ÿWPC¶ žo|Šæù×ìL›N.K6ÎFø‰N; 3XÏú>!Úµm¹Ý;¦eÊŒÄ"òŸ?ó9P–2hÛ;?Ú¢‘>¦8‘Ü éY \yÚÛÕ§;«P-ë"ïb}}‘6¿è®†ýÂBP£ øyúµFëÙÅ$jR˜¶[Zò–øð0ŠøQÀTÚp„Ii/nºN):õóð%¨-[ƒqnLhTu¬Rüƒ:tXNŸl™9¨$^´z|D]U½r\t±)³öáÎEºo‡Õ‰b«j¬CPöZJõ,ã8–ðl6×…žÕL .-¥=Žß2UÉsë F3w3²+:ìÇæerSQm·ÉøÌEÿî•!—þÓl¥r¯Z"úÉH2UNI %— 0(4ÅÙèw@è(U:+ 0Cen¨« AQ« UBü >  A U:N N N N N N N N N N N N N N ƈ 0DN 0D’ 0DÖ Ö D/ BI Bf D3ƒ˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0vLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡Ž~‚%ô\3|xì ÇÈÉÊËDÌÓ€ÖV×îâÓ€ì ùÝ ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ XÍ5XXXÔÔ€ ÒX XÍ5ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ XÍ5X ÒÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€3,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular(2C$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý«ô\  `*Times New RomanTTôôCô\  PŽ6QôP"ÝÆÿA€ArialTTomanTTXXaÝÆÿptQXpô\  `*Times New RomanTT¼¼^ô\  PŽ6Q¼P !"#%Cþÿ<< Cÿÿô\  `*Times New RomanTT ùÝ ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XÍ5XXXÔÔ€ÒXXÍ5ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XÍ5XÒÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€3,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó Ý ƒ C)ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ8°ÒÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°œX<ÓÔ  ÔÔ@  ÔÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚÔA  ÔÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?Ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial RegularƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd&&&&'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ£°ÒòòÔ€»x»XXÔÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑñÌñßr€ (<,(j 8` `€€@EÚ±` 8ttxP°ð  rßñÌñà@¯ ¯ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° ÐÌà@  )àAT€NASHVILLEˆÌÌÌÌDONNIE€G.€SMITHà h àà À àà  à}à p àPUTNAM€CIRCUIT€€€€€€€€€€Ð  ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}à p àNo.€€Below€NJ„6308€€€Ð  p Ðà ` àPlaintiff/Appelleeà h àà À àà  à}Ð 0 € Ðvs.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}€Ð @  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}ÌHERITAGE€FORD„LINCOLN„à À àà  à}à p àHon.€€John€A.€TurnbullÐ `°  ÐMERCURY,INC.,HARLEYSVILLEà  à}à p àJudge€€€€€Ð pÀ  ÐMUTUAL€INSURANCE€COMPANYà  à}Ð €Ð  Ðà ` àDefendants/Appelleesà À àà  à}à p àNo.€€01S01„9712„CV„00274Ð à Ðandà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à}Ð  ð ÐDINA€TOBIN,Director€of€the€Division€}€€€€à p à€€€€€€€Ð ° Ðof€Workersðð€Compensationà À àà  à}Ð À ÐTENNESSEE€DEPARTMENT€OFà  à}Ð Ð  ÐLABOR,€SECOND€INJURY€FUND€à  à}ñÅñà p àMODIFIED€IN€PART;ñÅñÐ à0 Ðà ` àDefendant/Appellantà À àà  à}à p àñÇñVACATED€IN€PARTñÇññÆñAFFIRMEDà x àñÆñÐ ð@ ÐÌà@(àJUDGMENT€ORDERˆÌÌÌÓ€Óà ` àà ¸ àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,€including€theÏorder€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€theÏPanel's€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÏlaw,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference.Ìà ` àà ¸ àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€Memorandum€Opinion€ofÏthe€Panel€should€be€accepted€and€approved;€andÌà ` àà ¸ àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€is€madeÏthe€judgment€of€the€Court.ÌÓ šX°œXÓà ` àà ¸ àCosts€will€be€paid€by€defendantñÈñs/ñÈññÉñañÉññÈñ/añÈñppellñÊñeesñÊññËñantñËñ,€€for€which€execution€mayÏissue€if€necessary.ÌÓ€Óà ` àà ¸ àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€on€December€3,€1998.Ô"USú ú, úÔÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àPER€CURIAMÌóóÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ h;¸69 ÐñÖñÐ  ° ÐñÖññ×ñÑTR[  AØ'[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÒ8£ÒÖ€ÿÿÖÑ  ÑÔ&  ÔÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#šX<ÓÔ‡¼ÿ{¼»»xÔÔ‡¼©Î ¼¼¼ÿ{ÔÔ  ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌñ×ññìñßt€(>.*jx`ÿ` `€€@E ×` 8ttxPØð È tßñìññ×ñÌñ×ññìññìññ×ñSPECIAL€WORKERS'€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌÌñ×ññìññâñßr€(<,(j 8` `€€@E@ ` 8ttxPx ð  rßñâññìññ×ñAT€NASHVILLEÌ(June€29,€1998€Session)ÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓÌÌDONNIE€G.€SMITH,à h àà À àà  àà p à)à È àPUTNAM€CIRCUITÐ ` ° Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à)Ìñ×ññ×ñà ` àà ¸ àPlaintiff„Appellee,à  àà p à)à È àHon.€John€Turnbull,Ð ŒÜ  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à)à È àJudge.Ð ¢ò  Ðv.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à)Ð ¸  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à)€€€à È àNo.01S01„9712„CV„00274Ð Î  ÐHERITAGE€FORD„LINCOLN„à  àà p à)Ð ä4 ÐMERCURY,€INC.,€HARLEYSVILLEà p à)Ð úJ ÐMUTUAL€INSURANCE€COMPANY,à p à)Ð ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à)Ìà ` àà ¸ àDefendants„Appellees,à  àà p à)Ð <Œ Ðandà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à)Ð R¢ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à)ÌDINA€TOBIN,€Director€of€the€Division€à p à)Ð ~Î Ðof€Workers'€Compensation,à À àà  àà p à)Ð ”ä ÐTENNESSEE€DEPARTMENT€OFà  àà p à)Ð ªú ÐLABOR,€SECOND€INJURY€FUND,à  àà p à)Ð À Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à)Ìà ` àà ¸ àDefendant„Appellant.à  àà p à)Ð ì < ÐÌÌòòFor€Defendant„Appellantóó:à À àà  àà p àòòFor€Defendants„Appellees:óóÐ .$~ ÐÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà h àà À àà  àJ.€Michael€MorganÐ Z&ª! ÐAttorney€General€&€Reporterà À àà  àOrtale,€Kelley,€Herbert€&€CrawfordÐ p'À"  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àNashville,€TennesseeÌKathleen€W.€StrattonÌSandra€E.€KeithÌAssistant€Attorneys€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<ÓòòM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€NóóÐ  0p+( ÐÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓÌÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<ÓòòMembers€of€Panelóó:Ð L2œ-* ÐÌFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,€Associate€Justice,€Supreme€CourtÌWilliam€H.€Inman,€Senior€JudgeÌJoe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓÐü:L62 ÐMODIFIED€IN€PARTÌVACATED€IN€PART€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Loser,€JudgeÓ {ÀÓÌÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<ÓòòMEMORANDUM€OPINIONóóÔ'°ÔÓ ö€{ÀÓÐ ­ý ÐÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?Óà ` àà ¸ àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€of€findingsÏof€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€The€issues€on€appeal€are€(1)€whether€the€trialÏcourt€erred€in€its€apportionment€of€permanent€total€disability€benefits€and€(2)Ïwhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€ordering€the€Second€Injury€Fund€(the€Fund)€toÏreimburse€the€employer€in€the€event€the€injured€employee€were€to€die€beforeÏreaching€age€sixty„five.€€As€discussed€below,€the€panel€recommends€theÏapportionment€of€disability€benefits€be€modified€and€the€order€that€the€FundÏreimburse€the€employer€be€vacated.Ìà ` àà ¸ àIn€April€of€1996,€the€employee€or€claimant,€Donnie€Smith,€sufferedÏa€compensable€back€injury,€while€working€as€a€mechanic€for€Heritage€Ford„¼Lincoln„Mercury,€Inc.€€The€injury€was€described€by€the€trial€judge€as€"reruptureÏof€a€previously€herniated€disk€at€the€L5„S1€level."Ìà ` àà ¸ àThe€claimant€had€suffered€three€previous€disabling€injuries.€€OnÏMay€7,€1986,€while€employed€by€Russell€Stover€Candies,€the€claimant€sufferedÏa€knee€injury,€for€which€he€received€a€lump€sum€award€of€$7,500.00,€whichÏequates€to€one€based€on€11.16€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole.Ìà ` àà ¸ àIn€1987,€he€hurt€his€back€while€working€on€a€car€at€home.€€For€thatÏinjury,€he€was€treated€by€Dr.€G.€William€Davis,€who€performed€a€lumbarÏlaminectomy€and€disk€excision€in€December€of€1987.€€After€recovering€fromÏthat€injury,€he€worked€approximately€fifty„five€hours€per€week€as€a€machineÏgrinder€for€a€period€of€approximately€three€years,€then€as€a€mechanic€for€ValleyÏFord€in€Sparta€until€April€of€1995,€when€he€began€working€for€Heritage.€€HisÏmedical€impairment€from€this€prior€back€injury€was€10€percent€to€the€wholeÏbody,€according€to€three€different€experts.Ìà ` àà ¸ àIn€addition,€the€claimant€suffered€a€gradually€occurring€injury€to€hisÏshoulder€in€1988,€which€resulted€in€surgery€in€1995,€and€from€which€he€receivedÏa€five€percent€medical€impairment€rating€from€his€doctor.€€The€evidence€doesÏnot€establish€that€the€1987€back€injury€or€the€1988€shoulder€injury€was€work„¼related€or€that€there€was€any€award€of€benefits€for€either.Ìà ` àà ¸ àFollowing€his€most€recent€injury,€which€is€the€subject€of€thisÏlitigation,€the€claimant€again€sought€the€services€of€Dr.€Davis,€who€diagnosedÏa€disk€rupture€at€the€site€of€the€previous€surgery€and€a€free€fragment€that€wasÏimpinging€on€the€nerve€root.€€The€doctor€recommended€a€diskectomy€and€fusionÏsurgery€at€the€L5„S1€interspace.€€During€surgery,€air€was€entrained€into€theÐ ‘8á33 Ðblood€flow,€resulting€in€the€claimant€being,€for€all€practical€purposes,€paralyzed€from€the€nipples€down.Ìà..àà..àIt€is€undisputed€that€the€claimant€is€permanently€and€totally€disabled,€that€Heritage€had€knowledge€of€his€prior€disabilities€to€the€shoulder,€knee€and€back€and€that€the€most€recent€injury€is€compensable€under€the€Workers'€Compensation€Laws€of€this€state.€€The€trial€judge€found€the€employee's€pre„existing€disability€from€the€back,€shoulder€and€knee€injuries€to€be€55%€to€the€body€as€a€whole€and€from€the€most€recent€injury€and€necessary€surgery€to€be€"100%€total€permanent€disability."€€He€found€"that€the€total€amount€of€plaintiff's€disabilities€are€155%,€155%."Ìà..àà..àThe€trial€court€ordered€the€employer€and€its€insurer€to€pay€benefits€due€the€employee€at€the€agreed€compensation€rate€for€the€first€45%€of€the€total€of€the€weeks€through€his€age€65,€the€Fund€to€pay€the€final€55%€of€such€benefits€through€his€age€65€and€that€"if€death€shortens€the€time€of€permanent€disability€payments€to€be€made,€then€(the€Fund)€will€pay€over€to€the€employer€its€55%€share€of€permanent€disability€payments€made€by€the€employer."Ìà..àà..àAppellate€review€is€de€novo€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„224(e)(2).€€òòJones€v.€Sterling€Last€Corp.óó,€962€€S.W.2d€€469€(Tenn.€1998).€€Conclusions€of€law€are€subject€to€de€novo€review€on€appeal€without€any€presumption€of€correctness.€€òòSpencer€v.€Towson€Moving€and€Storage,€Inc.óó,€922€€S.W.2d€€508€€(Tenn.€1996).€€Extent€of€vocational€disability€is€a€question€of€fact.€€òòCollins€v.€Howmet€Corp.óó,€970€€S.W.2d€€941€(Tenn.€1998).Ìà..àà..àThe€employer€and€its€insurer€contend€the€claimant€was€not€rendered€permanently€and€totally€disabled€as€a€result€of€the€most€recent€injury,€but€because€of€the€fusion€surgery,€and€that€the€fusion€surgery€was€necessitated€by€the€prior€back€injury.€€They€rely€on€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Davis€that€the€medical€impairment€from€the€second€injury€was€only€slightly€greater€than€the€impairment€from€the€prior€injury€and€on€the€following€excerpts€from€the€deposition€of€Dr.€Manuel€Robert€Weiss,€who€examined€the€claimant:Ìà..àà..àQ.€€Okay,€Doctor,€assume€that€at€the€time€of€the€surgery€by€Dr.€Davis€where€he€redid€the€disk€repair,€that€is,€we're€talking€about€the€second€surgery,€if€it€had€not€been€for€the€complication€that€occurred€and€caused€Donnie's€paralysis,€you€would€have€still€given€and€assigned€the€same€percentage€that€he€had€before€that€surgery;€that€is,€the€10€percent€impairment;€is€that€correct?Ìà..àà..àA.€€If€he€had€never€had€the€second€surgery?Ìà..àà..àQ.€€No,€sir.€€If€he€had€had€the€second€surgery€and€had€not€had€a€complication.Ìà..àà..àA.€€Oh,€then€he€might€have€received€an€additional€one€or€two€percent€for€the€second€operation.€€I€think€the€guidelines€are€pretty€clear€about€that.Ìà..àà..àQ.€€And€you€would€not€have€increased€his€work€restrictions€as€a€result€of€the€second€injury,€would€you?Ìà..àà..àA.€€It's€possible€I€would€have,€but€probably€not€that€much.€€I€mean€let's€just€say€he€did€have€an€80„pound€lifting€restriction€back€in€1987€and€he€reruptured€a€disk.€€I€would€probably€lower€that€to€40€pounds€or€something€like€that.Ìà..àà..àFrom€a€consideration€of€all€the€medical€evidence€and€the€lay€proof,€the€trial€court's€finding€that€the€claimant€is€permanently€and€totally€disabled€from€the€1996€injury€is€well€supported,€particularly€by€the€facts€that€the€employee€was€able€to€and€did€work€regularly€after€the€prior€injury€and€surgery,€though€with€considerable€pain,€and€that€he€"generally€did€well,"€as€the€trial€judge€noted.€€That€work€included€repeatedly€lifting€baskets€of€tank€balls€weighing€45„50€pounds€while€leaning€and€twisting.€€Additionally,€the€record€shows€he€missed€no€time€from€work€because€of€his€back€while€working€for€the€ball€joint€company,€Valley€Ford€or€Heritage€Ford€before€the€1996€injury.Ìà..àà..àMoreover,€it€is€settled€in€Tennessee€law€that€death€or€injury€resulting€from€medical€treatment€for€a€compensable€injury€or€occupational€disease€is€compensable€as€part€of€that€accident.€€òòSee€Rogers€v.€Shawóó,€813€€S.W.2d€€397€(Tenn.€1991)€and€cases€cited€therein.€€Accordingly,€the€evidence€fails€to€preponderate€against€such€finding.Ìà..àà..àThe€Fund€contends€its€liability,€if€any,€is€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„208(b),€and€that€the€trial€judge€erroneously€apportioned€the€award€between€it€and€the€employer.€€It€insists€its€maximum€liability€under€that€subsection€is€11.16%€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€We€agree.Ìà..àà..àAn€employee€who€has€previously€become€disabled€from€any€cause€and€who,€as€a€result€of€a€later€compensable€injury,€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabled,€may€receive€disability€benefits€from€his€employer€or€its€insurance€company€only€for€the€disability€that€would€have€resulted€from€the€subsequent€injury.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„208;€òòCameron€v.€Kite€Painting€Co.óó,€860€€S.W.2d€€41,€43€(Tenn.€1993).€€However,€such€employee€may€be€entitled€to€recover€the€remainder€of€the€benefits€allowable€for€permanent€total€disability€from€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€€òòId.óóÌÓ#ÿÿçÈ xÐ (##Ó€€€€€€€€€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€under€subsection€(a)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„208€if€(1)€an€employee€has€previously€suffered€a€permanent€physical€disability€from€any€cause€or€origin,€and€(2)€the€employee€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabled€as€the€result€of€a€subsequent€compensable€injury.€€Under€subsection€(a),€the€prerequisites€for€imposing€liability€on€the€Second€Injury€Fund€are€a€prior€injury,€either€compensable€or€non„compensable,€which€caused€permanent€disability€and€a€subsequent€compensable€injury€which€rendered€the€employee€permanently€and€totally€disabled.€€òòSweeten€v.€Trade€Envelopes,€Inc.óó,€938€€S.W.2d€€383,€385€(Tenn.€1996).€€Under€subsection€(a),€a€permanently€and€totally€disabled€employee€is€entitled€to€recover€from€the€Second€Injury€Fund€the€amount€whereby€an€award€for€permanent€total€disability€exceeds€the€award€for€the€subsequent€injury.€€òòMinton€v.€State€Industries,€Inc.óó,€€825€€S.W.2d€73,€76„77€(Tenn.€1992).Ì€€€€€€€€€€An€employer€under€subsection€(a)€is€responsible€only€for€that€disability€that€would€have€resulted€from€the€subsequent€injury€had€the€earlier€injury€or€injuries€not€existed.€€òòBomely€v.€Mid„America€Corp.óó,€970€€S.W.2d€€929€(Tenn.€1998).€€Consequently,€the€extent€of€disability€caused€by€the€last€injury€is€a€critical€factor€in€determining€the€liability,€if€any,€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€€òòId.óóÌ€€€€€€€€€€If€an€injured€employee€has€one€or€more€prior€awards€under€the€Workers'€Compensation€Act,€and€the€combination€of€all€such€awards€equals€or€exceeds€one€hundred€percent€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€then€the€Second€Injury€Fund€will€pay,€under€subsection€(b),€the€benefits€due€the€employee€in€excess€of€one€hundred€percent.€€òòSitz€v.€Goodyear€Truck€Tire€Centeróó,€762€€S.W.2d€€886,€887€(Tenn.€1988).€€Liability€under€subsection€(b)€is€conditioned€upon€awards€for€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€including€the€award€for€the€last€injury,€exceeding€100€percent.€€òòSweeten€v.€Trade€Envelopes,€Inc.óó,€€938€€S.W.2d€€383,€385€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€under€subsection€(b)€if€the€sum€of€two€or€more€awards€for€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€equal€or€exceed€100€percent€permanent€disability.€€òòHill€v.€Eagle€Bend€Mfg.€Co.óó,€€942€€S.W.2d€€483€(Tenn.€1997).Ó  ÓÓ >`ÓÌÓ5+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#5Óà..àà..àSubsections€(a)€and€(b)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„208€are€not€mutually€exclusive,€and€an€employee€may€meet€the€criteria€for€coverage€under€both€sections.€€òòPerry€v.€Sentry€Ins.€Co.óó,€€938€€S.W.2d€€404,€407€(Tenn.€1996).€€When€the€facts€satisfy€the€requirements€of€both€subsections€(a)€and€(b),€the€courts€should€apply€the€one€which€produces€a€result€more€favorable€to€the€employer€since€the€goal€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund€statute€is€to€encourage€the€hiring€of€injured€workers€by€limiting€employer€liability.€€òòBomely€v.€Mid„America€Corp.óó,€supra.Ó  ÓÓ …?ÓÌà..àà..àThe€facts€of€this€case€do€satisfy€the€requirements€of€both€subsections€(a)€and€(b).€€However,€if€subsection€(a)€is€applied,€there€is€no€liability€on€the€Fund,€because€the€employer€is€liable€for€all€of€the€subsequent€injury,€it€having€caused,€as€the€trial€judge€found,€the€employee€to€be€100%€permanently€and€totally€disabled.€€Thus,€the€rule€in€€òòBomelyóó€requires€the€application€of€subsection€(b)€in€this€case.€€That€section€provides€as€follows:Ìà0..àà..àà..à"(b)(1)(A)€€In€cases€where€the€injured€employee€has€received€or€will€receive€a€workers'€compensation€award€or€awards€for€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€and€the€ò òcombination€ofó ó€ò òawardsó ó€equals€or€exceeds€one€hundred€percent€(100%)€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€the€employee€shall€not€be€entitled€to€receive€from€the€employer€or€its€insurance€carrier€any€compensation€for€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€that€would€be€in€excess€of€one€hundred€percent€(100%)€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€ò òafter€combining€awardsó ó.Ìà0..àà..àà..à"(B)€€Benefits€which€may€be€due€the€employee€for€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€in€excess€of€one€hundred€percent€(100%)€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€ò òafteró ó€ò òcombiningó ó€ò òawardsó ó,€shall€be€paid€by€the€second€injury€fund.Ìà0..àà..àà..à"(C)€€It€is€the€intention€of€the€general€assembly€that€once€an€employee€receives€an€award€or€awards€for€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€and€such€awards€total€one€hundred€percent€(100%)€permanent€disability,€any€permanent€disability€compensation€due€for€subsequent€compensable€injuries€to€the€body€as€a€whole€shall€be€paid€by€the€second€injury€fund€instead€of€the€employer."€€(Emphasis€supplied).Ìà..àà..àThe€trial€judge€found€that€the€employee's€previous€award€for€a€knee€injury€equated€to€one€based€on€11.16%€permanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€which€he€combined€with€the€employee's€pre„existing€non„work„related€disabilities,€and€assessed€55%€as€the€Fund's€share€of€the€award€for€the€most€recent€injury.€€He€said,€"(T)aking€all€the€previous€disability€under€part€(a)€and€part€(b)€together,€the€combined€effect€resulted€in€vocational€disability€to€the€plaintiff€to€the€extent€of€55%€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€all€of€which€pre„existed€the€injury€which€is€the€immediate€subject€of€this€case."€€We€are€aware€of€no€published€authority€authorizing€the€combining,€under€subsection€(b),€of€disabilities€for€which€there€was€no€workers'€compensation€award;€and€none€has€been€cited€to€us.Ìà..àà..àIn€summary,€the€Fund€has€no€liability€under€subsection€(a)€because€the€evidence€fails€to€preponderate€against€the€trial€judge's€finding€that€the€employee€is€100%€permanently€and€totally€disabled€from€the€most€recent€injury.€€Under€subsection€(b),€the€employer's€liability€is€limited€to€88.84%€because€a€previous€workers'€compensation€award€equates€to€one€based€on€11.16%€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Thus,€the€judgment€is€modified€by€apportioning€88.84%€to€the€employer€and€its€insurance€carrier€and€11.16%€to€the€Fund.€€Ìà..àà..àThe€final€issue€derives€from€the€trial€court's€order€that€the€Fund€reimburse€the€employer€or€its€insurer€for€a€portion€of€payments€made€to€the€claimant€in€the€event€he€dies€before€reaching€age€sixty„five.€€The€employer€and€its€insurer€contend€the€order€is€consistent€with€the€purpose€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund.Ìà..àà..àThe€Fund€was€created€by€the€legislature€to€encourage€the€hiring€of€the€handicapped€by€relieving€an€employer€who€knowingly€hires€a€handicapped€person€or€retains€an€employee€after€discovering€the€employee€has€a€physical€disability€of€part€of€the€liability€for€workers'€compensation€benefits€by€shifting€liability€for€payment€of€benefits€to€the€Fund.€€òòArnold€v.€Tyson€Foods,€Inc.óó,€614€€S.W.2d€€43,€44€(Tenn.€1981).€€€It€provides€assurance€to€employers€that€they€will€not€be€liable€for€more€than€one€hundred€percent€disability€if€a€worker€is€injured€again.€€òòCaudill€v.€Consolidation€Coal€Co.óó,€910€€S.W.2d€€417,€419„420€(Tenn.€1995).Ìà..àà..àThe€obligation€of€the€employer€is€determined€first€and€paid€first.€€òòCameron€v.€Kite€Painting€Co.óó,€860€€S.W.2d€€41,€44€(Tenn.€1993).€€Where€liability€is€apportioned€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund,€the€payments€by€the€Fund€do€not€begin€until€after€completion€of€the€payments€by€the€employer.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„208(a)(1).€€The€obligation€of€the€Fund€is€not€concurrent€with€that€of€the€employer.€€òòSmith€v.€Liberty€Mut.€Ins.€Co.óó,€€762€€S.W.2d€€883,€885€(Tenn.€1988).€€If€the€injured€worker€dies€from€some€cause€other€than€the€compensable€injury,€benefits€are€terminated.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„207(4)(A)(iv).Ìà..àà..àWe€find€no€contrary€authority.€€To€the€extent€that€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€orders€reimbursement€of€the€employer€and€its€insurer€by€the€Fund,€it€is€therefore€vacated.Ìà..àà..àCosts€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€defendants„appellees.€€The€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Circuit€Court€of€Putnam€County.Ìà..àà..àÓ  ÓÓ ŸÓÌÓ  ÓÓ2(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#2Ó_______________________________Ó  ÓÓ ÓÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Joe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÓ  ÓÓ5+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#5ÓCONCUR:ÌÓ  ÓÌÌÓ  ÓÌ_________________________________ÌÓ  ÓFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,€Associate€JusticeÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌWilliam€H.€Inman,€Senior€JudgeÌÓ  ÓÓ#ÿÿçÈ xÐ (##ӜԆÿÿÔÔ†ÿÿÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ôñ×ñ