ÿWPCŽ* ÑkÇÏKX¾£ N}‰2ŒE:VÇKv)« rnŒÎ#™þóseŲ´Ö!emÏ•³µªšJƒrg†e…”þß)lŸ@Š,±^ñ cÓ$¦[ñL;-qKÂVÉýü=Y¡N¥qâ­5 2÷À¼3:ù »_B©ŠNÆ—ÔF5Üm_•˜çÃÀ~%+›?øøXU<#L4nÓ}j³±sp OæÎŽYHY(ÿU]å“âÒøýþHÛGLm5~Kf·†Ò<ù¢Å@¾ VÆÖ¶Wœ‘œÄîì6} ?/2ňíˆÙGãÏSS 4ºLvª¦¨ ¡÷®ã­çG>(ÃÁ®Ñÿeømˆe‚?DÍÞ;eUüèíhò |á°Ü¬(Á²7àlöªWÀ$äYÚzs Û¤‡ÇŽ¸Z>Ð`(NäÕÈY(t$ïñw÷‚z ûîA0!{H[qÌ‚Œ÷uÞCN4 £UÚC±Øg¨|ßÌñdf`H¥{à®ÍÄfLýÅI"ÑC­^±^†o4b¼¯IE ‚4ì¥L¥‹\1šSšˆ`Èz†(:‡\l‘º·7ÚHZ"‰ŒV4™“QœÝçnÍÅþâ0eR`ú æ÷r î?b %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ -‘ ƾ Æ„ ÆJ Æ 0 DÖNz™–E/1>Dí‚–oC"" 0¤H#H#H#ì#{%{%{%{%{%{%{%{%{%{%{%{%{%bƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ%ƒ% 0 ë‹%‹%‹%‹% Bv&v& 0¤“& D37' D-j' 0K—'—' ASâ'Æ5( 0¤û( 0DŸ) A«ã)»xB)â (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular ;)p±¨k2Ôǧ3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0 #Ñ#€CXÿÿd#ÑLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó pÝ ƒR”$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô¡òXXH¡Ô€€ð ðThe€Supreme€Court€may,€at€its€discretion,€answer€questions€of€law€certified€to€it€by€the€Supreme€Court€ofÐ ° Ðthe€United€States,€a€Court€of€Appeals€of€the€United€States,€a€District€Court€of€the€United€States€in€Tennessee,€or€a€UnitedÐ tÄ ÐStates€Bankruptcy€Court€in€Tennessee.€€This€rule€may€be€invoked€when€the€certifying€court€determines€that,€in€aÐ 8ˆ Ðproceeding€before€it,€there€are€questions€of€law€of€this€state€which€will€be€determinative€of€the€cause€and€as€to€which€itÐ üL Ðappears€to€the€certifying€court€there€is€no€controlling€precedent€in€the€decisions€of€the€Supreme€Court€of€Tennessee.ðð€Ð À ÐTenn.€Sup.€Ct.€R.€23,€ðð€1. Ý ƒR”$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô¡òXXH¡Ô€€ð ðA€person€commits€an€offense€who€intentionally:€(1)€Threatens,€by€telephone€or€in€writing,€to€take€actionÐ ° Ðknown€to€be€unlawful€against€any€person,€and€by€this€actions€knowingly€annoys€or€alarms€the€recipient;€(2)€Places€oneÐ tÄ Ð(1)€or€more€telephone€calls€anonymously,€or€at€an€inconvenient€hour,€or€in€an€offensively€repetitious€manner,€or€withoutÐ 8ˆ Ða€legitimate€purpose€of€communication,€and€by€this€actions€knowingly€annoys€or€alarms€the€recipient;€or€(3)Ð üL ÐCommunicates€by€telephone€to€another€that€a€relative€or€other€person€has€been€injured,€killed€or€is€ill€when€suchÐ À Ðcommunication€is€known€to€be€false.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„308(a)€(1997). Ý ƒR”$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€Ô€ô¡òXXH¡ÔAs€the€parties€note,€confusion€was€further€created€by€the€fact€that€a€series€of€cross€references€to€Tenn.€CodeÐ ° ÐAnn.€ðð4„21„701€changed€several€times€over€the€course€of€its€existence.€€òòSeeóó€òòYoung€v.€State€Farm€Mut.€Auto€Ins.€Co.óó,Ð œì Ð868€F.€Supp.€937,€942€(W.D.€Tenn.€1994).€€In€1993,€for€example,€the€Code€Commission€notes€following€ðð€„701€stated:Ð `° ÐÌà8  àThis€section€originally€contained€a€reference€to€ðð€39„17„313.€€During€the€1991€replacement€of€VolumeÐ è8 Ð2A,€the€publisher€was€instructed€to€change€the€reference€from€ðð€39„17„313€to€ðð€39„17„309€since€ðð€39„Ð ¬ü Ð17„313€was€repealed;€however,€that€instruction€has€been€superseded€and€the€section€returned€to€theÐ p À Ðoriginal€language.ððÐ#4 „Ð Ð  ¬ #ЇòòIdóó. 4Ý ƒR”$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô¡òXXH¡Ô€€Petitioners€Robertson€County€and€the€City€of€Springfield€agree€that€individual€liability€is€appropriate€underÐ ° ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701.€€As€counsel€for€Robertson€County€has€stated,€ð ðgiven€the€very€personal€nature€of€ððmaliciousÐ tÄ Ðharassmentðð€or€a€ððhate„crime,ðð€it€would€seem€incongruous€to€not€permit€the€victim€to€sue€the€specific€perpetrator.ðð ãÝ ƒR”$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô¡òXXH¡Ô€€We€disagree€with€the€petitionersðð€argument€that€malicious€harassment€is€limited€to€the€acts€set€forth€in€Tenn.Ð ° ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€39„17„308,€simply€because€that€statute€is€contained€in€a€cross€reference€òòafteróó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð4„21„701.€Ð tÄ ÐIndeed,€we€observe€that€several€of€the€parties€have€alluded€to€statutes€contained€in€cross€references.€€These€crossÐ 8ˆ Ðreferences€are€included€by€the€Code€Commission,€not€the€legislature,€and€they€do€not€reflect€legislative€intent€inÐ üL Ðinterpreting€a€statute. ŒÝ ƒR”$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€Ô€ô¡òXXH¡ÔWe€also€note€once€again€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309(a)€(1997)€states€in€part€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_Ô€generalÐ ° Ðassembly€finds€and€declares€that€it€is€the€right€of€every€person€regardless€of€race,€color,€ancestry,€religion€or€nationalÐ œì Ðorigin,€to€be€secure€and€protected€from€fear,€intimidation,€harassment,€and€bodily€injury€caused€by€the€activities€of€groupsÐ `° Ðòòand€individualsóó.ðð€€(Emphasis€added). 9Ý ƒR”$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€Ô€ô¡òXXH¡ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€became€effective€on€April€17,€1990.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€39„17„309€becameÐ ° Ðeffective€on€April€30,€1990.(|3¿h$©©Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ ]»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý …Ý ƒR”$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€Ô€ô¡òXXH¡ÔAs€with€ðð€„313,€a€violation€of€ðð€„309€is€a€class€D€felony.€€The€criminal€penalty€does€not€preclude€victims€fromÐ ° Ðseeking€other€civil€or€criminal€remedies.