WPC Yn:a8[BL.1/ܣ2ҼE1zV)ER4Hd[[ocI Ft57>]{h9}ݿ:j vR_ tZ ?HS3(JA ȥ`r'„D,GMC'{}#95KbIP7JV yxD2ߧ! 5~؈2L-ao[lvMU&Mj M#EFڂy xiC-OE[ik]y.Ů50nzܮLk$Y3 fx J6ct+wDaL.!ǣbYۖrqpJwr#h U N) %w 0} U,^UN^ w4  m U&>$U@b 0  0< 0DE( B-)} Vb:r "(-{0{0N%4'4 9R69696969 0T==e= A@HIWfffkRo7t7tE BNJNJNJNJNJNJNJNJNJNJNJNJ B*! AHP LaserJet 8000 Series PS0(uH Z6Times New Roman RegularX4·$RegularTRY,3' LetterY,3' Letter 3' Letter 3' LetterTX2(XXX  USUS.,,yAZArial ("  Z6Times New Roman Regular z/) r'),3|xU\  `&Times New Roman(uH Z(Times New Roman :008Body Text 2  X XXX  X XXX(-*2$ ·!TRY,3' LetterX3' Letter 3' Letter3'TXPXXX  USUS.,  V XXXXPXXXX      0  (#$  0    $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      4    _5 XXArticle1,section2reads: Thatgovernmentbeinginstitutedforthecommonbenefit,thedoctrineof  non-resistanceagainstarbitrarypowerandoppressionisabsurd,slavish,anddestructiveofthegoodandhappinessof  mankind.)Hairline d s $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      20    _5 XXTheinterestofthefatherinfetallifeisusuallyignoredintheabortiondebate.Thefathersinterestsareat  leastequal(and,insomecases,willevenoutweigh)theinterestofthemotherinthecaseofpreembryos,Davis_v._ԀDavis,  842S.W.2d588(Tenn.1992),_and_Ԁthefathersinterestsareatleastequalwiththatofthemotherwhendealingwiththe ` controlandcareofchildren,absentsubstantialdangerofharmtothechild,Hawkv.Hawk,855S.W.2d573(Tenn. $t 1993).Withregardtotheabortioncontext,eventheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateshasstatedthatahusband has 8 adeepandproperconcernandinterest...inhiswifespregnancyandinthegrowthanddevelopmentofthefetusshe  iscarrying.f  f  g g Ԁf  g f  g Casey,505U.S.at895(quotingPlannedParenthood_v._ԀDanforth,428U.S.52,69(1976)). p    Althoughonemustconcedetheconstitutionalargumentthatthef  g f  g interestsf  g Ԁofthehusbandorfathercannot 6  completelyovercometheinterestsofthemotherintheabortioncontext,thestrictscrutinyanalysisadoptedbythe  J majoritycompletelyignoresf  g f  g f  g f  g thefathersf  g f  g Ԁinterestasifitneverexisted.Anyproperstandardofreviewofabortion    regulationsmustrecognizethefactthatamyriadofimportantinterestsisinvolvedf  g f  g Ԁandf  g f  g f  g f  g thatstrictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁanalysissimply    cannotaccommodatethesecompetingconcerns.- - 0#Xd#     ' tg0tg .     $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      15    _5 XXAsanillustrationofthemalleablenatureofnaturallaw,onecommentatorhasf  g f  notedf  g Ԁthat  _natural_Ԁlawhashadasitscontentwhatevertheindividualinquestiondesiredtoadvocate.Thishas  variedfromadefenseoftheocracytoadefenseofthecompleteseparationofchurchandstate[;]_from_ ` revolutionaryrightsin1776tolibertyofcontractinrecentjudicialopinions[;]_from_Ԁtheadvocacyof $t universaladultsuffragetoadefenseofrigidlimitationsuponthevotingpower[;]..._from_Ԁthe 8 advocacyoftheinalienablerightofsecessiontotheassertionofthenaturallawofnational  supremacy[;]_from_Ԁtherightofmajorityruletotherightsofvestedinterests. p  BenjaminFletcherWright,Jr.,AmericanInterpretationsofNaturalLaw:AStudyintheHistoryofPoliticalThought339 4  40(1931).f  g Ԁf  g   $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      21    _5 XXf  g IalsonotethatitisunclearwhichstandardtheCourtusestoreachitsconclusion.TheCourtpurportsto  applyastandardrequiringthattheStatenarrowlytailoritsabortionregulationtofurtheracompellinginterest.TheCourt  doesnotexplainwhytheattendingphysicianprovisiondoesnotsatisfythenarrowlytailoredrequirement,becausethe ` requirementdoesf  g Ԁ infactf  g Ԁseemtobe reasonablyrelatedtothestatescompellinginterest.Rather,theCourtcontends $t thattheregulationisconstitutionallyinvalidbecauseothermedicalprofessionalscouldprovidetherequisiteinformation. : Essentially,thoughitdoesnotsayso,theCourtisapplyinga leastrestrictivemeansstandardwhichinevitablywill  resultinstrikingdowneveryregulation.  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      22    _5 XXf  g WhiletheCourtcontendsthatmandatedhospitalizationfailsstrictscrutiny,itconcedesthattheStatemay  imposeequipmentandstaffingstandardsonfacilitiesthatdonotmeettherequirementsofsection201(c)(2).  Presumably,then,theGeneralAssemblycouldimposeonsuchfacilitiesthesameregulationsimposedonhospitalsas ` definedinTennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection6811201(1996).  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      13    _5 XXSee,e.g.,Burford_v._ԀState,845S.W.2d204,207(Tenn.1992)(_finding_Ԁnostateorfederaldueprocessright   tocollaterallyattackconstitutionalviolationsoccurringduringtheconvictionprocess);Doe_v._ԀNorris,751S.W.2d834,  838(Tenn.1988)(_finding_ԀthatboththestateandfederalConstitutionswereconsistentintheirprohibitionon ` comminglingstatusoffenderswithdelinquentchildrenaspunishmentwithoutprioradjudicationofguilt).  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      6    _5 XXWeknowthatFranklinsDeclarationofRightswassubstantiallytakenfromthatofNorthCarolinabyaletter  writtenbytheFranklinAssemblyinreplytoaletterfromthenNorthCarolinaGovernorAlexanderMartinwrittenon  February27,1785.InordertomakeclearthatFranklinwasnotorganizedoutofanydissatisfactionwiththelawsof ` NorthCarolina,theAssemblystatedthat thefirstlawweenactedwas_to_Ԁsecureandconfirmalltherightsgrantedunder $t thelawsofNorthCarolinainthesamemannerasifwehasnotdeclaredourselvesanindependentState;[_we_]have 8 patronizedherConstitutionandlawsandhopeforherassistanceandinfluenceinCongresstoprecipitateourreception  intotheFederalUnion.SeeAntebellumHistoryofTennessee5354(EricR.Lacy,ed.1980)    H $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      5    _5 XXAlthoughthe perlegemterraeclauseappearedinChapter39oftheoriginalversionofMagnaCartasigned  byKingJohnatRunnymedein1215,theeffectofthisdocumentwasannulledalmostimmediatelybyPopeInnocentIII,  presumablyattherequestofKingJohn.HenryIIIreconfirmedtheprovisionsofMagnaCartaseveraltimes,most ` notablyin1225,andEdwardIreissuedaversionofMagnaCartain1297asapartofhisConfirmationof_theCharters_. $t The perlegemterraeclauseappearsinChapter29ofthe1297versionofMagnaCarta,whichisthedocumentusually 8 citedbyconstitutionalscholarsasprovidingthebasisforsubstantivelimitationonthepowerofgovernment.<  :Body Text In X X  [ $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      8    _5 XXIreferonceagaintoourdecisioninState_v._ԀJacumin,778S.W.2d430(Tenn.1989),whichprovidesagood  exampleofwhentextualdifferencescansupportafindingthattheTennesseeConstitutiongivesgreaterprotectionthan  thecorrespondingfederalright.  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      9    _5 XXSee 5 5 JamesW.Ely,Jr.,TheOxymoronReconsidered,MythandRealityintheOriginsofSubstantiveDue  Process,_16Const_.Comm.315(1999).InnotingthedifferenceinthewordingbetweenMagnaCartaandtheFifth  Amendment,ProfessorElycomments:#5  5 # ` JamesMadison,ofcourse,selectedthephrase dueprocessoflawindraftingtheFifthAmendment. $t ThereasonsforMadisonschangeinwordingareunclear,butonescholarhassuggestedthathechose 8 dueprocesslanguagetosecure moreencompassingprotectionofpersonalliberty.Thehistoryof  framinganddebatingtheBillofRightsisremarkablyskimpy,andagooddealmustrestupon p  historicalconjecture.Sincetheviewthat dueprocessoflawand lawofthelandhadthesame 4  meaningwasbroadlyshared,itseemsunlikelythatMadisonenvisionedanydeparturefromthegeneral  H understandingofthisconcept.Indeed,indraftingtheBillofRightsMadisonharborednoplanto    fashionnewrightsordepartfromsettlednorms.Heintendedtoformulateadocumentwhichreflected    aconsensusaboutwidelyheldvalues.AsMadisonexplainedtoThomasJefferson, Everythingof D   acontrovertiblenaturethatmightendangertheconcurrenceoftwo-thirdsofeachHouseand X  three-fourthsoftheStateswasstudiouslyavoided.ItthusseemsappropriatetoconcludethatMadison   used dueprocessoflawinlightofitshistoricalassociationwiththesubstantivedimensionsofthe    lawofthelandclause. T  Id.at325(footnotesomitted).  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      10    _5 XXSee,e.g., 5 5 State_v._ԀHale,840S.W.2d307,312(Tenn.1992)( Thephrase,thelawoftheland,usedinthis  sectionofourStateConstitution,andthephrase,dueprocessoflaw,usedintheFifthAmendmentandinthefirst  sectionoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,aresynonymousphrasesmeaningoneand ` thesamething.);Scopes_v._ԀState,154Tenn.105,111,289S.W.363,364(1927)( [T]helawofthelandclauseofthe $t stateConstitution,andthedueprocessoflawclauseofthefederalConstitution,whicharepracticallyequivalentin 8 meaning.);Stateexrel.Condonv.Maloney,108Tenn.82,88,65S.W.871,872(1901)( [I]tissaidthatthephrase  bythelawoftheland,asusedinsection8,art.1,ofthestateconstitution,istheexactequivalentofthetermdue p  processoflaw,asusedinthefederalconstitution.);Harbisonv.KnoxvilleIronCo.,103Tenn.421,431,53S.W.955, 4  957(1899)( What,then,isdueprocessoflaw,orthelawoftheland?Thetwophraseshaveexactlythesame_import  H ...._);Knoxville&O.R.Co._v._ԀHarris,99Tenn.684,704,43S.W.115,120(1897)(statingthat dueprocessoflaw    andthelawoftheland_are_Ԁsynonymousphrases);Knox_v._ԀState,68Tenn.(9Baxt.)202,207(1877)( Thelawofthe    land,inthesenseofthisclauseoftheconstitution,hasbeenheldtobeequivalentinmeaningtodueprocessoflaw.); D    State_v._ԀStaten,46Tenn.(6Cold.)233,244(1869)( Thephrase,thelawofthelandisanotherexpressionforthedue  processoflaw;_and_Ԁisofequivalentimport.);Owens_v._ԀRainsLessee,6Tenn.(5Hawy.)106,107(1818)( No t freemanshallbedisseisedofhisfreeholdlibertiesorprivileges,oroutlawedorexiled,orinanymannerdeprivedofhis 8 life,liberty,orproperty,butbythejudgmentofhispeersorthelawoftheland;_that_Ԁis,induecourseoflaw,andby L judicialproceedingsregularlycommencedandprosecutedtojudgment.);#5  5 # 5 5 Kittrell_v._ԀKittrell,59Tenn.App.584,588,  409S.W.2d179,181(1966)( Thephrase_lawofthelandasusedinthisSectionandthephrasedueprocessoflaw  asusedinthefirstsectionoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheFederalConstitutionare_Ԁsynonymousandastatutewhich H  violatesoneisviolativeoftheother.)#5  5 K # 5 5 .#5  5 i#  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      11    _5 XXSeeOwens_v._ԀState,724A.2d43,46n.3(Md.1999)(recognizingthattheMaryland LawoftheLand  Clauseistheequivalenttothefederaldueprocessclauses,andstatingthat UnitedStatesSupremeCourtcasesonthe  subjectthereforearepracticallydirectauthorit[y]forthemeaningoftheMarylandprovision) 5 5 (citing#5  5 #ԀNorthampton ` Corp.v.WashingtonSuburbanSanitaryCommn,278Md.677,686,366A.2d377,382(1976)); 5 5 Meadsv.North $t CarolinaDeptofAgric.,Food&DrugProtectionDiv.,509S.E.2d165,175(N.C.1998)#5  5 #Ԁ(statingthatthe Lawofthe 8 LandClausecontainedinArticleI,section19oftheNorthCarolinaconstitutionis  5 5 synonymous#5  5 #withtheDueProcess  ClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment);Commonwealth_v._ԀMartin,727A.2d1136,1141(Pa.Super.Ct.1999)( The p  termsdueprocessoflawand lawoftheland[in_article_ԀI,9]arelegalequivalents.);seealsoGannon_v._ԀState,704 4  A.2d272,278(Del.1998)( Itisnowwellestablishedthatthephrasenorshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orproperty,  H unlessby...thelawofthelandinArticleI,Section7oftheDelawareConstitutionhassubstantiallythesamemeaning    asnorbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orproperty,withoutdueprocessoflawintheFifthAmendmentoftheUnitedStates    Constitution.); 5 5 Ԁ#5  5 #Parkerv.Gorczyk,744A.2d410,416(Vt.1999)( [A]sfinalinterpreteroftheVermontConstitution, D   thisCourthasfinalsayonwhatprocessisdueinanygivensituation.Nevertheless,thetermlawsofthelandinArticle X  10issynonymouswiththetermdueprocessoflawcontainedintheFourteenthAmendmentoftheUnitedStates   Constitution,and,assuch,ourowndue-processjurisprudencehasreliedheavilyonthatoftheUnitedStatesSupreme   CourtevenwhenourdecisionswereultimatelybasedontheVermontConstitution.)(citationsomitted). T    Interestingly,althoughNorthCarolina reservestherighttoexpandthemeaningofthestateprovisionbeyond h  theprotectionsguaranteedinthefederalConstitution,ithasnotdonesowithregardtoprivacyor procreationalrights. ,  f  g f  g f  g f  g Moreover,myf  g f  g ԀresearchintoMarylandlawf  g f  g Ԁhasuncoverednocaseholdingthataseparaterightofprivacyevenexistsin   Maryland,orthattheprocreationalrightsreceivegreatersanctuaryundertheMarylandDeclarationofRightsthanthe d federalConstitution.  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      16    _5 XXRememberthewordsofAlexanderHamiltoninTheFederalistNo.78:f  g f  g f  g f  g Ԁ Itf  g f  g Ԁcanbeofnoweighttosaythat  thecourts,onthepretenseof_arepugnancy_,maysubstitutetheirownpleasuretotheconstitutionalintentionsofthe  legislature.f  g f  g f  g f  g ԀThismightaswellhappeninthecaseoftwocontradictorystatutes;oritmightaswellhappeninevery ` adjudicationuponanysinglestatute.f  g f  f  g f  g g f  g f  g f  g f  g Ԁf  g f  g (f  g f  g emphasisadded).  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      1    _5 XXAsanotherpossibleexampleofgreaterstateprotection,themajoritycitesState_v._ԀLakin,588S.W.2d544  (Tenn.1979),_in_Ԁwhich,asthemajorityclaims,thisCourtheldthatthelanguageofArticleI,section7gavegreater  protectioninthecontextofthe openfieldsdoctrine.TheactualholdingofLakin,however,wastoaffirmtheCourt ` ofCriminalAppeals,whichheldtheparticularsearchunreasonableunderbothArticleI,section7andtheFourth $t Amendment.  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      2    _5 XXSeemostnotably,RobertH.Bork,TheTemptingofAmerica(1990):  JusticeDouglasbypassedthatseeminglyinsuperabledifficultyf  g f  g [offindingtextualsupportfortheright  ofprivacy]f  g f  g bysimplyassertingthatthevariousseparatezonesofprivacycreatedbyeachseparate ` provisionoftheBillofRightssomehowcreatedageneralbutwhollyundefinedrightofprivacythat $t isindependentofandliesoutsideanyrightorzoneofprivacytobefoundintheConstitution. 