ÿWPC F «Œ•2rìáÂñxÝtüÖ °°:⟩úÆQ h¼–»àwÐF˜Í>ßbVT©ï¬=yqB¨‰Òf­dí‹£ ²Q)X΀z¨µÒ še‡^×ëmÇê¶U”9b“ï‚óÝONHhQ™øhK Àƒþ6](Û«ua-;Šô‰[ÿb¡¹9¯Vû¤ƒZg´¼VÄÚƒÖAW,;‰t4Z=aÔž®º ݯˆV5ÞílLÃ.þ+ãVìvpÐé_¿7ëÀ4‘,ûŽUL86õÏýAAÄ"Ï“ˆªêy—Œ¤³Áxv?/Ì´š|ðùÕÉ£.p%9[Ž Cv ~[´ )£"WE{—¨áçÿ—r´Ä7ƒüW)’%%MD¹‡ÊýÙõÿ¯€^⪟gÚ¹ÈfIÂÌGÛLæç"¢X‹ô/z÷wí¬E'·\ùð™úÉ;a…–?!£Uñìmž—x.X“Bl¹‚ݦÝʇÔ6B'qk¹MŠÚé“Üãí)'þ{µGî=] Ï–^òáKt,¦¤öFø#¢Þù«w)µ†E¦e¶ä‚»ÊÝÞ´È×ÚŒˆH‹5!'·üãKÇ>ŽYTVúbUCFÁÞfH@=&ÆŒ )—l–=#Á¶ %w ^ } 0ˆ‰ w UN 4c zw Òñ à Ò mÔ ë Æó ƹÆÆE N)U@+UCNkE¹r»»-4--aa™zzzÑ#fä%JJ(J(t”)”)”)”)11 0D44i[4bÄ5Ä5Ä5Ä5Ä5Ä5Ä5Ä5Ä5PÌ5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ì5Ó99999999999€ï:ï:ï:ï: 0ío<o<o<o< B\=\= 0¤y= D5> D-R> 0K>> ASÊ>Æ? 0¤ã? 0D‡@ A«Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@Ë@2vAæ¨BÜŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽCŽC AŸjE˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0»šv)â (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularUUb)bk1Ìh¡ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔRevcoððs€motion€to€dismiss€was€initially€based€upon€the€unamended€complaint,€which€only€alleged€that€RevcoÐ ° Ðð ðòòallowedóó€Boone€.€.€.€to€go€after€Woodfin€.€.€.€.ðð€(Ô_ÔemphasisÔ_Ô€added).€€The€trial€court€allowed€the€plaintiffs€to€amend€theirÐ tÄ Ðcomplaint€to€allege€Revcoððs€consent,€direction,€and€control€of€Booneððs€actions€giving€rise€to€the€wrongful€death€action.€Ð 8ˆ ÐEven€after€considering€the€allegations€contained€in€the€plaintiffsðð€amended€complaint,€however,€the€trial€granted€RevcoððsÐ üL Ðmotion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim.€(uHš Z‹(Times New Roman (ÆúI Z‹6Times New Roman Regular Ð  ( ' tg0tg .    öÝ ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔThis€requirement€is€necessary€to€establish€the€aspect€of€control€necessary€for€the€imposition€of€liability.€Ð ° ÐWithout€any€knowledge€by€the€municipality€of€the€actions€taken€by€the€off„duty€officer,€no€opportunity€or€duty€to€controlÐ tÄ  Ðthose€actions€can€arise,€and€consequently,€no€liability€can€be€fairly€imputed€to€the€municipality. *Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔWe€differ€from€many€of€the€minority€jurisdictions€which€find€the€actions€of€the€officer€to€be€ð ðprivateðð€inÐ ° Ðnature,€because€we€recognize€that€the€private€employer€may€be€subject€to€vicarious€liability€even€if€the€off„duty€officerÐ tÄ Ðperforms€ð ðofficialðð€acts€within€the€regular€scope€of€his€or€her€employment€as€a€security€guard.€€As€we€stated€previously,Ð 8ˆ Ðthe€nature„of„the„act€analysis€does€not€work€well€with€existing€Tennessee€law,€and€private€employers€are€not€immuneÐ üL Ðfrom€liability€for€the€acts€committed€by€their€employees€merely€because€the€employee€also€happens€to€be€a€municipalÐ À Ðpolice€officer.€€Employers€who€assume€the€benefits€of€employing€off„duty€officers€must€also€assume€the€correspondingÐ „Ô Ðrisk€of€harm€for€acts€committed€by€such€security€guards€within€the€scope€of€their€employment.à x à Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòLande€v.€Menage€Ltd.€Partnershipóó,€702€€A.2d€1259,€1261€(D.C.€1997);€òòTapp€v.€Stateóó,€406€N.E.2dÐ ° Ð296,€301€(Ind.€Ct.€App.€1980);€òòLovelace€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Andersonóó,€730€A.2d€774,€781€(Md.€Ct.€Spec.€App.€1999);€òòState€Ô_Ôv.Ô_Ô€Gloveróó,Ð tÄ Ð367€N.E.2d€1202,€1204€(Ohio€Ct.€App.€1976).€€ Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔWith€the€rule€we€announce€today,€we€doubt€that€private€employers€will€suddenly€forgo€hiring€off„duty€officersÐ ° Ðmerely€for€fear€of€liability,€because€the€advantages€of€hiring€off„duty€officers€include€their€training€in€law„enforcementÐ tÄ Ðpractices€and€their€ability€to€perform€some€duties€that€ordinary€citizens€cannot.€€So€long€as€employers€continue€to€hireÐ 8ˆ Ðsecurity€guards,€either€private€citizens€or€off„duty€officers,€we€find€that€deterrence€will€be€served€irrespective€of€liabilityÐ üL Ðissues.€€Accordingly,€we€give€little€additional€consideration€to€this€issue€in€deciding€whether€private€employers€shouldÐ À Ðbe€held€liable€for€the€actions€of€off„duty€officers€employed€as€security€guards. ÇÝ ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔBecause€the€primary€focus€of€agency€law€is€upon€the€consent€of€the€principal€to€have€actions€taken€on€hisÐ ° Ðor€her€behalf€by€the€agent,€this€last€scenario€envisions€that€a€private€employer€may€be€liable€for€actions€taken€by€theÐ tÄ Ðofficer€to€benefit€the€employer€and€of€which€the€employer€had€actual€knowledge€and€gave€consent.€€To€that€extent,Ð 8ˆ Ðtherefore,€it€is€irrelevant€to€the€analysis€of€this€factor€whether€the€actions€were€taken€by€the€officer€in€the€regular€scopeÐ üL Ðof€officerððs€off„duty€employment. \Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔThe€plaintiffs€point€out€that€Revco€asserted€actual€control€over€Boone€by€ordering€him€to€return€to€RevcoÐ ° Ðto€issue€a€shoplifting€citation.€€We€agree€that€this€fact€goes€to€show€that€Boone€was€acting€according€to€his€directions€orÐ tÄ Ðorders€issued€by€the€Revco€manager,€and€as€such,€Ô_Ôwe€conclude€that€theÔ_Ô€complaint€alleges€sufficient€facts€to€state€a€claimÐ 8ˆ Ðfor€relief€under€this€theory.€€ @Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú16Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔThe€amended€complaint€also€specifically€alleges€that€the€Revco€manager€consented€to€Boone€undertakingÐ ° Ða€mission€to€arrest€Woodfin€with€the€primary€intent€to€benefit€Revco. jÝ ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔFor€similar€reasons,€we€are€reluctant€to€ground€liability€for€private€employers€solely€on€the€fact€of€privateÐ ° Ðpayment€as€do€some€minority€jurisdictions.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòCervantez€v.€J.C.€Penny€Co.óó,€595€P.2d€975,€980€(Cal.€1975),Ð tÄ Ðòòsuperseded€by€statute€on€other€grounds€as€recognized€byóó€òòMelendez€v.€City€of€Los€Angelesóó,€73€Cal.€Rptr.€2d€469,€472„73Ð 8ˆ Ð(Cal.€Ct.€App.1998);€òòStewart€v.€Stateóó,€527€P.2d€22,€24€(Okla.€Crim.€App.€1974).€€This€approach€ignores€the€reality€thatÐ üL Ðworking€for€Ô_Ôa€private€employer€doesÔ_Ô€not€weaken€an€officerððs€continuing€authority€and€ability€to€act€as€a€peace€officer.€Ð À ÐMoreover,€while€the€police€officers€in€this€case€are€not€continuously€on€official€duty,€they€are€frequently€subject€to€beingÐ „Ô Ðsummoned€for€official€duty€at€any€time.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€Knoxville€City€Code€ðð€19„29.€€As€such,€situations€can€arise€where€aÐ H ˜ Ðpolice€officer€is€summoned€for€official€duty€or€otherwise€acts€in€an€official€capacity€as€a€peace€officer,€even€though€theÐ  \ Ðofficer€is€still€technically€on€the€payroll€of€the€private€employer.€€To€hold€that€a€private€employer€may€be€vicariouslyÐ Ð  Ðliable€for€the€acts€of€a€police€officer€simply€because€of€an€overlap€of€employment€schedules€does€not€comport€with€basicÐ ” ä  Ðnotions€of€fairness.€€Therefore,€while€this€rationale€may€be€attractive€for€some€jurisdictions,€we€believe€that€this€approachÐ X ¨  Ðover„€simplifies€the€practical€realities€of€our€state€law„enforcement€practices€and€could€result€in€unjust€determinationsÐ  l  Ðin€some€cases. Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔMoreover,€the€minority€approach€that€looks€to€whether€the€act€of€the€officer€was€committed€within€the€scopeÐ ° Ðof€private€employment€is€too€restrictive€in€its€approach€to€assigning€liability.