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D3KU>~U6¼œòU*ŽB)¸DCá AM$U*qC›ŒÞjn¶rS(&{½¡ »^"f%{%ú'v~y)vÓ÷*˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(óf$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒÀ°Ò ñ Àò Àó Àô Dõ ÷ ø ù Ó€  <à09Z 0Courier (WT) Regular- ù-(83‚ª$©©Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý(8(3ß«$¤¤Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóê‚_#Ôô3|x 2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ$%&')Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó**'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd d,,,,'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New ’Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d::::7Border 1dd$&;Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial 9Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ%"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€=ÔÔ€=ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€=XÔÌÌNovemberÏ24,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó ó ‚Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔ"Because€the€investigatory€stop€in€this€case€was€based€uponÏreasonable€suspicion,€it€was€valid€under€both€the€federal€and€stateÏconstitutions.ðð€€Majority€Opinion€at€_____€[slip€op.€at€16].€ÏParticularly€alarming€is€the€statement:€€ð ðIndeed,€the€availability€ofÏless€intrusive€investigatory€techniques€does€not€vitiate€theÏconstitutional€validity€of€a€stop€which€is€supported€by€reasonableÏsuspicion.ðð€€òòIdóó.Ì úÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€5ôÔÔ€6ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„401€(1993).Ì úÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„50„504€(1993).Ì ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔThe€Fourth€Amendment€states,€ÌÌà8 àò òUnreasonable€searches€and€seizures.€„€ó óThe€right€of€theÏpeople€to€be€secure€in€their€persons,€houses,€papers,€andÏeffects,€against€unreasonable€searches€and€seizures,€shallÏnot€be€violated,€and€no€warrants€shall€issue,€but€uponÏprobable€cause,€supported€by€oath€or€affirmation,€andÏparticularly€describing€the€place€to€be€searched,€and€theÏpersons€or€things€to€be€seized.ÌÌÌU.S.€Const.€amend.€IV.€€The€Fourth€Amendment€is€applicable€to€the€statesÏthrough€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€€òòMapp€v.€Ohioóó,€367€U.S.€643,€655,€81ÏS.Ct.€1684,€1691€(1961).Ô€6XÔà àÌÌÔ€6ôÔArticle€1,€Section€7€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€states,ÌÌà8 àò òUnreasonable€searches€and€seizures€„€GeneralÏwarrants.€„ó ó€That€the€people€shall€be€secure€in€theirÏpersons,€houses,€papers€and€possessions,€from€unreasonableÏsearches€and€seizures;€and€that€general€warrants,€whereby€anÏofficer€may€be€commanded€to€search€suspected€places,€withoutÏevidence€of€the€fact€committed,€or€to€seize€any€person€orÏpersons€not€named,€whose€offences€are€not€particularlyÏdescribed€and€supported€by€evidence,€are€dangerous€to€libertyÏand€ought€not€to€be€granted.ÌÌÌTenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€7.€€Ì IÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔThe€correct€spelling€of€the€defendant's€name€is€"Pulley";€however,Ïit€is€cited€by€West€Publishing€Company€as€"Pully."Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔThe€majority€states€that€òòWhrenóó€does€not€support€the€propositionÏthat€balancing€is€necessary€in€the€absence€of€probable€cause€where€aÏreasonable€suspicion€is€present.€€òòSeeóó€Majority€Opinion€at€_____.€€[SlipÏop.€at€8,€n.€8].€€òòWhrenóó€specifically€states,€ð ðWhat€is€true€of€òòProuseóó€isÏalso€true€of€other€cases€that€engaged€in€detailed€ð ðbalancingðð€to€decideÏthe€constitutionality€of€automobile€stops,€.€.€.€the€detailed€ð ðbalancingððÏanalysis€was€necessary€because€they€involved€seizures€without€probableÏcause.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€_____,€116€S.Ct.€at€1776.Ì ³Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔòòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð40„7„103€(Supp.1996)(setting€forthÏgrounds€for€arrest€by€an€officer€without€a€warrant).€€The€issue€ofÏwhether€section€40„7„103€was€complied€with€in€this€case€is€not€before€theÏCourt.Ì ±Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔNor€do€the€cases€of€òòMichigan€v.€Sitzóó€or€òòState€v.€Downeyóó,€holdingÏconstitutional€sobriety€checkpoints,€support€the€majorityððs€position.€€InÏboth€of€those€cases,€the€Court€vividly€illustrates€the€exigentÏcircumstances€surrounding€the€drunken€driving€problem€which€prompted€theÏdecisions.€€òòMichigan€Dept.€of€State€Police€v.€Sitzóó,€496€U.S.€455,€451,Ï110€S.Ct.€2481,€2485„86€(1990);€òòState€v.€Downeyóó,€945€S.W.2d€102,€104Ï(Tenn.€1997).Ô€5ÔÌ \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ qÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔAlthough€the€charge€on€which€the€òòcapiasóó€had€issued€for€Watkins€isÏnot€stated€in€the€opinion,€it€apparently€was€a€major€factor€on€which€theÏCourt€relied€in€finding€the€stop€justified.€€Even€though€the€stop€whichÏresulted€in€the€defendant's€arrest€was€sustained€as€an€investigativeÏstop,€the€facts€and€circumstances€also€would€support€a€finding€ofÏprobable€cause,€which€issue€was€not€discussed€in€the€opinion.Ì uÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ôÔFor€additional€decisions€based€on€exigent€circumstances,Ò ° ÒÒ À Òòòseeóó€4€òòWharton'sÏCriminal€Evidenceóó€ðð€717,€p.€826€(14th€ed.€1987).€€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€5ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  Ý›Ñ  ÑÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€6ÔÑ€ÑÑ7€Ü+XXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÖ€8ÖØ ØÓ&€99XÐd&Óœ›Þ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEE̜ـ$ÙßR€<>;A1-j|xþ•` à. `€€@ÿRß›Ìà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àHEARD€AT€COOKEVILLEÌ̛̜ÌÌÓ` °‚X.h—XÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Plaintiff„Appellee,à àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà à(€€Coffee€CriminalÌà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà à(€€Hon.