ÿWPCJ- …# VUNa %¯ 0 6µbëUHów@; 4{  0Rž 0µð 0D¥ Bé 0J 0TP 0^¤ 0h 0rj 0|Ü 0†X Þ D3æ 0 1u© 0@ 1m^ 0cË 0d.U>’nÐU*>U*hB)’DC» AMþ3KO~*ÍÝ÷ ÔÞ{Vv~nvÓì 0w¿& 0Š6' 0 À' 0´`( 0Ç) 0ÛÛ) 0ï¶* AO¥+Æô+ 0Dº, D/þ, B--˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLdÒ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(mê$¡¡ÒÀ°Ò- ù-<à09Z 0Courier (W1) Regular ÙÚÛÜVÝDÞDßUàUáDâÓ€Úƒç"3|xí(*3?$©©Ý ƒmê!ÝÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý(FG2"¨$¤¤Ý ƒmê!ÝÒÀ°ÒÝ  ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀÀÒà Ø àÔ€ôª°ôXXÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó d2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô 'ÿÿdxd2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô!#$%&'(+ ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò/tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;s˜$´´Ô2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  àP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman dÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d;;;;7Border 1dd€-<Cþÿ << Gÿÿ )Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÒ ! ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔÔ€9ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€9XÔÌÌò òDecemberÏ29,€1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€9ôÔAppellateÏCourt€Clerkó ó EÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ € ÒÒ À Òà àÔ€7ôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔòòUnited€States€v.€Whren›óó,€__U.S.€__,€116€œS.Ct›.€1769,€œ135€L.Ed›.œ2d›€œ89›€(1996).€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ € ÒÒ À Òà àÔ€7ôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔòòState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€430€(Tenn.€1989).Ì ÓÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ € ÒÒ À Òà àÔ€7ôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔOral€argument€was€heard€in€this€case€in€Chattanooga,€Hamilton€County,€as€part€of€thisÏCourtððs€S.C.A.L.E.S.€(ò òSó óupreme€ò òCó óourt€ò òAó ódvancing€ò òLó óegal€ò òEó óducation€for€ò òSó ótudents)€project.€Ô€7ÔÌ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ € ÒÒ À Òà àÔ€7ôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔRule€37(b)(2)(i),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.,€provides€in€pertinent€part€as€follows:Ìà8 àà8 à(b)€An€appeal€lies€from€any€order€or€judgment€in€a€criminalÏproceeding€where€the€law€provides€for€such€appeal,€and€from€anyÏjudgment€of€conviction:€(2)€Upon€a€plea€of€guilty€or€noloÏcontendere€if:€(i)€Defendant€entered€into€a€plea€agreement€underÏRule€11(e)€but€explicitly€reserved€with€the€consent€of€the€state€andÏof€the€court€the€right€to€appeal€a€certified€question€of€law€that€isÏdispositive€of€the€case.€.€.€.Ô€7ÔÌ “Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ € ÒÒ À Òà àÔ€7ôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔThe€Fourth€Amendment€is€applicable€to€the€states€through€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€ÏòòMapp€v.€Ohioóó,€367€U.S.€643,€655,€81€S.Ct.€1684,€1691,€6€L.Ed.2d€1081€(1961).Ì “Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ € ÒÒ À Òà àÔ€7ôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔThe€Court€noted€that€selective€enforcement€based€on€impermissible€criteria€would€raiseÏequal€protection€issues.€€òòWhren›óó,€_____€U.S.€at€_____,€116€S.Ct.€at€1774.Ì LÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ € ÒÒ À Òà àÔ€7ôÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔòòProuse›óó,€440€U.S.€at€œ654,›€99€S.Ct.€at€1396€(citations€and€internal€quotations€omitted)€.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò(OÞ{$µµà0  àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0` (#(#à(b²D$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xÓñ$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒÆ‚$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿù…$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³¶4$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Ǫ»$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€7ÔÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÖ€8ÖÑ  ÑÑ € ÑÑ\R AØ'\ћрÑÑ7€LXXdÈdÈ7ÑÔ€9ÔØ ØÓ&€::XÐd&Ӝـ€ÙßR€=><A1-j|` ¸ `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌà@ à(HEARD€AT€CHATTANOOGA)̛̜̜à àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòò òFOR€PUBLICATIONóó›ó óÌœÌSTATE›€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà àœ(€€€ò òFiledó ó:€ò òDecember€22,€1997ó ó›à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àœ(›Ìà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à àà àà àœ(€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€€€Bradley›€CriminalÌà àà àà àà àà àà àœ(›Ìœv.›à àà àà àà àà àœà à(€€€€€Hon.›€Mayo€L.€œMashburn›,€œà àà àà à›à àà àà àà àà àœ(€€€€ÏJudge›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€œ€€€€ÌDAVEY›€JOE€VINEYARD€œà àà àà à(ÌAND›€JIMMY€œLEE€COCKBURN,›à àà àœ(›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ(›Ìà àDefendants„Appellants.à àà àœ(€€€€€€S.Ct.€No.€03S01„9612„CR„00120›ÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff„Appelleeóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendants„Appellantsóó:ÌÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà àà àà àà àà àKenneth€L.€MillerÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àà àLogan,€Thompson,€Miller,ÌÒ € ÒÒ , ÒNashville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àœBilbo›,€Thompson€&€Fisher,€P.C.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœCleveland,›€TennesseeÌMichael€E.€MooreÌSolicitor€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌKaren€M.€œYacuzzo›€€€ÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌJerry€N.€œEstes›ÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌAthens,€TennesseeÌÌJoseph€A.€œRehyansky›€€ÌAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌCleveland,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€9¼Ôòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€9XÔÌÌÌAFFIRMED.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœDROWOTA›,€J.ÌÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ , ÑÑ ` ÑÓ` Ü‚Xh—XÓÓÓà àIn€this€appeal€we€are€asked€to€determine€whether€under€Article€I,€Section€7Ïof€the€Tennessee€Constitution€a€stop€based€upon€probable€cause€is€validÏirrespective€of€the€subjective€motivations€of€the€police€officer€making€the€stop.€ÏThe€defendant€concedes€that€under€the€Fourth€Amendment€to€the€federalÏconstitution,€the€subjective€motivations€of€police€officers€are€irrelevant€so€long€asÏthe€stop€is€otherwise€based€upon€probable€cause.œ× ƒ? ××  ×›€€However,€the€defendant€asksÏus€to€hold€that,€in€this€context,€the€Tennessee€Constitutionððs€prohibition€againstÏunreasonable€searches€and€seizures€is€more€stringent€than€the€FourthÍAmendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution.ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€recognized€that€the€state€constitution€mayÏgrant€greater€protection€from€unreasonable€searches€and€seizures€than€thatÏprovided€by€the€federal€constitution,× ƒ@ ××  ×€but€found€that€the€protection€afforded€in€thisÏcontext€is€the€same€under€both€constitutions.€€Therefore,€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress.€ÌÌà àWe€œconclude€that,›€in€this€context,€œthe›€protection€afforded€by€Article€I,ÏSection€7€of€the€Tennessee€œConstitution›€is€co„extensive€with€the€protectionÏafforded€by€the€Fourth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution.€ÏAccordingly,€a€stop€based€upon€probable€cause€is€valid€under€the€TennesseeÏConstitution,€without€regard€to€the€actual€subjective€motivations€of€police€officers.€ÍAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€is€affirmed.× ƒA ××  ×ò òœÌÌ›à@ àòòFACTUAL€BACKGROUNDóóó óÌà àBoth€defendants,€Davey€Joe€Vineyard€and€Jimmy€Lee€Cockburn,€pledÏguilty€to€possession€of€more€than€10€pounds€of€marijuana€for€resale.€€CockburnÏalso€pled€guilty€to€possession€of€drug€paraphernalia€and€òònoloóó€òòcontendereóó€toÏspeeding.€€Pursuant€to€Rule€œ37(b)(2)(i),× ƒB ××  ×›€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure,Ïthe€defendants€reserved€as€a€dispositive€question€of€law€the€trial€courtððs€refusal€toÏsuppress€the€incriminating€evidence€discovered€in€the€motor€vehicle€occupied€byÏthem€when€they€were€arrested.€€€ÌÌà àThe€only€witness€on€behalf€of€the€State€at€the€suppression€hearing€wasÏDetective€Gates,€a€narcotics€officer€with€the€City€of€Cleveland.€€Sometime€prior€toÏthe€morning€of€May€6,€1994,€Detective€Gates€said€that€he€had€receivedÏinformation€from€an€anonymous€informant€that€a€vehicle€occupied€by€theÏdefendants€would€be€traveling€north€on€Interstate€œ75€(ð ðI„75").›€€The€vehicle€wouldÏpass€through€Bradley€County€en€route€to€an€undisclosed€location,€where€theÏdefendants€would€obtain€a€load€of€marijuana€and€return,€later€that€day,€throughÏBradley€County€bound€for€Georgia.€ÌÌà àAt€approximately€7:00€œa.m.,€on€May€6,€1994,€Detective›€Gates,€along€withÏDetective€Queen,€of€the€narcotics€squad€of€the€Cleveland€city€police€department,Ïwere€conducting€drug€interdiction€surveillance€of€traffic€on€œI„75.€Between€8:00Ïand€8:30€a.m.,›€Gates€saw€the€defendantsðð€vehicle,€a€pickup€truck,€as€it€proceededÏnorthbound.€€He€notified€Officer€Queen€that€he€had€identified€the€vehicle,€and€heÏthen€crossed€I„75€to€a€position€from€which€he€could€watch€the€southbound€traffic.€ÍAt€approximately€9:30€a.m.,€the€vehicle€passed€Gatesðð€position€œtraveling›€south.€ÏDriving€unmarked€police€vehicles,€Gates€and€Queen€followed€the€defendants.€ÏGates€testified€he€had€no€intention€of€stopping€the€defendantsðð€vehicle€at€that€timeÏbut€was€instead€waiting€for€the€driver€to€commit€a€traffic€violation.€€Gates€said€heÏpaced€the€defendantsðð€vehicle€at€about€75€miles€per€hour,€ten€miles€per€hourÏfaster€than€the€posted€speed€limit.€€Gates€also€observed€the€defendantsðð€vehicleÏmove€from€the€left€lane€to€the€right€lane€without€displaying€a€turn€signal,€andÏabout€one€mile€farther,€the€vehicle€pulled€back€into€the€left€lane€without€a€signal.€ÏAt€that€point,€Gates€radioed€the€head€of€the€narcotics€squad,€Lieutenant€Wilcoxin,Ïwho,€accompanied€by€Officer€Young,€was€stopped€in€a€marked€police€car€in€theÏhighway€median€some€distance€south.€€Gates€told€Wilcoxin€they€were€planning€toÏstop€the€defendants€at€Exit€25€and€asked€him€to€check€the€speed€of€theÏdefendantsðð€vehicle€by€radar€when€it€passed€his€location.€€Wilcoxin€attempted€toÏcheck€the€speed€by€radar,€but€because€of€the€traffic,€was€unable€to€do€so.€€WhenÏthe€defendantsðð€vehicle€passed€by€the€marked€police€car,€Gates€saw€VineyardÏlooking€back€at€it.ÌÌà àWilcoxin€pulled€onto€the€highway€and€turned€on€his€blue€lights.€€As€theÏdefendantsðð€vehicle€drove€to€the€side€of€the€highway€at€Exit€25,€Gates€saw€theÏpassenger,€Vineyard,€ð ðmoving€aboutðð€in€the€vehicle€ð ðdoing€something€with€hisÏhands.ðð€€Gates€gave€this€account€of€the€stop:ÌÓÓà8 àDue€to€his€actions,€when€we€stopped,€they€was€ordered€to€put€theirÏhands€in€view€where€we€could€see€them.€€They€did€not€comply€withÏthe€first€order.€€At€this€time€weapons€were€drawn.€€I€believe€three,Ïthree€of€the€officers,€myself,€Queen€and€Young€did€pull€our€weaponsÏas€we€did€approach€the€vehicle.€€They€were€ordered€to€keep€theirÏhands€up€...€€As€we€approached€with€the€windows€down€we€had€aÏstrong€odor€of€marijuana€about€the€vehicle.€€It€was€real,€real€strong.ÌÌÌÓÓà àDetective€Gates€testified€that€the€defendants€got€out€with€their€hands€onÏthe€rail€of€the€truck€and€told€the€officers€there€were€no€weapons€or€drugs€in€theÏtruck.€€Wilcoxin€then€asked,€ð ðDo€you€give€us€consent€to€œsearch?ðð›€to€whichÏCockburn€answered,€ð ðYes€go€ahead.ðð€€The€marijuana,€which€was€the€object€ofÏthe€motion€to€suppress,€was€located€in€the€cab€of€the€truck€only€partiallyÏconcealed€in€a€plastic€bag.€€The€vehicle€was€stopped€approximately€seven€milesÏfrom€the€point€where€the€officers€began€following€it.ÌÌà àDetective€Gates€testified€that€he€had€pursued€the€defendantsðð€vehicle€ð ðwithÏthe€expectation€and€hope€that€there€would€be€a€traffic€violation€to€give€.€.€.€aÏreason€to€pull€the€vehicle€œover.ðð€€ð ðDrug€interdictionðð€consists€of€surveillance€of€theÏhighway€and€the€stop€of€certain€vehicles€for€traffic€violations€so€that€the€officersÏcould€observe€the€occupants€and€the€contents€of€the€vehicles€and€try€to€obtainÏpermission€to€search€the€vehicles€for€illegal€drugs.€€He€stated€that€he€does€notÏstop€all€traffic€violaters,€and,€at€times,€uses€a€ð ðcourier€profileðð€for€selecting€theÏvehicles€to€be€stopped.€€Detective€Gates€acknowledged€that€uniformed€officersÏon€routine€patrol€usually€do€not€try€to€search€vehicles€stopped€for€traffic€violations.€›€€€ÌÌà àThe€defendants€moved€to€suppress€the€evidence€seized€as€a€result€of€theÏstop,€and€€after€considering€the€proof,€the€trial€judge€denied€the€motion.€€TheÏCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€decision,€concluding€that€theÏstop€was€lawfully€based€upon€probable€cause€to€believe€that€a€traffic€violationÏhad€occurred.€€Thereafter,€we€granted€permission€to€appeal€to€consider€thisÍimportant€question€of€constitutional€law,€and€for€the€reasons€that€follow,€nowÏaffirm€the€decision€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals.ÌÌà@ àò òòòPRETEXTUAL€STOPSóóÌó óà àThe€Fourth€Amendment€œ× ƒC ××  ×›€to€the€United€States€Constitution€guaranteesÏð ð[t]he€right€of€the€people€to€be€secure€in€their€persons,€houses,€papers,€andÏeffects,€against€unreasonable€searches€and€seizures.€.€.€.ðð€€Similarly,€Article€I,ÏSection€7€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€provides€ð ðthat€the€people€shall€beÏsecure€in€their€persons,€houses,€papers€and€possessions,€from€unreasonableÏsearches€and€seizures.€.€.€.ðð€€The€purpose€of€the€prohibition€against€unreasonableÏsearches€and€seizures€under€the€Fourth€Amendment€is€to€ð ðsafeguard€the€privacyÏand€security€of€individuals€against€arbitrary€invasions€of€government€officials.ðð€ÏòòCamara€v.€Municipal€Courtóó,€387€U.S.€523,€528,€87€S.Ct.€1727,€1730,€18€L.Ed.2dÏ930€(1967).€ÌÌà àIn€this€appeal,€the€defendants€urge€this€Court€to€hold€that€the€evidenceÏagainst€them€should€have€been€suppressed€as€the€fruit€of€an€illegal€pretextualÏstop€and€search€of€their€automobile.€€The€defendants€assert€that€because€theÏofficers€initiating€the€stop€were€subjectively€seeking€to€discover€drugs€as€theÏresult€of€an€anonymous€tip,€rather€than€enforce€the€traffic€laws,€the€stop€wasÏpretextual.€€They€ask€the€Court€to€hold€that€pretextual€stops€violate€Article€I,ÏSection€7€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€even€when,€based€upon€the€facts€andÏcircumstances,€the€police€officer€has€probable€cause€to€believe€that€theÏdefendant€has€violated€the€law.€€The€defendants€concede€that€the€stop€in€thisÏcase€does€not€violate€the€Fourth€Amendment.€€Their€only€insistence€is€that€thisÏCourt€should€interpret€Article€I,€Section€7€as€providing€greater€protection€than€theÏFourth€Amendment€as€interpreted€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€in€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Whrenóó,€___€U.S.€___,€116€S.Ct.€1769,€œ135›€L.Ed.2d€œ89›€(1996).€€TheÏState€responds€that€this€Court€should€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€and€hold€that€the€Tennessee€Constitution€provides€no€greater€protectionÏthan€the€Fourth€Amendment€as€interpreted€in€òòWhrenóó.ÌÌà àThough€state€courts€are€free€to€interpret€their€respective€state€constitutionalÏprovisions€as€affording€greater€protections€than€the€ð ðbase€lineðð€level€of€protectionÏguaranteed€by€the€federal€constitution,€this€Court€has€previously€stated€thatÏœð ðArticle›€I,€œSection›€7€is€identical€in€intent€and€purpose€with€the€FourthÏAmendment.ðð€€òòState€v.€Downeyóó,€945€S.W.2d€102,€106€(Tenn.€1997),€quotingÏòòœSneed›€v.€Stateóó,€221€Tenn.€6,€13,€423€S.W.2d€857,€860€(1968).€€Federal€case€lawÏinterpreting€the€Fourth€Amendment€is€to€be€regarded€as€ð ðparticularly€persuasiveððÏwhen€the€scope€and€intent€of€Article€I,€ðð€7€is€at€issue.€€òòIdóó.€€Indeed,€whenÏinterpreting€the€state€constitutional€provision,€this€Court€has€departed€fromÏfederal€precedent€only€when:€(1)€adopting€federal€Fourth€Amendment€standardsÏwould€require€overruling€ð ða€settled€development€of€state€constitutional€law;ðð€andÏ(2)€when€linguistic€differences€justify€distinct€interpretations€of€state€and€federalÏconstitutional€provisions.€€òòState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€430,€435„36€(Tenn.Ï1989)€(probable€cause€standard€for€evaluation€of€affidavit);€€òòState€v.€œLakin›óó,€588ÏS.W.2d€544,€549,€œn.€2›€(Tenn.€1979)€(open€fields€doctrine).ÌÌà àWithout€question,€the€temporary€detention€of€individuals€during€the€stop€ofÏa€vehicle€by€police,€even€if€only€for€a€brief€period€and€for€a€limited€purpose,Ïconstitutes€a€ð ðseizureðð€which€implicates€the€protection€of€both€the€state€andÏfederal€constitutional€provisions.€€€€òòWhrenóó,€___€U.S.€at___,€116€S.Ct.€at€1772;ÏòòDelaware€v.€œProuse›óó,€440€U.S.€648,€654,€99€S.Ct.€1391,€1396,€59€L.Ed.2d€660Ï(1979);€òòState€v.€œPully›óó,€863€S.W.2d€29,€30€(Tenn.€1993).€€As€a€general€rule,Ïhowever,€the€stop€of€an€automobile€is€constitutionally€reasonable,€under€both€€theÏstate€and€federal€constitutions,€if€the€police€have€probable€cause€or€reasonableÏsuspicion€to€believe€that€a€traffic€violation€has€occurred.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àMoreover,€in€òòWhrenóó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€unanimouslyÏrejected€the€proposition€ð ðthat€the€constitutional€reasonableness€of€traffic€stopsÏdepends€on€the€actual€motivations€of€the€individual€officers€involved.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€___ÏU.S.€at€___,€116€S.Ct.€at€1774.€€Instead,€the€Court€€held€that€a€stop€based€uponÏprobable€cause€to€believe€that€provisions€of€the€traffic€code€have€been€violated€isÍconstitutionally€permissible,€despite€the€subjective€motivation€of€the€police€officerÏmaking€the€stop.× ƒD ××  ×€€òòWhrenóó,€œ___›€U.S.€at€œ___,›€116€S.Ct.€at€1774.ÌÌà àIn€that€case,€plainclothes€vice„squad€officers€patrolling€a€ð ðhigh€drug€areaððÏbecame€suspicious€when€they€observed€the€occupants€of€a€truck€stopped€at€anÏintersection.€€Upon€following€the€truck,€the€officers€observed€several€trafficÏviolations.€€When€the€truck€stopped€at€a€traffic€light,€one€officer€approached€theÏvehicle,€identified€himself€as€a€police€officer,€and€directed€the€driver€to€put€theÏvehicle€in€park.€€As€he€approached€the€vehicle,€the€officer€observed€WhrenÏholding€two€large€plastic€bags€of€crack€cocaine.€€The€occupants€of€the€vehicle,Ïincluding€Whren,€were€arrested€and€quantities€of€illegal€drugs€were€seized.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€rejected€Whrenððs€assertion€thatÏsuppression€of€the€evidence€was€required€because€the€stop€was€pretextual.€€TheÏCourt€found€the€stop€valid€under€the€Fourth€Amendment€because€the€officersÍexecuted€the€stop€only€after€developing€probable€cause€to€believe€that€the€driverÏof€the€vehicle€had€violated€the€traffic€code.€€The€Court€held€that€ð ð[œs]ubjective›Ïintentions€play€no€role€in€ordinary,€probable€cause€Fourth€Amendment€analysis.ðð€ÏòòWhrenóó,€__€U.S.€at€___,€116€S.Ct.€at€1774.€€The€existence€of€ð ðprobable€cause€toÏbelieve€that€the€petitioners€had€violated€the€traffic€code€.€.€.€rendered€the€stopÏreasonable€under€the€Fourth€Amendment.ðð€€òòIdóó€at€1777.ÌÌà àWhile€acknowledging€that€earlier€opinions€contained€language€expressingÏð ðdisapproval€of€police€attempts€to€use€valid€bases€of€action€against€citizens€asÏpretexts€for€pursuing€other€investigatory€agendas,ðð€the€Court€emphasized€thatÏeach€of€those€prior€statements€appeared€in€a€case€addressing€potential€abuse€ofÏa€police€practice€that€did€not€require€probable€cause€for€its€initiation,€for€example,Ïan€inventory€search€ð ðused€as€a€ruse€.€.€.€to€discover€incriminating€evidence,ððÏòòFlorida€v.€Wellsóó,€495€U.S.€1,€4,€110€S.Ct.€1632,€1635,€œ109›€L.Ed.2d€œ1›€(1990),€or€aÏwarrantless€administrative€search€undertaken€as€ð ða€ððpretextðð€for€obtainingÏevidence€of€violation€of€.€.€.€penal€laws.ðð€€òòNew€York€v.€Burgeróó,€482€U.S.€691,€716„717,€n.€27,€107€S.Ct.€2636,€265,€n.€27,€œ96›€L.Ed.2d€œ601›€(1987).€€The€CourtÏexplained€that€none€of€those€earlier€statements€endorsed€the€principle€ð ðthatÏulterior€motives€can€invalidate€police€conduct€that€is€justifiable€on€the€basis€ofÏprobable€cause€to€believe€that€a€violation€of€law€has€occurred.ðð€€òòWhrenóó,€___€U.S.Ïat€___,€116€S.Ct.€at€1772.€€The€danger€to€individual€liberty€and€privacy€posed€byÏœpolice›€abuses€discussed€in€the€earlier€decisions€is€not€present€when€the€policeÏaction€at€issue€is€supported€by€probable€cause.€€Despite€the€subjectiveÏmotivations€of€police,€the€ð ðessential€purposeðð€of€the€Fourth€Amendment,Ïimposition€of€a€ð ðstandard€of€reasonableness€upon€the€exercise€of€discretion€by€.€.Ï.€law€enforcement€agents€in€order€to€safeguard€the€privacy€and€security€ofÏindividuals€against€arbitrary€œinvasions,ðð× ƒE ××  ×›€is€entirely€fulfilled€when€a€traffic€stop€isÏinitiated€because€the€officers€have€probable€cause€to€believe€that€a€violation€ofÏthe€law€has€been€committed.€€The€probable€cause€requirement€constrains€theÏexercise€of€police€discretion€and€safeguards€the€citizenry€against€arbitraryÏintrusions.€€òòWhrenóó,€___€U.S.€at€___,€116€S.Ct.€at€1777.ÌÌà àThe€defendants€urge€us€to€reject€the€analysis€of€the€Supreme€Court€inÏòòWhrenóó€and€in€support€of€their€claim,€the€defendants€rely€upon€prior€decisions€ofÏthis€Court€which€they€claim€condemn€pretextual€stops.ÌÌà àIn€òòRobertson€v.€Stateóó,€184€Tenn.€277,€198€S.W.2d€633€(1947),€highwayÏpatrol€officers,€pretending€a€driverððs€license€inspection,€stopped€the€defendantððsÏvehicle€because€the€passenger€ð ðlooked€back€through€the€rear€window€in€a€wayÏthat€made€[the€officers]€suspicious.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€634.€€The€officers€had€no€informationÏthat€the€occupants€were€involved€in€any€illegal€activity,€and€they€observed€noÏviolation€of€the€traffic€code;€consequently,€they€did€not€have€probable€cause.€ÏUpon€stopping€the€vehicle,€the€officers€observed€illegal€liquor€in€the€rear€seat€ofÏthe€vehicle.€€The€Court€held,€ð ðThis€Court€will€not€permit€an€evasion€of€theÏrequirements€of€the€law€with€regard€to€search€warrants€through€the€device,Ïpretext,€or€subterfuge€of€a€pretended€examination€of€a€driverððs€license,ðð€òòid.óó€at€635,Ïwhere€ð ðno€impropriety€in€the€driving€of€the€defendantsðð€carðð€is€observed.€€òòId.óó€atÍ636.€ÌÌà àIn€òòCox€v.€Stateóó,€181€Tenn.€344,€181€S.W.2d€338€(1944),€highway€patrolÏofficers€followed€a€vehicle€operated€by€the€defendant€from€Davidson€County,Ïwhere€the€possession€of€liquor€was€legal,€into€œSumner›€County,€whereÏpossession€was€not€legal.€€The€officers€believed€the€vehicle€was€owned€byÏanother€person€whom€they€suspected€was€involved€in€the€illegal€transportation€ofÏliquor.€€As€in€òòRobertsonóó,€they€stopped€the€vehicle€and€asked€to€see€theÏdefendantððs€driverððs€license.€€And,€as€in€òòRobertsonóó,€the€officers€observed€liquor€inÏthe€front€seat€of€the€vehicle.€€This€Court€held€the€œsuspicionless›€stop€was€aÏviolation€of€the€defendantððs€constitutional€rights€against€unreasonable€seizureÏand€reversed€the€conviction.€€ÌÌà àContrary€to€the€defendantsðð€assertions,€the€decisions€in€òòRobertsonóó€andÏòòCoxóó€did€not€condemn€pretextual€stops.€€Instead,€those€decisions€condemnedÏintrusions€that€were€not€supported€by€probable€cause€or€òòanyóó€level€ofÍindividualized€suspicion.€€Such€intrusions,€as€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏrecognized€in€òòWhrenóó,€allow€unfettered€police€discretion€and€pose€the€greatestÏrisk€of€official€abuse.€€òòRobertsonóó€and€òòCoxóó€also€do€not€support€the€proposition€thatÏthe€state€constitution€is€more€protective,€in€this€context,€than€the€federalÏconstitution.€€Indeed,€those€cases€would€have€been€decided€the€same€underÏfederal€law.€€In€òòœProuse›óó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€aÏœsuspicionless›€traffic€stop€initiated€by€a€police€officer€on€a€ð ðroving€patrolðð€aimed€atÏdetecting€œunlicensed›€drivers€is€constitutionally€impermissible.€€The€Court€statedÏð ðòòexceptóó€in€those€situations€in€which€there€is€òòat€least€œarticulable›€and€reasonableÏsuspicionóó€[that€a€motorist€is€œunlicensed›]€or€that€an€automobile€is€not€registered,€orÏthat€either€the€vehicle€or€an€occupant€is€otherwise€subject€to€seizure€for€violationÏof€law,€stopping€an€automobile€and€detaining€the€driver€in€order€to€check€hisÏlicense€and€the€registration€of€the€automobile€are€unreasonable€under€the€FourthÏAmendment.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€440€U.S.€at€663,€99€S.Ct.€at€1401€(emphasis€added).€€€SinceÏthe€officers€initiating€the€traffic€stops€in€òòRobertsonóó€and€òòCoxóó€did€not€purport€to€haveÏreasonable€suspicion€nor€probable€cause,€those€stops€were€not€valid€underÍeither€the€federal€or€state€constitution.ÌÌà àTherefore,€under€this€Courtððs€prior€decisions,€pretext€is€not€theÏdeterminative€factor€in€evaluating€the€constitutionality€of€a€traffic€stop.€€ForÏexample€in€òòœMcBride›€v.€Stateóó,€200€Tenn.€100,€290€S.W.2d€648€(1956),€a€highwayÏpatrol€officer€ð ðhad€some€general€information€that€the€defendant€was€transportingÏliquor€from€[Dyer€County,€where€possession€was€legal]€into€Henry€County€[whereÏpossession€was€not€legal]€over€Highway€54.€..€[in]€a€green€Hudson€automobile.ðð€ÏWhile€traveling€on€Highway€54€in€Henry€County,€a€highway€patrol€officer€met€theÏdefendant€driving€a€green€Hudson.€€In€response€to€a€radio€call€from€the€highwayÏpatrol€officer,€a€Paris€city€police€officer€undertook€to€intercept€the€defendant€as€heÏentered€the€city€of€Paris.€€When€the€defendant€failed€to€stop€at€a€road€block,€aÏhigh€speed€chase€ensued€and€ended€on€a€dead„end€street.€€The€defendant€wasÏarrested,€and€the€officers€observed€liquor€in€the€rear€seat.€€This€Court€refused€toÏsuppress€the€evidence.€€The€Court€found€that€had€the€city€officer€intercepted€theÏdefendantððs€vehicle,€an€arrest€at€that€point€would€have€been€unlawful,€but,€heldÍthat€the€defendantððs€violation€of€the€traffic€code€committed€during€the€chaseÏjustified€the€defendantððs€arrest€and€the€officerððs€seizure€of€illegal€liquor€in€plainÏview.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòœBatchelor›€v.€Stateóó,€213€Tenn.€649,€378€S.W.2d€751,€752€(1964).€ÏTherefore,€despite€the€police€officerððs€subjective€motivations,€this€Court€upheldÏthe€constitutional€validity€of€the€stop€which€was€based€upon€probable€cause€thatÏthe€defendant€had€violated€the€traffic€code.ÌÌà àAdoption€of€the€Supreme€Courtððs€interpretation€of€the€Fourth€AmendmentÏin€òòWhrenóó€would€not€require€overruling€ð ða€settled€development€of€stateÏconstitutional€Ñ ` ÑÑ p Ñlaw.ðð€€Moreover,€œthere›€are€no€linguistic€differences€which,€in€thisÏcontext,€justify€distinct€interpretations€of€the€state€and€federal€constitutionalÏprovisions.€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€probable€cause€justifies€a€traffic€stopÏunder€Article€I,€Section€7€of€the€Tennessee€œConstitution›€without€regard€to€theÏsubjective€motivations€of€police€œofficers.Ì›Ìà àApplying€that€rule€to€the€facts€in€this€case,€it€is€clear€that€the€trial€court€andÏCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€appropriately€denied€the€defendantsðð€motion€toÍsuppress.€Although€the€subjective€motivation€for€the€stop€may€have€been€theÏofficersðð€desire€to€search€for€illegal€drugs,€the€stop€was€not€accomplished€until€theÏdetectives€had€personally€observed€at€least€three€violations€of€the€traffic€laws,Ïwhich€constitutes€probable€cause€justifying€the€stop.€€Since€the€stop€was€basedÏupon€probable€cause,€its€constitutional€validity€was€not€impaired€by€the€officersððÏsubjective€motivations.Ì̛̜à@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àBecause€we€conclude€that€Article€I,€Section€7€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€does€not€preclude€stops€supported€by€probable€cause,€despite€theÏsubjective€motivations€of€police€officers,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€upholding€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€defendantsðð€motion€to€suppressÏis€affirmed.Ìà@ àÌÓÓœ›à àà àà àà àà àà à___________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA,€III,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœJUSTICEÌÌò òÌÌConcur:ó óÌAnderson,€C.J.,ÌReid,€Birch€and€Holder,€JJ.Ì