ÿWPC^ ©cSòË>£ÞµÂë\?É:åþD,£Àb“y àPǛԱS Ú¢˜6›~XÄ -d‹µ7Áû·¤*d:£Å™È.31 obÈ ‡&9IO9'U³8Ìa·ÖI„WoXoÛËø#ðÂ5±l€}ö3m\_¸Šì^é\¶Ö`VÀúޱè$>"»B3ªä‡~uox¸'Mf­»†1ßǰ ³ƒëÜÓÞÇý—É‹ë ÇÃð:Üä#M°–y?ÄÛ£cðÁˆ©’ßÂ4|ù<»ÉÏ·³»„sÁ”ÜWÝÎéøà2Œ fj#+ä7ŠiSwc½S7:ËêÈ#¿:ÃN@Kppë¿Õß«©S«€ŽâÖÀ¤%YMëõ :ðËð ÕwNžä©||õòXž¶ð©½BW\å×|}8yÏ"κ"Á:hÞ²D‚'ûÅŒæj.JÄA·™_¹´¤$Eʬ`IÄX8§ÌÚäEç‹IE¯e[Ù™«+dêmwû#z Z[hÏÑ`–(`¢3ÊøÐß*¬;+,íâ•R"`SòДuÀ$P,}><7Çùfþ³èôGOÉ&zÞ½Iz´«UNI %— 0(4ÅÙèw@è-( 0lU 0DÁ  AQU:bœU:  Ú U:Þ Æ ÆÞ Ƥ Æj j j j j j j j j Æ0 0Dö 0D: 0D~ B D/ßß B D3+˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0vLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡Ž~‚%3|xÇ ¾¿ÀÓ€ÁPÂÃEÄÅEÆÇ #Ñ#€ÖØXÿÿd#Ñ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó úÝ ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XxgXXXÔÔ€çXXxgÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XxgXçÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€14,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó !"#%Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular úÝ ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X ´XXXÔÔ€yXX ´ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X ´XyÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€14,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular úÝ ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X ´XXXÔÔ€yXX ´ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X ´XyÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€14,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial RegularLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5ƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó d'''÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd$$$$'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ£°ÒòòÔ€»t»XXÔÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑñ¾ññ´ñßr€ (<,(j 8` `€€@EÚ±` 8ttxP°ð  rßñ´ññ¾ñà@¯ ¯ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðñ¿ññ¾ñßt€ (>.*jxÓÿŸ` `€€@E¨_` 8ttxPàÀð Ÿ tßñ¾ññ¿ñÌà@  )àAT€NASHVILLEˆÌÌÌñ¿ñßt€(>.*jx™` `€€@EL ` 8ttxP„ ( tßñ¿ñÌSTEVE€MADDOXà  àà h àà À àà  à}à p àROBERTSON€CHANCERYÐ  ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}à p àNo.€€Below€12847Ð  p Ðà ` àPlaintiff/Appelleeà h àà À àà  à}Ð 0 € Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}à p àHon.€à È àCarol€CatalanoÐ @  Ðvs.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}à p àChancellor€€€€€Ð P   Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}ÌINSURANCE€COMPANY€OFà À àà  à}ñÁñà p àñÁññÂñ01ñÂññÃññÂñsñÂññÃññÄñS01„9709„CñÄññÅññÄñh„ñÄññÅññÆñH„00198ñÆñÐ pÀ  ÐPENNSYLVANIA€AND€SECOND€€€€€€€€€}ÌINJURY€FUNDà  àà h àà À àà  à}à p àAFFIRMED€IN€PART€AS€Ð à Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}à p àMODIFIED,€AND€REVERSEDÐ  ð Ðà ` àDefendant/Appellantà À àà  à}à p àIN€PARTÐ ° ÐÌà@(àJUDGMENT€ORDERˆÌÌÌÓ€Óà ` àà ¸ àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,€including€theÏorder€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€theÏPanel's€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÏlaw,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference.Ìà ` àà ¸ àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€Memorandum€Opinion€ofÏthe€Panel€should€be€accepted€and€approved;€andÌà ` àà ¸ àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€is€madeÏthe€judgment€of€the€Court.ÌÓ šX°œXÓà ` àà ¸ àCosts€will€be€paid€by€defendants/appellants,€€for€which€execution€mayÏissue€if€necessary.