€Gerald€L.€Ewell,€Sr.,Ìà àà àà àà àà à(€€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà à(ÌWAYNE€LEE€YEARGAN,à àà àà à(€€No.€01S01„9604„CC„00080Ìà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Defendant„Appellant.à à(̛̜ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òC€O€N€C€U€œR€R›€I€N€G€€œI€N€€R€E€S€U€L€T€Sóóó ó›ÌÌÌÌÌÓÓà àI€œagree€that€the€motion€to€suppress€the€evidence€beÏdenied.€€I€write›€separately€because€the€language€of€the€majorityÏopinion€reduces€the€constitutional€standard€for€search€and€seizureÏto€ð ðreasonable€œsuspicion.ðð× ƒ? ××  ×›€€The€majority€misconstrues€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,Í392€U.S.€1,€88€S.Ct.€1868€(1968),€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏcase€which€recognized€the€validity€of€investigative€stops€based€onÏexigent€circumstances,€and€ignores€òòWhren€v.€United€Statesóó,€€_____ÏU.S.€_____,€116€S.Ct.€1769€(1996),€the€most€recent€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€case€discussing€the€œrequirements€for€probable€cause.€ÏThe€majority€also€fails€to€follow,€or€even€mention,€the€holdings€inÏòòHughes€v.€Stateóó,€588€S.W.2d€296€(Tenn.€1979)€and€òòState€v.€Pullyóó,€863ÏS.W.2d€29€(Tenn.€1993)€in€which€this€Court€discussed€in€detail€theÏrationale€and€requirements€for€an€investigative€stop.€€€€ÌÌà@ àò òIó óÌÌà àThe€appeal€is€from€convictions€of€driving€under€theÏinfluence€of€an€intoxicant,€second€offense,× ƒ@ ××  ×€and€driving€a€motorÏvehicle€with€a€revoked€driver€license,× ƒA ××  ×€entered€upon€the€defendant'sÏpleas€of€guilty,€reserving€a€dispositive€question€of€law.€ÌÌà àOn€Thursday,€January€28,€1993,€at€approximately€2:20€p.m.,ÏTullahoma€Police€Officer€Jason€Ferrell€observed€the€defendant,€WayneÍLee€Yeargan,€driving€a€pickup€truck€on€a€public€street€in€Tullahoma.€ÏPreviously,€Officer€Ferrell€had€arrested€the€defendant€for€drivingÏunder€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€and€had€been€present€in€theÏgeneral€sessions€court€on€July2,€1992€when€the€defendant€pleadedÏguilty€to€the€offense€and€was€sentenced€to€11€months€and€29€days€inÏjail,€a€fine€of€$250,€and€the€revocation€of€his€driver€license€forÏone€year€from€the€date€of€the€judgment.€€ÌÌà àWhen€the€officer€began€following€the€defendant's€truck,Ïthe€defendant,€according€to€the€officer's€testimony,€"sped€up€some,€Ïhe€wasn't€going€at€a€high€rate€of€speed,€but€he€accelerated."€€InÏthe€officer's€view,€the€defendant€"attempted€to€put€some€trafficÏbetween€us."€€The€defendant€then€drove€into€the€parking€lot€ofÏRubyððs€Lounge,€a€local€bar;€the€officer€followed€and€put€on€his€blueÏlights.€€The€defendant€parked€and€got€out€of€his€truck.€€The€officerÏasked€to€see€his€driver€license,€and€he€produced€a€restrictedÏlicense€issued€pursuant€to€a€court€order€which€permitted€theÏdefendant€to€drive€ð ðin€Coffee€County€only€as€necessary€to€completeÏjob€tasksðð€between€the€hours€of€7€a.m.€and€7€p.m.€€The€defendantððsÏemployment€was€listed€on€the€order€granting€the€restricted€licenseÏas€farming€and€"rental€property€owner."€€The€officer€testified€thatÏwhen€he€asked€the€defendant€why€he€had€driven€to€the€bar,€theÏdefendant€replied€that€he€ð ðhad€come€to€the€bar€to€meet€a€guy€about€aÍcow.ðð€€Based€on€his€observations€and€a€field€sobriety€test,€theÏofficer€concluded€that€the€defendant€was€under€the€influence€of€anÏintoxicant€and€arrested€him€for€driving€under€the€influence€andÏdriving€on€a€revoked€license.€€The€police€officer€admitted€that€heÏwas€aware€of€the€availability€of€restricted€licenses€for€drivingÏoffenders.€€However,€he€testified€that€if€he€had€tried€to€establishÏthe€status€of€the€defendantððs€license€before€stopping€him,€it€wouldÏhave€taken€approximately€15€minutes€for€the€police€radio€operator€toÏdetermine€whether€the€defendant€had€a€restricted€license.€€ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€found€that€"a€prudentÏofficer€could€reasonably€have€believed€that€the€appellant€wasÏdriving€on€a€revoked€license"€and€held€that€the€officer€hadÏ"probable€cause€to€conduct€an€investigative€stop."€€In€reaching€thatÏconclusion,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€relied€upon€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,Ï392€U.S.€1,€88€S.Ct.€1868€(1968)€and€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2dÏ293€(Tenn.€1992).€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIó óÌÔ€5ÔÌà àÔ€6ÔThis€Court€recently€clarified€the€standard€of€review€underÏwhich€a€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€on€suppression€issues€are€toÏbe€reviewed:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àQuestions€of€credibility€of€the€witnesses,Ïthe€weight€and€value€of€the€evidence,€andÏresolution€of€conflicts€in€the€evidence€areÏmatters€entrusted€to€the€trial€judge€as€theÏtrier€of€fact.€€The€party€prevailing€in€theÏtrial€court€is€entitled€to€the€strongestÏlegitimate€view€of€the€evidence€adduced€at€theÏsuppression€hearing€as€well€as€all€reasonableÏand€legitimate€inferences€that€may€be€drawnÏfrom€that€evidence.€€So€long€as€the€greaterÏweight€of€the€evidence€supports€the€trialÏcourtððs€findings,€those€findings€shall€beÏupheld.€€In€other€words,€a€trial€courtððsÏfindings€of€fact€in€a€suppression€hearing€willÏbe€upheld€unless€the€evidence€preponderatesÏotherwise.€€We€also€note€that€this€standard€ofÏreview€is€consistent€with€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï13(d),€which€provides€that€in€civil€cases,Ïfindings€of€fact€by€a€trial€court€are€presumedÏcorrect€ð ðunless€the€preponderance€of€theÏevidence€is€otherwise.ðð€€Hereafter,€the€properÏstandard€to€be€applied€in€reviewing€suppressionÏissues€is€the€ð ðpreponderance€of€the€evidenceððÏstandard.ÌÌÓÓÌòòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18,€23€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€application€ofÏthe€law€to€the€facts€found€by€the€trial€court,€however,€is€aÏquestion€of€law€which€this€Court€reviews€de€novo.€€òòBeare€Co.€v.ÏTennessee€Dept.€of€Revenueóó,€858€S.W.2d€906,€907€(Tenn.€1993).€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIIó óÌÌà@ àA.ÌÌà àThe€relevant€constitutional€provisions€are€the€FourthÏAmendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€1,€SectionÏ7,€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.× ƒB ××  ×€€The€Fourth€Amendment€"exists,Ïprimarily,€for€the€benefit€of€the€citizen;€its€origin€and€historyÏclearly€manifest€that€the€Fourth€Amendment€was€intended€as€aÏrestraint€upon€the€activities€of€the€sovereign€authority€to€theÏextent€that€a€citizen€may€be€secure€in€the€unmolested€enjoyment€ofÏhome€and€possessions,€except€by€virtue€of€process€duly€issued."€ÍòòState€v.€Burroughsóó,€926€S.W.2d€243,€245€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€CourtÏrecently€reaffirmed€this€historic€principle:ÌÌÓÓà8 à€[B]oth€the€Fourth€Amendment€to€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution€and€Article€1,€Section€7€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Constitution€prohibitÏ"unreasonable"€searches€and€seizures.€€TheÏState€may€not€invade€this€personalÏconstitutional€right€of€the€individual€citizenÏexcept€under€the€most€exigent€circumstances.ÌÌà8 à.€.€.ÌÌà8 à€€€€€A€warrantless€search€and€seizure,Ïtherefore,€is€presumed€unreasonable€unless€itÏfalls€into€one€of€the€narrowly€definedÏexceptions,€or€exigent€circumstances,€to€theÏwarrant€requirement.€€The€mere€existence€ofÏthese€circumstances€does€not€necessarilyÏvalidate€a€warrantless€search.€€As€pointed€outÏin€[òòUnited€States€v.€Nelsonóó,€459€F.2d€884,€885Ï(6th€Cir.€1972)],€exceptions€are€jealously€andÏcarefully€drawn."€€There€must€be€a€showing€byÏthose€asserting€the€exception€that€theÏexigencies€of€the€situation€made€the€searchÏimperative.€€The€burden€is€on€those€seeking€theÏexception€to€show€the€need.ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Bartramóó,€925€S.W.2d€227,€229„30€(Tenn.€1996)€(citationsÏomitted).€€ÌÌà àThe€stop€of€the€defendantððs€vehicle€in€this€caseÏimplicates€the€protection€of€both€the€state€and€federalÏconstitutions:€€"Temporary€detention€of€individuals€during€the€stopÏof€an€automobile€by€the€police,€even€if€only€for€a€brief€period€andÍfor€a€limited€purpose,€constitutes€a€'seizure'€of€'persons'€withinÏthe€meaning€of€this€provision."€€òòWhren€v.€United€Statesóó,€___€U.S.Ï____,___,€116€S.Ct.€1769,€1772€(1996);€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€440€U.S.Ï648,€654,€99€S.Ct.€1391,€1396€(1979).ÌÌÓÓà8 àWhen€an€officer€turns€on€his€blue€lights,€he€orÏshe€has€clearly€initiated€a€stop.€€òòSee€UnitedÏStates€v.€Hensleyóó,€469€U.S.€221,€226,€105ÏS.Ct.€675,€679,€83€L.Ed.2d€604€(1985);ÏòòColorado€v.€Bannisteróó,€449€U.S.€1,4€n.€3,€101ÏS.Ct.€42,€44€n.€3,€66€L.Ed.2d€1€(1980).€ÏMoreover,€as€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏobserved€in€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€16,€88ÏS.Ct.€1868,€1877,€20€L.Ed.2d€889€(1968),€ð ð[i]tÏmust€be€recognized€that€whenever€a€policeÏofficer€accosts€an€individual€and€restrains€hisÏfreedom€to€walk€away,€he€has€ððseizedðð€thatÏperson.ðð€€òòSee€also€United€States€v.€Brignoni„Ponceóó,€422€U.S.€873,€878,€95€S.Ct.€2574,€2578,Ï45€L.Ed.2d€607€(1975).€ÌÌÓÓÌòòState€v.€Pullyóó,× ƒC ××  ×€863€S.W.2d€29,€30€(Tenn.€1993).€€"An€automobile€stopÏis€thus€subject€to€the€constitutional€imperative€that€it€not€beÏ'unreasonable'€under€the€circumstances."€€òòWhren€v.€United€Statesóó,Ï___€U.S.€at€___,€116€S.Ct.€at€1772;€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Downeyóó,€945€S.W.2dÏ102,€106€(Tenn.€1997).ÌÌà àThe€Fourth€Amendment€and€Article€I,€Section€7€require€theÍexistence€of€ð ðprobable€causeðð€for€making€an€arrest€without€an€arrestÏwarrant.€€òòBeck€v.€Ohioóó,€379€U.S.€89,€85€S.Ct.€223,€225€(1964);ÏòòState€v.€Melsonóó,€638€S.W.2d€342,€350€(Tenn.€1982),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€459ÏU.S.€1137,€103€S.Ct.€770€(1983).€€In€order€to€have€probable€causeÏfor€an€arrest€without€a€warrant,€at€the€moment€of€the€arrest,€theÏfacts€and€circumstances€within€the€knowledge€of€the€officers,€and€ofÏwhich€they€had€reasonably€trustworthy€information,€must€beÏð ðsufficient€to€warrant€a€prudent€man€in€believing€that€theÏ[defendant]€had€committed€or€was€committing€an€offense.ðð€€òòBeck€v.ÏOhioóó,€379€U.S.€at€91,€85€S.Ct.€at€225;€€òòMelsonóó,€638€S.W.2d€at€350.ÌÌà àAlthough€probable€cause€is€the€only€basis€on€which€aÏperson€may€be€arrested€without€a€warrant,€under€certain€Ïcircumstances,€a€person€may€be€detained€briefly€by€a€police€officerÏwithout€a€warrant€or€probable€cause.€€Under€exigent€circumstances,Ï"a€police€officer€may€make€an€investigative€stop€of€a€motor€vehicleÏwhen€the€officer€has€a€reasonable€suspicion,€supported€by€specificÏand€articulable€facts,€that€a€criminal€offense€has€been€or€is€aboutÏto€be€committed."€€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€293,€294€(Tenn.Ï1992);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€21,€88€S.Ct.€1868,€1880Ï(1968)).ÌÌà àThe€motion€to€suppress€is€directed€to€evidence€of€theÍdefendant's€intoxication,€which€was€apparent€to€the€officer€uponÏobserving€his€appearance€and€demeanor,€consequently,€theÏadmissibility€of€the€evidence€depends€entirely€upon€the€legality€ofÏthe€stop.€€The€stop€was€permissible€and€the€evidence€admissible€ifÏthere€was€probable€cause€for€an€arrest€or€if€there€were€grounds€forÏan€investigative€stop.€€€ÌÌà àTwo€distinct€but€closely€related€issues,€both€governed€byÏthe€Fourth€Amendment€and€Art.€I,€Section€7,€are€presented€in€thisÏcase.€€The€facts€and€circumstances€of€the€case€must€be€examinedÏfirst€to€determine€if€they€constitute€grounds€justifying€theÏdefendant's€arrest.