€Agency€theory,€by€way€of€contrast,Ð tÄ Ðrecognizes€that€vicarious€liability€may€properly€arise€under€some€situations€even€outside€the€scope€of€privateÐ 8ˆ Ðemployment.€€òòSeeóó€òòParker€v.€Warren€County€Util.€Dist.óó,€2€S.W.3d€170,€177€(Tenn.€1999)€(recognizing€that€the€phraseÐ üL Ðð ðscope€of€employmentðð€does€not€serve€ð ðas€the€sole€basis€for€imposing€employer€liabilityðð).€(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó _Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú17Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔAs€the€issue€is€not€properly€before€this€Court€on€this€appeal,€we€express€no€opinion€as€to€whether€the€CityÐ ° Ðof€Knoxville€is€also€vicariously€liable€under€the€dual€master€doctrine€for€Booneððs€actions.- ù- FÝ ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔWe€believe€these€cases€to€be€persuasive€because€special€officers€and€off„duty€officers€employed€as€privateÐ ° Ðsecurity€guards€share€several€important€characteristics.€€To€provide€a€brief€example,€both€special€police€officers€and€off„Ð tÄ Ðduty€officers€Ô_ÔareÔ_Ô€employed€only€for€a€special€purpose,€usually€to€provide€security€for€a€private€entity.€€In€addition,€theÐ 8ˆ Ðprivate€employer€of€a€special€police€officer,€like€that€of€an€off„duty€officer€serving€as€a€private€security€guard,€isÐ üL Ðresponsible€for€compensating€the€officers€and€for€maintaining€employee€insurance.€€òòCf.óó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„8„212.€€ ÉÝ ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòWhitley€v.€Food€Giant,€Inc.óó,€721€So.€2d€207,€209€(Ala.€Civ.€App.€1998);€òòState€v.€Kurtzóó,€278€P.2dÐ ° Ð406,€408€(Ariz.€1952);€òòState€v.€Wilenóó,€539€N.W.2d€650,€658€(Neb.€Ct.€App.€1995);€òòGlenmar€Cinestate,€Inc.€v.€Farrellóó,Ð tÄ Ð292€S.E.2d€366,€369„70€(Va.€1982). vÝ ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔAs€no€issues€concerning€the€other€defendants€in€this€case€are€properly€before€this€Court,€we€focus€only€uponÐ ° Ðthe€allegations€of€the€complaint€relating€to€defendant€Boone€and€his€employment€and€association€with€defendant€Revco.(|I2u$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€<»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôõò»»Ô€€ d(|3–$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€<»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3–$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€<»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKK (Ý ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòDuncan€v.€Stateóó,€294€S.E.2d€365,€366€(Ga.€Ct.€App.€1982);€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€672€P.2d€1268,€1269„70Ð ° Ð(Wash.€Ct.€App.€1983). ÜÝ ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòMcWain€v.€Greyhoundóó,€357€So.€2d€780,€781€(Fla.€Dist.€Ct.€App.€1978).€ ÒÝ ƒRu$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô£a ò»»Ô€€Ý  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòCervantez€v.€J.C.€Penny€Co.óó,€595€P.2d€975,€980€(Cal.€1975),€òòsuperseded€by€statute€on€other€groundsÐ ° Ðas€recognized€byóó€òòMelendez€v.€City€of€Los€Angelesóó,€73€Cal.€Rptr.€2d€469,€472„73€(Cal.€Ct.€App.1998);€òòStewart€v.€Stateóó,Ð tÄ Ð527€P.2d€22,€24€(Okla.€Crim.€App.€1974).X[Z‘ I&mage <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€–»»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼‘»»»ÔÑ8€î XXdê»»d 8ÑÓ  Óà@@™ ™ ìàÔ‡î Ø‘ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÐ ° Ðà@@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼‘»îî Ø#ÔÐ Ö& ÐSeptember€6,€2000€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔÌÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕñ#Ôò òÔ_ÔJAMESENAÔ_Ô€WHITE,€òòet€al.óó€€v.€€REVCO€DISCOUNT€DRUG€Ð úJ ÐCENTERS,€INC.€ó óÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔÐ  ^ ÐÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕ³#ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔÌò òAppeal€by€Permission€from€the€Court€of€Appeals,€Eastern€SectionÐ  ^ ЀÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕ #ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔCircuit€Court€for€Knox€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€1„351„98€€€€€€Hon.€Dale€C.€Workman,€JudgeÐ æ 6  ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E1999„02023„SC„R11„CVÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕ¥#ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘Ô€„€Filed€November€22,€2000Ð ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í Ðó óÌÌÓ  ÓWe€granted€permission€to€appeal€in€this€case€to€address€whether€a€private€employer€may€be€heldÐ d´ Ðliable€for€the€negligent€actions€of€an€off„duty€police€officer€who€was€hired€by€the€employer€forÐ P  Ðprivate€security€purposes.€€In€the€circuit€court,€the€defendant€employer€moved€to€dismiss€theÐ <Œ Ðplaintiffsðð€wrongful€death€action€for€failure€to€state€a€claim,€and€the€motion€was€granted€by€the€trialÐ (x Ðjudge.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€dismissal,€holding€that€the€actions€of€the€off„duty€officerÐ d Ðwere€taken€in€furtherance€of€his€official€duties€as€a€peace€officer,€and€therefore,€the€defendantÐ P Ðemployer€could€not€be€held€liable€for€the€officerððs€negligent€actions.€€After€reviewing€the€complaintÐ ì< Ðin€this€case,€along€with€the€applicable€legal€authority,€we€hold€that€the€complaint€does€state€a€claimÐ Ø( Ðagainst€the€defendant€employer€for€the€negligence€of€the€off„duty€officer.€€The€judgment€of€the€CourtÐ Ä Ðof€Appeals€is€reversed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€Knox€County€Circuit€Court€for€furtherÐ ° Ðproceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.Ð œì ÐÓ­ÓÌò òÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕ#ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔTenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€Application€for€Permission€to€Appeal;€Judgment€of€the€Ð t Ä ÐCourt€of€Appeals€Reversed;€Case€RemandedÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕÛ #ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘Ôó ó€Ð `!°  ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼‘»àXPÕ¤ #ÔÔ‡XPÕX.¼‘ÔWilliam€M.€Barker,€Jóó.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€whichòò€E.€Riley€Anderson,€C.J.,€óóandòòÐ <#Œ" ÐÔ_ÔAdolphoÔ_Ô€A.€Birchóó,€òòJróó.,€and€òòJanice€M.€Holderóó,€JJ.,€joined.€€òòFrank€F.€Ô_ÔDrowotaÔ_Ô,€IIIóó,€J.,€notÐ ($x# Ðparticipating.€Ð %d $ ÐÌA.€Philip€Ô_ÔLomonacoÔ_Ô,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellants,€Ô_ÔJamesenaÔ_Ô€White,€Michael€L.Ð ì&<"& ÐÔ_ÔWoodfinÔ_Ô,€James€E.€Ô_ÔWoodfinÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€Cheryl€W.€Ô_ÔBobbitÔ_Ô,€Jacqueline€D.€Ô_ÔWoodfinÔ_Ô,€Joyce€C.€Woodward,Ð Ø'(#' Ðand€Roderick€Ô_ÔWoodfinÔ_Ô,€òòas€next€of€kin€and€heirs€of€óóJames€E.€Ô_ÔWoodfinÔ_Ô,€òòdeceasedóó.Ô#†¼‘»XXPÕ #ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔÐ Ä($( ÐÌRonald€T.€Hill,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Revco€Discount€Drug€Centers,€Inc.Ô#†¼‘»XXPÕð#ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔÐ œ*ì%* ÐÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕ¡#ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔÌÓà ÓÌà@@OO&ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕø#ÔÔ‡XPÕX»¼‘ÔÐ `-°(-ý ЇÔ_ÔÌÔ#†¼‘»XXPÕk#ÔÓ  Óà  àÔ€XPÕX»¼‘ÔThis€case€arises€out€of€the€dismissal€of€the€plaintiffsðð€wrongful€death€suit,€which€originatedÐ œì Ðfrom€the€shooting€death€of€James€E.€Woodfin€by€officers€of€the€Knoxville€Police€Department.