8 Douglasdidnotexplainhow...theCourtcould...inventageneralrightofprivacythattheFramers  had,inexplicably,leftout. p  Id._at_Ԁ9798.f  g  x $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      3    _5 XX 5 5 f  g f  g f  g f  g Severalf  g f  g Ԁotherstateconstitutionscontainbroad naturalrightsclausesf  g f  g ,evenf  g f  g Ԁinadditionto savingsclauses  similartothatoftheNinthAmendment.See,e.g.,Fla.Const.art.1,2( Allnaturalpersons,femaleandmalealike,  areequalbeforethelawandhaveinalienablerights,amongwhicharetherighttoenjoyanddefendlifeandliberty,to ` pursuehappiness,toberewardedforindustry,andtoacquire,possessandprotect_property...._);_Ill._ԀConst.art.1, $t 1( Allmenarebynaturefreeandindependentandhavecertaininherentandinalienablerightsamongwhicharelife, 8 libertyandthepursuitofhappiness.Tosecuretheserightsandtheprotectionofproperty,governmentsareinstituted  amongmen,derivingtheirjustpowersfromtheconsentofthegoverned.);_Ind._ԀConst.art.1,1( Thatallpeopleare p  createdequal;_thattheyareendowedbytheirCREATORwithcertaininalienablerights;_Ԁthatamongthesearelife, 4  liberty,andthepursuitof_happiness...._);_IowaConst._Ԁart.1,1( Allmenare,bynature,freeandequal,andhave  H certaininalienablef  g f  f  g f  g g rights"amongf  g f  g Ԁwhichare_thoseofenjoyingand_Ԁdefendinglifeandliberty,acquiring,possessing,and    protectingproperty,andpursuingandobtainingsafetyandhappiness.);#5  5 # 5 5 Ԁ_Kan._ԀConst.BillofRights,1( Allmenare    possessedofequalandinalienablenaturalrights,amongwhicharelife,liberty,andthepursuitofhappiness.);_Me._ D   Const.art.1,1( Allpeoplearebornequallyfreeandindependent,andhavecertainnatural,inherentandunalienable X  rights,amongwhichare_thoseofenjoyingand_Ԁdefendinglifeandliberty,acquiring,possessingandprotectingproperty,   andofpursuingandobtainingsafetyandhappiness.);_N.H.Const._ԀArt.1,1( Allmenhavecertainnatural,essential,    andinherentrights"amongwhichare,theenjoyinganddefendinglifeandliberty;_acquiring,possessing,andprotecting,  property;_Ԁ_and_,inaword,ofseekingandobtaininghappiness.Equalityofrightsunderthelawshallnotbedeniedor t abridgedbythisstateonaccountofrace,creed,color,sexornationalorigin.).#5  5 s #   $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      19    _5 XXInaddition,themajoritycriticizestheundueburdenstandardbecauseitislessthantenyearsold.Given  thatthemajorityoverrulestwocenturiesofcaselawholdingthatArticleI,section8isidenticalinscopeandeffectwith  federaldueprocess,onemaylegitimatelywonderhowlongastandardmustsurvivetobeworthyofthisCourts ` consideration. ; $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      14    _5 XXSeeJournaloftheProceedingsoftheConventionofDelegatesElectedbythePeopleofTennesseeto  Amend,Revise,orReformandMakeaConstitutionfortheState61(Jan.13,1870),94(Jan.18,1870).Ireferencethe  JournaloftheConventionbecause [i]fthereshouldbedoubtthoughitisthefirstobligationoftheCourttogotothe ` proceedingsoftheConstitutionalConventionwhichadoptedthisprovisionandseefromtheseproceedingswhatthe $t framersofthisresolutionintendedittomean.ShelbyCounty_v._ԀHale,200Tenn.503,511,292S.W.2d745,748 8 (1956).Infact,thereenactedversionofArticleI,section8wasunamendedexceptforchangingtheword freeman  to manandremovingthecommasafterthewords taken, destroyed, liberty,and peers.Theword freehold p  wasalsodividedintotwowords. d&0 d d  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      7    _5 XXSee28Edw.III,ch.3(1354)(Eng.),citedinConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,Analysisand  Interpretation1281,SenateDoc.No.99-16,99thCongress1stSession(1987). ! $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      12    _5 XXSee,e.g.,State_v._ԀTrusty,919S.W.2d305,309(Tenn.1996),_overruled_Ԁonothergroundsby,Statev.Burns,  6S.W.3d453(Tenn.1999)( ThesenotionsofdueprocessembracedbytheUnitedStatesConstitution_areincorporated_  intoTennesseesLawoftheLandClause.Itguaranteesthatnomanshallbe...deprivedofhislife,liberty,or ` property,butby...thelawoftheland.Tenn.Const.art.I,8.Thetwoprovisionsaresynonymous.);Newton_v._ $t Cox,878S.W.2d105,110(Tenn.1994)( ThisCourthaspreviouslyheldthatthelawofthelandprovisionofArticle 8 I,8oftheTennesseeConstitutionissynonymouswiththedueprocessclauseoftheFourteenthAmendmenttothe  UnitedStatesConstitution.);State_v._ԀHale,840S.W.2d307,312(Tenn.1992)( Thephrase,thelawoftheland,used p  inthissectionofourStateConstitution,andthephrase,dueprocessoflaw,usedintheFifthAmendmentandinthe 4  firstsectionoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,aresynonymousphrasesmeaningone  H andthesamething.);Stateexrel.Anglinv.Mitchell,596S.W.2d779,786(Tenn.1980)( Ourfederalconstitution,    throughtheFourteenthAmendment,coinsthephrasedueprocessoflaw.Ourstateconstitution,throughArticleI,    Section8,expressesthesameideawhenitprohibitsimprisonmentanddeprivationoflifeorliberty,butbythelawof D   theland.TheoriginofthisphraseintheTennesseeConstitutionistheMagnaCarta.Thelawofthelandprovisoof X  ourconstitutionissynonymouswiththedueprocessoflawprovisionsofthefederalconstitution.);Arutanoffv.   MetropolitanGovtofNashvilleandDavidsonCounty,223Tenn.535,541,448S.W.2d408,411(1969)( Sincethe   policepowerofthisstateisatleastco-extensivewiththatofanyotherstateoftheunion,beinglimitedherebyArticle T  1,Section8,oftheConstitutionofTennessee,whichhasbeensaidtobeequivalentineffecttotheDueProcessClause h  oftheFourteenth_Amendment...._);Daugherty_v._ԀState,216Tenn.666,675,393S.W.2d739,743(1965)( Defendant ,  firstcitesArticle1,Section8oftheTennesseeConstitutionwhichisthelawofthelandsection.Thisis,ofcourse,   synonymouswiththedueprocessoflawusedintheFifthAmendmentandintheFirstSectionoftheFourteenth d AmendmenttotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.);Mascariv.InternationalBroth._of_ԀTeamsters,Chauffeurs, (x Warehousemen&HelpersofAmerica(AFL)LocalUnionNo.667,187Tenn.345,350,215S.W.2d779,781(1948) < ( [T]herealquestioniswhethertheActviolatesthedueprocessoflawclausecontainedintheFourteenthAmendment  totheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesandinArticle1,section8,oftheConstitutionofTennessee.Theseprovisions t aresubstantiallythesameineffectandresult.);Scopes,154Tenn._at_Ԁ111,289S.W.at364( Itiscontendedthatthe 8 statuteviolatessection8ofarticle1oftheTennesseeConstitution,andsection1oftheFourteenthAmendmentofthe L ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates"thelawofthelandclauseofthestateConstitution,andthedueprocessoflawclause  ofthefederalConstitution,whicharepracticallyequivalentinmeaning.);Motlow_v._ԀState,125Tenn.547,560,145  S.W.177,180(1912)( Thesamerulesmustapplyindisposingofaquestionarisingunderarticle1,8,ofour H Constitutionof1870,embracingthelawofthelandclause,becauseitsprovisionsareinthisregard,...substantially  \ thesameasthosecontainedinthesecondclauseofthefirst_section_Ԁofthefourteenthamendmenttothefederal   Constitution.);Stateexrel.Condonv.Maloney,108Tenn.82,88,65S.W.871,872(1901)( [I]tissaidthatthephrase  bythelawoftheland,asusedinsection8,art.1,ofthestateconstitution,istheexactequivalentofthetermdue X  processoflaw,asusedinthefederalconstitution.);Knoxville&O.R.Co.,99Tenn._at_Ԁ704,43S.W.at120( This l! doubleassailmentmaybetreatedasoneobjection,sincedueprocessoflawandthelawofthelandaresynonymous 0" phrases,andthatwhichisviolativeoftheoneisviolativeoftheotheralso,andviceversa.);Ferguson_v._ԀTheMiners # andManufacturersBank,35Tenn.(3Sneed)609,616(1856)(comparingtheFifthAmendmentDueProcessClause h $  toArticle_I_,8);Fields_v._ԀState,8Tenn.(Mart.&Yer.)168,17273(1827)(comparingtheFifthAmendmentand  ArticleI,8andstating, HastheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,orofthisState,abridgedthepowersoftheCounty t Courtinthisrespect?Astheprovisionsinthetwoinstrumentsreferredtoarethesameinsubstance,Iwillonlyexamine 8 theConstitutionoftheStateof_Tennessee...._);Nichols_v._ԀTullahomaOpenDoor,Inc.,640S.W.2d13,16(Tenn.Ct. L App.1982)( TheprinciplesofdueprocessunderArticle1,Section8oftheTennesseeConstitutionareidenticaltothose  undertheUnitedStatesConstitution.AnyprerequisitesnecessarytoproveadueprocessviolationundertheUnited  StatesConstitutionwould,therefore,_be_ԀapplicabletoprovingaviolationofArticle1,Section8oftheTennessee H  Constitution.);Breault_v._ԀFriedli,610S.W.2d134,138(Tenn.Ct.App.1980)( Inasimilarmanner,Article1,section  \ 8hasbeenheldtobesynonymouswiththefifthandfourteenth_amendments_ԀoftheUnitedStatesConstitution.);_Kittrell,   59Tenn._ԀApp._at_Ԁ588,409S.W.2dat181( ThephraselawofthelandasusedinthisSectionandthephrasedue    processoflawasusedinthefirstsectionoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheFederalConstitutionaresynonymousand X   astatutewhichviolatesoneisviolativeoftheother.);Roberts_v._ԀBrown,43Tenn.App.567,59091,310S.W.2d197,  l  208(1957)( ArticleI,Section8oftheConstitutionofTennesseeusesthephrase,thelawofthelandwhereasthe  0  phrase,dueprocessoflawisusedintheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.Thesephrases   havebeenheldtobesynonymous,meaningoneandthesamething,andthatanystatutewhichisviolativeoftheoneis h  violativeoftheother.). $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      17    _5 XXf  g f  g Takeforexamplethemajoritysdeclarationthattherightofprivacyisafundamentalright.Initsdecision  today,themajoritystatesthatarightisdeemedfundamentalwhenitis inherentinourmostbasicconceptsofliberty  orwhenitis inherentintheconceptoforderedliberty.Thepreviousstandard,however,wasthatrightsare ` fundamental when 5 5 theyareeitherimplicitlyorexplicitlyprotectedbyaconstitutionalprovision.#5  5 #Ԁ 5 5 State_v._ԀTester,879 $t S.W.2d823,828(Tenn.1994).#5  5 # 8   Clearly,thestandardadoptedtodayismorebroadthanthestandardusedinTester,astheTesterstandard  requiredatleastsometangentialconnectiontoaspecificprovisionintheConstitution.Beforedecryingtheflexibility p  oftheundueburdenstandard,weshouldrememberthatthevagueconceptsofthef  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁstandardcanbejustas 4  dangerous.Theflexibilityofthe inherentintheconceptoforderedlibertystandardisfullydemonstratedbytheability  H ofthemajoritytoclaimthattherighttoabortafetusispartofourmostbasicconceptsofliberty.    f  g f  g   Interestingly,themajoritycitesBowersv.Hardwick,478U.S.186(1986),forthepropositionthatfundamental    rightsare thoselibertiesthataredeeplyrootedinthisNationshistoryandtradition.TheSupremeCourtinBowers, D   however,declinedtofindafundamentalrighttoengageinsodomy,asthepracticeofsodomyhasneverbeendeeply X  rootedinourhistoryandtradition.     Withitsdecisiontoday,though,IsuspectthattheTennesseeSupremeCourtwouldbecompelledtofindthat   engaginginsodomyispartofthefundamentalrightofprivacy,andtherefore,wouldbeobligedtograntthispractice T  theabsoluteprotectionoff  g f  f  g f  g g strictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁanalysis.TheCourtevenciteswithapprovalCampbellv.Sundquist,acasefrom h  theCourtofAppealswhichholdsthatsodomyisafundamentalrightafterinventingfromthinairanultrabroadright ,  ofprivacyinthisstate.  $XXXXUSUS.,V XXXXXXXX      18    _5 XXThemajorityacknowledgesthattheState hasacompellinginterestinmaternalhealthfromthebeginning  ofpregnancy.Asitsauthorityforthisstatement,themajoritycitesArticleI,section1oftheTennesseeConstitution  whichseems,onitsface,toaddressonlythepeoplescollectivepowertoadopt,reform,orabolishtheirpolitical ` government.Nomentionismadef  f  g g inthisclauseasf  g f  g totheabilitytoengageinpersonalandprivateactivities. $t   IagreewiththemajoritythattheStatesinterestinthiscaseiscompelling.Iusethisexamplemerelyto 8 illustratethatthemajoritycouldhaveeasilydeclaredthatnothinginArticleI,section1givesthestateacompelling  interestinmaternalhealthduringpregnancy.Nevertheless,theCourtwasabletoreachacorrectconclusioninthisone p  instancebyapplyingtheconceptuallydifficult compellingintereststandard.f  g ·!TRY,3' LetterX3' Letter 3' Letter3'TXXXX  USUS.,  _XXXX   a  KXXINTHESUPREMECOURTOFTENNESSEE  @@$ATNASHVILLE#XXK%#tXX  f  g October1999Session  8 #XXt#f  g tXX  PLANNEDPARENTHOODOFMIDDLETENNESSEE,etal.v.DON . _SUNDQUIST_,GOVERNOROFTHESTATEOFTENNESSEE,etal.#XXt#   < #XXXX#XXXX@   Appealf  g byPermissionf  g fromthef  g CourtofAppeals,MiddleSection  6   f  g CircuitCourtforDavidsonCounty  " @ No.92C1672f  g Ԁf  g ԀHon.HamiltonV._Gayden_,Jr.,Judge    @*AV) ` dE<` A߈   @No.M199600060SCR11CVf  g f  g Ԉ }  @!September15,_2000  _ i  AV) ` dE<T` A U U XX f  f  g g #XX .U4#f  g f  g f  g f  g WilliamM.f  g Barker,f  g J.,f  g dissentinginpart,concurringinpart.U XX     x  b   f  g #XX U #f  g f  g Aconstitutionisnottobemadetomeanonethingatonetime,andanotheratsome L subsequenttime,whenthecircumstancesmayhavesochangedasperhapstomake 8 adifferentruleinthecaseseemdesirable.Aprincipalshareofthebenefitexpected $t fromwrittenconstitutionswouldbelost,iftherulestheyestablishedweresoflexible ` astobendtocircumstancesorbemodifiedbypublicopinion. L   _McCully_Ԁv.State,#XXXX#XXXX102Tenn.509,53233,53_S.W._Ԁ134,#XXXX #XXXX13940(1899).#XXXXX #XXXX $ n f  g f  g f  g #XXXXʨ #XXXX  Undoubtedly,theissueofabortionisoneofthemostcontroversialandfiercelydebated  f  g politicalf  g issuesofourtime,andanyresolutionofthisissuecanonlybeachievedf  g f  g throughf  g    deliberative,thoughtful,andpublicdialogue.Nevertheless,withitsdecisiontoday,theCourthas !  elevatedoneextremeofthisdebatetoaconstitutionallevelf  g f  g Ԁandhasmadeanymeaningful p"! compromiseonthisissueallbutimpossible.TheCourthasdonesosimplybyproclaimingthatthe \#" righttoobtainanabortionis fundamentalundertheTennesseeConstitution,andthatassuch,our H$# ConstitutioneffectivelyremovesfromtheGeneralAssemblyanypowertoreachareasonable 4% $ compromisethatconsidersalloftheimportantinterestsinvolved.