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„309(d)€and€(e)€(1997). - ù-(|G2”$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ ]»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€XH¡X»»Ô d(|3¿h$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ ]»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3¿h$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ ]»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ ]»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€¼ ]»»»ÔÑ  ÑÑ€ û#Ñà@7 7 ìàIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@§§$ìàAT€NASHVILLEˆÐ  Ðà@¸¸ ìàFebruary€2000€SessionˆÐ Ô$ ÐÔ‡XH¡X»¼ ]ÔÌÌò òÔ#†¼ ]»XXH¡#ÔÓ  ÓTRENT€WASHINGTON€and€MARCUS€CARR€€v.€ROBERTSON€COUNTY,Ð ¾  ÐTENNESSEE,€Ô€XH¡X»¼ ]ÔòòET€ALóó.ó óÐ Ò " ÐÓÈÓÌà@««ìàò òCertified€Question€from€the€United€States€District€Court€for€the€Middle€DistrictˆÐ Ò " Ðà@€€ìà€of€Tennessee,€Nashville€DivisionˆÐ ¾   Ðà@  ìàNo.€3„97„0719€€€€€€Robert€L.€Ô_ÔEcholsÔ_Ô,€JudgeˆÐ ªú  ÐÌÌà@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<m` A߈Ð n¾  ÐÌà@ú ú ìàNo.€M1999„01332„SC„R23„CV€„€Filed€October€2,€Ô_Ô2000Ô_ԈРi¹  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<@` AßÐ A‘ Ðó óÌÓ=€ ]»Ð»dÐd=ÓIn€response€to€three€questions€certified€to€this€Court€from€the€United€States€District€Court€of€theÐ <Œ ÐMiddle€District€of€Tennessee,€we€hold:€that€the€elements€of€the€civil€claim€of€malicious€harassmentÐ (x Ðunder€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701(1998)€are€derived€from€the€criminal€offense€of€civil€rightsÐ d Ðintimidation€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309€(1997);€that€a€claim€may€be€brought€against€aÐ P Ðprivate€individual€or€an€employee€of€a€government€agency€in€his€or€her€individual€capacity;€and€thatÐ ì< Ða€governmental€entity€may€be€liable€for€the€acts€of€its€employees€committed€in€the€course€and€scopeÐ Ø( Ðof€employment€in€accordance€with€the€doctrine€of€Ô_ÔrespondeatÔ_Ô€superior.ò òó óÐ Ä ÐÌò òà@   ìàS.€Ct.€Rule€23€„€Certified€Question€of€State€Law€from€Federal€Courtó óˆÐ œì ÐÌòòE.€Riley€Anderson,€C.óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòFrank€F.€Ô_ÔDrowotaÔ_Ô,€III,Ð tÄ ÐÔ_ÔAdolphoÔ_Ô€A.€Birch,€Jr.,€Janice€M.€Holder,€óóandòò€William€M.€Barkeróó,€JJ.,€joined.Ð `° ÐÌJohn€E.€Quinn,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€petitioner,€Robertson€County,€Tennessee.Ð 8!ˆ  ÐÌJ.€Russell€Farrar€and€Ô_ÔKristinÔ_Ô€Ellis€Ô_ÔBerexaÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€petitioner,€City€ofÐ #`" ÐSpringfield.Ð ü#L# ÐÌW.€Gary€Blackburn,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€petitioners,€Mark€Ô_ÔWoodfinÔ_Ô,€Darrell€Cook,€DanaÐ Ô%$!% ÐÔ_ÔHeckartÔ_Ô,€and€Unknown€Officers.Ð À&"& ÐÌRobert€M.€Burns,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€petitioners,€Curtis€Ô_ÔCarneyÔ_Ô€and€Jeffrey€Ô_ÔBasketteÔ_Ô.Ð ˜(è#( ÐÌCharles€R.€Ray€and€Jeffery€S.€Ô_ÔFrensleyÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€respondents,€Trent€WashingtonÐ p*À%* Ðand€Marcus€Carr.Ð \+¬&+ ÐÌÐ 4-„(-ý? ÐÑ û#Ñâ  âÑ8€H¡XXdì»»d8Ñâ  âÑ  ÑÔ_Ôà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ ° Ðà  àThe€United€States€District€Court€for€the€Middle€District€of€Tennessee€has€certified€threeÐ œì Ðquestions€to€this€Court€pursuant€to€Rule€23€of€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court:׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ˆØ ÐÌà8  à(1)à0` Ð Ð àWhat€are€the€elements€of€a€claim€for€civil€malicious€harassment€under€Tenn.Ð `° ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€(1998)€and€which,€if€any,€criminal€statute€provides€theÐ L œ Ðframework€for€the€cause€of€action;Ð8 ˆ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à(2)à0` Ð Ð àMay€a€claim€be€brought€against€a€private€individual€or€an€employee€of€a€Ð  ` Ðgovernment€agency€in€his€or€her€individual€capacity€for€a€violation€of€Tenn.Ð ü L  ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€(1998);€and€Ðè 8 ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à(3)à0` Ð Ð àMay€a€city€or€county€be€found€liable€for€violations€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„Ð À  Ð21„701€(1998)€committed€by€its€agents€or€employees.Ьü ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌÌà  àWe€accepted€these€certified€questions€of€first€impression.€€We€conclude€that€the€elements€ofÐ pÀ Ða€civil€malicious€harassment€action€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€are€derived€from€the€criminalÐ \¬ Ðoffense€of€civil€rights€intimidation€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309€(1997).€€We€further€concludeÐ H˜ Ðthat€a€civil€claim€of€malicious€harassment€may€be€brought€against€a€private€individual€or€anÐ 4„ Ðemployee€of€a€government€agency€in€his€or€her€individual€capacity,€and€that€a€governmental€entityÐ  p Ðmay€also€be€found€liable€for€violations€committed€by€its€agents€or€employees€in€accordance€with€theÐ  \ Ðdoctrine€of€respondeat€superior.Ð øH ÐÌà@%ìàòòò òBACKGROUNDó óóóˆÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€relevant€facts€were€set€forth€by€the€district€court€in€its€certified€request€for€review,€whichÐ ¨ø Ðwe€shall€summarize€as€follows.€€Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àOn€September€2,€1996,€shortly€after€midnight,€Deputy€Dana€Hackert€was€in€pursuit€of€a€carÐ l¼ Ðbeing€driven€in€Robertson€County€by€a€suspected€intoxicated€driver.€€At€one€point,€the€car€pulled€toÐ X ¨ Ðthe€side€of€the€road,€but€then€sped€away€as€Deputy€Hackert€stepped€out€of€his€patrol€car.€€The€chaseÐ D!” Ðoccurred€at€speeds€exceeding€eighty€miles€per€hour€and€led€into€the€City€of€Springfield.€€When€theÐ 0"€  Ðsuspect€car€stopped€on€21st€Avenue,€Deputy€Hackert€saw€four€African„American€males€running€fromÐ #l! Ðthe€car€into€nearby€woods.