€€AsÐ ˆØ Ðalleged€by€the€plaintiffs€in€their€original€and€amended€complaint,€the€events€later€giving€rise€toÐ tÄ ÐWoodfinððs€alleged€wrongful€death€first€began€when€Woodfin€entered€a€Revco€Discount€Drug€StoreÐ `° Ð(Revco)€in€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€on€May€4,€1997.€€While€inside€Revco,€Woodfin€caused€aÐ L œ Ðconsiderable€disruption,€and€he€was€issued€a€misdemeanor€citation€for€disorderly€conduct€by€RevcoððsÐ 8 ˆ Ðsecurity€guard,€Danny€Boone.€€After€issuing€the€citation,€Boone,€who€was€also€an€off„duty€policeÐ $ t Ðofficer€with€the€Knoxville€Police€Department€(KPD),€warned€Woodfin€never€to€return€to€Revco.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àOne€month€later€on€June€4,€1997,€the€manager€of€Revco€approached€Boone€and€informed€himÐ è 8  Ðthat€Woodfin€entered€the€store€a€few€days€earlier,€contrary€to€Booneððs€earlier€warning.€€Boone,€whoÐ Ô$  Ðwas€working€that€day€as€Revcoððs€security€guard,€then€called€the€KPD€ð ðunder€the€complete€directionððÐ À  Ðof€the€Revco€Manager€and€inquired€as€to€the€status€of€the€May€4€citation.€€Boone€learned€thatÐ ¬ü  ÐWoodfin€failed€to€report€to€the€jail€for€ð ðbookingðð€on€May€19€as€ordered€by€the€citation€and€that€aÐ ˜è  Ðbench€warrant€had€been€issued€for€Woodfinððs€arrest.€€The€complaint€then€alleges€that€after€BooneÐ „Ô  Ðtold€the€Revco€manager€about€the€bench€warrant,€the€manager€directed€Boone€to€go€to€WoodfinððsÐ pÀ Ðapartment€ð ðto€serve€the€bench€warrant€to€prevent€Woodfin€from€ever€returning€to€Revco€and€toÐ \¬ Ðpunish€Woodfin€for€disregarding€Revcoððs€no€trespass€order.ðð€€Before€going€to€Woodfinððs€apartment,Ð H˜ Ðhowever,€Boone€contacted€four€or€five€uniformed€KPD€officers€to€accompany€him€from€Revco€toÐ 4„ ÐWoodfinððs€apartment.Ð  p ÐÌà  àUpon€arriving€at€Woodfinððs€apartment,€Boone€and€the€uniformed€officers€discovered€thatÐ øH ÐWoodfin€had€locked€himself€inside€the€apartment€and€that€he€would€not€allow€anyone€to€enter.€€OneÐ ä4 Ðof€the€officers€then€called€a€maintenance€person€for€a€key€to€the€apartment.€€While€waiting€for€theÐ Ð  Ðmaintenance€person€to€locate€the€key,€Boone€was€contacted€by€the€Revco€manager,€who€wantedÐ ¼  ÐBoone€to€return€to€the€store€to€issue€a€citation€to€a€shoplifter.€€Boone€left€the€apartment,€issued€theÐ ¨ø Ðcitation€to€the€shoplifter€at€Revco,€and€then€returned€to€Woodfinððs€apartment.€Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àAfter€finally€obtaining€a€key,€Boone€and€the€officers€entered€the€apartment€and€discoveredÐ l¼ Ðthat€Woodfin€had€locked€himself€in€the€bathroom.€€Woodfin€warned€the€officers€that€he€had€aÐ X ¨ Ðshotgun€pointed€at€the€bathroom€door€and€that€he€would€shoot€anyone€who€entered.€€According€toÐ D!” Ðthe€complaint,€one€of€the€other€officers€then€kicked€open€the€bathroom€door€and€fired€his€weapon,Ð 0"€  Ðmortally€wounding€Woodfin€in€the€stomach.€€The€officers€then€left€the€apartment€and,€for€the€firstÐ #l! Ðtime,€called€a€police€supervisor€to€tell€him€what€had€occurred.Ð $X" ÐÌà  àThe€plaintiffs€in€this€action€then€filed€a€wrongful€death€suit€against€Boone,€Revco,€theÐ à%0!$ ÐKnoxville€police€officers€involved,€the€City€of€Knoxville,€and€the€Knoxville€CommunityÐ Ì&"% ÐDevelopment€Corporation,€which€leased€the€apartment€to€Woodfin.׃N×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€complaint€alleged€inÐ ¸'#& Ðrelevant€part€that€the€officers€were€negligent€in€the€use€of€deadly€force€against€Woodfin,€becauseÐ ¤(ô#' Ðsuch€force€was€unreasonable€and€unnecessary€to€accomplish€an€arrest€on€a€misdemeanor€warrant.€Ð ° ÐThe€complaint€also€alleged€that€the€actions€of€the€officers€ð ðescalated€and€aggravated€the€situationððÐ œì Ðand€that€through€these€actions,€the€officers€became€ð ðthe€aggressors,ðð€making€any€use€of€deadly€forceÐ ˆØ Ðunreasonable.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àIn€the€original€complaint,€the€plaintiffs€alleged€that€Boone€was€acting€ð ðas€an€agentðð€for€RevcoÐ L œ Ðduring€the€events€giving€rise€to€Woodfinððs€death€and€that€Revco€was€therefore€liable€for€BooneððsÐ 8 ˆ Ðactions€under€the€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior.€€In€their€amended€complaint,€the€plaintiffs€furtherÐ $ t Ðalleged€that€during€all€times€relevant€to€the€action,€Boone€was€working€as€a€private€security€guardÐ  ` Ðfor€Revco€and€that€he€was€acting€ð ðunder€the€direction,€consent,€control,€and€within€the€scope€of€hisÐ ü L  Ðemployment€with€Revco.ðð€€More€specifically,€the€amended€complaint€alleged€that€Revco€directedÐ è 8  ÐBoone€to€call€the€KPD€to€check€on€Woodfin€and€that€Revco€directed€and€consented€to€Boone€goingÐ Ô$  Ðto€Woodfinððs€house€ð ðto€prevent€Woodfin€from€ever€returning€to€Revco€and€to€punish€Woodfin€forÐ À  Ðdisregarding€Revcoððs€no€trespass€order.ðð€€As€proof€of€Revcoððs€control€over€Boone,€the€plaintiffsÐ ¬ü  Ðalleged€that€Revco€recalled€Boone€from€Woodfinððs€apartment€to€issue€a€citation€to€a€shoplifter.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àRevco€moved€to€dismiss€the€complaint€against€itself€under€Tennessee€Rule€of€CivilÐ pÀ ÐProcedure€12.02(6),€stating€that€the€plaintiffs€failed€to€allege€sufficient€facts€setting€forth€a€cause€ofÐ \¬ Ðaction.€€The€basis€for€Revcoððs€motion€was€that€because€ð ðBoone,€as€a€matter€of€law,€was€acting€solelyÐ H˜ Ðwithin€the€scope€of€his€duty€as€a€police€officerðð€when€the€officers€sought€to€arrest€Woodfin€in€hisÐ 4„ Ðapartment,€Boone€could€not€be€Revcoððs€employee€or€agent.€€The€trial€court€granted€Revcoððs€motionÐ  p Ðto€dismiss,€and€the€plaintiffs€appealed€to€the€Court€of€Appeals.׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð  \ ÐÌà  àThe€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€dismissal€of€the€complaint€by€adopting€a€test€thatÐ ä4 Ðexamines€the€nature€of€the€activities€undertaken€by€the€police€officer€during€the€events€giving€riseÐ Ð  Ðto€the€cause€of€action.€€The€intermediate€court€then€found€that€Booneððs€actions€in€this€case€reflectedÐ ¼  Ðð ða€vindication€of€a€public€right,ðð€thereby€compelling€the€conclusion€that€Boone€could€only€have€beenÐ ¨ø Ðacting€in€his€official€capacity€as€a€Knoxville€police€officer.€€Because€Boone€was€not€acting€withinÐ ”ä Ðthe€scope€of€his€private€employment€with€Revco€at€the€time€of€Woodfinððs€death,€the€court€declinedÐ €Ð Ðto€find€that€a€cause€of€action€had€been€stated€against€Revco€under€the€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior.€Ð l¼ ÐWe€respectfully€disagree€with€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals,€and€for€the€reasons€givenÐ X ¨ Ðherein,€we€hold€that€the€original€and€amended€complaints€in€this€case€sufficiently€set€forth€a€causeÐ D!” Ðof€action€upon€which€relief€may€be€granted.€€Accordingly,€we€remand€this€case€to€the€Knox€CountyÐ 0"€  ÐCircuit€Court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.Ð #l! ÐÌò òÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔÓ  ÓSTANDARD€OF€APPELLATE€REVIEWó óÐ ô$D # Ðâ âÓ¥0ÓÐ à%0!$ Ðà  àA€Rule€12.02(6)€motion€to€dismiss€admits€the€truth€of€all€of€the€relevant€and€materialÐ ° Ðâ âaverments€contained€in€the€complaint,€but€it€asserts€that€the€averments€nevertheless€fail€to€establishÐ œì Ða€cause€of€action.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòStein€v.€Davidson€Hotel€Co.óó,€945€S.W.2d€714,€716€(Tenn.€1997).