ÿWPC! ÿÉ´¢Wö£½Å¢ô¼# ¡žð–3)ÛÑz„«ùÞ@þ÷Æ9EÖ›|òNÍ/¾é'û‚!ƒzù b¾×`Q1+ŸŽÓvP©–·5w= ØÂÝFسé¨wkÄß™…§¤™S“ÜÀTõL"í×’ nÂQ”ù"–3ƒWä¾xB¤\Åfî‡Ý»(<óK9*˜ûèrñ,Ÿâ‘մ㮪Oq Ъ«!½Ýò+ }xÉu”[Ã'48ßHܤö‘Дÿ¦fþ#"²]}{›:¸~ÿ„ƒ,{QnVE¥ë –õ7œ~ôÞJyÁD/AÂf½AƒèÚ¹Q"@/¡M<¾Eè÷Ju‰´¥¨‹4Ȭ}ÀԌߖÚxÚ5ÿ|ýàÐÈɲª¹Ih¸$R3&–èdîàv ÍV {âÎ-Â>%>¹`ªE| Ýa&ñþ÷QoD=›2 +áØÿ¹ÓÛà Ôr|´I”«Šu\¯¡±‹âO•zªí]öY ¢Ê%¬(5[V3gæ²õj,ݨž’ÍqC ºyb`y%‡ˆÏÌHeºpNÕÜJ•ðƒõàÛ3335^a ÿx¥*H?Ê«$åÑ3iÁ˜$lUm!Å}ñýq¥ùXsዘÐÞÿb %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ ‘ Æ™ Æ_ Æ% Æë U@±Nñ 1‡ó 72zz 1u¬ 72! 0cS<¶9ò 0D+UNoß½Eœœœ;ž-ÙÙÙÙÙÙÙÙÙÙÙb 0ë Bùù 0¤ D3º D-í 0K ASeƸ 0¤~ 0D" A«f »A‡+s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularXq+ê:i¢Ø+003|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0 Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(ÆúI Z‹(Times New Roman (нCEKQW]cioAutoList1A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à 2Ý ƒRe*$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô®íò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô®íòòô®íÔÔ‡ô®íòòô®íÔThe€trial€court€made€two€awards,€one€for€the€loss€of€each€arm.€€The€Workersðð€Compensation€Law,€however,Ð ° Ðspecifically€provides€scheduled€benefits€for€the€loss€of€two€arms,€which€means€that€only€one€award€is€required.€€Tenn.Ð tÄ ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(3)(A)(ii)(w);€òòsee,€e.g.óó,€òòThomas€v.€Murray,€Inc.óó,€No.€W2000„01280„WC„R3„CV,€2001€WL€640241Ð 8ˆ Ð(Tenn.€Sp.€Workers€Comp.€June€5,€2001);€òòSmith€v.€Sentry€Ins.€Co.óó,€No.€W1999„02148„WC„R3„CV,€2000€WL€1425115Ð üL Ð(Tenn.€Sp.€Workers€Comp.€June€28,€2000).€€While€the€courtððs€mistake€does€not€affect€the€number€of€weeks€of€benefits,Ð À Ðwe€wish€to€point€out€that€trial€courts€in€the€future€need€only€make€one€award.Ô‡XBIXòô®íÔÐ „Ô ÐÔ#†XBIXXXBI#ÔÔ#†ô®íòXXBI¸#Ô /Ñ ° ÑÑ#€CXÿÿd#Ñ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(@øÐ Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular ÕÝ ƒRe*$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô®íò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô®íòòô®íÔTo€avoid€confusion,€it€should€be€noted€that€basing€the€35%„65%€calculation€on€260€weeks€rather€than€400Ð ° Ðweeks€does€not€conflict€with€our€recent€decision€in€òòPeace€v.€Easy€Trucking€Co.óó,€38€S.W.3d€526€(Tenn.€2001).€€In€òòPeaceóóÐ tÄ Ðwe€held€that€permanent€partial€disability€awards€for€employees€over€age€60€must€be€calculated€as€a€percentage€of€400Ð 8ˆ Ðweeks,€with€total€benefits€capped€at€260€weeks,€rather€than€as€a€percentage€of€260€weeks.€€That€case,€of€course,Ð üL Ðconcerned€the€total€amount€of€benefits€to€which€an€employee€was€entitled,€a€number€that€changed€depending€upon€theÐ À  Ðapproach€taken€(i.e.,€X%€of€400€is€greater€than€X%€of€260).€€òòSeeóó€òòPeaceóó,€38€S.W.3d€at€530€n.5.€€Here,€we€are€concernedÐ ° Ðwith€apportionment,€not€Scalesððs€overall€award:€€she€will€receive€260€weeks€for€her€second€injury€regardless€of€whatÐ tÄ Ðpercentages€are€allocated€to€Oak€Ridge€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€€To€calculate€Oak€Ridgeððs€share€as€a€percentage€ofÐ 8ˆ Ð400€and€then€subtract€that€number€from€260€to€arrive€at€the€Second€Injury€Fundððs€share€would€change€the€35%„65%€split.€Ð üL ЀNo€statutory€provision€or€underlying€policy€calls€for€such€a€confusing€result. 1Ñ#€CXÿÿd#ÑØØ #Ñ#€CXÿÿd#Ñ- ù-(|G2e*$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€E»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô®íò»»Ô d(|3=$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€E»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3=$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€E»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€E»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼E»»»ÔÑ8€BIXXdì»»d8ÑÑ€"ôÑÑ€#û#ÑÑ€uî ÑÔ€¼E»»¼EÔÓ=€E»Ð»dÐd=Óà@™ ™ ìàÔ‡îÀ©î»¼EÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼E»îîÀ©›#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  Óà @ àMay€2,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XBIX»¼EÔÌò òÔ#†¼E»XXBI†#ÔMATTIE€L.€SCALES€v.€CITY€OF€OAK€RIDGE,€ET€AL.òòó óóóÔ‡XBIX»¼EÔÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Anderson€County€Ð ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€98LA0282€&€99LA0035€€€James€B.€Scott,€Jr.,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2000„00499„WCM„CV€„€Filed€August€23,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_Ô€€€Ð ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÔ#†¼E»XXBI#ÔÔ‡XBIX»¼EÔÌÓ  ÓÔ#†¼E»XXBIO#ÔÔ€XBIX»¼EÔThis€workersðð€compensation€case€presents€several€questions€involving€the€calculation€of€anÐ xÈ  Ðemployeeððs€benefits€award€and€its€apportionment€between€her€employer€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund,Ð d´ Ðincluding€a€question€involving€the€social€security€offset€provision€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€50„Ð P  Ð6„207(4)(A)(i).€€The€judgments€of€the€trial€court€and€the€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€AppealsÐ <Œ ÐPanel€involve€numerous€findings€and€holdings,€discussed€in€detail€below.