€€One€of€the€men€was€wearing€a€white€T„shirt.€Ð $X" Ðâ âÐ ô$D # Ðà  àTrent€Washington€and€Marcus€Carr,€both€of€whom€are€African„American€men,€were€in€theÐ ° Ðâ âyard€of€a€friendððs€home€on€20th€Avenue.€€Carr€was€wearing€a€white€T„shirt.€€Carr€was€stopped€atÐ œì Ðgunpoint,€sprayed€with€chemical€mace,€and€handcuffed.€€Washington€was€chased€by€an€officer€withÐ ˆØ Ða€police€dog,€stopped,€ordered€to€lie€down,€and€handcuffed.€€Washington€and€Carr€were€releasedÐ tÄ Ðwithout€being€arrested€or€charged€with€a€crime€when€neither€could€be€identified€as€having€been€inÐ `° Ðthe€suspect€car€pursued€by€officers.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àThe€respondents,€Washington€and€Carr,€filed€a€civil€claim€in€the€United€States€District€CourtÐ $ t Ðfor€the€Middle€District€of€Tennessee€against€the€petitioners,€Robertson€County,€the€City€ofÐ  ` ÐSpringfield,€and€several€named€and€unnamed€law€enforcement€officers.€€The€claim€alleged€thatÐ ü L  ÐWashington€and€Carr€were€denied€their€constitutional€rights€in€violation€of€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983,€andÐ è 8  Ðalso€alleged€several€state€tort€claims,€including€malicious€harassment€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð Ô$  Ððð€4„21„701€(1998).€€The€district€court€certified€the€three€issues€set€forth€above€with€regard€to€the€civilÐ À  Ðclaim€of€malicious€harassment€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701.€€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àWe€accepted€review€of€these€issues€of€first€impression.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà@Û Û ìàòòò òELEMENTS€OF€MALICIOUS€HARASSMENTó óóóˆÐ \¬ Ðà@ÛÛ%ìàò òòòBackgroundóóó óˆÐ H˜ ÐÌà  àThe€civil€cause€of€action€for€malicious€harassment€is€found€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701Ð  p Ð(1998).€€It€presently€reads€as€follows:Ð  \ ÐÌò òà8  àCreation€of€civil€actionð!ð€Damages.€ð!ðó ó€(a)€€There€is€hereby€created€a€civil€cause€ofÐ ä4 Ðaction€for€malicious€harassment.ÐÔ$Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(b)€A€person€may€be€liable€to€the€victim€of€malicious€harassment€for€both€special€andÐ ¬ü Ðgeneral€damages,€including,€but€not€limited€to,€damages€for€emotional€distress,Ð ˜è Ðreasonable€attorneyððs€fees€and€costs,€and€punitive€damages.ЄÔÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€(1998).€€The€companion€statute€to€the€civil€claim€of€maliciousÐ \ ¬ Ðharassment,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„702,€provides€as€follows:Ð H!˜ ÐÌò òà8  àAlternative€remedies€preserved.ð!ð€ó óThe€remedy€for€malicious€harassment€providedÐ  #p! Ðin€this€part€shall€be€in€addition€to,€and€shall€not€preclude€victims€from€seeking,€otherÐ $`" Ðremedies,€criminal€or€civil,€otherwise€available€under€the€law.Ðü$L #Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„702€(1998).€€Ð Ô&$"% ÐÌà  àAs€originally€adopted€in€1990,€however,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701(a)€began€with€theÐ ¬(ü#' Ðphrase€ð ðin€addition€to€the€criminal€penalty€provided€in€ðð€39„17„313.ðð€€1990€Tenn.€Public€Acts€ch.Ð ˜)è$( Ð908,€ðð€1.€€At€that€time,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð39„17„313€established€the€offense€of€ð ðintimidationðð€asÐ „*Ô%) Ðfollows:Ð p+À&* Їà8  àò òIntimidationó ó.ð!ð€(a)€òòThe€general€assembly€finds€and€declares€that€it€is€the€right€ofÐ ° Ðevery€person€regardless€of€race,€color,€ancestry,€religion€or€national€origin,€to€beÐ  ð Ðsecure€and€protected€from€fear,€intimidation,€harassment,€and€physical€harm€causedÐ ŒÜ Ðby€the€activities€of€groups€and€individualsóó.€€It€is€not€the€intent€of€this€section€toÐ xÈ Ðinterfere€with€the€exercise€of€rights€protected€by€the€constitution€of€the€United€States.€Ð d´ ÐThe€general€assembly€recognizes€the€constitutional€right€of€every€citizen€to€harborÐ P   Ðand€express€beliefs€on€any€subject€whatsoever€and€to€associate€with€others€who€shareÐ < Œ Ðsimilar€beliefs.€€The€general€assembly€further€finds€that€the€advocacy€of€unlawful€actsÐ ( x Ðby€groups€or€individuals€against€other€persons€or€groups€for€the€purpose€of€incitingÐ  d Ðand€provoking€damage€to€property€and€bodily€injury€or€death€to€persons€is€notÐ  P  Ðconstitutionally€protected,€poses€a€threat€to€public€order€and€safety,€and€should€beÐ ì <  Ðsubject€to€criminal€sanctions.ÐØ( Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(b)€It€shall€be€unlawful€for€any€person€knowingly€to€intimidate€or€harass€anotherÐ °  Ðperson€òòbecause€of€that€personððs€race,€color,€religion,€ancestry,€or€national€originóó,€to:Ðœì Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(1)€Cause€physical€injury€to€another€person;ÐtÄ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(2)€Damage,€destroy,€or€deface€any€real€or€personal€property€ofÐ Lœ Ðanother€person;€orÐ8ˆ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(3)€Threaten,€by€word€or€act,€to€do€the€acts€prohibited€if€there€isÐ ` Ðreasonable€cause€to€believe€that€any€of€the€acts€described€inÐ üL Ðsubdivisions€(a)(1)€and€(2)€will€occur;Ðè8` x` x ÐÌà8  à(c)€For€purposes€of€this€section,€ð ðdefaceðð€includes,€but€is€not€limited€to,€crossÐ À Ðburnings€or€the€placing€of€any€word€or€symbol€commonly€associated€with€racial,Ð ¬ü Ðreligious€or€ethnic€terrorism€on€the€property€of€another€person€without€permission.ИèÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„313€(1990)(emphasis€added).€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àShortly€following€the€enactment€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701,€however,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð H!