€€If€the€facts€and€circumstances€do€not€warrantÏthe€reasonable€belief€that€a€crime€has€been€or€is€being€committedÏand,€therefore,€there€is€no€probable€cause€for€arrest,€thenÏsecondly,€those€facts€and€circumstances€may€be€examined€to€determineÏif€they€permit€an€investigative€stop.€€ÌÌà@ àB.ÌÌà àAlthough€the€determination€of€probable€cause€turns€on€theÏfacts€and€circumstances€of€each€case,€the€framework€within€whichÏthat€determination€is€made€is€well€settled.€€Significant€aspects€ofÏthat€framework€are€set€forth€in€the€following€material€in€2€Wayne€R.ÍLaFave,€òòSearch€and€Seizureóó€ðð€3.1(b),€pp.€6,€and€ðð€3.2,€p.€22€(3d€ed.Ï1996):ÌÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€It€is€generally€assumed€by€the€SupremeÏCourt€and€the€lower€courts€that€the€sameÏquantum€of€evidence€is€required€whether€one€isÏconcerned€with€probable€cause€to€arrest€orÏprobable€cause€to€search.€€For€this€reason,Ïdiscussions€by€courts€of€the€probable€causeÏrequirement€often€refer€to€and€rely€upon€priorÏdecisions€without€regard€to€whether€theseÏearlier€cases€were€concerned€with€the€groundsÏto€arrest€or€the€grounds€to€search....ÌÌà8 à€€€€€.€.€..ÌÌà8 à€€€€€Notwithstanding€the€frequency€with€whichÏpolice,€lawyers€and€judges€must€decide€whetherÏa€given€set€of€facts€amounts€to€probable€cause,Ïit€remains€"an€exceedingly€difficult€concept€toÏobjectify."€€As€noted€in€òòUnited€States€v.ÏDavisóó:ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÒ  ÒÒ p ÒThe€contours€and€salient€principles€ofÏprobable€cause€have€been€faithfullyÏcatalogued€in€a€surfeit€of€decisionalÏlaw.€€Probable€cause€exists€when€knownÏfacts€and€circumstances€are€sufficientÏto€warrant€a€man€of€reasonableÏprudence€in€the€belief€that€an€offenseÏhas€been€or€is€being€committed.€.€.€.€ÏA€significantly€lower€quanta€of€proofÏis€required€to€establish€probableÏcause€than€guilt.€.€.€.€€ProbableÏcause€does€not€emanate€from€anÏantiseptic€courtroom,€a€sterileÏlibrary€or€a€sacrosanct€adytum,€nor€isÏit€a€pristine€"philosophical€conceptÏexisting€in€a€vacuum,"€.€.€.€butÏrather€it€requires€a€pragmaticÏanalysis€of€"everyday€life€on€whichÏreasonable€and€prudent€men,€not€legalÏtechnicians,€act."€.€.€.€€It€is€to€beÍviewed€from€the€vantage€point€of€aÏprudent,€reasonable,€cautious€policeÏofficer€on€the€scene€at€the€time€ofÏthe€arrest€guided€by€his€experienceÏand€training.€.€.€.€€It€is€"a€plasticÏconcept€whose€existence€depends€on€theÏfacts€and€circumstances€of€theÏparticular€case."€.€.€.€€Because€ofÏthe€kaleidoscopic€myriad€that€goesÏinto€the€probable€cause€mix€"seldomÏdoes€a€decision€in€one€case€handilyÏdispose€of€the€next."€.€.€.€€It€isÏhowever€the€totality€of€these€factsÏand€circumstances€which€is€theÏrelevant€consideration.€.€.€.€€ViewedÏsingly€these€factors€may€not€beÏdispositive,€yet€when€viewed€in€unisonÏthe€puzzle€may€fit.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÌÌÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÓÓà àThe€most€recent€decision€by€this€Court€consideringÏprobable€cause€to€arrest€is€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€638€S.W.2d€342€(Tenn.Ï1982),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€459€U.S.€1137,€103€S.Ct.€770€(1982).€€In€thatÏcase,€the€Court€found€that€the€information€given€to€police€officersÏimmediately€after€the€homicide€was€committed,€the€defendant'sÏpresence€nearby,€and€the€blood€spots€on€the€defendant's€clothing,Ïconstituted€probable€cause€for€the€defendant's€seizure€and€arrest,Ïstating,€€ÌÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€Since€there€was€no€warrant,€we€must€passÏupon€the€validity€of€the€arrest€under€theÏstatute€permitting€an€officer€to€make€aÏwarrantless€arrest€when€a€felony€has€beenÏcommitted€and€he€has€reasonable€or€probableÏcause€to€believe€that€the€arrestee€committedÏthe€felony.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„803(3).€€ItÍis€conceded€that€probable€cause€must€be€moreÏthan€mere€suspicion,€òòWest€v.€Stateóó,€221€Tenn.Ï178,€425€S.W.2d€602€(1968),€but€neither€must€itÏbe€absolute€certainty,€òòGrey€v.€Stateóó,€542ÏS.W.2d€102€(Tenn.€Cr.€App.€1976).€€ReasonableÏor€probable€cause€consists€of€grounds€whichÏwould€lead€a€reasonable€man€to€believe€that€theÏperson€arrested€was€guilty€of€the€felony,€òòDavisÏv.€Stateóó,€2€Tenn.€Cr.€App.€297,€453€S.W.2d€438Ï(1969).€€In€òòDavisóó,€we€quoted€from€òòJones€v.ÏStateóó,€161€Tenn.€370,€33€S.W.2d€59€(1930),Ïwherein€it€was€stated:ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÒ  ÒÒ p Ò€€€"In€òòBeck€v.€State€of€Ohioóó,€379€U.S.Ï89,€85€S.Ct.€223,€13€L.Ed.2d€142Ï(1964),€the€[United€States€Supreme]ÏCourt€stated:ÌÌ€€€€'Whether€that€arrest€wasÏconstitutionally€valid€depends€.€.€.Ïupon€whether,€at€the€moment€the€arrestÏwas€made,€the€officers€had€probableÏcause€to€make€it„„whether€at€thatÏmoment€the€facts€and€circumstancesÏwithin€their€knowledge€and€of€whichÏthey€had€reasonable€trustworthyÏinformation€were€sufficient€to€warrantÏa€prudent€man€in€believing€that€theÏpetitioner€had€committed€.€.€.€anÏoffense.'"ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p Òà8 à453€S.W.2d€at€440.ÌÌÓÓÌÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒòòId.óó€at€350„51.€€Thus,€probable€cause€is€established€when€the€factsÏand€circumstances€within€the€knowledge€of€the€officer€and€of€whichÏhe€has€reasonably€trustworthy€information€€warrant€a€prudent€personÏin€believing€the€defendant€has€committed€or€is€committing€anÏoffense.€€ÌÌÔ€5Ôà àÔ€6ÔThe€Supreme€Court€of€the€United€States€recently€emphasizedÏthat€where€there€is€probable€cause,€the€ð ðreasonablenessðð€of€theÏsearch€and€seizure€required€by€the€Fourth€Amendment€is€established.€ÏIn€òòWhren€v.€United€Statesóó,€_____€U.S.€_____,€116€S.Ct.€1769€(1996),Ïpolice€officers€observed€the€defendant€violating€several€trafficÏordinances.€€They€pursued€the€defendant's€vehicle€and€an€officerÏapproached€the€vehicle€while€it€was€stopped€at€a€traffic€light.€€TheÏofficer,€who€was€not€in€uniform,€identified€himself€to€the€defendantÏas€a€police€officer€and€directed€the€defendant€to€put€the€vehicle€inÏpark.