€Ð ˆØ ÐTherefore,€when€reviewing€a€dismissal€of€a€complaint€under€Rule€12.02(6),€this€Court€must€take€theÐ tÄ Ðfactual€allegations€contained€in€the€complaint€as€true€and€review€the€trial€courtððs€legal€conclusionsÐ `° Ðòòde€novo€óówithout€giving€any€presumption€of€correctness€to€those€conclusions.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòDoe€v.Ð L œ ÐSundquistóó,€2€S.W.3d€919,€922€(Tenn.€1999).Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕ†0#ÔÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔ€€Because€a€motion€to€dismiss€a€complaint€underÐ 8 ˆ ÐTennessee€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€12.02(6)€challenges€only€the€legal€sufficiency€of€the€complaint,Ð $ t Ðcourts€should€not€dismiss€a€complaint€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€based€upon€the€perceived€strengthÐ  ` Ðof€a€plaintiffððs€proof.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòBell€ex€rel.€Snyder€v.€Icard,€Merrill,€Cullis,€Timm,€Furen€&Ð ü L  ÐGinsburg,€P.A.óó,€986€S.W.2d€550,€554€(Tenn.€1999).€€As€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€8.01€only€requiresÐ è 8  Ðthat€a€complaint€set€forth€ð ða€short€and€plain€statement€of€the€claim€showing€that€the€pleader€isÐ Ô$  Ðentitled€to€relief,ðð€courts€should€liberally€construe€the€complaint€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff€whenÐ À  Ðconsidering€a€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòPursell€v.€First€Am.€Nat.€Bankóó,Ð ¬ü  Ð937€S.W.2d€838,€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕU4#ÔÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔ840€(Tenn.€1996).€€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕP8#ÔÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔAlthough€allegations€of€pure€legal€conclusions€will€not€sustainÐ ˜è  Ða€complaint,€òòseeóó€òòRuth€v.€Ruthóó,€372€S.W.2d€285,€287€(Tenn.€1963),€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕ¥8#Ôcourts€should€grant€a€motion€toÐ „Ô  Ðdismiss€only€when€it€appears€that€the€plaintiff€can€prove€no€set€of€facts€in€support€of€the€claim€thatÐ pÀ Ðwould€entitle€the€plaintiff€to€relief,€òòsee,€e.g.óó,€òòCook€v.€Spinnakerððs€of€Rivergate,€Inc.óó,€878€S.W.2d€934,Ð \¬ Ð938€(Tenn.€1994).€€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔÐ H˜ ÐÔ#†XPÕXXXPÕ×:#ÔÌÓ  Óò òPRIVATE€EMPLOYER€LIABILITY€FOR€ACTIONS€OF€Ð  p ÐOFF„DUTY€POLICE€OFFICERSó óÐ  \ ÐÌÓ  Óà  àThe€issue€of€whether€private€employers€may€be€held€vicariously€liable€for€the€torts€committedÐ ä4 Ðby€an€off„duty€police€officer€employed€as€a€private€security€guard€appears€to€be€one€of€firstÐ Ð  Ðimpression€in€this€state.€€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔIn€the€typical€case€involving€the€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior,€anÐ ¼  Ðemployer€may€be€held€liable€for€the€torts€committed€by€his€or€her€employees€while€performing€dutiesÐ ¨ø Ðwithin€the€scope€of€employment.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòHoward€v.€Havenóó,€198€Tenn.€572,€582,€281€S.W.2d€480,Ð ”ä Ð484„85€(1955);€òòTennessee€Farmers€Mut.€v.€American€Mut.óó,€840€S.W.2d€933,€937€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð €Ð Ð1992).€€Although€a€private€employer€is€certainly€ð ðnot€immune€from€liability€for€the€negligent€orÐ l¼ Ðwanton€acts€of€an€employee€.€.€.€for€the€reason€that€the€employee€has€official€status€as€a€policeÐ X ¨ Ðofficer,ðð€òòseeóó€òòCarmelo€v.€Milleróó,€569€S.W.2d€365,€367€(Mo.€Ct.€App.€1978),€we€recognize€that€issuesÐ D!” Ðstemming€from€the€private€employment€of€off„duty€officers€do€not€fit€precisely€within€the€typicalÐ 0"€  Ðframework€of€respondeat€superior.€€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕÅ<#ÔÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔThis€incongruity€arises€largely€because€the€special€status€of€peaceÐ #l! Ðofficers€in€this€state€permits€an€off„duty€officer€to€act€within€the€scope€of€his€or€her€publicÐ $X" Ðemployment,€even€while€otherwise€performing€duties€for€the€private€employerÔ#†XPÕXXXPÕÝ@#ÔÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔ.Ð ô$D # ÐÌÔ#†XPÕXXXPÕ6B#ÔÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔà  àOther€jurisdictions€that€have€examined€this€issue€are€divided€as€to€whether,€and€under€whatÐ Ì&"% Ðcircumstances,€a€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕB#Ôprivate€employer€may€be€held€liable€for€the€actions€of€an€off„duty€officer€employedÐ ¸'#& Ðas€a€security€guard.€€Irrespective€of€the€ultimate€conclusion€reached,€though,€most€jurisdictions,€ifÐ ¤(ô#' Ðnot€all,€resolve€this€type€of€issue€by€looking€to€the€ð ðnatureðð€of€the€act€committed€by€the€off„dutyÐ )à$( Ðofficer.€€A€majority€of€jurisdictions,€including€the€Court€of€Appeals€in€this€case,€find€that€becauseÐ |*Ì%) Ðthe€officerððs€actions€giving€rise€to€the€tort€were€taken€in€the€officerððs€official€capacity,€the€privateÐ h+¸&* Ðemployer€cannot€be€held€vicariously€liable.€€While€various€rationales€are€used€to€reach€thisÐ ° Ðconclusion,€most€jurisdictions€reason€that€the€officerððs€actions€were€ð ðofficialðð€because€(1)€policeÐ œì Ðofficers€have€an€ever„present€public€duty€to€preserve€the€peace€and€enforce€the€law,׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€or€(2)€theÐ ˆØ Ðofficerððs€action€was€taken€to€vindicate€a€public€right€or€to€benefit€the€public€in€general.׃CÜ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€additionÐ tÄ Ðto€these€considerations,€some€courts€have€even€declined€to€impose€vicarious€liability€on€employersÐ `° Ðbased,€in€part,€on€public€policy€grounds,€holding€that€employment€of€police€officers€as€securityÐ L œ Ðguards€furthers€deterrence€of€crimes.׃{ð×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р8 ˆ ÐÌà  àWhile€some€jurisdictions€impose€liability€on€private€employers€for€the€actions€of€off„dutyÐ  ` Ðofficers,€these€minority€jurisdictions€merely€conclude€that€the€officer€was€acting€in€a€private€capacityÐ ü L  Ðwhen€the€tort€was€committed.€€The€rationales€advanced€to€support€this€conclusion€include€(1)€thatÐ è 8  Ðthe€officerððs€actions€were€within€the€scope€of€his€or€her€private€employment;׃|@ ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€(2)€that€theÐ Ô$  Ðofficerððs€actions€were€taken€in€return€for€private€compensation,€contrary€to€a€statute€prohibitingÐ À  Ðprivate€compensation€for€public€duties.׃}Ì ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Consequently,€even€though€jurisdictions€may€disagree€asÐ ¬ü  Ðto€the€proper€resolution€of€any€given€case,€virtually€all€jurisdictions€ultimately€follow€a€nature„of„the„Ð ˜è  Ðact€approach€in€determining€private€employer€liability€for€the€actions€of€an€off„duty€officer€employedÐ „Ô  Ðas€a€security€guard.€Ð pÀ ÐÌòòÓ  Ó1.€€Analysis€Focusing€Upon€the€Nature€of€the€Officerððs€ActionsóóÐ H˜ ÐÓcNÓÌà  àUpon€due€consideration,€we€decline€to€strictly€analyze€this€issue€according€to€the€nature€ofÐ  p Ðthe€officerððs€actions,€as€this€approach€does€not€closely€comport€with€existing€Tennessee€law.€€WhenÐ  \ Ðanalyzed€in€terms€of€current€Tennessee€law€and€practice,€the€nature„of„the„act€analysis€has€threeÐ øH Ðprimary€shortcomings.€€First,€this€type€of€analysis€fails€to€take€into€account€the€fact€that€many€of€theÐ ä4 Ðactions€taken€by€officers€in€Tennessee€to€ð ðvindicate€public€rightsðð€may€also€be€lawfully€taken€byÐ Ð  Ðprivate€citizens€to€serve€other€interests.€€For€example,€police€officers€in€Tennessee€do€not€possessÐ ¼  Ðthe€exclusive€authority€to€make€arrests,€as€private€citizens€possess€this€power€in€many€of€the€sameÐ ¨ø Ðcircumstances€as€officers€on€official€duty.