˜ Ððð€39„17„313€was€repealed€by€our€legislature,€and€an€amended€version€of€ð ðcivil€rights€intimationðð€wasÐ 4"„  Ðenacted€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309.€€1990€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.€984.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€first€paragraph€of€theÐ  #p! Ðnew€statute,€ðð€309(a),€was€identical€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€39„17„313(a),€and€the€remainingÐ  $\" Ðprovisions€of€ðð€309€were€also€quite€similar€to€the€repealed€statute.€€For€example,€they€provided:Ð ø$H # ÐÌà8  à(b)€A€person€commits€the€offense€of€intimidating€others€from€exercising€civil€rightsÐ Ð& "% Ðwho:м' #&Ð Ð  ÐÐ ¨(ø#' Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(1)€Injures€or€threatens€to€injure€or€coerces€another€person€with€theÐ ° Ðintent€to€unlawfully€intimidate€another€from€the€free€exercise€orÐ œì Ðenjoyment€of€any€right€or€privilege€secured€by€the€constitution€or€lawsÐ ˆØ Ðof€the€state€of€Tennessee;ÐtÄ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(2)€Injures€or€threatens€to€injure€or€coerces€another€person€with€theÐ L œ Ðintent€to€unlawfully€intimidate€another€because€that€other€exercisedÐ 8 ˆ Ðany€right€or€privilege€secured€by€the€constitution€or€laws€of€the€UnitedÐ $ t ÐStates€or€the€constitution€or€laws€of€the€state€of€Tennessee;Ð `` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(3)€Damages,€destroys€or€defaces€any€real€or€personal€property€ofÐ è 8  Ðanother€person€with€the€intent€to€unlawfully€intimidate€another€fromÐ Ô$  Ðthe€free€exercise€or€enjoyment€of€any€right€or€privilege€secured€by€theÐ À  Ðconstitution€or€laws€of€the€state€of€Tennessee.€Ð¬ü ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(4)€Damages,€destroys€or€defaces€any€real€or€personal€property€ofÐ „Ô  Ðanother€person€with€the€intent€to€unlawfully€intimidate€anotherÐ pÀ Ðbecause€that€other€exercised€any€right€or€privilege€secured€by€theÐ \¬ Ðconstitution€or€laws€of€the€United€States€or€the€constitution€or€laws€ofÐ H˜ Ðthe€state€of€Tennessee.€Ð4„` x` x ÐÌà8  à(c)€It€is€an€offense€for€a€person€to€wear€a€mask€or€disguise€with€the€intent€to€violateÐ  \ Ðsubsection€(b).ÐøHÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309€(1997).׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àDespite€the€repeal€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„313€in€1990,€the€reference€to€it€was€notÐ ¨ø Ðdeleted€from€the€language€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€until€1996,€when€the€legislature€amendedÐ ”ä Ðseveral€statutory€provisions€ð ðrelative€to€technical€corrections€in€citation€and€textual€references€withÐ €Ð Ðrespect€to€criminal€law.ðð€€1996€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.€675.€€Thus,€as€it€exists€today,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð l¼ Ððð€4„21„701€does€not€expressly€refer€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„313€[repealed],€nor€does€it€cite€orÐ X ¨ Ðrefer€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€39„17„309.׃@×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€€€Ð D!” Їà  àWith€this€background€in€mind,€the€petitioners€argue€that€although€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„Ð ° Ð701€no€longer€refers€to€a€specific€criminal€statute,€malicious€harassment€should€be€defined€by€Tenn.Ð œì ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€39„17„308,€which€is€cross„referenced€òòafteróóðð€„701€and€proscribes€harassment€byÐ ˆØ Ðtelephone€or€in€writingòòóó.׃T×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€the€alternative,€the€petitioners€contend€that€the€action€of€maliciousÐ tÄ Ðharassment€is€intended€to€provide€a€civil€remedy€against€so„called€ð ðhate€groupsðð€and€that€theÐ `° Ðelements€of€the€claim€are€found€within€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309,€i.e.,€civil€rights€intimidation,Ð L œ Ðwhich€replaced€the€repealed€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„313.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€respondents€argue€that€the€court€should€determine€the€elements€of€the€civil€claim€ofÐ  ` Ðmalicious€harassment€simply€by€looking€to€the€plain€meaning€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701;€theyÐ ü L  Ðcontend€that€ð ðmaliceðð€is€defined€as€ð ðill„will,€hatred€or€personal€spite,ðð€and€that€ð ðharassmentðð€isÐ è 8  Ðð ðdestructive,€injurious€or€harassing€behavior€directed€at€another.ðð€€The€respondents€also€contend€thatÐ Ô$  Ðconduct€falling€under€either€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„308€or€ðð€„309€may€establish€a€claim€ofÐ À  Ðmalicious€harassment€but€that€there€is€no€need€to€limit€the€acts€of€malicious€harassment€to€these€orÐ ¬ü  Ðany€other€criminal€statutes.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà@‚‚&ìàò òòòAnalysisóóó óˆÐ pÀ ÐÌà  àA€basic€principle€of€statutory€construction€is€to€ascertain€and€give€effect€to€legislative€intentÐ H˜ Ðwithout€unduly€restricting€or€expanding€the€intended€scope€of€a€statute.€€òòParks€v.€Tennessee€Mun.Ð 4„ ÐLeague€Risk€Management€Poolóó,€974€S.W.2d€677,€679€(Tenn.€1998)€(citation€omitted).€€This€meansÐ  p Ðthat€the€Court€must€examine€the€language€of€a€statute€and,€if€unambiguous,€apply€its€ordinary€andÐ  \ Ðplain€meaning.€€If€the€language€is€ambiguous,€the€Court€must€look€to€the€statutory€scheme€as€aÐ øH Ðwhole,€as€well€as€legislative€history,€to€discern€its€meaning.€€òòIdóó.;€òòseeóóòòalsoóó€òòRiggs€v.€Bursonóó,€941Ð ä4 ÐS.W.2d€44,€54€(Tenn.€1997).