ÿWPCQ9 F# äUNï %= 0 (CU:kw@¥4åù 0D 0JL 0T– 0^ê 0hH 0r° 0|" 0†ž 0$ 1m´ 0c! 1u„ 0dù ] U >e U*£ U*Í B)÷ DC Bc AM€ 5Í fhYx£Ñbt |@…$ûÅ,v~À.vÓ>0 0â6 AQó6ÆD7 0D 8 0@N8 0DŽ8 D/Ò8 B9 D39˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ádâdDãdUädUådDædDçdUéd‘êdëdÓ€Ft‹##3|xöd(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô#5e37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;3¿$´´Ô25eÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd d:>#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ +Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ;"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌò òDecember€22,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€ ÔÔ€ ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝPerry€entered€a€guilty€plea€upon€the€expectation€that€any€sentence€he€received€would€runÏconcurrent€to€the€sentence€he€was€then€serving.€€Because,€under€state€law€the€sentence€on€theÏguilty€plea€did€not€commence€until€the€guilty€plea€was€entered,€the€overall€sentence€was€increased.Ì OÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€ ÔÔ€ ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòPearceóó,€395€U.S.€at€726,€89€S.Ct.€at€2081;€òòWasmanóó,€468€U.S.€at€570„72,€104€S.Ct.€atÏ3223„25€(ð ðConsideration€of€a€criminal€conviction€obtained€in€the€interim€between€an€originalÏsentencing€and€a€sentencing€after€retrial€.€.€.€amply€rebuts€any€presumption€of€vindictivenessððÏarising€from€imposition€of€a€longer€sentence€after€retrial.ðð)Ì ™Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€ ÔÔ€ ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAs€an€example€of€circumstances€giving€rise€to€an€absurd€result€by€application€of€theÏrestriction,€the€Court€quoted€the€following€hypothetical€provided€by€the€Solicitor€General.ÌÌà8 àà àSuppose€.€.€.€that€a€defendant€is€convicted€of€burglary,€a€non„violent,€andÏapparently€first,€offense.€€He€is€sentenced€to€a€short€prison€term€or€perhaps€placedÏon€probation.€€Following€a€successful€appeal€and€a€conviction€on€retrial,€it€is€learnedÏthat€the€defendant€has€been€using€an€alias€and€in€fact€has€a€long€criminal€record€thatÏincludes€other€burglaries,€several€armed€robbery€convictions;€and€a€conviction€forÏmurder€committed€in€the€course€of€a€burglary.€€None€of€the€reasons€underlyingÏPearce€in€any€way€justifies€the€perverse€result€that€the€defendant€receive€noÏgreater€sentence€in€light€of€this€information€than€he€originally€received€when€he€wasÏthought€to€be€a€first€offender.ÌÌòòMcCulloughóó,€475€U.S.€at€141,€106€S.Ct.€980.Ì- ù- ÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€ ÔÔ€ ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€òòU.S.€v.€Contrerasóó,€108€F.3d€1255,€1262€(10th€Cir.€1997)€(Once€presumption€isÏestablished,€ð ðthe€burden€shifts€to€the€prosecution€to€justify€its€decision€with€ððlegitimate,€articulable,Ïobjective€reasons.ðððð);€òòU.S.€v.€Rodgersóó,€18€F.3d€1425,€1431€(8th€Cir.€1994)€(ð ð[E]ven€if€aÏpresumption€of€vindictiveness€applies,€the€government€may€rebut€it€by€proffering€legitimate,Ïobjective€reasons€for€its€conduct.ðð);€òòU.S.€v.€Garza„Juarezóó,€992€F.2d€896,€906€(9th€Cir.€1993)€(ð ðOnceÏa€presumption€of€vindictiveness€has€arisen,€ððthe€burden€shifts€to€the€prosecution€to€show€that€anyÏincrease€in€the€severity€of€the€charges€did€not€stem€from€a€vindictive€motive,€or€was€justified€byÏindependent€reasons€or€intervening€circumstances€that€dispel€the€appearance€of€vindictiveness.ðð);ÏòòU.S.€v.€Espositoóó,€968€F.2d€300,€305€(3rd€Cir.€1992)€(ð ð[E]ven€if€the€presumption€applies,€theÏgovernment€may€rebut€it€by€proffering€legitimate,€objective€reasons€for€its€conduct.ðð);€òòU.S.€v.ÏKrezdornóó,€718€F.2d€1360,€1365€(5th€Cir.€1983)€(The€presumption€of€vindictiveness€can€only€€beÏovercome€by€proof€that€ð ðevents€occurring€since€the€time€of€the€original€charge€decision€altered€thatÏinitial€exercise€of€the€prosecutorððs€discretion.ðð);€òòU.S.€v.€Gallegos„Curielóó,€681€F.2d€1164,€1167€(9thÏCir.€1982)€(To€overcome€the€presumption,€the€State€must€show€that€its€decision€ð ðwas€justified€byÏindependent€reasons€or€intervening€circumstances€that€dispel€the€appearance€of€vindictiveness.ðð);ÏòòU.S.€v.€Andrewsóó,€633€F.2d€449,€456€(6th€Cir.€1980)€(ð ð[W]e€think€that€only€objective,€on„the„recordÏexplanations€can€suffice€to€rebut€a€finding€of€realistic€likelihood€of€vindictiveness.ðð);€òòIn€Re€Boweróó,Ï700€P.2d€1269,€1277€(Cal.€1985)€(ð ðIn€order€to€rebut€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness,€theÏprosecution€must€demonstrate€that€(1)€the€increase€in€charge€was€justified€by€some€objectiveÏchange€in€circumstances€or€in€the€state€of€the€evidence€which€legitimately€influenced€the€chargingÏprocess€and€(2)€that€the€new€information€could€not€reasonably€have€been€discovered€at€the€timeÏthe€prosecution€exercised€its€discretion€to€bring€the€original€charge.ðð);€òòCherry€v.€Stateóó,€414€N.E.2dÏ301,€305„06€(Ind.€1981)€(The€State€must€prove€that€the€ð ðincrease€in€the€number€or€severity€of€theÏcharges€was€not€motivated€by€a€vindictive€purpose.ðð);€òòAtchak€v.€Stateóó,€640€P.2d€135,€144€(AlaskaÏApp.€1981)(ð ð[O]nly€objective,€on„the„record€explanations€can€suffice€to€rebut€a€finding€of€realisticÏlikelihood€of€vindictiveness.ðð);€òòState€v.€Hintonóó,€601€P.2d€338,€340€(Ariz.€App.€1979)€(TheÏpresumption€may€be€rebutted€by€proof€of€ð ðintervening€circumstances€or€events€or€of€new€evidenceÏwhich€the€government€was€excusably€unaware€at€the€time€of€the€first€charge.ðð);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòKimberlin€v.ÏO.I.€Whiteóó,€7€F.3d€527,€531€(6th€Cir.€1993);€òòJackson€v.€Walkeróó,€585€F.2d€139,€148€(5th€Cir.€1978);ÏòòHardwick€v.€Doolittleóó,€558€F.2d€292,€301€(5th€Cir.€1977).