ÿWPC!% …# VUNa %¯ 0 (µw@Ý4 1 @ UHH 0l 0Dü @ 0JF b 0T˜ 0Dì 0^0 0hŽ 0rö 0|h Bä 0† 0‡ 1u 0dŒ D3ðU>#U*a 0@‹U6ËyB)zDC£ AMæU*3]úwJqp»v~+vÓ© AO|#ÆË# 0D‘$ D/Õ$ B%˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ U UUU $%ӀπX#ÔôtTÔô3|x0<à09Z 0Courier (W1) Regular((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóH2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô- ù-2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(3¯$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ! ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Times("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Courier New oÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ)ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd€-1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€3XÔÌÌò òOctober€27,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€3ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ðÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€.ÔÔ€.ôÔThe€question€of€whether€this€theory€survived€the€Courtððs€adoption€ofÏcomparative€fault€has€not€been€raised,€but€this€Court€has€previously€noted€itsÏprobable€continued€application:ÌÌ€€à8 àà8 à€The€abolition€of€joint€and€several€liability€whenÏtortfeasors€are€negligent€does€not€necessarilyÏundermine€principles€of€vicarious€liability.€There€areÏstill€situations€in€which€a€party€who€is€without€faultÏis€responsible€for€paying€compensatory€damages€causedÏby€the€fault€of€another.€To€take€the€example€closestÏin€point,€the€rule€of€respondeat€superior€providesÏthat€a€faultless€employer€is€nevertheless€liable€forÏtorts€committed€by€an€employee€in€the€course€and€scopeÏof€employment.€Because€liability€is€not€predicated€onÏthe€fault€of€the€employer,€the€abolition€of€joint€andÏseveral€liability€does€not€eliminate€respondeatÏsuperior€liability.€ÌÓÓÌòòÓÓCamper€v.€Minoróó,€915€S.W.2d€437€(Tenn.€1996)(quoting€òòMedina€v.€Graham'sÏCowboys,€Inc.óó,€€113€N.M.€471,€827€P.2d€859,€863€(N.M.€App.€1992)€(emphasisÏadded€and€citations€omitted)).€Ì @Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€.ÔÔ€.ôÔThe€statute€has€been€amended€since€the€òòHaggardóó€case,€the€version€inÏeffect€in€òòHaggardóó€was€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà8 àIn€all€actions€for€injury€to€persons€and/or€toÏproperty€caused€by€the€negligent€operation€or€use€ofÏany€automobile,€auto€truck,€motorcycle,€or€other€motorÏpropelled€vehicle€within€this€state,€proof€ofÏownership€of€such€vehicle,€shall€be€prima€facieÏevidence€that€said€vehicle€at€the€time€of€the€cause€ofÏaction€sued€on€was€being€operated€and€used€with€theÏauthority,€consent€and€knowledge€of€the€owner€in€theÏvery€transaction€out€of€which€said€injury€or€cause€ofÏaction€arose.ÌÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€59„1037€(1955).Ì fÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€.ÔÔ€.ôÔThe€parties€also€refer€to€an€unpublished€decision.€€UnpublishedÏopinions€do€not€provide€precedential›€authority.€€òòIsbell€v.€Isbellóó,€816€S.W.2dÏ735,€€€€(Tenn.€1991).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓØ ØÓ&€Ðd&ÓÓ&€,,XÐd&ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€.ÔÑ€ÑÑ7€  XXdÈdÈ7ÑÖ€/ÖÑ  ÑÙ€€ÙßR€241A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÓÓÌWILLIAM€GAYLE€WARREN,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àPlaintiff„Appellant,à àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€McNairy€CircuitÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€Hon.€Jon€Kerry€Blackwood,à à€à àà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÏJudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€S.€Ct.€No.€02S01„9602„CV„00006ÌTHE€ESTATE€OF€JERRY€N.€KIRK,à àà à(ÌDECEASED€AND€BELTON€DUNCAN€d/b/aà à(ÌDELTA€TREE€SERVICE,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àDefendant„Appellee.