€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€claim€of€malicious€harassment€is€found€within€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act,€which,Ð ¨ø Ðin€general,€addresses€discrimination€based€on€race,€creed,€color,€religion,€sex,€gender€or€nationalÐ ”ä Ðorigin.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„101€òòetóó€òòseqóó.€(1998).€€The€terms€ð ðmaliciousðð€and€ð ðharassmentðð€areÐ €Ð Ðnot€defined€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€4„21„701€or€elsewhere€in€the€Act.€€Although€the€respondentsÐ l¼ Ðclaim€that€the€terms€are€plain€in€meaning,€the€definitions€they€suggest€would€result€in€an€overly€broadÐ X ¨ Ðinterpretation€that€would€be€inconsistent€with€the€overall€statutory€scheme,€the€legislative€history,Ð D!” Ðand€the€legislative€intent.€€€Ð 0"€  Ðâ âÐ #l! Ðà  àThe€legislative€history€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€indicates€that€the€supporters€of€theÐ ° Ðâ âlegislation€favored€creation€of€a€civil€remedy€for€so„called€ð ðhate€crimesðð€committed€by€ethnic€andÐ œì Ðracial€supremecist€groups€such€as€the€Ku€Klux€Klan,€Aryan€Nation€and€Skinheads.€€The€civil€remedyÐ ˆØ Ðwas€to€be€in€addition€to,€but€separate€from,€the€applicable€criminal€statutes€set€forth€first€in€Tenn.Ð tÄ ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€39„17„313€and€then€in€Tenn.€Code€An.€ðð€39„17„309.€€Ð `° ÐÌà  àNumerous€comments€made€by€legislators,€both€in€the€Senate€and€the€House,€illustrate€thisÐ 8 ˆ Ðintent€by€frequently€discussing€the€civil€claim€in€relation€to€the€related€criminal€provisions€that€makeÐ $ t Ðintimidation€a€felony.€€For€example:€€Ð  ` ÐÌà8  à[It]€makes€it€a€felony,€malicious€harassment,€if€the€attack€on€the€person€or€on€theÐ è 8  Ðproperty€is€done€because€of€.€.€.€[a€personððs]€race,€religion,€national€origin,€raceÐ Ô$  Ðreligion€or€national€origin,€or€ancestry.€€ÐÀ Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€S.,€òòDebate€on€Tenn.€S.€1694€on€the€Floor€of€the€Senateóó,€95th€òòóóGen.€Assembly,€2nd€Reg.€Sess.Ð ˜è  Ð(Feb.€22,€1998)€(Tape€S„24)€(statement€of€Mr.€Cohen).€€Additionally:Ð „Ô  ÐÌà8  à2023€is€a€bill€that€just€makes€it€a€felony€to€maliciously€harass€someone€because€ofÐ \¬ Ðtheir€race,€color,€religion,€ancestry,€or€national€origin.€€Harassment€means€to€causeÐ H˜ Ðphysical€injury€to€another€person€[or]€to€damage,€destroy€or€deface€any€real€orÐ 4„ Ðpersonal€property.Ð pÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€H.R.€Calendar€and€Rules€Comm.,€òòHearing€on€Tenn.€H.R.€2023óó,€95th€òòóóGen.€Assembly,€2nd€òòóóReg.Ð øH ÐSess.€(Mar.€3,€1988)€(Tape€H„C&R„1)€(statement€of€Mr.€Kisber).€€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àOn€several€occasions,€legislators€observed€that€malicious€harassment€would€add€a€civilÐ ¼  Ðcomponent:Ð ¨ø ÐÌà8  àThis€also€adds€a€civil€cause,€it€allows€a€person€to€also€besides€the€criminal€offense,Ð €Ð Ðit€allows€that€person€a€civil,€does€not€preclude€a€civil€action€in€the€case.€Ðl¼Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àWe€have€heard€from€the€people€from€Pulaski€on€several€times€and€felt€that€much€ofÐ D!” Ðtheir€request€is€already€covered€€under€other€sections€of€the€criminal€code.€€In€our€lastÐ 0"€  Ðmeeting€it€was€our€opinion€that€Section€1€and€2,€the€inciting€to€riot,€and€that€firstÐ #l! Ðsection€were€already€covered€and€that€we€would€repeal€that,€and€then€that€simply,€itÐ $X" Ðdeletes€as€section,€and€creates€a€civil€action€in€another€title.€Ðô$D #Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€S.€Judiciary€Comm.,€òòHearing€on€Tenn.€S.€1611óó,€96th€Gen.€Assembly,€2nd€Reg.€Sess.(Feb.€13,Ð Ì&"% Ð1990)€(Tape€S„Judiciary€2)€(statement€of€Sen.€Richardson)€(statement€of€Judge€Haynes).€€Similarly,Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà8  àThe€bill€takes€a€portion€where€we€have€had€some€very€serious€problems€.€.€.whereÐ )à$( Ðwe€have€been€dealing€with€people€who€have€come€in€who€have€attempted€to€inciteÐ |*Ì%) Ðpeople€into€various€activities€that€would€create€perhaps€a€riot,€or€other€civilÐ h+¸&* Ðdisturbance,€and€this€bill€is€aimed€at€allowing€a€civil€process€against€those€peopleÐ ° Ðwho€incite€other€people€to€join€in€this€type€of€activity.ÐœìÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€S.,€òòDebate€on€Tenn.€S.€1611€on€the€Floor€of€the€Senateóó,€96th€Gen.€Assembly,€2nd€Reg.€Sess.Ð tÄ Ð(Feb.€19,€1990)€(Tape€S„24)€(statement€of€Sen.€Richardson).€€Again,€the€criminal€provision€wasÐ `° Ðreferenced€in€conjunction€with€the€civil€action:Ð L œ ÐÌà8  à[W]e€already€have€the,€the€crime€of€malicious€harassment,€and€itððs€a€class€D€felony.€Ð $ t ÐIt€involves€cross€burnings,€it€involves.€.€.causing€physical€injury€to€another€personÐ  ` Ðas€a€result€of€intimidation€or€harassment€based€upon€race,€color,€religion€or€ancestry.€Ð ü L  ÐWhat,€what€weððre€doing€is€adding€a€new€section€to€the€already€existing€felony€thatÐ è 8  Ðwill€say€itððs€also€illegal€for€those€same€reasons€to€incite€others€by€word€or€act€to€theÐ Ô$  Ðacts€prohibited..€.€.Iððm€not€sure€that€itððs€not€but€an€incremental€increase€in€whatððsÐ À  Ðalready€included€within€the€existing€class€D€felony€and€then€including€the€civilÐ ¬ü  Ðremedy€as€described.Иè Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€H.R.€Judiciary€Comm.,€òòHearing€on€Tenn.€H.R.€1747óó,€96th€Gen.€Assembly,€òòóó€2nd€Reg.€Sess.Ð pÀ Ð(Feb.€20,€1990)€(Tape€H„Judiciary„1)€(statement€of€Rep.€Purcell).€€Finally,Ð \¬ ÐÌà8  àThis€bill€is€a€very€simple€bill.€.€.€.It€increases€the€penalty€of€malicious€harassment.€Ð 4„ ÐWe€need€this€bill€for€the€problems€that€we€have€had€with€Aryan€Nation,€the€Ku€KluxÐ  p ÐKlan,€in€Pulaski,€and€the€Skinheads€that€come€here€and€invade€and€pester€the€goodÐ  \ Ðcommunity€and€the€citizenry.