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.ðð40„7„109€(1997)€(listing€groundsÐ ”ä Ðpermitting€arrest€by€private€citizens).€€In€addition,€private€citizens€employed€as€security€guards€inÐ ° ÐTennessee€are€authorized€by€statute€to€undertake€many€actions€for€private€interests€that€also€appearÐ œì Ðto€be€consistent€with€a€general€vindication€of€public€rights.€€For€example,€private€security€guards€inÐ ˆØ Ðthis€state€are€authorized€to€protect€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àpersons€and/or€property€from€òòcriminal€activitiesóó,€including,€but€not€limited€to:Ð L œ Ðà8  àà ` à(A)à ¸ àPrevention€and/or€detection€of€intrusion,€unauthorized€entry,€larceny,€Ð 8 ˆ Ðà ` àà ¸ àvandalism,€abuse,€fire€or€trespass€on€private€property;Ð$ tÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(B)à ¸ àPrevention,€observation€or€detection€of€any€unauthorized€activity€on€Ð  ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àprivate€property;Ðü L Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(C)à ¸ àòòEnforce€rules,€regulations€or€local€or€state€laws€óóon€private€property;Ðè 8 Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(D)à ¸ àControl,€regulation€or€direction€of€the€flow€or€movements€of€the€à @ê àà @ê àÐ Ô$  Ðpublic,€whether€by€vehicle€or€otherwise€on€private€property;€€orÐÀ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(E)à ¸ àStreet€patrol€service;Ьü Ð Ð  ÐòòÌSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.ðð62„35„102(16)€(1997)€(emphasis€added).€€As€this€statute€makes€clear,€privateÐ „Ô  Ðsecurity€guards€are€authorized€to€enforce€local€and€state€laws€and€to€protect€persons€and€propertyÐ pÀ Ðagainst€general€criminal€activities,€irrespective€of€whether€the€guard€is€a€private€citizen€or€an€off„dutyÐ \¬ Ðofficer.€€Because€many€of€these€statutorily€authorized€activities€could€legitimately€be€viewed€eitherÐ H˜ Ðas€serving€the€interests€of€the€private€employer€or€as€vindicating€public€rights,€analysis€focusing€onÐ 4„ Ðthe€ð ðnatureðð€of€the€act€may€not€provide€a€meaningful€basis€upon€which€to€impose€vicarious€liabilityÐ  p Ðon€the€private€employer.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àSecond,€just€as€the€majority€approach€that€looks€to€the€official€nature€of€the€officerððs€actionsÐ ä4 Ðignores€that€private€citizens€in€Tennessee€can€perform€many€of€the€same€actions€as€police€officers,Ð Ð  Ðan€approach€that€looks€to€the€private€nature€of€the€officerððs€actions€ignores€that€police€officers€inÐ ¼  ÐTennessee€still€possess€the€full€panoply€of€ð ðofficialðð€police€power,€even€when€they€are€off€duty.׃%×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р¨ø ÐIndeed,€this€benefit€is€one€of€the€considerable€advantages€of€employing€off„duty€officers€as€privateÐ ”ä Ðsecurity€guards,€and€we€are€unwilling€to€restrict€the€powers€of€an€off„duty€officer€solely€toÐ €Ð Ðaccommodate€a€test€that€examines€the€nature€of€the€acts€committed.€€For€the€same€reasons€that€weÐ l¼ Ðreject€a€test€denying€vicarious€liability€when€the€off„duty€officer€performs€ð ðofficial€actions,ðð€we€mustÐ X ¨ Ðnecessarily€reject€a€rule€that€holds€private€employers€liable€in€situations€solely€because€the€actsÐ ° Ðcommitted€by€the€off„duty€officer€were€ð ðprivateðð€in€nature.Ð œì ÐÌà  àThird,€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔwhile€most€states€decline€to€impose€vicarious€liability€on€private€employers€becauseÐ tÄ Ðpolice€officers€have€a€continuous€duty€to€keep€the€peace€and€enforce€the€law,€we€can€find€noÐ `° Ðcorresponding€statute€or€rule€of€law€in€this€state€that€places€a€mandatory€duty€upon€police€officersÐ L œ Ðto€keep€the€peace€when€ð ðoff€duty.ðð€€To€the€contrary,€when€officers€are€ð ðoff€duty,ðð€our€statutesÐ 8 ˆ Ðgenerally€treat€the€officer€as€an€ordinary€private€citizen€and€not€as€an€agent€or€employee€of€theÐ $ t Ðmunicipal€police€department€under€a€general€duty€to€keep€the€peace.€€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕ”`#ÔòòSee,€e.g.óó,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ  ` Ð38-8-351€(1997)Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔ€(allowing€officers€to€participate€in€political€activities€when€ð ðoff„duty€and€acting€asÐ ü L  Ða€private€citizen,ðð€but€not€when€the€officer€is€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕ­c#Ôð ðon€duty€or€acting€in€such€officerððs€official€capacityððÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔ);Ð è 8  ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€38-8-303€(1997)Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕÑd#ÔÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔ€(making€distinction€between€ð ðthe€performance€of€the€officerððsÐ Ô$  Ðofficial€dutiesÔ#†XPÕXXXPÕNe#Ôðð€and€the€officerððs€ð ðoff-duty€[private]€employmentðð€for€purposes€of€disclosure€inÐ À  Ðofficial€investigations).€€Consequently,€to€the€extent€that€a€nature„of„the„act€analysis€focuses€uponÐ ¬ü  Ðsome€continuous€duty€of€police€officers€to€keep€the€peace,€that€analysis€is€impractical€in€this€state.€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àOf€course,€to€say€that€officers€do€not€continuously€function€in€an€official€capacity€is€not€toÐ pÀ Ðsay€that€off„duty€officers€are€prevented€from€assuming€a€duty€to€remedy€a€breach€of€the€peace,€or€thatÐ \¬ Ðofficers€are€incapable€of€being€summoned€to€official€duty€by€the€municipality.€€òòCf.óó€Knoxville€CityÐ H˜ ÐCode€ðð€19„29.€€Nevertheless,€it€is€clear€that€officers€are€not€under€a€general€duty€to€enforce€the€lawÐ 4„ Ðwhile€ð ðoff€duty,ðð€òòcf.óó€òòEzell€v.€Cockrellóó,€902€S.W.2d€394,€403€(Tenn.€1995)€(stating€that€an€officerððsÐ  p Ðability€to€arrest€at€any€time€does€not€give€rise€to€a€duty€to€do€so,€but€ð ðonly€delineate[s]€the€generalÐ  \ Ðauthority€and€responsibility€of€police€officersðð),€and€a€blanket€rule€declaring€that€police€officers€areÐ øH Ðunder€a€never„ending€duty€to€keep€the€peace€is€contrary€to€existing€Tennessee€law.€€We€thereforeÐ ä4 Ðdecline€to€use€this€rationale€in€determining€the€scope€of€private€employer€liability.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àFor€these€reasons,€we€conclude€that€a€test€examining€the€nature€of€the€officerððs€actions€toÐ ¨ø Ðresolve€the€question€of€employer€liability€is€probably€unworkable€within€the€current€framework€ofÐ ”ä ÐTennessee€law.€€No€doubt€because€of€the€practical€difficulty€in€determining€the€proper€nature€of€theÐ €Ð Ðactions€committed€by€a€security€guard,€this€test€has€resulted€in€over„insulating€private€employers€whoÐ l¼ Ðwould€otherwise€be€subject€to€liability€if€the€security€guard€were€not€also€employed€by€a€municipalÐ X ¨ Ðpolice€department.€€While€a€few€states€in€minority€jurisdictions€have€held€employers€liable€under€thisÐ D!” Ðapproach,€the€vast€majority€of€jurisdictions€using€this€approach€have€held€that€private€employers€areÐ 0"€  Ðnot€liable.€€We€are€unwilling€to€provide€such€practical€immunity€for€private€employers€based€onlyÐ #l! Ðupon€negligible€distinctions€concerning€the€ð ðnatureðð€of€the€officerððs€conduct.Ð $X" ÐÌÓ  Óòò2.€€Public€Policy€Grounds€for€Denying€or€Imposing€Private€Employer€LiabilityóóÐ à%0!$ ÐÓüoÓÌà  àSeveral€jurisdictions€have€also€used€public€policy€considerations€to€hold€that€privateÐ ¸'#& Ðemployers€are€not€liable€for€the€actions€of€off„duty€officers€employed€as€security€guards.