ÌÓ€Óà ` àà ¸ àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€on€December€14,€1998.Ô"*USú ú, úSUú ú, ú*ÔÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àPER€CURIAMÌóóÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ  88ˆ36 ЛÓ °šXÓÓ  ÓÑ7€eXXdìXXdì7Ñò òÑ€ üŸÑIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÐ ° ÐñÇñœßt€(>.*jxÿÝ` `€€@Eb›` 8ttxPšÓð È tß›ñÇñSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANEL€ÌñÇññÇñAT€NASHVILLEÌñÇññÇñÌÌÌñÇñßr€(<,(j 8` `€€@EÚ ` 8ttxP ð  rßñÀñœñÀññÇñÌÓ  Óó óSTEVE€MADDOX,à p à)Ð  b Ðà ` àà p à)ÌÓ! °p°!Óà ` àœPlaintiff/Appellee›à p à)à È àROBERTSON€CHANCERYÐ 2‚  Ðà ` àà p à)Ìv.à ` àà p à)à È àNO.€€01S01„9709„CH„00198Ð R¢  Ðà ` àà p à)ÌINSURANCE€COMPANY€OFà p à)à È àHON.€CAROL€CATALANO,Ð r  ÐPENNSYLVANIA€andà p à)à È àCHANCELLORÐ ‚Ò ÐSECOND€INJURY€FUND,à p à)Ð ’â Ðà ` àà p à)Ìà ` àœDefendants/Appellants›à p à)Ð ² ÐÌÌÌòòò òFor€the€Appellant:à p àFor€the€Appellee:Ð òB ÐÌó óóóKitty€Boyteà p àStacy€A.€TurnerÐ ^ ÐGracey,€Ruth,€Howard,€Tate€&€Sowellà p à105€South€Third€StreetÐ n Ð150€Second€Avenue,€North,€Suite€201à p àP.O.€Box€273Ð .~ ÐNashville,€TN€€€37201à p àClarksville,€TN€37041„0273Ð > Ž ÐÌò òòòSecond€Injury€FundÐ ^"® ÐÌó óóóVincent€PeppeÐ z$Ê ÐTennessee€Department€of€LaborÌTennessee€Tower,€6th€FloorÌ312€8th€Avenue€NorthÌNashville,€TN€€€37243ÌÌÌÓ  Óò òòòM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÐ ê+:'% ÐÌò òMembers€of€Panel:Ð .X)' ÐÌó óJustice€William€M.€BarkerÐ $0t+) ÐSenior€Judge€John€K.€ByersÌSpecial€Judge€Robert€E.€Corlew,€IIIÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌñÀññ³ñÑ üŸÑÑ#€ÖØXÿÿd#ÑÑ  Ññ³ññÀñÌñÀññ³ñÑ üŸÑÑ7€µ`XXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  Ññ³ññÀñÐ Ô;$74 ÐÑ üŸÑÑ7€eXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑñÀññ³ñÑ üŸÑÑ#€ÖØXÿÿd#ÑÑ  Ññ³ññÀñÌÌÌÌÌAFFIRMED€IN€PART€AS€MODIFIED,ÌAND€REVERSED€IN€PARTà p àà È àCORLEW,€Special€JudgeÐ  ` ÐÓ  Óòòò òOPINIONÐ  p ÐñÀññ³ñÑüŸÑÑ7€Å{XXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  Ññ³ññÀñó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌÓÓà ` àThis€workerððs€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€Special€WorkerððsÏCompensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€with€the€provisionsÏof€òòTennessee€Code€Annotated€ððóó50„6„225€(e)€(3)€(1997€Supp.)€for€hearing€andÐ ŽÞ Ðreporting€to€the€Supreme€Court€of€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€OurÏreview€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€accompanied€by€the€presumption€of€correctnessÐ Î Ðunless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€òòTennessee€Code€AnnotatedÐ î> Ðððóó50„6„225€(e)€(2)€(1997€Supp.).€Ð ^ Ðà ` àThe€proof€is€uncontroverted€that€the€Plaintiff,€while€within€the€course€and€scopeÏof€his€responsibilities€as€an€employee€of€the€Defendant,€sustained€an€injury€to€his€leftÏknee€on€May€1,€1993.€€The€Plaintiff€was€treated€by€a€number€of€orthopedic€surgeons,Ïand€a€number€of€surgeries€were€performed€upon€his€knee.€€One€of€the€treatingÏsurgeons€testified€that€the€Plaintiff€sustained€twelve€percent€anatomical€impairmentÏapportioned€to€his€left€leg.€€The€other€treating€doctors€did€not€testify.€€A€doctor€whoÏtestified€on€behalf€of€the€Plaintiff€performed€an€independent€medical€examination,€andÏopined€that€the€Plaintiff€sustained€twenty„five€percent€anatomical€impairmentÏapportioned€to€his€leg.€€€Following€his€initial€injury,€the€Plaintiff€received€temporaryÏtotal€disability€benefits€for€a€period€of€time.