€€After€considering€bothÐ (x Ðjudgments,€and€the€applicable€statutes€and€case€law,€we€hold€that:€€the€employee€sustained€twoÐ d Ðseparate€injuries,€each€of€which€is€separately€compensable;€the€first€injury,€to€her€arms,€is€not€subjectÐ P Ðto€the€260€week€cap€in€section€207(4)(A)(i)€because€it€is€an€injury€to€a€scheduled€member;€neitherÐ ì< Ðof€the€two€awards€is€subject€to€the€social€security€offset€provision;€the€Second€Injury€Fund€isÐ Ø( Ðresponsible€for€65%€of€260€weeks€of€benefits€for€the€permanent€total€disability€award€after€theÐ Ä Ðemployer€fully€satisfies€its€obligation€of€35%€of€that€award;€and€the€employer€is€responsible€for€theÐ ° Ðfull€amount€of€benefits€relating€to€the€employeeððs€first€injury.€€The€effect€of€these€holdings€is€toÐ œì Ðaffirm€in€part€and€reverse€in€part€the€decision€of€the€Panel.Ð ˆØ ÐÓoÓÌò òAppeal€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e);€Judgment€of€the€Ð `° ÐSpecial€Workersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€Affirmed€in€Part;€Ð L œ ÐReversed€in€Part;€Case€Remanded€to€the€Circuit€Courtó óÐ 8!ˆ  ÐÌÓ  ÓòòFrank€F.€Ô_ÔDrowotaÔ_Ô,€III,€Jóó.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òò€Ô_ÔAdolphoÔ_Ô€A.€Birch,€Jr.,Ð #`" ÐJanice€M.€Holder,€óóandòò€William€M.€Barker,€JJ.,€óó€joined.òò€€E.€Riley€Anderson,€C.J.,óó€notÐ ü#L# Ðparticipating.Ð è$8 $ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àÌJohn€T.€Batson,€Jr.,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellants,€The€City€of€Oak€Ridge,€The€City€ofÐ À&"& ÐOak€Ridge€Board€of€Education,€and€TML€Risk€Management€Pool.Ð ¬'ü"' ÐÌRoger€L.€Ridenour,€Clinton,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Mattie€L.€Scales.Ð „)Ô$) ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter,€E.€Blaine€Sprouse,€Assistant€Attorney€General,Ð \+¬&+ ÐNashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Second€Injury€Fund.€Ð H,˜', ÐÐ 4-„(-ý ÐÑ"ôÑâ "âÑ8€BIXXdìXXdì8ÑØØâ "âÑ  ÑÓ´ ÓÌÓÓà@@OO&ìàò òOPINIONó óÐ œì Ðòòò òÓÓI.€€Backgroundóóó óÐ tÄ ÐÓ  Óà  àThe€employee,€Mattie€L.€Scales€(ð ðScalesðð),€who€was€seventy„two€years€old€at€the€time€ofÐ `° Ðtrial,€had€worked€in€the€food€service€department€of€the€City€of€Oak€Ridge€school€system€(ð ðOakÐ L œ ÐRidgeðð)€for€forty„seven€years.€€In€early€1997,€Scales€developed€pain€and€numbness€in€her€hands€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðarms.€€She€sought€medical€treatment€and€was€diagnosed€with€carpal€tunnel€syndrome€in€both€herÐ $ t Ðhands,€for€which€she€required€surgery.€€In€January€1998,€she€returned€to€work.€€On€April€14,€whileÐ  ` Ðon€the€job,€she€tripped€and€fell,€causing€injury€to€her€back.€€She€sought€treatment€for€this€injury€butÐ ü L  Ðwas€not€able€to€return€to€work€again.€€She€received€retirement€benefits€from€the€TennesseeÐ è 8  ÐConsolidated€Retirement€System€in€the€amount€of€$962€per€month.€€She€did€not€apply€for€SocialÐ Ô$  ÐSecurity€benefits,€but€instead€drew€such€benefits€from€her€deceased€husbandððs€account€in€the€amountÐ À  Ðof€$832€per€month,€which€she€believed€was€greater€than€what€she€would€be€eligible€to€receive€in€herÐ ¬ü  Ðown€right.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àBecause€of€these€injuries,€Scales€brought€an€action€for€workersðð€compensation€benefits€in€theÐ pÀ Ðtrial€court.€€She€filed€two€separate€suits,€one€for€the€injury€to€her€arms,€the€other€for€the€injury€to€herÐ \¬ Ðback.€€The€court€consolidated€these€cases€for€one€trial.€€After€hearing€medical€evidence€aboutÐ H˜ ÐScalesððs€injuries,€the€court€awarded€her€75%€permanent€partial€disability€to€each€arm;€this€equals€150Ð 4„ Ðweeks€of€benefits€per€arm,€i.e.,€300€weeks.Ô_Ô׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€Regarding€Scalesððs€back€injury,€the€court€awarded€herÐ  p Ðan€additional€permanentòò€óópartial€disability€of€35%€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€The€court€also€determinedÐ  \ Ðthat€the€combination€of€these€two€injuries€rendered€her€totally€and€permanently€disabled.€€Thus,€theÐ øH Ðcourt€found€that€Scales€was€entitled€to€ð ðpermanent€total€disabilityðð€benefits,€and€since€she€was€overÐ ä4 Ð60€years€old€when€injured,€these€benefits€were€capped€at€260€weeks.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„Ð Ð  Ð207(4)(A)(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô).€€The€total€weeks€of€benefits€awarded,€therefore,€was€560€(300€permanent€partial€forÐ ¼  Ðthe€first€injury,€plus€260€permanent€total€for€the€second€injury).€€Finally,€the€court€apportioned€25%Ð ¨ø Ðof€the€permanent€total€disability€award€to€Oak€Ridge€and€75%€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àOak€Ridge€(along€with€the€Oak€Ridge€Board€of€Education€and€the€Boardððs€insurance€carrier,Ð l¼ ÐÔ_ÔTMLÔ_Ô€Risk€Management€Pool)€appealed€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€to€the€Supreme€Court.€€The€case€wasÐ X ¨ Ðreferred€to€the€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„Ð D!” Ð225(e)(3).€€The€Panel€considered€and€decided€several€issues.€€First,€it€rejected€Oak€Ridgeððs€argumentÐ 0"€  Ðthat€Scales€only€sustained€one€injury;€rather,€the€Panel€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€she€hadÐ #l! Ðsustained€two€separate€injuries,€each€of€which€is€separately€compensable.€€Second,€the€Panel€rejectedÐ $X" ÐOak€Ridgeððs€argument€that€the€permanent€partial€disability€award€(75%€to€each€arm;€300€weeks)€isÐ ô$D # Ðsubject€to€the€260€week€cap;€rather,€it€held€that€the€cap€does€not€apply€to€ð ðscheduled€membersðð€suchÐ ° Ðas€arms,€based€on€òòÔ_ÔMcIlvainÔ_Ô€v.€Russell€Ô_ÔStoverÔ_Ô€Candies,€Inc.óó,€996€S.W.2d€179€(Tenn.€1999).€€Third,Ð œì Ðthe€Panel€accepted€part€of€Oak€Ridgeððs€argument€that€the€trial€court€should€have€reduced€ScalesððsÐ ˆØ Ðaward€by€the€amount€of€social€security€benefits€she€drew€from€her€deceased€husbandððs€account;€itÐ tÄ Ðagreed€with€Oak€Ridge€that€an€offset€was€required,€but€held€that€the€offset€only€applied€to€theÐ `° Ðpermanent€total€disability€award€(for€Scalesððs€second€injury,€to€her€back).€€Finally,€the€Panel€foundÐ L œ Ðthat€it€could€not€determine€the€exact€apportionment€of€Scalesððs€award€between€Oak€Ridge€and€theÐ 8 ˆ ÐSecond€Injury€Fund,€since€there€was€no€evidence€in€the€record€as€to€how€the€award€of€75%€disabilityÐ $ t Ðto€each€arm€would€convert€into€a€percentage€of€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Without€suchÐ  ` Ðevidence,€the€Panel€concluded€it€could€not€determine€which€subsection€of€Tennessee€CodeÐ ü L  ÐAnnotated€50„6„208€ð!ð€subsection€(a)€or€subsection€(b)€ð!ð€applied,€and€so€it€could€not€apportionÐ è 8  Ðliability€correctly€under€òòÔ_ÔBomelyÔ_Ô€v.€Mid„America€Corp.óó,€970€S.W.2d€929€(Tenn.€1998).€€On€this€lastÐ Ô$  Ðissue,€the€Panel€remanded€the€case€to€the€trial€court.Ð À  ÐÌÌÓ  Óò òòòII.€€Our€Findings€of€Fact€and€Conclusions€of€Lawóóó óÐ „Ô  ÐÓc&Óà  àBoth€Scales€and€Oak€Ridge€sought€further€review€in€this€Court€and€we€granted€their€motions.€Ð pÀ ÐAs€discussed€later€in€this€opinion,€we€affirm€the€Panelððs€first€two€findings:€€Scales€did€suffer€twoÐ \¬ Ðseparate€injuries,€each€of€which€is€separately€compensable;€further,€the€injury€to€her€arms,€which€areÐ H˜ Ðscheduled€members,€is€not€subject€to€the€260€week€cap.€€As€to€the€third,€we€reverse€the€PanelððsÐ 4„ Ðholding€that€a€social€security€offset€is€required€against€the€permanent€total€disability€award;€the€trialÐ  p Ðcourt€correctly€determined€that€no€offset€is€required€for€either€the€permanent€partial€or€permanentÐ  \ Ðtotal€award.€€We€also€conclude€ð!ð€and€all€the€parties€in€this€case€agree€ð!ð€that€a€remand€is€unnecessary.€Ð øH ÐUnder€the€ð ðnumber€of€weeksððconversion€method,€explained€below,€we€find€that€300€weeks€ofÐ ä4 Ðbenefits€for€Scalesððs€injury€to€her€arms€is€equivalent€to€75%€permanent€partial€disability€to€the€bodyÐ Ð  Ðas€a€whole.€€Added€to€the€subsequent€injury€with€a€35%€disability,€relating€to€her€back€injury,Ð ¼  ÐScalesððs€award€exceeds€100%€permanent€and€total€disability,€thereby€implicating€both€subsectionÐ ¨ø Ð(a)€and€subsection€(b).€€Under€òòÔ_ÔBomelyÔ_Ôóó,€we€find€that€subsection€(a)€controls.€€Therefore,€the€SecondÐ ”ä ÐInjury€Fund€is€liable€for€65%€of€benefits€for€Scalesððs€second€injury€(which,€under€the€statutory€cap,Ð €Ð Ðis€260€weeks)€after€Oak€Ridge€satisfies€its€obligation€of€35%.€€Finally,€we€hold€that€Oak€Ridge€isÐ l¼ Ðliable€for€the€full€amount€of€benefits€relating€to€Scalesððs€first€injury€to€her€arms.€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌÓ  Óò òòòIII.€€Analysisóóó óÐ 0"€  ÐÓ.Óà  àAppellate€review€of€factual€findings€in€a€workerððs€compensation€case€is€de€novo€upon€theÐ #l! Ðrecord€of€the€trial€court€with€a€presumption€that€the€courtððs€findings€are€correct.€€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.Ð $X" Ððð€50„6„225(e)(2).€€Questions€of€law,€however,€are€reviewed€de€novo,€without€a€presumption€ofÐ ô$D # Ðcorrectness.€€òòSmith€v.€U.S.€Pipe€&€Foundry€Co.óó,€14€S.W.3d€739,€742€(Tenn.€2000);€òòNutt€v.Ð à%0!$ ÐChampion€Intððl€Corp.óó,€980€S.W.2d€365,€367€(Tenn.€1998).€Ð Ì&"% ÐÓ€ (н83ÓòòóóÌà  àInitially,€we€note€that€the€Panelððs€first€two€findings€are€clearly€supported€by€recent€decisionsÐ ¤(ô#' Ðof€this€Court€and€may€therefore€be€disposed€of€without€lengthy€discussion.€€First,€it€is€clear€thatÐ )à$( ÐScales€suffered€two€separate€injuries,€one€to€her€arms€and€the€other,€over€a€year€later,€to€her€back.€Ð |*Ì%) ÐIn€òòSeals€v.€England/Corsair€Upholstery€Mfg.óó,€984€S.W.2d€912,€916€(Tenn.€1999),€the€Court€held€thatÐ h+¸&* Ða€workersðð€compensation€claimant€who€suffered€two€distinct€injuries,€and€was€ultimately€determinedÐ ° Ðto€be€permanently€and€totally€disabled,€was€entitled€to€separate€disability€awards€for€both€herÐ œì Ðinjuries.€€The€same€is€true€for€Scales.€€The€fact€that€these€two€injuries€became€part€of€the€same€suit,Ð ˆØ Ðafter€the€trial€court€consolidated€Scalesððs€separately€filed€complaints,€is€irrelevant.€€Second,€inÐ tÄ ÐòòÔ_ÔMcIlvainÔ_Ôóó,€the€Court€held€that€the€260€week€cap€set€forth€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„6„Ð `° Ð207(4)(A)(i)€€ð ðapplies€to€workers€over€age€60€who€suffer€injuries€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€whetherÐ L œ Ðpermanent€partial€or€permanent€total,€òòbut€not€to€such€workers€who€suffer€scheduled€memberÐ 8 ˆ Ðinjuriesóó.ðð€€996€S.W.2d€at€185€(emphasis€added).€€Scalesððs€first€injury,€which€occurred€when€she€wasÐ $ t Ðover€60€years€old,€was€to€both€her€arms,€which€are€scheduled€members.€€Thus,€under€òòMcIlvainóó,€thisÐ  ` Ðfirst€injury€is€not€subject€to€the€260€week€cap.€€Her€second€injury,€to€her€back,€is€subject€to€that€cap.€Ð ü L  ÐòòSeeóó€òòid.óó;€òòVogel€v.€Wells€Fargo€Guard€Serv.óó,€937€S.W.2d€856,€862€(Tenn.€1996).€€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àScalesððs€second€injury,€which€resulted€in€a€combined€award€exceeding€100%€permanentÐ À  Ðdisability,€raises€two€further€issues€that€require€some€discussion:€€the€application€of€the€socialÐ ¬ü  Ðsecurity€offset€provision€and€the€€apportionment€of€Scalesððs€overall€award€between€Oak€Ridge€andÐ ˜è  Ðthe€Second€Injury€Fund.à  àà h àà À àÐ „Ô  ÐÌÌòòÓ  Óò òA.€€Social€Security€Offsetóóó óÐ H˜ ÐÓ(:Óà  àThe€statutory€provision€governing€the€availability€of€an€offset€for€social€security€benefits€isÐ 4„ ÐTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„6„207(4)(A)(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô).€€Referring€to€permanent€total€disabilityÐ  p Ðbenefits,€the€statute€provides€that€ð ð[s]uch€compensation€payments€shall€be€reduced€by€the€amountÐ  \ Ðof€any€old€age€insurance€benefit€payments€attributable€to€employer€contributions€which€the€employeeÐ øH Ðmay€receive€under€the€Social€Security€Act€.€.€.€.ðð€Oak€Ridge€argues€that€nothing€in€this€statute€òòòòóóóómakesÐ ä4 Ðit€ineligible€to€receive€the€benefit€of€the€offset€provision;€therefore,€the€total€amount€of€benefits€itÐ Ð  Ðowes€to€Scales€must€be€reduced€by€the€amount€of€social€security€benefits€she€receives.€€Although€itÐ ¼  Ðis€undisputed€that€Scales€does€not€receive€any€such€benefits€in€her€own€name,€the€record€reveals€sheÐ ¨ø Ðdid€not€seek€her€own€benefits€because€she€believed€her€deceased€husbandððs€benefits€were€moreÐ ”ä Ðgenerous.€€Since€she€is€still€enjoying€the€benefits€of€social€security€payments,€Oak€Ridge€argues,€theÐ €Ð Ðoffset€provision€should€apply.€€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€Panel€agreed€in€part€with€Oak€Ridgeððs€argument,€stating:€€ð ðWe€do€not€accept€theÐ D!” Ðargument€the€offset€should€not€be€allowed€against€the€total€disability€award€because€the€socialÐ 0"€  Ðsecurity€benefits€were€attributable€to€the€employeeððs€husbandððs€account€and€based€on€his€earnings.ðð€Ð #l! ÐThe€Panel€then€quoted€language€from€section€207(4)(A)(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô),€which€it€deemed€ð ðbroadðð€in€scope,€asÐ $X" Ðfollows:€€ð ðany€.€.€.€.€benefit€.€.€.€.€which€the€employee€may€receive€.€.€.€.ðð€€Therefore,€the€PanelÐ ô$D # Ðmodified€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€refusing€to€allow€an€offset.€€It€did€not€reverse€the€trial€courtÐ à%0!$ Ðoutright,€however,€in€recognition€of€two€recent€social€security€offset€cases,€namely,€òòMcCoy€v.€Ô_ÔT.T.C.Ô_ÔÐ Ì&"% ÐIllinois,€Inc.óó,€14€S.W.2d€734,€737€(Tenn.€€2000),€where€we€held€that€the€offset€applies€to€all€workersÐ ¸'#& Ðover€age€60€who€suffer€injuries€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€whether€permanent€partial€or€permanent€totalÐ ¤(ô#' Ðdisability€injuries,€and€òòU.S.€Pipe€&€Foundry€Co.óó,€14€S.W.3d€at€743,€where€we€held€that€the€offsetÐ )à$( Ðâ âdoes€not€apply€to€awards€for€injuries€to€scheduled€members.€€òòóóBelieving€that€òòMcCoyóó€and€òòU.S.€PipeÐ |*Ì%) ÐÑ#û#Ñâ #âÑ8€BIXXdìXXdì8Ñâ #âÑ  Ñ&€Foundry€Co.óó€may€have€some€bearing€on€the€ultimate€allocation€of€Scalesððs€award€between€OakÐ ° ÐRidge€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund,€the€Panel€remanded€the€case€for€further€consideration.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àBefore€this€Court,€Oak€Ridge€offers€two€statutory€construction€arguments€in€support€of€itsÐ tÄ Ðposition,€in€addition€to€the€Panelððs€analysis.€€First,€ð ðthe€reduction€is€mandatory€because€theÐ `° Ðlegislature€used€the€word€ððshallðððð€in€section€207(4)(A)(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)€(ð ð[Ô_Ôs]uchÔ_Ô€compensation€payments€shall€beÐ L œ Ðreducedðð),€and€second,€the€ð ðemployee€is€not€required€to€actually€be€receiving€old„age€insuranceÐ 8 ˆ Ðbenefits€under€the€Social€Security€Act€but€must€merely€be€eligible€to€receive€such€benefits€.€.€.€.ððÐ $ t Ðbecause€the€legislature€used€the€words€ð ðwhich€the€employee€òòmayóó€receiveðð€instead€of€ð ðis€receiving.ðð€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àWe€do€not€think€that€either€the€Panelððs€or€Oak€Ridgeððs€construction€of€the€statute€is€correct.€Ð è 8  ÐWhile€the€Panelððs€quotation€of€section€207(4)(A)(i)€ð!ð€ð ðany€.€.€.€.€benefit€.€.€.€.€which€the€employeeÐ Ô$  Ðmay€receive€.€.€.€.ðð€ð!ð€appears€to€call€for€the€application€of€the€offset€provision,€this€quotation€leavesÐ À  Ðout€an€important€phrase.€€As€quoted€above,€the€entire€portion€of€the€statute€provides€that€ð ðsuchÐ ¬ü  Ðcompensation€shall€be€reduced€by€the€amount€of€any€old€age€insurance€benefits€paymentsÐ ˜è  Ðòòattributable€to€employer€contributionsóó€which€the€employee€may€receive€.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ „Ô  Ð50„6„207(4)(A)(i)€(emphasis€added).€€It€is€undisputed€that€Scalesððs€social€security€benefits€wereÐ pÀ Ðdrawn€from€her€deceased€husbandððs€account,€which€means€that€she€did€not€receive€any€benefitÐ \¬ Ðð ðattributable€to€employer€contributions.ðð€€As€to€Oak€Ridgeððs€emphasis€on€the€word€ð ðshallðð€in€theÐ H˜ Ðstatute,€we€find€that€this€simply€begs€the€question:€the€compensation€award€shall€be€reduced,€but€onlyÐ 4„ Ðwhen€the€offset€provision€properly€applies.€€As€to€the€emphasis€on€ð ðmay€receive,ðð€as€opposed€to€ð ðisÐ  p Ðreceiving,ðð€it€is€clear€that€Scales€is,€in€fact,€receiving€social€security€benefits.€€The€issue€before€usÐ  \ Ðconcerns€the€relevance€of€the€fact€that€Scalesððs€benefits€are€drawn€from€her€husbandððs€account,€ratherÐ øH Ðthan€her€own,€given€that,€according€to€the€record,€Scales€had€to€choose€one€account€versus€the€other,Ð ä4 Ðand€she€chose€her€husbandððs.€€Thus,€we€need€not€confront€the€question€whether€the€offset€appliesÐ Ð  Ðwhen€the€employee€is€eligible€to€receive€social€security€benefits€from€any€source,€but€for€whateverÐ ¼  Ðreason€does€not€apply€for€them.€€Here,€Scales€has€chosen€to€seek€benefits,€but€those€benefits€are€notÐ ¨ø Ðð ðattributable€to€employer€contributions,ðð€as€the€statute€requires.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àApart€from€the€statutory€construction€arguments,€Oak€Ridge€contends€that€on€policy€groundsÐ l¼ Ðthe€offset€provision€should€apply:€€first,€Oak€Ridge€ð!ð€which€paid€half€of€Scalesððs€social€security€taxesÐ X ¨ Ðfor€many€years€ð!ð€should€not€be€prevented€from€enjoying€the€benefits€of€the€offset€provision€merelyÐ D!” Ðbecause€Scales€chose€to€draw€more€generous€benefits€from€another€source;€second,€the€offsetÐ 0"€  Ðprovision€is€designed€to€prevent€the€duplication€of€benefits€for€lost€income,€a€purpose€that€will€beÐ #l! Ðthwarted€by€todayððs€holding.€€This€Court,€however,€cannot€ignore€the€express€language€of€sectionÐ $X" Ð207(4)(A)(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô),€which€requires€that€offsetting€benefits€be€ð ðattributable€to€employer€contributions.ðð€€AsÐ ô$D # Ðwe€recently€stated,€ð ð[a]€basic€rule€of€statutory€construction€is€that€the€legislature€is€presumed€to€useÐ à%0!$ Ðeach€word€in€a€statute€deliberately,€and€that€the€use€of€each€word€conveys€some€intent€and€has€aÐ Ì&"% Ðspecific€meaning€and€purpose.ðð€€òòBryant€v.€Ô_ÔGencoÔ_Ô€Stamping€&€Mfg.€Co.óó,€33€S.W.3d€761,€765€(Tenn.Ð ¸'#& Ð2000);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòMooney€v.€Ô_ÔSneedÔ_Ôóó,€30€S.W.3d€304,€307€(Tenn.€2000)€(stating€that€courts€mustÐ ¤(ô#' Ðð ðpresume€that€the€legislature€says€in€a€statute€what€it€means€and€means€in€a€statute€what€it€saysÐ )à$( Ðthereðð)€(quoting€òòBellSouth€Ô_ÔTelecommÔ_Ô.,€Inc.€v.€Greeróó,€972€S.W.2d€663,€673€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997)).€Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Їà  àOur€reading€of€the€statute€leads€to€the€conclusion€that,€insofar€as€Oak€Ridge€is€concerned,€theÐ ° Ðoffset€provision€does€not€apply€to€either€of€Scalesððs€awards,€for€the€Panel€correctly€held€that€afterÐ œì ÐòòU.S.€Pipe€&€Foundry€Co.óó€the€offset€provision€could€only€be€relevant€to€Scalesððs€second€injury€to€herÐ ˆØ Ðback€(her€first€injury€was€to€a€scheduled€member).€€Accordingly,€there€is€no€need€for€a€remand€onÐ tÄ Ðthis€issue.€€Ð `° ÐÌà  àIt€remains€to€be€considered€whether€the€offset€provision€applies€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund,Ð 8 ˆ Ðwhich,€as€we€explain€below,€is€responsible€for€a€percentage€of€Scalesððs€award.€€We€note€that€in€itsÐ $ t Ðbrief€the€Second€Injury€Fund€simply€states€without€elaboration€or€argument€that€the€Panel€correctlyÐ  ` Ðheld€that€the€offset€provision€applies.€It€is€unclear€whether€this€indicates€that€the€Fund€believes€itsÐ ü L  Ðposition€is€incontestable€or€that€it€can€adduce€no€persuasive€argument€in€its€favor.€€We€think,Ð è 8  Ðhowever,€that€the€very€language€emphasized€above€ð!ð€ð ðattributable€to€employer€contributionsðð€ð!ð€leads€Ð Ô$  Ðto€the€conclusion€that€the€offset€does€not€apply€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund,€for€the€Fund€is€obviouslyÐ À  Ðnot€the€same€as€or€equivalent€to€an€ð ðemployer.ðð€€The€Fund,€rather,€is€a€statutorily„created€vehicle€forÐ ¬ü  Ðcompensating€workers€who€have€sustained€a€ð ð[Ô_Ôs]ubsequentÔ_Ô€permanent€injury€after€sustainingÐ ˜è  Ðprevious€permanent€injury,ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208,€the€purpose€of€which€is€ð ðto€limit€theÐ „Ô  Ðliability€exposure€of€the€employer€by€holding€it€responsible€only€for€the€employeeððs€first€100€percentÐ pÀ Ðof€workersðð€compensation€disability,€thereby€encouraging€the€employment€of€injured€workers.ðð€Ð \¬ ÐòòÔ_ÔBomelyÔ_Ôóó,€970€S.W.2d€at€932€(quoting€òòReagan€v.€American€Policyholdersðð€Ins.€Co.óó,€842€S.W.2d€249,Ð H˜ Ð250€(Tenn.€1992));€òòsee€alsoóó€òòHenson€v.€City€of€Ô_ÔLawrenceburgÔ_Ôóó,€851€S.W.2d€809,€813€(Tenn.€1993).€Ð 4„ ÐIt€is€clear€that€whether€the€offset€applies€to€the€Second€Injury€Fundððs€portion€of€the€employeeððs€awardÐ  p Ðhas€no€bearing€on€whether€the€statutory€goal€of€ð ðencouraging€the€employment€of€injured€workersððÐ  \ Ðwill€be€advanced,€for€however€this€question€is€resolved€the€employer€must€pay€the€same€amount.€Ð øH ÐWhile€nothing€prevents€the€legislature€from€determining€that€the€offset€should€apply€to€the€SecondÐ ä4 ÐInjury€Fund,€perhaps€in€furtherance€of€the€anti„duplication€principle€mentioned€above,€the€statute€asÐ Ð  Ðcurrently€written€provides€that€the€offset€applies€only€to€ð ðpayments€attributable€to€employerÐ ¼  Ðcontributions.ðð€€Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àWe€therefore€reverse€this€part€of€the€Panelððs€decision€and€hold€that€the€social€security€offsetÐ €Ð Ðprovision€does€not€apply€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€€The€exact€apportionment€of€the€compensationÐ l¼ Ðaward€between€Oak€Ridge€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€may€now€be€determined.Ð X ¨ ÐÌòòÓ  Óò òB.€€Apportionmentóóó óÐ 0"€  ÐÓÜfÓà  àScales€sustained€two€permanent€injuries€resulting€in€awards€which€exceed€100%€whenÐ #l! Ðcombined.€€We€must€therefore€determine€whether€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€some€portionÐ $X" Ðof€her€overall€compensation€award,€and,€if€so,€the€proper€apportionment€of€that€award€between€theÐ ô$D # ÐFund€and€Oak€Ridge.€€The€Second€Injury€Fundððs€liability€is€governed€by€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÐ à%0!$ Ðsection€50„6„208€according€to€the€procedure€outlined€in€€òòÔ_ÔBomelyÔ_Ôóó.€€òòSeeóó€970€S.W.2d€at€934„35;€òòseeÐ Ì&"% Ðalsoóó€òòHill€v.€CNA€Ins.€Co.óó,€985€S.W.2d€959,€961„62€(Tenn.€1999)€(following€€òòÔ_ÔBomelyÔ_Ôóó).€€Based€onÐ ¸'#& Ðan€earlier€case,€òòPerry€v.€Sentry€Ins.€Co.óó,€938€S.W.2d€404€(Tenn.€1996),€we€noted€in€òòBomelyóó€that€theÐ ¤(ô#' ÐSecond€Injury€Fund€is€liable€under€section€208(a)€if€(1)€the€employee€has€previously€sustained€aÐ )à$( Ðpermanent€physical€disability€from€any€cause€or€origin,€either€compensable€or€noncompensable,€andÐ |*Ì%) Ð(2)€the€employee€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabled€as€the€result€of€a€subsequent€injury.€Ð h+¸&* ÐExplaining€this€statutory€language,€we€stated:€€ð ðIn€such€a€case,€the€employer€pays€only€for€theÐ ° Ðdisability€that€results€from€the€subsequent€injury€that€rendered€the€employee€permanently€and€totallyÐ œì Ðdisabled,€without€consideration€of€any€prior€injuries.€€In€other€words,€an€employer€under€subsectionÐ ˆØ Ð(a)€is€responsible€only€for€that€disability€that€would€have€resulted€from€the€subsequent€injury€had€theÐ tÄ Ðearlier€injury€or€injuries€not€existed.ðð€€970€S.W.2d€at€934€(internal€citation€omitted).€€Also€followingÐ `° ÐòòPerryóó,€we€indicated€that€an€ð ðemployee€will€also€have€met€the€requirements€for€recovery€underÐ L œ Ð[section€208(b)]€if€the€employee€has€received€or€will€receive€workersðð€compensation€awards,Ð 8 ˆ Ðincluding€the€last€one,€for€permanent€disability€to€the€whole€body€which€exceed€100€percent€whenÐ $ t Ðcombined.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€934„35€(citations€omitted).€€ð ðWhen€this€occurs,€the€Second€Injury€Fund€paysÐ  ` Ðbenefits€due€the€worker€in€excess€of€100€percent€after€all€compensable€awards,€including€the€last€one,Ð ü L  Ðare€combined.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€935€(citations€omitted).€€Finally,€we€restated€our€previous€holding€that€anÐ è 8  Ðinjured€worker€may€meet€the€criteria€under€both€subsection€(a)€and€subsection€(b).€€òòId.óó€(citing€òòPerryóó,Ð Ô$  Ð938€S.W.2d€at€407)€(ð ð[Ô_ÔS]ectionÔ_Ô€(a)€and€(b)€are€not€mutually€exclusive,€and€an€employee€may€meetÐ À  Ðthe€criteria€for€recovery€under€both€sections.ðð).€€Resolving€the€issue€of€how€to€apportion€liabilityÐ ¬ü  Ðwhen€both€subsections€apply,€we€held€that€ð ðwhen€the€facts€satisfy€the€requirements€of€bothÐ ˜è  Ðsubsections,€courts€should€apply€the€one€which€produces€a€result€more€favorable€to€the€employerÐ „Ô  Ðsince€the€goal€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund€statute€is€to€encourage€the€hiring€of€injured€workers€byÐ pÀ Ðlimiting€employer€liability.ðð€€òòId.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àóóThe€Panel€attempted€to€apply€òòÔ_ÔBomelyÔ_Ôóó€but€concluded€that,€because€of€an€incomplete€record,Ð 4„ Ðit€was€impossible€to€determine€which€subsection€would€be€most€favorable€to€the€employer.€€First,Ð  p Ðit€held€that€a€calculation€under€subsection€(a)€was€possible:€€the€trial€court€found€that€Scales€hadÐ  \ Ðbecome€permanently€and€totally€disabled€because€of€her€subsequent€injury,€which€resulted€in€aÐ øH Ðvocational€disability€rating€of€35%€to€the€body€as€a€whole;€thus,€Oak€Ridge€is€liable€for€35%€of€theÐ ä4 Ðtotal€disability€award€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€the€balance.€€The€Panel,€however,Ð Ð  Ðdetermined€that€it€could€not€perform€the€calculation€under€subsection€(b),€because€the€trial€courtÐ ¼  Ðfailed€to€convert€the€75%€disability€finding€ð!ð€which€related€to€Scalesððs€first€injury,€to€her€arms€ð!ð€intoÐ ¨ø Ða€percentage€of€disability€for€the€body€as€a€whole.€€While€the€Panel€believed€such€a€conversion€wasÐ ”ä Ðpossible,€based€on€the€American€Medical€Association€(AMA)€Guidelines,€the€trial€court€had€simplyÐ €Ð Ðfailed€to€make€the€necessary€findings.€€Without€those€findings€it€could€not€be€determined€whetherÐ l¼ ÐScalesððs€award€exceeds€100%,€the€prerequisite€for€applying€subsection€(b),€and,€accordingly,€whichÐ X ¨ Ðsubsection€is€most€favorable€to€Oak€Ridge.€€The€Panel€therefore€remanded€the€case€to€the€trial€courtÐ D!” Ðon€this€issue.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àAlthough€the€parties€differ€in€their€ultimate€apportionment€calculations,€they€agree€that€theÐ $X" ÐPanel€erred€in€ordering€a€remand;€they€argue€that€the€Court€has€all€the€information€it€needs€to€convertÐ ô$D # Ðthe€scheduled€member€disability€award€of€75%€to€a€body€as€a€whole€award,€thereby€allowing€for€aÐ à%0!$ Ðcalculation€under€subsection€(b).€€Despite€some€differences€in€elaboration,€the€partiesðð€arguments€onÐ Ì&"% Ðhow€this€conversion€should€proceed€generally€conform€to€the€Second€Injury€Fundððs€analysis.€€InÐ ¸'#& Ðbrief,€the€Fund€advocates€a€ð ðnumber€of€weeksðð€conversion€method,€rather€than€a€reliance€on€theÐ ¤(ô#' ÐAMA€Guidelines.€€As€it€notes,€however,€the€case€law€is€not€clear€on€this€question.Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àIn€òòHensonóó,€the€Court€stated€that€the€legislatureððs€intention€was€to€equate€a€prior€scheduledÐ ° Ðâ âmember€award€to€a€percentage€of€the€body€as€a€whole€under€the€AMA€Guidelines.€€851€S.W.2d€atÐ œì Ð813.€€In€òòPerryóó,€however,€the€Court€explained€ð!ð€without€discussing€òòHensonóó€ð!ð€the€ð ðnumber€of€weeksððÐ ˆØ Ðconversion€method€that€had€been€used€by€the€Panel.€€938€S.W.2d€at€406.€€The€Panel€in€òòPerryóó€heldÐ tÄ Ðthat€the€Second€Injury€Fund€was€liable€for€only€12.5%€of€the€employeeððs€permanent€total€disabilityÐ `° Ðaward,€a€conclusion€it€reached€by€converting€an€award€of€25%€permanent€disability€to€the€leg,€aÐ L œ Ðscheduled€member,€to€an€award€of€12.5%€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Explaining€this€method,Ð 8 ˆ Ðthe€Court€stated:€€ð ðThe€leg€is€a€scheduled€member€having€a€maximum€value€of€200€weeks€ofÐ $ t Ðbenefits.€€The€body€as€a€whole€is€valued€at€400€weeks,€or€twice€the€value€of€a€leg.€€Thus,€an€awardÐ  ` Ðbased€on€a€25€percent€disability€to€the€leg€equates€to€one€based€on€12.5€percent€disability€to€the€bodyÐ ü L  Ðas€a€whole.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€n.1.€(internal€citations€omitted).€€This€is€the€Second€Injury€Fundððs€recommendedÐ è 8  Ðapproach.€€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àThe€Fund€acknowledges€that€òòPerryóó€is€not€controlling€authority€but€argues€that€the€method€ofÐ ¬ü  Ðconversion€òòPerryóó€describes€should€be€adopted€on€policy€grounds.€€The€Fund€reasons€that€the€AMAÐ ˜è  ÐGuidelines€address€impairment€ratings,€not€vocational€disability€ratings;€thus,€the€effect€of€using€theÐ „Ô  ÐGuidelines€would€be€to€convert€a€scheduled€member€disability€to€a€physical,€medical€impairmentÐ pÀ Ðrating,€when€the€very€purpose€of€conversion€is€to€translate€a€scheduled€member€disability€value€intoÐ \¬ Ða€whole€body€disability€value.€€The€ð ðnumber€of€weeksðð€conversion€method,€on€the€other€hand,Ð H˜ Ðaccomplishes€the€desired€task€in€a€straightforward,€uniform€way.€€Scales€and€Oak€Ridge€agree€withÐ 4„ Ðthis€argument.€€After€considering€it€fully,€so€do€we.€€Ð  p Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àÌà  àWe€may€now€follow€òòÔ_ÔBomelyÔ_Ôóó€to€determine€the€calculation€under€section€208(a)€and€(b),€andÐ øH Ðthen€to€determine€which€subsection€is€more€favorable€to€Oak€Ridge.€€As€to€Scalesððs€first€injury,€theÐ ä4 Ðtrial€court€found€she€has€sustained€75%€permanent€partial€disability€to€each€arm.€€Based€on€the€valueÐ Ð  Ðof€200€weeks€of€benefits€for€injury€to€a€scheduled€member,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„Ð ¼  Ð207(3)(A)(m),€this€equates€to€150€weeks€(75%€of€200),€which,€in€turn,€equates€to€300€weeks,€sinceÐ ¨ø ÐScales€injured€both€her€arms.€€Under€the€method€outlined€above,€we€must€calculate€the€value€of€thisÐ ”ä Ð300€week€figure€in€terms€of€an€award€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€The€body€as€a€whole€is€valued€at€400Ð €Ð Ðweeks.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(3)(F);€òòPerryóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€406€n.1.€€The€result€of€theÐ l¼ Ðcalculation€is€75%€(300€is€75%€of€400).€€In€sum,€as€a€result€of€her€first€injury,€Scales€sustained€75%Ð X ¨ Ðpermanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€As€to€her€second€injury€(to€her€back),€the€trialÐ D!” Ðcourt€found€that€she€sustained€an€additional€35%€permanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€Ð 0"€  ÐAdding€the€two€awards,€she€sustained€110%€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€and€Oak€Ridge€agree€with€the€analysis€up€to€this€point.€€They€alsoÐ ô$D # Ðagree€that€subsection€(a)€is€more€favorable€to€Oak€Ridge.€€Under€subsection€(a),€Oak€Ridge€is€liableÐ à%0!$ Ðfor€35%€of€Scalesððs€award€ð!ð€the€amount€of€vocational€disability€she€sustained€as€a€result€of€herÐ Ì&"% Ðsecond€injury€ð!ð€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€the€remaining€65%.€€Under€subsection€(b),Ð ¸'#& ÐOak€Ridge€would€be€liable€for€90%€of€Scalesððs€award,€for€the€Second€Injury€Fund€would€be€liableÐ ¤(ô#' Ðonly€for€the€amount€exceeding€100%€permanent€disability,€in€this€case€10%.€€But€although€the€partiesÐ )à$( Ðagree€with€this€percentage€allocation€they€disagree€on€the€other€essential€part€of€the€calculus,€namely,Ð |*Ì%) Ðhow€many€weeks€of€benefits€are€at€issue.€€This€disputed€question€may€be€framed€as€follows:€€ð ð35%Ð h+¸&* Ðof€what€amount€of€benefitsðð?€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€argues€that€the€answer€is€clearly€260€weeksÐ ° Ðð!ð€the€statutory€cap€applying€to€employees€over€60€years€old€who€sustain€permanent€total€disabilityÐ œì Ðinjuries,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(4)(A)(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)€ð!ð€for€this€figure€corresponds€to€Scalesððs€awardÐ ˆØ Ðfor€her€second€injury€to€her€back.€€As€for€Scalesððs€first€injury€to€her€arms,€resulting€in€300€weeks€ofÐ tÄ Ðbenefits,€the€Fund€argues€that€Oak€Ridge€is€responsible€for€the€entire€amount.Ð `° Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àÌà  àOak€Ridge€disagrees.€€Its€argument€is€based€on€statutory€language€from€subsection€(a),Ð 8 ˆ Ðdiscussed€above,€which€states€in€part€that€an€ð ðemployee€shall€be€entitled€to€compensation€from€theÐ $ t Ðemployeeððs€employer€.€.€.€.€only€for€the€disability€that€would€have€resulted€from€the€subsequentÐ  ` Ðinjury,€and€such€previous€injury€shall€not€be€considered€.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)(1).€Ð ü L  ÐThus,€it€is€responsible€for€35%€of€the€second€injury€and€no€percentage€of€the€first.€€Under€this€readingÐ è 8  Ðof€the€statute,€Oak€Ridge€argues,€it€must€pay€only€140€weeks€of€benefits,€for€that€number€equals€35%Ð Ô$  Ðof€400,€the€value€of€permanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„Ð À  Ð6„207(3)(F).€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€the€remainder€of€Scalesððs€total€award€of€560Ð ¬ü  Ðweeks,€which€amounts€to€420€weeks.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àWe€agree€with€the€Second€Injury€Fundððs€reasoning.€€It€is€true,€as€Oak€Ridge€argues,€that€theÐ pÀ Ðtext€of€section€208(a)(1)€states€that€the€employee€is€only€entitled€to€compensation€from€the€employerÐ \¬ Ðfor€the€second€injury,€not€the€previous€injury.€€But€this€statement€appears€in€a€subsection€of€aÐ H˜ Ðstatutory€provision€that€is€entirely€devoted€to€the€question€of€how€liability€should€be€apportioned€forÐ 4„ Ðòòsubsequentóó€permanent€injury.€€Section€208,€in€other€words,€is€the€Second€Injury€Fund€statute,€andÐ  p Ðnothing€else.€€It€does€not€purport€to€eclipse€all€the€other€provisions€in€the€Workersðð€CompensationÐ  \ ÐAct€that€govern€injuries€for€which€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€not€implicated.€€The€procedural€postureÐ øH Ðof€this€case€underscores€why€this€is€so.€€Scales€filed€two€separate€workersðð€compensation€suits,€oneÐ ä4 Ðfor€each€injury.€€In€the€normal€course€of€proceedings,€she€would€have€received€one€award€for€her€firstÐ Ð  Ðinjury,€which€occurred€in€early€1997,€and€then€a€separate€award€for€her€second€injury,€whichÐ ¼  Ðoccurred€in€April€of€1998.€€The€reason€this€outcome€did€not€arise€is€simply€that€the€trial€court,€forÐ ¨ø Ðreasons€of€judicial€efficiency,€consolidated€Scalesððs€two€cases.€€Oak€Ridge€never€compensated€ScalesÐ ”ä Ðfor€her€initial€injury,€as€would€normally€occur,€because€the€trial€court€ruled€on€both€injuries€in€theÐ €Ð Ðsame€case.€€We€see€no€reason€to€hold€that€simply€because€of€the€trial€courtððs€consolidation€order€OakÐ l¼ ÐRidge€is€absolved€from€paying€benefits€for€Scalesððs€first€injury.€€Indeed,€we€have€made€this€clear€inÐ X ¨ Ða€recent€case.€€òòSeeóó€òòSealsóó,€948€S.W.2d€at€916€(rejecting€a€ð ðcase€consolidationðð€argument€similar€toÐ D!” ÐOak€Ridgeððs).Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àWe€therefore€hold€that€the€Second€Injury€Fundððs€apportionment€argument€is€correct:€€OakÐ $X" ÐRidge€must€pay€35%€of€260€weeks€for€Scalesððs€second€injury;€the€Second€Injury€Fund€must€pay€theÐ ô$D # Ðbalance€of€65%€for€that€injury;׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€Oak€Ridge€must€pay€for€all€of€Scalesððs€first€injury,€whichÐ à%0!$ ÐÑuî Ñâ âѰ°ÑÑ8€BIXXdìXXdì8Ñâ âÑ  Ñamounts€to€300€weeks.€€The€effect€of€this€decision€is€to€reverse€in€part€the€decision€of€the€Panel,Ð ° Ðwhich€remanded€to€the€trial€court€after€holding€that€it€had€insufficient€information€with€which€toÐ œì Ðmake€a€judgment€concerning€apportionment.€Ð ˆØ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àÌÌÓ  Óò òòòIV.€€Conclusionóóó óÐ L œ ÐÓ‰£Óà  àWe€hold€that€Scales€suffered€two€separate€injuries,€each€of€which€is€compensable.€€We€alsoÐ 8 ˆ Ðhold€that€the€social€security€offset€provision€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„6„207(4)(A)(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)Ð $ t Ðdoes€not€apply€in€this€case.€€Finally,€regarding€the€apportionment€of€liability,€we€hold€that€(1)Ð  ` ÐTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„6„208(a)€controls€the€apportionment€of€Scalesððs€award€for€herÐ ü L  Ðsecond€injury€to€her€back,€and€that€under€this€section€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€65%€of€260Ð è 8  Ðweeks€of€benefits€after€Oak€Ridge€fully€satisfies€its€obligation€of€35%€of€260€weeks;€and€(2)€OakÐ Ô$  ÐRidge€is€liable€for€all€of€Scalesððs€first€injury.€€The€case€is€remanded€to€the€Circuit€Court€for€AndersonÐ À  ÐCounty€for€entry€of€an€order€consistent€with€these€holdings.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  Óà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ  p Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àFRANK€F.€Ô_ÔDROWOTAÔ_Ô,€III,€JUSTICE€à Ð à