€€The€officer€saw€the€defendant€openly€holding€contraband€inÏhis€hands.€€The€defendant€in€òòWhrenóó€pressed€the€Supreme€Court€toÏsuppress€the€evidence€obtained€on€the€ground€that€the€stop€wasÏpretextual.€€The€defendant€insisted€that€the€officer€used€theÏtraffic€violations€as€a€pretext€for€stopping€the€defendant€when€hisÏreal€purpose€was€to€find€evidence€of€illegal€drug€activity.€ÏInstead,€the€Court€held€that€the€ulterior€motives€of€the€officer€doÏnot€invalidate€police€conduct€that€is€justified€on€the€basis€ofÏprobable€cause.€€ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àIt€is€of€course€true€that€in€principleÏevery€Fourth€Amendment€case,€since€it€turnsÏupon€a€ð ðreasonablenessðð€determination,€involvesÏa€balancing€of€all€relevant€factors.€€With€rareÏexceptions€not€applicable€here,€however,€theÏresult€of€that€balancing€is€not€in€doubt€whereÏthe€search€or€seizure€is€based€upon€probableÏcause.€€That€is€why€petitioners€must€rely€uponÍcases€like€òòProuseóó€to€provide€examples€of€actualÏð ðbalancingðð€analysis.€€There,€the€police€actionÏin€question€was€a€random€traffic€stop€for€theÏpurpose€of€checking€a€motoristððs€license€andÏvehicle€registration,€a€practice€that€...Ïinvolves€police€intrusion€òòwithout€the€probableÏcause€that€is€its€traditional€justificationóó.ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€_____,€116€S.Ct.€at€1776€(1996)€(emphasis€in€original).€€òòSeeóóÏòòalsoóó€òòOhio€v.€Robinetteóó,€____€U.S.€____,€____,€117€S.Ct.€417,€420„21Ï(1996).€€The€Supreme€Court€did€not€specifically€discussÏinvestigative€stops€authorized€by€òòTerryóó€and€its€progeny,€but€itsÏholding€validates,€under€federal€law,€all€detentions€authorized€byÏprobable€cause.ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àWhere€probable€cause€has€existed,€the€onlyÏcases€in€which€we€have€found€it€necessaryÏactually€to€perform€the€ð ðbalancingðð€analysisÏinvolved€searches€or€seizures€conducted€in€anÏextraordinary€manner,€unusually€harmful€to€anÏindividualððs€privacy€or€even€physical€interestsÏ„€such€as,€for€example,€seizure€by€means€ofÏdeadly€force€....€€The€making€of€a€traffic€stopÏout„of„uniform€does€not€remotely€qualify€asÏsuch€an€extreme€practice,€and€so€is€governed€byÏthe€usual€rule€that€probable€cause€to€believeÏthe€law€has€been€broken€ð ðoutbalancesðð€privateÏinterest€in€avoiding€police€contact.ÌÌÓÓòòWhren€v.€United€Statesóó,€_____€U.S.€at€_____,€116€S.Ct.€at€1776„77.€ÏConsequently,€a€balancing€analysis€under€òòTerryóó€is€not€necessaryÏwhere€there€is€probable€cause.€ÌÌà@ àC.ÌÌà àHowever,€as€recognized€in€òòWhrenóó,€the€most€recent€decisionÏby€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€on€this€issue,€where€there€is€noÏprobable€cause€there€must€be€ð ðdetailed€ððbalancingðð€to€decide€theÏconstitutionality€of€automobile€stopsðð€involving€sufficient,Ïspecific,€identified€facts€in€order€to€justify€even€a€limitedÏintrusion.× ƒD ××  ×€€òòId.óó€at€_____,€116€S.Ct.€at€1776.ÌÌà àThe€validity€of€an€investigative€stop€under€exigentÏcircumstances€was€first€recognized€by€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€in€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó.€€In€that€case,€the€Court€addressed€the€issueÏof€whether€the€police€have€the€right€to€stop€and€question€anÏindividual€in€the€absence€of€probable€cause.€€In€òòTerryóó,€a€policemanÏbecame€suspicious€of€two€men€who€separately€walked€up€and€down€aÏstreet€several€times€peering€into€a€store,€talked€to€a€third€man€andÏfollowed€him€up€the€street€a€short€time€later.€€A€police€officerÏfollowed€the€suspects,€confronted€and€searched€them,€and€found€aÍpistol€on€two€of€them.€€Terry,€charged€with€the€crime€of€carrying€aÏconcealed€weapon,€moved€to€suppress€the€weapon€as€evidence.€€TheÏCourt€held:ÌÌÓÓà8 àEach€case€of€this€sort€will,€of€course,€have€toÏbe€decided€on€its€own€facts.€€We€merely€holdÏtoday€that€where€a€police€officer€observesÏunusual€conduct€which€leads€him€reasonably€toÏconclude€in€light€of€his€experience€thatÏcriminal€activity€may€be€afoot€and€that€theÏpersons€with€whom€he€is€dealing€may€be€armedÏand€presently€dangerous,€where€in€the€course€ofÏinvestigating€this€behavior€he€identifiesÏhimself€as€a€policeman€and€makes€reasonableÏinquiries,€and€where€nothing€in€the€initialÏstages€of€the€encounter€serves€to€dispel€hisÏreasonable€fear€for€his€own€or€othersðð€safety,Ïhe€is€entitled€for€the€protection€of€himselfÏand€others€in€the€area€to€conduct€a€carefullyÏlimited€search€of€the€outer€clothing€of€suchÏpersons€in€an€attempt€to€discover€weapons€whichÏmight€be€used€to€assault€him.ÌÌÌÌòòTerry€v.€State€of€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€at€30,€88€S.Ct.€at€1884„85.ÌÌÓÓThe€majority€opinion€states€that€òòTerryóó€requires€only€a€reasonableÏsuspicion€supported€by€specific€and€articulated€facts€that€aÏcriminal€offense€has€been€or€is€about€to€be€committed.€€€However,ÏòòTerryóó€specifically€limited€its€holding€to€allow€a€stop€where€theÏofficer€has€not€only€a€reasonable€suspicion€that€ð ðcriminal€activityÏmay€be€afoot,ðð€but€also€a€reasonable€suspicion€that€the€persons€ð ðmayÏbe€armed€and€presently€dangerous,ðð€and€to€allow€a€search€where€afterÏreasonable€inquiries,€nothing€ð ðserves€to€dispel€his€reasonable€fearÍfor€his€own€or€othersðð€safety.ðð€€òòTerry€v.€State€of€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€atÏ30,€88€S.Ct.€at€1884„85.€€The€requirement€of€exigent€circumstancesÏis€not€included€in€the€rule€announced€by€the€majority.€€€ÌÌà àSubsequent€decisions€have€reaffirmed€the€holding€in€òòTerryóóÏthat€investigative€stops€are€limited€to€extraordinary€situations.€ÏIn€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€the€Supreme€Court€found€the€stop€to€beÏconstitutionally€unreasonable.