à àà àà à(ÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff„Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendant„Appelleeóó:ÌÌJoseph€C.€Langstonà àà àà àà àà àStephen€Craig€KennedyÌ€€Langston,€Langston,€Michaelà àà àà à€€Deusner€&€KennedyÌ€€&€Bowen,€P.A.à àà àà àà àà àSelmerÌBonneville,€MSÌÌKent€E.€SmithÌ€€Webb,€Sanders,€Deaton,€Ì€€Balducci,€Smith€&€FaulksÌOxford,€MSÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àREID,€J.ÌÓÓà àà àThis€case€presents€for€review€the€question€of€whetherÏsummary€judgment€is€appropriate€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„311Ï(1993),€where€the€defendant€asserts€in€an€action€for€injury€causedÏby€the€negligent€operation€of€the€defendantððs€automobile,€that€atÏthe€time€of€the€accident,€there€was€no€agency€or€master„servantÏrelationship€between€the€defendant€and€the€driver.ÌÌà àà àThe€plaintiff,€William€Gayle€Warren,€alleges€in€hisÏcomplaint€that€on€October€19,€1991,€he€was€driving€a€tractor„trailerÏalong€US€Highway€45€in€McNairy›€County.€€He€alleges€that€theÏdeceased,€Jerry€N.€Kirk,€was€driving€a€pickup€truck€in€the€oppositeÏdirection€on€Highway€45.€The€pickup€truck€was€owned€by€theÏdefendant,€œBelton›€Duncan,€d/b/a/€Delta€Tree€Service.€€Kirk€wasÏemployed€as€a€working€foreman€by€the€defendant.€€According€to€theÏcomplaint,€Kirk€drove€the€pickup€across€the€center„line€of€theÏhighway€and€struck€the€plaintiffððs€tractor„trailer€head„on.€€KirkÏdied€as€a€result€of€injuries€sustained€in€the€accident.€€TheÏplaintiff€was€injured.€€The€plaintiff€alleges€that€Kirk€was€theÏemployee€and€agent€of€the€defendant,€and€that€the€defendant€isÍliable€for€the€negligence€of€Kirk€under€the€legal€theory€ofÏrespondeat€superior.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€filed€an€answer€denying€the€allegations€ofÏthe€complaint.€The€defendant€also€filed€a€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment€based€on€the€ground€that€Kirk€was€not€acting€within€theÏscope€of€his€employment€at€the€time€of€the€accident.€€The€defendantÏfiled€a€deposition€in€support€of€his€motion€for€summary€judgment€inÏwhich€he€states€that€on€the€day€of€the€accident,€he€and€hisÏemployees€were€off€from€work;€that€Kirk€only€had€permission€to€driveÏthe€truck€during€working€hours€and€to€and€from€their€work€site;€andÏthat€the€defendant€had€permitted€Kirk€to€park€the€pickup€at€KirkððsÏfatherððs€house€at€night€and€on€the€weekends€because€it€was€close€toÏthe€work„site€at€which€they€were€working.€€In€addition€to€theÏdeposition,€the€defendant€submitted€an€affidavit€stating€that€KirkÏwas€not€acting€in€furtherance€of€any€of€his€business€at€the€time€ofÏthe€accident.€€The€plaintiff€submitted€affidavits€from€fourÏindividuals€which€stated€that€ð ðJerry€Kirk€had€permission€from€BeltonÏDuncan€to€use€his€employerððs€equipment€on€the€weekends€and€duringÏother€off„duty€hours.ðð€€ÌÌà àà àIn€response€to€the€motion€for€summary€judgment,€theÏplaintiff€insists€that€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€55„10„311€creates€a€primaÍfacie€case€of€a€respondeat€superior€relationship€and€that€the€primaÏfacie€case€established€by€the€statute€is€always€sufficient€toÏwithstand€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.ò ò€€ó óThe€plaintiff€also€assertsÏthat€the€evidence€establishes€an€issue€of€disputed€material€factÏconcerning€agency.ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€court€granted€the€defendantððs€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment€and€dismissed€the€claims€against€the€defendant.€€The€CourtÏof€Appeals€found€that€the€affidavits€submitted€by€the€plaintiffÏmerely€show€that€Kirk€had€permission€to€use€the€defendantððsÏequipment€during€off„hours,€not€that€there€was€an€agencyÏrelationship€at€the€time€of€the€€accident.