€ÐøHÐ Ð  ЀÌTenn.€H.R.,€òòDebate€on€Tenn.€H.R.€1747/S.€1611€on€the€Floor€of€the€Houseóó,€96th€Gen.€Assembly,€2ndÐ Ð  ÐReg.€Sess.€(Apr.€9,€1990)€(Tape€H„66)€(statement€of€Rep.€DePriest).€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àWhile€we€recognize€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€no€longer€contains€a€specific€referenceÐ ”ä Ðto€a€criminal€statute,€we€conclude€that€given€the€legislative€history€and€intent,€the€elements€ofÐ €Ð Ðmalicious€harassment€are€found€by€examining€its€counterpart€criminal€statutes.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòóóWe€find€itÐ l¼ Ðunnecessary€and€illogical€to€rely€on€the€€repealed€statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„313,€given€theÐ X ¨ Ðsimilar€provisions€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309€presently€in€effect.€€For€example,€like€ðð€„313(a),Ð D!” Ðthe€provisions€of€ðð€„309(a)€state€that€ð ð[t]he€general€assembly€finds€and€declares€that€it€is€the€right€ofÐ 0"€  Ðevery€person€regardless€of€race,€color,€ancestry,€religion€or€national€origin,€to€be€secure€and€protectedÐ #l! Ðfrom€òòfear,€intimidation,€harassment€and€bodily€injuryóó€caused€by€the€activities€of€groups€andÐ $X" Ðindividuals.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309(a)€(1997)€(emphasis€added).Ð ô$D # Ðâ âÐ à%0!$ Ðà  àAccordingly,€we€conclude€that€a€claim€of€malicious€harassment€requires€not€only€that€aÐ ° Ðâ âperson€acted€maliciously,€i.e.,€ill„will,€hatred€or€spite,€but€also€that€a€person€unlawfully€intimidatedÐ œì Ðanother€from€the€free€exercise€or€enjoyment€of€a€constitutional€right€by€injuring€or€threatening€toÐ ˆØ Ðinjure€or€coercing€another€person€or€by€damaging,€destroying€or€defacing€any€real€or€personalÐ tÄ Ðproperty€of€another€person.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309(b)€(1997).Ð `° ÐÌÌÌÌà@ééìàò òòòLiability€of€Private€Individualó óóóˆÐ ü L  ÐÌà  àThe€individual€petitioners,€Woodfin,€Cook,€Heckart,€Carney€and€Baskette,€argue€that€aÐ Ô$  Ðgovernment€employee€may€not€be€held€individually€liable€for€a€violation€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„Ð À  Ð701,€because€the€statute€is€directed€at€associations€and€groups.€€The€respondents,€Washington€andÐ ¬ü  ÐCarr,€assert€that€individual€liability€is€consistent€with€the€statutory€definition€of€ð ðpersonðð€and€furthersÐ ˜è  Ðthe€purpose€of€the€statute.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р„Ô  ÐÌà  àWe€begin€our€analysis€by€examining€the€language€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€(1998),Ð \¬ Ðwhich€states€that€ð ð[a]€òòpersonóó€may€be€liable€to€the€victim€of€malicious€harassment.ðð€€(EmphasisÐ H˜ Ðadded).€€Moreover,€as€discussed€above,€the€malicious€harassment€statute€is€included€among€theÐ 4„ Ðprovisions€of€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€(THRA).€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„101,€òòetóó€òòseqóó.Ð  p Ð(1998).€€The€Act€defines€ð ðpersonðð€as€follows:Ð  \ ÐÌà8  àð ðPersonðð€includes€òòone€(1)€or€more€individualsóó,€governments,€governmental€agencies,Ð ä4 Ðpublic€authorities,€labor€organizations,€corporations,€legal€representatives,Ð Ð  Ðpartnerships,€associations,€trustees,€trustees€in€bankruptcy,€receivers,€mutualÐ ¼  Ðcompanies,€joint€stock€companies,€trusts,€unincorporated€organizations€or€otherÐ ¨ø Ðorganized€groups€of€persons.ДäÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€4„21„102(14)€(1998)€(emphasis€added).Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àNotwithstanding€this€plain€definition,€the€petitioners€contend€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„Ð D!” Ð701€is€aimed€solely€at€groups€or€associations€that€engage€in€acts€of€malicious€harassment.€€ThisÐ 0"€  Ðposition,€however,€cannot€be€reconciled€with€the€statute.€€The€legislature€specifically€used€the€termÐ #l! Ðð ðpersonðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701,€the€definition€of€which€includes€ð ðone€(1)€or€moreÐ $X" Ðindividuals€.€.€.€.ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€4„21„102(14)€(1998).€Moreover,€the€legislature€is€presumedÐ ô$D # Ðto€know€of€its€prior€enactments€and€the€state€of€the€law€when€it€enacts€legislation.€€òòRiggs€v.€Bursonóó,Ð à%0!$ Ðâ â941€S.W.2d€at€54.€€Had€the€legislature€intended€to€exclude€individuals€or€employees€of€governmentÐ Ì&"% Ðagencies€from€liability€for€malicious€harassment,€it€would€not€have€used€the€word€ð ðpersonðð€in€Tenn.Ð ° ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Рœì Ðâ âÌòòóóà  àThe€petitioners€nonetheless€urge€us€to€hold€that€there€is€no€individual€liability€under€theÐ tÄ ÐTennessee€Human€Rights€Act,€arguing€that€there€is€no€individual€liability€under€Title€VII€in€theÐ `° Ðfederal€system€and€that€we€should€follow€federal€law.€€The€petitioners€cite,€for€example,€òòWathan€v.Ð L œ ÐGeneral€Elec.€Co.óó,€115€F.3d€400€(6th€Cir.€1997),€in€which€the€Sixth€Circuit€held€that€individualÐ 8 ˆ Ðliability€could€not€be€imposed€on€a€supervisor€for€acts€of€sexual€harassment.€€After€discussing€theÐ $ t Ðdefinition€of€ð ðemployerðð€under€42€U.S.C.€ðð€2000e€(b),€which€includes€a€person€engaged€in€anÐ  ` Ðindustry€affecting€commerce€who€has€15€or€more€employees€and€any€agent€of€such€person,€the€courtÐ ü L  Ðconcluded€that€ð ðthe€statutory€scheme€itself€indicates€that€Congress€did€not€intend€to€imposeÐ è 8  Ðindividual€liability€on€employees.ðð€€òòIdóó.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àIn€òòCarr€v.€United€Parcel€Serviceóó,€955€S.W.2d€832,€834€(Tenn.