Ô€ XÔÌÔ€ ôÔ 6Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€ ÔÔ€ ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€òòWasmanóó,€468€U.S.€at€570„72,€104€S.Ct.€at€3223„25€(ð ðConsideration€of€a€criminalÏconviction€obtained€in€the€interim€between€an€original€sentencing€and€a€sentencing€after€retrial€.€.€.Ïamply€rebuts€any€presumption€of€vindictivenessðð€arising€from€imposition€of€a€longer€sentence€afterÏretrial.ðð);€òòRodgersóó,€18€F.3d€at€1431€(proof€that€prosecutors€were€not€aware€of€significance€ofÏavailable€evidence€indicating€a€lack€of€preparation€by€State€is€sufficient€to€overcome€presumption);ÏòòEspositoóó,€968€F.2d€at€306€(proof€that€prosecution€chose€not€to€charge€all€possible€offenses€at€theÏfirst€trial€because€it€would€have€made€the€trial€unmanageable€and€would€have€confused€the€jury€wasÏsufficient€to€rebut€the€presumption);€òòAndrewsóó,€633€F.2d€at€456€(prosecutorððs€assertion€that€sheÏmade€a€mistake€is€not€sufficient€to€rebut€the€presumption,€but€her€claims€that€the€Grand€Jury€wasÏunavailable€and€that€she€was€inexperienced€do€have€an€objective€basis€and€deserveÏconsideration.);€òòIn€Re€Boweróó,€700€P.2d€at€1277€(presumption€cannot€be€overcome€by€theÏstatement€that€prosecutor€was€motivated€by€a€reassessment€of€the€evidence€against€the€defendantÏrather€than€a€desire€to€punish);€òòU.S.€v.€Schilleróó,€424€A.2d€51,€55€(D.C.€1980)€(presumption€may€beÏovercome€more€easily€by€evidence€that€prosecutor€was€dealing€with€multiple€criminal€acts€or€a€crimeÏspree);€òòCherryóó,€414€N.E.2d€at€305€(prosecution€may€overcome€the€presumption€by€offering€proofÏthat€additional€evidence€has€been€discovered,€elements€of€the€crime€not€complete€at€the€first€trialÏhave€now€been€completed,€or€an€honest€mistake€or€oversight€was€made€at€the€time€of€the€originalÏdecision€to€prosecute);€òòHintonóó,€601€P.2d€at€340€(mere€ineptitude€in€filing€the€lower€charge€in€theÏfirst€place€does€not€justify€a€subsequent€charge€of€a€more€serious€crime).€Ì ñÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€ ÔÔ€ ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòButóó€òòseeóó€òòIn€Re€Boweróó,€700€P.2d€at€1277€(State€must€show€that€the€new€evidence€used€toÏrebut€the€presumption€ð ðcould€not€reasonably€have€been€discovered€at€the€time€the€prosecutionÏexercised€its€discretion€to€bring€the€original€charge.ðð).€€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò(’(2)=$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑȰÑÑÚ°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€X-§XXXÔÔ€ô¸ôXX-§Ôà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó:;>?ACþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óBB'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd$$$$'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€ ԛр+ÑÑ7€ÖaXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑœØ ØÓ&€!!X°d&ÓÙ€:ÙßR€%&#A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àÔ€ ¼Ôò òIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONó óÔ€ XÔÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEòò,óóà àà àà àà à)à àœò òFiled:ó ó€ò òDecember€22,Ï1997ó ó›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellant,à àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€C.€Creed€McGinley,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àJudgeÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHENRY€COUNTYÌDAVID€WILLARD€PHIPPS,€JR.,à àà àà à)à àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àSupreme€CourtÌà àAppellee.à àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€02„S01„9607„CC„00068Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌÌÌòòÌÌÌÌFOR€STATE€OF€TENNESSEEà àà àFOR€DAVID€WILLARD€PHIPPS,€JR.óóÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà àà àà àà àLionel€R.€Barrett,€Jr.ÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àNashville,€TennesseeÌÌMichael€E.€Mooreà àà àà àà àJacob€M.€Dickinson,€IVÌSolicitor€General€à àà àà àà àMemphis,€TennesseeÌÌKathy€Morante,ÌDeputy€Attorney€GeneralÌCriminal€Justice€Division€ÌÌLisa€A.€Naylor,ÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌNashville,€Tennessee€Ì€€ÌÌRobert€ð ðGusðð€RadfordÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌHuntingdon,€TennesseeÌÌÔ€ „ÔÌà@ àò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ€ XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌREVERSED€ÓÓAND€REMANDED.à àà àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€J.€Ñ€'ÑÇÑ  ÑÑ ` Ñà àIn€this€appeal,€we€must€determine€whether€the€Stateððs€decision€to€pursueÏthe€death€penalty,€following€the€defendantððs€successful€appeal€of€his€convictionÏfor€which€the€death€penalty€originally€was€not€sought,€gives€rise€to€a€rebuttableÏpresumption€of€prosecutorial€vindictiveness.€€After€carefully€considering€theÏrelevant€legal€principles,€we€conclude€that€the€rebuttable€presumption€ofÏvindictiveness€applies€in€this€case.€€Because€the€State€had€no€opportunity,€duringÏthe€hearing€on€the€motion€to€strike,€to€introduce€proof€to€overcome€theÏpresumption,€we€reverse€the€decision€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€upholdingÏthe€trial€courtððs€order€striking€the€Stateððs€notice€of€intent€to€seek€the€death€penaltyÏand€remand€this€cause€to€the€trial€court€for€a€hearing€in€which€the€State€shall€bearÏthe€burden€of€demonstrating€œby›€clear€and€convincing€œevidence›€that€theÏpresumption€of€vindictiveness€has€been€overcome.€€If,€after€hearing€the€proofÏpresented,€the€trial€court€is€satisfied€that€the€presumption€has€been€overcome,€theÏState€may€seek€the€death€penalty€in€this€case.ÌÌòòò òà@ àBACKGROUNDóóó óÌà àThe€facts€relevant€to€the€legal€question€presented€by€this€appeal€may€beÏbriefly€stated.€€The€defendant,€David€Willard€Phipps,€Jr.,€was€tried€for€the€firstÏdegree€murder€of€Michael€Presson.