€€The€Court€held€that€a€stop€to€checkÏa€license€and€registration€is€unreasonable€"except€in€thoseÏsituations€in€which€there€is€at€least€articulable€and€reasonableÏsuspicion€that€a€motorist€is€unlicensed€or€that€an€automobile€is€notÏregistered,€or€that€either€the€vehicle€or€an€occupant€is€otherwiseÏsubject€to€seizure€for€violation€of€law.ðð× ƒE ××  ×€€€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€440ÏU.S.€648,€664,€99€S.Ct.€1391,€1401€(1979).€€In€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,Ïa€police€officer€stopped€an€automobile€though€ð ðhe€had€observedÏneither€traffic€or€equipment€violations€nor€any€suspiciousÏactivity.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€651,€99€S.Ct.€at€1394.€€The€stop€was€made€solelyÏto€check€the€driverððs€license€and€registration€because€the€officerÏð ðsaw€the€car€in€the€area€and€wasnððt€answering€any€complaints€....ðð€ÏòòIdóó.€€Upon€approaching€the€vehicle,€the€officer€smelled€marijuana,Íand€seized€marijuana€in€plain€view€on€the€floor€of€the€car.€€TheÏCourt€suppressed€this€evidence€because€there€was€no€reasonable€basisÏfor€the€stop.ÌÌà àThe€majority€relies€on€òòProuseóó€to€support€its€position.€€InÏòòProuseóó,€the€Court€first€discussed€òòUnited€States€v.€Brignoni„Ponceóó,Ï422€U.S.€873,€95€S.Ct.€2574€(1975)€and€òòUnited€States€v.€Martinez„Fuerteóó,€428€U.S.€543,€96€S.Ct.€3074€(1976),€where€the€Court€upheldÏcheckpoint€stops€and€disallowed€roving€patrol€stops.€€TheseÏdeterminations€were€based€on€the€exigent€circumstances€surroundingÏillegal€aliens.€€òòProuseóó,€440€U.S.€at€656,€99€S.Ct.€at€1397.€€TheÏòòProuseóó€Court€found€that€in€the€case€of€other€random€stops€which€wereÏnot€based€on€any€suspicion€of€a€violation€of€the€law,€no€interestsÏ(or€exigent€circumstances)€existed€to€justify€the€intrusion.€€TheÏmajority€interprets€the€holding€to€support€the€conclusion€that€inÏthe€presence€of€a€reasonable€suspicion,€a€stop€is€alwaysÏconstitutional.€€òòSeeóó€Majority€Opinion€_____€[slip€op.€at€11].€€SuchÏan€interpretation€is€inconsistent€with€the€language€in€òòProuseóóÏspecifically€limiting€its€holding:€ð ðWe€hold€only€that€persons€inÏautomobiles€on€public€roadways€may€not€for€that€reason€alone€haveÏtheir€travel€and€privacy€interfered€with€at€the€unbridled€discretionÍof€police€officers.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€664,€99€S.€Ct.€at€1401.× ƒF ××  ×ÌÌà àGuidance€as€to€the€circumstances€in€which€an€investigativeÏstop€is€justified€is€found€in€Justice€Jacksonððs€dissent€in€òòBrinegarÏv.€United€Statesóó,€338€U.S.€160,€183,€69€S.Ct.€1302,€1314€(1949):Ñ€GÑÇÌÓÓà8 àIf€we€assume,€for€example,€that€a€child€isÏkidnapped€and€the€officers€throw€a€roadblockÏabout€the€neighborhood€and€search€everyÏoutgoing€car,€it€would€be€a€drastic€andÏundiscriminating€use€of€the€search.€€TheÏofficers€might€be€unable€to€show€probable€causeÏfor€searching€any€particular€car.€€However,€IÏshould€candidly€strive€hard€to€sustain€such€anÏaction€....€€But€I€should€not€strain€to€sustainÏsuch€a€roadblock€and€universal€search€toÏsalvage€a€few€bottles€of€bourbon€and€catch€aÏbootlegger.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€balancing€public€and€private€interests,€exigentÏcircumstances€are€necessary€to€justify€the€intrusion.€€The€òòTerryóóÏdecision€as€developed€by€other€cases€which€have€allowed€short€termÏseizures€without€a€probable€cause€for€arrest,€created€a€balancingÏanalysis€which€has€been€summarized€by€this€Court€as€follows:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àIn€general,€although€the€Fourth€AmendmentÏrequires€ð ðprobable€causeðð€before€an€arrest€isÏdeemed€to€be€reasonable,€the€reasonableness€ofÏseizures€less€intrusive€than€a€full„scaleÏarrest€is€judged€by€weighing€the€gravity€of€theÏpublic€concern,€the€degree€to€which€the€seizureÏadvances€that€concern,€and€the€severity€of€theÏintrusion€into€individual€privacy.€€òòSee,€e.g.,ÏBrown€v.€Texasóó,€443€U.S.€47,€50,€99€S.€Ct.Ï2637,€2640,€61€L.Ed.2d€357€(1979).€€In€òòTerry€v.ÏOhioóó,€392€U.S.€at€20„21,€88€S.Ct.€at€1879„80,Ïthe€United€States€Supreme€Court€acknowledgedÏpolice€officersðð€need€for€ð ðan€escalating€set€ofÏflexible€responses,€graduated€in€relation€toÏthe€amount€of€information€they€possess.ðð€€òòIdóó.Ïat€10,€88€S.Ct.€at€1874.€€The€òòTerryóó€Court€heldÏthat€to€justify€a€stop,€ð ðthe€police€officerÍmust€be€able€to€point€to€specific€andÏarticulable€facts€which,€taken€together€withÏrational€inferences€from€those€facts,Ïreasonably€warrant€that€intrusion.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€21,Ï88€S.Ct.€at€1880.ÌÌÌÌòòState€v.€Pullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€30.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThis€Court€has,€in€several€decisions,€addressed€theÏconstitutional€validity€of€investigative€stops.€€In€òòHughes€v.€Stateóó,Ï588€S.W.2d€296,€309€(Tenn.€1979),€after€reviewing€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€decisions€on€investigative€stops,€the€Court€stated:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àA€citizen€has€a€constitutionally€ordered€rightÏto€be€secure€in€his€person€and€possessions€andÏto€be€free€from€ð ðarbitrary€invasions€solely€atÏthe€unfettered€discretionðð€of€the€police.ÌÌÌÌÓÓIn€that€case,€the€defendant€and€a€companion€drove€to€a€store,€theÏdefendant€dropped€off€his€companion€at€the€store€and€left.€€TheÏcompanion€bought€some€snacks€which€he€consumed€while€readingÏmagazines€at€the€magazine€rack.€€The€proprietor€contacted€theÏpolice,€related€these€facts€and€concluded€that€the€defendant€wasÏð ðacting€a€little€strange€or€suspicious.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€299.€€When€officersÏarrived€at€the€store,€they€restrained€the€companion€in€the€rear€seatÏof€the€patrol€car€while€it€was€determined€that€he€had€no€criminalÏrecord.€€The€officers€began€searching€for€the€defendant,€who€wasÍthen€returning€to€the€store€parking€lot.€€The€defendant€rolled€downÏthe€window€when€an€officer€approached€the€automobile€and€asked€forÏhis€driver€license.