€1997),€we€addressed€a€similarÐ ¬ü  Ðissue€òòóóas€it€related€to€a€statute€in€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€that€defines€employer€to€includeÐ ˜è  Ðð ðpersons€employing€eight€(8)€or€more€persons€within€the€state,€or€any€person€acting€as€an€agent€ofÐ „Ô  Ðthe€employer,€directly€or€indirectly.ðð€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(4)(1998).€€In€concluding,€likeÐ pÀ Ða€majority€of€federal€courts,€that€there€was€no€individual€liability€for€sexual€harassment€under€ðð„Ð \¬ Ð102(4),€we€observed€that€the€definition€of€ð ðemployer,ðð€the€small€business€exemption,€and€the€ð ðanyÐ H˜ Ðagentðð€provision€found€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(4)€were€substantially€similar€to€the€definitionÐ 4„ Ðof€ð ðemployerðð€under€Title€VII.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àOur€holding€in€òòCarróó€does€not€govern€all€interpretations€under€the€THRA.€€Each€statutoryÐ øH Ðinterpretation€will€be€influenced€by€the€subject€matter,€the€plain€language,€the€legislative€intent,€andÐ ä4 Ðhistory€of€the€particular€statute.€€As€we€said€in€òòCarróó,€we€ð ðare€neither€bound€by€nor€limited€by€federalÐ Ð  Ðlaw€when€interpreting€the€THRA.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€835.€€Thus,€despite€finding€that€there€was€no€individualÐ ¼  Ðliability€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð4„21„102(4),€we€went€on€to€hold€that€under€an€accomplice€liabilityÐ ¨ø Ðprovision€in€the€THRA,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„301(a)(2),€ð ðan€individual€who€aids,€abets,€incites,Ð ”ä Ðcompels,€or€commands€an€employer€to€engage€in€employment„related€discrimination€has€violatedÐ €Ð Ðthe€THRA.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€836.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€òòCarróó€stands€for,€among€other€things,€the€principle€that€this€CourtððsÐ D!” Ðinterpretations€of€the€THRA€are€not€bound€or€limited€by€federal€law.€€In€this€case,€the€plain€languageÐ 0"€  Ðof€the€malicious€harassment€statute€states€that€ð ð[a]€person€may€be€liable€to€the€victim€of€maliciousÐ #l! Ðharassment.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701€(1998).€€The€definition€of€ð ðpersonðð€includes€ð ðone€(1)€orÐ $X" Ðmore€individuals.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(14)€(1998).€€It€would€defy€a€plain€and€logicalÐ ô$D # Ðinterpretation€of€these€provisions€to€conclude€that€an€individual€cannot€be€liable€for€maliciousÐ à%0!$ Ðharassment.€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€an€individual,€including€an€employee€working€for€aÐ Ì&"% Ðgovernment€agency,€may€be€liable€for€malicious€harassment€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„Ð ° Ð701.Ð œì ÐÌà@rrìàòòò òLiability€of€City€or€Countyó óóóˆÐ tÄ ÐÌà  àPetitioners€Robertson€County€and€the€City€of€Springfield€contend€that€a€city€or€county€isÐ L œ Ðimmune€from€liability€for€its€employeesðð€acts€of€malicious€harassment€under€the€Governmental€TortÐ 8 ˆ ÐLiability€Act.€€€They€rely€upon€the€following€statute:€€Ð $ t ÐÌà8  àExcept€as€may€be€otherwise€provided€in€this€chapter,€all€governmental€entities€shallÐ ü L  Ðbe€immune€from€suit€for€any€injury€which€may€result€from€the€activities€of€saidÐ è 8  Ðgovernmental€entities€wherein€said€governmental€entities€are€engaged€in€the€exerciseÐ Ô$  Ðand€discharge€of€any€of€their€functions,€governmental€or€proprietary.ÐÀ Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„201(a)€(1980).€€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àAgain,€we€begin€our€analysis€by€looking€at€the€language€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701Ð pÀ Ð(1998),€which€states€that€ð ð[a]€person€may€be€liable€to€the€victim€of€malicious€harassment.ðð€AsÐ \¬ Ðdiscussed€above,€the€statutory€definition€of€ð ðpersonðð€includes€ð ðgovernments,€governmental€agencies,Ð H˜ Ð[and]€public€authorities.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(14)€(1998).€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àAs€a€matter€of€statutory€construction,€a€specific€statutory€provision,€such€as€the€definition€ofÐ  \ Ðð ðpersonðð€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(14),€will€control€over€a€more€general€statutoryÐ øH Ðprovision.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Cauthernóó,€967€S.W.2d€726,€735€(Tenn.€1998).€€Moreover,€the€plain€languageÐ ä4 Ðevinces€the€legislatureððs€intent€to€remove€any€governmental€immunity€in€matters€involving€theÐ Ð  ÐTHRA.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòSanders€v.€Lanieróó,€968€S.W.2d€787,€790€(Tenn.€1998);€òòJohnson€v.€South€Cent.Ð ¼  ÐHuman€Resources€Agencyóó,€926€S.W.2d€951,€953€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€Accordingly,€we€concludeÐ ¨ø Ðthat€a€government€or€a€government€agency€may€be€held€liable€for€acts€committed€by€its€employees.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àThe€more€difficult€question€is€determining€whether€and€when€liability€is€imputed€to€aÐ l¼ Ðgovernmental€entity.€€Petitioners€Robertson€County€and€the€City€of€Springfield€argue€that€they€areÐ X ¨ Ðliable€only€if€their€employees€have€committed€acts€of€malicious€harassment€pursuant€to€a€governmentÐ D!” Ðpolicy€or€custom.€€The€respondents€contend€that€the€government€is€liable€for€the€acts€of€its€employeesÐ 0"€  Ðcommitted€in€the€scope€and€course€of€employment€pursuant€to€the€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àThe€petitioners€argue€that€this€issue€is€controlled€by€òòMonell€v.€Department€of€Soc.€Serv.€of€Ð ô$D # ÐN.Y.óó,€436€U.S.€658,€98€S.€Ct.2018,€56€L.