#XXXXq#XXXXf  g f  g   &p!%   Inwritingseparatelyfrommycolleagues,IwishtoemphasizethatthefunctionofthisCourt 'H#' isnottoreadpreferencesorpredilectionsintothelaw,norisittorewritethelawmerelybecausewe (4$( can.Rather,ourtasktoday,inthefamiliarwordsofChiefJusticeJohnMarshall,is todeclarewhat ) %) thelawiswithrespecttotheconstitutionalityofthisstatesregulationsontherighttoobtain * &* abortion.Thistask,thoughsimplystated,isanexceedinglycomplexundertaking,anditinvolves +&+  anexaminationofthelanguageoftheconstitutionandofthehisto#XXXX#XXXXricalconstructiongiventothat ,', a 8XXdd8   _languagef  g f  g f  g f  g .Inaddition,weshouldbeguidedbyf  g f  g Ԁlegalprecedent,canonsofconstitutionalconstruction,  andconcernsofpublicpolicy.     Withitsf  g Ԁconclusionthatabortionregulationsmustwithstandf  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁanalysistobe t f  g f  g constitutionallypermissible,thisCourthasconsciouslydecidedtoignoref  g f  g f  g f  twocenturiesf  g f  g Ԁofsettled ` constitutionalinterpretationconcerningtheproperscopeofourConstitution.Despitethesettled L  meaningofArticleI,section8,theCourthastakenituponitselftosuddenlychangetheimportof 8  thisprovisionsoastoreachitsdesiredconclusion.f  g f  g f  g ԀInfact,theCourthasevendeclaredtodaythat $ t it remainsopposedtoanyassertionthatpriorcasesinterpretingourconstitutionshouldcontrolthe  ` outcomeofthiscase.f  g f  g   L    ThisCourthasadutyf  g f  g Ԁtothepeopleofthisstatef  g f  g f  g Ԁtoarticulatethebasisforitsf  g f  g f  g f  g decisionsf  g f  g Ԁwith $  aclearandpreciserationaleandtoestablishanadequatefoundationforitsdecisioninlegal   precedent.Regrettably,however,theCour#XXXX#XXXXthasfailedtof  g f  g provideapersuasivebasisforf  g Ԁitsf  g f  g conclusionf  g    thattheTennesseeConstitutiongivesgreaterprotectionforabortionrightsthanthefederal   Constitution.#XXXX#XXXXf  g f  g f  g f  g Althoughthef  g f  g Ԁmajoritypurportstogrounditsdecisioninthelanguageandstructure   ofourConstitution,f  g f  g Ԁcloserexaminationrevealsthatitsconstitutionalleapiscompletelywithout p foundation.Whilethelawcertainlymusthaveroomtogrowandexpandasthevaluesandpriorities \ ofsocietychange,thisgrowthcannotcomefromthejudiciarywithoutbeingsolidlygroundedin H experience,reason,andprecedent.f  g f  g Absentanysuchf  g f  g f  g f  g foundationf  g f  g ,thegrowthandexpansionofthelaw 4 mustcomefromtherepresentativesofthepeopleassembledinthelegislature.#XXXX} #f  g   p XXXX#XXXX$#XXXX  ThemajoritylaudsatlengththeabilityofourConstitutiontoguaranteegreaterprotection H forcertainrightsthanisreceivedfromothersources.Icertainlydonotforeclosethepossibilitythat 4 theTennesseeConstitutioncanprovideitscitizenswithgreaterlibertyprotectionsthanthefederal   Constitution.Onthecontrary,inmanycases,thejudiciaryhasbeenabletoadvancetheflagof   libertywhentheotherbranchesofgovernmenthavebeenunwillingorunabletodoso,andjudicial  protectionoflibertyisthehallmarkofourbeliefintheruleoflaw.    Anysuchprotectionof libertybythejudiciary,however,mustbeaccompaniedby l somethingmorethanamere#XXXX%#XXXXdeclarationofthefact,andt#XXXXʫ(#XXXXhecourtscannotsubstitutetheirownview X  ofthewisdomanddesirabilityoflegislationinordertoprotectwhattheyf  g f  g f  g f  g aloneperceivef  g f  g Ԁtobe D!  fundamentalrights.Absentaviolationofaspecificconstitutionalprovision,itiswithintherealm 0"  andcompetenceofthepeoplesrepresentativesintheGeneralAssemblytomakesuchvalue #l! judgments.Otherwise,#XXXX )# XXXXthecardinaldoctrineofseparationofpowers,uponwhichtheverytheory $X" off  g f  g f  g f  g Tennesseef  g f  g Ԁgovernmentf  g f  g f  g f  g rests,seeTenn.Const.art2f  g f  g ,f  g f  g Ԁ1,2,f  g f  g Ԁisrenderedutterlywithoutmeaning. $D # #XXX Xʊ+#XXXXf  g   #XXXX.# XXXXf  g   Accordingly,IdissentfromthejudgmentoftheCourtholdingthatf  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁanalysis &"% appliestoreviewreasonableregulationsonabortion.Instead,ourConstitutionshouldcompelthis '#& Courttoadoptthefederal undueburdenstandardofreview.WhileIagreewiththemajoritythat (#' theundueburdenstandardiscertainlyaflexiblestandard,f  g f  g f  g f  g itsflexibilityf  g f  g Ԁallowssomeroomto )$( accommodatethemyriadofcompellingintereststhatareinvolvedinthisdebatef  g f  g f  g f  g .Thesamecannot |*%) besaidofstrictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁanalysisf  g f  g .Nevertheless,becauseIfindthatthemedicalemergencyexception h+&* _cannotf  g f  g withstandf  g f  g Ԁevenf  g f  g Ԁthe undueburdenanalysisunderthefederalConstitution,Iconcurinthat  portionoftheCourtsjudgmentfindingthisprovisionunconstitutional.Iwouldfindf  g f  g thatnoneof  thef  g Ԁotherchallengedprovisionsf  g f  g ,though,f  g f  g Ԁf  g placesanundueburdenontherighttoobtainanabortion,  andthusf  g f  g ,f  g f  g Ԁeachf  g f  g f  g f  g withstandf  sf  g f  g Ԁg constitutionalf  g Ԁchallengef  g . t   I.PROPERSTANDARDOFAPPELLATEREVIEWf  g  L  7  Themajorityopinionconcludesthatregulationsinfringingontherighttoobtainanabortion $ t aresubjecttof  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁanalysisbecause thisright[toobtainanabortion]isinherentinthe  ` conceptoforderedlibertyembodiedintheTennesseeConstitution,and [t]herefore,thestatutory  L  provisionsregulatingabortionmustbesubjectedtostrictscrutinyanalysis.Althoughthisipsofacto  8  conclusionmayapplyinsomecases,strictscrutinyiscertainlynotrequiredbythefederal $  Constitutionwithregardtotherighttoobtainanabortion.SeePlannedParenthoodofSoutheastern   Pa.v.Casey,500U.S.833(1992)(recognizingthattherighttoobtainanabortionisafundamental   right,butrejectingapplicationofstrictscrutiny).Rather,theonlylegitimaterationaleforholding   thatabortionregulationsmaybesubjecttof  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g ԀanalysisinTennesseeisthattheTennessee   ConstitutionprovidesgreaterprotectionforthisrightthanthefederalConstitution.Ifour p Constitutiondoesnotsoprovide,thenthisCourtisobligedtoapplythe undueburdenstandard \ ofreview,whichwasarticulatedbyCaseyandcompelledbytheFourteenth#XXX Xc.#XXXXAmendmentf  g f  g . H   BeforethisCourtmayproperlyconcludethattheTennesseeConstitutionaffordsitscitizens  p agreaterrighttoobtainanabortionthanthefederalConstitution"andthereforecompelsf  g f  g f  g f  g strict  \ scrutinyf  g f  g ԀanalysisofourregulationsinsituationswhenthefederalConstitutiondoesnot"itshould H carefullyexaminethepreciseconstitutionalsourcesofthisright.Onlywhenarightis implicitly 4 orexplicitlyprotectedbyaconstitutionalprovisioncanitbedeemed fundamentalandsubjectto   heightenedscrutiny.SeeStatev.Tester,879S.W.2d823,828(Tenn.1994);Doev.Norris,751   S.W.2d834,841(Tenn.1988).Themajorityopinionconcludesthattherighttoobtainanabortion  stemsfromcertainfundamentalprocreationalrights,whichinturnarederivedfromthegeneralright  ofprivacy.Evenassumingtheaccuracyofthesepropositions,theCourtshouldthoroughlyexamine  thesourcesandparametersofthestaterightofprivacybeforeconcludingthatitismorebroadthan l thecorrespondingfederalright. X  #XXXXU>#XXXXf  g f  g   AlthoughageneralrightofprivacyismentionednowhereinthetextofourConstitution,this 0"  CourtfirstrecognizedinDavisv.Davis,842S.W.2d588(Tenn.1992),thatageneralrightof #l! privacydoesinfactexistundertheTennesseeConstitution.Thisgen#XXXXkD#XXXXeralrightisprimarilygrounded $X" inthe LawoftheLandClauseofArticleI,section8ofourConstitution,whichstatesf  g :f  g Ԁ Thatno $D # manshallbetakenorimprisoned,orf  g f  g f  g f  g disseizedf  g f  g Ԁofhisfreehold,libertiesorprivileges,oroutlawed, %0!$ orexiled,orinanymannerdestroyedordeprivedofhislife,liberty,orproperty,butbythejudgment &"% ofhispeersorbythelawoftheland.AccordingtotheDavisCourt,ageneralrightofprivacy '#& existedinArticleI,section8becausetherightwas reflectedinseveralsectionsoftheDeclaration (#' ofRights.842S.W.2dat600.These severalsectionsincludedthefreedomofworship,the )$( freedomsofspeechandpress,theprohibitionf  g f  g againstf  g Ԁunreasonablesearchesandseizures,andthe |*%) regulationf  g f  g off  g Ԁquarteringoftroops.Id.f  g f  g f  g f  g Ԁf  g f  g Despitethemajoritysconclusiontodaythatthestateright h+&* ofprivacyismuchmorebroadthanthecorrespondingfederalright,thereareatleastthreespecific  reasonswhysuchaconclusioniserroneous.f  g f  g Idiscusseachofthesereasonsbelow.    A.FederalCaseLawastheSourceofTennesseePrivacy  t  M  f  g f  g Thefirstreasonf  g f  g f  g f  g thatthestaterightofprivacycannotbemorebroadthanthecorresponding L  federalrightisthatthisCourtoriginallydefinedf  g f  g Ԁthescopeandparametersofthestaterightofprivacy 8  f  g f  g exclusivelyintermsoff  g f  g federalf  g f  g f  g f  g constitutionallawf  g f  g .AlthoughthemajorityclaimsthatDavissupports $ t itspositionf  g Ԁconcerningthebreadthofthestaterightofprivacy,thescopeofthef  g f  g staterightofprivacy  ` stillcannotbesaidtoexceedthatofthefederalrightf  g f  g Ԁforonesimplereason:everysinglef  g Ԁstate  L  constitutionalprovisionf  g f  g relieduponbytheDavisCourtto discoverthestaterightofprivacyalso  8  hasf  g Ԁcorrespondingfederalsupportf  g f  g Ԁandprotection.BecauseDavisinterpretedanddefinedthestate $  rightofprivacysolelyintermsofthecorrespondingfederalright,themajoritysrelianceonthiscase   ismisplacedandsomewhatcurious.f  g f  g f  g f  g Ԁ     Inanattempttodenythiscriticalfact,themajorityemphaticallystatesthat weexplicitly   reliedontheTennesseeConstitutioninDavistoextendprotection[throughtherightofprivacy]to p thehusbandsrighttoprocreationalautonomy.WhileDaviswascertainlyadecisionofstate \ constitutionallawasthemajoritymaintains,thefactstillremainsthattherationaleofDavisused H todiscoverthisnewstateconstitutionalrightwaspremisedentirelyuponfederalcaselaw.f  g f  g Ԁ#XXXXF#XXXXThere 4 iscertainlynothingintheconstitutionalthoughtofDavisthatwarrantsplacingtherightofprivacy  p onsuchahighpedestal,becauseasDavisimplicitlyacknowledges,thefederalcourtswerethesole  \ architectsofourstatehouseofprivacy. H   Themajoritycountersthatsomeofthesestateprotectionsaremorebroadthantheir   correspondingfederalcounterparts,andconsequently,thestaterightofprivacymustalsobemore   broad.Themajorityevengoessofarastocountthewordsofvariousstateandfederalprovisions,  apparentlyonthenovelconstitutionaltheorythatmorewordsequalgreaterbreadth.Ifword  countingisthenewmethodbywhichtodeterminetheproperscopeofourconstitutionalprovisions,  Itrembleatthefutureofconstitutionalinterpretationinthisstate. l   Perhapsthisinnovativeschoolofthoughtneedsfurtherconsiderationbeforeitisusedas D! rationaletodeclarelawsunconstitutional.Afterall,theantislaveryclauseofArticleI,section33 0"  containssevenwordslessthantheThirteenthAmendment,andthedoublejeopardyprovisionof #l! ArticleI,section10containsthreewordslessthanthesimilarclauseintheFifthAmendment.Even $X" thelanguageofArticleI,section27,uponwhichthemajorityfashionsits inherentrightofprivacy, $D # isshorterthanitsfederalcounterpartintheThirdAmendment.IsthisCourtnowtoinfer,basedon %0!$ thislogic,thateachofthesestateprotectionsistheoreticallylessbroadthattheirfederal &"% counterparts?Ineedf  g f  g f  g f  g hardlyf  g f  g Ԁsaythatsuchaconclusionf  g f  g f  g f  g overstretchesf  g f  g Ԁeventhemostelasticof '#& imaginations. (#'     ItakenoissuewiththeabilityofthisCourtf  g f  g Ԁtofindf  g f  g ,inthepropercase,f  g f  g Ԁ#XXXXW#XXXXthatgreaterprotections |*%) existunderourStateConstitution.Theremustbe,however,somelegitimatereasonwhythis h+&* conclusionfollowsinaparticularcase,suchaskeydifferencesinthehistoricalbackgroundofthef  g   constitutionalprovisions,differencesintherespectivelanguageoftheprovisions,orevenkey  differencesinthehistoricalapplicationoftheclausesinTennessee.Unlesssomelegitimate  differencebetweenrespectivestateandfederalclausescanbefound,courtsengaginginsuch t f  g f  g f  g f  g interpretiveexploitsf  g f  g ԀceasetoexerciseJudgment#XXXX+a#XXXXandf  g f  g undertaketof  g f  g exerciseWillinstead.f  g f  g f  g f  g Cf.f  g f  g The ` FederalistNo.78(AlexanderHamilton)( Thecourtsmustdeclarethesenseofthelaw;andifthey L  shouldbedisposedtoexerciseWILLinsteadofJUDGMENT,theconsequencewouldequallybe 8  thesubstitutionoftheirpleasuretothatofthelegislativebody.Theobservation,ifitproveany $ t thing,wouldprovethatthereoughttobenojudgesdistinctfromthatbody.).Thecourtsofthis  ` statesimplydonotexerciselegitimatejudicialpowerwhentheirdecisionsaregroundedinnothing  L  morethanmerepronouncementsf  g f  g f  g f  g orf  g f  g Ԁdeclarations.  8    TheonlyTennesseecasetoactuallyholdthatastateconstitutionalprovisionismorebroad   thanitscorrespondingfederalprotectionreliedupontheactuallanguageofthetext.Ourdecision   inStatev.Jacumin,778S.W.2d430(Tenn.1989),providesf  g f  g f  g f  g anexcellentf  g f  g Ԁexampleofwhentextual   differencesf  g f  g f  g f  g couldf  g f  g ԀsupportafindingthattheTennesseeConstitutiongivesgreaterprotectionthana   correspondingfederalright.InJacumin,thisCourtconcludedthatthelanguageinArticleI,f  g f  g f  g sectionf  g  p 7,whichstatesthatawarrantmaynotissue withoutevidenceofthefactcommitted,f  g f  g f  g f  g weighed \ againstadoptingthe totalityofthecircumstancestestforexaminingf  g f  g Ԁthesufficiencyofanaffidavit H usedtosupportasearchwarrant.f  g f  g Instead,thisCourtretainedtheAguilarSpinellitwoprongedtest, 4 whichspecificallyrequiresspecificexaminationofthecredibilityandreliabilityoftheinformant.  p #XXXXʢd#XXXX  f  g f  g OtherthanJacumin,however,Iamunawareofanycaseinanyareaoflawthatactuallyholds H thatastatefreedomisgreaterthanthecorrespondingfederalfreedom.Whilethislanguageappears 4 inmanyofourcases,thisCourthasnotseenfittoemploythepossibilityofgreaterprotectionin   evenoneothercase.0 #  1      ׀Accordingly,whilethestateprotectionsmaybegreaterintheory,theyhave   certainlynotreceivedsuchattentioninpractice.Asapracticalmatter,f  g f  g therefore,f  g f  g evenifthestate  rightofprivacyisgroundedintheseotherprovisionsoftheDeclarationofRights,itstillf  g f  g f  g f  g cannotbef  g f  g   morebroadthanf  g f  g f  g f  g thecorrespondingf  g f  g Ԁfederalright.    f  f  g g B.Absenceofa SavingsClauseor NaturalRightsClause  X  tf  g f  g   Thesecondreasonthatthestaterightf  g f  g f  g f  g off  g f  g Ԁprivacycannotbemorebroadthanthefederalright 0"  isbecauseourConstitutionisnotstructuredinsuchawayastopermitthisconclusion.Idonot #l! necessarilydisagreef  g thatarightofprivacymayexistinTennessee,butthereasoningusedbythe $X" DavisCourttodiscovertherightofprivacy,coupledwiththestructureoftheDeclarationofRights $D # itself,leadsmetoconcludethatthescopeoftherightinTennesseeis,atmost,coextensivewiththe %0!$ federalf  g f  g right"iffornootherreasonthanf  g Ԁtherightf  g ofprivacyf  g enjoysf  g significantlyf  g lessf  g Ԁconstitutional  foundationinthisstate.      InGriswoldv.Connecticut,381U.S.479,484(1965),theSupremeCourtoftheUnited t StatesfirststatedthatthefederalrightofprivacywasactuallygroundedintheNinthAmendment ` andtheDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment.Althoughtherightofprivacywassaid L  tobea penumbralrightthat emanatedfromotherconstitutionalamendments,thetextualbasis 8  oftherightofprivacywassaidtobetheNinthandFourteenthAmendments.SeealsoRoev.Wade, $ t 410U.S.113,153(1973)(findingthattheprivacyrightgivingrisetoarighttoabortionisbroad  ` enoughtofallwithintheNinthAmendmentortheFourteenthAmendment).Whileconstitutional  L  scholarshavedebatedwhetherJusticeDouglasproperlyinterpretedtheNinthAmendmentin  8  Griswoldtoincludeageneralrightofprivacy,1 #  2      ׀sucharightarguablyfallswithintheplainlanguage $  off  g f  g thatf  g ԀAmendment,whichcontemplatesthatotherrightsmayexistalthoughnotspecifically   mentionedintheBillofRights.     f  g f  g Instarkcontrasttof  g ԀtheprovisionsofthefederalConstitution,however,theTennessee   Constitutiondoesnotcontaina savingsclausesimilartothatoftheNinthAmendmentintowhich p f  g acourtcouldlegitimatelyreadf  g otherunenumeratedrightsf  g f  g .Infact,unlikemanyofoursisterstates, \ ourConstitutionf  g Ԁdoesf  g f  g notf  g Ԁevencontainageneral naturalrightsclausef  g f  g f  g f  g Ԁpurportingtoprotect H  inalienablerightsf  g f  g ,f  g f  g f  g f  g Ԁwhichwouldf  g atleastf  g f  g lendamodicumoff  g Ԁsupporttothemajoritysassertion 4 concerningthef  g f  g f  g f  g presenceandstrengthf  g f  g Ԁofourrightofprivacy.2 #  3      ׀f  g f  g f  g f  g BecauseourConstitutioncontains  p neitheroftheseclausesf  g f  g ,af  g f  g carefulandprudentexaminationf  g ԀoftheDeclarationofRightscounsels  againstholdingthattherightofprivacyinthisstateissomuchmorebroadthanthecorresponding  federalright.Indeed,becausetherightofprivacycannotbetextuallygroundedinf  g thetextoff  g our  ConstitutionoutsideofArticleI,section8,onemayevenrationallyconclude"shockinglycontrary t tothepositiontakenbythemajority"thatthefederalf  g rightofprivacyf  g f  g isactuallythemorebroadof ` thetwo. L    Tooffsetthislackofstructuralsupport,themajoritycastsawidenetoverourDeclaration $ t ofRightstofishoutconstitutionalprovisionswhichseeminglygiverisetoabroadrightofprivacy.  ` Themajoritygoessofarastodeclarethattherightofprivacy,includingtherightofprocreational  L  autonomy,arisesfromthelibertyprovisionsofArticleI,sections1and2f  f  .Citationtosections1and  8  2ofArticleIforthispropositionisnothingshortofremarkable,andinitshaste,themajorityeven $  declaresthat [t]heprovisionsoftheTennesseeConstitutionimplyprotectionofanindividualsright   tomakeinherentlypersonaldecisions,andtoactonthosedecisions,withoutgovernment   interference.Thisunqualifiedstatementisliterallybreathtaking,asitsnaturalconclusionisthat   thegovernmentf  g f  g f  g f  g iswithoutlegitimatepowertof  g f  g Ԁenactreasonablef  g f  g f  g f  g legislationf  g f  g Ԁhavingadirecteffecton    inherentlypersonaldecisions. p   Anyreasonableandobjectiveinterpretationoff  g Ԁthesetwosectionssimplycannotf  g f  g supportthe H f  g f  g viewf  g f  g Ԁthatf  g f  g Ԁthesetwoprovisionsf  g f  g f  g f  g reflectf  g f  g Ԁa righttobeleftalonebythegovernment.Ratherf  g f  g Ԁthan 4 providinga righttobeleftalone,section2ofArticleIf  g f  g f  g f  g moreproperlyf  g f  g Ԁcontemplatesthatthepeople  p haveadutytoobeythereasonablelawsofgovernment,irrespectiveofwhetherthoselawsf  g f  g f  g f  g directly  \ affectf  g f  g Ԁthepeople.f  g f  g  #  4      f  g f  g ԀThemajorityshouldf  g f  g f  g f  g givemorecarefulattentiontof  g f  g Ԁthef  g f  g Ԁactualf  g f  g Ԁlanguageofthis H clause,whichcondemnsonlytheexerciseoff  g f  g f  g f  g arbitraryf  g f  g Ԁpower.Althoughthemajoritylaudsthis 4  righttorevolution,section2providesnosuch righttobeleftalonefromreasonablelegislation   thathasbeendulyenactedaccordingtoconstitutionalprocedures.   f  g f  g   Sections1and2ofArticleIsimplydonotreflectarightofprivacyinthesensethatthe  governmenthasnopowertoenactlawsdirectlyaffectingitscitizensf  g f  g ,andtheseclausesare  improperlyf  g Ԁconstruedf  g whenusedf  g tosupportstrikingdownreasonableabortionregulationsunderthe l guiseofprotectingarightofprivacy.f  g Ԁf  g f  g Whenunderstoodintheirproperhistoricalcontext,these X  provisionsarereallyareflectionofthefundamentalprincipalthatthepeoplearetheultimate D! sovereignandthatallgovernmentalpowerisderivedfromthem.#XXXXxo#XXXXf  g f  g EvenDavisdidnottakef  g f  g f  g f  g thef  g f  g  0"  questionableconstitutionalleapf  g f  g Ԁtakenbythemajoritytodayf  g f  g ,asthatCourtcitedthesetwosections #l! ofArticleIonlytoshowthatf  g f  g f  g f  g individuallibertyf  g f  g ԀisdeeplyembeddedinourConstitution"nottoshow $X" thattheseclausesf  g f  g f  g f  g reflectedf  g f  g Ԁageneralrightofprivacy.See842S.W.2dat599600.Regrettably,this $D # typeofanalysisf  g f  g f  g f  g ,withitscompletedisregardforf  g f  g Ԁthef  g f  g f  g f  g languageandpurposeoftheclause,f  g f  g Ԁexemplifies  howwillingf  g f  g f  g f  g themajorityf  g f  g Ԁistof  g f  g f  g f  g construeconstitutionalf  g f  g Ԁprecedenttoreachitsdesiredresultf  g f  g Ԁinthiscasef  g f  g .  f  g f  g f  g f  g   C.ScopeofArticleI,Section8  t f  g f  g j  ThethirdreasonthatthemajorityerrsinconcludingthattheStaterightofprivacyismore L  broadthanthecorrespondingfederalrightisthattheonlypropertextualbasisoftherightofprivacy, 8  the LawoftheLandClauseofArticleI,section8,isnotmorebroadthanitsfederalcounterparts, $ t theDueProcessClausesoftheFifthandFourteenthAmendments.g ԀWhendiscussingthesourcesof  ` thestaterightofprivacy,themajorityconspicuouslyomitsanyreferencetoHawkv.Hawk,855  L  S.W.2d573(Tenn.1993),whichholdsthatArticleI,section8istheonlyconstitutionalprovision  8  inwhichtherightofprivacymaybetextuallygrounded.Id.at579.Certainly,nolegalprecedent $  orcanonofconstitutionalconstructionallowsthisCourttodiscoverpreviouslyunprotectedrights   withoutatleastsometextualsupportinourConstitution,andthisCourtinHawkrepudiatedsuch   anapproachbyanalyzingtherightofprivacywithexclusivereferencetof  g f  g ArticleI,section8.     Inthepresentcase,however,themajorityapparentlyignorestheneedfortextualsupportand p attemptstousealloftheprovisionscitedbyDavistobootstraparightofprivacy"andbyextension, \ arighttoobtainanabortion"#XXXX #XXXXintotheConstitution.Evenasthemajorityattemptstorewritethe H buddingTennesseelawofprivacy,though,industriousstudentsofthelawshouldreadcarefullyonce 4 againthecasesfromthisCourtdecipheringf  g f  g Ԁthescopeoff  g f  g Ԁthestaterightofprivacy.Whilethe  p constitutionalprovisionscitedbytheDavisCourtas reflectingarightofprivacyunquestionably  \ havevariousaspectsofprivacyattheircore,noneoftheseprovisionscanbesaidtoactuallyserve H asthetextualbasisof procreationalrightsontheirown.Theprotectionagainstunreasonable 4 searchesandseizures,forexample,saysnothingabouttherightnottobearchildren,and   procreationalrightscannotbereadintothelanguageregulatingquarteringoftroops.Onlythe Law   oftheLandClauseofArticleI,section8issufficientlyvagueandambiguoustoprovidetextual  supportfortherighttoobtainanabortion.  #XXXX6# XXXX  Theessentialquestiontobeansweredinthiscase,therefore,iswhetherthe Lawofthe l LandClauseismorebroadthantheDueProcessClausesoftheFifthandFourteenthAmendments, X  whichserveasthebasisforprotectingabortionrightsunderthefederalConstitution.SeeCasey,505 D! U.S.at846.OnlyifthelibertyprotectionsoftheTennessee LawoftheLandClausearemore 0"  broadthanthoseprotectionsguaranteedbythefederaldueprocessclausescanthisCourtproperly #l! f  g f  g holdf  g Ԁabortionregulationstotherigorsoff  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁanalysis.f  g f  g f  g f  g  $X"   Accordingly,iff  g f  g Ԁf  g f  g ArticleI,section8doesprovideagreatersanctuaryforabortionrightsthan %0!$ thefederaldueprocessf  g f  g f  g f  g clausesf  g "asf  g f  g Ԁ#XXX X6#XXXXthemajorityholdsf  g f  g f  g f  g Ԁtoday"#XXXX߲# XXXXonef  g f  g Ԁwouldexpecttofindkey &"% differencesinthehistoricalbackgroundofthef  g Ԁclauses,differencesintherespectivelanguageofthe '#& clauses,orkeydifferencesinthehistoricalapplicationofthe LawoftheLandClausein (#' Tennessee.Nevertheless,f  g f  g whilethesefactorsf  g f  g Ԁaref  g f  g f  g f  g completelyf  g f  g Ԁignoredbythemajorityopinion,f  g f  g Ԁmy )$(  ownanalysisf  g f  g Ԁleadsmetoconcludethatthetwoprotectionsaref  g f  g ,atmost,f  g f  g Ԁcoextensivef  g f  g ,andf  g f  g f  g f  g whenf  g f  g Ԁa |*%) statuteispermissibleunderoneconstitutionalprovision,thenitispermissibleundertheotheras  well.#XXX Xʑ#XXXXf  g f  g      f  g f  g f  g f  g ComparisonoftheHistoricalBackgroundofthe LawoftheLand t ClauseandtheFederalDueProcessClauses ` #XXXX˸#6XXXX  Nothinginthehistoricalbackgroundofthe LawoftheLandClauseorofthefederaldue 2  processclausessuggeststhattheTennesseeConstitutiongivesgreaterprotectiontolibertyinterests  n thandoesthefederalConstitution.Infact,myresearchonthisissuerevealsthatthehistoryofeach  Z clausecanbetracedpreciselytothesamesource:the perlegemterrae,or LawoftheLand,  F  #XXXXi#XXXXclausef  g f  g inChapter29ofMagnaCarta,f  g Ԁwhichstatesthat [N]ofreemanshallbetakenorimprisoned  2  ordispossessed,oroutlawed,orbanished,orinanywaydestroyed,norwillwegouponhim,nor   senduponhim,exceptbythelegaljudgmentofhispeersorbythelawoftheland.#XXXXʥ#f  g f  g # #  5      XXXXԀBecauseeach   clausestemshistoricallyfromthesameoriginalsource,themajoritycannotrelyuponf  g f  g f  g f  g historical   differencesf  g f  g ԀtoconcludethatthegeneralprotectionoflibertyinTennesseeisgreaterthanthat   providedbythefederalConstitution. ~  #XXXX#XXXX  The LawoftheLandClauseenjoysalonghistoryintheconstitutionaljurisprudenceofthis V State,andbecauseitsprope#XXXX#XXXXrinterpretationisessentialtotheresolutionofthiscase,itisimportant B tocarefullyexaminefromwheretheclausewasf  g f  g derived.f  g f  g f  g f  g IntheyearsfollowingAmerican .~ Independence,thef  g f  g Ԁlandsf  g f  g f  g f  g thatf  g f  g ԀwerelaterorganizedintotheStateofTennesseewereprincipally j claimedbytheStateofNorthCarolina,andweregovernedbytheConstitutionandlawsofthatstatef  g f  g . V Apartfromestablishingatheoryandformofgovernment,theNorthCarolinaConstitutionof1776 B alsocontaineda DeclarationofRights,whichplacedcertainfundamentalrights beyondthereach . ofanyactofAssembly.SeeMarshallv.Lovelass,1N.C.(Tay.)412(1801)(Johnston,J.).Section  10oftheNorthCarolinaDeclarationofRightsof1776read:  [N]ofreemanoughttobetaken,imprisoned,ordisseizedofhisfreehold,libertiesor  privileges,oroutlawedorexiled,orinanymannerdestroyedordeprivedofhislife, z libertyorproperty,butby#XXXX#XXXXԀthelawoftheland.#XXXX#XXXX f f  g f  g   InJuneof1784,NorthCarolinajoinedwithotherstatesincedingitslandswestofthe >! AlleghenyMountains#XXXXX#XXXXԀtothenationalgovernment#XXXXʂ#XXXXf  g f  g Ԁorganizedf  g f  g ԀundertheArticlesofConfederation. *"z  #XXXX#XXXXAlthoughNorthCarolinalaterrepealeditscessionlawandreclaimedthecededlands,East #f! TennesseetookthisopportunitytobrieflyorganizeitselfintotheStateofFranklin"namedafter $R" BenjaminFranklin"inanticipationofjoiningthefederalunionasanewstate.Insection12ofthe $> #  DeclarationofRightsMadebytheRepresentativesoftheFreemenoftheStateofFranklin"a %*!$ documenttakensubstantiallyfromtheNorthCarolinaDeclarationofRights,! #  6      "thefollowingclause  f  g f  g f  g f  g appearedf  g f  g :  #XXXXʺ#XXXXThatnofreemanoughttobetaken,imprisonedordesseizedofhisfreehold,liberties t orprivileges,oroutlawedorexiled,orinanymannerdestroyedordeprivedofhis ` life,libertyorproperty,butbythelawsoftheland. L  f  g f  g Thisoriginal LawoftheLandClause,alongwiththeentireDeclarationofRights,wasexplicitly $ t madeapartoftheFranklinConstitutionbysection44ofthatdocument.SeeConst.oftheStateof  ` Franklin44( ThattheDeclarationofRightsisherebydeclaredtobepartoff  g ԀtheConstitutionof  L  f  #XXXX^#XXXXg f  g thisState,andoughtnevertobeviolatedonanypretensewhatsoever.).  8    #XXXXʣ#XXXXOnDecember22,1789,NorthCarolinaagaincededitswesternlandstothenational   government,see17#XXXXr#XXXX89N.C.Pub.Acts31,ch.3,andbyaprovisionoftheactofseparation,thelaws   ofNorthCarolinabecamethelawsofTennessee,untilrepealedbytheLegislativeauthorityofthe   cededterritory.CongressacceptedthecessiononApril2,1790,ActofApril2,1790,ch.6,1Stat.   106,andorganizedtheterritoryintotheSouthwesternTerritory,ActofMay20th,1790,1Stat.123. p InthisAct,Congressdeclaredthat thegovernmentofthesaidterritory...shallbesimilartothat \ whichisnowexercisedintheterritorynorthwestoftheOhio....Inthesecondarticleofthe H Ordinanceof1787fortheGovernmentoftheNorthwestTerritory,aclausesimilartotheearlier 4 NorthCarolinaandFranklinf  g Ԁ LawoftheLandf  g clausesagainappeared,whichstatedthat noman  p shallbedeprivedofhislibertyorpropertybutbytheJudgmentofhisPeers,orthelawoftheland.  \ 1Stat.51,note. H   f  g f  g f  g f  g Thisearlyf  g f  g ԀhistoryofArticleI,section8isespeciallysignificant,becausetherespective   provisionsofstateandfederallawgivingrisetof  g f  g f  g f  g thef  g f  g Ԁ LawoftheLandClausef  g f  g Ԁinour1796   Constitutionf  g f  g ԀwereeachdirectlydescendedfromChapter29ofMagnaCarta.Forexample,boththe  UnitedStatesSupremeCourtandtheSupremeCourtofNorthCarolinahaverecognizedthatthe  respectivefederalandstate LawoftheLandclauseswerederivedfromthenearlyidentical  provisionofMagnaCarta.SeeMurraysLesseev.HobokenLand&ImprovementCo.,59U.S.272, l 276(1855);Statev.,1N.C.(Mart.)28(N.C.Sup.Ct.L.&Eq.1794)(statingthat ifweattend X  tothef  g f  g f  g f  g [ LawoftheLandClausef  g f  g oftheNorthCarolinaDeclarationofRights],weshallfinditwas D! copiedalmostverbatimfromthe29thchap.ofMagnaCharta);seealsoBankofColumbiav.Okely, 0"  17U.S.(4Wheat.)235,243(1819)(statingthat [t]he21starticleofthedeclarationofrightsofthe #l! stateofMaryland"whichisvirtuallyidenticaltoArticleI,section8oftheTennesseeConstitution $X" "#XXXX3#XXXX isinthewordsofMagnaCharta).Thisancestryhasalsobeenlongrecognizedbythe $D # TennesseeSupremeCourt,whichhasfrequentlystatedthatf  g f  g f  g f  g ourownf  g f  g Ԁ LawoftheLandClauseof  ArticleI,section8isadirectdescendantofthe perlegemterraeclauseofMagnaCartastwenty  ninthchapter.See,e.g.,Stateexrel.Anglinv.Mitchell,596S.W.2d779,786(Tenn.1980)(stating  thatArticleI,8comesfromMagnaCarta);McGinnisv.State,28Tenn.(9Hump.)43,47(1848) t (comparingArticleI,section8tothesimilarprovisioninMagnaCarta). `   Inasimilarmanner,the perlegemterraeclauseofMagnaCartaisalsotheancientancestor 8  ofthemodernDueProcessClausesoftheFifthandFourteenthAmendmentstotheConstitutionof $ t theUnitedStates.Thefirstprominentuseoftheterm dueprocessoflawwasina1354English  ` statute,whichprovidedthat [n]omanofwhatestateorconditionthathebe,shallbeputoutofland  L  o#XXXX8#XXXXrtenement,nortakennorimprisoned,nordisinherited,norputtodeath,withoutbeingbroughtin  8  answerbydueprocessofthelaw,f  g f  g f  g f  g s #  7      f  g f  g ԀandSirEdwardCokeconfirmedthattheuseoftheterm due $  processinthis1354statutewascloselytiedtothephrase LawoftheLandf  g inMagnaCarta,see   2Institutes50(5thed.1797).f  g f  g Moreoverf  g ,theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesf  g hasrepeatedly   stated,f  g andconstitutionalscholarshavef  g agreedf  g ,f  g Ԁthatf  g ԀtheFifthAmendmentsDueProcessClausef  g f  g is   descendedfromf  g Ԁthe perlegemterraeclauseofMagnaCarta.See,e.g.,f  g ԀPlannedParenthoodv.   Casey,505U.S.833,847(1992)(statingthat theguarantiesofdueprocess[have]theirrootsin p MagnaCartasperlegemterrae)(citingHurtadov.California,110U.S.516,532(1884));f  g  \ OBannonv.TownCourtNursingCtr.,447U.S.773,789n.2(1980)(Blackman,J.,concurringin H judgment)( ItiswellrecognizedthattheDueProcessClausesoftheUnitedStatesConstitution 4 grewoutoftheLawoftheLandprovisionofMagnaCartaanditslatermanifestationsinEnglish  p statutorylaw.);#XXXX#XXXXԀf  g seealso,FrankR.Strong,SubstantiveDueProcessofLaw:ADichotomyofSense  \ andNonsense3-25(1986)(tracingtheantecedentsofsubstantivedueprocesstoMagnaCarta). H   f  g f  g GiventhatArticleI,section8andthefederaldueprocessclausesbothowetheirancestryto   MagnaCartastwentyninthchapter,thehistoricalbackgroundoftheclausescertainlyprovidesno   supportforthepropositionthatf  g Ԁthe LawoftheLandClausef  g ismorebroadf  g f  g thanf  g Ԁthef  g f  g correspondingf  g   federaldueprocessf  g f  g protectionsf  g .Atmost,f  g Ԁanyf  g Ԁanalysisofthehistoricalbackgroundoff  g f  g theclausesf  g   showsthattheprotectionsintendedbyf  g f  g eachclausef  g Ԁaresubstantiallyidentical,andf  g f  g thatbothofthe  protectionsf  g f  g arethesameasthosecontemplatedbyf  g f  g the perlegemterraeclausef  g ԀofMagnaCarta. l Accordingly,themajoritymustseeksupportfromf  g f  g f  g f  g elsewheref  g f  g Ԁforitsconclusionthatthestate X  constitutionprovidesf  g f  g greatersanctuaryf  g Ԁforthef  g f  g abortionf  g f  g Ԁrightsf  g f  g ԀthanthefederalConstitution.#XXXX}#XXXX D! f  g f  g f  g   TextualComparisonofthef  g f  g f  g f  g Respectivef  g f  g ԀClauses#XXXX#XXXX #l! h  AlthoughthisCourthasoftennotedthatdifferencesinthelanguageofconstitutional $D #  provisionscansometimesimplythatarightissubjecttogreaterprotectionunderourstate %0!$ Constitution,) #  8      ׀thetextualdifferencesinthiscasecanbeaccordedverylittleweightintermsof   constitutionalsignificance.WithrespecttothelanguageofthefederalConstitution,therecanbe  littledoubtthatthephrase dueprocessoflawwasmeanttoprovideforthesamesubstantive  guaranteesasthephrase lawoftheland.* #  9      ׀Infact,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,initsfirst t significantinterpretationoftheFifthAmendmentDueProcessClause,f  g f  g confirmedthisfactbystatingf  g  ` that [t]hewords,dueprocessoflaw,wereundoubtedlyintendedtoconveythesamemeaningas L  thewords,bythelawoftheland,inMagnaCarta.MurraysLesseev.HobokenLand& 8  ImprovementCo.,59U.S.272,276(1855).#XXXXD# XXXXf  g Ԁ $ t   Althoughitshouldbeoflittlesurprisegiventhecommonf  g f  g historyf  g Ԁofthephrases,f  g the  L  f  g Tennesseef  g f  g SupremeCourthasalsoconsistentlyheldorstatedf  g ԀunderallthreeConstitutionalperiods  8  since1796f  g Ԁ#XXX X# XXXXthatthephrase lawofthelandcarrieswithitthesamef  g Ԁimportandf  g Ԁmeaningasthe $  phrase dueprocessoflaw.+ #  10      ׀f  g f  g Indeed,severalofthesef  g Ԁcasesf  g Ԁweref  g Ԁdecidedunderprevious   constitutionalperiods,andintheinterestofcontinuityinthelaw,thisCourthaslongaccordedthese  oldercasesmuchweightwhen#XXX X6# XXXXconstruingf  g Ԁsubstantiallyidenticalf  g f  g provisionf  g sinthe1870Constitution.  Cf.CumberlandCapitalCorp.v.Patty,556S.W.2d516,526(Tenn.1977).f  g Moreover,Tennessee  isnotaloneininterpretingthephrase lawofthelandtomean dueprocessoff  g f  g f  g f  g law.f  g f  g ԀNorth t CarolinasConstitutionreceivesasimilarinterpretationfromitscourts,asf  g f  g f  g f  g dof  g f  g Ԁthef  g f  g ԀConstitutionsoff  g f  g  ` MarylandandPennsylvaniaf  g f  g ,fromwhichitisgenerallysupposedthattheNorthCarolina L  Constitutionwassubstantiallyderived.SeeLewisL.Laska,TheTennesseeConstitution5(1990)., #  11      ׀ 8    f  g Consequently,becausebothfederalandf  g f  g Tennesseef  g Ԁcourtshaveinterpretedthephrases due  ` processoflawand lawofthelandtocarrythesameessentialmeaning,themajoritysf  g f  g Ԁf  g f  g premisef  g   L  concerningthebreadthofTennessees LawoftheLandClausecannotbesustainedonthebasis  8  ofanytextualdifferencesinthetwoclauses.f  g f  g Asf  g Ԁthef  g f  g commonhistoryf  g Ԁoftheclausesf  g Ԁwouldnaturally $  leadonetoconcludef  g ,thetextualdifferencesf  g f  g betweenthetwophrasesareofnosignificanceinterms   ofsubstantiveconstitutionallaw,andf  g Ԁdespitetheirminortextualdifferences,therespectiveclauses   providecoextensiveprotectionsofliberty.f  g f  g Accordingly,themajoritycannotrelyuponany   perceivedf  g ԀtextualdifferencesbetweenArticleI,section8andtheFourteenthAmendmentf  g Ԁtosupport   itspositionconcerningthebreadthoftheTennessee LawoftheLandClausef  g .f  g Ԁf  g Ԁ#XXX X# XXXX p Ї  HistoricalApplicationofthe LawoftheLandClauseinTennessee  f  g  f  g   f  g f  g AlthoughthemajorityapparentlytreatsitasanissueoffirstimpressioninthisState,the  legitimatescopeofArticleI,section8haslongbeensettled,andaf  g Ԁcarefulandthoroughreviewof t ourconstitutionaljurisprudencerevealsf  g nothinginthehistoricalapplicationofArticleI,section8 ` f  g thatf  g warrantsthef  g Ԁconclusionthatf  g f  g Tennesseesf  g Ԁprotectionf  g f  g oflibertyf  g Ԁisfarmoreextensivethanthat L  providedbythefederaldueprocessclauses.Infact,ratherthanbeingconstruedmorebroadlythan 8  thecorrespondingfederalprotections,ArticleI,section8hasbeenuniversallyinterpretedas $ t providingf  g f  g f  g coextensivef  g f  g Ԁf  g protectionwiththatofthefederalconstitution.Infact,virtuallyevery  ` Tennesseecaseexaminingthetwoclauseshasconcludedthattheimportandmeaningofeachclause  L  f  g f  g aref  g Ԁeitherexact,identical,orsynonymousineffectandresult, #  12      ׀andf  g f  g manyofthesecaseshaveheld  8  thatwhereastatuteisf  g Ԁconstitutionalunderonef  g Ԁf  g provisionf  g f  g ,thenitisf  g Ԁentitledtobef  g f  g sustainedf  g Ԁunderthe  otherprovisionaswell.See#XXX Xz #XXXXHarbisonv.KnoxvilleIronCo.,103Tenn.421,431,53S.W.955,957  (1899).#XXXXn# XXXXEveninthosecasesinwhichtheTennesseeSupremeCourthasimpliedthatagreaterliberty  protectionmayemanatefromArticleI,section8,nosuchholdinghaseverbeensustainedonany t setoffacts.  #  13      f  g Ԁf  g Ԁ `   Themajorityapparentlyreadsthesecasesf  g f  g differentlythanI,asthemajorityrepeatsseveral 8  timesthattheseoldercasesstandonlyforthepropositionthatthetwoclausesare practically $ t synonymous.Assuch,themajorityconcludes,wearefreetodepartfromthehistory,language,and  ` applicationofthe LawoftheLandClausetoreachthef  g f  g judiciallyf  g f  g desiredresultinthiscase.  L  Respectfully,though,thelanguagefromthisCourtsowncasesisfarmorecompellingthanthe  8  majorityf  g f  g f  g f  g wouldindicatef  g f  g .Farfrombeingmerely practicallysynonymous,#XXX X# XXXXԀthecourtsofthisstate $  havedescribedthesetwophrasesusingthefollowinglanguage: aresynonymous#XXX Xʟ# XXXX,see,e.g.,Trusty,   919S.W.2dat309; aresynonymous#XXX Xf# XXXXԀphrasesmeaningoneandthesamething,see,e.g.,#XXX X # XXXXԀHale,840   S.W.2dat312; areequivalentineffect,see,e.g.,#XXX Xʋ# XXXXԀArutanoff,223Tenn.at541,448S.W.2dat411;   #XXX X9# XXXX areidentical,see,e.g.,#XXX X# XXXXԀNichols,640S.W.2dat16; istheexactequivalent,see,e.g.,#XXX X5# XXXXԀMaloney,   108Tenn.at88,65S.W.at872;and aresynonymous#XXX X# XXXXԀandastatutewhichviolatesoneisviolative p oftheother,Kittrell,409S.W.2dat181. \   Althoughthemajoritycertainlycanfindsomelanguagetosupportits practically 4 synonymoustheory,thesecasesareoverwhelmedbyauthoritytothecontrary.TheCourtshould  p bepreparedtoexplicitlyacknowledgethatitsdecisiontodayeffectivelyoverrulestwocenturiesof  \ f  g f  g settledf  g f  g constitutionalf  g f  g f  g f  g constructionf  g f  g ,anditmuststatethereasonswhysuchoverrulingisrequired, H otherthanithastheinherentpowertodoso.Instead,withitsdecisiontoday,theCourthastried, 4 andfailed,todistinguishalloftheseoldercasesonthebasisoflanguagealone.Thepeopleofthis  statedeservetoknowwhythemeaningoftheirconstitutionhassuddenlychangedovernightand  whatchangedcircumstanceshaverequiredsucharadicalreversal.    Themajoritymayhaveanevengreaterhurdletoovercome,however,thanthelackoflegal ` precedentorhistoricalapplicationuponwhichtogrounditsdecision.Myresearchoftherelevant L  constitutionalauthorityonthisissuecastsf  g f  g f  g f  g substantialf  g f  g Ԁdoubtf  g f  g f  g f  g astowhetherf  g f  g ԀthisCourtevenhasthe 8  authoritytofindthatstatelibertyprotectionsaregreaterthanthecorrespondingfederalprotections. $ t Priorto1870,severalTennesseecasesassertedthattheprotectionsofArticleI,section8were  ` synonymouswithfederaldueprocessprotections.Forexample,inFieldsv.State,8Tenn.(Mart.  L  &Yer.)168,169(1827)#XXX Xs # XXXX,thisCourtexaminedwhetheracountycourtcouldremoveaconstable  8  frompublicofficeforextortion.InansweringthequestionintheaffirmativeunderTennesseelaw, $  #XXX Xʤ)# XXXXthisCourtnotedthatthefederaldueprocessprotectionsandthosecontainedinArticleI,section8   were thesameinsubstance#XXX Xʹ*# XXXX.ThisCourtreaffirmedthisf  g f  g f  g f  g principlef  g f  g Ԁagain#XXX Xʓ+# XXXXinFergusonv.Miners&   ManufacturersBank,35Tenn.(3Sneed)609,616(1856)#XXX Xʅ,# XXXX,#XXX X3-# XXXXwhenitstatedthattheFifthAmendment   andArticleI,section8providedthesamedueprocessprotections,andourcaselawisalsoreplete   withstatementsfromthisCourtsayingthatthephrase LawoftheLandissynonymouswith due p processoflaw.See,e.g.,Statev.Staten,46Tenn.(6Cold.)233,244(1869)( Thephrase,thelaw \ ofthelandisanotherexpressionforthedueprocessoflaw;andisofequivalentimport.#XXX Xw-#XXXX);#XXXX/# XXXXOwens H v.RainsLessee,6Tenn.(5Hawy.)106(1818)(statingthat lawofthelandcarriessamemeaning 4 as duecourseoflaw)#XXX X,0#XXXX.  p   Inpointoffact,the1870Constitutionwasnota newconstitution,butwaslargelyare H enactmentoftheolder1834Constitution.See#XXXX,1# XXXXGoldv.Fite,61Tenn.(2Baxt.)237,243(1872) 4 (statingthat [t]heConstitutionof1870wasnotanewConstitution,butinallitsmainfeatureswas   are-enactmentoftheConstitutionof1834).#XXX X?2#XXXXAssuch, thejudicialconstructionwhichhad   theretoforebeenplaceduponit,formsapartoftheenactment,andtheconstructionispresumedto  beasmuchapartofthereenactmentasifitwerewrittenintotheplainlanguageoftheConstitution  itself.Cf.Smithv.NorthMemphisSav.Bank,115Tenn.12,30,89S.W.392,396(1905);seealso  Jenkinsv.Ewin,55Tenn.(8Heisk.)456,47576(1872);Statev.Schlier,50Tenn.(3Heisk.)281, l 283(1871).Indeed,thispresumptionmaybeaccordedevengreaterweightgiventhefactthatthe X  1870ConstitutionalConventionreenactedArticleI,section8unanimously,withoutsubstantive D! amendment,andwithoutfloordiscussion.Q #  14      ׀ 0"    #l!   Accordingly,themodernversionofthe LawoftheLandClausef  g f  g itselff  g f  g f  g f  g incorporatesf  g f  g Ԁtheprior   decisionsofthisCourtconcludingthatitsprotectionsarecoextensivewiththatoffederaldue  process.f  g f  g f  g f  g Assuchf  g f  g ,f  g f  g ԀthisCourtcannotnowchooseto reinterpretthisprovisionf  g f  g soasf  g f  g toreachamore  f  g f  g personallydesirablef  g Ԁresultinf  g f  g f  g f  g thisf  g f  g Ԁparticularcase.Evenifthisresultdoesnotnecessarilyfollow, t legitimateandfundamentalquestionsareraisedastotheauthorityofthisCourttoformulatenew ` standardsofreviewf  g f  g thatf  g Ԁaref  g f  g f  g f  g withouthistoricalorlegalfoundationf  g f  g Ԁandf  g f  g Ԁotherwisef  g f  g Ԁcontrarytoaccepted L  canonsofconstitutionalconstruction. 8  #XXXXy3#XXXX  "r  f  g f  f  g f  g g II.EFFECTOFHOLDINGTHATSTRICTSCRUTINYOFABORTION  ` REGULATIONSISCONSTITUTIONALLYCOMPELLEDf  g f  g   L  #XXXXN>#>XXXX   Plainlystated,theeffectoftheCourtsholdingtodayistoremovefromthepeopleallpower, $  exceptbyconstitutionalamendment,toenactreasonableregulationsofabortion.Ratherthanleaving   policydecisionsregardingreasonableabortionregulationtotheGeneralAssembly,thisCourthas   converteditselfintoarovingconstitutionalconvention,whichf  g f  g seesitselff  g Ԁfreetostrikedowntheduly   enactedlawsofthelegislaturefornootherreasonthanf  g f  g itf  g Ԁfeelstheyareburdensomeandunwise.In   sodoing,theCourthasbeenunabletoconvincinglypointtoanytextualorhistoricalbasisforits p decision,anditsholdingthatourConstitutionprovidesgreaterprotectionforthejudiciallycreated \ rightofprivacythanthefederalConstitutioniscontrarytonearlyf  g f  g f  g f  g f  g f  g twohundredf  g f  g f  g Ԁyearsoff  g Ԁlegalf  g  H precedent. 4   #XXXX?#XXXX  AlthoughIcertainlyrespectthejudgmentofmycolleagues,IbelievethattheCourthas  \ oversteppeditsauthoritywiththisdecision.Itsfactualdeclarationofthefundamentalnatureofthe H rightofprivacy"andbyextension,abortion"harkensbacktoatimewhenopinionsofthecourts 4 werejustifiedby naturallaw,whosemalleableandfluidnaturepermittedalmostanyconclusion   tobeadopted. #  15      ׀Althoughthelanguageisnotseeninourcasestoday,weshouldberemindedthat   atonetime,thecourtsofthisstateroutinelyheldthatadulyenactedstatute  cannotbeinvalidateduponsomesupposedorassumednaturalrightorequity,upon  thegeneralstatementthatitisopposedtotheinherentrightsoffreemen,norupon l anyspiritsupposedtopervadetheconstitutionnotexpressedinwords,norbecause X  itisopposedtothegeniusofafreepeople,noruponanygeneralorvague D! interpretationofaprovisionbeyonditsplainandobviousimport. 0"   #l! f  g f  g Leeperv.State,103Tenn.500,51011,53S.W.962,964(1899)(emphasisadded);seealsoHenley  v.State,98Tenn.665,682,41S.W.352,354(1897)#XXXX~E#XXXX;StrattonClaimantsv.MorrisClaimants,89  Tenn.497,511,15S.W.87,90(1891);Davisv.State,71Tenn.(3Lea)376,378(1879)#XXXXL#XXXX.    Nevertheless,despitethisancientconcern,themajorityhasundertakentousethisprecise ` formofadjudication.Ithasheldthattheabortionregulationsofthisstateareviolativeoftheright L  ofprivacy,which pervadestheconstitutionandwhichisreflectedinseveralofitsprovisions.It 8  hasheldthattherightstoprivacyandabortionare inherentandfundamental,thoughneitherenjoys $ t textualsupportintheConstitution.Ithasfurtherheldthattheprotectionsofthe LawoftheLand  ` Clausearebeyondthatwhichhasbeeninterpretedasits plainandobviousimport.f  g   L    f  g Iamunsurewhyconstitutionalinterpretationinthisstatehasdeviatedfromthesemaxims. $  Itcouldbethatwehavegrownwiseroverthepastcentury,oritcouldbethatourcourtshave   ignoredthefactthatthepeopleofthisf  g f  g state"ratherthanthecourts"aref  g Ԁultimatelyinthebest   positiontomakesuchpolicydecisions.f  g - #  16      f  g ԀWhateverthef  g f  g reasonsf  g ,If  g Ԁknowthatthesetenetsprovidea   soundbasisfromwhichtobeginouranalysis,andthemajoritycoulddomuchworsethantopay   heed. p #XXXXL#XXXX' X  'T  Idonotwishtobemisunderstood.Withoutadoubt, dueprocessisnotastaticlegal H principle,[and],inafreesociety,itisanadvancingstandardconsistingofthosebasicrightswhich 4 aredeemedreasonableandright.SeeCityofWhiteHousev.Whitley,979S.W.2d262,266(Tenn.  p 1998).FortheintegrityandlegitimacyofthisCourttobemaintained,though,thegrowthofthelaw  \ mustatalltimesbesolidlygroundedinlogic,reason,andexperience.Thepowertodeclarelaws H unconstitutionalthatareotherwisedulyenactedbyrepresentativesofthepeopleisanawesome 4 power,andinexercisingthispower,thejudiciarymustbepreparedinallcasestostatewithclarity   andprecisionthespecificreasonsuponwhichitsconstitutionaldecisionsaremade.'T7T݌   Ќ X    Inmyopinion,thisCourttodayhasfailedinthismostessentialduty.f  g f  g Evenwhenpresented  withmorethanf  g f  g f  g f  g twocenturiesf  g f  g Ԁoflegalprecedenttothecontrary,themajorityboldlyconcludesthat   weremainopposedtoanyassertionthatpreviousdecisions...f  g f  g f  g f  g require[]f  g f  g Ԁthiscourttointerpretour l constitutionascoextensivetotheUnitedStatesConstitution.Afterreadingsuchanastonishing X  statementthattheconstitutionissubjecttothewhimandmercyofthepresentmembersoftheCourt, D! thenextlogicalquestionmustnecessarilybe:Ofwhatbenefitisawrittenconstitutionf  g f  g ,f  g f  g Ԁwithsettled 0"  interpretationf  g f  g ,f  g f  g Ԁthatpurportstof  g f  g Ԁguaranteerightsandf  g f  g Ԁlimitthepowersoff  g f  g government?f  g f  g f  g f  g Theanswer #l! mustsurelybe none,becausewhenf  g f  g Ԁcourtstakeituponthemselvestoamendtheconstitutionatwill $X" throughtheirowninterpretivedevices,thebenefitofwrittenconstitutionswithsettledinterpretation $D #  islost.Asthemajoritymustf  g f  g f  g f  g certainlyf  g f  g ԀrecognizewithitscitationtoArticleI,section1,f  g f  g though,f  g f  g it %0!$ "r "  "  isf  g f  g f  g f  g theprerogativeoff  g f  g Ԁthef  g f  g f  g f  g people"notthatoff  g f  g Ԁthef  g f  g f  g f  g courts"tof  g f  g Ԁ alter,reform,orabolishthegovernment  insuchamannerastheymaythinkproper.     #XXXXS#XXXXTheCourtsdecisiontodayillustrateswellthedangersofconstitutionalinterpretationthat t isakinto makingitupasyougo.Themajoritycanoffernolegitimatef  g f  g f  g f  g reasonf  g f  g Ԁwhyf  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g  ` analysisiscompelledotherthanitcanf  g f  g requiref  g f  g Ԁthisstandardf  g f  g Ԁthroughexerciseofitsinherentauthority. L  BecausetherightofprivacyenjoysnotextualsupportinourConstitution,therightservesatthe 8  pleasureofthejudiciary,andtherefore,itcanbeeasilymanipulatedbycourtsdesiringtolegislate $ t fromthebench.Expansionand interpretationofthis fundamentalrightofprivacyallowcourts  ` toimposeuponthepeopletheirownviewofthewisdom,propriety,anddesirabilityofchallenged  L  legislation.  8  Ѐ#XXXXʁc#XXXXԀ $    #XXXXh#XXXXf  g ItisforthesereasonsthatIdissent.f  g f  g    f  g #XXXX%i#XXXXԀ  f  g f  g f  f  g f  g g    f  g   III. UNDUEBURDENSTANDARDOFREVIEW    j  Evenassumingforsakeofargumentf  g f  g Ԁthattherightofprivacyguaranteedunderthestate p constitutionismorebroadthanthecorrespondingfederalright,f  g f  g f  g f  g itisf  g f  g Ԁstillnotf  g f  g reasonablef  g f  g Ԁtosubjectf  g f  g  \ abortionregulationstof  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁanalysis.Theveryproblemwiththerightofprivacyisthatthe H rightenjoysnotextualsupportinourConstitution,andtherightmaybestretchedtoencompass 4 virtuallyanyperceivedinjustice.Toconcludethatallrightsfallingwithintherubricofprivacyare  p subjecttothesameleveloff  g f  g f  g f  g constitutionalf  g f  g Ԁscrutinyignoresthefactthatevery privacyrightthatwe  \ discovermaynotbeentitledtosuchpracticalimmunityfromreasonableregulation.f  g f  g f  g f  g  H   Althoughthemajorityportraysitselfaslawfullyboundtoapplystrictscrutinyanalysis   becausethef  g f  g Ԁrighttoobtainanabortionisf  g f  g a fundamentalrightundertheTennesseeConstitution,   nocaseorruleoflawcompelsthisresult.WhilethemajorityreliesheavilyuponDavistoprovide  theconstitutionalbasisforitsdecisiontoday,Davissimplycannotbereadtomeanthatthestateright  ofprivacyissobroadastorequirestrictscrutinyinallcasesinvolvinginfringementofth#XXXXi#XXXXatright,  particularlywhenthefederalConstitutiondoesnotsorequire.Icanfindnolanguageinthatopinion l whichactuallydeclaresthattherightofprivacyisfundamentalunderthestateconstitution,asone X  wouldcertainlyexpect,andaccordingtomyreadingofDavis,iftherightofprivacyisfundamental D! atall,itisbecausefederalcourtshavef  g sof  g heldf  g ԀunderthefederalConstitution.#XXXXʹs#XXXXԀ 0"    Itisworthremembering,though,thattheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtalsoviewstheright $X" toobtainanabortionasa fundamentalright,yetthatCourthasstoppedreviewingabortion $D # regulationsunderthestrictscrutinystandardofRoe.TheSupremeCourthasreachedthisconclusion %0!$ whilesimultaneouslyacknowledginginothercasesthatotherprivacyrightsareusuallyprotected &"% bystrictscrutinyanalysis.Readingfootnotesevenofthemajorityopinioninthiscase,onewould '#& thinkthatthisCourtisofthesameopiniontoday,asthemajorityremarksthat [d]ifferenttestsmay (#' bewarrantedindifferentcontexts.(emphasisadded).Thisimportantprinciplehavingbeen )$(  admitted,itisofsomewonder,then,whythemajoritygoestogreatpainstooverrulescoresofcases |*%) andcenturiesofconstitutionalinterpretationtoarriveatadecisionthatisnotevencompelledbyour  greatcharterofgovernment.#XXXXv#XXXX     A.TheFlexibilityofthe UndueBurdenStandard  t 5{  XXXXXXXXX  X  {  {1|݌̌  XXXXXXXX    Themajoritysprimarycriticismoftheundueburdenstandardisthatitprovides nostandard L  atallbywhichtoreviewabortionregulations.Withoutadoubt,reasonablemindswillsometimes 8  disagreeastowhetheraparticularregulationconstitutesanundueburdenontherighttoobtainan $ t abortion.Indeed,reasonabledisagreementastothemeaningofrulesandstandardsiscommonplace  ` inmanypartsofourlawandisadirectconsequenceofthecommonlawsystemofadjudication  L  inheritedfromEngland.Despiteitsshortcomings,though,theflexibilityoftheundueburden  8  standardisitsverystrength,andthismoreflexiblestandardallowscourtstoaccommodatevarious $  interestsandtofashionappropriatereliefunderthecircumstancesofanindividualcase.     Bywayofcontrast,theapplicationofstrictscrutinyisnotflexibleatall,andIcanfindno   caseinthisstatewhereapplicationofthisstandardhasresultedinupholdingthechallengedlaw.   Withtheadoptionofstrictscrutiny,thisCourthasforcedtheStateofTennesseeintoan allor p nothingscenario,whereonlythemostimpeccablydraftedlegislationwithstandstheslightest \ possibilityofdarkeningtheconstitutionaldoorway.Isimplycannotfathomthatthepeopleof H Tennessee,whooutlawedthepracticeofabortionuntilRoev.Wade,intendedtoremoveallpower 4 fromthemselvestoenactreasonableregulationsonabortion.Nevertheless,thisisthevery  p conclusionreachedbythemajoritytoday.  \   #XXXXz#XXXX  Evendespitethemajoritysadmittedlylegitimateconcerns,theundueburdenstandardis 4 practicallynomoreflexiblethananyotherstandardofreview.Afterall,evenstrictscrutinyanalysis   begsthequestionofhowarightachievesfundamentalstatus, #  17      ׀orevenhowastateinterestbecomes    compelling,ratherthanmerely importantor legitimate. #  18      ׀Otherobjectiveconstitutional  standards,suchasthe reasonablenessofasearch,orthe fairnessofatrial,arejustascapable  oflawlessdecisionmakingbyjudgeswhorefusetofollowprecedentorwhowishtoplacetheirown  imprimaturuponthelaw. t   Theundueburdenstandard,though,isnotsubjectiveorwithoutdefinitionasthemajority L  asserts.AsCaseydefinedthestandard,thephrase undueburdenisshorthandforthoseregulations 8  whichhave#XXXXB#XXXX thepurposeoreffectofplacingasubstantialobstacleinthepathofawomanseeking $ t anabortionofanonviablefetus.505U.S.at877(emphasisadded).#XXXX[#XXXXSurelythemajoritydoesnot  ` shyawayfromtheundueburdenstandardbecauseitrequiresanexaminationofthepurposeofa  L  statute,asthistaskisperformeddailywithinthehallsofthishallowedinstitution.Moreover,an  8  examinationoftheeffectsofaregulationrequiresonlythatthepartiesfullydevelopanddocument $  theappellaterecordandthatthereviewingcourtdiligentlyconsidertherelevantpartsofthatrecord.   Contrarytothemajoritysassertions,therefore,acourtthatisfaithfultoitsduty todeclarewhatthe   lawisdoeshaveanobjectivebenchmarkbywhichtomeasurewhetheraregulationplacesanundue   burdenontherighttoobtainanabortion.     Withoutanycitationtolegalauthorityoranalysiswhatsoever,themajorityboldlydeclares \ thatitwouldfindthatallofthechallengedregulationsalsoplaceanundueburdenontherightto H obtainanabortion.Themajoritythenusesmydisagreementwiththisstatementtoillustratethe 4  subjectivenatureoftheundueburdenstandard.Themajorityiscertainlycorrectthatapplication  p oftheundueburdenstandardcanresultin subjectiveanalysis,butonlywhenthat analysis  \ consistsofbalddeclarationsofunconstitutionality.ThereasonedjudgmentoftheCourt"notthe H adoptionofstrictscrutiny"isthecheckinoursystemagainstthearbitraryexerciseofjudicial 4 power.Solongasthejudgmentofthecourtcanbesupportedbyexperience,logic,andprecedent,   #XXXX[#XXXXthenIcannotconceivethatanystandard,includingtheundueburdenstandard, offersnoreal   guidanceandengendersnoexpectationamongthecitizenrythatgovernmentalregulationofabortion  willbeobjective,evenhanded,orwellreasoned.H #  19      #XXXXӑ#XXXX  #XXXXʊ#XXXX  Itistruethatbyusingtheundueburdenstandard,weareforcedtoputourtrustandfaithin l judgesofgoodcharacterw#XXXX#XXXXhoarededicatedtosoundandreasonedinterpretationsoflaw,andIagree X  thatwewouldbeintroubleifthejudgestookituponthemselvestomakelawratherthaninterpret  it.SolongastheCourtisabletomakeareasoneddecision,themajoritysfearsconcerningthe  undueburdenstandardshouldbeminimized.Itismyhopeandexpectation,perhapsna5velyso,that  reasonandsoundjudgmentwouldprevailattheendoftheday.#XXXXʾ#XXXXԀTheflexibilityoftheundueburden t standardissimplynotalegitimatereasontoadoptthewroughtironhammerofstrictscrutiny. `   B.StrictScrutinyandAccommodationofAllInterests  8  ڗ  Therighttoobtainanabortionisf  g f  g thesinglemostcomplexrightfallingundertheprivacy  ` umbrella,andthese procreationalrightsinvolveamyriadofinterestsotherthanthatofthemother,  L  includingthoselegitimateinterestsofthefetus,thefather, #  20      ׀andcertainlyofthestate.Asthe  8  SupremeCourtofMississippiheldwhenfacedwiththissamequestion: $    XXXXXXXXX  X    ݌̌  XXXX  Whilewehavepreviouslyanalyzedcasesinvolvingthestateconstitutionalrightto   privacyunderastrictscrutinystandardrequiringtheStatetoproveacompelling   interest,wearenotboundtoapplythatstandardinallprivacycases.Theabortion   issueismuchmorecomplexthanmostcasesinvolvingprivacyrights.Weareplaced p intheprecariouspositionofbothprotectingawomansrighttoterminateher \ pregnancybeforeviabilityandprotectingunbornlife.Inanattempttocreatea H workableframeworkoutofthesediametricallyopposedpositions,weadoptthewell 4 reasoneddecisioninCasey,applyingtheundueburdenstandardtoanalyzelaws  p restrictingabortion.Wedonotlimitanyfutureapplicationofthestrictscrutiny  \ standardforevaluatinginfringementonapersonsrighttoprivacyinotherareas. H f  g f  g f  g f  g f  g ProChoiceMiss.v.Fordice,716So.2d645,655(Miss.1998).   #XXXX #XXXX#XXXXϠ#XXXXf  g f  g f  g f  g   XXXXX      Becausef  g f  g Ԁstrictscrutinyf  g f  g f  g f  g isusually strictintheory,andfatalinfact,IquestiontheCourts  decisiononlytopermittheGeneralAssemblytoenactregulationswhenthoseregulationsarethe  leastrestrictivemeanstoachievethepreciseinterestatstake.Morespecifically,Iquestionwhether  abortionregulationscaneverbecraftedtoserveasingleinterest,andanyefforttobalanceand l accommodateseveralcompetinginterests#XXXX#XXXXԀmayresultintheregulationfailingstrictscrutinywith X  respecttoanysingleinterest.Indeed,asf  g f  g ԀtheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtf  g f  g f  g f  g hasconceded,thestates D!  importantandlegitimateinterestinpotentiallife...hasbeengiventoolittleacknowledgmentand  implementationbytheCourtinitssubsequentcases[usingthef  g f  g Ԁstrictscrutinyf  #XXXXʳ#g f  XXXXg ԀstandardofRoe].  Casey,505U.S.at871;seealsoThornburghv.AmericanCollegeofObstetriciansf  g f  g f  g f  g &f  g f  g ԀGynecologists,  476U.S.747,828(1986)(OConnor,J.,dissenting)( TheStatehascompellinginterestsinensuring t maternalhealthandinprotectingpotentialhumanlife,andtheseinterestsexistthroughout ` pregnancy.)#XXXXV#XXXX,overruledby,Casey,505U.S.at881.#XXXX#XXXX݌ L  Ќ  XXXXX    Becausethemajorityopinionrefusestorecognizethatmanyinterestsmaybefurtheredby $ t asingleregulation,itweighsthevalueofaregulationagainstasingleinterestinordertostrikedown  ` theregulation.Forexample,initsdiscussionofthemandatorywaitingperiod,themajority  L  concludesthattheregulationcannotsurvivestrictscrutinysimplybecauseitdoesnot furtherthe  8  Statesinterestinmaternalhealth.Whenconsideringthepossiblepurposesoftheregulation, $  however,Irecognizethatthestatealsohasaninterestinfetallife,andthatthisinterestcombined   withthestatesinterestinensuring informedanddeliberatedecisionmaking,seeCasey,505U.S.   at885,couldworktoupholdtheregulation.Althoughthe undueburdenstandarddoesnotfully   worktoaccommodateallthevariousinterestsinvolved,thestandardcertainlyrecognizesthatthe   legislaturemayworktoadvanceseveralinterestswithasingleregulation.#XXXXZ#XXXXԀ#XXXXʻ#XXXXNevertheless,withits p adoptionofstrictscrutinytoday,thisCourtissettospiraldownthesameroadwhichhasalready \ beenf  g f  g traveledf  g ԀandabandonedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt.Wedosowhilerecognizingthat H thispathisaroughoneandnotwideenoughtosafelyaccommodateallofitstravelers. 4   f  g f  g AlthoughIunderstandtheapparentmotivesofthemajority,#XXXX#XXXXthejudiciaryofthisstateis  \ simplynotlegitimatelyempoweredtomakeourConstitutionsaytodaywhatitdidnotsayyesterday. H Afterall,iff  g ԀIwerevestedwithlawmakingauthorityand remain[ed]opposedtoanyassertionthat 4 previousdecisionsshouldcontroltheoutcomeofthiscase,itcouldbethatIwouldf  g f  g alsorequirea   differentconstitutionalstandardwhenreviewingf  g Ԁabortionf  g f  g regulations"Iwouldprobablyonly   requirethechallengedregulationf  g Ԁtoberationallyrelatedtof  g f  g thestatesf  g Ԁlegitimatef  g f  g interestsinensuring  maternalhealthandfetallifef  g .Nevertheless,Irecognizethatthehistory,language,andstructureof  ourConstitutionf  g f  g f  g f  g f  g f  g providef  g f  g f  g Ԁprotectionthatiscoextensivewithfederaldueprocess.f  g     f  g Accordingly,forthereasonsgivenabove,Iwouldholdthatthe undueburdenstandard X  developedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinPlannedParenthoodv.Caseyshouldapplyto D! reviewabortionregulationsundertheTennessee LawoftheLandClause.Thisstandardisproper 0"  becauseourhistoricalinterpretationofthe LawoftheLandClauseissubstantiallyidenticaltothat #l! oftheDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment,andbecausethe undueburdenstandard $X" betterworkstoaccommodatethemyriadofinterestsarisinginthisincreasinglycomplexissueof $D # publicpolicy. %0!$   f  g f  f  g f  g g IVf  g f  g .APPLICATIONOFTHE UNDUEBURDENSTANDARD#XXXXw#f  g f  g f  f  g f  g g f  g  '#& f  g f  g XXXX  InCasey,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtrejectedstrictscrutinyasthestandardofreview )$( forregulationsofabortion.Inattemptingtocraftastandardofreviewthatbalancedthestates v*%) interestsinprotectingpotentiallife,inregulatingmaternalandfetalhealth,andinexpressinga b+&* preferenceforchildbirthoverabortionagainstawomansrighttoterminateherpregnancy,theCourt  adoptedanundueburdenstandardforstatutesregulatingpreviabilityabortions.SeeCasey,505  U.S.at87079.Undertheundueburdenstandard,astatuteisunconstitutionalonlyifithas the  purposeoreffectofplacingasubstantialobstacleinthepathofawomanseekinganabortionofa t nonviablefetus.Id.at877.Atthepointofviability,theStatesinterestbecomesfargreater,and ` itmayheavilyregulatef  g ,f  g Ԁorevencompletelyproscribeabortion,exceptwheretheprocedureis L  necessarytopreserveamotherslifeorhealth.Seeid.at879f  g ;seealsoStenbergvf  g .f  g ԀCarhart,__U.S. 8  __,__(2000).f  g  $ t   f  g f  f  g f  g g A.f  g f  g MedicalEmergencyExceptionf  g f  f  g g f  g   L    InCasey,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtbeganitsanalysisofPennsylvaniasabortion $  statutesbyexaminingtheexceptionforabortionsinmedicalemergencies.TheCourtdidsobecause   itcharacterizedthemedicalemergencyexceptionascentraltotheoperationofthestatutesother   provisions.Seeid.at879.Thestatutedefined medicalemergencyasaconditionnecessitating   immediateabortion toavert[themothers]deathorforwhichsubstantialdelaywillcreateserious   riskofsubstantialandirreversibleimpairmentofamajorbodilyfunction.Id.PlannedParenthood p arguedthattheexceptionwassonarrowlydefinedthatitforeclosedthepossibilityofanabortionin \ somecircumstancesinwhichthemotherwouldbeexposedtoathreattoherhealth.TheCourt H concludedthatthestatutewassufficientlybroadtoencompassallserioushealthrisks.Seeid.at 4 880.TheCourtnoted,however,thatifthestatutedidlimitabortionsinsomecircumstancesin  p whichthehealthofthemotherwouldbeendangered,thestatutewouldhavebeenunconstitutional  \ because theessentialholdingofRoeforbidsaStatetointerferewithawomanschoicetoundergo H anabortionprocedureifcontinuingherpregnancywouldconstituteathreattoherhealth.Id.f  g  4   TheSupremeCourthasrecentlyreaffirmedthisholdingofCaseyinStenbergv.Carhart,__   U.S.__(2000).Instrikingdownalawprohibitinganabortionprocedurecommonlyknownas   partialbirthabortion,theCourtnotedthat thelawlacksanyexception forthepreservationof  the...healthofthemother.f  f  g g Ԁf  g f  g __U.S.at__(quotingCasey,505U.S.at879).Inherconcurring  opinionprovidingthecrucialfifthvoteforthemajority,though,JusticeOConnorstatedthatifthe l Nebraskalawwasnotassweepingandifit includedanexceptionforthelifeandhealthofthe X  mother,thenthelaw wouldbeconstitutionalin[her]view.f  g Thus,evenafterStenberg,anyf  g Ԁsystem D! ofabortionregulationsmustprovideamedicalemergencyexceptionforthelifeandhealthofthe 0"  mothertopassconstitutionalmuster. #l!   Tennesseesabortionstatutescontainthreeseparatemedicalemergencyexceptions. $D # TennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection3915202(d)(3)(1997)suspendsthefortyeighthourwaiting %0!$ periodrequirementwhenitwould endangerthelifeofthepregnantwoman.Inaddition,section &"% Є202(g)preemptstheoperationoftheinformedconsentprovisionsaswellasthewaitingperiod '#& when necessarytopreservethelifeofthepregnantwoman.Neitheroftheseprovisionscontains (#' anexceptionwhenthehealthofthemotheristhreatened.TennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection3915 )$( 201(c)(3)(1997)doesprovidethatawomanmayprocureanabortionwhennecessarytopreserve |*%) herlifeorhealth;however,thissectionappliesonlyinsituationswhenthefetusisviable. h+&* Ї  TheStatearguesthatthemedicalemergencyprovisionforthehealthofawomaninsection  Є201(c)(3)maybereadintothemedicalemergencyprovisionsofsection202.Accordingtothe  State,theGeneralAssemblyaddedsection201(c)(3)inresponsetoafederalcourtorderenjoining  theabortionregulationsbecausetheydidnotcontainamedicalemergencyexceptionforthelifeof t themother.TheGeneralAssembly,though,alsoaddedsection202(g)atthesametime. ` Consequently,whiletheGeneralAssemblyexplicitlyprovidedfortheexceptiontoapplywhenthe L  lifeorhealthofthemothercarryingaviablefetuswasthreatenedinoneprovision,itprovideda 8  medicalemergencyexceptioninanothersectionaddedatthetimethatcoveredcircumstances#XXXXʼ#XXXXԀonly $ t whenthelifeofawomancarryingapreviablefetuswasthreatened.  `   Clearly,theGeneralAssemblyknewhowtoprovideforamedicalemergencyexceptionfor  8  thehealthofawomancarryingapreviablefetuswhenitsodesired,andtheabsenceofthehealth $  exceptioninsection202must,therefore,#XXXXJ#XXXXԀbepresumedtobeintentional.Courtsmayreadtermsinto   thetextofastatutewhensuchaninterpretationwouldclearlyfurthertheintentofthelegislatureor   whenthetermtobesuppliedwasclearlyomittedonlybyinadvertenceormistake.SeeInre   Swanson,2S.W.3d180,186(Tenn.1999);KnoxvillePower&LightCo.v.Thompson,152Tenn.   223,226,276S.W.1050,1051(1925).Nevertheless,Icannotconcludeunderthecircumstances p thatreadingtheword healthintosection202wouldfurthertheclearintentofthelegislatureor \ thattheword healthwasomittedinsection202onlybyinadvertenceormistake. H   Iconclude,therefore,thattheplainlanguageofTennesseesabortionstatutesdoesnot  p provideamedicalemergencyexceptiontothechallengedregulationswhenthehealthofawoman  \ carryingapreviablefetusisthreatened.Consequently,IamcompelledbytheUnitedStates H SupremeCourtsdecisioninCaseytoalsoconcludethatthefailuretoprovideamedicalemergency 4 exceptionforthehealthofawomancarryingapreviablefetusisunconstitutional,andthatthis   failurerenderstheotherchallengedprovisionsunconstitutionalundertheDueProcessClauseofthe   FourteenthAmendmentandthe LawoftheLandClauseoftheTennesseeConstitution.Butfor  thisdeficiencyinthemedicalemergencyexceptions,Iwouldfindtheremainderofthechallenged  provisionstobeconstitutionallysound.    f  g f  f  g f  g g B.f  g f  g InformedConsentProvisionsofTennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection3915202f  g f  g f  f  g g f  g  X  n  Thechallengedinformedconsentprovisionsofsection3915202canbedividedintothree 0"  components:(1)anattendingphysicianrequirement;(2)contentrequirements;and(3)amandatory #l! waitingperiod. $X"   f  g f  f  g f  g g f  g f  g AttendingPhysicianRequirementf  f  g g f  g f  g  %0!$   TennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection3915202(b)provides: '#& Inordertoensurethataconsentforanabortionistrulyinformedconsent,anabortion )$(  shallbeperformedorinduceduponapregnantwomanonlyaftershehasbeenorally |*%) informedbyherattendingphysicianofthefollowingfactsandhassignedaconsent  formacknowledgingthatshehasbeeninformedasfollows....   f  g f  g   TheCourtholdsthatthisprovisionisunconstitutionalf  g f  g Ԁbecauseitisnotnarrowlytailoredto t achievetheStateslegitimateandimportantinterestinguaranteeingthatapatientbeinformedofthe ` risksofamedicalprocedureinaccordancewithrecognizedstandardsofacceptableprofessional L  practice.f  g ԀIdisagree. #  21       8    InCityofAkronv.AkronCenterforReproductiveHealth,Inc.,462U.S.416,448(1983),  ` overruledby,Casey,505U.S.at88485,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsimilarlyheldthatthe  L  criticalfactorinensuringinformedconsent iswhether[awoman]obtainsthenecessaryinformation  8  andcounselingfromaqualifiedperson,nottheidentityofthepersonfromwhomsheobtainsit. $  InCasey,however,theCourtrejectedthisportionofAkronandconcludedthatanattending   physicianrequirementwasanappropriateexerciseofaStates broadlatitudetodecidethat   particularfunctionsmaybeperformedonlybylicensedprofessionals,evenifanobjective   assessmentmightsuggestthatthosesametaskscouldbeperformedbyothers.505U.S.at88485.   Accordingly,theCourtheldthatPennsylvaniasattendingphysicianrequirementwasconstitutional. p Sectionf  g Ԅ202(b)isnotappreciablydifferentfromtheprovisionexaminedbytheUnitedStates \ SupremeCourtinCasey,andIwouldthereforeholdthatitisconstitutionalundertheDueProcess H ClauseoftheFourteenthAmendmentand,byextension,Article1,section8oftheTennessee 4 Constitution.  p   H   f  f  g g f  g f  g ContentRequirementsf  f  g g f  g f  g     Severalprovisionsofsection3915202(b)and(c),whichrequiretheattendingphysicianto  f  g f  g f  g f  g apprisef  g f  g Ԁapregnantwomanseekinganabortionofcertaininformation,havebeenchallengedas t unconstitutional.Theseparticularinformationalrequirementsareasfollows: `  X X `  ` (b)(1) Thataccordingtothebestjudgmentofherattendingphysiciansheis 8  pregnant; $ t  ` (2) Thenumberofweekselapsedfromtheprobabletimeofthe  L  conceptionofherunbornchild,basedupontheinformationprovidedbyherastothe  8  timeofherlastmenstrualperiodorafterahistory,physicalexamination,and $  appropriatelaboratorytests;   f  g f  g  ` (3) Thatifmorethantwentyfour(24)weekshavepassedfromthetime   ofconception,herchildmaybeviable,thatis,capableofsurvivingoutsideofthe   womb,andthatifsuchchildisprematurelybornaliveinthecourseofanabortion p herattendingphysicianhasalegalobligationtotakestepstopreservethelifeand \ healthofthechild.... H f  g f  g f  g  ` (4) Thatabortioninaconsiderablenumberofcasesconstitutesamajor  p surgicalprocedure;  \ f  g  ` (5) Thatnumerouspublicandprivateagenciesandservicesareavailable 4 toassistherduringherpregnancyandafterthebirthofherchild,ifshechoosesnot   tohavetheabortion,whethershewishestokeepherchildorplacethechildfor   adoption,andthatherphysicianwillprovideherwithalistofsuchagenciesandthe  servicesavailableifshesorequests;  f  g f  g  ` (6) Numerousbenefitsandrisksareattendanteithertocontinued l pregnancyandchildbirthortoabortiondependinguponthecircumstancesinwhich X  thepatientmightfindherself.Thephysicianshallexplainthesebenefitsandrisks D! tothebestofsuchphysiciansabilityandknowledgeofthecircumstancesinvolved. 0"  f  g f  g  ` (c) Atthesametimetheattendingphysicianprovidestheinformation $X" requiredbysubsection(b),suchphysicianshallinformthepregnantwomanofthe $D # particularrisksassociatedwithherpregnancyandchildbirthandtheabortionorchild %0!$ deliverytechniquetobeemployed,includingprovidingherwithatleastageneral &"% descriptionofthemedicalinstructionstobefollowedsubsequenttotheabortionor '#& childbirthinordertoensurehersaferecovery. (#'  X Xv  TheStatehasanumberofsubstantialintereststhatitmayfurtherbyrequiringthatcertain |*%) informationbeprovidedpriortoanabortion.Ofcourse,theStatehasaninterestinthephysical h+&* healthofawoman,whichitmayfurtherbyrequiringthatthewomanbetoldofthehealthrisksof  abortionandchildbirth.SeeCasey,505U.S.at882.Thescopeofinformationthatcanberequired  includes,butisnotlimitedto, thenatureoftheprocedure,theattendanthealthrisksandthoseof  childbirth,andtheprobablegestationalageofthefetus.Id. t   TheStatealsohasaninterestinthepsychologicalhealthofawoman.Seeid.Information L  concerningtheimpactofanabortiononafetusfurthersthisinterestbyreducingtheriskthata 8  womanwhoobtainsanabortionwillsufferdevastatingpsychologicalconsequences.Seeid. $ t   Moreover,theStatehasaninterestinprotectingthelifeoftheunborn,irrespectiveof  L  whetherthefetusisviable.Seeid.at846,883.TheStatemaypursuethisinterestbyrequiringthat  8  awomanbeinformedofthedevelopmentofthefetusandassistancethatwouldbeavailableifshe $  chosetocarrythefetustofullterm.Seeid.at883.ItdoesnotmatterthattheStatesinterestmay   bepurelyapreferenceforchildbirthoverabortion.Becausesuchrequirementscannotbeconsidered   substantialobstaclestoobtainingabortions,theyarenotundueburdensandmaybeimposed.See   id.Inshort, [i]ftheinformationtheStaterequirestobemadeavailabletothewomanistruthful   andnotmisleading,therequirementmaybepermissible.Id.at882. p   InCasey,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtexaminedcontentrequirementsofPennsylvanias H abortionstatuteswhich,exceptforsection202(b)(6),areanalogoustothosethatarechallenged 4 beforethisCourt.TheCaseyCourtupheldtheconstitutionalityofeachofthechallengedprovisions.  p Giventhewideconstitutionallatitudewithinwhichastatemayregulateabortionwithoutviolating  \ eithertheFourteenthAmendmentoftheDueProcessClauseorthe LawoftheLandClause,Ifind H thatnoneofthechallengedprovisionsissuspect.Sectionf  g Ԅ202(b)(1)(3),(5)andsection202(c) 4 areclearlywithintheboundsoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsdecisioninCaseyandare,   withoutdoubt,constitutional.     AlthoughtheCaseyCourtdidnotexamineastatutesimilartosectionf  g Ԅ202(b)(6),thegeneral  principlesannouncedinCaseyaresufficientlybroadtoencompassthisprovisionaswell.Section  Є202(b)(6)essentiallycomplementssection202(c)byrequiringawomansphysiciantoexplainthe l benefitsaswellasrisksofcontinuingwithapregnancyorabortingafetus.Thedutyimposedon X  physiciansbysection202(b)(6)iseasilysatisfiedduringthecourseofmeetingtheotherinformed D! consentrequirements.Moreover,Iwouldfindthisprovisionnomoreconstitutionallyoffensivethan 0"  Iwouldarequirementthataphysicianperforminganyothermedicalprocedureinformapatientof #l! thebenefitsofthatprocedure.Theinformationcompelledbysection202(b)(6)isneitheruntruthful $X" normisleading,andIwouldthereforeholdthatitisconstitutionalundertheDueProcessClauseof $D # theFourteenthAmendmentand,byextension,the LawoftheLandClauseoftheTennessee %0!$ Constitution. &"%   Asthemajoritynotes,theStatehasconcededthatsection202(b)(4)isunconstitutional. (#' However,Idonotfindthatthisf  g Ԁconcessionnecessarilyf  g Ԁrenderstheremainderoftheinformed )$( consentrequirementsunconstitutional. Thefactthatoneprovisionofastatuteisunconstitutional |*%) doesnotaffectthevalidityofotherindependentprovisions.Statev.Murray,480S.W.2d355,356 h+&* (Tenn.1972).Underthedoctrineofelision,acourtmayelidetheunconstitutionalprovisionofa  statutewhilefindingtheremainingportionstobeconstitutionalandeffective.SeeLowesCos.,Inc.  v.Cardwell,813S.W.2d428,430(Tenn.1991).    Significantly,theGeneralAssemblyenactedthecurrentabortionstatutesaspartofthe1989 ` CriminalCoderevision,whichdidcontainageneralseverabilityclause,see1989Tenn.Pub.Acts L  ch.591,120,andthelegislaturehaselsewhereexpresseditsgeneralintentionthatunconstitutional 8  provisionsofastatutemaybeelidedinordertogiveeffecttotheremainderofthestatute,seeTenn. $ t CodeAnn.13110(1994).Contrarytotheconclusionreachedbythemajority,section202(b)(4)  ` isnotessentialtotheoperationoftheinformedconsentprovisions,anditselisiondoesnotcreate  L  anincompletestatute.Cf.Frostv.CityofChattanooga,488S.W.2d370,373(Tenn.1972).As  8  such,IdisagreethattheGeneralAssemblybelievedsection202(b)(4)tobeanecessarycomponent $  oftheinformedconsentrequirements,andIthereforefindthattheremainderofsection202could   stillbef  g ԀenforceddespitetheStatesconcessionthatsection202(b)(4)isunconstitutional.     f  f  g g f  g f  g MandatoryWaitingPeriodf  f  g g f  g f  g    ,  Inadditiontotheattendingphysicianrequirementandthecontentrequirements,section202 \ alsoprovidesthat [t]hereshallbeatwodaywaitingperiodafterthephysicianprovidestherequired H information,excludingthedayonwhichsuchinformationwasgiven.Onthethirddayfollowing 4 thedaysuchinformationwasgiven,thepatientmayreturntothephysicianandsignaconsentform.  p Tenn.CodeAnn.3915202(d)(1)(1997).  \   TheCourtstrikesthedownthemandatorywaitingperiodrequirement,inpart,becauseit 4 doesnotfurthertheStatesinterestinmaternalhealth.Thisconclusionislargelytheproductofthe   CourtsinabilityorrefusaltoconsidertheotherintereststhattheStatemaypursue.Aperiodof   reflectionnotonlyfurtherstheStateslegitimateinterestinapatientspsychologicalwellbeing,but  awaitingperiodalsofurtherstheStatesinterestinexpressingapreferenceforchildbirthover  abortion.ThesearelegitimateandsubstantialintereststhattheStatemayconstitutionallypursue,  andthemajoritysfailuretorecognizetheseinterestsistroubling. l   TheCourtalsofindsthemandatorywaitingperiodunconstitutionalbecausewaitingperiods D! requiretwotripstoaphysicianwhichmaybeproblematicforwomenwhowork,womenwhoare 0"  inabusiverelationships,andwomenwhotravelgreatdistances.Idisagree.Itisbeyonddisputethat #l! waitingperiodrequirementsarepermissibleformsofregulation. Theideathatimportantdecisions $X" willbemoreinformedanddeliberateiftheyfollowsomeperiodofreflection[isnot]unreasonable, $D # particularlywherethestatutedirectsthatimportantinformationbecomepartofthebackgroundof %0!$ thedecision.Casey,505U.S.at884. &"%   ThisCourtsf  g f  g f  g f  g concernf  g f  g Ԁwiththeimpactofthewaitingperiodf  g f  g f  g f  g isf  g f  g Ԁnotf  g f  g asufficientf  g f  g reasontostrike (#' downthisprovision.InCasey,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtconcededthatwaitingperiods )$( increasedtheriskthatsomewomenwouldbeexposedtoharassmentfromantiabortionprotesters. |*%) Seeid.at886.TheCourtalsoobservedthatawaitingperiodwouldbetaxingonsomewomenwith h+&* limitedfinancialresourcesandthosewhohadtotravellongdistances.Seeid.at88586.TheCourt  additionallynotedtheproblemssomewomenwouldhaveinexplainingabsencestohusbands,  employersf  f  g g ,f  g f  g Ԁorothers.Seeid.at886.WhiletheCourtcharacterizedtheseincidentaleffectsofthe  waitingperiodas troublesome,itneverthelessconcludedthatthewaitingperioddidnotconstitute t anundueburden.Seeid. `   Theonlyrealdistinctionbetweensection202(d)andthePennsylvaniastatuteinCaseyis 8  thatthePennsylvaniastatuteimposedatwentyfourhourwaitingperiodwhilesection202(d) $ t imposesafortyeighthourwaitingperiod.However,Idonotfindthisdistinctiontobecritical.The  ` CaseyCourtupheldPennsylvaniastwentyfourhourwaitingperiodeventhoughitnotedthedistrict  L  courtsfindingthat thepracticaleffect[would]oftenbeadelayofmuchmorethanaday.505  8  U.S.at88586.Withanappropriatemedicalemergencyexceptioninplace,anyconcernswith $  increasedhealthrisksofaf  g f  g f  g f  g twodayf  g f  g Ԁdelaywouldbealleviated.Thus,Iwouldfindthatsectionf  g f  g f  g f  g 3915   202f  g f  g (d)doesnotconstituteanundueburden.     f  f  g g  C.f  g f  g MandatoryHospitalization f  g f  f  g g f  g    ')  TennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection3915201(c)(2)(1997)requiresthatabortionsperformed \ afterthreemonthsofpregnancybutbeforeviabilitybecompleted inahospitalasdefinedinf  g f  g f  g f  g  H [section]f  g f  g Ԁ6811201,licensedbythestatedepartmentofhealthorahospitaloperatedbythestateof 4 Tennesseeorabranchofthefederalgovernment.Iwouldfindthatthisstatutedoesnotactasa  p substantialobstacletowomenseekingabortions.First,thisprovisiondoesfurthertheStates  \ interestsinprotectingboththehealthofthemotherandofthefetus.TheCourt,initsanalysisofthis H provision,casuallydisregardsanydangerofcomplicationsarisingduringthecourseofanabortion 4 andassertsinsteadthatabortionsduringtheperiodregulatedbysection201(c)(2)canbesafely   performedinfreestandingsurgicalfacilitiesinadditiontohospitals.Whilethismaybetrue,itis   alsotruethatlifethreateningcomplicationsmayindeedaccompanyanabortionprocedure.Such  complicationscanincludehemorrhaging,bacterialshock,acuterenalfailure,septicemia,metritis,  parametritis,peritonitis,seriousmorbidity,andmortality.SeeF.GaryCunningham,etal.,Williams  Obstetrics50607(18thed.1989).Withthisinmind,IamnotpreparedtoconcludethattheState l hasnolegitimateinteresttopromotethroughsectionf  g Ԅ201(c)(2).f  g f  g f  g f  g Hencef  g f  g ,Ifindf  g f  g thatf  g f  g sectionf  g f  g f  g f  g 3915 X  201f  g f  g (c)(2)furtherstheStatesinterestinmaternalandfetalhealthwithintheconstitutionallimitations D! setbyCasey. #  22       0"    Ialsofindthattheeffectofsection201(c)(2)doesnotconstituteanundueburden.InCasey, $X" theCourtexpressedconcernthatstatutesmightprohibit significantnumbersofwomenfrom $D # obtainingabortions.See505U.S.89394.Suchstatutes,theCourtconcluded,wereunconstitutional %0!$ becausetheyconstitutedsubstantialobstacles,thusfailingtheundueburdentest.However,asthe &"% CourtofAppealsinthiscaseobserved,section201(c)(2)affectslessthantwopercentofall  abortionssoughtinTennessee.Clearly,significantnumbersofwomenarenotprecludedfrom  obtainingabortionsbysection201(c)(2).    Whilesection201(c)(2)mayincreasetheinconvenienceandcostofobtaininganabortion ` forsomewomen,thisisnotasufficientreasontostrikedowntheregulationasunconstitutional. L  AsInotedwithregardtothemandatorywaitingperiod,abortionregulationsarenotrendered 8  unconstitutionalbecausetheyhavesuchincidentaleffects.Giventhelimitednumberofwomen $ t affectedbysection201(c)(2)andtheStateslegitimateintereststhatitprotectsbyregulatingthis  ` medicalprocedure,IwouldupholditsconstitutionalityundertheDueProcessClauseofthe  L  FourteenthAmendmentandthe LawoftheLandClauseoftheTennesseeConstitution.  8    f  g f  g f  g f  g f  g f  g Vf  g f  g .f  g CONCLUSION #XXXX"#    :XXXX  Inconclusion,Iwouldholdthatregulationsontherighttoobtainanabortionaretobe   reviewedunderthe undueburdenstandardadoptedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinPlanned ~  ParenthoodofSoutheasternPennsylvaniav.Casey.Therighttoobtainanabortionisprotected j underthestateconstitution,ifatall,bythe LawoftheLandClauseinArticleI,section8f  g f  f  g f  g g ;f  g f  g Ԁthe V history,language,andapplicationofthisclauseshowthatitsprotectionsaref  g ,atmost,f  g Ԁcoextensive B withthoseaffordedbytheDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment. .~   Withitsopiniontoday,themajorityhasfailedinitsmostessentialdutytoarticulatethebasis V ofitsdecisionwithaclearandpreciserationale,andithasfailedtoestablishanadequatefoundation B foritsdecisioninlegalprecedent.Whilethelawcertainlymusthaveroomtogrowandexpandas . thevaluesandvirtuesofsocietychange,thisgrowthcannotcomefromthejudiciarywithouthaving  afirmfoundationinreason,precedent,andexperience.Inholdingthatabortionregulationsare  reviewedunderaf  g f  g f  g f  g strictscrutinyf  g f  g Ԁstandardofreview,theCourthasignoredpriorTennesseelawand  history,andtheuseofthisstandardfailstosufficientlyaccommodatetheimportantandcompeting  interestsinvolvedinthiscomplexissue. z   Evenunderthemorelenient undueburdenstandardofreview,however,Iwouldfindthat R  themedicalemergencyexceptionsareunconstitutionalXXXXԀbecausetheyoperatetoprohibitobtaining >! anabortionwhenthehealthofawomancarryingapreviablefetusisthreatened.#XXXXʎC#XXXXԀButforthis *"z  deficiencyinthemedicalemergencyexceptions,f  g f  g Iwouldfindtheremainderofthechallenged #f! provisionstobeconstitutionallysound.#XXXXnD#f  g  $R" f  f  g g    `     h    %*!$ f  g f  g    @  @`  @  @  @h  @  @ ____________________________________ (#' xF   `     h   f  f  g g   f  g f  g WILLIAMM.BARKER,JUSTICEf  g