€€TheseÐ ¤(ô#' Ðjurisdictions€generally€reason€that€because€deterrence€of€crime€is€furthered€by€employing€policeÐ )à$( Ðofficers,€private€employers€should€be€encouraged€to€hire€such€officers€as€security€guards.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,Ð |*Ì%) ÐòòDuncanóó,€294€S.E.2d€at€366;€òòBrownóó,€672€P.2d€at€1269.€€In€its€most€basic€sense,€therefore,€theseÐ h+¸&* Ðjurisdictions€have€decided€to€grant€practical€immunity€to€private€employers€in€exchange€for€theÐ ° Ðperceived€benefit€derived€from€private€employers€hiring€off„duty€officers€as€security€guards.Ð œì ÐÌà  àAlthough€we€agree€that€deterrence€of€crime€may€be€rationally€furthered€by€the€hiring€of€off„Ð tÄ Ðduty€officers,€we€also€recognize€that€some€level€of€deterrence€is€provided€simply€by€hiring€privateÐ `° Ðsecurity€guards,€irrespective€of€whether€the€guards€are€off„duty€officers€or€private€citizens.׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀РL œ ÐMoreover,€eliminating€vicarious€liability€for€private€employers€who€hire€off„duty€police€officersÐ 8 ˆ Ðencourages€such€employers€to€shift€their€risk€of€liability€to€the€municipality€solely€because€theirÐ $ t Ðemployees€are€also€employees€of€the€local€police€department.€€As€jurisdictions€following€a€nature„of„Ð  ` Ðthe„act€approach€recognize,€at€least€implicitly,€the€private€employer€would€have€been€vicariouslyÐ ü L  Ðliable€for€the€torts€of€its€security€guard€except€for€the€fact€that€the€security€guard€is€also€a€municipalÐ è 8  Ðpolice€officer.€€As€such,€allowing€liability€based€only€upon€the€official€status€of€the€employeeÐ Ô$  Ðundermines€the€modern€rationale€of€vicarious€liability,€which€according€to€Professor€Keeton,€is€theÐ À  Ðresult€of€ð ðdeliberate€allocation€of€risk.ðð€€W.€Page€Keeton,€et€al.,€òòProsser€and€Keeton€on€Tortsóó€ðð€69,Ð ¬ü  Ðat€500€(5th€ed.€1984).€€This€allocation€of€risk€is€Ð ˜è  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àplaced€on€the€employer€because,€having€engaged€in€an€enterprise,€which€will€on€theÐ pÀ Ðbasis€of€all€past€experience€involve€harm€to€others€through€the€torts€of€employees,Ð \¬ Ðand€sought€to€profit€by€it,€it€is€just€that€[the€employer],€rather€than€the€innocentÐ H˜ Ðinjured€plaintiff,€should€bear€[the€risk];€and€[liability€is€placed€on€the€employer]Ð 4„ Ðbecause€[the€employer]€is€better€able€to€absorb€[the€risks],€and€to€distribute€them,Ð  p Ðthrough€prices,€rates€or€liability€insurance,€to€the€public,€and€so€to€shift€them€toÐ  \ Ðsociety,€to€the€community€at€large.ÐøHÐ Ð  ÐÌòòId.óó€ðð€69,€at€500„01.€€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àUnder€the€majority€rule,€the€private€employer€may€take€advantage€of€the€benefits€of€hiringÐ ¨ø Ðan€off„duty€officer€without€assuming€any€of€the€normal€risks€of€liability€associated€with€hiring€non„Ð ”ä Ðofficer€employees.€We€simply€do€not€believe€that€in€many€cases,€the€risk€of€loss€is€properly€shiftedÐ €Ð Ðfrom€the€private€employer€to€the€municipality€or€to€an€innocent€plaintiff,€and€we€therefore€disagreeÐ l¼ Ðwith€the€public€policy€rationales€advanced€by€many€of€our€sister€jurisdictions€that€have€adopted€theÐ X ¨ Ðmajority€rule€on€this€issue.Ð D!” Ðò òó óÌòòÓ  Ó3.€€Advantages€of€Agency€LawóóÐ #l! ÐÓUÓÌà  àAfter€due€consideration,€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔwe€conclude€that€issues€of€employer€liability€for€the€acts€of€off„dutyÐ ô$D # Ðpolice€officers€are€best€resolved€under€traditional€principles€of€Tennessee€agency€law.€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕË#Ô€Use€of€agencyÐ à%0!$ Ðprinciples€in€Tennessee€to€resolve€this€complex€issue€has€several€advantages.€€First,€becauseÐ ° Ðtraditional€agency€principles€have€been€used€in€this€state€for€two€centuries,€they€possess€theÐ œì Ðadvantages€of€experience€and€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔstraightforward€application.€€In€addition,€these€principles€do€notÐ ˆØ Ðdepend€upon€the€splitting€of€legal€hairs€into€meaningless€distinctions,€which€is€a€hallmark€of€manyÐ tÄ Ðof€the€other€approaches.׃)×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕå#ÔÐ `° ÐÌà  àSecond,€and€most€importantly,€use€of€traditional€agency€law€to€resolve€these€types€of€issuesÐ 8 ˆ Ðcorresponds€most€closely€with€prior€case€law€from€this€Court.€€Although€the€issue€of€privateÐ $ t Ðemployer€liability€for€the€acts€of€aòòóó€municipal€police€officer€employed€in€a€private€capacity€is€an€issueÐ  ` Ðof€first€impression€in€this€state,€this€Court€has€previously€addressed€this€same€question€in€terms€ofÐ ü L  Ðprivate€employer€liability€for€the€torts€committed€by€a€òòspecial€óópolice€officer€commissioned€by€aÐ è 8  Ðmunicipality€for€a€particular€assignment.€€In€òòTerry€v.€Burfordóó,€131€Tenn.€451,€175€S.W.€538€(1915),Ð Ô$  Ðthis€Court€applied€traditional€agency€principles€to€hold€the€private€employer€vicariously€liable€forÐ À  Ðthe€torts€committed€by€the€officer,€notwithstanding€the€officerððs€special€commission€from€theÐ ¬ü  Ðmunicipality.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòUnion€Ry.€Co.€v.€Carteróó,€129€Tenn.€459,€166€S.W.€592€(1914).€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àAlthough€these€cases€do€not€directly€control€the€decision€in€this€case€because€of€the€importantÐ pÀ Ðdistinction€between€special€officers€and€regular€police€officersð"ðspecial€officers€usually€only€haveÐ \¬ Ðthe€complete€authority€and€powers€of€regular€officers€to€the€extent€allowed€by€the€specialÐ H˜ Ðcommission,€òòcf.óó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„8„212(b)€(1997)ð"ðthese€cases€are€certainly€persuasiveÐ 4„ Ðauthority€for€applying€traditional€agency€principles€to€the€issues€involving€regular€officers€as€well.׃7d×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р p ÐFor€these€reasons,€we€conclude€that€issues€concerning€employer€liability€for€torts€committed€by€off„Ð  \ Ðduty€police€officers€employed€as€security€guards€are€to€be€resolved€according€to€traditional€TennesseeÐ øH Ðagency€principles.€Ð ä4 Ѐ¹Ó  Óò òGENERAL€PRINCIPLES€OF€TENNESSEE€LAW€OF€AGENCYó óÐ ¼  ÐÓ”‹ÓÌÔ‡XPÕXXXPÕÔà  àHaving€decided€that€this€case€should€be€resolved€with€reference€to€Tennessee€agency€law,Ð ”ä Ðit€may€be€necessary€to€review€the€relevant€principles€of€agency.€€In€its€broadest€sense,€the€conceptÐ €Ð Ðof€agency€ð ðincludes€every€relation€in€which€one€person€acts€for€or€represents€another.ðð€€òòKerney€v.Ð l¼ ÐAetna€Cas.€&€Sur.€Co.óó,€648€S.W.2d€247,€253€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1982).€€An€agency€relationship€doesÐ X ¨ Ðnot€require€an€explicit€agreement,€contract,€or€understanding€between€the€parties,€òòWarren€v.€EstateÐ D!” Ðof€Kirkóó,€954€S.W.2d€722,€725€(Tenn.€1997),€and€when€ð ðthe€facts€establish€the€existence€of€an€agencyÐ 0"€  Ðrelationship,€it€will€be€found€to€exist€whether€the€parties€intended€to€create€one€or€not.ðð€òòHarben€v.Ð ° ÐHuttonóó,€739€S.W.2d€602,€606€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòSmith€v.€Tennessee€Coach€Co.óó,€183Ð œì ÐTenn.€676,€680-81,€194€S.W.2d€867,€869€(1946).€€Whether€an€agency€exists€ð ðis€a€question€of€factÐ ˆØ Ðunder€the€circumstances€of€the€particular€case;€and€whether€an€agency€has€been€created€is€to€beÐ tÄ Ðdetermined€by€the€relation€of€the€parties€as€they€in€fact€exist€under€their€agreement€or€acts.ðð€€òòMcCayÐ `° Ðv.€Mitchellóó,€62€Tenn.€App.€424,€434,€463€S.W.2d€710,€715€(1970).Ð L œ ÐÌà  àImportant€in€the€concept€of€agency,€of€course,€is€that€a€principal€is€generally€ð ðbound€by€itsÐ $ t Ðagentððs€acts€done€in€its€behalf€and€within€the€actual€or€apparent€scope€of€the€agency.