€€Because€the€officer€smelled€burning€marijuanaÏwhen€the€window€was€lowered,€the€officer€searched€the€automobile€andÏdiscovered€the€contraband.€€In€òòHughesóó,€the€Court€held€that€theÏseizure€was€not€based€on€information€which€contained€ð ðspecific€andÏarticulable€facts€or€inferences€from€facts,€sufficient€to€generate€aÏreasonable€conclusion€that€a€crime€had€been,€was,€or€was€about€to€beÏcommitted.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€308.ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€293,€294€(Tenn.€1992),€theÏofficer,€who€had€made€an€investigative€stop,€testified€at€theÏsuppression€hearing€that€he€had€personal€knowledge€that€a€capias€wasÏoutstanding€for€the€defendantððs€arrest,€that€other€police€officersÏhad€informed€him€that€the€defendant€often€drove€a€black€CadillacÏinscribed€with€the€words€ð ðThe€Duke,ðð€and€that€when€he€saw€this€car,Ïbecause€of€the€outstanding€capias,€the€officers€stopped€the€vehicle.€ÏThis€Court€found€that€the€police€officers€had€the€requiredÏreasonable€suspicion,€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,Ïto€withstand€the€constitutional€challenge€to€the€stop.€€òòIdóó.€at€295.€ÏThe€Court€stated€that,€ÌÌÓÓà8 àIn€determining€whether€a€police€officerððsÏreasonable€suspicion€is€supported€by€specificÍand€articulable€facts,€a€court€must€considerÏthe€totality€of€the€circumstances€òòUnited€StatesÏv.€Cortezóó,€449€U.S.€411,€417,€101€S.Ct.€690,Ï695,€66€L.Ed.2d€621,€629€(1981).€€ThisÏincludes,€but€is€not€limited€to,€objectiveÏobservations,€information€obtained€from€otherÏpolice€officers€or€agencies,€informationÏobtained€from€citizens,€and€the€pattern€ofÏoperation€of€certain€offenders.€€òòIdóó.,€449€U.S.Ïat€418,€101€S.Ct.€at€695,€66€L.Ed.2d€at€629.€ÏA€court€must€also€consider€the€rationalÏinferences€and€deductions€that€a€trained€policeÏofficer€may€draw€from€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€known€to€him.€€òòTerryóó,€392€U.S.€atÏ21,€88€S.Ct.€at€1880,€20€L.Ed.2d€at€906.ÌÌòòId.óó€at€294.× ƒH ××  ×ÌÌÌÓÓÌÓÓÓÓà àIn€òòState€v.€Pullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€29€(Tenn.€1993),€the€officerÏreceived€an€anonymous€radio€report€that€the€defendant€was€in€aÏyellow€Ford€in€a€trailer€park,€was€armed€with€a€shotgun,€and€wasÏð ðsupposed€to€shoot€someone.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€On€the€way€to€the€trailer€park,Ïthe€officer€received€another€similar€report.€€The€officer€did€notÏfind€the€defendant€at€the€trailer€park;€he€then€drove€to€a€gasÏstation€where€the€defendant€was€parked€in€a€yellow€Ford.€€TheÏofficer€turned€on€his€blue€lights,€asked€the€defendant€to€get€out€ofÏthe€car,€and€saw€a€shotgun€on€the€front€floorboard€of€the€car.€€HeÍarrested€the€defendant€for€driving€on€a€revoked€license,€for€aÏsecond€offense€of€driving€under€the€influence€of€alcohol,€and€forÏpossessing€a€loaded€weapon,€a€hunting€knife,€and€a€billy€club.€€TheÏtrial€court€suppressed€the€weapons€and€the€results€of€theÏblood/alcohol€test€on€the€grounds€that€the€officer€had€no€reasonableÏsuspicion€that€the€defendant€had€or€would€commit€a€crime.€€ThisÏCourt€reversed€that€decision,€analyzing€the€tests€for€determiningÏthe€reliability€of€informantsðð€tips€in€the€context€of€ð ðprobableÏcauseðð€determinations,€and€stating,ÌÌÓÓà8 àIn€this€case,€the€public€interest€served€by€theÏstop€was€the€prevention€of€violent€crime.€€TheÏscope€of€the€intrusion€was€minor;€it€wasÏintended€to€be€only€a€temporary€stop€of€theÏdefendantððs€car.€€Finally,€the€ð ðindicia€ofÏreliabilityðð€were€sufficient€in€light€of€theseÏother€considerations€to€warrant€a€briefÏinvestigatory€stop.€....€Although€theÏreliability€of€the€tip€would€certainly€notÏestablish€probable€cause€to€search€or€arrest,Ïand€would€not€furnish€reasonable€suspicion€toÏstop€the€defendant€in€all€circumstances,€weÏconclude€that,€given€the€threat€of€violence,Ïthe€police€had€ð ðspecific€and€articulable€factsððÏto€warrant€the€investigatory€stop€in€this€case.ÌÌÌÌòòId.óó€at€34.€ÌÌÌÌà àÓÓThis€Court€recently€balanced€public€interest€againstÏprivate€rights€in€deciding€that€sobriety€roadblocks€do€not€òòperóó€òòseóóÍviolate€the€Fourth€Amendment€or€Article€I,€Section€7.€€The€CourtÏstated:ÌÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€In€order€for€us€to€determine€whether€aÏseizure€which€is€less€intrusive€than€aÏtraditional€arrest€is€reasonable,€we€mustÏbalance€the€public€interest€served€by€theÏseizure€with€the€severity€of€the€interferenceÏwith€individual€liberty.ÌÌÌÌòòState€v.€Downeyóó,€945€S.W.2d€102,€104€(Tenn.€1997).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àRecognition€that€an€investigative€stop€may€beÏconstitutionally€reasonable,€even€though€an€arrest€would€not€beÏconstitutionally€reasonable,€was€not€intended€to€be€a€relaxation€ofÏconstitutional€protection€against€intrusions€by€the€State.€€òòSeeóó€ÏòòMinnesota€v.€Dickersonóó,€508€U.S.€366,€374,€113€S.Ct.€2130,€2136Ï(1993);€òòAdams€v.€Williamsóó,€407€U.S.€143,€146,€92€S.Ct.€1921,€1923Ï(1972).€€Instead,€it€is€a€recognition€that€a€limited€intrusion€underÏexigent€circumstances€may€be€justified€as€constitutionallyÏreasonable.€€Two€essential€conditions€characterize€a€validÏinvestigative€stop,€exigent€circumstances€and€limited€intrusion.€ÏAfter€reviewing€decisions€from€other€jurisdictions€in€whichÏinvestigative€stops€were€found€to€be€justified,€the€Court€in€òòPullyóóÏstated:€€"These€cases€show€that€the€gravity€of€the€perceived€harm€isÏa€crucial€element€in€assessing€the€reasonableness€of€anÍinvestigative€òòTerryóó€stop."€€òòPullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€33.€€The€Court€thenÏapproved€this€statement€from€a€concurring€opinion€in€òòUnited€StatesÏv.€Mendenhallóó€,€446€U.S.€544,€561,€100€S.Ct.€1870,€1881€(1980)Ï(Powell,€J.,€concurring):ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€reasonableness€of€a€stop€turns€on€the€factsÏand€circumstances€of€each€case.