ÿWPC# 6# U: %I 0 ˆOL×wš#4½Ñ 0à 0Dç+ Æ3 0Jù 0TC — 0^Ÿ 0hý 0re 0|× 0†S 0Ù 1ui 0dÞ AQB B“ 0D° 0@ô 0D4 D/x B§ D3ÄU*÷B)!DCJ AMŽÚYhúÁÿ»ºv~ÀvÓ>˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX(`o$¡¡ÑTRY 3Ø'ÿ LetterY 3Ø'ÿ Letter3Ø'ÿ Letter3Ø'ÿ LetterTÑÔ  ÔC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT‡ Eˆ E‰ DŒ U UŽ D H ‘ E’ “ {” • E– — {˜ ™ š D› •œ D Ež Ÿ U  Ó€¬ WX$¤Ôô3|x¬ (·(2$$¤¤Ý ƒo!ÝÑTRY3Ø'ÿ Letter3Ø' 3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ôp¶ôXXÔÒ4°ÒÒ„°Òà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ!"#%Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ d(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd 'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d,,,,7Border 1dd"-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ „Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌò òMarch€2,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€+ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó OÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€+ôÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€37„1„106.Ì ðÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€+ôÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€1972€Public€Acts€1676„1680,€Ch.€863€created€a€law€and€equity€court€in€DyerÏCounty,€Tennessee,€and€conferred€Judge€Lanier's€jurisdictional€authority€over€the€juvenile€courtÏof€Dyer€County.Ì õÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€+ôÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€economic€realities€test€focuses€on€one's€ability€to€control€a€plaintiff's€job€performanceÏand€employment€opportunities.€€òòEyerman€v.€Mary€Kay€Cosmeticsóó,€967€F.2d€213,€219€(6th€Cir.Ï1992).Ì üÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€+ôÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€plaintiff's€complaint€also€sets€forth€a€claim€which€could€be€properly€classified€as€aÏsupervisor„created€hostile€environment.€€Whether€the€employer€is€liable€for€its€supervisor's€actionsÏin€hostile€work€environment€claims€depends€on:€€"(1)€€whether€the€supervisor's€harassing€actionsÏwere€foreseeable€or€fell€within€the€scope€of€employment;€and€(2)€€even€if€they€were,€whether€theÏemployer€responded€adequately€and€effectively€to€negate€liability."€€òòCarr€v.€U.P.S.óó,€___€S.W.2dÏ___€(Tenn.€1997).€€For€the€reasons€stated€in€this€opinion,€we€find€that€Judge€Lanier's€actions€fellÏwithin€the€scope€of€employment.€€Whether€the€State€responded€adequately€to€Judge€Lanier'sÏharassment€shall€be€decided€on€remand.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿáùEG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€+ÔÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€oåXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò ò›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àFOR€PUBLICATIONÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òFiled:ó ó€òò€€€€€œMarch€2,€1998›à€ àóóÌÌÌÌSANDRA€SANDERS,à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àDYER€CHANCERYÌà àPLAINTIFF„APPELLEE,à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àHon.€William€H.€Inman,Ìv.à@ à)à àSenior€JudgeÌà@ à)à àSitting€by€DesignationÌDAVID€W.€LANIER€ANDà@ à)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à@ à)ÌÙ€ÙœßR€./-A1-j||¾` Å `€€@ÿRß›à@ à)à àNo.€02S01„9706„CH„00060Ìà àDEFENDANTS„APPELLANTS.à@ à)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFOR€APPELLANT€STATE€OFóó:à àà àòòFOR€APPELLEEóóÌòòTENNESSEEóó:Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJerrold€L.€BeckerÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà àà àà àà àScarlett€A.€BeatyÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àLockridge,€Becker€&€Valone,€P.C.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxvilleÌMichael€E.€MooreÌSolicitor€GeneralÌÌElizabeth€MartinÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌÌÌÌÌÌœÌÌÌ›ÌÌà@ àò òÔ€+èÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ€+XÔÌÌÌÌœ›ÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€AFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIEDà€ àHOLDER,€J.ÇÓÓà àà@ àò òOPINIONó óÌÌà àThe€issue€with€which€we€are€confronted€is€whether€the€State€may€beÏliable€to€a€county€employee€for€employment€discrimination€under€theÏTennessee€Human€Rights€Act€("THRA")€when€the€county€employee€is€under€theÏsupervision€of€a€state€judge€who€commits€quid€pro€quo€sexual€harassmentÏagainst€the€county€employee.€€The€trial€court€answered€the€question€in€theÏnegative€holding€that€the€State€was€not€the€plaintiff's€employer€under€the€THRA.€ÏThe€Court€of€Appeals€reversed€and€held€that€the€THRA€imposed€liability€on€theÏState€under€an€economic€realities€test.€€For€the€reasons€set€forth€in€this€opinion,Ïwe€affirm€as€modified€the€appellate€court's€reversal€of€the€trial€court's€judgment.Ìò òÌÓ  ÓFACTSó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€plaintiff€alleges€that€she€was€employed€as€a€Youth€Services€OfficerÏwith€the€Dyer€County€Juvenile€Court.€€Youth€Services€Officers€receive€theirÏcompensation€from€the€County.× ƒ0 ××  ×€€The€plaintiff,€however,€maintains€thatÏChancellor€David€Lanier€possessed€the€authority€to€hire,€discipline,€promote,Ïand€terminate€her€and€all€other€juvenile€court€employees.€€Judge€Lanier€was€aÍstate€judge€and€presided€over€both€the€chancery€and€juvenile€courts€in€DyerÏCounty.× ƒ1 ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€plaintiff€contends€that€Judge€Lanier€sexually€harassed€her.€€HerÏallegations€include€both€sexual€assault€("grabbing€her€breast€and€buttocks")Ïand€unwelcome€sexual€advances.€€She€alleges€that€she€repeatedly€rejectedÏJudge€Lanier's€unwelcome€sexual€advances€and€that€Judge€Lanier€demotedÏher€from€her€supervisory€position€in€retaliation€for€rejecting€his€sexual€advances.€ÏShe€further€alleges€that€Judge€Lanier€denied€her€an€increase€in€salary€andÏ"unilaterally"€altered€her€job€requirements€on€a€weekly€basis.ÌÌà àThe€plaintiff€filed€suit€against€the€State€of€Tennessee€("State")€allegingÏviolations€of€the€THRA.€€The€defendant€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€toÏstate€a€claim€for€which€relief€can€be€granted.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€Rule€12.02(6).€ÏThe€trial€court€found€that€the€State€was€not€the€plaintiff's€employer€for€purposesÏof€THRA€liability€and€dismissed€the€plaintiff's€claim€for€failure€to€state€a€cause€ofÍaction.€€The€appellate€court€adopted€the€federal€courts'€economic€realities€test× ƒ2 ××  ×Ïand€the€common€law€test€of€control€and€reversed€the€trial€court.ÌÌÓ  Óò òDISCUSSIONó óÌÓ  Óà àÌà àThe€plaintiff€alleges€that€Judge€Lanier€conditioned€her€employmentÏbenefits€on€sexual€favors.€€The€plaintiff€further€alleges€that€Judge€LanierÏpossessed€supervisory€powers€over€her€position€and€had€the€actual€or€apparentÏauthority€to€alter€the€terms€and€conditions€of€her€employment.ÌÌà àThe€plaintiff's€claim€against€Judge€Lanier€can€best€be€classified€as€quidÏpro€quo€harassment.× ƒ3 ××  ×€€Quid€pro€quo€harassment€occurs€when€a€supervisorÏconditions€employment€benefits€on€sexual€favors.€€òòKelly€Carr€v.€U.P.S.óó,€___ÏS.W.€___€(Tenn.€1997).€€To€prevail€under€a€quid€pro€quo€theory€of€sexualÏharassment,€a€plaintiff€must€show:€€ÌÌÓÓà8 à(1)€€that€the€employee€was€a€member€of€a€protected€class;€(2)€€thatÏthe€employee€was€subjected€to€unwelcome€sexual€harassment€inÏthe€form€of€sexual€advances€or€requests€for€sexual€favors;€(3)€€thatÏthe€harassment€complained€of€was€based€on€sex;€(4)€€that€theÏemployee's€submission€to€the€unwelcome€advances€was€anÏexpress€or€implied€condition€for€receiving€job€benefits€or€that€theÏemployee's€refusal€to€submit€to€the€supervisor's€demands€resultedÏin€a€tangible€job€detriment;€and€(5)€€the€existence€of€respondeatÏsuperior€liability.ÓÓòòÌÌKauffman€v.€Allied€Signal,€Inc.óó,€970€F.2d€178,€186€(6th€Cir.€1992).ÌÌà àIn€òòCarróó,€we€held€that€an€employer€is€strictly€liable€for€a€supervisor's€quidÏpro€quo€harassment€under€the€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior.€€òòCarróó,€___ÏS.W.2d€at€___.€€Strict€liability€is€imposed€because:€€(1)€€a€supervisor€is€the€alterÏego€of€the€employer;€and€(2)€€a€supervisor€has€the€actual€or€apparent€authorityÏto€alter€an€employee's€terms€or€conditions€of€employment.€€"Under€this€alter€egoÏtheory€of€liability,€a€supervisor's€acts€within€the€scope€of€employment€areÏimputed€to€the€employer."€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àAs€to€the€first€four€elements,€the€plaintiff€is€a€member€of€a€protected€class.€ÏShe€has€alleged€that€she€was€subject€to€unwelcome€sexual€advances€and€thatÏthe€harassment€was€based€on€sex.€€She€has€further€alleged€that€she€sufferedÍadverse€job€consequences€as€a€result€of€her€rejecting€Judge€Lanier's€sexualÏadvances.ÌÌà àOur€last€inquiry€is€whether€Judge€Lanier€was€acting€within€the€scope€ofÏhis€employment.€€We€believe€that,€when€an€employer€empowers€a€supervisorÏwith€the€ability€to€take€actions€that€affect€the€employment€status€of€subordinates,Ïthe€supervisor's€acts€taken€or€threats€made€within€the€actual€or€apparent€scopeÏof€authority€are€imputed€to€the€employer.€€òòEllerth€v.€Burlington€Industries,€Incóó.,Ï102€F.3d€848,€860€(7th€Cir.€1996).€€Accordingly,€respondeat€superior€isÏapplicable€under€a€quid€pro€quo€theory€when:€€(1)€€an€employer€empowers€aÏsupervisor€with€the€ability€to€alter€job€benefits;€(2)€€the€supervisor€abuses€theÏempowerment€by€making€a€subordinate's€job€benefits€contingent€upon€receiptÏof€sexual€favors;€and€(3)€€the€subordinate€reasonably€believes€that€theÏsupervisor€has€the€actual€or€apparent€authority€to€alter€the€subordinate's€jobÏbenefits.ÌÌà àThe€State,€either€directly€or€indirectly,€empowered€Judge€Lanier€with€theÏauthority€to€alter€the€plaintiff's€job€benefits.€€The€plaintiff€alleges€that€JudgeÏLanier€conditioned€her€job€benefits€upon€the€receipt€of€sexual€favors€and€thatÏshe€sustained€adverse€job€consequences€as€a€result€of€her€rejection€of€theÏsexual€advances.€€The€plaintiff's€complaint€further€indicates€that€she€believedÏthat€Judge€Lanier€had€the€actual€or€apparent€authority€to€hire,€discipline,Ípromote,€demote,€or€terminate€her€and€all€other€juvenile€court€employees.€€TheÏplaintiff's€allegations,€if€true,€would€support€a€finding€of€respondeat€superiorÏliability.ÌÌà àThe€THRA€prohibits€an€employer€from€discriminating€against€a€person€orÏan€individual.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„401(1)€(stating€"[i]t€is€aÏdiscriminatory€practice€for€an€employer€to€.€.€.€discriminate€against€an€individualÏwith€respect€to€compensation,€terms,€conditions€or€privileges€of€employment.").€Ï"Employer"€is€defined€as€including€"the€state,€or€any€political€or€civil€subdivisionÏthereof,€.€.€.€or€any€person€acting€as€an€agent€of€an€employer,€directly€orÏindirectly."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ4„21„102(4).›€€A€"person"€is€defined€as€includingÏ"one€(1)€or€more€œindividuals."€€By€these€terms,€the›€definition€does€not€requireÏthat€the€person€or€individual€be€an€employee€of€the€employer.ÌÌà àThe€State€falls€within€the€THRA's€definition€of€an€employer.€€Judge€LanierÏallegedly€acted,€directly€or€indirectly,€as€an€agent€of€the€State.€€Judge€Lanier'sÏalleged€actions€against€the€plaintiff€constitute€quid€pro€quo€sexual€harassment.€ÏIn€òòCarróó,€we€held€that€an€employer€is€strictly€liable€for€its€supervisor's€quid€proÏquo€harassment.€€Carr,€___€S.W.2d€at€___.€€Accordingly,€Judge€Lanier'sÏactions,€if€proven,€may€be€imputed€to€the€State€because€the€State€empoweredÏJudge€Lanier€with€the€authority€he€allegedly€abused€in€an€attempt€to€gainÏsexual€favors.ÌÌà àThe€State's€argument€that€sovereign€immunity€insulates€the€State€fromÏliability€for€Judge€Lanier's€alleged€discriminatory€acts€is€without€merit.€€TheÏTHRA€explicitly€provides€that€the€State€may€be€liable€for€employment„relatedÏdiscrimination€against€an€individual.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(4)€&€401.€ÏThe€plaintiff's€allegations,€therefore,€satisfy€the€legislative€requirements€forÏimposition€of€State€liability€under€the€THRA.ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals'€reversal€of€the€trial€court's€decision€is€affirmed€asÏmodified,€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€proceedings€consistentÏwith€this€opinion.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€appellant,€State€ofÏTennessee,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àòòà€ àóóÌà àà àà àà àà àJanice€M.€Holder,€JusticeÌÌÌò òœCONCURRING:›Ìó óÌAnderson,€C.J.ÌœDrowota€and€Reid,€J.J.ÌÌBirch,€J.,€Not€Participating›