ðð€€òòV.L.Ð  ` ÐNicholson€Co.€v.€Transcon€Inv.€&€Financial€Ltd.óó,€595€S.W.2d€474,€483€(Tenn.€1980).€€The€focus€ofÐ ü L  Ðthis€inquiry,€however,€is€placed€upon€the€actions€and€consent€of€the€principal,€rather€than€upon€theÐ è 8  Ðagentððs€actions€or€the€willingness€of€the€agent€to€perform€those€actions.€€òòHaury€&€Smith€Realty€Co.Ð Ô$  Ðv.€Piccadilly€Partners€Ióó,€802€S.W.2d€612,€615€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€Although€the€principalððs€rightÐ À  Ðto€control€the€actions€of€the€agent€is€an€important€factor€in€finding€the€existence€of€an€agencyÐ ¬ü  Ðrelationship,€òòJack€Daniel€Distillery,€et€al.€v.€Jacksonóó,€740€S.W.2d€413,€416€(Tenn.€1987),€the€rightÐ ˜è  Ðof€control€is€not€necessarily€as€important€as€the€principalððs€exercise€of€actual€control€over€the€agent,Ð „Ô  Ðòòseeóó€òòParker€v.€Vanderbilt€Univ.óó,€767€S.W.2d€412,€416€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àIndeed,€a€principal€may€be€held€liable€for€an€agentððs€tortious€act,€even€if€that€act€occursÐ H˜ Ðoutside€of€the€scope€of€the€agency,€if€the€act€was€commanded€or€directed€by€the€principal.€€òòSeeóóÐ 4„ ÐòòKinnard€v.€Rock€City€Const.€Co.óó,€39€Tenn.€App.€547,€551,€286€S.W.2d€352,€354€(1955).€€As€theÐ  p ÐòòKinnardóó€Court€stated€the€rule:Ð  \ Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àA€master€is€liable€for€the€tort€of€his€servant€where€the€tortious€act€is€done€inÐ ä4 Ðobedience€to€his€express€orders€or€directions,€even€though€the€service€is€not€withinÐ Ð  Ðthe€line€of€the€servantððs€usual€duties,€and€provided€the€injury€to€the€third€personÐ ¼  Ðoccurs€as€the€natural,€direct,€and€proximate€result€of€the€directed€or€authorized€act.ШøÐ Ð  ÐÌòòId.óó€at€551„52,€286€S.W.2d€at€354„55.€€The€court€also€noted€that€the€law€did€not€strictly€require€thatÐ €Ð Ðð ðthe€principal€or€master€should€expressly€direct€or€have€knowledge€of€the€act€done;€it€is€enough€thatÐ l¼ Ðthe€servant€or€agent€was€acting€in€the€business€of€his€superior.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€551,€286€S.W.2d€at€354€(citingÐ X ¨ ÐòòLuttrell€v.€Hazenóó,€35€Tenn.€(3€Sneed)€20,€25€(1855)).Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕù‹#ÔÐ D!” ÐÌà  àIt€is€also€well€settled€that€an€agent€may€serve€two€masters€simultaneously,€so€long€as€theÐ #l! Ðobjectives€of€one€master€are€not€contrary€to€the€objectives€of€the€other.€€òòSeeóó€òòMonroe€County€MotorÐ $X" ÐCo.€v.€Tennessee€Odin€Ins.€Co.óó,€33€Tenn.€App.€223,€241,€231€S.W.2d€386,€394€(1950).€€As€sectionÐ ô$D # Ð226€of€the€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€€Agencyóó€states€the€rule,€ð ðA€person€may€be€the€servant€of€twoÐ à%0!$ Ðmasters,€not€joint€employers,€at€one€time€as€to€one€act,€if€the€service€does€not€involve€abandonmentÐ Ì&"% Ðof€the€service€to€the€other.ðð€€In€so€doing,€the€person€serving€two€masters€ð ðmay€cause€both€employersÐ ¸'#& Ðto€be€responsible€for€an€act€.€.€.€.€if€the€act€is€within€the€scope€of€employment€for€both.ðð€€òòId.óó€ðð€226Ð ¤(ô#' Ðcmt.€a.€Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àTo€summarize€these€agency€principles€in€terms€of€application€to€the€issue€in€this€case,€weÐ ° Ðâ âconclude€that€private€employers€may€be€held€vicariously€liable€for€the€acts€of€an€off„duty€policeÐ œì Ðofficer€employed€as€a€private€security€guard€under€any€of€the€following€circumstances:€(1)€the€actionÐ ˆØ Ðtaken€by€the€off„duty€officer€occurred€within€the€scope€of€private€employment;׃×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€(2)€the€action€takenÐ tÄ Ðby€the€off„duty€officer€occurred€outside€of€the€regular€scope€of€employment,€if€the€action€giving€riseÐ `° Ðto€the€tort€was€taken€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔin€obedience€to€orders€or€directionsÔ#†XPÕXXXPÕ†¢#Ô€of€the€employer€and€the€harm€proximatelyÐ L œ Ðresulted€from€the€order€or€direction;€òòoróó€(3)€the€action€was€taken€by€the€officer€with€the€consent€orÐ 8 ˆ Ðratification€of€the€private€employer€and€with€an€intent€to€benefit€the€private€employer.׃!ì×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р$ t ÐÌà  àConsistent€with€agency€law,€the€private€employer€of€an€off„duty€officer€cannot€generally€beÐ ü L  Ðheld€vicariously€liable€for€actions€taken€by€the€off„duty€officer€outside€of€the€officerððs€regular€scopeÐ è 8  Ðof€employment€as€a€security€guard.€€As€such,€when€the€officer€is€summoned€to€official€duty€by€theÐ Ô$  Ðmunicipality,€or€otherwise€performs€traditional€police€actions€outside€of€the€scope€of€his€or€herÐ À  Ðprivate€employment,€the€private€employer€will€notbe€generally€liable.€€The€private€employer€wouldÐ ¬ü  Ðbe€liable,€however,€for€acts€taken€outside€of€the€regular€scope€of€private€employment€under€theÐ ˜è  Ðfollowing€two€scenarios:€(1)€the€employer€ordered€or€directed€the€action;€or€(2)€the€employer€gaveÐ „Ô  Ðconsent€to€the€action,€which€was€taken€by€the€officer€with€a€primary€intent€to€benefit€the€employer.€Ð pÀ ÐAs€is€the€case€with€agency€law€in€general,€issues€such€as€whether€the€officer€acted€within€the€scopeÐ \¬ Ðof€employment,€or€whether€the€officer€acted€at€the€direction€or€with€the€consent€of€his€or€her€privateÐ H˜ Ðemployer,€are€questions€of€fact€to€be€resolved€by€the€jury.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àWe€also€recognize€that€under€the€dual€master€doctrine,€the€municipality€may€also€beÐ  \ Ðvicariously€liableð"ðalong€with€the€private€employerð"ðfor€the€actions€taken€by€one€of€its€off„dutyÐ øH Ðpolice€officers.€€Under€Tennessee€agency€law,€liability€may€also€be€imputed€to€the€municipality€whenÐ ä4 Ðall€of€the€following€four€circumstances€are€present:€(1)€the€action€taken€by€the€off„duty€officerÐ Ð  Ðinvolves€exercise€of€a€traditional€police€power,€such€as€the€power€to€arrest,€the€power€to€issueÐ ¼  Ðcitations,€or€the€power€to€command€aid;€(2)€the€municipality€had€knowledge,€either€actual€orÐ ¨ø Ðconstructive,€of€the€action€taken€by€the€off„duty€officer;׃ˆ ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€(3)€the€action€taken€by€the€off„duty€officerÐ ”ä Ðsimultaneously€serves€the€objectives€of€the€private€employer€and€the€municipality;€òòandóó€(4)€theÐ ° Ðobjectives€of€the€private€employer€and€the€municipality,€which€are€both€served€by€the€officerððsÐ œì Ðaction,€are€not€inconsistent€with€each€other.Ð ˆØ Ðò òÓ  ÓÌDISMISSAL€OF€THE€COMPLAINT€PURSUANT€TO€RULE€OF€Ð `° ÐCIVIL€PROCEDURE€12.02(6)ó óÐ L œ ÐÓ=®ÓÌà  àBecause€this€case€comes€before€us€on€a€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim,€weÐ $ t Ðconfine€our€inquiry€solely€to€the€allegations€of€the€complaint€to€determine€whether€the€plaintiffs€haveÐ  ` Ðalleged€a€cause€of€action€against€Revco€upon€which€relief€may€be€granted.€€After€carefully€examiningÐ ü L  Ðthe€material€allegations€of€the€original€and€amended€complaints,€we€conclude€that€the€plaintiffs€haveÐ è 8  Ðin€fact€made€sufficient€allegations€under€all€three€agency€theories,€which,€if€proven,€would€give€riseÐ Ô$  Ðto€vicarious€liability€on€the€part€of€Revco.€Ð À  ÐÌà  àFirst,€we€find€that€the€plaintiffs€have€made€sufficient€allegations€to€assert€a€cause€of€actionÐ ˜è  Ðagainst€Revco€based€on€a€tort€committed€by€Boone€while€acting€within€the€course€and€scope€of€hisÐ „Ô  Ðemployment€with€Revco.€€The€amended€complaint€alleges€in€several€paragraphs€that€Booneððs€actionsÐ pÀ Ðwere€taken€ð ðwithin€the€scope€of€his€employment€with€Revco,ðð€and€that€Boone€was€acting€at€allÐ \¬ Ðrelevant€times€ð ðunder€the€direction,€consent,€and€controlðð€of€Revco.€€The€amended€complaint€alsoÐ H˜ Ðalleges€that€Revco€employed€Boone€especially€to€take€advantage€of€Booneððs€ability€to€make€arrestsÐ 4„ Ðand€issue€citations.€€Finally,€as€evidence€of€Revcoððs€control€over€Boone€during€the€relevant€periodÐ  p Ðof€time,€the€complaint€sets€forth€the€fact€that€Boone€was€summoned€back€to€Revco€to€issue€a€citationÐ  \ Ðto€a€shoplifter€even€while€he€was€attempting€to€enforce€the€cityððs€bench€warrant.€€Accordingly,€whenÐ øH Ðviewed€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€the€plaintiffs,€we€find€that€the€plaintiffs€have€adequately€statedÐ ä4 Ða€cause€of€action€against€Revco€based€on€the€torts€of€its€security€guard€committed€within€the€scopeÐ Ð  Ðof€his€private€employment.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àIn€response,€Revco€asserts€that€because€the€original€and€amended€complaints€allege€mereÐ ”ä Ðlegal€conclusions,€the€complaints€cannot€be€sustained€on€a€Rule€12.02(6)€motion€to€dismiss.€€WeÐ €Ð Ðdisagree.€€A€complaint€ð ðneed€not€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔcontain€in€minute€detail€the€facts€that€give€rise€to€the€claim,ðð€soÐ l¼ Ðlong€as€the€complaint€does€ð ðcontain€allegations€from€which€an€inference€may€fairly€be€drawn€thatÐ X ¨ Ðevidence€on€these€material€points€will€be€introduced€at€trialðð€€òòDonaldson€v.€Donaldsonóó,€557€S.W.2dÐ D!” Ð60,€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕñ·#Ô61€(Tenn.€1977).€€In€this€case,€Revco€may€reasonably€infer€from€the€allegations€contained€in€theÐ 0"€  Ðcomplaints€that€the€plaintiffs€plan€to€introduce€(1)€evidence€concerning€the€course€and€scope€ofÐ #l! ÐBooneððs€employment€with€Revco,€and€(2)€evidence€that€Booneððs€actions€giving€rise€to€WoodfinððsÐ $X" Ðwrongful€death€were€within€the€course€and€scope€of€that€employment€with€Revco.€€As€such,€weÐ ô$D # Ðdecline€to€dismiss€the€complaint€for€any€perceived€deficiency€in€its€factual€allegations,€and€weÐ à%0!$ Ðconclude€that€the€plaintiffs€have€stated€a€cause€of€action€under€this€agency€theory.Ð Ì&"% Ðâ âÐ ¸'#& Ðà  àSecond,€we€also€conclude€that€the€plaintiffs€have€made€sufficient€allegations€to€assert€a€causeÐ ° Ðâ âof€action€based€on€a€tort€committed€by€Boone€while€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔin€obedience€to€the€orders€or€directionsÔ#†XPÕXXXPÕ½#Ô€ofÐ œì ÐRevco.€€First,€the€complaint€alleges€that€following€a€conversation€about€Woodfinððs€secondÐ ˆØ Ðappearance€at€Revco€a€few€days€prior€to€June€4,€the€Revco€manager€directed€Boone€to€check€withÐ tÄ Ðthe€KPD€about€Woodfinððs€previous€citation€for€disorderly€conduct.€€The€complaint€further€allegesÐ `° Ðthat€upon€learning€that€a€bench€warrant€had€been€issued€for€Woodfinððs€arrest,€the€Revco€ManagerÐ L œ Ðdirected€Boone€ð ðto€serve€the€bench€warrant€to€prevent€Woodfin€from€ever€returning€to€Revco€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðto€punish€Woodfin€for€disregarding€Revcoððs€no€trespass€order.ðð€€If€these€facts€are€taken€as€true,€anÐ $ t Ðagency€relationship€is€established,€and€Revco€would€then€be€liable€for€the€harm€proximately€resultingÐ  ` Ðfrom€Booneððs€actions€taken€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔin€obedience€to€its€directionsÔ#†XPÕXXXPÕûÀ#Ô,€irrespective€of€whether€Booneððs€actionsÐ ü L  Ðwere€within€the€scope€of€his€employment.׃"×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Accordingly,€we€hold€that€the€plaintiffsðð€complaint€hasÐ è 8  Ðstated€a€cause€of€action€against€Revco€for€Booneððs€actions€taken€in€obedience€to€directions€issuedÐ Ô$  Ðby€Revco.Ð À  ÐÌà  àFinally,€we€conclude€that€the€amended€complaint€alleges€a€cause€of€action€based€upon€theÐ ˜è  Ðactions€taken€by€Boone€with€the€actual€knowledge€and€consent€of€Revco€and€taken€primarily€forÐ „Ô  ÐRevcoððs€benefit.€€For€example,€the€original€complaint€alleges€that€Boone€attempted€to€arrest€WoodfinÐ pÀ Ðafter€Revco€ð ðallowedðð€Boone€to€leave,€which€taken€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€the€plaintiffs,€showsÐ \¬ Ðthat€Revco€had€knowledge€of€Booneððs€actions€and€consented€to€those€actions.׃# ×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú16Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€amendedÐ H˜ Ðcomplaint€also€alleges€that€the€purpose€of€Booneððs€actions€was€ð ðto€prevent€Woodfin€from€everÐ 4„ Ðreturning€to€Revco€and€to€punish€Woodfin€for€disregarding€Revcoððs€no€trespass€order.ðð€€This€fact,Ð  p Ðtaken€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€the€plaintiffs,€shows€that€Booneððs€primary€intent€in€undertakingÐ  \ Ðthe€attempted€arrest€of€Woodfin€was€to€benefit€Revco,€his€private€employer.€€Consequently,€becauseÐ øH Ðthe€complaint€alleges€that€Revco€knew€of,€and€consented€to,€actions€taken€by€Boone€with€the€primaryÐ ä4 Ðintent€to€benefit€Revco,€an€agency€relationship€is€established,€and€Revco€is€vicariously€liable€for€theÐ Ð  Ðharm€proximately€resulting€from€Booneððs€actions.€€We€hold,€therefore,€that€the€plaintiffs€haveÐ ¼  Ðalleged€sufficient€facts€in€support€of€a€claim€of€vicarious€liability€based€upon€knowledge€and€consentÐ ¨ø Ðof€the€principal€to€actions€by€an€agent€that€were€primarily€intended€to€benefit€the€principal.׃-ð×Ý ƒ+#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú17Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р”ä ÐÓ  Óò òÌCONCLUSIONó óÐ l¼ ÐÌÓ  Óà  àIn€summary,€we€conclude€that€issues€concerning€private€employer€liability€for€acts€taken€byÐ D!” Ðan€off„duty€police€officer€employed€as€a€private€security€guard€are€to€be€resolved€according€toÐ 0"€  ÐTennessee€agency€law.€€Accordingly,€we€hold€that€the€complaint€in€this€case€alleges€sufficient€factsÐ ° Ðto€state€a€cause€of€action€against€defendant€Revco€based€on€three€separate€theories:€(1)€that€RevcoÐ œì Ðis€vicariously€liable€for€the€harm€proximately€resulting€from€the€acts€of€its€agent€taken€within€theÐ ˆØ Ðcourse€and€scope€of€the€agentððs€employment€with€Revco;€(2)€that€Revco€is€vicariously€liable€for€theÐ tÄ Ðharm€proximately€resulting€from€the€acts€of€its€agent€taken€in€obedience€to€directions€or€orders€issuedÐ `° Ðby€Revco;€and€(3)€that€Revco€is€vicariously€liable€for€the€harm€proximately€resulting€from€the€actionsÐ L œ Ðof€its€agent€that€were€taken€with€the€primary€intent€to€benefit€Revco€and€of€which€Revco€knew€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðgave€consent.€€Ô‡XPÕXXXPÕÔAny€analysis€of€whether€the€plaintiffs€have€established€a€prima€facie€case€of€liabilityÐ $ t Ðis€premature€at€this€time,€and€the€facts,€if€any,€supporting€Revcoððs€liability€for€Booneððs€actions€haveÐ  ` Ðnot€been€developed€in€this€Rule€12.02(6)€motion.€€We€therefore€reverse€Ô#†XPÕXXXPÕÎÎ#Ôthe€judgment€of€the€CourtÐ ü L  Ðof€Appeals€and€remand€this€case€to€the€Knox€County€Circuit€Court€for€further€proceedings€consistentÐ è 8  Ðwith€this€opinion.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àCosts€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€appellee,€Revco€Discount€Drug€Centers,€Inc.,€for€whichÐ ¬ü  Ðexecution€shall€issue€if€necessary.Ð ˜è  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  à€€€€€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àà  àà x àà Ð à¼à  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________Ð  \ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUSTICE