ÿWPCw$ …# VUNa %¯ 0 (µw@Ý4 1 @ UHH 0l 0Dü 0J@ 0TŠ 0^Þ 0h< 0r¤ b 0D 0|b 0†Þ 0d 1uô Bi 0d†U>êU*(U6R D3ˆy»B)4 0@]DC AMàU*-Wqò‰øv~vÓÿ AOÒ"Æ!# 0Dç# D/+$ BZ$˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ DU P {   U DӀπX#ÔôtTÔô3|x<à09Z 0Courier (W1) Regular((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô- ù-(3¯$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a) dP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Times< Œ 9p`(Courier New'ÿÿdxd oÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ)ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ% Line 7 d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò,,,,7Border 1dd€-.Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€0XÔÌÌò òOctober€27,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€0ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó wÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€'ôÔÔ€)ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„311€(1993)€provides€as€follows:€€ÌÌÌà8 àà8 àà à(a)€In€all€actions€for€injury€to€persons€and/orÏto€property€caused€by€the€negligent€operation€or€useÏof€any€automobile€...€within€this€state,€proof€ofÏownership€of€such€vehicle€shall€be€prima€facieÏevidence€that€the€vehicle€at€the€time€of€the€cause€ofÏaction€sued€on€was€being€operated€and€used€withÏauthority,€consent,€and€knowledge€of€the€owner€in€theÏvery€transaction€out€of€which€the€injury€or€cause€ofÏaction€arose,€and€such€proof€of€ownership€likewiseÏshall€be€prima€facie€evidence€that€the€vehicle€wasÏthen€and€there€being€operated€by€the€owner,€or€by€theÏownerððs€servant,€for€the€ownerððs€use€and€benefit€andÏwithin€the€course€and€scope€of€the€servantððsÏemployment.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€€€(b)€This€section€is€in€the€nature€of€remedialÏlegislation€and€it€is€the€legislative€intent€that€itÏbe€given€a€liberal€construction.ÌÓÓ€€Ì üÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔWhen€enacted€in€1921,€the€statute€provided€that€proof€of€ownership€of€aÏvehicle€was€ð ðòòprima€facieóó€evidence,€and€rais[ed]€a€presumptionðð€that€theÏvehicle€was€driven€with€the€consent€of€the€owner.€€1921€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.Ï162.€€In€1957,€the€statute€was€amended€by€adding€the€provision€that€ð ðproof€ofÏownership€.€.€.€shall€be€òòprima€facieóó€evidenceðð€that€the€vehicle€was€ð ðbeingÏoperated€by€the€owner,€or€by€the€ownerððs€servant,€for€the€ownerððs€use€andÏbenefit€and€within€the€course€and€scope€of€his€employment.ðð€€1957€Tenn.€Pub.ÏActs€ch.€123.€€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔòòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòHaggard€v.€Jim€Clayton€Motors,€Inc.óó,€216€Tenn.€625,€393€S.W.2dÏ292€(1965)€(found€judgment€that€trial€court€should€have€directed€verdicts€forÏthe€defendant€to€be€error).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€'ÔÝ  Ý›Ñ  ÑÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑØ ØÓ&€Ðd&ÓÓ&€((XÐd&ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€)ÔÑ€ÑÑ7€ £b XXdÈdÈ7ÑÖ€+ÖÑ  ÑœÞ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àOctober€27,€1997Ì›à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÓӜـ€ÙßR€/1.A1-j|yù` Å `€€@ÿRßÌ›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÓÓÌWILLIAM€GAYLE€WARREN,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àPlaintiff„Appellant,à àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€McNairy€CircuitÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€Hon.€Jon€Kerry€Blackwood,à à€à àà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÏJudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€S.€Ct.€No.€02S01„9602„CV„00006ÌTHE€ESTATE€OF€JERRY€N.€KIRK,à àà à(ÌDECEASED€AND€BELTON€DUNCAN€d/b/aà à(ÌDELTA€TREE€SERVICE,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àDefendant„Appellee.à àà àà à(ÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff„Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendant„Appelleeóó:ÌÌJoseph€C.€Langstonà àà àà àà àà àStephen€Craig€KennedyÌ€€Langston,€Langston,€Michaelà àà àà à€€Deusner€&€KennedyÌ€€&€Bowen,€P.A.à àà àà àà àà àSelmerÌœBooneville,›€MSÌÌKent€E.