ÿWPCZ8 W# ÒUNÝ %+ 0D1w@uUHµbý 0` 0 Æe 0E+4p„ 0J“ 0TÝ 0^1 0h 0r÷ 0|i 0†å 0k 1uû p 0dx U>Ü œ U*¶ B)à U* DC3 Bv AM“Mà-:@U:zf´,fF€¬…, ±W¼p®ƒ AQ1#Æ‚# 0`H$ 0@¨$ 0Dè$ D/,% B[% D3x%«%f³%Š&b£)UH«)Æó)ƹ*Æ+ÆE,ê -‘õ.U6†/M¼/v~ 1vÓ‡2˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(óf$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒÀ°Ò è&Eé&Eê&#-ë&Ó€÷& ù&Vú& îû&Dü&Ó€'<à09Z 0Courier (WT) Regular- ù-(83‚ª$©©Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý(8f2$¤¤Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àÔ€ôZ¢ ôXXÔÔ€2ôBàô ôôZ¢ÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(9ˆ$òòÚ  Ú12Ú  Úóók`($\Ôô3|x'2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman ’Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d< Œ 9p`(Times))))7Border 1dd d=?+Cþÿ << Gÿÿ CÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ>"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òFebruaryÏ23,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€430€(Tenn.€1989).€Ì 0Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝBrumley€was€a€codefendant€in€this€case€in€the€trial€court€but€is€not€a€party€to€this€appeal.Ì,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ "Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€car€was€registered€in€the€name€of€the€defendantððs€son€who€was€deceased.Ì \Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€trial€court€explicitly€found€ð ðthat€exigent€circumstances€existed€for€an€immediate€searchÏof€the€vehicle€and€of€the€defendant.ððÌ vÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝRule€37(b)(2)(i),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.,€provides€in€pertinent€part€as€follows:Ìà8 àà8 à(b)€An€appeal€lies€from€any€order€or€judgment€in€a€criminalÏproceeding€where€the€law€provides€for€such€appeal,€and€from€anyÏjudgment€of€conviction:€(2)€Upon€a€plea€of€guilty€or€noloÏcontendere€if:€(i)€Defendant€entered€into€a€plea€agreement€underÏRule€11(e)€but€explicitly€reserved€with€the€consent€of€the€state€andÏof€the€court€the€right€to€appeal€a€certified€question€of€law€that€isÏdispositive€of€the€case.€.€.€.ÌThe€defendant€also€reserved€for€appeal€the€denial€of€her€motion€to€dismiss€for€violation€of€doubleÏjeopardy.€€However,€that€claim€is€not€at€issue€in€this€Court.€€Ì {Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€Fourth€Amendment€is€applicable€to€the€states€through€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€ÏòòMapp€v.€Ohioóó,€367€U.S.€643,€655,€81€S.Ct.€1684,€1691,€6€L.Ed.2d€1081€(1961).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòIdóó.,€407€U.S.€at€146,€92€S.Ct.€at€1923.Ì MÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAt€the€time€of€the€decision€in€òòAdamsóó,€the€two„pronged€veracity€and€basis€of€knowledgeÏtest€was€the€standard€employed€by€federal€courts€to€analyze€the€reliability€of€an€informantððs€tip.€€TheÏfederal€courts€did€not€adopt€the€ð ðtotality€of€the€circumstancesðð€test€until€1983.€€òòSeeóó€òòIllinois€v.€Gatesóó,Ï462€U.S.€213,€102€S.Ct.€2317,€76€L.Ed.2d€527€(1983).€€Ì fÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€observed€that€the€two„pronged€test€had€been€abandoned€by€the€federal€courts€inÏfavor€of€a€ð ðtotality€of€the€circumstancesðð€approach€which€requires€ð ð[s]ome€showing€of€veracity€andÏsome€showing€of€basis€of€knowledge,ðð€but€which€allows€for€a€ð ðdeficiency€in€one€[prong]€to€beÏcompensated€for€.€.€.€by€a€strong€showing€as€to€the€other.ðð€€òòGatesóó,€462€U.S.€at€223,€103€S.Ct.€atÏ2329.€Ì ¤Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€defendantððs€reliance€upon€òòState€v.€Colemanóó,€791€S.W.2d€504€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1989),€is€misplaced.€€There,€the€informant€previously€had€been€arrested€on€other€charges,€butÏexplicitly€had€never€been€utilized€as€an€informant€in€any€prior€police€investigations.€€In€addition,€theÏinformation€was€given€to€the€officer€two€days€before€the€alleged€transaction€was€to€occur,€and€theÏinformant€provided€no€explicit€statement€relating€his€basis€of€knowledge.€€€Ì=>?@ACþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(83‚ª$¢¢Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óBB'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd,,,,'ÿÿdxd \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ €Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€defendantððs€reliance€upon€òòState€v.€Morelockóó,€851€S.W.2d€838€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1992)€is€misplaced.€€In€that€case,€the€officer€merely€stopped€the€defendant€for€speeding€and€had€noÏinformation€that€the€defendant€was€committing€any€other€criminal€offense.€€Despite€the€completeÏlack€of€an€objective€basis€for€suspicion,€the€officer€detained€the€defendant€in€his€patrol€car€until€sheÏconsented€to€a€search€of€the€passenger€compartment€of€her€car,€and€continued€to€detain€theÏdefendant,€her€sister,€and€her€nieces€and€nephews,€despite€their€repeated€requests€to€leave,€whileÏhe€conducted€a€more€extensive€search€with€a€drug€dog.€€The€circumstances€clearly€areÏdistinguishable.€Ì- ù-<à09Z 0Courier (W1) RegularLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 àÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€&ôÔÔ€(ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€defendant€also€argues€that€her€consent€was€involuntary€because€the€trial€court€foundÏshe€was€in€custody€when€it€was€given.€€The€defendant€fails€to€recognize€that€the€trial€court€alsoÏexplicitly€found€that€the€defendant€was€not€subjected€to€custodial€interrogation.Ì ‡Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ< Œ 9p`(Courier New CÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ>"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òFebruaryÏ23,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿáùEG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€&ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ћрÑÑ7€ÜXXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÖ€'ÖÔ€(ÔÑ , ÑÑ õ ÑÑ  ÑÑ€) §u` ÑÑ  Ñò òØ ØÓ&€**XÐd&Óœ›Þ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONó óÌÌÌÌÓ` °‚X.h—XÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à(à àòòò òFOR€PUBLICATIONóóà àó óÌà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Plaintiff„Appellee,à àà àà à(à àò òFiled:ó ó€February€23,€1998Ìà àà àà àà àà à(€€à àÌà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà à(à àMcNairy€CountyÌà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà à(€€à àHon.