€€Therefore,€the€CourtÏruled€that€the€plaintiff€had€failed€to€counter€the€defendantððsÏevidence€that€the€plaintiff€was€not€acting€within€the€scope€ofÏemployment€at€the€time€of€the€accident,€and€affirmed€the€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment.Ìò òÌà àà àó óThe€issue€presented€for€review€to€this€Court€is€whetherÏthe€evidence€or€the€statutory€provision€precludes€summary€judgmentÏin€this€case.ò òà àó óÌÌà àà àThe€standard€for€review€of€a€trial€courtððs€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment€is€de€novo€with€no€presumption€of€correctness.€ÍòòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€€SummaryÏjudgment€is€appropriate€where€ð ðthe€pleadings,€depositions,€answersÏto€interrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,€together€with€theÏaffidavits,€if€any,€show€that€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€anyÏmaterial€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€asÏa€matter€of€law.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03.aÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[œS]ummary›€judgment€is€appropriate€where€(1)Ïthere€is€no€genuine€issue€with€regard€to€theÏmaterial€facts€relevant€to€the€claim€or€defenseÏcontained€in€the€motion,€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847ÏS.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€and€(2)€the€movingÏparty€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€ofÏlaw€on€the€undisputed€facts.€€òòAnderson€v.ÏStandard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555,€559Ï(Tenn.€1993).€€The€moving€party€has€the€burdenÏof€proving€that€its€motion€satisfies€theseÏrequirements.€€òòDownen€v.Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€811ÏS.W.2d€523,€524€(Tenn.€1991).€€When€the€partyÏseeking€summary€judgment€makes€a€properlyÏsupported€motion,€the€burden€shifts€to€theÏnonmoving€party€to€set€forth€specific€factsÏestablishing€the€existence€of€disputed,€materialÏfacts€which€must€be€resolved€by€the€trier€ofÏfact.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€215.ÌÌà àà8 à...Courts€must€view€the€evidence€in€the€lightÏmost€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€party€and€mustÏalso€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€in€theÏnonmoving€partyððs€favor.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€atÏ210„211.€€Courts€should€grant€summary€judgmentÏonly€when€both€the€facts€and€the€inferences€toÏbe€drawn€from€the€facts€permit€a€reasonableÏperson€to€reach€only€one€conclusion.€€òòId.̛̜œÌ›ÌÓÓBain€v.€Wellsóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€1997).€€ÌÌà àà àThe€consideration€of€whether€a€genuine€issue€‚regarding€aÏmaterial€fact€remains€in€this€case,€begins€with€the€statutoryÏconstruction€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€55„10„311€(1993).€€The€statuteÏprovides€as€follows:€€ÌÓӜ̛Ìà8 àà8 àà à(a)€In€all€actions€for€injury€to€personsÏand/or€to€property€caused€by€the€negligentÏoperation€or€use€of€any€automobile€...€withinÏthis€state,€proof€of€ownership€of€such€vehicleÏshall€be€prima€facie€evidence€that€the€vehicleÏat€the€time€of€the€cause€of€action€sued€on€wasÏbeing€operated€and€used€with€authority,€consent,Ïand€knowledge€of€the€owner€in€the€veryÏtransaction€out€of€which€œthe›€injury€or€cause€ofÏaction€arose,€and€such€proof€of€ownershipÏlikewise€shall€be€prima€facie€evidence€that€theÏvehicle€was€then€and€there€being€operated€by€theÏowner,€or€by€the€ownerððs€servant,€for€theÏownerððs€use€and€benefit€and€within€the€courseÏand€scope€of€the€servantððs€employment.€€....ÌÌà8 àà8 à(b)€This€section€is€in€the€nature€of€remedialÏlegislation€and€it€is€the€legislative€intentÏthat€it€be€given€a€liberal€construction.