€€The€State€did€not€seek€the€death€penalty,Ïand€upon€a€jury€verdict€of€guilty,€the€trial€court€sentenced€Phipps€to€lifeÏimprisonment.€€The€defendant€appealed,€and€after€finding€prejudicial€error€in€theÏjury€instructions,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€reversed€the€defendantððsÏconviction€and€remanded€for€a€new€trial.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Phippsóó,€883€S.W.2d€138Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994),€òònoóó€òòapp.óó€òòforóó€òòperm.óó€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòfiledóó.ÌÌà àWhen€the€case€returned€to€the€trial€court,€the€State€filed€a€notice€of€intent€toÏseek€the€death€penalty€pursuant€to€Rule€12.3(b),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€Proc.€€PhippsÏmoved€to€strike€the€notice,€arguing€that€principles€of€due€process€and€doubleÏjeopardy€preclude€the€State€from€seeking€the€death€penalty€following€aÏsuccessful€defense€appeal€if€the€State€did€not€seek€the€death€penalty€at€the€initialÏtrial.€€At€the€hearing€on€the€motion€to€strike,€the€State€indicated€that€it€intended€toÏrely€upon€new€evidence€to€establish€the€aggravating€circumstance€codified€atÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„204(I)(5)€(1989),€ð ð[t]he€murder€was€especially€heinous,Íatrocious,€or€cruel€in€that€it€involved€torture€or€serious€physical€abuse€beyond€thatÏnecessary€to€produce€death.ðð€€The€State€identified€a€witness€who€had€contactedÏthe€District€Attorney€Generalððs€office€approximately€one€week€prior€to€the€trial€andÏrelated€a€conversation€between€himself,€the€defendant,€and€some€other€men€inÏwhich€the€defendant€described€how€simple€it€would€be€to€escape€prosecution€forÏa€homicide€if€the€victimððs€body€were€burned€and€buried€in€a€remote€area€ofÏStewart€County.€€The€State€did€not€present€the€testimony€of€this€witness€as€anÏoffer€of€proof€at€the€hearing€on€the€motion€to€strike.ÌÌà àThe€State€also€referred€to€a€letter,€allegedly€written€by€the€defendant,Ïwhich€had€been€found€inside€an€internal,€closed€compartment€of€a€back€pack€thatÏwas€€located€by€police€after€the€murder€near€the€victimððs€house.€€The€back€packÏhad€been€in€the€Stateððs€possession€from€the€beginning€of€the€murderÏinvestigation,€but€the€letter€œhad›€œnot€been›€discovered€until€after€the€conclusion€ofÏPhippsðð€initial€trial.€€€A€copy€of€this€letter€was€attached€to€the€Stateððs€memorandumÏof€law€filed€in€the€trial€court€in€opposition€to€the€motion€to€strike.ÌÌà àUpon€considering€the€argument€of€counsel€at€the€hearing,€the€trial€courtÏgranted€œthe€defense›€motion€to€strike€the€notice,€thereby€effectively€barring€theÏState€from€seeking€the€death€penalty.€€However,€the€trial€court€also€granted€theÏState€permission€to€seek€an€interlocutory€appeal€pursuant€to€Rule€9,€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€P.,€and€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€accepted€the€appeal.€€Although€firstÏconcluding€that€constitutional€principles€of€double€jeopardy€do€not€bar€the€StateÏfrom€seeking€the€death€penalty€under€such€circumstances,€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€judgment,€finding€that€the€risk€of€prosecutorialÏvindictiveness€and€piecemeal€litigation€is€too€great€to€allow€the€State€to€seek€theÏdeath€penalty€upon€retrial€following€a€successful€defense€appeal€of€a€convictionÏfor€which€the€death€penalty€originally€had€not€been€sought.€Thereafter,€weÏgranted€the€State€permission€to€appeal€to€consider€this€important€issue€of€law.€ÏFor€the€reasons€that€follow,€we€reverse€the€decision€of€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€upholding€the€trial€courtððs€order€striking€the€Stateððs€notice€of€intent€toÏseek€the€death€penalty,€and€remand€this€cause€to€the€trial€court€for€a€hearing€inÏwhich€the€State€shall€have€the€opportunity€to€present€proof€to€overcome€theÏpresumption€of€prosecutorial€vindictiveness.ÌÌà@ àòòò òPROSECUTORIAL€VINDICTIVENESSóóó óÌà àWe€begin€our€analysis€of€the€issue€in€this€appeal€with€òòNorth€Carolina€v.ÏPearceóó,€395€U.S.€711,€724„25,€89€S.Ct.€2072,€2080,€23€L.Ed.2d€656€(1969),€inÏwhich€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€it€is€a€violation€of€basic€dueÏprocess€to€punish€a€person€because€he€has€done€what€the€law€plainly€allows.€€InÏòòPearceóó,€the€defendant€successfully€appealed€his€conviction,€and€on€retrial,Ïreceived€a€greater€sentence€than€had€been€originally€imposed.€€Pearce€broughtÏa€federal€habeas€corpus€action€challenging€the€constitutionality€of€the€harsherÏsentence.€ÌÌà àThe€Supreme€Court€initially€concluded€that€neither€the€Double€JeopardyÏClause€nor€the€Equal€Protection€Clause€bar€imposition€of€a€more€severeÏsentence€after€retrial.€€However,€the€Court€held€that€the€Due€Process€Clause€ofÏthe€Fourteenth€Amendment€prevents€increased€sentences€which€are€actually€orÏlikely€motivated€by€a€vindictive€desire€to€punish€a€defendant€for€the€exercise€of€aÍstatutory€or€procedural€right.€€òòIdóó.,€395€U.S.€at€723„24,€89€S.Ct.€at€2080.€€TheÏòòPearceóó€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 à[d]ue€process€of€law,€then,€requires€that€vindictiveness€against€aÏdefendant€for€having€successfully€attacked€his€first€conviction€mustÏplay€no€part€in€the€sentence€he€receives€after€a€new€trial.€€And€sinceÏthe€fear€of€such€vindictiveness€may€unconstitutionally€deter€aÏdefendantððs€exercise€of€the€right€to€appeal€or€collaterally€attack€hisÏfirst€conviction,€due€process€also€requires€that€a€defendant€be€freedÏof€apprehension€of€such€a€retaliatory€motivation€on€the€part€of€theÏsentencing€judge.€ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.,€395€U.S.€at€725,€89€S.Ct.€at€2080.