€Ed.2d€611€(1978),€a€case€in€which€the€United€StatesÐ à%0!$ ÐSupreme€Court€addressed€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983.€€The€language€of€ðð€1983€states€that€ð ð[e]very€personÐ Ì&"% Ðwho,€under€color€of€any€statute,€ordinance,€regulation,€custom,€or€usage€of€any€State€or€Territory€orÐ ¸'#& Ðthe€District€of€Columbia,€subjects,€or€causes€to€be€subjected,€any€citizen.€.€.to€the€deprivation€of€anyÐ ¤(ô#' Ðrights,€privileges,€or€immunities€secured€by€the€Constitution€and€laws,€shallbe€liable€to€the€partyÐ )à$( Ðâ âinjured.€.€.€.ðð€€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983€(1988).€€The€Supreme€Court€concluded:Ð |*Ì%) Ðà8  à[T]he€language€of€ðð€1983,€read€against€the€background€of€the...legislative€history,Ð ° Ðâ âcompels€the€conclusion€that€Congress€did€not€intend€municipalities€to€be€held€liableÐ œì Ðunless€action€pursuant€to€official€municipal€policy€of€some€nature€caused€aÐ ˆØ Ðconstitutional€tort.€€€In€particular,€we€conclude€that€a€municipality€cannot€be€heldÐ tÄ Ðliable€òòsolelyóó€because€it€employs€a€tortfeasor„„€or,€in€other€words,€a€muncipality€cannotÐ `° Ðbe€held€liable€under€ðð€1983€on€a€òòrespondeat€superioróó€theory.ÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÌòòMonellóó,€436€U.S.€at€691„92,€98€S.€Ct.€at€2036€(italics€in€original).€The€Supreme€Court€has€recentlyÐ $ t Ðreaffirmed€this€holding€in€òòBoard€of€County€Commððr€v.€Brownóó,€520€U.S.€397,€117€S.€Ct.€1382,€137Ð  ` ÐL.Ed.2d€626€(1997).Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àHowever,€unlike€the€specific€language€and€history€of€the€federal€statute,€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983,Ð Ô$  ÐTennesseeððs€statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701,€does€not€contain€language€that€could€be€construedÐ À  Ðto€limit€a€government€liability€to€acts€in€furtherance€of€a€policy€or€custom.€€Since€the€Act€does€notÐ ¬ü  Ðspecifically€address€or€limit€the€manner€of€determining€governmental€liability,€the€plain€languageÐ ˜è  Ðof€the€statute€must€be€interpreted€to€include€respondeat€superior€liability,€a€doctrine€well„establishedÐ „Ô  Ðin€our€common€law.€òòSeeóó€òòRiggs€v.€Bursonóó,€941€S.W.2d€at€54€(legislature€presumed€to€know€existingÐ pÀ Ðstate€of€the€law).€€Moreover,€we€have€applied€the€theory€of€respondeat€superior€in€other€contextsÐ \¬ Ðunder€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act.€€òòSeeóó€òòCarróó,€955€S.W.2d€at€837;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòParker€v.€WarrenÐ H˜ ÐCounty€Util.€Dist.óó€,€2€S.W.3d€170,€173€(Tenn.€1999);€òòSanders€v.€Lanieróó,€968€S.W.2d€at€789.€€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àWe€also€observe€that€other€jurisdictions€have€applied€respondeat€superior€in€similarÐ  \ Ðcircumstances€as€the€present€case.€€For€example,€in€òòHolder€v.€Ivanjackóó,€39€F.€Supp.€2d€965€(N.D.€Ill.Ð øH Ð1999),€the€plaintiff€filed€a€civil€action€against€several€city€police€officers€and€the€city€itself€based€onÐ ä4 Ðthe€Illinois€Hate€Crime€Act.€€The€city€contended€that€the€suit€should€be€dismissed€because€a€ð ðhate„Ð Ð  Ðcrimeðð€by€definition€was€motivated€by€personal€animus€and€therefore€not€within€the€scope€of€theÐ ¼  Ðofficersðð€employment.€€The€district€court€ruled:€Ð ¨ø ÐÌà8  àUnder€Illinois€law,€[the€plaintiffððs]€claim€against€the€City€pursuant€to€òòrespondeatóóÐ €Ð Ðòòsuperioróó€is€permissible€if€the€individual€police€officersðð€conduct€was€within€the€scopeÐ l¼ Ðof€their€employment.€.€.€.ÐX ¨Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àConduct€is€within€the€scope€of€employment€if:€ð ð(a)€it€is€of€the€kind€he€is€employedÐ 0"€  Ðto€perform;€(b)€it€occurs€substantially€within€the€authorized€time€and€space€limits;Ð #l! Ð[and]€(c)€it€is€actuated,€at€least€in€part,€by€a€purpose€to€serve€the€master.ðð€.€.€.Ð $X" ÐConduct€is€not€within€the€scope€of€employment€if€the€employeeððs€actions€wereÐ ô$D # Ðdifferent€from€those€authorized€.€.€.or€were€performed€purely€in€the€employeeððs€selfÐ à%0!$ Ðinterest.ÐÌ&"%Ð Ð  ÐÌòòHolder€v.€Ivanjackóó,€39€F.€Supp.€2d€at€971€(italics€in€original);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòDiPino€v.€Davisóó,€729€A.2d€354Ð ¤(ô#' Ð(Md.€1999)€(respondeat€superior€applied€to€government€where€its€agents€commit€constitutionalÐ )à$( Ðviolations€in€the€scope€of€employment).Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àAccordingly,€we€conclude€that€governmental€liability€in€these€circumstances€is€to€beÐ ° Ðdetermined€through€the€traditional€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior.€Ð œì ÐÌÌà@FF%ìàòòò òCONCLUSIONóóˆÐ `° ÐÌà  àó óAfter€consideration€of€the€record€and€applicable€authority,€we€conclude€that€the€elements€ofÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€civil€claim€of€malicious€harassment€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„701(1998)€are€derived€fromÐ $ t Ðthe€criminal€offense€of€civil€rights€intimidation€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309€(1997);€that€aÐ  ` Ðclaim€may€be€brought€against€a€private€individual€or€an€employee€of€a€government€agency€in€his€orÐ ü L  Ðher€individual€capacity;€and€that€a€governmental€entity€may€be€liable€for€the€acts€of€its€employeesÐ è 8  Ðcommitted€in€the€course€and€scope€of€employment€pursuant€to€the€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior.Ð Ô$  Ðà  àÌà  àCosts€of€the€appeal€shall€be€assessed€equally€among€the€petitioners.Ð ¬ü  Ðà  à€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________Ð pÀ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àE.€RILEY€ANDERSON,€CHIEF€JUSTICE€