ÌÓÓ€€Ìà àà àThe€record€shows€that€the€defendant€owned€the€vehicleÏwhich€caused€the€accident€and€the€plaintiffððs€injuries;€under€theÏstatute,€it€is€unquestioned€that€this€constitutes€ð ðprima€facieÏevidence€that€ð ðthat€the€vehicle€was€then€and€there€being€operated€byÏthe€owner,€or€by€the€ownerððs€servant,€for€the€ownerððs€use€andÏbenefit€and€within€the€course€and€scope€of€the€servantððsÏemployment.ðð€€Such€a€showing,€if€uncontested,€establishes€theÍliability€of€the€defendant€for€the€negligence€of€Kirk€under€theÏtheory€of€agency€or€respondeat€superior,€a€Latin€phrase€meaning€"LetÏthe€Master€Answer."€Blacks€Law€Dictionary,€Fourth€Edition,€(1957).€ÏThis€legal€theory€allows€a€plaintiff€to€hold€an€employer€orÏprincipal€€liable€for€the€wrongful€acts€of€its€employees€or€agents,Ïwhen€those€acts€are€done€within€the€scope€and€course€of€theÏwrongdoer's€employment× ƒ5 ××  ×.€€€òòCraig€v.€Gentryóó,€792€S.W.2d€77€(Tenn.€App.Ï1990);€òòParker€v.€Vanderbilt€Universityóó,€767€S.W.2d€412€(Tenn.€App.Ï1988).ÌÌà àà àAn€agent€is€ð ðsimply€[œo]ne›€who€undertakes€to€transact€someÍbusiness,€or€to€manage€some€affair,€for€another,€by€the€authorityÏand€on€account€of€the€latter,€and€to€render€an€account€of€it.ðð€ÏòòMiller€v.€Ins.€Co.€of€North€Americaóó,€366€S.W.2d€909,€911€(Tenn.Ï1963).€€The€ð ðagency€relationship€does€not€require€an€explicitÏagreement,€contract€or€understanding€between€the€parties.ðð€€òòHarbenÏv.€Huttonóó,€739€S.W.2d€602,€606€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987)(citing€òòElectricÏPower€Bd.€of€œMetr›.€Gov.€v.€Woodsóó,€558€S.W.2d€821,€824€(Tenn.€1977);ÏòòSmith€v.€Tennessee€Coach€Co.óó,€194€S.W.2d€867,€869€(Tenn.€1946).€ÏWhile€there€may€be€a€number€of€factors€that€determine€whether€anÏagency€relationship€exists,€the€principalððs€right€to€ð ðcontrol€theÏconduct€of€the€agent€with€respect€to€matters€entrusted€to€the€agentððÏis€the€essential€test.€€òòNidiffer€v.€Clinchfield€R.R.€Co.óó,€600€S.W.2dÏ242,€245€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980)€òòJack€Daniel€Distillery€v.€Jacksonóó,Ï740€S.W.2d€413,€416€(Tenn.€1987);€€òòEdwards€v.€Intððl€Harvester€Co.óó,Ï688€S.W.2d€456,€459€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1985)().€€Another€ð ðelementaryÏand€essential€factor€in€the€relation€of€Principal€and€Agent,€is€thatÏthe€object€of€the€contract€is€for€the€benefit€of€the€principal.ðð€ÏòòFoster€Trailer€Co.€v.€United€States€Fidelity€&€Guar.€Co.óó,€228€S.W.2dÏ107,€109€(Tenn.€1950).€€The€burden€of€proof€is€ordinarily€on€theÏparty€asserting€the€agency€relationship.€€òòJack€Daniel€Distillery€v.ÏJacksonóó,€740€S.W.2d€at€416.€€The€enactment€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„311,€relieved€the€plaintiff€of€this€burden€as€to€the€owners€ofÏautomobiles€involved€in€accidents.ÌÌà àà àIn€this€case,€however,€the€defendantððs€evidence€disprovesÏthe€existence€of€an€agency€relationship€between€himself€and€theÏdriver€at€the€time€of€the€accident.€€The€uncontested€evidence€isÏthat€Kirk€was€allowed€to€use€the€truck€on€weekends€only€when€workingÏon€a€job,€Kirk€was€not€working€on€the€date€of€the€accident;€theÏdefendant€had€no€knowledge€that€Kirk€was€using€his€truck€on€the€dateÏof€the€accident€until€after€the€accident€had€occurred;€and€on€theÏdate€of€the€accident,€Kirk€was€not€acting€on€the€defendantððs€behalfÏin€furtherance€of€any€of€the€defendantððs€business.€€The€defendantððsÏtestimony€is€not€impeached.€€This€undisputed€evidence€establishesÏthat€there€was€no€agency€relationship€between€the€defendant€andÏKirk,€and€consequently,€that€summary€judgment€is€appropriate€as€aÏmatter€of€law€unless€this€Court€finds€that€summary€judgment€isÏprecluded€by€section€55„10„311€in€all€circumstances.ÌÌà àœà àThe›€issue€of€the€statuteððs€effect€on€directed€verdicts€andÏsummary€judgment€has€been€considered€by€this€Court.€€In€òòHaggard€v.ÏJim€Clayton€Motors,€Inc.óó,€393€S.W.2d€292€œ(Tenn.€1965),›€the€driver€ofÏthe€defendantððs€car€was€a€friend€of€the€defendantððs€bill€collector.€ÏThe€defendant€denied€that€the€bill€collector€was€an€agent€of€theÏdefendant.€€The€Court€noted€that,€ð ð[œt]he›€rule€in€this€State,€whereÏevidence€is€offered€in€rebuttal€to€the€presumption€created€byÍTenn.Code€Ann.€ðððð€59„1037× ƒ6 ××  ×€...€is€that€uncontradicted€and€unimpeachedÏevidence€[that€there€was€no€agency]€causes€the€presumption€toÏdisappear.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€294.€€€The€only€evidence€offered€at€trial€wasÏthat€the€driver€was€not€on€any€business€of€the€defendant;€the€CourtÏfound€however,€that€it€would€have€been€improper€for€the€trial€judgeÏto€have€directed€a€verdict€for€the€defendant€because€of€the€blatantÏdiscrepancies€in€the€testimony€concerning€agency,€not€to€mention€theÏimpeachment€of€one€of€the€witnesses€who€ð ðwas€a€convicted€forger€andÏmurderer,€and€had€been€declared€infamous,ðð€òòidóó.€at€297,€making€theÏdefendantððs€witnesses€unbelievable.€€The€Court€concluded€that€theÏtrial€court€was€correct€in€submitting€the€case€to€the€jury.ÌÌà àà àIn€œòòHamrick›€v.€Spring€City€Motor€Co.óó,€708€S.W.2d€383€(Tenn.Ï1986),€the€trial€court€granted€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€theÏdealership€that€owned€a€vehicle€involved€in€an€accident€while€drivenÍby€the€purchaser.€€The€evidence€established€either€a€permissive€useÏor€an€informal,€incomplete€sale.€€The€Court€œstated,Ì›Ìà8 àÓÓà8 àThe€principal€provisions€of€this€section€...Ïhave€been€construed€many€times€by€the€courts€ofÏthis€state.€...€As€presently€written,€theÏstatute€does€not€contain€the€word€ð ðpresumption,ððÏalthough€prior€versions€did€so.€€Earlier€casesÏconstruing€the€statute€held€that€it€created€aÏð ðrebuttable€presumptionðð€of€a€master„servantÏrelationship,€sometimes€referred€to€as€anÏð ðagency,ðð€and€that€unless€there€wasÏcountervailing€evidence€introduced€at€trial,Ïthis€prima€facie€evidence€was€sufficient€to€takeÏthe€case€to€the€jury€and€to€support€a€juryÏverdict€against€the€owner.ÌœÌÌ›ÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€387.€€ð ðEssentially€the€statute€has€the€effect€of€placing€theÏburden€of€proof€upon€the€owner€to€overcome€that€case€by€evidence.€ÏIf€it€is€overcome€by€proof€so€strong€that€reasonable€minds€could€notÏdiffer,€a€directed€verdict€for€the€owner€may€be€proper;€otherwiseÏthe€issue€is€to€be€resolved€by€the€jury.ðð€€òòIdòòóó.€€óó€The€Court€noted,€ð ðòòaÏserious€question€is€presented€as€to€whether€or€not€this€prima€facieÏcase€can€be€overcome€pre„trial€motion€for€summary€judgmentóó.ðð€€òòId.óó€atÏ387€(emphasis€added).€€The€Court€concludes€that€ð ðordinarily€theÏprima€facie€case€established€from€proof€of€ownership€is€sufficientÏto€overcome€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€....ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€388.€ÏFurthermore,€the€Court€stated,€ð ðThere€may€be€some€instances€whereÏsummary€disposition€could€be€warranted.€€However,€we€are€of€theÍopinion€that€summary€judgment€is€not€ordinarily€the€proper€procedureÏfor€determining€whether€a€prima€facie€case€has€or€has€not€beenÏovercome€by€countervailing€evidence.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€389.€€The€Count€foundÏthat€the€evidence€did€not€clearly€show€whether€the€purchaser€wasÏtest€driving€the€vehicle€or€had€finalized€the€purchase€and€wasÏactually€the€owner,€consequently,€the€Court€overruled€the€motion€forÏsummary€judgment.€€òòIdóó.€€ÌÌÌà àà àAs€mentioned€in€òòHamrick€v.€Spring€City€Motor€Co.óó,€theÏCourt€of€Appeals€has€ruled€on€this€statute€ð ðmany€times.ðð€€TheÏparties€specifically€refer€to€the€case€of€òòFerguson€v.