ÿWPCy+ @# UN› %é 0 DïU:3w@m4­ÁÐ 0 ÃØ 0¡›U:<U:v 0J° 0Tú 0^N 0h¬ 0r 0|† 0† 0ˆ 1u 0d bñ Bù U* B)@ DCi AM¬ .ù Ñ' AQøÆI 0D 0@S 0D“ D/× B# D3Béu‡^žå>ƒŒÁÛM!v~($vÓ¦%˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular X(r+$¡¡Ò4°ÒÒ„°Ò@"Arial Regular C%D%UE%EF%PeG%H%DI%J%Ó€T%U%ê‚_#î‹á"úÿÿú, ú3|xW%(s(2ad$¤¤Ý ƒr+!ÝÒ4°ÒÒ„°ÒÝ  ÝÒ44ÒÒ„„ÒÔ€ ô7ÝôX XÔà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó("WV$Ô€ôèêôXXÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôb´ôôôèêÔÔ€X'?Xôôb´Ô,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular+•ŸzAZ‹"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ- ù- d< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d))))7Border 1dd/1*Cþÿ << Gÿÿ $Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ0"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌNovemberÏ17,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó ó ÇÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Oral€argument€was€heard€in€this€case€on€April€15,€1997,€in€Chattanooga,€HamiltonÏCounty,€Tennessee,€as€part€of€this€Courtððs€S.C.A.L.E.S.€(ò òSó óupreme€ò òCó óourt€ò òAó ódvancing€ò òLó óegalÏò òEó óducation€for€ò òSó ótudents)€project.Ì/0123Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó44'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€has€likewise€relied€on€òòMarionóó€in€requiring€a€formal€grandÏjury€action€or€the€actual€restraints€of€an€arrest€and€holding€to€answer€a€criminal€charge.€€òòState€v.ÏNorthcuttóó,€568€S.W.2d€636€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978);€òòBoswell€v.€Stateóó,€528€S.W.2d€825€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1975).€Ì%%%%'ÿÿdxd ßÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€òòPharm€v.€Hatcheróó,€984€F.2d€783€(7th€Cir.),€òòcertóó.òòdeniedóó,€510€U.S.€841,€114€S.Ct.€125,Ï126€L.Ed.2d.€89€(1993);€òòArnold€v.€McCarthyóó,€566€F.2d€1377€(9th€Cir.€1978);€òòColeman€v.€Loftonóó,Ï715€S.W.2d€435€(Ark.€1986);€òòState€v.€Crawfordóó,€521€A.2d€1034€(Conn.€1987);€òòHenson€v.€UnitedÏStatesóó,€287€A.2d€106€(D.C.€App.€1972);€òòPreston€v.€Stateóó,€338€A.2d€562€(Del.€1975);€òòDillard€v.ÏStateóó,€931€S.W.2d€157€(Mo.€App.€1996);€òòRios€v.€Stateóó,€718€S.W.2d€730€(Tex.€Crim.€App.€1986).Ì }Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Cordovaóó,€448€A.2d€848€(Conn.€Super.€Ct.€1982);€òòWilliams€v.€Darróó,€603ÏP.2d€1021€(Kan.€App.€1979);€òòState€v.€Brouilletteóó,€286€N.W.2d€702€(Minn.€1979);€òòState€v.€Lemayóó,Ï455€N.W.2d€233€(Wis.€1990);€òòbutóó€òòseeóó€òòPharm€v.€Hatcheróó,€984€F.2d€at€784€(Wisconsin€ruleÏexpressed€in€òòState€v.€Lemayóó€ð ðconflicts€with€federal€case€law.ðð).€€Still€other€courts€hold€that€an€arrestÏwarrant€òòmayóó€trigger€speedy€trial€rights€if€the€defendant€is€ð ðsubject€to€be€tried€on€that€document.ðð€ÏòòState€v.€Geeóó,€471€A.2d€712,€716€(Md.),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€467€U.S.€1244,€104€S.Ct.€3519,€82€L.Ed.2dÏ827€(1984).Ì ”Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Although€we€cited€to€this€statute€in€dealing€with€the€speedy€trial€issue€in€òòWoodóó,€òòsupraóó,Ïwe€quoted€only€the€portion€regarding€indictments€and€presentments.€€924€S.W.2d€at€345.Ì 4Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€State€asserts€that€the€defendant€was€not€ð ðarrestedðð€in€the€traditional€senseÏbecause€he€was€already€in€custody€when€served€with€the€warrant€and€that,€therefore,€the€speedyÏtrial€analysis€was€not€implicated€until€the€indictment€in€September€of€1992.€€We€reject€thisÏcontention;€as€we€have€discussed,€the€interests€protected€by€a€speedy€trial€were€certainlyÏimplicated€when€he€was€served€with€the€arrest€warrants.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòSmith€v.€Hooeyóó,€393€U.S.€374,Ï87€S.Ct.€575,€21€L.Ed.2d€607€(1969)(speedy€trial€interests€apply€to€defendant€alreadyÏincarcerated€on€unrelated€charges).Ì ‚Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€This€appears€to€be€the€prevailing€view€in€a€majority€of€jurisdictions.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€LaFave€&ÏIsrael,€òòCriminal€Procedureóó,€Vol.€2€ðð€18.5€at€429€(1984).Ì ÑÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Finally,€we€note€that€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€expressed€concern€with€regard€to€theÏsufficiency€of€the€indictment€after€determining€that€it€was€issued€after€the€statute€of€limitations€butÏdid€not€allege€facts€indicating€when€the€prosecution€was€commenced.€€We€since€have€held€inÏòòState€v.€Messamoreóó,€937€S.W.2d€916€(Tenn.€1996),€that€an€indictment€issued€after€the€applicableÏstatute€of€limitations€need€not€allege€facts€to€establish€that€the€prosecution€was€timelyÏcommenced€by€another€method.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€(ÔÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÑ  ћр ÑÑ7€¢ XXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑØ ØÓ&€XÐd&Óœ›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€œNASHVILLEÌà@ à(HEARD€AT€CHATTANOOGA)›ÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€ò òòòFOR€PUBLICATIONó óóóÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àœò òòòFiled:€€November€17,€1997ó óóóÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellant,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€DAVIDSON€CRIMINALÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€€THOMAS€H.€SHRIVER,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà à€€€€€JUDGEÌDEMETRIUS€DEWAYNE€UTLEY,à à)ÌÙ€/ÙßR€+,*A1-j|?õ^` à. `€€@ÿRßà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellee.à àà àà à)à àNo.€01„S„01„9604„CR„00120ÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòFor€Appellant:à àà àà àà àà àFor€Appellee:ó óóóÌÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà àà àà àà àà àDavid€BakerÌAttorney€General€&€Reporter€€€€€à àà àà àAssistant€Public€DefenderÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TennesseeÌMichael€E.€MooreÌSolicitor€GeneralÌÌGordon€W.€SmithÌAssociate€Solicitor€GeneralÌÌDarian€B.€TaylorÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌVictor€S.€Johnson,€IIIÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌWilliam€R.€ReedÌAssistant€District€AttorneyÌFranklin,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÌò òÔ€(„Ôà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÔ€(XÔÌÌÌREVERSED€AND€REMANDED›ÌTO€THE€TRIAL€œCOURTà àà àà àà àà àà àANDERSON,€C.J.›ÇÓÓà àThe€question€to€be€decided€in€this€appeal€is€whether€the€defendant€wasÏdenied€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial€as€required€under€the€Sixth€Amendment€to€theÏUnited€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€ðð€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€ToÏanswer€that€question,€we€must€determine€the€type€of€state€action€which€willÏengage€the€defendantððs€right€to€a€speedy€trial.× ƒ- ××  ×ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€speedy€trial€right€was€engagedÏby€the€issuance€of€an€arrest€warrant€against€the€defendant€and€that€a€delay€ofÏfive€and€one„half€years€from€the€issuance€of€the€arrest€warrant€was€a€violation€ofÏthe€defendantððs€constitutional€right€to€a€speedy€trial.€€As€a€result,€the€trial€court€Ïdismissed€the€armed€robbery€charge.€€The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€affirmed.ÌÌà àAfter€a€review€of€applicable€federal€and€state€authority,€we€conclude€thatÏthe€issuance€of€an€arrest€warrant€alone€does€not€trigger€a€speedy€trial€analysisÏand€that€the€right€to€a€speedy€trial€is€not€implicated€until€there€is€an€arrest€or€aÏformal€grand€jury€accusation.€€In€this€case,€there€was€a€delay€of€eight€monthsÏfrom€the€service€of€the€arrest€warrant€to€the€argument€on€the€motion€for€speedyÏtrial.€€Because€the€delay€is€not€presumptively€prejudicial€under€òòBarker€v.€Wingoóó,Ï407€U.S.€514,€92€S.Ct.€2182,€33€L.Ed.2d€101€(1972),€we€conclude€that€theÍdefendantððs€right€to€a€speedy€trial€was€not€violated€under€the€United€States€orÏTennessee€Constitutions.€€ÌÌà àWe€also€conclude,€however,€that€the€five„year€delay€from€the€commissionÏof€the€offense€to€the€arrest,€raises€due€process€concerns€under€the€UnitedÏStates€and€Tennessee€Constitutions,€and€that€a€due€process€analysis€isÏrequired€as€to€whether€the€delay€caused€substantial€prejudice€to€theÏdefendantððs€right€to€a€fair€trial,€and€whether€the€delay€was€an€intentional€deviceÏto€gain€a€tactical€advantage€over€the€accused.€€Because€this€issue€was€notÏheard€in€the€courts€below€and€no€record€was€developed,€we€reverse€theÏjudgment€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedingsÏconsistent€with€this€Opinion.ÌÌà@ àò òòòBACKGROUNDó óóóÌà àOn€June€4,€1987,€a€criminal€arrest€warrant€for€armed€robbery€was€issuedÏfor€the€defendant,€Demetrius€Dewayne€Utley,€for€an€alleged€offense€committedÏon€May€27,€1987,€in€Davidson€County,€Tennessee.€€The€defendant€was€notÏserved€with€the€warrant€until€June€of€1992,€even€though€he€had€been€in€theÏStateððs€custody€for€unrelated€convictions€for€the€majority€of€the€five€years.€€AfterÏthe€return€of€an€indictment€in€September€of€1992,€the€defendant€moved€toÏdismiss€the€charge€because€he€had€been€denied€his€constitutional€right€to€aÍspeedy€trial.€€The€motion€was€filed€in€December€of€1992€and€granted€inÏFebruary€of€1993.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€concluded€that€the€speedy€trial€right€was€triggered€by€theÏissuance€of€the€arrest€warrant€in€1987,€despite€the€fact€that€the€defendant€wasÏnot€arrested€or€indicted€until€1992.€€The€court€found€that€the€five€and€one„halfÏyear€period€was€ð ðintolerable€and€egregious,ðð€particularly€since€the€defendantÏhad€been€in€the€custody€of€the€state.€€After€concluding€that€the€defendant€hadÏbeen€prejudiced,€the€trial€court€dismissed€the€armed€robbery€charge.€€The€CourtÏof€Criminal€Appeals€agreed€that€the€issuance€of€the€arrest€warrant€triggered€theÏright€to€a€speedy€trial.€€After€applying€the€four„factor€analysis€in€òòBarker€v.€Wingoóó,Ïòòsupraóó,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€concluded€that€the€defendantððs€right€to€aÏspeedy€trial€had€been€violated.€ÌÌà àThe€State€argues€that€the€speedy€trial€right€is€not€implicated€until€a€formalÏgrand€jury€accusation€or€the€restraint€provided€by€an€actual€arrest,€and€that€priorÏto€these€events,€the€defendant€is€protected€by€the€statute€of€limitations€and€theÏright€to€due€process.€€The€defendant€maintains€that€the€lower€courts€correctlyÏdetermined€that€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial€had€been€violated.€€We€granted€theÏStateððs€application€to€appeal€to€consider€this€important€issue.€ÌÌà@ àò òòòSPEEDY€TRIALó óóóÌà àThe€Sixth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€provides€in€partÏthat€ð ðin€all€criminal€prosecutions,€the€accused€shall€enjoy€the€right€to€a€speedyÏand€public€trial.ðð€€U.S.€Const.€amend.€VI.€€This€provision€is€applicable€to€theÏstates€through€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution.€ÏòòKlopfer€v.€North€Carolinaóó,€386€U.S.€213,€87€S.Ct.€988,€18€€L.Ed.2d€1€(1967).€ÏThe€Tennessee€Constitution€also€provides€that€ð ðin€prosecutions€by€indictment€orÏpresentment€[the€accused€has€the€right€to]€a€speedy€public€trial.ðð€€Tenn.€Const.ÏArt.€I,€ðð€9.€€€The€right€to€a€speedy€trial€is€also€statutory€in€Tennessee:€€ð ðIn€allÏcriminal€prosecutions,€the€accused€is€entitled€to€a€speedy€trial....ðð€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„14„101€(1990).€ÌÌà àThe€purpose€of€the€speedy€trial€guarantee€is€to€protect€the€accusedÏagainst€oppressive€pre„trial€incarceration,€the€anxiety€and€concern€due€toÏunresolved€criminal€charges,€and€the€risk€that€evidence€will€be€lost€or€memoriesÏdiminished.€€òòDoggett€v.€United€Statesóó,€505€U.S.€647,€654,€112€S.Ct.€2686,€2692,Ï120€L.Ed.2d€520€(1992).€€In€òòBarker€v.€Wingoóó,€òòsupraóó,€the€Supreme€CourtÏestablished€four€factors€to€consider€in€evaluating€a€speedy€trial€issue:€€theÏlength€of€the€delay,€the€reason€for€the€delay,€the€defendantððs€assertion€of€theÏright,€and€the€prejudice€suffered€by€the€defendant€from€the€delay.€€404€U.S.€atÏ530,€92€S.Ct.€at€2192;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Bishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€81,€83„85€(Tenn.Ï1973)€(adopting€òòBarkeróóanalysis).ÌÌà àThe€threshold€question€in€this€case€is€what€state€action€triggers€speedyÏtrial€analysis.€€In€òòUnited€States€v.€Marionóó,€404€U.S.€307,€320,€92€S.Ct.€455,€463,Ï30€L.Ed.2d€468€(1971),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€said€that€ð ðit€is€either€aÏformal€indictment€or€information€or€else€the€actual€restraint€imposed€by€arrestÏand€holding€to€answer€a€criminal€charge€that€engage€the€particular€protectionsÏof€the€speedy€trial€provisions.€...ðð€€Although€not€confronted€with€the€issue€of€anÏarrest€warrant,€the€Court€said:ÌÓÓÌà8 àòò[W]e€decline€to€extend€the€reach€of€the€amendment€to€the€periodÏprior€to€arrest.€€Until€this€event€occurs,€a€citizen€suffers€no€restraintsÏon€his€liberty€and€is€not€the€subject€of€public€accusations:€hisÏsituation€does€not€compare€with€that€of€a€defendant€who€has€beenÏarrested€and€held€to€answeróó.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÓÓ404€U.S.€at€321„22,€92€S.Ct.€at€463„64€(emphasis€added);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòDoggettóó,Ï505€U.S.€at€655,€112€S.Ct.€at€2692€(ð ðarrest,€indictment€or€other€officialÏaccusationðð).ÌÌà àFrom€the€time€it€was€decided,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€hasÏfollowed€òòMarionóó.€€In€òòState€v.€Woodóó,€924€S.W.2d€342€(Tenn.€1996),€we€held€thatÏthe€defendant,€who€was€charged€in€a€sealed€grand€jury€presentment,€was€anÏð ðaccusedðð€for€purposes€of€the€speedy€trial€provision€because€he€was€ð ðfaced€withÏa€formal€accusation.ðð€€We€stressed€that€it€is€ð ðeither€a€formal€indictment€orÏinformation€or€else€the€actual€restraint€imposed€by€arrest€and€holding€to€answerÍa€criminal€chargeðð€that€triggers€the€speedy€trial€analysis.€€€Likewise,€in€òòState€v.ÏBakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€352,€354€(Tenn.€1981),€we€relied€on€òòMarionóó€in€holding€that€œÏð ðno›€speedy€trial€rights€arise€until€after€formal€accusation,€either€by€arrest€or€byÏgrand€jury€action.ðð× ƒ5 ××  ×ÌÌà àAlthough€we€have€not€specifically€addressed€the€issue€in€this€Court,€otherÏstate€courts€have.€€The€majority€view€of€other€state€and€federal€jurisdictions€isÏthat€the€issuance€of€an€arrest€warrant€or€complaint€does€not€invoke€speedy€trialÏrights.œ× ƒ7 ××  ×›€€For€example,€the€Connecticut€Supreme€Court€observed€in€òòState€v.ÏCrawfordóó:€ÌÓÓÌà8 à[With€respect€to€an€intermediate€courtððs€decision,]€we€do€notÏnecessarily€agree€with€the€conclusion€.€.€.€that€the€issuance€of€anÏarrest€warrant€in€and€of€itself€triggers€the€sixth€amendment€right€ofÏa€person€not€yet€arrested€to€a€speedy€trial.€€This€conclusion€doesÏnot€comport€with€the€purpose€of€the€sixth€amendment.€€ððTheÏspeedy€trial€guarantee€is€designed€to€minimize€the€possibility€ofÏlengthy€incarceration€prior€to€trial,€to€reduce€the€lesser,€butÏnonetheless€substantial,€impairment€of€liberty€imposed€on€anÏaccused€while€released€on€bail,€and€to€shorten€the€disruption€ofÏlife€caused€by€arrest€and€the€presence€of€unresolved€charges.ððÌÌÌÓÓ521€A.2d€at€1039,€n.€13€(quoting€in€part€òòUnited€States€v.€MacDonaldóó,€456€U.S.Ï1,€8,€102€S.Ct.€1497,€71€L.Ed.2d€696€(1982)).€ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€some€courts€have€held€that€an€arrest€warrant€orÏcomplaint€does€trigger€speedy€trial€protection.€€In€òòState€v.€Holtslanderóó,€629€P.2dÏ702€(Idaho€1981),€the€court,€applying€its€state€constitutional€right€to€a€speedyÏtrial,€held€that€an€arrest€warrant€constitutes€a€formal€charge€and€that€the€right€toÏa€speedy€trial€engages€upon€the€issuance€of€a€formal€charge€or€arrest,Ïwhichever€comes€first.œ× ƒ8 ××  ×›€€ÌÌà àLike€the€other€courts€that€follow€the€majority€view,€this€Court€hasÏdetermined€that€a€warrant€alone€does€not€trigger€speedy€trial€analysis;€to€theÏcontrary,€a€formal€grand€jury€action€or€the€actual€restraints€of€an€arrest€areÏrequired.€€òòWoodóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€345;€òòBakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€at€353.€€We€haveÏfollowed€òòMarionóóððs€lead,€reasoning€that€it€is€at€this€stage€of€arrest€and€grand€juryÏaction€that€the€significant€interests€served€by€the€right€to€a€speedy€trial€are€mostÏdirectly€implicated:€the€protection€against€oppressive€pre„trial€incarceration€andÍthe€reduction€of€anxiety€and€concern€caused€by€unresolved€charges.€€€òòSeeóóÏòòMarionóó,€404€U.S.€at€321„22,€92€S.Ct.€at€463„64.€€Moreover,€as€we€and€otherÏcourts€have€recognized,€a€defendant€has€other€protections€during€delays€priorÏto€arrest,€in€particular,€the€applicable€statute€of€limitations€and€the€right€to€dueÏprocess.€€As€we€noted€in€òòBakeróó,€ÌÓÓÌà8 àprior€to€formal€accusation,€the€defendantððs€rights€are€protected€byÏthe€statute€of€limitations.€.€.€.€[œD]elay›€may€[also]€occur€in€such€aÏmanner€that€the€defendantððs€Fifth€Amendment€right€to€due€processÌà à„„€in€contrast€to€the€Sixth€Amendment€right€to€speedy€trial€„„€is€violated.€€ÌÌÌÓÓ614€S.W.2d€at€354€(citing,€òòMarionóó,€404€U.S.€at€322„25,€92€S.Ct.€at€464,€andÏòòUnited€States€v.€Lovascoóó,€431€U.S.€783,€97€S.Ct.€2044,€52€L.Ed.2d€752€(1977)).Ì€€Ìà àThe€defendant€argues,€however,€that€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals,€inÏdeciding€that€the€right€to€a€speedy€trial€is€triggered€by€the€issuance€of€an€arrestÏwarrant,€properly€relied€upon€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„2„104€(1990),€which€statesÏin€part€that€ÌÓÓÌà8 à[a]€prosecution€is€commenced,€within€the€meaning€of€this€chapter,Ïby€finding€an€indictment€or€presentment,€òòthe€issuing€of€a€warrantóó,Ïbinding€over€the€offender,€by€the€filing€of€an€information€asÏprovided€in€chapter€3€of€this€title,€or€by€making€an€appearance€.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÓÓ(Emphasis€added).€€But,€we€think€the€reliance€is€misplaced€because€this€statuteÏspecifically€pertains€to€the€statute€of€limitations€governing€offenses€and€when€aÍprosecution€is€commenced€for€that€purpose.× ƒ: ××  ×€€€There€is€a€completely€separateÏstatute€governing€an€accusedððs€right€to€speedy€trial€which€does€not€contain€aÏspecific€triggering€mechanism.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„14„101€(1990)€(ð ðInÏall€criminal€prosecutions,€the€accused€is€entitled€to€a€speedy€trialðð).€€Still€anotherÏstatute,€which€sets€forth€the€methods€of€prosecution,€states€that€ÌÓÓÌà8 à[œn]o›€person€shall€be€put€to€answer€any€criminal€charge,€but€byÏpresentment,€indictment€or€impeachment;€provided,€that€inÏaccordance€with€the€provisions€of€this€chapter,€an€accusedÏrepresented€by€an€attorney€may€waive€his€right€to€be€tried€uponÏpresentment€or€indictment€and€consent€to€prosecution€byÏinformation.€€ÌÌÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„3„101€(1990).€€Accordingly,€it€is€clear€that€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„2„104€does€not€support€the€broad€proposition€advanced€by€theÏdefendant€and€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals.€€Similarly,€because€due€processÏrights€also€protect€against€unreasonable€delays,€we€reject€the€contention€thatÏallowing€the€issuance€of€a€warrant€to€commence€the€prosecution€for€theÏpurpose€of€the€statute€of€limitations€but€not€trigger€the€right€to€a€speedy€trial€isÏð ðmanifestly€unfair.ðð€€ÌÌÑ , ÑÑ   ÑÑ  ÑÑ€) u` Ñà àThe€defendant€also€relies€on€the€advisory€commission€comments€to€RuleÏ4€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure,€which€governs€arrest€warrantsÏand€summons:ÌÓÓÌà8 à[œT]he›€form€of€the€arrest€warrant,€as€set€out€in€Rule€4(c)(1),€makesÏno€distinction€between€warrants€issued€for€persons€not€yetÏarrested€and€those€warrants€issued€for€persons€already€arrestedÏwithout€a€warrant.€.€.€.€Such€a€warrant€serves€a€dual€function,€first,Ïas€the€authority€for€an€arrest€(where€an€arrest€has€not€alreadyÏbeen€lawfully€made)€and,€secondly,€as€a€statement€of€the€chargeÏwhich€the€accused€is€called€upon€to€answer.€.€.€.€€òòThe€command€toÏarrest€is€obviously€surplusage€where€the€warrant€is€directedÏagainst€one€already€in€custody;€but€a€warrant€in€such€cases€stillÏserves€as€the€official€charging€instrument,€issued€after€a€judicialÏfinding€of€probable€cause,€and€gives€notice€of€the€charge€whichÏmust€be€answeredóó.ÌÌÌÓÓ(Emphasis€added).€€Neither€Rule€4€nor€the€advisory€comments€address€the€rightÏto€a€speedy€trial.€€Moreover,€in€spite€of€the€reference€to€an€ð ðofficial€chargingÏinstrument,ðð€it€is€clear€that€the€underlined€passage€pertains€to€an€accused€whoÏhas€already€been€arrested,€which€is€consistent€with€what€has€been€held€toÏtrigger€the€speedy€trial€right.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Bakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€at€353.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€in€our€view€the€defendantððs€right€to€a€speedy€trial€wasÏtriggered€when€he€was€served€with€the€arrest€warrant€and€arrested€in€June€ofÏ1992,× ƒ; ××  ×€and€not€when€the€warrant€was€issued€in€June€of€1987.€€Although€theÍcase€was€dismissed€before€a€trial€date€was€set,€the€motion€was€argued€inÏFebruary€of€1993;€thus,€the€delay€was€between€arrest€and€dismissal,Ïapproximately€eight€months.€€ÌÌà àWhile€€such€a€delay€must€approach€one€year€to€trigger€the€òòBarker€v.ÏWingoóó€analysis,€the€line€of€demarcation€depends€on€the€nature€of€the€case.€€TheÏpresumption€that€pre„trial€delay€has€prejudiced€the€accused€intensifies€overÏtime.€€òòDoggettóó,€505€U.S.€at€652,€112€S.Ct.€at€2691.€€ÌÌà àHere,€the€length€of€time€was€not€presumptively€prejudicial€within€theÏmeaning€of€òòBarker€v.€Wingoóó.€€The€defendant€was€arrested€in€June,€indicted€inÏSeptember,€and€arraigned€in€October€of€1992.€€After€asserting€his€right€to€aÏspeedy€trial€by€moving€to€dismiss€the€charges€in€December€of€1992,€the€motionÏwas€granted€in€February€of€1993.€€òòCompareóó€òòState€v.€Woodóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€346Ï(delay€of€thirteen€years).€€There€was€no€ð ðpresumptively€prejudicialðð€delay€underÏthe€facts€of€this€case.€€Therefore,€without€addressing€the€remaining€factors,€weÏconclude€that€the€defendantððs€right€to€a€speedy€trial€was€not€violated€under€theÏUnited€States€or€Tennessee€Constitutions.€€€ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òDUE€PROCESSó óóóÌà àA€delay€that€does€not€implicate€the€speedy€trial€right€may€still€raise€dueÏprocess€concerns€under€the€Fifth€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€to€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution€and€Article€I,€ðð€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€As€theÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court€said€in€òòMarionóó,€ð ð[œt]he›€Due€Process€Clause€of€theÏFifth€Amendment€would€require€dismissal€.€.€.€if€it€were€shown€at€trial€that€theÏpre„indictment€delay€.€.€.€caused€substantial€prejudice€to€the€[defendantððs]€rightsÏto€a€fair€trial€and€that€the€delay€was€an€intentional€device€to€gain€tacticalÏadvantage€over€the€accused.ðð€€404€U.S.€at€324„25,€92€S.Ct.€at€465.€€Similarly,€inÏòòState€v.€Grayóó,€917€S.W.2d€668,€671€(Tenn.€1996),€we€noted:ÌÓÓÌà8 à[œb]efore›€an€accused€is€entitled€to€relief€based€upon€the€delayÏbetween€the€offense€and€the€initiation€of€adversarial€proceedings,Ïthe€accused€must€prove€that€(a)€there€was€a€delay,€(b)€the€accusedÏsustained€actual€prejudice€as€a€direct€and€proximate€result€of€theÏdelay,€and€(c)€the€State€caused€the€delay€in€order€to€gain€tacticalÏadvantage€over€or€to€harass€the€accused.ÌÌÌÓÓ(quoting,€òòState€v.€Dykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€250,€255€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990)).× ƒ< ××  ×€€ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Grayóó,€we€held€that€a€42€year€pre„accusatorial€delay,€which€weÏdefined€as€the€period€between€the€offense€and€its€disclosure€to€law€enforcementÍofficers,€violated€the€defendantððs€right€to€due€process.€€In€so€doing€we€found€thatÏrequiring€the€defendant€to€prove€ð ðnot€only€that€a€delay€has€caused€prejudice€butÏalso€that€the€State€orchestrated€the€delay€in€order€to€obtain€a€tacticalÏadvantageðð€as€required€under€òòMarionóó„òòDykesóó€was€ð ðextremely€one„sidedðð€andÏð ðœplace[d›]€a€daunting,€almost€insurmountable€[€]€burden€on€the€accused.ðð€€òòIdóó.€atÏ673.€€Thus,€given€the€unique€facts€in€òòGrayóó,€we€held€that€in€analyzing€a€pre„accusatorial€delay€during€which€the€state€was€unaware€of€the€commission€of€theÏcrime,€the€trial€court€must€consider€only€the€length€of€the€delay,€the€reason€forÏthe€delay,€and€the€degree€of€prejudice€to€the€accused.€€We€indicated,€however,Ïthat€in€other€cases€involving€a€pre„arrest€delay,€the€due€process€inquiryÏcontinues€to€be€guided€by€òòMarionóó.€€€€ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€neither€the€parties€nor€the€trial€court€analyzed€the€delayÏbetween€the€commission€of€the€offense€and€the€defendantððs€arrest€in€June€ofÏ1992€as€a€due€process€issue€under€òòMarionóó,€and€there€was€no€evidence€offeredÏas€to€prejudice€suffered€by€the€defendant.€€Instead,€the€trial€court,€relying€uponÏòòDoggettóó,€òòsupraóó,€in€which€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€said€that€ð ðaffirmative€proof€ofÏparticularized€prejudice€is€not€essential€to€every€speedy€trial€issue,ðð€mentionedÏthe€òòpossibleóó€loss€by€the€State€of€a€photographic€line„up€and€the€òòpossibleóóÏdifficulty€the€defendant€would€have€in€supporting€an€alibi€defense.€€Similarly,€theÏCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€stressed€the€possibility€that€the€defendant€could€haveÏreceived€a€sentence€concurrent€to€the€one€he€was€serving€on€an€unrelatedÍconviction.€€òòSeeóó€òòSmith€v.€Hooeyóó,€393€U.S.€at€379,€89€S.Ct.€at€577€(in€discussingÏspeedy€trial€issue,€Court€noted€possibility€that€defendant€in€prison€might€receiveÏa€sentence€at€least€partially€concurrent€with€the€one€being€served).ÌÌà àAlthough€òòDoggettóó€may€have€relaxed€the€need€for€showing€prejudice€inÏrelation€to€a€sixth€amendment€speedy€trial€claim,€it€did€not€change€the€need€toÏshow€actual€prejudice€in€relation€to€a€due€process€claim.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Grayóó,Ï917€S.W.2d€at€673;€òòPharm€v.€Hatcheróó,€984€F.2d€at€786€n.€5.€€Thus,€the€factorsÏcited€by€the€lower€courts,€while€certainly€potential€forms€of€prejudice,€cannot€beÏpresumed€and€instead€must€be€substantiated€by€the€defendant€with€evidence€inÏthe€record.€€òòDillard€v.€Stateóó,€931€S.W.2d€at€163.€€Moreover,€the€due€processÏinquiry€under€€òòMarionóó€also€requires€proof€regarding€the€Stateððs€use€of€the€delayÏto€gain€tactical€advantage.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€the€case€must€be€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÏproceedings€on€this€issue.€€If€the€defendant€shows€that€his€right€to€due€processÏwas€violated€under€the€standard€set€forth€in€òòMarionóó,€the€trial€court€shall€dismissÏthe€charge;€otherwise,€the€trial€should€proceed.ÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONó óóóÌà àIn€our€view,€the€defendantððs€constitutional€right€to€a€speedy€trial€wasÏtriggered€at€the€time€of€his€arrest€and€not€at€the€time€of€the€issuance€of€the€arrestÍwarrant,€and€the€eight„month€delay€after€the€actual€arrest€did€not€deprive€him€ofÏhis€constitutional€right€to€a€speedy€trial.€€ÌÌà àWe€further€conclude,€however,€that€the€five„year€delay€from€theÏcommission€of€the€offense€to€the€defendantððs€arrest€raises€due€processÏconcerns€and€requires€a€due€process€analysis€under€the€United€States€andÏTennessee€Constitutions.€€Because€this€issue€was€not€raised€or€heard€in€theÏcourts€below,€we€reverse€the€judgment€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€forÏfurther€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.× ƒ= ××  ×Ìà à€Ìà àCosts€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€defendant,€Demetrius€DewayneÏUtley,€for€which€execution€may€issue.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àE.€RILEY€ANDERSON,€CHIEF€JUSTICEÌÌÌÌÌò òConcur:ó ó€€ÌÌDrowota,€Reid,€Birch,€and€Holder,€JJ.ÌÌ