€Joe€H.€Walker,ÌGRAPEL€SIMPSON,à àà àà à(à àJudge€€à àÌà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Defendant„Appellant.à àà àà à(à àNo.€02S01„9702„CC„00010ÌÌòòÔ€(&ÔÌÌÌFor€Plaintiff„Appelleeóó:à àà àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendant„Appellantóó:ÌÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà àà àà àà àà àLloyd€R.€Tatumà àÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àà àà àTatum€&€TatumÌNashville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àà àTatum€BuildingÌÙ€=ÙœßR€./+A1-j|LË` à. `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àà àHenderson,€TennesseeÌMichael€E.€MooreÌSolicitor€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌKenneth€W.€RuckerÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌElizabeth€T.€RiceÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌTwenty„Fifth€Judicial€DistrictÌSomerville,€TennesseeÌÌEd€McDanielÌAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneraÔ€(XÔlÌSelmer,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àÌÑ , ÑÑ ` ÑÌAFFIRMEDà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€J.ÇÓ` Ü‚Xh—XÓÓÓà àBased€on€a€confidential€informantððs€tip,€police€stopped€the€defendantððsÏvehicle.€€A€consensual€search€of€her€person€revealed€drugs.€€The€issue€in€thisÏappeal€is€whether€the€tip,€as€corroborated€by€independent€police€work,€exhibitedÏsufficient€indicia€of€reliability€to€satisfy€the€two„pronged× ƒ0 ××  ×€constitutional€test€ofÏreliability€and€provide€reasonable€suspicion€to€justify€the€investigatoryÏstop.à àWe€hold€that€it€did€and€therefore€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€ofÏCriminal€Appeals€upholding€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€defendantððs€motion€toÏsuppress.ÌÌÌà@ àò òòòFACTUAL€BACKGROUNDóóó óÌà àTestifying€at€the€suppression€hearing€in€this€case,€Officer€Rodney€WeaverÏof€the€McNairy€County€Sheriffððs€Department€and€Drug€Task€Force€said€that€heÏreceived€a€call€from€a€confidential€informant€at€approximately€3:30€p.m.€onÏDecember€30,€1994,€that€the€defendant,€Grapel€Simpson,€and€another€person,ÍJimmy€Brumley,× ƒ1 ××  ×€were€transporting€100€dilaudid€pills€from€Memphis€to€McNairyÏCounty.€€The€informant€related€that€the€defendant€and€Brumley€were€travelingÏfrom€Memphis€on€Highway€64€in€a€two„door,€cream€or€beige€colored€OldsmobileÏand€would€arrive€in€Selmer€ð ðany€minute.ðð€€The€informant€did€not€state€which€of€theÏtwo€would€be€driving€the€vehicle.€€Though€he€did€not€explicitly€say€that€theÏinformant€previously€had€given€information€resulting€in€arrests€and€convictions,Ñ€3ÑÇOfficer€Weaver€said€he€knew€the€informant€ð ðthrough€previous€contacts€as€aÏconfidential€informant.ðð€€Officer€Weaver€acknowledged€that€the€informantÏpreviously€had€been€convicted€of€a€felony,€but€said€that€he€considered€theÏinformation€reliable,€related€it€to€McNairy€County€Sheriff€Paul€Ervin,€andÏproceeded€to€Highway€64.ÌÌà àSheriff€Ervin€arrived€first€at€Highway€64€and€identified€Brumley€and€theÏdefendant€coming€in€from€the€west€in€the€vehicle€described€by€the€informant.€ÏBased€upon€the€tip€and€his€corroboration€of€it,€Sheriff€Ervin€stopped€the€vehicle.€ÏOfficer€Weaver€arrived€about€three€minutes€thereafter€and€questioned€separatelyÏthe€defendant€and€her€companion.€€Each€claimed€that€they€were€returning€fromÏMemphis,€but€they€gave€inconsistent€responses€about€the€purpose€of€the€trip.€ÏThe€defendant€told€Officer€Weaver€that€they€had€taken€her€niece€back€toÏMemphis,€while€Brumley€said€they€had€driven€to€Memphis€alone.€Officer€WeaverÏthen€told€the€defendant€that€they€had€information€she€was€transporting€illegalÏdrugs,€to€which€the€defendant€replied,€ð ðWell,€you€can€look.€€You€can€search.€€IÍdonððt€have€anything.ðð€€Brumley,€who€had€been€driving€the€car,€also€consented€toÏthe€search.€€The€officers€proceeded€to€search€the€car,€but€the€search€revealedÏnothing.€€ÌÌà àOfficer€Weaver€then€asked€the€defendant€if€she€had€any€drugs€on€herÏperson.€€Simpson€responded,€ð ðNo.€€You€can€look€all€you€want.ðð€€Officer€WeaverÏreplied€ð ðWell,€you€donððt€mind€us€looking€then,€if€you€hadnððt€got€anything€to€hide,ððÏand€the€defendant€replied€ð ðYeah,€sure.ðð€€Ruth€Travis,€a€female€dispatcher,€whoÏpreviously€had€been€summoned€to€the€scene€arrived€less€than€five€minutes€later.€ÏTravis,€the€director€and€dispatcher€of€E„911,€previously€had€been€employed€byÏthe€Sheriffððs€Department€and€had€conducted€body€searches€on€other€occasions.€ÏTravis€escorted€the€defendant€to€an€area€behind€a€patrol€car€which€had€beenÏparked€on€the€opposite€side€of€the€highway.€€The€defendant€removed€her€coatÏand€Travis€placed€it€in€the€seat€of€the€patrol€car.€€Travis€proceeded€to€search€theÏdefendant`s€person.€€Eventually,€claiming€that€she€was€cold,€the€defendantÏreached€for€her€coat.€€When€Travis€told€the€defendant€that€she€would€first€have€toÍsearch€the€coat€before€the€defendant€could€put€it€on,€the€defendant€told€TravisÏthat€there€were€drugs€in€the€pocket€of€the€coat.€€The€defendant€offered€to€payÏTravis€if€she€would€not€tell€the€other€officers€about€the€drugs.€€Travis€seized€theÏcoat€and€called€for€Officer€Weaver.€€One€hundred€dilaudid€pills€were€discoveredÏin€the€defendantððs€coat€pocket.ÌÌà àThe€defendant€also€testified€at€the€suppression€hearing€and€denied€givingÏthe€officers€permission€to€search€either€her€car× ƒ4 ××  ×€or€her€person.€€She€also€deniedÏoffering€to€pay€Travis€to€keep€quiet€about€the€drugs,€and€said€the€reason€she€hadÏtold€Travis€about€the€drugs€was€to€avoid€having€to€remove€her€clothing€whileÏstanding€alongside€the€highway€on€a€cold€day€with€four€or€five€male€officers€onÏthe€other€side€of€the€road.ÌÌà àBased€upon€the€proof€summarized€above,€the€trial€court€denied€theÏdefendantððs€motion€to€suppress€finding€ð ðthat€sufficient€probable€cause€supportedÍthe€initial€stop€of€the€vehicle€in€which€the€defendant€was€a€passenger.ðð€€ByÏdenying€the€motion€to€suppress,€the€trial€court€implicitly€rejected€the€defendantððsÏclaim€that€she€did€not€consent€to€the€search€of€her€person€or€vehicle.× ƒ5 ××  ×€€Upon€theÏtrial€courtððs€denial€of€her€motion€to€suppress,€the€defendant€pled€guilty€toÏpossession€of€dilaudid,€a€Schedule€II€drug,€with€intent€to€deliver€and€sell,€butÏreserved€the€right€to€appeal€as€a€certified€question€of€law€the€denial€of€her€motionÏto€suppress.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€òòSeeóó,€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37(b)(2).ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€motionÍto€suppress,€finding€the€confidential€informantððs€tip,€along€with€the€policeÏcorroboration,€sufficiently€reliable€to€satisfy€the€two„pronged€test€and€establishÏreasonable€suspicion€to€render€the€stop€valid€under€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€88ÏS.Ct.€1868,€20€L.Ed.2d€889€(1968).€€In€addition,€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏfound€that€the€defendant€voluntarily€consented€to€the€search€of€both€her€vehicleÏand€her€person.€Thereafter,€we€granted€the€defendant€permission€to€appeal,€andÏfor€the€reasons€that€follow,€now€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals.ÌÌà@ àòòò òSTANDARD€OF€REVIEWó óóóà@ àÌà àIn€resolving€the€issues€in€this€appeal,€we€review€the€trial€courtððs€findings€as€Ïfollows:ÌÓÓà8 àQuestions€of€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€of€theÏevidence,€and€resolution€of€conflicts€in€the€evidence€are€mattersÏentrusted€to€the€trial€judge€as€the€trier€of€fact.€€The€party€prevailing€inÏthe€trial€court€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€theÏevidence€adduced€at€the€suppression€hearing€as€well€as€allÏreasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€that€may€be€drawn€from€thatÏevidence.€€So€long€as€the€greater€weight€of€the€evidence€supportsÏthe€trial€courtððs€findings,€those€findings€shall€be€upheld.€€In€otherÍwords,€a€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€in€a€suppression€hearing€will€beÏupheld€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€otherwise.ÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18,€23€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€application€of€the€law€to€theÏfacts€found€by€the€trial€court,€however,€is€a€question€of€law€which€this€CourtÏreviews€de€novo.€€òòState€v.€Yearganóó,€€___€S.W.2d€___,€___€(Tenn.€1997).ÌÌò òÌà@ àòòCONSTITUTIONALITY€OF€THE€STOPÌà@ àóóA.€Informantððs€Tip/Reasonable€Suspicionó óÌà àIn€this€Court,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€confidential€informantððs€tipÏdid€not€demonstrate€the€informantððs€veracity€or€basis€of€knowledge€as€required€byÏthis€Courtððs€decisions€in€òòState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€430€(Tenn.€1989)€andÏòòState€v.€œPulleyóó,›€863€S.W.2d€29€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€defendant€also€contends€thatÏbecause€the€reliability€of€the€tip€was€not€sufficiently€established,€the€tip€did€notÏgive€rise€to€a€reasonable€suspicion€justifying€an€investigatory€stop.€€The€StateÏresponds€that€given€the€specificity€of€the€information€provided€by€the€confidentialÏinformant,€the€timing€of€the€tip,€and€the€independent€police€corroboration,€the€tipÍwas€sufficiently€reliable€to€give€the€officers€reasonable€suspicion€to€initiate€theÏinvestigatory€stop.ÌÌà àWe€begin€our€analysis€of€this€issue€with€the€text€of€the€Fourth€Amendment€× ƒ7 ××  ×Ïto€the€United€States€Constitution€which€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àò òUnreasonable€searches€and€seizures.€„€ó óThe€right€of€theÏpeople€to€be€secure€in€their€persons,€houses,€papers,€and€effects,Ïagainst€unreasonable€searches€and€seizures,€shall€not€be€violated,Ïand€no€warrants€shall€issue,€but€upon€probable€cause,€supportedÏby€oath€or€affirmation,€and€particularly€describing€the€place€to€beÏsearched,€and€the€persons€or€things€to€be€seized.ÌÓÓÌSimilarly,€Article€1,€Section€7€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€guaranteesÌÓÓà8 àthat€the€people€shall€be€secure€in€their€persons,€houses,€papersÏand€possessions,€from€unreasonable€searches€and€seizures;€andÏthat€general€warrants,€whereby€an€officer€may€be€commanded€toÏsearch€suspected€places,€without€evidence€of€the€fact€committed,€orÏto€seize€any€person€or€persons€not€named,€whose€offences€are€notÏparticularly€described€and€supported€by€evidence,€are€dangerous€toÏliberty€and€ought€not€to€be€granted.ÌÓÓÌThe€purpose€of€the€prohibition€against€unreasonable€searches€and€seizuresÏunder€Ñ  Ñthe€Fourth€Amendment€is€to€ð ðsafeguard€the€privacy€and€security€ofÏindividuals€against€arbitrary€invasions€of€government€officials.ðð€€òòCamara€v.ÏMunicipal€Courtóó,€387€U.S.€523,€528,€87€S.Ct.€1727,€1730,€18€L.Ed.2d€930€(1967).€Ïð ð[A]rticle€I,€section€7€is€identical€in€intent€and€purpose€with€the€FourthÏAmendment.ðð€€òòState€v.€Downeyóó,€945€S.W.2d€102,€106€(Tenn.€1997),€quotingÏòòSneed€v.€Stateóó,€221€Tenn.€6,€13,€423€S.W.2d€857,€860€(1968).€€ÌÌà àConsequently,€the€Fourth€Amendment€and€Article€I,€Section€7€demonstrateÏa€ð ðstrong€preference€for€searches€conducted€pursuant€to€a€warrant.ðð€€òòOrnelas€v.ÏUnited€Statesóó,€517€U.S.€690,€116€S.Ct.€1657,€134€L.Ed.2d€911€(1996).€€UnderÏboth€the€federal€and€state€constitutions,€a€warrantless€search€or€seizure€isÏpresumed€unreasonable,€and€evidence€discovered€as€a€result€thereof€is€subjectÏto€suppression€unless€the€State€demonstrates€by€a€preponderance€of€theÏevidence€that€the€search€or€seizure€was€conducted€pursuant€to€one€of€theÏnarrowly€defined€exceptions€to€the€warrant€requirement.€€òòCoolidge€v.€NewÏHampshireóó,€403€U.S.€443,€454„55,€91€S.Ct.€2022,€2032,€29€L.Ed.2d€564€(1971);ÏòòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€293,€295€(Tenn.€1992).€€ÌÌà àThe€protections€embodied€in€both€the€Fourth€Amendment€and€Article€I,ÏSection€7€apply€to€seizures€of€the€person,€including€the€stop€of€the€defendantððsÏvehicle€in€this€case.€€€òòWhren€v.€United€Statesóó,€517€U.S.€806,€116€S.Ct.€1769,Ï1772,€135€L.Ed.2d€89€(1996);€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€440€U.S.€648,€654,€99€S.Ct.Ï1391,€1396,€59€L.Ed.2d€660€(1979);€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Hensleyóó,€469€U.S.ÏÑ ` Ñ221,€226,€105€S.Ct.€675,€679,€83€L.Ed.2d€604€(1985);€òòColorado€v.€Bannisteróó,€449ÏU.S.€1,€4€n.€3,€101€S.Ct.€42,€44€n.€3,€66€L.Ed.2d€1€(1980)€(When€an€officer€turnsÏon€his€blue€lights,€he€or€she€has€clearly€initiated€a€stop).€Because€the€stop€in€thisÏcase€was€not€conducted€pursuant€to€a€warrant,€it€was€presumptivelyÏunreasonable.€€However,€the€lower€courts€appropriately€denied€the€defendantððsÏmotion€to€suppress€because€the€evidence€demonstrates€that€the€seizure€wasÏeffected€pursuant€to€a€narrowly€defined€exception€to€the€warrant€requirement.ÌÌà àIn€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€21,€88€S.Ct.€1868,€1880,€20€L.Ed.2d€889Ï(1968),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€considered€whether€the€lawÍenforcement€practice€of€ð ðstop€and€friskðð€violated€the€proscriptions€of€the€FourthÏAmendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution.€€In€that€case,€a€police€officerÏbecame€suspicious€of€two€men€who€separately€and€repeatedly€walked€up€andÏdown€a€street€peering€into€a€store€window.€After€each€trek,€the€men€talked€to€aÏthird€man€up€the€street.€€The€officer,€after€observing€this€conduct€for€a€short€time,Ïfollowed€the€suspects,€stopped€and€frisked€them,€and€discovered€that€two€of€themÏwere€carrying€pistols.€€Charged€with€the€crime€of€carrying€a€concealed€weapon,ÏTerry€moved€to€suppress€the€evidence€on€the€basis€that€the€stop€and€frisk€wereÏunconstitutional.€The€Court€held€that€an€investigatory€stop€is€constitutionallyÏpermissible€if€the€officer€has€a€reasonable€suspicion,€supported€by€specific€andÏarticulable€facts,€that€a€criminal€offense€has€been€or€is€about€to€be€committed.€€AÏfrisk€is€warranted€under€òòTerryóó€if€the€police€officer€has€a€reasonable€suspicionÏsupported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts€that€the€suspect€is€armed.€€òòIdóó.,€392ÏU.S.€at€27,€88€S.Ct.€at€1883;€€òòWatkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€294.€€Police€also€mayÏconstitutionally€initiate€an€investigative€stop€of€an€automobile€if€the€police€haveÏreasonable€suspicion,€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,€that€theÍoccupants€of€the€vehicle€have€committed€a€criminal€offense€or€are€about€toÏcommit€a€criminal€offense.€€òòCortezóó,€449€U.S.€411,€417,€101€S.Ct.€690,€694,€66ÏL.Ed.2d€621€(1981);€òòProuseóó,€440€U.S.€at€663,€99€S.Ct.€at€1401;€òòYearganóó,€__ÏS.W.2d€at€__;€òòWatkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€294.ÌÌà àThe€facts€forming€the€basis€for€an€officerððs€reasonable€suspicion€need€notÏrest€upon€the€personal€knowledge€or€observation€of€the€officer.€€Indeed,€in€òòAdamsÏv.€Williamsóó,€407€U.S.€143,€147,€92€S.Ct.€1921,€1924,€32€L.Ed.2d€612€(1972),€theÏCourt€rejected€the€argument€ð ðthat€reasonable€cause€for€a€stop€and€frisk€can€onlyÏbe€based€on€the€officerððs€personal€observation,ðð× ƒ8 ××  ×€and€sustained€a€òòTerryóóÏinvestigative€stop€and€frisk€undertaken€on€the€basis€of€a€tip€given€in€person€by€aÏknown€informant€who€had€provided€information€in€the€past.€€In€that€case,€a€singleÏpolice€officer€was€on€patrol€duty€in€a€high€crime€area,€when,€at€approximatelyÏ2:15€a.m.,€a€person€known€to€the€officer€approached€his€cruiser€with€informationÏthat€an€individual€seated€in€a€nearby€vehicle€was€carrying€narcotics€and€had€aÍgun€at€his€waist.€€The€officer€called€for€assistance€and€then€approached€theÏvehicle€to€investigate€the€informantððs€report.€€The€officer€walked€up€to€the€parkedÏcar,€tapped€on€the€window,€and€asked€the€occupant€to€open€the€door.€€WhenÏWilliams,€the€occupant,€rolled€down€the€window€instead,€the€officer€reached€intoÏthe€car€and€removed€a€loaded€revolver€from€Williamsðð€waistband.€€€The€gun€wasÏnot€in€plain€view,€but€it€was€located€where€the€informant€had€indicated.€€WilliamsÏwas€arrested€for€unlawful€possession€of€a€handgun,€and€a€search€incident€to€theÏarrest€revealed€substantial€quantities€of€heroin€and€other€contraband.€€The€CourtÏupheld€the€constitutionality€of€the€investigative€stop€and€seizure€and€concludedÏthat€while€the€unverified€tip€may€have€been€insufficient€to€support€an€arrest€orÏsearch€warrant,€the€information€carried€sufficient€ð ðindicia€of€reliabilityðð× ƒ9 ××  ×€to€justifyÏan€investigative€stop.€€òòIdóó.€407€U.S.€at€147,€92€S.Ct.€at€1924.€ÌÌà àLikewise,€in€œòòPulleyóó,›€this€Court€upheld€the€constitutionality€of€anÍinvestigatory€stop€of€a€motor€vehicle€where€the€reasonable€suspicion€supportingÏthe€stop€was€derived€from€anonymous€tips.€€òòIdóó.,€863€S.W.2d€at€29.€€€There,€theÏofficer€received€a€radio€report€that€Terry€œPulley›€was€driving€a€yellow€Ford€L.T.D.€inÏthe€Village€Green€Trailer€Park,€was€armed€with€a€shotgun,€and€was€ð ðsupposed€toÏshoot€someone.ðð€€On€his€way€to€the€trailer€park,€the€officer€received€anotherÏsimilar,€urgent€report.€€The€officer€arrived€at€the€trailer€park€within€ten€to€twelveÏminutes€of€the€first€report€and€did€not€find€œPulley,›€with€whom€he€was€acquainted,Ïto€be€there.€€The€officer€drove€to€a€gas€station€about€an€eighth€of€a€mile€away€andÏfound€œPulley›€parked€in€a€yellow€Ford.€€The€officer€stopped€the€vehicle,Ïapproached€it,€€and€asked€œPulley›€to€get€out€of€the€car.€€At€that€point,€the€officer,Ïsaw€a€shotgun€lying€on€the€front€floorboard.€€œPulley›€was€arrested€for€driving€on€aÏrevoked€license,€for€second€offense€driving€under€the€influence€of€alcohol,€andÏfor€possessing€a€loaded€weapon,€a€hunting€knife,€and€a€billy€club€with€the€intentÏto€go€armed.€€œPulley›€filed€a€motion€to€suppress€which€was€granted€by€the€trialÏcourt€upon€a€finding€that€the€officer€lacked€reasonable€suspicion€to€believe€thatÏthe€defendant€had€or€would€commit€a€crime.€€The€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÍaffirmed€the€trial€courtððs€judgment.€€We€granted€permission€to€appeal€andÏreversed,€finding€that€the€officer€had€reasonable€suspicion€to€initiate€the€stop.ÌÌà àIn€so€holding,€we€recognized€the€inherent€danger€of€false€reports,€throughÏpolice€fabrication€or€from€vindictive€or€unreliable€informants,€which€is€presentÏwhen€an€investigative€stop€is€based€upon€the€tip€of€an€informant.ðð€€œòòPulleyóó,›€863ÏS.W.2d€at€31.€€We€emphasized,€however,€that€the€federal€and€state€courts€haveÏdeveloped€tests€for€assessing€the€reliability€of€informantsðð€tips€to€guard€againstÏthose€dangers.€€In€the€context€of€evaluating€the€reliability€of€an€informantððs€tip€forÏprobable€cause€determinations,€we€observed€that€Tennessee€law€requires€aÏshowing€of€both€the€informantððs€veracity€or€credibility€and€his€or€her€basis€ofÏknowledge.€òòIdóó.;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó,€òòJacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€at€436.€€€€While€independentÏpolice€corroboration€can€make€up€deficiencies,€ð ðeach€prong€represents€anÏindependently€important€consideration€that€must€be€separately€considered€andÍsatisfied€in€some€way.ðð× ƒ: ××  ×€€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àWe€concluded€that€the€òòJacuminóó€factors€of€credibility€and€basis€ofÏknowledge€are€helpful€in€determining€whether€a€tip€is€sufficiently€reliable€toÏsupport€a€finding€of€reasonable€suspicion.€€However,€in€so€holding,€weÏemphasized€that€ÌÓÓà8 à[r]easonable€suspicion€is€a€less€demanding€standard€than€probableÏcause€not€only€in€the€sense€that€reasonable€suspicion€can€beÏestablished€with€information€that€is€different€in€quantity€or€contentÏthan€that€required€to€establish€probable€cause,€òòbut€also€in€the€senseÏthat€reasonable€suspicion€can€arise€from€information€that€is€lessÏreliable€than€that€required€to€show€probable€cause.ÌÓÓÌœPulleyóó,›€863€S.W.2d€at€32,€quoting€òòAlabama€v.€Whiteóó,€496€U.S.€325,€330,€110ÏS.Ct.€2412,€2416,€110€L.Ed.2d€301€(1990)€(emphasis€added).€€In€other€words,€weÏrecognized€that€the€two„pronged€test€of€reliability€need€not€be€as€strictly€applied€ifÍthe€informantððs€tip€is€being€used€to€establish€reasonable€suspicion€rather€thanÏprobable€cause.€€We€emphasized€that€the€circumstances€in€which€a€tip€is€givenÏmay€sufficiently€relate€the€informantððs€basis€of€knowledge,€even€in€the€absence€ofÏan€explicit€statement€by€the€informant.€€œòòPulleyóó,›€863€S.W.2d€at€32.€€We€observedÏthat€if€an€informant€reports€an€incident€at€or€near€the€time€of€its€occurrence,€ð ðaÏcourt€can€often€assume€that€the€report€is€first„hand,€and€hence€reliable.ðð€€òòIdóó.€ÏMoreover,€if€a€call€is€contemporaneous€with€the€police€corroboration€of€the€tip,€itÏis€Ñ 4 Ñreasonable€to€infer€eyewitness€reliability€of€the€informant.€€òòIdóó.€€PoliceÏcorroboration€of€several€details€of€the€informantððs€report€may€also€satisfyÏunknowns€about€the€informantððs€credibility.€€òòIdóó.€€€Finally,€we€stated€that€theÏcontent,€quality,€and€quantity€of€the€information€possessed€by€police€must€beÏassessed€in€determining€whether€it€is€sufficiently€reliable€to€support€a€finding€ofÏreasonable€suspicion.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àApplying€the€foregoing€analysis€to€the€facts€in€œòòPulleyóó,›€we€concluded€thatÏð ð[t]he€timely€nature€of€the€report€indicated€an€eye„witness€basis€of€knowledge,Ïand€the€corroboration€of€many€of€the€informantððs€details,€although€not€all,Íprovided€some€basis€to€believe€that€the€informant€was€credible.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€34.€ÏAlthough€the€tip€in€œòòPulleyóó›€could€not€have€established€probable€cause€to€search€orÏarrest,€and€would€not€necessarily€furnish€reasonable€suspicion€under€allÏcircumstances,€we€concluded€that,€ð ðgiven€the€threat€of€violence,€the€police€hadÏððspecific€and€articulable€factsðð€to€warrant€the€investigatory€stopðð€in€that€case.€€òòIdóó.€ÌÌà àWe€must€apply€the€analysis€outlined€in€œòòPulleyóó›€to€determine€first€whetherÏthe€informantððs€tip€was€sufficiently€reliable€under€Tennessee€law€and€secondÏwhether€the€officer€had€reasonable€suspicion€to€stop€the€defendantððs€vehicle.€€WeÏfirst€consider€whether€the€credibility€of€the€informant€was€sufficiently€established.€ÏUnlike€œòòPulleyóó,›€the€informant€in€this€case€was€not€anonymous.€Officer€WeaverÏknew€the€confidential€informant€and€was€aware€that€he€or€she€was€a€convictedÏfelon.€€Officer€Weaver€testified,€however,€that€he€had€personally€ð ðinterview[ed]ððÏthe€informant€on€prior€occasions€and€had€previous€contacts€with€the€person€as€ð ðaÏconfidential€informant.ðð€€Though€there€is€no€explicit€statement€in€the€record€thatÏthe€informant€had€provided€reliable€information€in€the€past,€Officer€WeaverÏtestified€that€he€considered€the€tip€to€be€credible.€€In€addition,€several€of€the€factsÍsupplied€by€the€informant,€such€as€the€location€and€direction€of€travel,€the€time€ofÏarrival,€and€the€description€of€the€car€were€corroborated€by€police€before€the€stopÏwas€initiated€and€support€the€credibility€of€the€informant.€€A€showing€that€theÏinformantððs€data€is€reliable€may€satisfy€the€credibility€prong.€€òòState€v.€Ballardóó,€836ÏS.W.2d€560,€562€(Tenn.€1992).€€Moreover,€the€informantððs€statement€predictedÏthe€defendantððs€future€behavior.€€When€significant€aspects€of€an€informantððsÏpredictions€about€future€behavior€are€verified,€there€is€reason€to€believe€that€theÏinformant€is€honest€and€well€informed.€€òòWhiteóó,€496€U.S.€at€332,€110€S.Ct.€at€2417.€ÏThe€preexisting€relationship€between€Officer€Weaver€and€the€confidentialÏinformant,€as€well€as€the€independent€police€corroboration€of€the€facts€predictingÏthe€defendantððs€future€behavior€given€by€the€informant,€sufficiently€satisfy€theÏcredibility€prong€of€the€òòJacuminóó€test.ÌÌà àWith€respect€to€the€second€prong,€we€note€that€the€informant€in€this€caseÏmade€no€explicit€statement€conveying€his€or€her€basis€of€knowledge.€€However,Ïas€in€œòòPulleyóó,›€the€circumstances€under€which€the€tip€was€given€indicate€that€theÏinformant€was€an€eye„witness.€€Here,€the€confidential€informant€told€OfficerÍWeaver€that€the€car€in€which€the€defendant€was€traveling€was€due€to€arrive€inÏSelmer€ð ðany€minute.ðð€€The€officers€drove€immediately€to€Highway€64€and€foundÏthe€vehicle€described€by€the€informant,€occupied€by€the€defendant€and€Brumley,Ïthus€confirming€the€content€of€the€tip.€€The€circumstances€surrounding€the€tip,Ïincluding€the€police€corroboration€of€the€facts€supporting€an€eye„witness€basis€ofÏknowledge,€are€sufficient€to€establish€the€informantððs€basis€of€knowledge€underÏòòJacuminóó.× ƒ; ××  ×€€ÌÌà àAs€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€recently€has€recognized,€ÌÓÓà8 à[a]rticulating€precisely€what€ððreasonable€suspicionðð€and€ððprobableÏcauseðð€mean€is€not€possible.€€They€are€common€sense,Ïnontechnical€conceptions€that€deal€with€the€factual€and€practicalÏconsiderations€of€everyday€life€on€which€reasonable€and€prudentÏmen,€not€legal€technicians,€act.€ÌÓÓÌòòOrnelasóó,€___€U.S.€at€__,€116€S.Ct.€at€1661.€€In€evaluating€whether€a€police€officerÏhas€a€reasonable€suspicion,€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,€a€courtÍmust€consider€the€totality€of€the€circumstances.€òòWatkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€at€294;ÏòòCortezóó,€449€U.S.€at€417,€101€S.Ct.€at€695.€€Circumstances€relevant€to€theÏevaluation€include,€but€are€not€limited€to,€the€officerððs€personal€objectiveÏobservations,€information€obtained€from€other€police€officers€or€agencies,Ïinformation€obtained€from€citizens,€and€the€pattern€of€operation€of€certainÏoffenders.€A€court€must€also€consider€the€rational€inferences€and€deductions€thatÏa€trained€officer€may€draw€from€the€facts€and€circumstances€known€to€him„„inferences€and€deductions€that€might€well€elude€an€untrained€person.€€òòWatkinsóó,Ï827€S.W.2d€at€294;€€òòCortezóó,€449€U.S.€at€418,€101€S.Ct.€at€695;€òòTerryóó,€392€U.S.€atÑ€GÑÇ21,€88€S.Ct.€at€1880.€€ÌÓÓà8 àThe€officer,€of€course,€must€be€able€to€articulate€something€moreÏthan€an€inchoate€and€unparticularized€suspicion€or€hunch.€€TheÏFourth€Amendment€requires€some€minimal€level€of€objectiveÏjustification€for€making€the€stop.ÌÓÓÌòòSokolowóó,€490€U.S.€at€7„8,€109€S.Ct.€at€1585€(internal€citations€and€quotationsÏomitted).ÌÓÓà8 àÓÓÌà àEvaluating€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€of€this€case€in€light€of€the€well„settled€principles€of€law€set€forth€above,€we€conclude€that€the€stop€of€theÏdefendantððs€vehicle€was€supported€by€reasonable€suspicion.€€Having€establishedÏthe€informantððs€credibility€and€basis€of€knowledge,€the€information€provided€byÏthe€informant€was€that€the€defendant€was€transporting€illegal€drugs.€€Based€uponÏthat€information,€police€had€reasonable€suspicion€to€believe€that€a€criminalÏoffense€was€being€committed€by€the€occupants€of€the€vehicle.€€Therefore,€theÏinitial€stop€was€constitutionally€valid.ÌÌà@ àò òB.€Validity€of€Defendantððs€Consent€to€Searchó óÌÌà àThe€defendant€next€argues€that€the€motion€to€suppress€should€have€beenÏgranted€because€her€detention€during€the€subsequent€search€of€her€car€and€herÏperson€was€unreasonable€and€exceeded€the€scope€of€a€valid€òòTerryóó€stop,€therebyÏrendering€her€consent€to€these€searches€involuntary.€€The€State€asserts€theÏinvestigative€detention€was€reasonable,€and€the€search€of€her€person€andÏautomobile€were€constitutional€because€based€upon€consent.€€We€agree.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€stated€that€when€assessingÏwhether€a€detention€is€too€long€to€be€justified€as€an€investigative€stop,€the€properÏinquiry€is€whether€during€the€detention,€the€police€diligently€pursued€a€means€ofÏinvestigation€that€was€likely€to€confirm€or€dispel€their€suspicions€quickly.€€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Sharpeóó,€470€U.S.€675,€686,€105€S.Ct.€1568,€1575,€84€L.Ed.2d€605Ï(1985).€€Applying€that€standard€to€the€facts€in€this€case,€it€is€clear€the€detentionÏwas€not€excessive.€€When€Officer€Weaver€was€given€conflicting€stories€by€theÏdefendant€and€Brumley€about€the€purpose€of€their€trip€to€Memphis,€heÏimmediately€informed€them€that€the€police€had€information€that€they€wereÍtransporting€illegal€drugs.€€This€exchange€occurred€less€than€five€minutes€afterÏthe€stop€was€initiated.€The€defendant,€at€that€point€responded,€ð ðWell,€you€canÏlook.€€You€can€search.€€I€donððt€have€anything.ðð€€After€the€search€of€the€carÏrevealed€nothing,€Officer€Weaver€immediately€asked€the€defendant€if€she€hadÏanything€on€her€person.€€At€this€point,€the€stop€had€been€in€progress€forÏapproximately€ten€minutes.€€Again,€the€defendant€responded,€ð ðNo.€€You€can€lookÏall€you€want.ðð€€Officer€Weaver€detained€the€defendant€until€Travis€arrived€lessÏthan€five€minutes€later€to€conduct€the€body€search.€€The€contraband€wasÏdiscovered€during€this€search.€€Clearly,€the€police€diligently€pursued€a€means€ofÏinvestigation€that€was€likely€to€dispel€or€confirm€their€suspicions€òòquicklyóó.€€TheÏdetention€was€not€unreasonable.× ƒH ××  ×€€€ÌÌà àHaving€so€concluded,€we€also€reject€the€defendantððs€claim€that€herÍconsent× ƒQ ××  ×€was€involuntary.€€ð ðTo€pass€constitutional€muster,€consent€to€searchÏmust€be€unequivocal,€specific,€intelligently€given,€and€uncontaminated€by€duressÏor€coercion.ðð€€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€836€S.W.2d€530,€547€(Tenn.€1992).€€TheÏdefendantððs€unelicited€statements€of€consent€clearly€meet€this€standard.€€ÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONó óóóÌà àFor€the€reasons€stated€herein,€we€conclude€that€the€confidentialÏinformantððs€tip€as€corroborated€by€independent€police€work,€exhibited€sufficientÏindicia€of€reliability€to€satisfy€the€two„pronged€constitutional€test€of€reliability,€andÏprovided€reasonable€suspicion€to€justify€the€investigatory€stop.à àThe€ensuingÏsearch€which€resulted€in€the€seizure€of€contraband€was€based€upon€theÏdefendantððs€voluntary€consent€and€therefore€was€constitutionally€valid.€ÏAccordingly,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€upholdingÏthe€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress.ÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA€III,Ìà àà àà àà àà àJUSTICEÌÌÌò òConcur:ó óÌÌAnderson,€C.J.,ÌBirch,€Holder,€JJÌReid,€J.€„€Dissenting€by€Separate€OpinionÌœÌÇÖ€RÖØ ØÓ&€**XÐd&ÓÑ  ћрIÑÑ7€JÜJXXdÈXXdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ` Ü` ˜XÓÔ€SÔà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœ›à àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌœßJ€.T;+'b|§š` 0* `€@ÿJß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSON€ÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Plaintiff„Appellee,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€McNairy€CountyÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Hon.€Joe€H.€Walker,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€No.€02S01„9702„CC„00010ÌGRAPEL€SIMPSON,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Defendant„Appellant.à àà à(ÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòDISSENTING€OPINIONóóó óÌÌÌÌÓÓà àI€dissent€because€the€majorityððs€decision€representsÏa€further€erosion€of€constitutional€protection€againstÏunreasonable€searches€and€seizures.€€I€would€find€that€theÏinvestigative€stop€in€this€case€violates€the€Fourth€AmendmentÏto€the€Constitution€of€the€United€States€and€Article€I,ÍSection€7€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee,€and€reverse€theÏconviction.ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€29€(Tenn.€1993),€thisÏCourt,€following€òòState€v.€Terryóó,€392€U.S.€1,€88€S.Ct.€1868Ï(1968),€found€that€an€investigative€stop€by€police€officersÏwas€not€constitutionally€unreasonable€under€certain€limitedÏcircumstances.€€The€Court€in€òòPulleyóó€held:€€ð ðThus,€the€FourthÏAmendment€permits€an€investigative€stop€based€on€theÏcorroborated€tip€of€an€informant€in€circumstances€involving€anÏimmediate€threat€of€danger.ðð€€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€atÏ31.€€The€Court€further€stated:€€ð ðThe€whole€[United€StatesÏSupreme]€Court€thus€recognized€[in€òòTerryóó]€that€the€seriousnessÏof€the€criminal€threat€is€an€important€factor€in€determiningÏthe€reasonableness€of€a€police€response€and€the€reliabilityÏrequired€of€an€informantððs€tip.€€òòId.óó€at€33.€€€After€reviewingÏdecisions€from€other€states€which€had€applied€the€òòTerryóóÏholding,€this€Court€stated€further:€€ð ðThese€cases€show€thatÏthe€gravity€of€the€perceived€harm€is€a€crucial€element€inÏassessing€the€reasonableness€of€an€investigative€òòTerryóó€stop.ðð€ÍòòIdóó.€€Because€the€informantððs€tip€in€this€case€contains€noÏthreat€of€imminent€danger€or€other€exigent€circumstancesÏrequiring€immediate€action€by€the€police€officer,€it€does€notÏjustify€an€investigative€stop€under€òòTerryóó€and€òòPulleyóó.€ÏTherefore,€I€would€hold€the€investigative€stop€was€notÏjustified.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Yearganóó,€_____€S.W.2d€_____,€_____Ï(Tenn.€1997)€(Reid,€J.,€concurring)€[slip€op.€at€25„27];€òòStateÏv.€Bridgesóó,€_____€S.W.2d€_____,€_____€(Tenn.€1997)€(Reid,€J.,Ïconcurring€and€dissenting)€[slip€op.€at€10„12].ÌÌà àEven€if€we€assume€that€òòYearganóó€and€òòBridgesóó,€and€nowÏthe€decision€in€this€case,€permit€an€investigative€stop€whereÏthere€is€reasonable€suspicion€that€an€offense€not€involving€anÏimminent€danger€or€other€exigent€circumstance€is€beingÏcommitted,€the€stop€in€this€case€violates€the€constitutionalÏprohibitions€against€unreasonable€searches.€€Where,€as€in€thisÏcase,€the€suspicion€is€based€on€an€informantððs€tip,€there€mustÏbe€corroboration€of€the€informantððs€credibility€andÏcorroboration€of€the€informantððs€basis€of€knowledge.€€òòState€v.ÏPulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€31;€majority€opinion€at€_____€[slip€op.Íat€12].€€The€majorityððs€struggle€to€find€any€corroboration€ofÏthe€informantððs€tip€in€this€case€was€patently€unsuccessful.ÌÌà àThe€majority€finds€that€the€informantððs€credibilityÏwas€established€by€the€officerððs€œð ðpreexisting›€relationshipððÏwith€the€informant€and€ð ðindependent€police€corroboration€ofÏthe€facts€predicting€the€defendantððs€future€behavior.ðð€ÏMajority€opinion€at€_____€[slip€op.€at€15].€€The€record€doesÏnot€show€the€nature€or€extent€of€the€œpreexisting›€relationshipÏbetween€the€officer€and€the€informant.€€It€does€not€show€thatÏthe€informant€previously€had€supplied€reliable€information€toÏthe€officer.€€It€shows€only€that€the€informant€was,€in€theÏofficerððs€conclusive€language,€a€ð ðconfidential€informant.ðð€ÏThere€is€in€the€record€no€objective€fact€indicatingÏcredibility.€€The€fact€that€the€informant€was€a€convictedÏfelon€militates€against€a€finding€that€he€was€a€reliableÏinformant.€€ÌÌà àThe€majorityððs€finding€of€independent€policeÏcorroboration€is€equally€illusory.€€The€ð ðcorroborationðð€reliedÍupon€was€the€description€of€the€vehicle€in€which€the€defendantÏwas€travelling,€that€the€vehicle€was€travelling€on€Highway€64Ïtowards€Selmer€and€that€it€would€arrive€at€Selmer€ð ðanyÏminute.ðð€€From€this,€the€majority€finds€that€ð ðthe€informantððsÏstatement€predicted€the€defendantððs€future€behavior.ðð€€On€thisÏpoint,€the€majority€relies€upon€òòAlabama€v.€Whiteóó,€496€U.S.Ï325,€110€S.€Ct.€2412€(1990),€which€does€not€support€theirÏposition.€€In€that€case€an€officer€of€the€Montgomery,€AlabamaÏPolice€Department€received€a€telephone€tip€that€the€defendantÏWhite€would€be€leaving€a€particular€address€at€a€particularÏtime€in€a€particular€vehicle€and€would€arrive€at€a€particularÏdestination.€€The€informant€told€the€officer€that€White€wouldÏbe€in€possession€of€an€ounce€of€cocaine€in€a€brown€attacheÏcase.€€Thereafter,€the€officers€proceeded€to€the€departureÏaddress€where€they€observed€the€described€vehicle€in€theÏparking€lot.€€They€observed€White€leave€the€building,€get€inÏthe€vehicle,€and€drive€the€most€direct€route€towards€theÏdestination€the€informant€had€stated.€€When€stopped€short€ofÏthat€destination,€she€consented€to€a€search.€€The€officersÏfound€marijuana€in€the€described€brown€attache€case,€and,Íwhile€being€processed€at€the€police€station€after€her€arrest,Ïthe€officers€found€three€milligrams€of€cocaine€in€her€purse.€ÏThe€court€upheld€the€stop€and€subsequent€search€in€that€case,Ïbased€on€the€independent€corroboration€by€the€police€ofÏsignificant€aspects€of€the€informantððs€predictions.€€ConcedingÏthat€it€was€a€close€case,€the€Supreme€Court€noted€that€the€tipÏð ðcontained€a€range€of€details€relating€not€just€to€easilyÏobtained€facts€and€conditions€existing€at€the€time€of€the€tip,Ïbut€to€future€actions€of€third€parties€ordinarily€not€easilyÏpredicted.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€€œ332,€110€S.Ct.€at€2417›€(quoting€òòIllinoisÏv.€Gatesóó,€462€U.S.€213,€245,€103€S.Ct.€2317,€2335„36€(1983)).€ÏThe€court€in€òòWhiteóó€placed€special€significance€on€theÏinformantððs€ability€to€predict€the€defendantððs€futureÏbehavior.ÌÌÓÓà8 à[I]t€demonstrated€inside€information€„€aÏspecial€familiarity€with€respondentððsÏaffairs.€€The€general€public€would€haveÏhad€no€way€of€knowing€that€respondentÏwould€shortly€leave€the€building,€get€inÏthe€described€car,€and€drive€the€mostÏdirect€route€to€Dobeyððs€Motel.€€BecauseÏonly€a€small€number€of€people€areÏgenerally€privy€to€an€individualððsÏitinerary,€it€is€reasonable€for€police€toÍbelieve€that€a€person€with€access€to€suchÏinformation€is€likely€to€also€have€accessÏto€reliable€information€about€thatÏindividualððs€illegal€activities€.€.€.€.€ÏWhen€significant€aspects€of€the€callerððsÏpredictions€were€verified,€there€wasÏreason€to€believe€not€only€that€the€callerÏwas€honest,€but€also€that€he€was€wellÏinformed,€at€least€well€enough€to€justifyÏthe€stop.€€€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€ÌÌà àThe€tip€relied€upon€in€the€instant€case€demonstratedÏno€ð ðinside€informationðð€and€gave€no€indication€that€theÏinformant€was€honest€or€well€informed€about€the€defendantððsÏaffairs.€€The€facts€relied€upon,€an€identified€automobileÏproceeding€along€Highway€64€approaching€Selmer,€demonstratesÏno€knowledge€not€equally€available€to€dozens€of€other€persons.€ÏConsequently,€it€provides€no€support€for€the€majorityððsÏfinding€that€the€informant€was€credible.€€ÌÌà àThe€record€contains€no€evidence€for€the€finding€thatÏthe€informantððs€information€was€reliable,€the€second€prong€ofÏthe€test€to€determine€if€the€officer€had€reasonable€suspicion.€ÍThe€majority€acknowledges€that€the€informant€did€not€discloseÏto€the€officer€the€basis€of€his€tip,€but€the€majority,Ïsomewhat€incredibly,€finds€that€the€tip€that€the€automobile€inÏwhich€the€defendant€was€riding€would€arrive€in€Selmer€ð ðanyÏminuteðð€and€that€the€automobile€did€in€fact€arrive€in€SelmerÏindicates€that€the€informant€was€an€ð ðeyewitness.ðð€€AnÏeyewitness€to€what?€€That€the€automobile€was€legally€precedingÏalong€Highway€64?€€Certainly.€€That€the€defendant€was€inÏpossession€of€illegal€drugs?€€Hardly!€€A€basis€of€knowledgeÏcannot€be€inferred€from€the€corroboration€of€facts€relatedÏonly€to€innocent€activity€or€matters€open€and€obvious€toÏanyone.€€òòState€v.€Bridgesóó,€_____€S.W.2d€at€_____€(Reid,€J.,Ïconcurring€and€dissenting)€[slip€op.€at€9].ÌÌà àThe€facts€of€this€case€closely€parallel€those€inÏòòState€v.€Colemanóó,€791€S.W.2d€504€(Tenn.€Cr.€App.€1989),€inÏwhich€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€found€the€investigativeÏstop€was€illegal.€€In€òòColemanóó,€an€officer€of€the€RobertsonÏCounty€Drug€Task€Force€received€a€tip€from€an€informant€whomÏhe€had€previously€arrested€and€from€whom€he€had€never€obtainedÍconfidential€information€in€any€police€investigation.€€TheÏinformant€told€the€officer€that€between€2€p.m.€and€2:30€p.m.Ïon€August10,€1988,€a€white€female,€25€to€35€years€old,€withÏthe€first€name€of€ð ðCarla,ðð€would€be€driving€an€older€modelÏblack€Monte€Carlo€travelling€from€Davidson€County€to€RobertsonÏCounty€on€Highway€431€South€and€that€she€would€proceed€to€aÏlocation€on€Washington€Road.€€According€to€the€informant,Ïð ðCarlaðð€was€in€possession€of€several€pounds€of€marijuana.€ÏThere€was€no€verification€of€the€credibility€of€the€informantÏor€the€reliability€of€the€Ñ ° Ñinformation€provided.€€The€onlyÏindependently€corroborated€fact€was€that€the€car€wasÏregistered€to€Carla€Coleman,€which€the€Court€found€wasÏinsufficient€to€justify€the€stop.€€In€òòPulleyóó,€this€CourtÏspecifically€approved€the€holding€in€òòColemanóó€œthat,›ÌÌÓÓà8 àwhile€further€independent€corroborationÏmay€generally€make€up€any€deficiencies€inÏan€informantððs€tip,€neither€theÏinformantððs€reliability€nor€his€basis€forÏknowledge€was€sufficiently€substantiatedÏin€this€case€to€establish€the€necessaryÏð ðreasonable€and€articulable€suspicionððÏrequired€by€our€state€constitution.ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€31„32€(quoting€òòState€v.ÏColemanóó,€791€S.W.2d€at€507).ÌÌà àSimilarly,€in€the€case€before€the€Court,€a€tip€fromÏan€informant€of€unproved€reliability€that€a€woman€named€GrapelÏSimpson€would€be€driving€a€cream€colored€Oldsmobile€on€HighwayÏ64€from€Memphis€to€Selmer€are€not€grounds€for€reasonableÏsuspicion€that€an€offense€was€being€committed.€€ÌÌà àThe€defendant€contends€further€that€even€if€the€stopÏwas€justified,€there€was€no€legal€basis€for€the€search€whichÏdisclosed€possession€of€illegal€drugs.€€Necessary€deference€toÏthe€finder€of€fact€forecloses€reconsideration€of€theÏconclusion€that€the€defendant€consented€to€the€search.€€Tenn.ÏR.€App.€P.€13(e).€€However,€the€circumstances€of€this€caseÏdramatically€demonstrate€the€ð ðdanger€of€false€reports,€throughÏpolice€fabrication€or€from€vindictive€or€unreliableÏinformants.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€31.€€TheÏmajority€decision€permits€the€body€search€of€an€innocentÏcitizen€on€the€side€of€a€major€highway€in€full€view€of€theÏtravelling€public€upon€the€uncorroborated€snitch€of€aÏconvicted€felon.€€Surely,€the€decision€is€inimical€to€ArticleÏI,€Section€7€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee,€which€declaresÏð ðthe€people€shall€be€secure€in€their€persons,€houses,€papers,Ïand€possessions,€from€unreasonable€searches€and€seizures.ððÌÌà àI€would€hold€the€stop€invalid€and€reverse€theÏconviction.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àReid,€J.€œÔ€(Ô›