€Tomerlinóó,€656ÏS.W.2d€378€(Tenn.€App.€1983).œ× ƒ7 ××  ×›€€In€òòFergusonóó,€the€case€went€to€theÏjury€which€awarded€$125,000€against€the€owner€of€an€automobileÏcausing€the€plaintiffððs€injuries.€€The€owner€had€provided€theÏvehicle€to€his€daughter€for€her€personal€use;€the€driver€was€aÏfriend€of€the€daughter€who€shared€an€apartment€with€her.€€The€friendÏborrowed€the€car€on€the€day€of€the€accident€with€the€daughterððsÏpermission.€€The€court€considered€whether€the€trial€court€erred€inÏoverruling€the€defendantððs€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€The€summaryÏjudgment€motion€was€supported€by€the€defendantððs€answers€toÍinterrogatories€stating€that€he€had€instructed€his€daughter€not€toÏlet€anyone€else€drive€his€vehicle,€and€this€use€of€his€vehicle€wasÏin€no€way€for€his€benefit.€€The€plaintiff€offered€no€proof€to€rebutÏthe€defendantððs€statements.€€Relying€on€òòHaggard€v.€Jim€ClaytonÏMotors,€Inc.óó,€the€court€stated,ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àIt€is€therefore€well€settled€that€theÏpresumption€of€owner„driver€agency€created€byÏownership€of€a€vehicle€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ55„10„311€can€be€rebutted€by€credible€proof€thatÏthe€driver€was€in€fact€operating€the€vehicleÏwithout€authority€of€the€owner.€€òòSeeóó€òòSadler€v.ÏDraperóó,€46€Tenn.€App.€1,€326€S.W.2d€148€(1959).€ÏTo€withdraw€the€matter€from€the€jury€suchÏrebutting€evidence€must€be€uncontradicted€andÏunimpeached.€€òòHaggard€v.€Jim€Clayton€Motors,ÏInc.óó,€òòsupraóó.ÌœÌÌ›ÌòòÓÓFerguson€v.€Tomerlinóó,€656€S.W.2d€378,€381„82€œ(Tenn.€App.›€1983).€€TheÏcourt€reversed€the€trial€court€and€granted€the€motion€for€summaryÏœjudgment.Ì›Ìà àà àœIn€none€of€these€cases€is€it€held€that€a€summary€judgmentÏmay€never€be€entered€on€the€issue€of€agency€under€the€statute.€€TheÏsole€effect›€of€the€statute€is€to€relieve€the€plaintiff€of€theÏinitial€burden€of€proving€a€prima€facie€case€of€agency.€€œÌÌà àà àð ðWhere›€the€plaintiffððs€action€is€one€in€tort,€the€burdenÍof€proof€in€the€sense€of€the€risk€of€œnonpersuasion›€is€on€theÏplaintiff€and€never€shifts;€however,€the€burden€of€going€forwardÏwith€evidence€may€shift€back€and€forth.ðð€€11€Tenn.€Juris.,€òòEvidenceóó,Ïðð49€(1995).€€The€plaintiffððs€initial€burden€of€producing€evidence€isÏto€establish€a€prima€facie€case;€once€established,€the€burden€ofÏgoing€forward€with€the€evidence€shifts€to€the€defendant.€€UnderÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„311,€this€œinitial›€œburden,›€as€far€as€theÏissue€of€agency€is€concerned,€is€met€by€proof€that€the€defendantÏowned€the€vehicle€alleged€to€have€caused€the€injuries.€€The€burdenÏof€producing€evidence€then€shifts€to€the€defendant.€€There€isÏnothing€in€the€statute€to€indicate€that€the€defense€of€the€lack€ofÏan€agency€relationship€is€confined€to€the€trial€of€the€matter.€TheÏpresumption€created€by€the€statute€may€be€overcome€by€evidence€toÏthe€contrary;€whether€œthe›€œevidence€that€an€agency€relationship€didÏnot€exists›€meets€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€standard€atÏtrial,€or€œis€such€to€remove›€all€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€asÏnecessary€to€prevail€by€summary€judgment,€it€will€prevail€over€aÏprima€facie€case.€ÌÌà àà àAccordingly,€the€statute€does€not€preclude€summaryÏjudgment€where€defendant€presents€uncontested€evidence€that€theÏdriver€of€the€vehicle€at€the€time€of€the€accident€was€not€acting€asÏits€agent.€€The€judgments€of€the€trial€court€and€the€Court€ofÍAppeals€are€affirmed.ÌÌà àà àThe€case€is€remanded€to€Ô% € Ôthe€trial€court.ÌÌà àà àCosts€are€taxed€to€the€œplaintiff.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àReid,€J.ÌÌÌConcur:ÌÌAnderson,€C.J.,€Drowota,€Birch,Ì€€and€Holder,€JJ.›