€€He€remained€away€from€the€work€placeÏuntil€November€15,€1994,€except€for€very€brief€intervals€when€he€returned€to€work€forÏshort€periods€of€time€either€under€restrictions,€or€while€awaiting€treatment€by€anotherÏdoctor.€€€On€November€15,€the€Plaintiff€was€returned€to€limited€duty€for€work€whichÏinvolved€sitting€only.€€The€Plaintiff€was€to€retain€this€position€for€so€long€as€heÐ Î952 Ðremained€on€crutches.€€€The€employer€had€a€policy€of€accommodating€virtually€allÏtemporary€restrictions€resulting€from€work„related€injuries,€and€returned€the€PlaintiffÏto€duty€sitting€at€a€table€in€an€area€near€his€regular€work€station€enclosed€by€ð ðchickenÏwire.ðð€€€Without€reporting€any€psychological€injury,€the€Plaintiff€began€seeing€aÏpsychologist€some€time€during€the€summer€of€1994,€and€was€referred€to€a€psychiatristÏin€October€of€that€year.€€In€January€1995,€the€psychiatrist€sent€a€letter€to€the€employerÏstating€that€the€Plaintiff€was€unable€to€work€ð ðdue€to€work„related€stressors.ðð€€HisÏpsychological€problems€prevented€the€Plaintiff€from€returning€to€the€work€place€untilÏFebruary€7,€1997.€€€Because€the€employer€considered€the€psychological€injury€not€toÏbe€work„related,€the€Plaintiff€had€been€allowed€to€collect€benefits€for€fifty„two€(52)Ïweeks€under€an€insurance€policy€of€accident€and€sickness€coverage€during€this€period.€ÏÌà ` àThe€Trial€Court€heard€the€testimony€of€the€Plaintiff€and€his€witnesses,€includingÏlive€testimony€of€one€psychiatrist,€and€the€deposition€testimony€of€that€sameÏpsychiatrist€and€a€second€psychiatrist,€both€presented€by€the€Plaintiff.€€The€PlaintiffÏalso€presented€deposition€testimony€of€an€orthopedic€surgeon€who€had€conducted€anÏindependent€medical€examination€and€two€lay€witnesses.€€€The€Defendant€presentedÏthe€lay€testimony€of€the€employerððs€safety€manager,€and€the€testimony€of€one€of€theÏauthorized€treating€orthopedic€surgeons.€€No€psychological€evidence€was€presentedÏby€the€Defendant.€€€The€Trial€Court€determined€that€the€Plaintiff€sustained€oneÏhundred€percent€vocational€disability€to€his€left€leg,€and€further€established€thatÏalthough€the€Plaintiff€had€no€permanent€impairment€due€to€his€psychological€œinjury,›Ïhe€was€entitled€to€twenty„five€(25)€months€temporary€total€disability€due€to€hisÏpsychological€problems,€finding€those€psychological€problems€to€have€been€relatedÏto€the€initial€knee€injury.€€The€Trial€Court€ruled€that€the€employer€was€not€entitled€toÏreimbursement€for€the€money€paid€to€the€Plaintiff€under€the€sickness€and€accidentÐ Ð9 52 Ðinsurance€policy.€€€€Finally€the€Trial€Court€determined€that€the€Plaintiff€was€entitledÏto€receive€all€of€his€benefits€in€a€lump€sum,€commutation€of€the€award€beingÏappropriate.€€Ìà ` àAfter€our€review€of€the€evidence,€it€is€our€finding€that€the€Plaintiff€did€in€factÏsustain€a€permanent€injury€apportioned€to€his€left€leg,€but€that€his€benefits€under€theÏworkerððs€compensation€law€should€be€limited€to€sixty€(60)€percent€vocationalÏdisability€apportioned€to€the€leg.€€€We€affirm€the€finding€of€the€Trial€Court€that€theÏPlaintiff€is€entitled€to€twenty„five€(25)€months€temporary€total€disability€benefits€forÏhis€psychological€injury,€but€we€reverse€the€finding€that€the€employer€is€not€entitledÏto€reimbursement€of€the€sums€paid€under€the€sickness€and€accident€insurance€policy.€Ï€Finally,€we€find€that€the€evidence€does€not€justify€commutation€of€the€award,Ïalthough€the€Plaintiff€is€entitled€to€receive€his€accrued€benefits€in€a€lump€sum,€and€aÏsum€sufficient€to€compensate€his€attorney€similarly€should€be€commuted.€€Ìà ` àIn€performing€our€òòde€novoóó€review€of€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Court€with€regardÐ P   Ðto€the€Plaintiffððs€vocational€disability,€we€have€considered€the€evidence€presented€toÏthe€Trial€Court€with€regard€to€all€pertinent€factors,€including€the€anatomicalÏimpairment,€medical€restrictions,€and€lay€evidence€concerning€the€Plaintiffððs€disabledÏcondition,€the€Plaintiffððs€age,€education,€transferrable€job€skills,€and€evidence€to€theÏdegree€that€it€was€presented€concerning€local€job€opportunities€available€to€theÏPlaintiff€in€his€disabled€condition.€€With€regard€to€evidence€presented€to€the€TrialÏCourt€in€the€form€of€testimony,€we€have€reviewed€the€record€accompanied€by€aÏpresumption€of€correctness,€as€stated€above,€but€with€regard€to€evidence€presented€byÏdeposition,€we€have€reviewed€that€testimony€òòde€novoóó,€without€a€presumption€ofÐ p3À., Ðcorrectness.€€òòKrick€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€945€S.W.2d€709,€712€(Tenn.€1997).€€WeÐ 5à0. Ðhave€considered€permanent€restrictions€imposed€upon€the€Plaintiff,€includingÏrestrictions€providing€that€he€avoid€repetitive€pounding,€repetitive€squatting,€repetitiveÐ Ð9 52 Ðstooping,€quantities€of€heavy€lifting,€and€that€he€avoid€occasional€squatting.€€€Ìà ` àWe€have€considered€the€anatomical€impairment€ratings€of€Dr.€Burton€€E.€Elrod,Ïone€of€the€treating€physicians,€who€opined€that€the€Plaintiff€sustained€twelve€percentÏanatomical€impairment,€and€the€opinion€of€Dr.€Richard€Fishbein,€who€performed€anÏindependent€medical€evaluation,€who€opined€that€the€Plaintiff€sustained€twenty„fiveÏpercent€anatomical€impairment.€€€We€have€recognized€the€Plaintiffððs€age€as€presentedÏby€the€evidence,€being€forty„two€(42)€years,€and€his€education,€which€includesÏgraduation€from€high€school.€€€His€prior€employment€has€involved€primarily€menialÏlabor,€having€worked€as€a€tire€builder€and€warehouse€worker€and€other€productionÏtype€jobs€for€his€employer,€and€having€previously€worked€as€a€welder,€mechanic,Ïfreight€loader,€and€in€similar€jobs.€€€Evidence€was€presented€from€the€safety€directorÏfor€the€employer€at€the€time€of€trial€that€jobs€were€available€in€limited€numbers€withinÏthe€restrictions€of€the€Plaintiff,€but€no€other€evidence€was€presented€for€either€partyÏwith€regard€to€the€availability€of€jobs€within€the€open€market€in€the€Plaintiffððs€currentÏcondition.€€€€We€find€that€sixty€percent€vocational€disability,€apportioned€to€the€leftÏleg,€adequately€compensates€the€Plaintiff€for€his€injury.€€Therefore,€we€affirm€theÏdecision€of€the€Trial€Court€in€its€finding€of€permanent€disability,€yet€we€modify€theÏdecision€after€a€full€consideration€of€the€evidence.€€It€is€our€finding€that€the€PlaintiffððsÏvocational€disability€should€be€limited€to€sixty€percent.Ìà ` àNext€we€consider€the€far€more€complex€question€of€temporary€total€disabilityÏfor€psychological€injury.€€€The€Trial€Court€related€the€Plaintiffððs€psychologicalÏproblems€to€his€knee€injury,€and€awarded€compensation.€€We€have€recognized€theÏevidence€which€shows€that€the€Plaintiff€began€seeking€treatment€from€a€psychologistÏduring€the€summer€of€1994,€after€his€knee€injury€on€May€1,€1993.€€Further,€in€OctoberÏ1994,€the€Plaintiff€initially€saw€a€psychiatrist.€€It€was€not€until€January€6,€1995,€someÏtwenty€months€after€his€initial€knee€injury€that€his€psychological€injury€becameÐ Ð9 52 Ðsufficiently€disabling€to€cause€his€absence€from€the€work€place.€€The€record€is€filledÏwith€events€which€occurred€in€the€Plaintiffððs€life€after€his€knee€injury€and€before€hisÏdisability.€€€Some€of€those€events€were€in€fact€in€some€manner€related€to€his€kneeÏinjury,€including€the€Plaintiffððs€frustration€over€his€inability€to€recover€from€his€injuryÏto€his€knee.€€Other€events€were€totally€unrelated€to€the€work€place,€however,€includingÏevidence€of€an€automobile€accident€which€occurred€shortly€before€his€disability€dueÏto€psychological€problems.€€After€considering€all€of€the€facts,€we€find€that€theÏpsychological€injury€was€in€fact€a€new€and€separate€injury€from€the€initial€knee€injury.€Ï€Had€the€psychological€injury€been€occasioned€by€the€Plaintiffððs€frustration€over€hisÏinability€to€recover€physically,€and€his€dissatisfaction€with€requirements€of€hisÏemployer€that€he€drive€to€the€work€place€to€receive€various€compensation€checksÏwhile€he€was€not€working,€it€would€be€our€finding€that€the€Plaintiff€would€not€beÏentitled€to€œrecover€under›€Tennessee€law,€€òòJose€v.€Equi„Faxóó,€556€S.W.2d€82€(Tenn.Ð 0€ Ð1977);€òòCigna€v.€Sneedóó,€772€S.W.2d€422€(Tenn.€1989).€€€We€find,€however,€that€theÐ P   Ðevidence€preponderates€in€favor€of€a€finding€that€the€Plaintiff€suffered€a€psychologicalÏinjury€after€he€returned€to€work€for€the€employer€after€November€15,€1994,€whichÏaggravated€the€Plaintiffððs€pre„existing€mental€condition€to€the€extent€that€it€becameÏtemporarily€disabling,€necessitating€his€absence€from€employment.€€We€thus€find€theÏdate€of€this€injury€to€be€January€6,€1995,€which€finding€appears€to€be€supported€by€theÏtestimony€of€both€psychiatrists€who€testified.€€There€is€no€evidence€that€the€PlaintiffÏsustained€any€permanent€impairment€or€permanent€vocational€disability€due€to€theseÏproblems,€but€the€evidence€preponderates€in€favor€of€a€finding€that€the€Plaintiff€didÏsuffer€from€a€condition€which€resulted€in€temporary€total€disability,€as€determined€byÏthe€Trial€Court,€for€a€period€of€twenty„five€(25)€months.€€€The€requirement€under€theÏlaw€for€notice€to€the€employer€of€an€injury€is€satisfied€by€a€letter€from€the€PlaintiffððsÏpsychiatrist€on€the€date€that€the€€injury€became€temporarily€disabling.€€Although€weÐ Ð9 52 Ðfind€that€the€cause€of€the€injury€was€different€from€that€determined€by€the€Trial€Court,Ïwe€affirm€the€finding€of€the€Trial€Court€that€the€injury€was€in€fact€compensableÏtemporarily€for€twenty„five€(25)€months,€and€we€thus€affirm€the€decision€of€the€TrialÏCourt€in€this€respect.€€Ìà ` àNext,€we€turn€our€attention€to€the€question€of€reimbursement€of€sickness€andÏaccident€benefits€previously€paid€by€the€employer.€€€The€Trial€Court€found€that€theÏemployer€was€not€entitled€to€reimbursement€of€those€sums,€apparently€under€theÏtheory€that€the€contract€of€insurance€was€not€adequately€proven€by€the€employer.€€WeÏagree€with€the€Trial€Court€that€the€proof€on€this€issue€certainly€was€not€presented€inÏdetail.€€The€policy€of€insurance€was€never€introduced.€€In€fact,€the€only€evidenceÏpresented€by€any€party€as€to€this€issue€was€the€testimony€of€the€employerððs€safetyÏdirector€that€a€reimbursement€provision€was€contained€within€the€policy€of€insurance.€ÏÌà ` àReimbursement€provisions€of€insurance€contracts€are€treated€under€the€law€justÏas€provisions€of€other€contracts.€€While€stipulations€are€often€reached€concerning€suchÏreimbursements€provisions,€we€agree€with€the€Plaintiff€that€the€better€rule€when€suchÏissues€are€contested€is€to€present€the€insurance€contract€for€consideration€by€the€Court.€ÏIn€this€cause,€however,€because€the€only€evidence€on€the€issue€is€that€the€contract€doesÏprovide€for€€reimbursement,€we€find€that€the€evidence€so€preponderates,€and€weÏtherefore€reverse€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Court€as€to€this€issue,€and€order€theÏreimbursement.€€Ìà ` àFinally,€we€find€that€the€evidence€does€not€justify€commutation€of€the€workerððsÏaward.€€The€Plaintiff€is,€of€course,€entitled€to€receive€those€benefits€which€haveÏaccrued€since€his€date€of€maximum€medical€improvement,€being€February€7,€1997.€ÏòòSee,€Henson€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburg,€óó851€S.W.2d€809,€814€(Tenn.€1993);òò€Lock€v.Ð °730 ÐNational€Union€Fire€Insurance€Co.€of€Pittsburgh,€óó809€S.W.2d€483,€488€(Tenn.€1991);Ð Ð9 52 ÐòòDavenport€v.€Taylor€Feed€Millóó,€784€S.W.2d€923,€926€(Tenn.€1990).€€€€Further,€itÐ ° Ðappears€appropriate€to€award€payment€of€attorneyððs€fees€similarly€in€a€lump€sum.ò ò€Ð Ð  Ðó óòòTennessee€Code€Annotated€ððóó50„6„229€(a)€(1998€Supp.).€€€€€While€we€recognize€thatÐ øH Ðthere€is€a€very€limited€amount€of€compensation€which€has€not€accrued,€the€principleÏremains€the€same,€and€we€find€that€the€proof€when€examined€in€comparison€withÏrecent€case€law€does€not€justify€commutation.€€òòSee,€Spencer€v.€Towson€Moving€&Ð X¨  ÐStorage,€Inc.,€óó922€S.W.2d€508,€511€(Tenn.€1996);òò€€€Henson€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburg,óóÐ xÈ  Ð851€S.W.2d€809,€814€(Tenn.€1993);€òò€€€North€American€Royalties€v.€óóThrasher,€817Ð ˜è ÐS.W.2d€308,€310„311€(Tenn.€1991).€€œÌà ` àLittle€evidence€was€presented€with€regard€to€the€ability€of€the€Plaintiff€wiselyÏto€manage€his€funds.€€€Proof€was€presented,€however,€showing€that€the€Plaintiff€isÏgenerally€delinquent€in€his€payment€of€bills€and€further€that€he€was€some€eight€monthsÏor€more€in€arrears€in€his€payment€of€his€house€note.€€Where€the€proof€does€notÏdemonstrate€that€a€party€can€wisely€manage€his€funds€and€that€it€is€in€the€workerððs€bestÏinterest€to€receive€an€award€in€a€lump€sum,€the€award€shall€not€be€commuted.›Ìà ` àIn€summary,€then,€we€affirm€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Court€in€its€finding€thatÏthe€Plaintiff€has€sustained€permanent€disability€apportioned€to€his€leg,€and€we€modifyÏthat€award€to€provide€for€sixty€(60)€percent€vocational€disability.€€We€further€affirmÏthe€Trial€Courtððs€decision€that€the€Plaintiff€is€entitled€to€twenty„five€(25)€monthsÏtemporary€total€disability€due€to€his€psychological€problems,€but€is€not€entitled€to€anÏaward€of€permanent€disability€for€his€psychological€injury.€€We€reverse€the€decisionÏof€the€Trial€Court€with€regard€to€the€issue€of€reimbursement€of€the€sickness€andÏaccident€insurance€payment,€and€we€further€reverse€with€regard€to€commutation.€€Ìà ` àCosts€are€assessed€against€the€œAppellant.›ÌÌ€€Ð Ø9(52 ÐÓÓà ` à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ï_______________________________________Ìà ` à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Robert€E.€Corlew,€III,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€JusticeÌñÇñœñÇñÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€JudgeÌœñÇñÔ†ÿÿÔÔ†ÿÿÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔñÇñ