WPC01 xq(DPb\ ީ%=^*E*c W.1cGT+lsM! LH&Y@V}~=C6}nP4ܿ,]鴄't{&R҅cnlعgԅb"΢cYj s_aKdXiLȺc!ZQ`r1j8l)} g va;&{]ZtBfrd+VW[GeŅ!%% ݚu"(x3ﻰ Ͷ ծ{ytyиu0T˰:b񿘛LqHC#'>fjtAF|/J,?㷄BuxU(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#$  0   h R(2$      1    _Uponenteringhisguiltyplea,Peelewassentencedfortheburglary,grandlarceny,andlarceny.Thesentencing  forthefirstdegreemurderconvictionwaspostponeduntilPeeletestifiedagainsthiscodefendants.Theextensivetime t periodbetweenPeelesguiltypleaandsentencingisattributabletothetimenecessarytoconcludehismultipleco 8 defendantstrialsandtoconductmentalevaluationsrequestedbyPeele.  R(2$      2    _Aperiodofapproximatelynineyearselapsedfromthefilingofthesecondmotiontowithdrawtheguiltyplea  tothetimetheorderdenyingthemotionwasentered.Thetrialcourtsdelayinrulingonthemotionappearstohavebeen t causedbyseveralmotionsfiledbyPeeleforsubstitutionofcounselandforcontinuances. C R(2$      4    _SubsectionRule32(f)(1)isatypographicalerror.TheruleconcerningsuspendedsentencesisfoundinTenn.  R.Crim.P.32(a).Rule32doesnotcontainasubsection32(f)(1).*+ (_2623  ..*D+J (_25   ," <DL,23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  *A+J (_24   ) <DL)23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  *>+J (_23  ` &<<DL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  *;+J (_22   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  *8+J (_21    DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  *5+J (_20  h DDL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  *2+J (_19   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  */+J (_18    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  * (_1723  Ԁ*DJ (_16   ," <DL,23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  *AJ (_15   ) <DL)23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  *>J (_14  ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  *;J (_13   #DL#23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  *8J (_12    DL 23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  *5J (_11  h DDL23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  *2J (_10   L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  (/J &_9    L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  ( &_823  (DJ &_7   ," <DL,23   2( 4 <DL2  (AJ &_6   ) <DL)23   2( 4 <DL2  (>J &_5  ` &<<DL&23   2( 4 <DL2  - -(;J &_4   #DL#23   2( 4 <DL2  (8J &_3    DL 23   2( 4 <DL2  (5J &_2  h DDL23   2( 4 <DL2  (2J &_1   L23   2( 4 <DL2  &/J $_    L23   2( 4 <DL2    R(2$      3    _7ThelanguageofTenn.R.Crim.P.32(f)providesthatadefendantmayattempttowithdrawaguiltypleaat  twoindependentpointsintime.ThefirstportionofRule32(f)allowsamotiontobefiledpriortosentencing.The t secondpartoftheruleallowssuchamotiontobefiledaftersentencingbutbeforethejudgmentbecomesfinal.Although 8 PeelefiledbothtypesofRule32(f)motionsinthiscase,thisappealconcernsonlythesecondmotion,whichwasfiled L aftersentencing.#7~#'n2 Z(Times New Roman  (|G2(2$ !.8KdXXd8         0   d(|3b$ !.8KdXXd8     VVVV'dxd)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3b$ !.8KdXXd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK !.8Kdd8     _   K8!XXdd8@ GKINTHESUPREMECOURTOFTENNESSEE  @WW$ATKNOXVILLE#KG #Ԉ &   May2,2001Session L X!XK #KXX!#STATEOFTENNESSEEv.CLIFFORDPEELEX!XK  J @@ AppealbyPermissionfromtheCourtofCriminalAppeals  J CircuitCourtforCarterCounty  6 @@No.8027ArdenL.Hill,Judge  " @@*AV) ` dE<` A   @@TTNo.E199900907SCR11CDFiledOctober16,_2001_   AV) ` dE<h` A i    X!XXX!# KX X!]# X!X K  Wegrantedappealtodetermine(1)ifTenn.R.App.P.3(b)permitstheappealofadenialofa d motiontowithdrawaguiltyplea;and(2)whetheraTenn.R.Crim.P.32(f)motiontosetasidea P guiltypleafiledpriortothetimethejudgmentbecomesfinaltollsthetimeforfilinganappealto < permitthetrialcourttoruleonthemotion.Wehold(1)thatadenialofamotiontosetasideaguilty (x pleamaybeappealedpursuanttoTenn.R.App.P.3(b);and(2)thatatrialcourtretainsjurisdiction d toruleonamotiontosetasideaguiltypleaifthemotionisfiledpriortothedatethejudgment P becomesfinal.Accordingly,theholdingoftheCourtofCriminalAppealsisreversed,andthecase < isremandedtotheintermediateappellatecourtforproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.#X!XX X!# (  Tenn.R.App.P.11AppealbyPermission;  JudgmentoftheCourtofCriminalAppealsReversed.     JaniceM.Holder,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichFrankF.Drowota,III,CJ,and t E.RileyAnderson,AdolphoA.Birch,Jr.,andWilliamM.Barker,JJ,joined. ` KennethF.Irvine,Jr.,Knoxville,Tennessee,fortheappellant,CliffordPeele. 8!  PaulG.Summers,AttorneyGeneralandReporter;MichaelE.Moore,SolicitorGeneral;and #`" ElizabethB.Marney,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,fortheappellee,StateofTennessee. #L#  @@OO& OPINION  %$!%    X!XXX!@  FACTS@@e e ANDPROCEDURALHISTORY  '"'   CliffordPeele(Peele)pledguiltyonDecember6,1982,tofirstdegreemurder,burglary, )$) grandlarceny,andlarceny.Approximatelysevenyearslater,onFebruary22,1990,Peelefileda p*%*  motiontowithdrawhisguiltypleatothefirstdegreemurderchargebecausehehadnotbeen \+&+; sentencedforthecrime. #  1      ׀OnApril30,1990,thetrialcourtdeniedhismotiontosetasidetheguilty   pleaandsentencedhimtolifeimprisonment.ThejudgmentwasfiledonMay22,1990.Noappeal  wastakenfromthejudgment.    OnJune21,1990,Peelefiledasecondmotiontowithdrawhisguiltypleabasedonalleged ` ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.ThetrialcourtconcludedthatPeelehadtimelyfiledhismotion L  underTenn.R.Crim.P.32(f).Anorderenteredbythetrialcourt#X!XX X!/ # X!XXX!ԀonMay19,1999,deniedPeeles 8  secondmotiontowithdrawhisguiltyplea. #  2      ׀TheCourtofCriminalAppealsdismissedtheappeal $ t onJune20,2000,onthegroundsthatTenn.R.App.P.3(b)doesnotallowanappealofrightfrom  ` adenialofamotiontowithdrawaguiltyplea.Thecourtalsoheldthatthetrialcourtwaswithout  L  jurisdictiontoruleonthemotionafterthejudgmentbecamefinalonJune21,1990.Thereafter,  8  PeeleappealedthedecisiontothisCourt. $    @& ANALYSIS    @*@, , I.TENNESSEERULEOFAPPELLATEPROCEDURE3(b)     OnJune20,2000,theCourtofCriminalAppealsruledthatthetrialcourtsdenialofa \ motiontowithdrawaguiltypleawasnotsubjecttoappealunderTenn.R.App.P.3(b).InStatev. H Wilson,decidedonSeptember18,2000,westatedthat [a]directappealthenliesfromadenialof 4 aRule32(f)motion.31S.W.3d189,195n.14(Tenn.2000)(citingStatev.Newsome,778S.W.2d  p 34(Tenn.1989)).Accordingly,Peeleproperlyappealedthedenialofthemotiontosetasidehis  \ guiltyplea. H   @ @@ttII.THEJURISDICTIONOFTHETRIALCOURT     AtissueinthiscaseisthecontinuedjurisdictionofthetrialcourttoruleonPeelesmotion  towithdrawhisguiltyplea.Resolutionofthisissuerequiresananalysisoftheinterplaybetween  Tenn.R.Crim.P.32(f)andTenn.R.App.P.4(c).Withthatinterplayinmind,weturnfirsttoan  analysisofTenn.R.Crim.P.32(f). l     Rule32(f)oftheTennesseeRulesofCriminalProcedureallowsadefendantwhopleads D! guiltytofileamotiontowithdrawthatplea.Rule32(f)providesthat 0"    #l! 8  [a]motiontowithdrawaguiltypleamaybemadeuponashowingbythedefendant   ofanyfairandjustreasononlybeforesentenceisimposed;buttocorrectmanifest  injustice,thecourtaftersentence,butbeforethejudgmentbecomesfinal,mayset  asidethejudgmentofconvictionandpermitthedefendanttowithdrawtheplea.t   Tenn.R.Crim.P.32(f)(2000)(emphasisadded).4 #  3      ׀Atrialcourtsjudgmentasageneralrule L  becomesfinalthirtydaysafteritsentryunlessatimelynoticeofappealorspecifiedposttrialmotion 8  isfiled.Statev.Pendergrass,937S.W.2d834,837(Tenn.1996).Afterthetrialcourtloses $ t jurisdiction,generallyitretainsnopowertoamendajudgment.Id.(citingStatev.Moore,814  ` S.W.2d381,382(Tenn.Crim.App.1991)).Judgmentsmadeoutsidethecourtsjurisdictionare  L  void.Id.(citingBrownv.Brown,281S.W.2d492,497(Tenn.1955)).  8    #X!XX X!# X!XXX!  TheStatemaintainsthatthetrialcourtsjudgmentbecamefinalthirtydaysafteritsentry,   despitePeelesRule32(f)motionfiledonthethirtiethday.#X!XX X!&# X!XXX!ԀTheState,therefore,arguesthatthetrial   courtlostjurisdictiontoruleonPeelesRule32(f)motionbecausethecourtdidnotruleonthe   motionbeforethejudgmentbecamefinal.     Whenconstruingstatutes,thementionofonesubjectinastatuteexcludesothersubjectsthat \ arenotmentioned.Statev.Brewer,989S.W.2d349,355n.4(Tenn.Crim.App.1997)(citingState H v.Harkins,811S.W.2d79,82(Tenn.1991)).Statutorysegments,however,shouldbe construed 4 togetherinlightofthegeneralpurposeandplan...andobjecttobeobtained.Id.(quotingNeff  p v.CherokeeIns.Co.,704S.W.2d1,3(Tenn.1986)).Furthermore,statutesshouldbeconstrued so  \ thatnopartwillbeinoperative,superfluous,voidorinsignificant...andtogiveeffecttoevery H word,phrase,clauseandsentenceoftheactinordertocarryoutthelegislativeintent.Id.(quoting 4 Tidwellv.Collins,522S.W.2d674,67677(Tenn.1975)).Suchstatutoryconstructionisapplicable   inconstruingrulesgoverningpracticeandprocedureofthecourt.See,e.g,id.(applyingstatutory   constructiontointerpretTenn.R.Crim.P.41(c)).    ReadingRule32(f)todivestthetrialcourtofjurisdictiontoruleonamotionfiledbeforethe  judgmentbecomesfinalwouldlimittheeffectivenessofthepostsentenceportionofRule32(f). l ThelanguageofRule32(f)clearlystatesthatthetrialcourtmayhearamotiontowithdrawaguilty X  pleaaftersentence,butbeforethejudgmentbecomesfinal.Theruleissilent,however,astowhether D! suchamotionstaysthejudgmentuntilthetrialcourtrulesonthemotion.ThepurposeofRule32(f) 0"  istoprovideadefendantwithaproceduretowithdrawaguiltyplea.InterpretingRule32(f)tolimit #l! thetrialcourtsabilitytodecidesuchamotionwoulddefeattheverypurposeforwhichtherulewas $X" intended. $D #   %0!$   IfweweretoholdthatthetrialcourtlosesjurisdictiontoruleonthetimelyfiledRule32(f)   motion,amovingpartywouldbeplacedinoneoftwountenablepositions.Themovingpartywould  beforcedtochoosewhetherto(1)awaitthetrialcourtsrulingontheRule32(f)motion#X!XX X!* #Ԁandchance  thatthetrialjudgewillnotruleonthemotionbeforethejudgmentbecomesfinal;or(2)beforethe t judgmentbecomesfinal,fileanappealunderTenn.R.App.P.3(b) X!XXX!Ԁofthetrialcourtsanticipated ` denialoftheRule32(f)motion.#X!XX X!,#Adefendantwhochoosesthefirstoptionrisksthepossibilitythat L  thetrialcourtwillfailtoruleonthemotion.Oncethejudgmentbecamefinalandthetrialcourtlost 8  jurisdiction,adefendantwouldhaveforfeitedhisrighttoappealadenialoftheRule32(f)motion. $ t Thesecondoptionofanappealbeforeatrialcourtrulingpresentsasimilarpitfall.Whenanappeal  ` isfiled,thetrialcourtlosesjurisdiction,andthejurisdictionoftheCourtofCriminalAppeals  L  attaches.Pendergrass,937S.W.2dat837(Tenn.1996)(citingStatev.Peak,823S.W.2d228,229  8  (Tenn.Crim.App.1991)).Byprematurelyappealing,thedefendantwouldlosetheopportunityto $  havethetrialcourtrule,perhapsfavorably,onhismotion.Neitheroptionprovidesadefendanta   meaningfulopportunityforreliefunderRule32(f).Proceduralrulesshouldnotbeappliedto   precludetheirpracticalapplication.     ThesecondpartoftheanalysisconcernsTenn.R.App.P.4(c).Rule4(c)directlyaddresses p theissueoftolling.Therulespecifiescertainposttrialmotionsorpetitionsthattollthetimefor \ filinganoticeofappeal: H 8  InacriminalactionifatimelymotionorpetitionundertheTennesseeRulesof  p CriminalProcedureisfiledinthetrialcourtbythedefendant:(1)underRule29(c)  \ forajudgmentofacquittal,(2)underRule33(a)foranewtrial,(3)underRule34for H arrestofjudgment,or(4)underRule32(f)(1) #  4      ׀forasuspendedsentence,thetimefor 4 appealforallpartiesshallrunfromentryoftheorderdenyinganewtrialorgranting   ordenyinganyothersuchmotionorpetition.    Tenn.R.App.P.4(c)(2000).Amotiontowithdrawaguiltypleaisnotoneofthespecifiedmotions  orpetitions.However,Rule4(c)doesnotspecificallyexcludefromtollingproperlyfiledmotions  orpetitionsnototherwiseenumeratedintherule. l   TheAdvisoryCommissionCommentstoRule4(c)statethat unlessthesemotionsare D! abolished,itwouldbeundesirabletoproceedwiththeappealwhilethetrialcourthasbeforeita 0"  motionthegrantingofwhichwouldvacateoralterthejudgmentappealedfrom,andwhichmight #l! affect...thedecisiontoseekappellatereview.Althoughamotiontowithdrawaguiltypleaisnot $X" oneoftheenumeratedmotionsorpetitionslistedinRule4(c),thegrantingofsuchamotionwould $D # vacatethejudgment.HadthetrialcourtdeterminedthatPeelewasentitledtowithdrawhisguilty %0!$ plea,thejudgmentsentencinghimwouldhavebeenvacated.Peelewouldhavebeenentitledtoa &"%  jurytrialonthefirstdegreemurdercharge,andhewouldhavehadnoneedtoappealtheconviction '#& andsentence.AllowingPeeletoawaitarulingonthemotiontowithdrawhisguiltypleabefore  institutinganappealfromhisconviction,therefore,wouldfurtherthestatedpurposeofRule4(c).     Conversely,readingRule4(c)andRule32(f)toallowthetrialcourtsjudgmenttobecome t finalbeforearulingismadeonatimelyfiledRule32(f)motioneffectivelygrantsthetrialcourta `  pocketveto.Thetrialcourtwouldhavecompletediscretiontoruleonthemotionortoallowthe L  timetorununtilthejudgmentbecamefinal.Bywaitingingoodfaithforarulingthatisnevermade, 8  thedefendantwouldlosetheopportunitytoappeal.Therefore,commonsensedictatesthatthe $ t timelyfilingofaRule32(f)motionshouldstaythejudgmentofthetrialcourtuntilthemotionis  ` decided.  L    Accordingly,weholdthatTenn.R.App.P.4(c)andTenn.R.Crim.P.32(f)vestthetrial $  courtwithjurisdictiontodecideatimelyfiledRule32(f)motion.Inthiscasethejudgmentofthe   trialcourtwasenteredonMay22,1990,andthejudgmentwouldhavebecomefinalonJune21,   1990,thirtydaysafteritsentry.Peelessecondmotiontowithdrawtheguiltypleaforfirstdegree   murderwasfiledonJune21,1990.Thefilingofthemotionthereforestayedthejudgmentuntilthe   trialcourtruledonthemotiontosetasidetheguiltyplea. p   @FF% @@!*CONCLUSION  H   ATenn.R.App.P.3(b)directappealliesfromatrialcourtsdenialofamotiontowithdraw  p aguiltyplearaisedunderTenn.R.Crim.P.32(f).Uponthetrialcourtsdenialofthemotionto  \ withdrawhisguiltyplea,thedefendantwasentitledtoappellatereviewofthedecision.We H thereforeoverruletheCourtofCriminalAppealsholdingthatadirectappealdoesnotarisefrom 4 suchadenial.     ThetrialcourtcorrectlyexerciseditsjurisdictionunderTenn.R.Crim.P.32(f)toruleonthe  motiontosetasidetheguiltyplea.Althoughajudgmentgenerallybecomesfinalthirtydaysafter  itsentry,themotionfiledonJune21,1990,stayedthejudgmentofthetrialcourt,whichwouldhave  otherwisebeenfinalonthatday.WethereforeoverruletheCourtofCriminalAppealsholdingthat l thetrialcourtlackedjurisdictiontoruleonthemotion.ThecaseisremandedtotheCourtof X  CriminalAppealsforproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.CostsareassessedtotheStatefor D! whichexecutionmayissueifnecessary. X!XXX!Ԁ#X!XX X!F# 0"     `     h     ___________________________________ %0!$    `     h     JANICEM.HOLDER,JUSTICE &"%