€SmithÌ€€Webb,€Sanders,€Deaton,€Ì€€Balducci,€Smith€&€FaulksÌOxford,€MSÌÌÌÌÌÌœ›ÌÌà@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌJUDGMENT€OF€TRIAL€COURT€ANDÌJUDGMENT€OF€COURT€OF€APPEALSÌREVERSED;€CASE€REMANDED.à àà àà àà àà àà àREID,€J.ÌÓÓà àà àThis€case€presents€for€review€the€decision€of€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€affirming€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€forÏthe€owner€of€a€vehicle€in€an€action€for€personal€injuries€caused€byÏthe€negligent€operation€of€the€vehicle.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€foundÏthat€there€is€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€as€to€the€existenceÏof€a€master„servant€relationship€between€the€driver€and€the€ownerÏand€dismissed€the€complaint€against€the€owner.€€This€Court€concludesÏthat€the€lower€courts€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment.ÌÌà@ àò òIó óÌÌà àà àThe€plaintiff,€William€Gayle€Warren,€alleges€that€onÏOctober19,€1991€he€was€driving€a€tractor„trailer€on€U.S.€Highway€45Ïin€McNairy€County;€that€at€that€time€and€place€the€defendant€JerryÏN.€Kirk,€now€deceased,€was€driving€a€pickup€truck€in€the€oppositeÏdirection;€that€Kirkððs€vehicle€crossed€the€center€line€and€struckÏthe€plaintiffððs€vehicle;€and€that€Kirk€was€killed€and€the€plaintiffÏwas€injured€as€the€result€of€the€collision.€€The€complaint€furtherÏcharges€that€the€pickup€truck€was€owned€by€the€defendant€BeltonÏDuncan,€d/b/a€Delta€Tree€Service€and€that€Kirk€was€ð ðan€agent€andÍemployeeðð€of€Duncan.€€ÌÌÓ` Ü` ˜XÓà àThe€defendant€Duncan€filed€an€answer€in€which€he€deniedÏthat€the€plaintiff€is€entitled€to€recover€from€him.€€He€states€inÏhis€answer€that€he€ð ðadmits€that€Jerry€N.€Kirk€was€employed€by€BeltonÏDuncan€d/b/a€Delta€Tree€Service,€but€specifically€denies€that€JerryÏN.€Kirk€was€acting€as€the€employee€or€agent€of€the€defendant€BeltonÏDuncan€d/b/a€Delta€Tree€Service€or€was€on€or€about€any€business€ofÏBelton€Duncan€d/b/a€Delta€Tree€Service€at€the€time€of€the€accident.ðð€€Ìà àÌà àDuncanððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€asserts€that€there€isÏno€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€and€that€he€is€entitled€toÏjudgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Duncanððs€deposition€and€affidavitÏfiled€in€support€of€the€motion€state€that€ð ðKirk€had€permission€toÏdrive€Duncanððs€vehicle,€but€only€during€working€hours,ðð€ð ðKirk€[was]Ïnot€working€on€the€date€of€the€accident,ðð€ð ðthe€only€time€Duncan€everÏgave€Kirk€permission€to€use€the€vehicle€outside€of€working€hours€wasÏif€they€were€doing€a€private€job,ðð€ð ðon€the€date€of€the€accident,Ïthere€was€no€type€of€private€work€being€done,ðð€ð ðDuncan€had€noÏknowledge€that€Kirk€was€using€the€truck€on€the€date€of€the€accidentÏuntil€after€the€accident€and€had€never€given€Kirk€permission€to€beÏdriving€the€truck€on€that€date,ðð€and€ð ðon€the€date€of€the€accident,ÏKirk€was€not€on€or€about€any€business€€of€Duncan€and€was€not€actingÍon€Duncanððs€behalf€in€furtherance€of€any€of€his€business.ðð€€ÌÌà àIn€opposition€to€the€motion,€the€plaintiff€submitted€twoÏaffidavits€in€which€the€affiants€state,€ð ðI€have€personal€knowledgeÏthat€Jerry€Kirk€had€permission€from€Belton€Duncan€to€use€hisÏœemployerððs›€equipment€on€the€weekends€and€during€other€off€dutyÏhours.ðð€€The€plaintiff€also€filed€another€affidavit€in€which€theÏaffiant€made€the€above€statement€and€added,€ð ðworking€on€weekendsÏusing€equipment.ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€record€shows€that€Duncan€was€a€resident€of€MissouriÏand€provided€ð ðtree€servicesðð€for€several€electric€transmissionÏcompanies,€including€Pickwick€Electric€Cooperative,€Gibson€CountyÏElectric€Cooperative,€and€Arkansas€Power€and€Light€Company;€that€theÏdeceased€Kirk€was€the€foreman€of€a€crew€working€on€a€contract€withÏPickwick€Electric€Cooperative€at€the€time€of€the€accident;€that€theÏcrew€regularly€worked€on€the€Pickwick€job€four€days€a€week;€and€thatÏthe€crew€worked€on€ð ðprivate€jobsðð€when€available€after€regularÏworking€hours€and€on€days€off.€€The€record€further€shows€that€KirkÏwas€in€charge€of€Duncanððs€vehicles€and€equipment,€that€he€selected€aÏplace€where€the€vehicles€were€kept€when€not€in€use€and€that€Kirk€wasÏauthorized€to€make€preliminary€contacts€for€ð ðprivate€work.ðð€€TheÏrecord€does€not€show€the€time€(day€or€night)€at€which€the€accidentÍoccurred€or€the€purpose€of€the€trip.€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIó óÌÌà àThe€standard€for€review€of€a€trial€courtððs€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment€is€de€novo€with€no€presumption€of€correctness.€ÏòòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€€SummaryÏjudgment€is€appropriate€where€ð ðthe€pleadings,€depositions,€answersÏto€interrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,€together€with€theÏaffidavits,€if€any,€show€that€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€anyÏmaterial€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€asÏa€matter€of€law.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03.ÌÌÓÓà8 à[S]ummary€judgment€is€appropriate€where:€€(1)Ïthere€is€no€genuine€issue€with€regard€to€theÏmaterial€facts€relevant€to€the€claim€or€defenseÏcontained€in€the€motion,€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847ÏS.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€and€(2)€the€movingÏparty€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€ofÏlaw€on€the€undisputed€facts.€€òòAnderson€v.ÏStandard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555,€559Ï(Tenn.€1993).€€The€moving€party€has€the€burdenÏof€proving€that€its€motion€satisfies€theseÏrequirements.€€òòDownen€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€811ÏS.W.2d€523,€524€(Tenn.€1991).€€When€the€partyÏseeking€summary€judgment€makes€a€properlyÏsupported€motion,€the€burden€shifts€to€theÏnonmoving€party€to€set€forth€specific€factsÏestablishing€the€existence€of€disputed,€materialÏfacts€which€must€be€resolved€by€the€trier€ofÏfact.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€215.ÌÌà8 à€€€€€.€.€.€Courts€must€view€the€evidence€in€theÍlight€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€party€andÏmust€also€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€in€theÏnonmoving€partyððs€favor.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€atÏ210„211.€€Courts€should€grant€a€summary€judgmentÏonly€when€both€the€facts€and€the€inferences€toÏbe€drawn€from€the€facts€permit€a€reasonableÏperson€to€reach€only€one€conclusion.€€òòId.ÌÌÌÌÓÓBain€v.€Wellsóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€1997).€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIIó óÌÌà àThe€plaintiff€insists€that€summary€judgment€does€not€lieÏin€this€case€for€two€reasons:€in€an€action€for€injury€to€personsÏand/or€property€caused€by€the€negligent€operation€or€use€of€anÏautomobile,€proof€of€ownership€of€the€vehicle€pursuant€to€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€55„10„311€(1993)× ƒ2 ××  ×€constitutes€evidence€of€a€master„servantÍrelationship€sufficient€to€withstand€a€motion€for€summary€judgment;Ïand,€in€the€alternative,€the€evidence€considered€on€the€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€creates€a€genuine€issue€with€regard€to€theÏrelationship€between€Kirk€and€Duncan€at€the€time€of€the€accident.ÌÌà àDuncan€responds€that€the€ð ðpresumptionðð€which€arisesÏpursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„311€upon€proof€of€ownership€wasÏrebutted€by€evidence€that€Kirk€was€not€operating€Duncanððs€vehicleÏwithin€the€course€and€scope€of€his€employment.ÌÌà àThe€statute€provides€that€proof€of€ownership€is€òòprimaÏfacieóó€òòevidenceóó€that€the€vehicle€was€being€operated€with€the€consentÏof€the€owner€by€the€ownerððs€servant€within€the€course€and€scope€ofÏthe€servantððs€employment.€ÌÌà àIn€òòHamrick€v.€Spring€City€Motor€Co.óó,€708€S.W.2d€383€(Tenn.Ï1986),€the€Court€noted€that€since€proof€of€ownership€under€the€l957Ïamendment€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„311€is€evidence€of€the€master„servant€relationship,€rather€than€merely€a€presumption,× ƒ3 ××  ×€ð ða€seriousÏquestion€is€presented€as€to€whether€or€not€this€òòprima€facieóó€case€canÏbe€overcome€pre„trial€by€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€òòId.óó€at€Ô€)&Ô387.€ÏÔ€)XÔIn€that€case,€the€Court€stated:€€€ÌÌÓÓà8 à[S]ummary€judgment€proceedings€do€not€involveÏfindings€of€fact€or€weighing€of€evidence.€€TheyÏwere€not€designed€to€match€statutory€ð ðòòprimaÏfacieóóðð€cases€against€rebutting€proof€or€toÏdetermine€whether€a€party€has€carried€theÏrequisite€burden€of€proof.€€They€are€merely€toÏdispose€of€legal€questions€upon€undisputedÏfacts.ÌÌÌÌòòId.óó€at€388.€€And€further:ÌÌÌÌà8 à[S]ummary€judgment€is€not€ordinarily€the€properÏprocedure€for€determining€whether€a€òòprima€facieóóÏcase€has€or€has€not€been€overcome€byÏcountervailing€evidence.ÌÌÌÌòòÓÓId.óó€at€389.€€The€Court€discussed€in€that€case€the€application€ofÍTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„311€to€motions€for€directed€verdicts× ƒ4 ××  ×€as€wellÏas€motions€for€summary€judgment€and€observed€that€the€denial€of€aÏmotion€for€summary€judgment€does€not€mean€that€the€case€must€beÏsubmitted€to€the€jury.€€ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€overruling€of€a€motion€for€summary€judgmentÏdoes€not€necessarily€mean€that€the€case€will€goÏto€a€jury€at€a€trial,€because€the€evidenceÏadduced€at€trial€may€be€significantly€differentÏfrom€that€contained€in€affidavits€or€depositionsÏheard€pre„trial€on€summary€judgment€proceedings.€ÏAll€that€the€overruling€of€a€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment€indicates€is€that€the€case€shouldÏproceed€further.€€Whether€it€will€ever€go€to€aÏjury€or€whether€it€will€be€disposed€of€onÏdirected€verdict€pursuant€to€Rule€50,€Tenn.€R.ÏCiv.€P.,€depends€upon€the€record€developed€atÏtrial.ÌÌÌÌòòId.óó€at€388€(citations€omitted).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€Court€in€òòHamrickóó€stopped€short€of€holding€that€proofÏof€ownership€will€defeat€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€in€everyÏcase,€stating,€ð ðThere€may€be€some€instances€where€summaryÏdisposition€could€be€warranted.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€389.€€However,€the€recordÏin€the€case€before€the€Court€does€not€show€this€to€be€a€case€inÏwhich€summary€judgment€is€warranted.€€The€evidence€does€not€show€theÍpurpose€of€the€trip€on€which€the€ownerððs€employee€was€driving€theÏownerððs€vehicle.€€Kirk€had€Duncanððs€expressed€permission€to€operateÏthe€vehicle€during€work,€travelling€to€and€from€work,€andÏtransporting€other€employees€to€and€from€work.€€The€prohibitions€onÏthe€use€of€the€vehicle€stated€by€Duncan€in€his€deposition€andÏaffidavit€do€not€necessarily€proscribe€Kirkððs€operation€of€the€truckÏat€the€time€of€the€accident€in€the€course€and€scope€of€hisÏemployment.€€For€example,€Kirk€was€authorized€by€Duncan€to€makeÏpreliminary€arrangements€regarding€ð ðprivate€work.ðð€€The€workingÏarrangement€between€Duncan€and€Kirk€indicate€that€Kirk€had€dutiesÏbeyond€the€performance€of€the€contracts€with€Duncanððs€customers.€ÏKirk€was€obligated€to€keep€the€chain€saws€and€other€equipment€inÏoperating€condition,€he€was€required€to€find€convenient€locations€atÏwhich€to€park€the€vehicles,€and€he€was€responsible€for€seeing€thatÏhis€crew€was€available€for€work.€€In€summary,€he€was€responsible€forÏall€the€duties€incident€to€his€job€as€foreman€for€an€absentee€owner.€ÏAs€to€those€duties,€Kirk€had€at€least€implicit€permission€to€use€theÏpickup€truck.€€The€ð ðagency€relationship€does€not€require€an€explicitÏagreement,€contract,€or€understanding€between€the€parties.ðð€€òòHarbenÏv.€Huttonóó,€739€S.W.2d€602,€606€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987)€(citingÏòòElectric€Power€Bd.€of€Metr.€Govððt.€v.€Woodsóó,€558€S.W.2d€821,€824Ï(Tenn.€1977).€€The€evidence€presented€on€the€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment€is€not€conclusive€proof€that€Kirk€was€not€acting€within€theÍcourse€and€scope€of€his€employment€at€the€time€of€the€accident.€ÌÌà@ àò òIVó óÌÌà àThe€judgments€of€the€trial€court€and€Court€of€Appeals€areÏreversed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÏproceedings.ÌÌà àCosts€are€taxed€to€the€defendant€Belton€Duncan.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àReid,€J.ÌÌConcur:ÌÌAnderson,€C.J.,€Drowota,€Birch,Ì€€and€Holder,€œJJ.›