6 ××  ×€ÏSecond,€we€expressed€our€concern€that€allowing€comparison€would€reduce€the€negligent€personððsÏincentive€to€comply€with€the€applicable€duty€of€care€and€thus€prevent€further€wrongdoing.€€òòId.óó€ÏFinally,€we€recognized€that€when€a€defendant€breaches€a€duty€to€prevent€the€foreseeable€risk€ofÏharm€by€a€nonparty€intentional€actor,€that€negligent€co„tortfeasor€cannot€reduce€his€or€her€liabilityÏby€relying€on€the€foreseeable€risk€of€harm€that€he€or€she€had€a€duty€to€prevent.€€òòId.óó€ÌÌà àThe€present€case€presents€a€different€factual€setting.€€Unlike€òòTurneróó,€the€plaintiff€here€hasÏbrought€a€cause€of€action€against€all€tortfeasors€whose€unreasonable€acts€have€contributed€to€theÏelderly€residentððs€injuries.€€Consequently,€we€are€required€to€determine€how€to€assign€causalÏresponsibility€between€negligent€and€intentionally€tortious€defendants€where€the€intentionalÏmisconduct€is€the€foreseeable€risk€created€by€the€negligent€defendant.€€We€continue€to€adhere€to€theÏprinciple€established€in€òòTurneróó€that€the€conduct€of€a€negligent€defendant€should€not€be€comparedÏwith€the€intentional€conduct€of€a€nonparty€tortfeasor€in€apportioning€fault€where€the€intentionalÏconduct€is€the€foreseeable€risk€created€by€the€negligent€tortfeasor.€€òòId.óó;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòWhite€v.€Lawrenceóó,Ï975€S.W.2d€525,€531€(Tenn.€1998)€(holding€that€the€defendant€physicianððs€liability€would€not€beÏreduced€by€comparing€his€negligent€conduct€with€the€decedentððs€intentional€act€of€committingÏsuicide€since€the€intentional€act€was€a€foreseeable€risk€created€by€the€defendantððs€negligence).€€AfterÏcareful€consideration,€we€conclude€that€where€the€intentional€actor€and€the€negligent€actor€are€bothÏnamed€defendants€and€each€are€found€to€be€responsible€for€the€plaintiffððs€injuries,€then€eachÏdefendant€will€be€jointly€and€severally€responsible€for€the€plaintiffððs€total€damages.€€òòSee€generallyóóÍòòRestatement€(Third)€of€Tortsóó€ðð€24€(1999).€€Therefore,€both€CMC€and€Ms.€Ray€are€each€liable€forÏall€of€the€plaintiffððs€damages.× ƒ7 ××  ׀̀Ìà àAlthough€our€adoption€of€comparative€fault€abrogated€the€use€of€the€doctrine€of€joint€andÏseveral€liability€in€those€cases€where€the€defendants€are€charged€with€separate,€independent€acts€ofÏnegligence,€òòseeóó€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó,€833€S.W.2d€52,€58€(Tenn.€1992),€the€doctrine€continues€toÏbe€an€integral€part€of€the€law€in€certain€limited€instances.€€òòSeeóó€òòOwens€v.€Truckstops€of€Am.óó,€915ÏS.W.2d€420,€431€n.13,€432€(applying€joint€and€several€liability€to€parties€in€the€chain€of€distributionÏof€a€product€when€the€theory€of€recovery€is€strict€liability);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòResolution€Trust€Corp.€v.ÏBlockóó,€924€S.W.2d€354,€355„56€(Tenn.€1996)€(holding€the€officer€and€director€jointly€and€severallyÏliable€to€the€corporation€for€their€collective€actions).€€We€believe€that€in€the€context€of€a€negligentÏdefendant€failing€to€prevent€foreseeable€intentional€conduct,€the€joint€liability€rule€ð ðis€a€veryÏreasonable€and€just€rule€of€law€which€compels€each€to€assume€and€bear€the€responsibility€of€theÏmisconduct€of€all.ðð€€òòResolution€Trust€Corp.óó,€924€S.W.2d€at€356.€€Consequently,€we€reverse€the€trialÏcourtððs€apportionment€of€fault€and€hold€that€CMC€and€Louise€Ray€are€jointly€and€severally€liableÏfor€the€full€amount€of€damages€awarded€to€Mr.€Limbaugh.€€However,€because€the€trial€courtÏincorrectly€apportioned€damages€between€the€two€tortfeasors,€we€remand€this€case€to€the€CircuitÏCourt€for€Coffee€County€to€determine€the€total€amount€of€damages€for€which€each€tortfeasor€shallÏbe€jointly€and€severally€liable.ÌÌà@ àò òCONCLUSIONó óÌà@ àÌà àHaving€thoroughly€examined€the€record€in€this€case€and€after€carefully€applying€allÏapplicable€law,€we€hold€that:€(1)€the€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act€removes€governmentalÏimmunity€for€injuries€proximately€caused€by€the€negligent€act€or€omission€of€a€governmentalÏemployee€except€when€the€injury€arises€out€of€only€those€specified€torts€enumerated€in€TennesseeÏCode€Annotated€section€29„20„205(2);€and€(2)€where€the€harm€arising€from€the€tortious€acts€of€anÏintentional€tortfeasor€was€a€foreseeable€risk€created€by€a€negligent€defendant,€and€all€tortfeasorsÏhave€been€made€parties€to€the€suit,€each€tortious€actor€shall€be€jointly€and€severally€liable€for€theÏplaintiffððs€damages.€€Ìà àAccordingly,€we€affirm€that€portion€of€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€finding€CoffeeÏMedical€Center€negligent.€€However,€we€reverse€those€portions€of€the€judgment€(1)€holding€CoffeeÏMedical€Center€immune€from€suit,€and€(2)€implicitly€upholding€the€trial€courtððs€apportionment€ofÏfault€and€allocation€of€damages€between€the€negligent€and€intentional€tortfeasors.€€We€remand€theÏcase€to€the€trial€court€to€determine€the€total€amount€of€damages€to€be€awarded€to€the€plaintiff.€ÌÌà àCosts€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€appellee,€Coffee€Medical€Center.ÌÌà àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 à__________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUSTICEÌ