ÿWPCÃM gîS±Xžô!É(Ž*¸“CÅg¸¿ÿeHùn<Ìùžõr-â(Pdžžíˆû7ÈS®YÏKÊ£ §J‰œg'ÙþÐ`œ‡\¬±ëeÈ‹“wþ¡Ö¿õU–ƒUôp,+?ÞÏ-n+§‡êßÁ7$r^‰ÍO¬±A«§ a2·t)á?+9ºÓbY€âB?‹†âÙÒ7¼~Û·ºÓrŒŒ)z½ÇCd4Ç,ƒ!Ø›ÇzˆF\­ç’^·ÔMyþãý¤¨=?$¨ø+Ýq¿Êîט8ÿº°6‘Âø0u¸ºÙÍÛKë÷âý| –^Îr ª ÞF}|_¯ýö6…ŸÝTS+‚CâÒâ^°òƒ–)<ΦaaÍ“P£ù¶¾ŒÓ^èÙbÊU =oö–5“·ñÛwÞ.óìyàm$9¸s½¼5ˆ sÿ3¬`öR—$¹/àíâ9äªý3²'öSChuÆŽæ@¼½goÏÀ žé("{ 4×£ùG‰3†´J•¥ îòE]0–uÒ›¯\¢¦lœ¥§ÒÐÄÃÒ-¹Ê(Nó=ÆGa°eã½n½ù)€•éC |{v¥>Ü ZȱØûz£§eóB1í±ÚGöjF¯Tb#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ w· U7N» 4 z Ò— i x mz q‘ Æ ÆÈ ÆŽÆT¾NØ—Ú÷qEhÿ jÜi#E+ÌZ/Z/Z/ð&2ã3bù7ù7ù7ù7ù7ù7ù7ù7ù7ù7ù7ù7 0D[@[@[@bŸ@Ÿ@Ÿ@Ÿ@Ÿ@Ÿ@Ÿ@Ÿ@Ÿ@Ÿ@§@§@¼@¼@¼@¼@¼@¼@ßÃEÃEÃEÃE¢H¢H¢H¢H¢H¢H¢H¢H¢H¢H ªHªHªHªH 0í¼H¼H¼H¼H B©I©I 0¤ÆI D5jJ D-ŸJ 0KÌJÌJ ASKÆjK 0¤0L 0DÔL A«M˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»lZ+s (`¤ê$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularj5+ÜÍ«k1x9« ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ gÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔThough€not€relevant€to€the€issues€in€this€appeal,€the€arbitrator€specified€no€reasons€for€the€$10,000€award€toÐ ° ÐÔ_ÔSCIÔ_Ô,€and€he€denied€SCIððs€motion€for€clarification€of€the€award.€€Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 ´Ý ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€No.€03A01„9712„CH„00524,€1999€WL€76074€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€filed€at€Knoxville,€Jan.€28,€1999).€Ð ° ÐAlthough€this€decision€appears€to€be€in€conflict€with€another€unreported€decision€from€the€Western€Section€of€the€CourtÐ tÄ Ðof€Appeals,€the€chancery€court€felt€bound€by€the€decision€of€the€Eastern€Section€in€òòParks€Construction€Co.óó€€We€grantedÐ 8ˆ Ðpermission€to€appeal€in€òòParks€Construction€Co.óó€on€September€13,€1999,€but€the€case€was€settled€during€the€pendency€ofÐ üL Ðthat€appeal.€ Ý ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔBy€way€of€contrast,€the€statutes€governing€municipalities€do€confer€broad€powers€for€the€benefit€of€the€localÐ ° Ðeducation€system.€€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€6„19„101(30)€authorizes€cities€under€a€city€manager„commissionÐ tÄ Ðcharter€to€ð ðdo€all€other€acts€necessary€to€establish,€maintain€and€operate€a€complete€educational€system€within€the€city.ðð€Ð 8ˆ ÐòòSee€alsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.ðð6„2„201(29)€(stating€the€same€with€respect€to€mayor„aldermanic€charters). íÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔA€modern€example€of€a€grant€of€general€police€power€to€municipal€governments€may€be€found€in€TennesseeÐ ° ÐCode€Annotated€section€6„2„201(22),€which€provides€that€Ð tÄ Ðà8  à[e]very€municipality€incorporated€under€[a€mayor„aldermanic]€charter€may...[d]efine,€prohibit,Ð 8ˆ Ðabate,€suppress,€prevent€and€regulate€all€acts,€practices,€conduct,€businesses,€occupations,€callings,Ð üL Ðtrades,€uses€of€property€and€all€other€things€whatsoever€detrimental,€or€liable€to€be€detrimental,€to€theÐ À Ðhealth,€morals,€comfort,€safety,€convenience€or€welfare€of€the€inhabitants€of€the€municipality,€andÐ „Ô Ðexercise€general€police€powers.ÐH ˜Ð Ð  ÐòòSee€alsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€6-19-101(22)€(stating€the€same€with€regard€to€city€manager-commission€charter). õ Ý ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Const.€art.€VII,€ðð€1;€Tenn.€Const.€art.€XI€ðð€8;€Tenn.€Const.€art.€XI,€ðð€9.€€With€regard€to€municipalÐ ° Ðgovernments,€this€Court€has€acknowledged€that€Article€XI,€section€8€confers€upon€the€General€Assembly€the€power€toÐ tÄ Ðcreate€municipal€corporations€and€that€ð ðno€constitutional€restriction€[exists€upon€the€power€of€the€General€Assembly]Ð 8ˆ Ðrequiring€the€consent€or€the€acceptance€of€the€inhabitants€of€the€district€or€incorporated€area€to€make€it€a€corporation.ðð€Ð üL ÐòòSeeóó€òòBradley€v.€Rock€Gardens€Util.€Dist.óó,€186€Tenn.€665,€667„68,€212€S.W.2d€657,€658€(1948).€€Similarly,€with€respectÐ À Ðto€county€governments,€we€have€noted€that€the€first€clause€of€Article€XI,€section€9€establishes€ð ðthat€the€county€courtsÐ „Ô Ðconstitute€the€governing€body€of€these€corporations,€that€these€courts€have€judicial€and€police€powers,€[and]€that€theyÐ H ˜ Ðcan€exercise€that€portion€of€the€sovereignty€of€the€state€communicated€to€them€by€the€Legislature,€and€no€Ô_Ômore....Ô_Ôðð€Ð  \ ÐòòWright€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Cunninghamóó,€115€Tenn.€445,€466,€91€S.W.€293,€298€(1905)€(citations€and€internal€quotation€marks€omitted).Ð Ð  Ðà  àWhile€the€General€Assembly€generally€lacks€the€authority€to€delegate€its€law„making€powers€to€other€entities,Ð ” ä  Ðthe€legislature€may€do€so€under€two€circumstances:€Ô_ÔwhenÔ_Ô€the€Constitution€itself€authorizes€the€delegation€and€when€theÐ X ¨  Ðdelegation€is€ð ðððsanctioned€by€immemorial€usage€originating€anterior€to€the€Constitution€and€continuing€unquestionedÐ  l  Ðthereunder.ðððð€€òòKee€v.€Parksóó,€153€Tenn.€306,€313,€283€S.W.€751,€753€(1926)€(quoting€òòWrightóó,€115€Tenn.€at€466,€91€S.W.Ð à 0  Ðat€297„98).€€We€have€previously€held€that€the€ð ðimmemorial€usageðð€exception€to€the€non„delegation€doctrine€permits€theÐ ¤ô  ÐGeneral€Assembly€(1)€to€confer€powers€upon€municipal€corporations€in€their€several€charters€and€through€generalÐ h¸  Ðstatutes,€and€(2)€in€conjunction€with€Article€XI,€section€9,€to€confer€powers€upon€the€several€counties€for€the€managementÐ ,|  Ðof€their€local€matters.€€òòId.óó€òòóó ÒÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔSome€state€legislatures,€such€as€the€North€Carolina€General€Assembly,€have€enacted€statutes€to€abolish€theÐ ° Ðeffect€of€Dillonððs€Rule:Ð tÄ Ðà8  àIt€is€the€policy€of€the€General€Assembly€that€the€cities€of€this€State€should€have€adequate€authority€toÐ 8ˆ Ðexecute€the€powers,€duties,€privileges,€and€immunities€conferred€upon€them€by€law.€To€this€end,€theÐ üL Ðprovisions€of€this€Ô% ‡N ÔÔ%†NSÔChapter€and€of€Ô_ÔcityÔ_Ô€charters€shall€be€broadly€construed€and€grants€of€power€shall€beÐ À Ðconstrued€to€include€any€additional€and€supplementary€powers€that€are€reasonably€necessary€orÐ „Ô Ðexpedient€to€carry€them€into€execution€and€effect....ÐH ˜Ð Ð  ÐÓÓN.C.€Gen.€Stat.€ðð€160A„4€(1994).€€Indeed,€Indiana€has€abolished€the€effect€of€Dillonððs€Rule€by€stating€its€intent€moreÐ  \ Ðdirectly:€ð ðThe€rule€of€law€that€a€unit€has€only:€(1)€Ô_ÔpowersÔ_Ô€expressly€granted€by€statute;€(2)€Ô_ÔpowersÔ_Ô€necessarily€or€fairlyÐ Ð  Ðimplied€in€or€incident€to€powers€expressly€granted;€Ô_ÔandÔ_Ô€(3)€powers€indispensable€to€the€declared€purposes€of€the€unit;Ð ” ä  ÐÔ_ÔisÔ_Ô€abrogated.ðð€€òòSeeóó€Ind.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„1„3„4(a)€(1997).€€This€statute€further€provides€that€a€local€government€has€ð ð(1)Ð X ¨  Ðall€powers€granted€it€by€statute;€Ô_ÔandÔ_Ô€(2)€all€other€powers€necessary€or€desirable€in€the€conduct€of€its€affairs,€even€thoughÐ  l  Ðnot€granted€by€statute.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€ðð€36„1„3„4(b).€€Our€General€Assembly€has€taken€no€similar€action€in€this€regard. Ý ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Board€disputes€that€Dillonððs€Rule€applies€because€it€is€performing€the€ð ðstate€functionðð€of€education.€Ð ° ÐEven€if€this€fact€were€relevant€to€the€analysis,€the€Boardððs€argument€appears€to€be€contradicted€by€òòBoswell€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Powellóó,Ð tÄ Ð163€Tenn.€445,€448,€43€S.W.2d€495,€495€(1931),€which€held€that€while€ð ða€county€board€of€education€is€a€part€of€theÐ 8ˆ Ðstateððs€educational€system,€we€think€the€members€of€such€board€are€primarily€local€officers.€They€are€primarily€chargedÐ üL Ðwith€the€business€administration€of€the€county€schools,€òòprimarily€endowed€with€Ô_ÔcountyÔ_Ô€or€municipal€functionsóó.ðð€Ð À Ð(Ô_ÔemphasisÔ_Ô€added).€€Accordingly,€we€will€apply€Dillonððs€Rule€in€this€case€for€the€reasons€given€above. ÂÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔOther€states€have€also€recognized€that€the€adoption€of€home€rule€authority€effectively€abrogates€Dillonððs€RuleÐ ° Ðof€construction.€€One€very€recent€example€is€found€in€òòBigs€v.€City€of€Wichitaóó,€23€P.3d€855,€863€(Kan.€2001),€whereinÐ tÄ Ðthe€Kansas€Supreme€Court€noted€specifically€that€ð ð[h]ome€rule€abolished€the€ð ðDillon€Ruleðð€under€which€cities€wereÐ 8ˆ Ðconsidered€creatures€of€the€legislature€and€could€only€exercise€that€authority€conferred€by€statute.ðð€€(Ô_ÔcitationsÔ_Ô€omitted). æÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€No.€03A01„9712„CH„00524,€1999€WL€76074€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€filed€at€Knoxville,€Jan.€28,€1999).€ ÙÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔIn€this€respect,€home€rule€municipalities€differ€from€counties€organized€under€a€charter€government,€whoseÐ °  Ðestablishment€is€authorized€by€the€Constitution,€but€whose€authority€remains€subject€to€the€prerogative€of€the€legislature.€Ð ° ÐòòCompareóó€Tenn.€Const.€art.€XI,€ðð€9,€òòwithóó€Tenn.€Const.€art.€VII,€ðð€1.€€Moreover,€unlike€counties€organized€under€charterÐ tÄ Ðgovernment,€the€charters€of€home€rule€municipalities€cannot€be€amended€or€repealed€through€legislative€acts.€€òòSeeóó€òòCountyÐ 8ˆ Ðof€Shelby€v.€McWherteróó,€936€S.W.2d€923,€934€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€Despite€these€important€differences,€though,€itÐ üL Ðmust€be€recognized€that€both€types€of€local€government€are€beyond€application€of€Dillonððs€Rule.€€The€former€is€soÐ À Ðbecause€of€the€constitutional€change€in€the€relationship€between€the€state€and€local€governments,€and€the€latter€is€soÐ „Ô Ðbecause€it€exercises€authority€pursuant€to€a€general€Ô_ÔpowersÔ_Ô€clause. XÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔFor€example,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€6„19„102€clearly€shows€an€intention€to€have€municipalÐ ° Ðpowers€broadly€construed:Ð tÄ Ðà8  àThe€enumeration€of€particular€powers€in€this€charter€is€not€exclusive€of€others,€nor€restrictive€ofÐ 8ˆ Ðgeneral€words€or€phrases€granting€powers,€nor€shall€a€grant€or€failure€to€grant€power€in€this€chapterÐ üL Ðimpair€a€power€granted€in€any€other€part€of€this€charter,€and€whether€powers,€objects,€or€purposes€areÐ À Ðexpressed,€conjunctively€or€disjunctively,€they€shall€be€construed€so€as€to€permit€the€city€to€exerciseÐ „Ô Ðfreely€Ô_Ôany€oneÔ_Ô€(1)€or€more€such€powers€as€to€any€one€(1)€or€more€such€objects€for€any€one€(1)€or€moreÐ H ˜ Ðsuch€purposes.Ð \Ð Ð  ÐòòSee€alsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€7„82„306€(stating€the€same€with€respect€to€utility€districts);€Ô_Ô7„83„302€(stating€the€same€withÐ Ð  Ðrespect€to€power€districts);Ô_Ô€Ô_Ô65„23„105€(stating€the€same€with€respect€to€the€State€Rural€Electrification€Authority).Ô_ÔÐ ” ä  ÐAdmittedly,€it€appears€as€though€section€6„19„102€largely€duplicates€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€6-19-101(33),Ð X ¨  Ðwhich€provides€that€ð ð[e]very€municipality€incorporated€under€[city€manager„commission]€charter€may...[h]ave€andÐ  l  Ðexercise€all€powers€that€now€or€hereafter€it€would€be€competent€for€this€charter€specifically€to€enumerate,€as€fully€andÐ à 0  Ðcompletely€as€though€these€powers€were€specifically€enumerated.ðð€€òòSee€alsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.ðð6„2„201(32)€(same).€Ð ¤ô  ÐHowever,€we€need€not€remark€further€on€the€precise€applications€of€these€two€statutes,€other€than€to€say€that€they€bothÐ h¸  Ðproperly€reflect€a€legislative€intention€to€have€municipal€powers€broadly€construed.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù- Ñ  Ñ ýÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòCity€of€Hartford€v.€American€Arbitration€Assððnóó,€391€A.2d€137,€140€(Conn.€1978)€(ð ðThe€powerÐ ° Ðof€a€municipal€corporation€to€submit€to€arbitration€is€incident€to€its€capacity€to€contract€or€make€settlements€or€its€powerÐ tÄ Ðto€sue€and€be€sued.ðð);€òòDepartment€of€Health€&€Rehab.€Servs.€v.€E.D.S.€Fed.€Corp.óó,€631€So.€2d€353,€356€(Fla.€Ct.€App.Ð 8ˆ Ð1994)€(ð ð[T]he€power€to€contract€implies€the€power€to€agree€to€settlement€of€disputes€under€the€contract€by€arbitration.ðð)Ð üL Ð(Ô_ÔcitationÔ_Ô€omitted);€òòDormitory€Auth.€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Span€Elec.€Corp.óó,€218€N.E.2d€693,€696„98€(N.Y.€1966)€(ð ð[T]he€power€to€contractÐ À Ðimplies€the€power€to€assent€to€the€settlement€of€disputes€by€means€of€arbitration.ðð);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòCity€of€Atlanta€v.€BrindersonÐ „Ô ÐCorp.óó,€799€F.2d€1541,€1543€(11th€Cir.€1986)€(ð ðSuch€a€power€[to€arbitrate]€is€incident€to€its€capacity€to€contract€or€makeÐ H ˜ Ðsettlements,€and€its€powers€to€sue€and€be€sued.ðð). ÕÝ ƒR&f$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔAlthough€the€constitutional€structure€of€government€in€Tennessee€provides€a€sound€basis€for€the€continuedÐ ° Ðuse€of€Dillonððs€Rule,€we€in€no€way€hold€that€the€Rule€is€somehow€constitutionally€required€or€beyond€the€power€of€theÐ tÄ Ðjudiciary€to€abrogate.€€It€certainly€is€not.€€Rather,€we€mention€these€provisions€only€to€recognize€the€constitutional€realityÐ 8ˆ Ðthat,€with€limited€exception,€local€governments€are€creatures€of€the€state€and€possess€no€more€authority€than€has€beenÐ üL Ðconferred€upon€them€by€the€General€Assembly. ÿÿSDU_35(|I2&f$¤¤Ý ƒ¤ê!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€›Í»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô •ò»»Ô€€ d(|3¯¨$££Ý ƒ¤ê!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€›Í»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3¯¨$¢¢Ý ƒ¤ê!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€›Í»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ¤ê!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€›Í»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ  XÑÔ€¼›Í»»»ÔÑ8€ÄAXXdì»»d8ÑÑ€8P¸Ñà@™ ™ ìàÔ‡îž î»¼›ÍÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼›Í»îîž +#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓSeptember€6,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔÌÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄA#Ôò òSOUTHERN€CONSTRUCTORS,€INC.€€v.€€Ô_ÔLOUDONÔ_Ô€COUNTY€Ð úJ ÐBOARD€OF€EDUCATIONó óÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔÐ  ^ ÐÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄAÑ#ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔÌò òAppeal€by€Permission€from€the€Court€of€Appeals,€Eastern€SectionÐ  ^ ЀÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄA(#ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔChancery€Court€for€Ô_ÔLoudonÔ_Ô€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€9756€€€€€€Hon.€Frank€V.€Williams,€III,€ChancellorÐ æ 6  ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2000„02577„SC„S09„CVÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄAÃ#ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔ€„€Filed€October€26,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_ÔÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í Ðó óÌÌÓ  ÓThe€issue€in€this€case€is€whether€a€county€board€of€education€has€the€authority€to€arbitrate€a€disputeÐ d´ Ðarising€out€of€a€school€construction€contract.€€After€the€parties€completed€arbitration,€the€plaintiffÐ P  Ðfiled€suit€to€vacate€the€award,€arguing€that€the€defendant,€a€county€board€of€education,€lacked€theÐ <Œ Ðstatutory€authority€to€agree€to€arbitration.€€The€defendant€unsuccessfully€moved€for€summaryÐ (x Ðjudgment,€and€it€sought€interlocutory€appeal€with€the€trial€courtððs€permission.€€The€intermediateÐ d Ðcourt,€however,€denied€the€interlocutory€appeal,€finding€that€the€trial€courtððs€decision€was€consistentÐ P Ðwith€prior€cases€from€the€Eastern€Section€Court€of€Appeals.€€We€granted€permission€to€appeal€andÐ ì< Ðhold€that€the€rule€of€strict€construction€of€local€governmental€powers€should€be€retained.€We€alsoÐ Ø( Ðhold,€though,€that€the€power€to€arbitrate€construction€contract€disputes€is€fairly€implied€from€theÐ Ä Ðexpress€authority€to€enter€into€construction€contracts.€€We€therefore€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€denialÐ ° Ðof€summary€judgment€and€dismiss€the€case.€Ð œì ÐÓÓÌò òÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄAL#ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔTenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€Application€for€Permission€to€Appeal;€Judgment€of€the€Ð t Ä ÐCourt€of€Appeals€Reversed;€Case€DismissedÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄAP #ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔó óÐ `!°  ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼›Í»àXÄA #ÔÔ‡XÄAX.¼›ÍÔWilliam€M.€Barker,€Jóó.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòFrank€F.€Ô_ÔDrowotaÔ_ÔÔ#†¼›Í»àXÄA„ #ÔÔ‡XÄAX.¼›ÍÔ,€III,€C.J.,Ð 8#ˆ" Ðóóand€òòE.€Riley€AndersonÔ#†¼›Í»àXÄA@ #ÔÔ‡XÄAX.¼›ÍÔ,€Ô_ÔAdolphoÔ_Ô€A.€Birchóó,€òòJróó.,€and€òòJanice€M.€Holderóó,€JJ.,€joined.Ð $$t# ÐÌR.€Ô_ÔLoyÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔWaldropÔ_Ô,€Linda€J.€Hamilton€Ô_ÔMowlesÔ_Ô,€and€Ô_ÔMaraneeÔ_Ô€L.€Petersen,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€forÐ ü%L!% Ðthe€appellant,€Ô_ÔLoudonÔ_Ô€County€Board€of€Education.Ô#†¼›Í»XXÄA¾ #ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔÐ è&8"& ÐÌMonty€L.€Walton€and€Stephanie€K.€Hunt,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€Ô#†¼›Í»XXÄAÁ#ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔfor€the€appellee,€SouthernÐ À($( ÐConstructors,€Inc.Ô#†¼›Í»XXÄAV#ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔÐ ¬)ü$) ÐÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄAÙ#ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔÌÓU ÓÌà@@OO&ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄA0#ÔÔ‡XÄAX»¼›ÍÔÐ p,À', ÐÐ \-¬(-ý ÐÔ_Ô‡ò òÔ& ° ÔFACTUAL€BACKGROUNDó óÐ ° ÐÔ#†¼›Í»XXÄA£#ÔÔ€XÄAX»¼›ÍÔÓ  ÓÌà  àOn€April€24,€1997,€the€Loudon€County€Board€of€Education€(ð ðBoardðð)€contracted€withÐ ˆØ ÐSouthern€Constructors,€Inc.€Ô'°°Ô(ð ðSCIðð),€for€additions€and€renovations€to€two€county€school€buildings.€Ð tÄ ÐShortly€after€construction€began,€a€subcontractor€for€SCI€ruptured€an€electrical€cable€at€one€of€theÐ `° Ðsites,€damaging€electrical€switchgear€at€the€school€and€disrupting€power€to€another€building.€€TheÐ L œ Ðsubcontractor€subsequently€repaired€the€damaged€lines€and€equipment€at€no€cost€to€the€Board.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àAlthough€SCI€supplied€power€to€parts€of€the€building€during€the€repair€of€the€electricalÐ  ` Ðequipment,€most€of€the€school€building€remained€without€electricity.€€On€July€17,€a€Board€employeeÐ ü L  Ðdiscovered€mold€and€mildew€growth€in€a€part€of€the€school€building€without€electrical€power,€andÐ è 8  Ðthe€Board€requested€that€SCI€remove€the€growth.€€SCI€declined€to€do€so,€however,€claiming€that€itÐ Ô$  Ðwas€not€contractually€responsible€for€such€expenses.€€The€Board€then€hired€outside€contractors€toÐ À  Ðremove€the€growth€at€a€cost€of€$115,248.22,€and€it€withheld€this€amount€from€the€balance€owed€toÐ ¬ü  ÐSCI€under€the€construction€contract.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àSCI€then€demanded€that€Board€pay€the€withheld€amount,€and€after€a€failed€attempt€to€mediateÐ pÀ Ðthe€dispute,€SCI€requested€that€the€Board€agree€to€arbitration.€€Although€the€parties€had€removed€theÐ \¬ Ðarbitration€clause€from€their€original€contract,€both€parties€executed€a€written€arbitration€agreementÐ H˜ Ðin€March€1999,€and€two€months€later,€a€hearing€was€held€before€a€mutually€selected€arbitrator.€€OnÐ 4„ ÐMay€26,€1999,€the€arbitrator€rendered€a€decision€in€favor€of€the€Board,€but€he€awarded€$10,000€ofÐ  p Ðthe€withheld€amount€to€SCI€in€addition€to€interest€and€administrative€expenses.׃ ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Thereafter,€theÐ  \ ÐBoard€issued€a€check€to€SCI€for€$12,988.25,€which€SCI€deposited€on€June€7.€Ð øH Ðà  àÌà  àLess€than€two€months€later,€SCI€filed€a€complaint€in€the€Loudon€County€Chancery€CourtÐ Ð  Ðseeking€to€set€aside€the€arbitration€award.€€SCI€claimed€that€after€the€issuance€of€the€arbitrationÐ ¼  Ðaward,€it€learned€that€the€Board,€ð ðas€a€governmental€entity[,]€had€no€authority€to€enter€into€anÐ ¨ø Ðagreement€to€arbitrate€and€its€act€in€doing€so€was€ultra€vires.ðð€€More€specifically,€SCI€alleged€thatÐ ”ä Ðthe€Board€lacked€the€power€to€enter€into€arbitration€agreements€because€the€General€Assembly€didÐ €Ð Ðnot€expressly€give€that€power€to€county€school€boards€and€because€other€express€legislative€grantsÐ l¼ Ðof€power€did€not€imply€that€county€school€boards€possessed€any€such€authority.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àOn€September€29,€1999,€the€Board€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€asserting€that€theÐ 0"€  Ðchancery€court€lacked€subject€matter€jurisdiction€over€the€dispute.€€The€Board€claimed€that€becauseÐ #l! ÐSCI€agreed€to€arbitrate€the€dispute,€and€because€the€arbitration€award€had€already€been€rendered€andÐ $X" Ðsatisfied,€state€and€federal€law€prevented€SCI€from€seeking€a€òòde€novoóó€hearing€of€that€award€in€court.€Ð ô$D # Ðâ âHowever,€the€court€denied€the€Boardððs€motion,€agreeing€with€òòChattanooga€Area€Regional€TransitÐ à%0!$ ÐAuthority€v.€Parks€Construction€Co.óó,׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€that€local€governments€do€not€have€the€implied€power€toÐ ° Ðarbitrate€disputes.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àPursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Appellate€Procedure€9,€the€Board€then€requested€permissionÐ tÄ Ðto€seek€interlocutory€appeal,€which€the€chancery€court€granted.€€The€court€cited€two€reasons€forÐ `° Ðgranting€permission:€(1)€the€presence€of€conflicting€decisions€from€the€Court€of€Appeals€evidencedÐ L œ Ða€need€to€develop€a€uniform€body€of€law€as€to€whether€a€governmental€entity€may€arbitrate€anÐ 8 ˆ Ðexisting€dispute;€and€(2)€a€decision€in€favor€of€the€Board€would€prevent€needless,€expensive,€andÐ $ t Ðprotracted€litigation.€€The€Board€then€petitioned€the€intermediate€court€for€interlocutory€appeal.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àThe€Court€of€Appeals€denied€the€Boardððs€petition€for€interlocutory€appeal,€but€it€did€so€basedÐ è 8  Ðupon€its€view€that€the€Boardððs€case€lacked€merit.€€In€its€order,€the€court€noted€the€presence€ofÐ Ô$  Ðconflicting€decisions€between€the€Eastern€and€Western€sections€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€on€this€issue,Ð À  Ðbut€it€felt€constrained€to€follow€the€opinion€of€its€own€section€and€to€deny€the€motion.€€However,€theÐ ¬ü  Ðpanel€further€suggested€in€its€order€that€the€Board€seek€permission€to€appeal€from€this€Court.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àWe€then€granted€the€Boardððs€application€for€permission€to€appeal€on€the€issue€of€whetherÐ pÀ Ðcounty€boards€of€education€have€the€authority€to€arbitrate€contract€disputes€concerning€theÐ \¬ Ðconstruction€and€renovation€of€school€buildings.€€For€the€reasons€given€herein,€we€hold€that€theÐ H˜ Ðcounty€boards€of€education€do€have€authority€to€arbitrate€construction€contract€disputes,€and€althoughÐ 4„ Ðwe€decline€to€abolish€the€rule€of€strict€construction€known€as€ð ðDillonððs€Rule,ðð€we€conclude€that€thisÐ  p Ðauthority€is€fairly€implied€from€the€express€power€to€enter€into€construction€contracts.€€Therefore,Ð  \ Ðbecause€the€Loudon€County€School€Board€is€entitled€to€summary€judgment,€we€reverse€the€judgmentÐ øH Ðof€the€Court€of€Appeals€and€dismiss€the€case.Ð ä4 ÐÌÓ  Óò òÔ& ° ÔANALYSISó óÐ ¼  ÐÌÓ  Óà  àThe€question€before€the€Court€is€whether€the€Loudon€County€Board€of€Education€possessesÐ ”ä Ðthe€authority€under€the€laws€of€the€State€of€Tennessee€Ô'° !æ*Ôto€arbitrate€disputes€arising€out€of€a€schoolÐ €Ð Ðconstruction€contract.€€If€the€Board€possesses€no€such€authority,€then€its€agreement€to€arbitrate€theÐ l¼ Ðdispute€in€this€case,€along€with€the€ultimate€award,€are€void€as€òòultra€viresóó.€€The€Board€urges€thisÐ X ¨ ÐCourt,€under€several€legal€theories,€to€find€that€it€possesses€the€authority€to€enter€into€such€arbitrationÐ D!” Ðagreements,€and€SCI€urges€this€Court€to€apply€Dillonððs€Rule€and€to€strictly€construe€the€statutoryÐ 0"€  Ðpowers€of€county€school€boards€against€having€any€such€authority.€€Any€question€regarding€the€scopeÐ #l! Ðof€local€governmental€authority€is€a€question€of€law,€and€as€such,€we€review€the€issue€in€this€caseÐ $X" Ðunder€a€pure€òòde€novoóó€standard€of€review,€according€no€deference€to€the€conclusions€of€law€made€byÐ ô$D # Ðthe€lower€courts.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòDaron€v.€Department€of€Corr.óó,€44€S.W.3d€478,€480€(Tenn.€2001);Ð à%0!$ ÐòòJohnson€v.€Johnsonóó,€37€S.W.3d€892,€894€(Tenn.€2001).Ð Ì&"% Їò òÓ  ÓÔ&   ÔI.€€DILLONððS€RULE€AND€THE€SCOPE€OF€LOCAL€GOVERNMENTAL€Ð ° ÐAUTHORITY€IN€TENNESSEEó ó€Ð œì ÐÓQ0ÓÌà  àAt€its€most€basic€level,€Dillonððs€Rule€is€a€canon€of€statutory€construction€that€calls€for€theÐ xÈ Ðstrict€and€narrow€construction€of€local€governmental€authority.€€Ô' °]0ÔAs€originally€articulated€by€itsÐ d´ Ðauthor,€then€Chief€Justice€John€F.€Dillon€of€the€Iowa€Supreme€Court,€Dillonððs€Rule€provides€theÐ P   Ðfollowing€regarding€the€nature€and€scope€of€municipal€government€authority:€Ð < Œ ÐÌà8  àIn€determining€the€question€now€made,€it€must€be€taken€for€settled€law,€that€aÐ  d Ðmunicipal€corporation€possesses€and€can€exercise€the€following€powers€and€noÐ  P  Ðothers:€First,€those€granted€in€express€words;€second,€those€necessarily€implied€orÐ ì <  Ðnecessarily€incident€to€the€powers€expressly€granted;€third,€those€absolutely€essentialÐ Ø(  Ðto€the€declared€objects€and€purposes€of€the€corporationð"ðnot€simply€convenient,€butÐ Ä  Ðindispensable;€fourth,€any€fair€doubt€as€to€the€existence€of€a€power€is€resolved€by€theÐ °  Ðcourts€against€the€corporationð"ðagainst€the€existence€of€the€power.€Ðœì Ð Ð  ÐÌòòMerriam€v.€Moodyððs€Exððróó,€25€Iowa€163,€170€(1868).€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àAs€in€many€jurisdictions€throughout€the€nation,€Dillonððs€Rule€has€been€applied€in€this€stateÐ Lœ Ðfor€more€than€a€century€to€determine€the€scope€of€local€governmental€authority.€€Beginning€withÐ 8ˆ ÐòòMayor€&€City€Council€v.€Linckóó,€80€Tenn.€(12€Lea)€499€(1883),€this€Court€has€recognized€thatÐ $t Ðmunicipal€governments€in€Tennessee€derive€the€whole€of€their€authority€solely€from€the€GeneralÐ ` ÐAssembly€and€that€courts€may€reasonably€presume€that€the€General€Assembly€ð ðhas€granted€in€clearÐ üL Ðand€unmistakable€terms€all€[power]€that€it€has€designed€to€grant....ðð€€òòId.óó€at€505€(citation€omitted).€Ð è8 ÐTo€this€end,€the€òòLinckóó€Court€held€that€municipal€governmental€authority€should€be€strictly€construed,Ð Ô$ Ðand€it€stated€that€a€municipal€government€may€exercise€a€particular€power€only€when€one€of€theÐ À Ðfollowing€three€conditions€is€satisfied:€(1)€the€power€is€granted€in€the€ð ðexpress€wordsðð€of€the€statute,Ð ¬ü Ðprivate€act,€or€charter€creating€the€municipal€corporation;€(2)€the€power€is€ð ðòònecessarily€or€fairlyÐ ˜è Ðimpliedóó€in,€oròò€incidentóó€to[,]€the€powers€expressly€grantedðð;€or€à8 @ö à(3)€the€power€is€one€that€is€neitherÐ „Ô Ðexpressly€granted€nor€fairly€implied€from€the€express€grants€of€power,€but€is€otherwise€implied€asÐ pÀ Ðð ðessential€to€the€declared€objects€and€purposes€of€the€corporation.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€at€504€(emphases€inÐ \ ¬ Ðoriginal).€€Consistent€with€other€articulations€of€Dillonððs€Rule,€we€also€stated€that€ð ððð[a]ny€fair,Ð H!˜ Ðreasonable€doubt€concerning€the€existence€of€the€power€is€resolved€by€the€courts€against€theÐ 4"„  Ðcorporation€and€the€power€is€denied.ðððð€€òòId.óó€(quoting€1€John€F.€Dillon,€òòCommentaries€on€the€Law€ofÐ  #p! ÐMunicipal€Corporationsóó€173€(1st€ed.€1872)).Ð  $\" ÐÌà  àAlthough€a€discussion€of€the€numerous€applications€of€Dillonððs€Rule€in€this€state€isÐ ä%4!$ Ðunnecessary,€the€Rule€has€been€consistently€applied€to€all€forms€of€local€government,€including€thoseÐ Ð& "% Ðof€cities,€counties,€and€special€districts.€€Despite€this€wide€application,€however,€many€legalÐ ¼' #& Ðcommentators,€and€some€courts,€have€criticized€the€Rule€as€needlessly€depriving€local€governmentsÐ ¨(ø#' Ðof€the€ability€to€deal€with,€and€respond€to,€changing€local€situations€and€needs.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€Gerald€E.Ð ”)ä$( Ðâ âFrug,€òòThe€City€as€a€Legal€Conceptóó,€93€Harv.€L.€Rev.€1059€(1980);€òòState€v.€Hutchinsonóó,€624€P.2dÐ €*Ð%) Ð1116,€1121€(Utah€1980).€€Indeed,€the€Board€in€this€case€cites€many€of€these€same€concerns€as€reasonsÐ ° Ðto€abrogate€Dillonððs€Rule€in€Tennessee.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àWe€are€not€unmoved€by€some€of€these€criticisms,€but€while€Dillonððs€Rule€is€essentially€onlyÐ tÄ Ða€canon€of€construction,€it€continues€to€reflect€the€constitutional€realities€of€local€government€in€thisÐ `° Ðstate.€€Article€II,€section€3€of€our€Constitution€confers€upon€the€General€Assembly€the€whole€of€theÐ L œ Ðstateððs€legislative€power,€and€with€limited€exception,€òòseeóó€òòGibson€County€Special€Sch.€Dist.€v.Ð 8 ˆ ÐPalmeróó,€691€S.W.2d€544,€550€(Tenn.€1985),€the€General€Assembly€has€the€sole€and€plenary€authorityÐ $ t Ðto€determine€whether,€and€under€what€circumstances,€portions€of€that€power€should€be€delegated€toÐ  ` Ðlocal€governments.òòóó׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€As€this€Court€has€previously€acknowledged,€local€governments€have€neverÐ ü L  Ðpossessed€the€inherent€right€to€autonomous€self„government,€and€all€local€governmental€authorityÐ è 8  Ðð ðhas€always€been€interpreted€as€a€matter€of€constitutional€entitlement€or€legislative€delegation€ofÐ Ô$  Ðauthority.ðð€€òòCivil€Serv.€Merit€Bd.€v.€Bursonóó,€816€S.W.2d€725,€727€(Tenn.€1991)€(citation€omitted).€Ð À  ÐPlainly€stated,€then,€without€some€form€of€constitutional€authorization,€local€governments€inÐ ¬ü  ÐTennessee€possess€only€those€powers€and€authority€as€the€General€Assembly€has€deemed€appropriateÐ ˜è  Ðto€confer€upon€them.€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àIt€is€from€this€rationaleð"ðthat€local€governments€have€no€inherent€right€to€autonomous€self„Ð \¬ Ðgovernmentð"ðthat€the€rule€of€strict€construction€of€local€governmental€authority€arises€in€this€state.€Ð H˜ ÐThough€at€least€one€court€has€criticized€strict€construction€of€local€governmental€power€asÐ 4„ Ðoriginating€from€a€time€when€distrust€of€such€government€was€prevalent,€òòseeóó€òòHutchinsonóó,€624€P.2dÐ  p Ðat€1121,€we€see€no€evidence€that€such€has€ever€been€the€reason€in€this€state€for€similar€holdings.€€FarÐ  \ Ðfrom€being€an€irrational€interpretive€canon,€the€doctrine€of€strict,€but€reasonable,€construction€ofÐ øH Ðdelegations€of€state€legislative€power€seeks€only€to€give€effect€to€the€practical€nature€of€localÐ ä4 Ðgovernmental€authority€in€Tennessee.€€As€such,€absent€some€indication€to€the€contrary,€the€GeneralÐ Ð  ÐAssembly€must€be€presumed€to€have€endowed€local€governments€with€only€as€much€authority€as€itÐ ¼  Ðhas€granted€through€the€language€of€its€delegation.€€òòSeeóó€òòLinckóó,€80€Tenn.€(12€Lea)€at€505.Ð ¨ø ÐÐ ”ä Ðà  àNevertheless,€although€the€constitutional€structure€of€local€government€in€Tennessee€providesÐ ° Ða€sound€basis€for€the€continued€strict€construction€of€local€governmental€authority,€we€also€recognizeÐ œì Ðthat€several€important€exceptions€to€Dillonððs€Rule€have€diminished€its€practical€importance.€€ForÐ ˆØ Ðexample,€the€General€Assembly€itself€can€mitigate€any€unwanted€effects€of€strict€construction€byÐ tÄ Ðsupplying€direct€evidence€of€its€intent€to€grant€broad€local€governmental€powers€when€it€chooses€toÐ `° Ðdo€so.€€Importantly,€strict€construction€of€local€governmental€power€is€only€appropriate€whenÐ L œ Ðlegislative€intent€as€to€the€proper€scope€of€that€power€is€absent€or€otherwise€ambiguous,׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€anÐ 8 ˆ Ðintent€to€have€local€powers€broadly€construed€may€be€expressed€either€in€the€language€granting€theÐ $ t Ðparticular€power€itself€or€in€a€separate€statute€applying€to€all€grants€of€power€generally.׃„ ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€BecauseÐ  ` ÐDillonððs€Rule€is€essentially€only€a€canon€of€construction€used€to€ascertain€the€intention€of€the€GeneralÐ ü L  ÐAssembly,€the€Rule€must€necessarily€yield€when€a€contrary€intent€plainly€appears.€€òòSeeóó€òòDorrier€v.Ð è 8  ÐDarkóó,€540€S.W.2d€658,€659€(Tenn.€1976)€(ð ðAll€rules€of€statutory€interpretation€have€only€oneÐ Ô$  Ðpurpose,€and€that€is€to€ascertain€legislative€intent.ðð).€Ð À  ÐÌà  àAs€an€important€corollary€to€this€principle,€where€the€General€Assembly€grantsÐ ˜è  Ðcomprehensive€governmental€power€to€the€local€authority€without€either€enumerating€the€powers€orÐ „Ô  Ðexpressly€limiting€the€scope€of€the€authority,€that€ð ðgeneral€provision€[will]€be€òòliberallyóó€construed.ððÐ pÀ ÐÑ8P¸Ñâ 8âÑ  Ñâ 8âÑ  ÑòòSeeóó€òòLinckóó,€80€Tenn.€(12€Lea)€at€508€(emphasis€in€original).€€One€example€of€a€comprehensive€grantÐ ° Ðof€power€may€be€seen€in€the€charter€government€provisions€for€counties€authorized€by€Article€VII,Ð œì Ðsection€1€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€and€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sections€5„1„201€to€5„1„214.€Ð ˆØ ÐUnder€a€charter€form€of€government,€counties€are€authorized€to€ð ðpass€ordinances€relating€to€purelyÐ tÄ Ðcounty€affairs,ðð€subject€only€to€the€exceptions€that€these€ordinances€ð ðshall€not€be€opposed€to€theÐ `° Ðgeneral€laws€and€shall€not€interfere€with€the€local€affairs€of€any€municipality€within€the€limit€of€suchÐ L œ Ðcounty.ðð€€Counties€organized€under€charter€government,€therefore,€are€not€strictly€limited€to€thoseÐ 8 ˆ Ðpowers€otherwise€granted€by€the€General€Assembly,€and€they€possess€broad€authority€for€theÐ $ t Ðregulation€of€their€own€local€affairs.€€Consequently,€when€the€issue€concerns€the€scope€of€a€generalÐ  ` Ðgrant€of€power€such€as€this,€Dillonððs€Rule€cannot€be€applied€to€narrowly€limit€the€exercise€of€thatÐ ü L  Ðpower€by€a€local€authority.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àFurther,€courts€have€not€taken€a€narrow€view€of€local€governmental€power€when€the€GeneralÐ À  ÐAssembly€has€conferred€general€welfare€authority€to€protect€the€citizensðð€health,€convenience,€andÐ ¬ü  Ðsafety.€€In€the€same€decision€that€recognized€Dillonððs€Rule€as€a€rule€of€construction€in€this€state,€thisÐ ˜è  ÐCourt€stated€that€where€the€legislature€grants€local€governments€broad€authority€to€provide€for€theÐ „Ô  Ðgeneral€welfare,€Dillonððs€Rule€cannot€be€used€to€challenge€the€exercise€of€that€authority€as€beyondÐ pÀ Ðthe€scope€of€the€delegated€power.€€òòSeeóó€òòLinckóó,€80€Tenn.€(12€Lea)€at€509„10.€€Because€the€very€natureÐ \¬ Ðof€general€police€powers€demands€that€such€authority€receive€a€broad€construction€to€accomplish€itsÐ H˜ Ðpurposes,€the€òòLinckóó€Court€held€that€so€long€as€ordinances€adopted€under€a€grant€of€general€welfareÐ 4„ Ðauthority€are€not€ð ðunreasonable€or€oppressive[,]€they€are€valid,€and€will€be€maintained.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€510;Ð  p Ðòòsee€alsoóó€òòMcKelley€v.€City€of€Murfreesboroóó,€162€Tenn.€304,€310,€36€S.W.2d€99,€100€(1931).׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€WeÐ  \ Ðcontinue€to€concur€in€that€assessment.Ð øH ÐÌà  àFinally,€an€exception€to€Dillonððs€Rule€necessarily€arises€when€the€issue€concerns€the€authorityÐ Ð  Ðof€home€rule€municipalities.€€In€1953,€the€Constitution€was€amended€to€permit€municipalÐ ¼  Ðgovernments€to€adopt€and€operate€under€home€rule€authority,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Const.€art.€XI,€ðð€9,€and€asÐ ¨ø Ðthis€Court€has€previously€recognized,€ð ððð[t]he€whole€purpose€of€the€Home€Rule€Amendment€was€toÐ ”ä Ðvest€control€of€local€affairs€in€local€governments.ðððð€€òòBursonóó,€816€S.W.2d€at€729€(Tenn.€1991)Ð €Ð Ð(quoting€òòFarris€v.€Blantonóó,€528€S.W.2d€549,€551€(Tenn.€1975)).€€The€effect€of€the€home€ruleÐ l¼ Ðamendments€was€to€fundamentally€change€the€relationship€between€the€General€Assembly€and€theseÐ X ¨ Ðtypes€of€municipalities,€because€such€entities€now€derive€their€power€from€sources€other€than€theÐ D!” Ðprerogative€of€the€legislature.׃°×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Consequently,€because€the€critical€assumption€underlying€applicationÐ 0"€  Ðof€Dillonððs€Rule€is€no€longer€valid€as€to€home€rule€municipalities,€Dillonððs€Rule€simply€cannot€beÐ ° Ðapplied€to€limit€any€authority€exercised€by€them.׃°×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð œì ÐÌà  àSubject€to€these€important€exceptions,€we€hold€that€the€courts€of€this€state€should€continueÐ tÄ Ðto€strictly,€but€reasonably,€construe€the€scope€of€local€governmental€authority€delegated€by€theÐ `° ÐGeneral€Assembly.€€The€legislature€has€relied€upon€the€continued€existence€of€this€presumption€inÐ L œ Ðdelegating€its€power€to€local€authorities,€and€it€has€displayed€a€noted€ability€to€abrogate€the€RuleÐ 8 ˆ Ðwhen€necessary€to€accomplish€its€desired€objectives.€€While€Dillonððs€Rule€is€essentially€only€aÐ $ t Ðjudicial€rule€of€statutory€construction,€and€is€therefore€within€our€power€to€abrogate,€we€acknowledgeÐ  ` Ðthat€the€Rule€is€generally€necessary€to€give€effect€to€the€constitutional€realities€of€local€governmentÐ ü L  Ðin€this€state.׃@ˆ ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Consequently,€we€retain€Dillonððs€Rule,€subject€to€its€exceptions,€as€a€rule€ofÐ è 8  Ðconstruction€to€determine€the€scope€of€local€governmental€authority.Ð Ô$  ÐÌò òÓ  ÓII.€€APPLICATION€OF€DILLONððS€RULE€IN€THIS€CASEó óÐ ¬ü  ÐÓ©iÓÌà  àAlthough€we€have€found€no€case€in€Tennessee€expressly€holding€that€Dillonððs€Rule€appliesÐ „Ô  Ðin€construing€the€authority€of€county€boards€of€education,€we€nevertheless€conclude€that€it€is€properÐ pÀ Ðto€do€so.€€Just€as€the€Constitution€grants€the€General€Assembly€plenary€authority€to€structure€andÐ \¬ Ðprovide€for€local€government,€Article€XI,€section€12€of€the€Constitution€also€grants€the€GeneralÐ H˜ ÐAssembly€plenary€and€exclusive€authority€to€ð ðprovide€for€the€maintenance,€support€and€eligibilityÐ 4„ Ðstandards€of€a€system€of€free€public€schools.ðð€€Indeed,€this€Court€has€expressly€recognized€thatÐ  p Ðcorporate€entities€created€for€educational€purposes€are€under€the€control€of€the€Legislature,€ð ðso€thatÐ  \ Ð[they]€may€be€abolished€or€[their]€power€may€be€enlarged€or€[their]€responsibilities€increased€at€anyÐ øH Ðtime€by€that€body,€without€the€danger€of€encountering€constitutional€difficulties.ðð€€òòBoard€of€Educ.Ð ä4 Ðv.€Shelby€Countyóó,€155€Tenn.€212,€219,€292€S.W.€462,€464€(1927)€(citation€and€internal€quotationÐ Ð  Ðmarks€omitted).€€Moreover,€while€county€boards€of€education€are€not€part€of€the€general€countyÐ ¼  Ðgovernment€in€the€sense€that€they€derive€their€powers€and€duties€from€the€county€charter,€they€areÐ ° Ðin€essence€part€of€that€local€government,€exclusively€vested€with€statutory€authority€in€all€mattersÐ œì Ðrelating€to€public€education.€€òòSeeóó€òòReed€v.€Rhea€Countyóó,€189€Tenn.€247,€251,€225€S.W.2d€49,€50Ð ˆØ Ð(1949)€(ð ðIt€follows€that€a€County€Board€of€Education€is€a€county€government€entity€exercising€aÐ tÄ Ðgovernmental€function€in€the€operation€and€maintenance€of€the€schools€of€the€County.ðð).׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð `° ÐÌà  àConsequently,€if€Dillonððs€Rule€is€generally€applied€to€determine€the€scope€of€municipal€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðcounty€governmental€authority,€it€seems€only€appropriate,€in€the€absence€of€any€exception,€to€applyÐ $ t Ðthis€rule€of€construction€to€determine€the€scope€of€local€school€board€authority€as€well.€€In€this€case,Ð  ` Ðhowever,€we€have€been€unable€to€locate€any€expressed€intention€by€the€General€Assembly€to€conferÐ ü L  Ðgeneral€powers€upon€the€county€boards€of€education€or€to€have€the€expressed€powers€broadlyÐ è 8  Ðconstrued.׃(×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Moreover,€the€General€Assembly€does€not€appear€to€have€conferred€any€type€of€ð ðhomeÐ Ô$  Ðruleðð€authority€upon€county€boards€of€education€or€particular€schools€as€has€been€done€in€otherÐ À  Ðstates.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€Cal.€Educ.€Code€ðð€47610€(West€1993);€Tex.€Educ.€Code€Ann.€ðð€12.054€(WestÐ ¬ü  Ð1996);€Tex.€Educ.€Code€Ann.€ðð€12.103€(West€1996),€òòamended€byóó€2001€Tex.€Sess.€Law€Serv.€ch.Ð ˜è  Ð1504,€ðð€4€(effective€Sept.€1,€2001).€€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€Dillonððs€Rule€applies€to€determineÐ „Ô  Ðwhether€the€Board€possesses€the€authority€to€arbitrate€its€contract€dispute€with€SCI.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àOur€first€inquiry,€then,€in€applying€Dillonððs€Rule€in€this€case€is€whether€the€GeneralÐ H˜ ÐAssembly€has€expressly€conferred€upon€county€school€boards€the€power€to€arbitrate€disputes€arisingÐ 4„ Ðout€of€a€construction€contract.€€The€authority€to€enter€into€construction€contracts€is€granted€byÐ  p ÐTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€49„2„203(a)(4),€which€confers€upon€county€school€boards€theÐ  \ Ðauthority€to€ð ð[p]urchase€all€supplies,€furniture,€fixtures€and€material€of€every€kind€through€theÐ øH Ðexecutive€committee.ðð€€Through€subsections€(C)(1),€(C)(2),€and€(D)€of€this€provision,€the€GeneralÐ ä4 ÐAssembly€has€given€the€local€school€boards€the€authority€to€ð ðcontract€for€the€construction€of€schoolÐ Ð  Ðbuildings€or€additions€to€existing€buildings,ðð€and€it€has€emphasized€that€ð ð[n]o€board€of€educationÐ ¼  Ðshall€be€precluded€from€purchasing€materials€and€employing€labor€for€the€construction€of€schoolÐ ¨ø Ðbuildings€or€additions€thereto.ðð€€However,€no€part€of€section€49„2„203€expressly€mentions€anyÐ ”ä Ðauthority€to€enter€into€arbitration€agreements,€either€to€confer€the€power€or€to€deny€it.€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àBecause€the€General€Assembly€has€not€expressly€conferred€upon€county€school€boards€theÐ X ¨ Ðpower€to€arbitrate€disputes€arising€out€of€construction€contracts,€our€next€inquiry€is€whether€thatÐ D!” Ðpower€is€fairly€implied€from€the€powers€expressly€granted.€€The€law€implies€powers€from€expressÐ 0"€  Ðgrants€of€authority€because€the€General€Assembly€can€hardly€be€expected€to€specify€in€minute€detailÐ ° Ðthe€incidents€of€power€conferred€upon€local€governments.€€However,€in€finding€the€existence€of€anÐ œì Ðimplied€power,€courts€must€remember€that€ð ð[i]mplied€powers€do€not€exist€independently€of€the€grantÐ ˆØ Ðof€express€powers[,]€and€the€only€function€of€an€implied€power€is€to€aid€in€carrying€into€effect€aÐ tÄ Ðpower€expressly€granted.ðð€€òòCity€of€Flagstaff€v.€Associated€Dairy€Prods.€Co.óó,€206€P.2d€1041,€1043Ð `° Ð(Ariz.€1953).€€Consequently,€we€examine€closely€the€express€powers€of€the€county€boards€ofÐ L œ Ðeducation€to€determine€what€authority€is€also€conferred€as€fairly€implied€from€those€powers.Ð 8 ˆ Ðà  àÌà  àUpon€examination€of€the€powers€given€to€boards€of€education€by€section€49„2„203,€weÐ  ` Ðconclude€that€the€power€to€arbitrate€is€fairly€implied€from€the€express€power€to€contract€in€the€firstÐ ü L  Ðinstance.€€Although€no€case€from€this€Court€has€specifically€held€that€the€power€to€arbitrate€a€contractÐ è 8  Ðdispute€is€fairly€implied€from€the€power€to€contract€itself,€the€veracity€of€this€proposition€cannot€beÐ Ô$  Ðreasonably€doubted.€€As€the€Wisconsin€Supreme€Court€has€articulated€the€principle€of€law,€ð ðððIt€isÐ À  Ðwell€established€that€a€city€has€the€power€to€submit€to€arbitration€any€claim€asserted€by€or€againstÐ ¬ü  Ðit,€whether€based€on€contract€or€tort,€in€the€absence€of€a€statutory€prohibition.€€This€power€is€basedÐ ˜è  Ðon€the€right€to€contract€and€the€right€to€maintain€and€defend€suits.ðððð€òòCity€of€Madison€v.€Frank€LloydÐ „Ô  ÐWright€Found.óó,€122€N.W.2d€409,€416€(Wis.€1963)€(quoting€òòPower€of€a€Municipal€Corporation€toÐ pÀ ÐSubmit€to€Arbitrationóó,€40€A.L.R.€1370,€1372€(1926)).€€Wisconsin€is€not€alone€in€this€view,€andÐ \¬ Ðdecisions€in€several€states€reflect€similar€holdings.׃:×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€òòÐ H˜ ÐóóÌà  àThis€Court€held€long€ago€that€ð ðwhen€the€law€gives€the€power€and€right€to€contract,€the€rightÐ  p Ðto€enforce€such€contract€necessarily€and€as€a€matter€of€course€follows....ðð€€òòUhl€v.€Board€ofÐ  \ ÐCommððrsóó,€74€Tenn.€(6€Lea)€610,€614€(1881).€€The€power€to€enforce€that€contract€not€only€includesÐ øH Ðthe€authority€to€seek€full€judicial€determination€of€the€respective€rights€and€obligations€of€the€parties,Ð ä4 Ðbut€it€must€also€necessarily€include€the€ability€to€seek€other€reasonable€avenues€of€dispute€resolution,Ð Ð  Ðincluding€settlement,€mediation,€and€arbitration.€€It€is€not€for€this€Court€to€decide€which€is€the€betterÐ ¼  Ðcourse€for€a€local€government€to€pursue€in€resolving€a€contract€dispute.€€òòCf.óó€òòMitchell€v.€Garrettóó,€510Ð ¨ø ÐS.W.2d€894,€898€(Tenn.€1974)€(stating€that€discretionary€actions€of€an€education€board€orÐ ”ä Ðsuperintendent€are€presumed€to€be€reasonable€and€fair,€ð ðunless€there€is€clear€evidence€to€theÐ €Ð Ðcontraryðð).€€Consequently,€because€the€legislature€has€not€provided€for€a€specific€method€to€be€usedÐ l¼ Ðin€resolving€contract€disputes,€that€decision€is€more€properly€made€by€those€entrusted€with€ensuringÐ X ¨ Ðthe€overall€well„being€of€each€county€school€system.òòóó€€òòSeeóó€òòCity€of€Va.€Beach€v.€Hayóó,€518€S.E.2d€314,Ð D!” Ð316€(Va.€1999)€(ð ðWhere€the€state€legislature€grants€a€local€government€the€power€to€do€somethingÐ 0"€  Ðâ âbut€does€not€specifically€direct€the€method€of€implementing€that€power,€the€choice€made€by€the€localÐ #l! Ðgovernment€as€to€how€to€implement€the€conferred€power€will€be€upheld€as€long€as€the€methodÐ ° Ðselected€is€reasonable.ððòòóó).Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àIn€response,€and€citing€an€unreported€case€from€the€Court€of€Appeals,€SCI€urges€this€CourtÐ tÄ Ðto€reject€the€notion€that€the€power€to€arbitrate€is€fairly€implied€from€the€power€to€contract.€€InÐ `° ÐòòChattanooga€Area€Regional€Transit€Authority€v.€Parks€Construction€Co.óó,׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€the€intermediate€courtÐ L œ Ðheld€that€municipalities€lack€the€implied€power€to€arbitrate€disputes,€relying€exclusively€upon€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðfederal€decision€that€reached€the€same€conclusion€by€applying€Virginia€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòSchlosser€Co.€v.Ð $ t ÐSchool€Bd.óó,€980€F.2d€253€(4th€Cir.€1993).€€In€òòSchlosser€Co.óó,€the€court€held€that€a€local€school€boardÐ  ` Ðunder€Virginia€law€has€no€authority€to€arbitrate€a€dispute€arising€out€of€a€construction€contract.€€TheÐ ü L  Ðschool€board€argued€that€the€power€to€arbitrate€is€implied€from€the€power€to€contract,€and€while€theÐ è 8  Ðcourt€noted€that€this€argument€was€not€ð ðwithout€force,ðð€it€viewed€the€Virginia€Public€ProcurementÐ Ô$  ÐAct€as€reflecting€a€policy€to€withhold€from€local€governments€the€power€to€arbitrate€disputes.€€òòSeeóóÐ À  Ð980€F.2d€at€256.€€We€note€that€even€were€we€to€agree€with€the€general€rationale€used€by€theÐ ¬ü  ÐòòSchlosser€Co.óó€Court,€we€find€no€evidence€of€a€similar€policy€in€Tennessee€to€generally€withholdÐ ˜è  Ðarbitration€from€local€governments€as€an€avenue€of€dispute€settlement.€€Consequently,€to€the€extentÐ „Ô  Ðthat€the€òòParks€Construction€Co.óó€Court€did€not€note€this€apparent€distinction€between€the€generalÐ pÀ Ðpolicies€of€our€state€and€that€of€Virginia,€its€persuasive€value€as€an€accurate€reflection€of€TennesseeÐ \¬ Ðlaw€òòóóis€significantly€weakened.€€òòCf.óó€Tenn.€Sup.€Ct.€R.€4(H)(1).€òòóóÐ H˜ ÐÌà  àIn€any€event,€given€that€the€general€rule€of€law€is€that€the€power€to€contract€necessarilyÐ  p Ðincludes€the€power€to€settle€disputes€arising€under€that€contract,€one€would€reasonably€expect€theÐ  \ ÐGeneral€Assembly€to€expressly€withhold€the€ability€to€arbitrate€disputes€if€that€avenue€of€disputeÐ øH Ðresolution€were€not€available.€€We€can€find€no€express€prohibition€in€this€regard,€however,€and€weÐ ä4 Ðmust€therefore€conclude€that€the€power€to€arbitrate€disputes€is€fairly€implied€from€the€power€toÐ Ð  Ðcontract€in€the€first€instance.€€Accordingly,€we€hold€that€the€Board€possessed€the€authority€to€arbitrateÐ ¼  Ðits€construction€contract€dispute€with€SCI€as€a€power€fairly€implied€from€its€authority€to€contract€withÐ ¨ø Ðthat€party€in€the€first€instance.€€Having€so€concluded,€it€is€unnecessary€for€us€to€inquire€further€as€toÐ ”ä Ðwhether€the€power€to€arbitrate€is€otherwise€so€essential€to€the€declared€objects€and€purposes€ofÐ €Ð Ðcounty€boards€of€education€that€it€must€be€within€the€scope€of€their€authority.Ð l¼ ÐÌÓ  Óò òÔ& ° ÔCONCLUSIONó óÐ D!” ÐÌÓ  Óà  àWe€hold€that€grants€of€power€to€local€governments€will€continue€to€receive€a€strict,€butÐ #l! Ðreasonable,€construction€under€the€canon€of€construction€known€as€Dillonððs€Rule.€€ThisÔ'°˜#½šÔ€rule€ofÐ $X" Ðconstruction€reflects€the€proper€nature€of€local€governmental€power€in€this€state,€and€its€several€broadÐ ô$D # Ðexceptions€significantly€alleviate€its€shortcomings.€€We€also€hold€that€the€Loudon€County€Board€ofÐ à%0!$ ÐEducation€possesses€the€authority€to€arbitrate€construction€contract€disputes€because€such€a€powerÐ Ì&"% Ðis€fairly€implied€from€the€express€power€to€enter€into€construction€contracts.€€Accordingly,€becauseÐ ¸'#& Ðâ âthe€dispute€in€this€case€has€already€been€resolved€by€means€of€final,€binding€arbitration,€the€LoudonÐ ¤(ô#' ÐCounty€School€Board€is€entitled€to€summary€judgment.€€We€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€ofÐ ° ÐAppeals€and€dismiss€the€case.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àÔ& ` ÔCosts€of€this€appeal€shall€be€assessed€to€the€appellee,€Southern€Constructors,€Inc.Ð tÄ ÐÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ð ü L  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUSTICEÔ'`tŸÔ