€€To€prevent€vindictiveness€from€enteringÏinto€the€decision€and€to€allay€any€fear€on€the€part€of€a€defendant€that€anÏincreased€sentence€is€the€product€of€vindictiveness,€the€Court€fashioned€aÏprophylactic€rule€thatÌÓÓà8 àwhenever€a€judge€imposes€a€more€severe€sentence€upon€aÏdefendant€after€a€new€trial,€the€reasons€for€his€doing€so€mustÏaffirmatively€appear.€€Those€reasons€must€be€based€upon€objectiveÏinformation€concerning€identifiable€conduct€on€the€part€of€theÏdefendant€occurring€after€the€time€of€the€original€sentencingÏproceeding.€€And€the€factual€data€upon€which€the€increasedÏsentence€is€based€must€be€made€part€of€the€record,€so€that€theÏconstitutional€legitimacy€of€the€increased€sentence€may€be€fullyÏreviewed€on€appeal.ÌÓÓòòÌIdóó.,€395€U.S.€at€726,€89€S.Ct.€at€2081.€€The€rule€announced€in€òòPearceóó€has€beenÏinterpreted€to€create€a€rebuttable€presumption€of€vindictiveness€which€may€beÏovercome€only€by€objective€information€in€the€record€which€justifies€the€increasedÏsentence.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Goodwinóó,€457€U.S.€368,€374,€102€S.Ct.€2485,€2489,Ï73€L.Ed.2d€74€(1982).ÌÌà àIn€òòBlackledge€v.€Perryóó,€417€U.S.€21,€94€S.Ct.€2098,€40€L.Ed.2d€628€(1974),Ïthe€Court€extended€the€rule€of€òòPearceóó€to€encompass€post€trial€prosecutorialÏconduct€potentially€motivated€by€vindictiveness.€€In€that€case,€Perry,€while€in€stateÏprison,€was€involved€in€a€fight€with€a€fellow€inmate,€and€was€charged€with€theÏmisdemeanor€offense€of€assault€with€a€deadly€weapon.€€He€was€convicted€in€aÏstate€court€of€limited€jurisdiction€and€sentenced€to€a€six€month€prison€term€to€runÏconcurrent€with€the€term€he€was€then€serving.€€Perry€exercised€his€statutory€rightÏto€appeal€to€the€County€Superior€Court,€where,€under€applicable€state€law,€heÏhad€a€right€to€a€trial€òòde€novoóó.ÌÌà àAfter€Perry€filed€his€notice€of€appeal,€but€before€the€trial€òòde€novoóó,€theÏprosecutor€obtained€an€indictment€charging€Perry€with€the€felony€offense€ofÏassault€with€a€deadly€weapon€with€intent€to€kill€and€inflict€serious€bodily€injury.€ÏThis€charge€was€based€on€the€same€conduct€for€which€Perry€had€been€chargedÏand€convicted€of€the€misdemeanor€in€the€lower€court.€€Perry€entered€a€guiltyÏplea× ƒ( ××  ×€to€the€felony€offense€and€was€sentenced€to€a€term€of€five€to€seven€yearsÏimprisonment€to€run€concurrent€with€the€sentence€he€was€then€serving.€€Overall,Ïthis€conviction€increased€Perryððs€sentence€by€seventeen€months.ÌÌà àThe€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€prosecutorððs€decision€to€seek€a€felonyÏindictment€following€Perryððs€assertion€of€his€right€to€a€òòde€novoóó€trial€raised€aÏpresumption€of€vindictiveness.ÌÓÓà8 àA€prosecutor€clearly€has€a€considerable€stake€in€discouragingÏconvicted€misdemeanants€from€appealing€and€thus€obtaining€a€trialÏòòde€novoóó€in€the€Superior€Court,€since€such€an€appeal€will€clearlyÏrequire€increased€expenditures€of€prosecutorial€resources€beforeÏthe€defendantððs€conviction€becomes€final,€and€may€even€result€in€aÍformerly€convicted€defendantððs€going€free.€€And,€if€the€prosecutorÏhas€the€means€readily€at€hand€to€discourage€such€appeals„„byÏððupping€the€anteðð€through€a€felony€indictment€whenever€a€convictedÏmisdemeanant€pursues€his€statutory€appellate€remedy„„the€StateÏcan€insure€that€only€the€most€hardy€defendants€will€brave€theÏhazards€of€a€òòde€novoóó€trial.ÌÓÓòòÌIdóó.,€417€U.S.€at€27„28,€94€S.Ct.€at€2102.€€In€so€holding,€the€òòBlackledge€óóCourtÏacknowledged€that€no€affirmative€evidence€was€offered€to€establish€that€theÏprosecutor€ð ðacted€in€bad€faith€or€maliciously€in€seeking€the€felony€indictmentÏagainst€Perry.ðð€€òòIdòòóó.,€óó417€U.S.€at€28,€94€S.Ct.€At€2102.€€The€Court€emphasized,Ïhowever,€that€the€òòPearceóó€decision€was€not€grounded€upon€the€existence€ofÏactual€retaliatory€motivation,€but€upon€the€proposition€that€due€process€protectsÏagainst€the€fear€of€vindictiveness€which€may€chill€a€defendantððs€exercise€of€theÏright€to€appeal€or€collaterally€attack€his€first€conviction.€€€òòIdóó.€€The€Court€concludedÏthat€ð ð[a]€person€convicted€of€an€offense€is€entitled€to€pursue€his€statutory€right€to€aÏtrial€òòde€novo€óówithout€apprehension€that€the€state€will€retaliate€by€substituting€aÏmore€serious€charge€for€the€original€one,€thus€subjecting€him€to€a€significantlyÏincreased€potential€period€of€incarceration.ðð€€òòIdòòóó.óóÌÌà àThe€òòBlackledgeóó€Court€found€that€the€prosecutorððs€decision€to€obtain€theÏindictment€for€a€felony€offense€after€Perry€exercised€his€statutory€right€to€appealÏposed€a€ð ðrealistic€likelihood€of€vindictivenessðð€justifying€recognition€of€aÏrebuttable€presumption.€€òòIdóó.,€417€U.S.€at€27,€94€S.Ct.€at€2102.€€Because€theÏrecord€contained€no€explanation€for€the€new€indictment,€the€Court€grantedÏhabeas€corpus€relief.€€In€a€revealing€footnote,€the€Court€expressly€commentedÏthat€a€different€disposition€would€have€obtained€had€the€State€ð ðshown€that€it€wasÏimpossible€to€proceed€on€the€more€serious€charge€at€the€outset.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€417€U.S.€atÏ29,€n.€7,€94€S.Ct.€at€2103,€n.€7.€€The€Court€gave€as€an€example€a€case€in€whichÏan€assault€victim€died€after€his€attacker€was€convicted€of€assault,€and€theÏprosecutor€was€permitted€to€retry€the€defendant€for€homicide.€€òòIdóó.,€citing€òòDiaz€v.ÏUnited€States€óó,€223€U.S.€442,€32€S.Ct.€250,€56€L.Ed.€500€(1912);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóóÏòòWasman€v.€United€Statesóó,€468€U.S.€559,€566,€104€S.Ct.€3217,€3222,€82€L.Ed.2dÏ424€(1984)€(ð ð[W]e€explicitly€observed€[in€òòBlackledgeóó]€that€a€different€dispositionÏwould€have€been€called€for€had€the€State€advanced€a€legitimate€nonvindictiveÏjustification€for€the€greater€charge.ðð)€This€statement€by€the€òòBlackledgeóó€Court€wasÏno€more€than€an€acknowledgment€and€reaffirmation€that€òòPearceóó€established€aÍrebuttable€presumption€of€vindictiveness,€not€an€absolute€prohibition€onÏenhancement€of€sentence€upon€retrial.€€òòWasmanóó,€468€U.S.€at€566,€104€S.Ct.€atÏ3222.ÌÌà à€Because€of€its€ð ðseverity,ðð€òòseeóó€òòGoodwinóó,€457€U.S.€at€373,€102€S.Ct.€atÏ2489,€the€Court€has€restricted€application€of€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness€toÏsituations€where€ð ðits€objectives€are€thought€most€efficaciously€served.ðð€€òòTexas€v.ÏMcCulloughóó,€475€U.S.€134,€138,€106€S.Ct.€976,€979,€89€L.Ed.2d€104€(1986).€€InÏòòColten€v.€Kentuckyóó,€407€U.S.€104,€92€S.Ct.€1953,€32€L.Ed.2d€584€(1972),€forÏexample,€the€Court€expressly€declined€to€extend€the€presumption€in€the€contextÏof€Kentuckyððs€two„tier€trial€system.€€There,€the€defendant€appealed€aÏmisdemeanor€conviction€to€a€trial€òòde€novoóó€before€a€different€judge€who€imposedÏa€more€severe€sentence.€€The€Court€held€that€the€possibility€of€ð ðpersonalÏvindictiveness,ð ð€presumed€to€exist€inòò€œóóòòPearceóó›€was€not€likely€since€a€different€judgeÏimposed€the€more€severe€sentence.ÌÌà àAlso,€in€òòChaffin€v.€Stynchcombeóó,€412€U.S.€17,€93€S.Ct.€1977,€36€L.Ed.2dÏ714€(1973),€the€Court€rejected€the€need€for€the€œpresumption,›€characterizing€asÏð ðde€minimisðð€the€possibility€that€an€increased€sentence€by€a€different€jury€uponÏreconviction€after€a€new€trial€would€be€motivated€by€vindictiveness.€€Not€only€wasÏthe€second€jury€unaware€of€the€prior€conviction,€but€in€contrast€to€the€judge€andÏprosecutor€in€òòPearceóó€and€òòBlackledgeóó,€it€was€considered€highly€unlikely€that€theÏjury€would€perceive€a€ð ðpersonal€stake€in€the€prior€convictionðð€or€adopt€an€attitudeÏof€ð ðself„vindication.ðð€€òòChaffinóó,€412€U.S.€at€27,€93€S.Ct.€at€1983.€€The€CourtÏexplained€in€òòChaffinóó€that€ÌÓÓÌà8 àòòPearceóó€was€not€written€with€a€view€to€protecting€against€the€mereÏpossibility€that,€once€the€slate€is€wiped€clean€and€the€prosecutionÏbegins€anew,€a€fresh€sentence€may€be€higher€for€some€valid€reasonÏassociated€with€the€need€for€flexibility€and€discretion€in€theÏsentencing€process.ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.,€412€U.S.€at€25,€93€S.Ct.€at€1982.€€€€òòPearceóó,€instead€was€ð ðpremised€on€theÏapparent€need€to€guard€against€vindictiveness€in€the€resentencing€process.ðð€€òòIdóó.€ÌÌà àIn€òòBordenkircher€v.€Hayesóó,€434€U.S.€357,€98€S.Ct.€663,€54€L.Ed.2d€604Ï(1978),€the€Court€considered,€for€the€first€time,€an€allegation€of€vindictiveness€thatÏarose€in€a€pretrial€setting.€€In€that€case,€the€Court€held€that€the€presumption€doesÏnot€arise€when€a€prosecutor€follows€through€on€a€threat,€made€during€pleaÏnegotiations,€to€bring€additional€charges€against€an€accused€who€refused€toÏplead€guilty€to€the€offense€with€which€he€was€originally€charged.€€The€CourtÏdeclined€to€characterize€this€conduct€as€offensive€to€due€process€andÏdistinguished€òòPearceóó€and€òòBlackledgeóó€by€noting€that€those€cases€dealtÌÓÓÌà8 àwith€the€Stateððs€unilateral€imposition€of€a€penalty€upon€a€defendantÏwho€had€chosen€to€exercise€a€legal€right€to€attack€his€originalÏconviction„„a€situation€very€different€from€the€give„and„takeÏnegotiation€common€in€plea€bargaining€between€the€prosecutionÏand€defense,€which€arguably€possess€relatively€equal€bargainingÏpower.€€€ÌÓÓÌòòIdóó.,€434€U.S.€at€362,€98€S.Ct.€at€667.ÌÌà àMore€recently,€in€òòGoodwinóó,€òòsupraóó,€the€Court€considered€whether€theÏprosecutorððs€addition€of€a€felony€charge€following€a€defendantððs€pretrial€demandÍfor€a€jury€trial€on€a€misdemeanor€charge€gives€rise€to€the€presumption.€€The€CourtÏstated€that,€in€determining€whether€the€circumstances€of€a€particular€case€pose€aÏð ðrealistic€likelihoodðð€of€prosecutorial€retaliation€warranting€application€of€theÏpresumption€of€vindictiveness,€courts€should€focus€upon€ð ðthe€nature€of€the€rightÏassertedðð€and€ð ðthe€timing€of€the€prosecutorððs€action.ðð€€òòIdóó,€457€U.S.€at€381„82,€102ÏS.Ct.€at€2493.€€The€balance€weighs€in€favor€of€applying€the€presumption€if€theÏright€asserted€by€the€defendant€requires€ð ðduplicative€expenditures€ofÏprosecutorial€resources,ðð€or€would€require€the€State€ð ðto€do€over€what€it€thought€itÏhad€already€done€correctly.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€457€U.S.€at€383,€102€S.Ct.€at€2494.€€If€theÏprosecutor€has€a€ð ðpersonal€stakeðð€or€if€€ð ðinstitutional€biases,ðð€such€as€òòstare€decisisóóÏand€òòres€judicataóó,€militate€against€the€retrial€of€a€decided€question,€the€Court€foundÏthe€presumption€especially€appropriate.€€òòIdóó.€€With€respect€to€the€timing€of€theÏprosecutorððs€action,€the€Court€stated€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àÌà8 àThere€is€good€reason€to€be€cautious€before€adopting€an€inflexibleÏpresumption€of€prosecutorial€vindictiveness€in€a€pretrial€setting.€€InÏthe€course€of€preparing€a€case€for€trial,€the€prosecutor€may€uncoverÏadditional€information€that€suggests€a€basis€for€further€prosecutionÏor€he€simply€may€come€to€realize€that€information€possessed€by€theÏState€has€a€broader€significance.€€At€this€stage€of€the€proceedings,Íthe€prosecutorððs€assessment€of€the€proper€extent€of€prosecutionÏmay€not€have€crystallized.€€In€contrast,€once€a€trial€begins„„andÏcertainly€by€the€time€a€conviction€has€been€obtained„„it€is€muchÏmore€likely€that€the€State€has€discovered€and€assessed€all€of€theÏinformation€against€an€accused€and€has€made€a€determination,€onÏthe€basis€of€that€information,€of€the€extent€to€which€he€should€beÏprosecuted.€€Thus,€a€change€in€the€charging€decision€made€after€anÏinitial€trial€is€completed€is€much€more€likely€to€be€improperlyÏmotivated€than€is€a€pretrial€decision.ÌÓÓòòÌIdóó.,€457€U.S.€at€381,€102€S.Ct.€at€2492„93.€€Considering€the€circumstances€ofÏòòGoodwinóó€in€light€of€the€relevant€factors,€the€Court€found€that€the€presumption€ofÏvindictiveness€was€not€warranted.€€€€The€Court€deemed€it€highly€unlikely€ð ðthat€aÏprosecutor€would€respond€to€a€defendantððs€pretrial€demand€for€a€jury€trial€byÏbringing€charges€not€in€the€public€interest.ðð€€òòIdóó,€457€U.S.€at€384,€102€S.Ct.€atÏ2494.€€Unlike€òòBlackledgeóó,€no€duplicative€expenditures€were€incurred€as€a€resultÏof€the€defendantððs€request,€and€as€compared€to€òòPearceóó,€no€judge€was€asked€toÏdo€again€what€he€thought€he€had€already€done€correctly€once.€€Thus,€the€deepÏseated€institutional€bias€against€retrying€previously€decided€issues€was€notÏoffended.€€òòIdóó.€€Finally,€the€timing€of€the€prosecutorððs€decision€weighed€against€aÍfinding€of€the€presumption€since,€in€the€pretrial€context,€the€assessment€of€theÏproper€extent€of€prosecution€has€not€yet€been€resolved.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àLater,€the€Court€applied€the€analysis€delineated€in€òòGoodwinóó,€in€òòTexas€v.ÏMcCulloughóó,€òòsupraóó,€to€determine€whether€the€circumstances€posed€a€ð ðrealisticÏlikelihoodðð€of€retaliation€warranting€the€òòPearceòòóó€óópresumption.€€There,€theÏdefendant€had€been€convicted€of€murder€and€sentenced€by€a€jury€to€twenty€yearsÏin€prison.€€The€trial€judge,€however,€granted€the€defendantððs€motion€for€a€newÏtrial.€€Three€months€later,€with€the€same€trial€judge€presiding,€the€defendant€wasÏretried€and€again€convicted€of€murder€by€a€jury.€€This€time,€the€defendant€electedÏto€have€his€punishment€fixed€by€the€trial€judge,€and€a€fifty€year€sentence€wasÏimposed.€€The€defendant€asserted€that€the€increased€sentence€violated€òòPearceóó.€ÏWeighing€the€factors€cited€in€òòGoodwinóó,€the€Court€concluded€thatÌÓÓœ›à8 àà à[t]he€facts€of€this€case€provide€no€basis€for€a€presumption€ofÏvindictiveness.€€In€contrast€to€òòPearceóó,€McCulloughððs€second€trialÏcame€about€because€the€trial€judge€herself€concluded€that€theÏprosecutorððs€misconduct€required€it.€.€.€.€[U]nlike€the€judge€who€hasÏbeen€reversed,€the€trial€judge€here€had€no€motivation€to€engage€inÏself„vindication.€€In€such€circumstances,€there€is€no€justifiableÏconcern€about€ð ðinstitutional€interests€that€might€occasion€higherÍsentences€by€a€judge€desirous€of€discouraging€what€he€regards€asÏmeritless€appeals.ððÌÓÓœÌId.,›€475€U.S.€at€138„39,€106€S.Ct.€at€979€(internal€citations€omitted),€quotingÏòòChaffinóó,€412€U.S.€at€27,€93€S.Ct.€at€1983.ÌÌà àThe€Court€alternatively€held€that€even€if€òòPearceóó€applied,€the€presumptionÏhad€been€rebutted€by€the€findings€of€the€trial€judge€describing€the€grounds€for€theÏenhanced€sentence.€€òòIdóó.,€475€U.S.€at€141,€106€S.Ct.€at€980.€€The€trial€judge€reliedÏupon€new€evidence€about€the€murder,€specifically€the€testimony€of€two€witnesses,Ïwhich€had€not€been€presented€by€the€State€at€the€first€trial.€€The€trial€judgeÏdescribed€the€testimony€as€directly€affecting€the€strength€of€the€Stateððs€case€atÏboth€the€guilt€and€punishment€phases€of€the€trial€by€bolstering€the€credibility€ofÏthe€Stateððs€key€witness,€detracting€from€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses€for€theÏdefense,€directly€implicating€the€defendant€in€the€commission€of€the€murder,€andÏshedding€new€light€upon€the€defendantððs€life,€conduct,€mental€and€moralÏpropensities.€€€òòMcCulloughóó,€475€U.S.€at€143,€106€S.Ct.€at€981.€€In€addition,€theÏtrial€judge€explained€that€she€learned€for€the€first€time€on€retrial€that€the€defendantÍhad€been€released€from€prison€only€four€months€before€the€crime€had€beenÏcommitted.€€Finally,€the€trial€judge€candidly€admitted€that,€had€she€fixed€the€firstÏsentence,€it€would€have€been€longer€than€twenty€years.€€òòIdóó.,€475€U.S.€at€144,€106ÏS.Ct.€at€981„82.ÌÌà à€€Because€the€circumstances€cited€by€the€trial€judge€as€justifications€for€theÏincreased€sentence€did€not€arise€after€the€first€trial,€the€defendant€claimed€that€theÏfindings€were€not€sufficient€to€overcome€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness.€€InÏrejecting€that€claim,€the€Court€acknowledged€that€òòPearceóó€and€its€progenyÏexpressly€held€that,€to€justify€an€increased€sentence€and€rebut€the€presumption€ofÏvindictiveness,€a€sentencing€authority€must€point€to€ð ðrelevant€conduct€or€eventsÏthat€occur€subsequent€to€the€original€sentencing€proceedings.ðð× ƒ) ××  ×€€Pointing€out,Ïhowever,€that€no€case€had€attempted€to€exhaustively€identify€all€circumstancesÏwhich€constitute€valid€justifications€for€increased€sentences,€the€Court€refused€toÏrestrict€the€scope€of€information€sufficient€to€justify€a€sentence€increase€to€onlyÍevents€which€occur€after€the€original€sentencing€proceeding.€€Finding€that€such€aÏÑ ü Ñrestriction,€in€some€cases,€would€lead€to€absurd€results× ƒ* ××  ×€without€advancing€theÏunderlying€rationale€of€òòPearceóó,€the€Court€chose€to€maintain€a€general€standard,Ïobserving€that€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness€ð ðððmay€be€overcome€only€byÏobjective€information€.€.€.€justifying€the€increased€sentence.ðððð€€òòMcCulloughóó,€475ÏU.S.€at€142,€106€S.Ct.€at€981,€quoting€òòGoodwinóó,€457€U.S.€at€374,€102€S.Ct.€at€Ï2489.€€The€òòMcCulloughóó€Court€commented€that€ð ð[n]othing€in€the€ConstitutionÏrequires€a€judge€to€ignore€ð ðobjective€information€.€.€.€justifying€the€increasedÏsentence.ðð€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àThe€standard€necessary€to€overcome€the€presumption€has€been€furtherÏexplained€by€state€and€federal€court€decisions€applying€òòPearceóó.€€For€example,€in€ÌòòAdamson€v.€Rickettsóó,€865€F.2d€1011,€1019€(9th€Cir.€1988),€the€Court€held€thatÏð ð[o]nce€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness€is€raised,€the€burden€shifts€to€theÏprosecution€to€rebut€it€by€presenting€evidence€of€independent€reasons€orÏintervening€circumstances€which€demonstrate€that€the€prosecutorððs€decision€wasÏmotivated€by€a€legitimate€purpose.ðð€€In€òòAdamsonóó,€the€Ninth€Circuit€concluded€thatÏthe€State€had€failed€to€rebut€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness€which€arose€fromÏits€reinstatement€of€the€first€degree€murder€charge€and€pursuit€of€the€deathÏÑ  Ñpenalty.€€The€State€introduced€no€proof€on€the€issue,€and€attempted€to€overcomeÏthe€presumption€by€arguing€that€its€decision€was€an€appropriate€exercise€of€Ïprosecutorial€discretion,€and€specifically€authorized€by€the€plea€agreement€underÏwhich€Adamson€agreed€to€testify.€€The€federal€court€characterized€the€StateððsÏposition€as€ð ðwhollyðð€missing€the€point.€€òòIdóó.,€865€F.2d€at€1019.ÌÌà àLikewise,€in€òòState€ex€rel.€Patterson€v.€Randallóó,€637€S.W.2d€16,€19Ï(Mo.banc.€1982),€the€Court€found€that€the€State€had€failed€to€advance€ð ðobjectiveÍevidence€justifying€the€prosecutorððs€decision€to€seek€the€death€penalty€atÏPattersonððs€second€œtrial.ð𛀀As€explanations€for€its€decision,€the€State€alleged€thatÏthe€original€prosecutor€did€not€believe€the€death€penalty€should€be€imposedÏunder€any€circumstance.€€The€Missouri€Supreme€Court€rejected€this€explanation,Ïcharacterizing€it€as€ð ðnothing€more€than€a€mistake€.€.€.€on€the€part€of€the€State€inÏassigning€a€capital€murder€case€to€a€prosecutor€who€does€not€believe€inÏpursuing€the€death€penalty.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€Secondly,€the€State€argued€that€the€newÏprosecutor€could€not€have€been€motivated€by€vindictiveness€because€it€was€theÏconviction€obtained€by€the€original€prosecutor€which€had€been€reversed.€€TheÏCourt€refused€to€individualize€the€application€of€òòBlackledgeóó,€explaining€that,€onceÏthe€presumption€of€vindictiveness€arises,€it€applies€with€equal€force€to€allÏmembers€of€the€prosecuting€attorneyððs€office,€not€exclusively€to€the€originalÏprosecuting€attorney.€€òòIdóó.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòThigpen€v.€Robertsóó,€468€U.S.€27,€31,€104ÏS.Ct.€2916,€2919,€82€L.Ed.2d€23€(1984).̛̜à àThough€courts€consistently€hold€that,€to€overcome€the€presumption,€theÏState€must€present€objective€evidence€which€demonstrates€that€the€prosecutorððsÍÑ  ÑÑ , ÑÑ ` ÑÑ  ÑÑ€" §u` Ñdecision€was€motivated€by€a€legitimate€purpose,€the€precise€formulation€of€theÏtest€varies€to€some€degree,× ƒ, ××  ×€as€does€the€type€and€quality€of€proof€deemedÍsufficient€to€meet€the€standard.œ× ƒ. ××  ×›€€However,€as€the€Fifth€Circuit€recognized,€evenÏthough€the€burden€has€been€placed€on€the€State€to€overcome€the€presumption,€itÏis€the€trial€court€which€must€perform€the€difficult€task€of€determining,€in€light€of€theÏtotality€of€the€circumstances,€whether€the€State€has€met€that€burden.€€òòJacksonóó,Ï585€F.2d€at€149.ÌÌà àTo€summarize,€œwe›€œhold›€that,€even€in€the€absence€of€proof€of€actual€badÏfaith€or€malice,€a€rebuttable€presumption€of€prosecutorial€vindictiveness€mayÍarise€if€the€circumstances€of€a€case€pose€a€ð ðrealistic€likelihoodðð€of€prosecutorialÏretaliation.€€œAfter›€a€defendant€has€raised€the€issue€of€vindictiveness,€the€trial€courtÏmust€review€the€circumstances€of€record€and€decide€whether€the€prosecutorððsÏactions€give€rise€to€a€realistic€likelihood€of€prosecutorial€œretaliation.›€€In€assessingÏwhether€a€ð ðrealistic€likelihoodðð€of€prosecutorial€retaliation€exists,€courts€œmust›Ïconsider€whether€the€right€asserted€by€the€defendant€would€result€in€duplicativeÏexpenditures€of€prosecutorial€resources,€or€require€the€State€to€do€over€againÏwhat€it€thought€it€had€already€done€correctly€once.€€òòGoodwinóó,€457€U.S€at€383,€102ÏS.Ct.€at€2494.€€When€the€circumstances€demonstrate€that€the€prosecutor€has€ð ðaÏpersonal€stakeðð€or€an€interest€in€self€vindication,€or€when€institutional€biasesÏmilitate€against€retrial€of€a€decided€question,€the€œbalance›€weighs€in€favor€ofÏrecognizing€the€presumption.€€òòIdóó.€€€Likewise€the€presumption€is€especiallyÏwarranted€if€the€prosecutorial€decision€to€increase€the€charge€or€sentence€isÏmade€after€an€initial€trial€is€completed€rather€than€in€a€pretrial€context.€€WhenÏapplication€of€these€factors€to€the€circumstances€of€a€case€reveal€the€existence€ofÏa€realistic€likelihood€of€prosecutorial€retaliation,€òòPearceóó€applies.€€TheÏpresumption€is€not,€however,€absolute.€€Once€the€presumption€of€vindictivenessÍhas€been€raised,€the€burden€shifts€to€the€State€to€rebut€it€by€presenting€œclear›€andÏœconvincing›€evidence€Ñ , ÑÑ «) ÑÑ  ÑÑ€" §u` Ñwhich€demonstrates€that€the€prosecutorððs€decision€wasÏmotivated€by€a€legitimate€purpose.€€Finally,€in€attempting€to€overcome€theÏpresumption,€the€prosecutor€is€not€limited€to€evidence€which€arose€after€theÏoriginal€sentencing€proceedings,€so€long€as€the€evidence€constitutes€ð ðobjectiveÏinformation€.€.€.€justifying€the€increased€sentence.ððœ× ƒ/ ××  ×›€òòMcCulloughóó,€475€U.S.€at€142,Ï106€S.Ct.€at€981,€quoting€òòGoodwinóó,€457€U.S.€at€374,€102€S.Ct.€at€€2489.ÌÌà àIn€accordance€with€these€principles,€we€must€first€determine€whether€theÏprosecutorððs€decision,€in€this€case,€to€seek€the€death€penalty€at€Phipps€secondÏtrial€presents€a€realistic€likelihood€of€prosecutorial€retaliation€giving€rise€to€theÏpresumption€of€vindictiveness.€€The€State€contends€that€the€presumption€doesÏnot€apply.€€We€disagree.ÌÌà àAs€in€òòPearceóó€and€òòBlackledgeóó,€Phippsðð€successful€appeal€culminated€in€theÏreversal€of€his€conviction.€€He€must€now€be€retried.€€Duplicative€expenditures€ofÏprosecutorial€resources€will€be€incurred.€€Because€Phipps€exercised€his€right€ofÏappeal,€the€State€must€now€do€again€what€it€thought€it€had€already€doneÏcorrectly.€€The€institutional€biases€against€retrial€of€issues€already€decidedÏmilitates€in€favor€of€the€presumption.€€The€inherent€prosecutorial€stake€inÏdiscouraging€appeals€by€ð ðupping€the€ante,ðð€recognized€in€òòBlackledgeóó,€appliesÏwith€great€force€in€this€case.€€Finally,€the€post€trial€timing€of€the€prosecutorððsÏdecision€to€pursue€the€death€penalty€òòafteróó€a€successful€appeal€strongly€supportsÏapplication€of€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness€in€this€case.€€As€the€UnitedÏStates€Supreme€Court€recognized€in€òòGoodwinóó,€a€change€in€the€chargingÏdecision€after€an€initial€trial€has€been€completed€and€a€conviction€obtained€givesÏrise€to€a€great€risk€of€prosecutorial€retaliation.€€Moreover€we€agree€with€the€ÏMissouri€Supreme€Court€which€stated€when€confronting€this€issue:€ÌÓÓà8 àà àWhether€the€State€shall€seek€the€death€penalty€in€a€capitalÏmurder€case€is€initially€within€the€discretion€of€the€State.€€Because€ofÏthe€severity€of€this€penalty,€the€potential€of€its€imposition€normallyÏwill€have€the€effect€of€creating€apprehension,€even€during€theÏoriginal€trial.€€Given€this,€apprehension€must€necessarily€be€createdÏin€the€defendant€who€would€appeal€successfully€his€conviction€andÍthen€be€faced€with€the€Stateððs€election€to€seek€the€death€penalty€onÏretrial€when€it€was€waived€at€the€first€trial.€€Because€due€process€ofÏlaw€prohibits€the€state€from€responding€to€a€personððs€invocation€ofÏhis€right€of€appeal€by€bringing€a€more€serious€charge€against€aÏdefendant€prior€to€his€new€trial,€the€same€is€necessarily€true€ofÏsubjecting€the€defendant€to€a€more€serious€penalty€subsequent€toÏhis€successful€appeal.€ÌÓÓÌòòRandallóó,€637€S.W.2d€at€18.€€Accordingly,€we€hold€that€the€Stateððs€pursuit€of€theÏdeath€penalty€following€a€successful€appeal€of€a€conviction€for€which€the€deathÏpenalty€originally€was€not€sought€gives€rise€to€a€rebuttable€presumption€ofÏprosecutorial€vindictiveness.€€Having€concluded€that€the€circumstances€of€thisÏcase€give€rise€to€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness,€we€must€next€consider€theÏStateððs€assertion€that€the€presumption€has€been€rebutted€in€this€case.ÌÌà àAs€we€have€previously€recognized,€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness€isÏnot€absolute€and€may€be€overcome€by€œclear›€and€œconvincing›€evidence€whichÏdemonstrates€that€the€prosecutorððs€decision€was€motivated€by€a€legitimateÏpurpose.€€òòSeeóó€Footnote€4,€òòsupraóó.€€Though€the€prosecutor,€in€attempting€toÏovercome€the€presumption,€is€not€limited€to€evidence€which€arose€after€theÍoriginal€sentencing€proceedings,€the€type€of€evidence€sufficient€to€overcome€theÏpresumption€varies€greatly.€òòSeeóó€Footnote€5,€òòsupraóó.€€Certainly,€a€prosecutorððsÏbare€assertion€that€he€or€she€made€a€mistake€when€the€evidence€was€initiallyÏevaluated€is€not€sufficient€to€rebut€the€presumption.€€òòAndrewsóó,€633€F.2d€at€456;ÏòòHintonóó,€601€P.2d€at€340.€€To€overcome€the€presumption,€the€State€must€profferÏfact€specific,€legitimate,€on„the„record€explanations€for€its€conduct€which€dispelÏthe€appearance€of€vindictiveness.€€òòEspositoóó,€968€F.2d€at€305;€òòAndrewsóó,€633€F.2dÏat€456.€ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€no€evidence€was€presented€at€the€hearing€on€the€motion€toÏstrike.€€Moreover,€argument€at€the€hearing€focused€primarily€upon€principles€ofÏdouble€jeopardy€and€centered€little€upon€the€dictates€of€due€process.€€Neither€theÏdefendant€nor€the€prosecution€had€the€benefit€of€the€standards€we€announceÏherein.€€Although,€from€the€statements€of€counsel€in€the€record€on€appeal,€we€areÏaware€of€the€general€nature€of€the€information€upon€which€the€State€intends€toÏrely€to€overcome€the€presumption,€no€specific€proof€explaining€the€prosecutorððsÏdecision€to€seek€the€death€penalty€was€introduced€at€the€hearing€on€theÍdefendantððs€motion€to€strike.€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€this€cause€should€beÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€a€hearing€in€which€the€State€shall€have€theÏopportunity€to€introduce€proof€to€rebut€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness.€€òòSeeóóÏòòe.g.€Andrewsóó,€633€F.2d€at€456;€òòState€v.€Lewisóó,€461€So.2d€1250,€1253€(La.€App.Ï1984).€€We€are€confident€that€the€trial€judge€will€carefully€consider€the€proofÏpresented,€in€light€of€the€totality€of€the€circumstances,€to€determine€whether€theÏState€has€proffered€fact€specific,€legitimate,€on„the„record€explanations€for€itsÏdecision€to€seek€the€death€penalty€which€will€dispel€the€appearance€ofÏvindictiveness.€€If€the€trial€court€is€satisfied,€after€hearing€the€proof,€that€theÏpresumption€has€been€overcome,€the€State€may€seek€the€death€penalty€in€thisÏcase.ÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àFor€the€reasons€previously€explained,€we€conclude€that€the€circumstancesÏof€this€case€pose€a€realistic€likelihood€of€prosecutorial€retaliation€which€gives€riseÏto€a€rebuttable€presumption€of€prosecutorial€vindictiveness.€€We€reverse€theÏdecision€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€and€remand€this€case€to€the€trial€courtÍfor€a€hearing€to€allow€the€State€an€opportunity€to€rebut€the€presumption€by€œclear›Ïand€œconvincing›€evidence€which€demonstrates€that€the€prosecutorððs€decision€wasÏlegitimate.€€If,€after€hearing€the€proof,€the€trial€judge€determines€that€theÏpresumption€has€been€overcome,€the€State€may€seek€the€death€penalty€in€thisÏcase.ÌÌÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àœ________________________________›€Ìà àà àà àà àà àœFRANK€F.€DROWOTA,€III,Ìà àà àà àà àà àJUSTICEÌÌÌÌò òConcur:ó óÌAnderson,€C.J.,€ÌÌReid,€J.€and€Birch,€J.,€concur€separately€€„€See€Separate€Concurring€Opinion.ÌÌHolder,€J.,€Not€Participating.ÌÓÓÔ€Ô