€€In€particular,Ïthe€Court€has€emphasized€(i)€the€publicÏinterest€served€by€the€seizure,€(ii)€the€natureÏand€scope€of€the€intrusion,€and€(iii)€theÏobjective€facts€upon€which€the€law€enforcementÏofficer€relied€in€light€of€his€knowledge€andÏexperience.€€ÌÌÌÌòòState€v.€Pullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€34.€€€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€burden€is€on€the€State€to€show€that€exigentÏcircumstances€make€the€search€imperative.€€òòState€v.€Bartramóó,€925ÏS.W.2d€227,€230€(Tenn.€1996);€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€293,€295Ï(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà@ àD.ÌÌ€à àAs€stated€previously,€the€record€will€be€examined€first€toÏdetermine€if€there€was€probable€cause€to€arrest€the€defendant€inÏthis€case.€€The€facts€and€circumstances€show€that€Officer€FerrellÏhad€probable€cause€to€believe€that€the€defendant€was€violating€theÍlaw.€€Initially,€the€officer's€knowledge€that€the€defendant's€driverÏlicense€had€been€revoked€for€a€year€was€not€reasonable€cause€toÏbelieve€that€the€defendant€was€committing€an€offense.€€Since€he€alsoÏknew€that€restricted€licenses€were€available€for€business€purposes,Ïhis€observation€of€the€defendant,€who€was€a€farmer,€driving€a€pickupÏtruck€during€working€hours,€would€reasonably€support€nothing€moreÏthan€a€suspicion€that€the€defendant€was€driving€without€authority.€ÏStated€another€way,€he€did€not€have€reasonable€cause€to€believe€theÏdefendant€had€not€applied€for€or€had€been€denied€a€restrictedÏlicense.€€However,€the€officer€knew€that€a€restricted€license€wouldÏnot€authorize€a€farmer€to€drive€to€a€bar.€€The€defendant's€furtiveÏdriving€behavior€and€his€stopping€at€the€bar€were€sufficient€toÏelevate€suspicion€to€probable€cause.€€Had€the€defendant€not€been€inÏviolation€of€the€restricted€license€by€driving€while€drinkingÏintoxicants,€there€was€no€obvious€reason€to€avoid€Officer€Ferrell.€ÏAlso,€had€the€defendant€been€about€his€business€purposes,€he€wouldÏnot€have€violated€the€restricted€license€by€stopping€at€a€bar.€ÏThese€facts€and€circumstances€were€sufficient€to€support€a€findingÏof€probable€cause€justifying€the€stop€and€the€subsequent€arrest.ÌÌà@ àE.ÌÌà àEven€though€Officer€Ferrell€had€probable€cause€to€stop€theÍdefendantððs€vehicle,€it€should€be€observed€that€the€stop€would€failÏthe€balancing€test€that€must€be€applied€to€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€where€there€is€reliance€on€an€investigative€stop.€€AsÏstated€in€òòHughes€v.€Stateóó,€588€S.W.2d€at€303:ÌÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€Thus,€in€the€context€of€a€"stop€and€frisk"Ïsituation,€the€Court€freed€Fourth€AmendmentÏanalysis€from€the€rigidity€of€the€probableÏcause€standard€but€in€so€doing€it€imposed€aÏstandard€of€specific€and€articulable€facts.€ÏThe€detection€and€prevention€of€crime€and€theÏsafety€of€the€officer€are€balanced€against€theÏnature€and€extent€of€and€the€reasons€for€theÏintrusion.ÌÌÌÌÓÓThe€decisions€require€an€articulable€and€reasonable€suspicion€thatÏthe€vehicle€or€the€occupant€is€subject€to€seizure€for€a€violation€ofÏthe€law,€and,€further,€ð ðððthat€a€seizure€must€be€based€on€òòspecific,Ïobjective€factsóó€indicating€that€societyððs€legitimate€interestsÏrequire€the€seizure€of€the€particular€individual.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€307Ï(quoting€òòBrown€v.€Texasóó,€443€U.S.€47,€52,€99€S.Ct.€2637,€2640Ï(1979)).€€The€facts€and€circumstances€of€this€case€support€the€firstÏrequirement,€reasonable€suspicion€(and€even€probable€cause).€€ÏHowever,€those€facts€and€circumstances€do€not€show€exigentÏcircumstances€requiring€that€the€defendant€be€seized.€€OfficerÏFerrell€had€no€basis€on€which€to€suspect€that€the€defendant€wasÏintoxicated.€€The€defendant€was€not€speeding,€nor€was€he,€to€theÍofficer's€observation,€violating€any€traffic€regulations.€€HisÏobservable€operation€of€the€vehicle€posed€no€danger€to€the€public.€ÏThe€only€suspected€violation€was€driving€on€a€revoked€license.€€TheÏpublic's€interest€in€enforcing€the€law€could€as€well€have€beenÏprotected€by€checking€the€records€regarding€the€status€of€theÏdefendant's€license€and€procuring€a€warrant€for€his€arrest€or€makingÏan€accusation€to€the€grand€jury.€€The€purpose€of€the€stop€was€notÏlimited€to€insuring€the€officer's€safety€or€the€protection€of€theÏpublic.€€In€contrast€to€this€situation,€the€exigent€circumstance€inÏòòPullyóó€was€that€the€officer€had€reliable€information€that€theÏdefendant€was€in€possession€of€a€shotgun€and€"was€supposed€to€shootÏsomeone."€€òòPullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€29.€€The€cases€relied€upon€in€òòPullyóóÏto€justify€the€stop€involved€situations€where€the€officer€reasonablyÏsuspected€that€the€person€stopped€was€in€the€possession€of€aÏconcealed€weapon,€or€items€taken€from€the€victim€of€a€recent€murder.€€ÏòòPullyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€33„34.× ƒI ××  ×€€Consequently,€the€evidence€does€notÏsupport€a€finding€of€exigent€circumstances.ÌÌà àThe€majority€states€that€a€brief›€œinvestigatory›€stop€isÏconstitutionally€œpermissible€if›€the€œofficer€has€a€reasonableÏsuspicion,›€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,€that€aÍcriminal€offense€has€been€or€is€about€to€be€œcommitted.›€€œMajority›ÏœOpinion€at€_____€[slip€op.€at€14].Ô€6&Ô€›€€As€a€practical€matter,€theÏlanguage€of€the€majority€would€allow€the€detention€and€at€least€aÏpatdown€search€of€any€person€suspected€of€possessing€illegal€drugsÏœorÔ€6XÔ›€other€contraband.€€The€majority,€then,€would€eliminate€the€needÏfor€exigent€circumstances€and€allow€officers€to€proceed€only€onÏð ðreasonable€suspicion,ðð€œonly.€€The€language€of€the€majority€would€Ïallow€detention€upon€mere€suspicion.€€òòSeeóó€òòMinnesota€v.€Dickersonóó,Ï508€U.S.€366,€381,€113€S.Ct.€2130,€2140€(1993).€€Such€anÏinterpretation€of€the€law€contradicts€the€consistent€holdings€underÏòòTerryóó€and€this€Court€that€each€case€must€be€decided€on€its€own€factsÏand€that€the€ð ðexigencies€of€the€situation€[must€make]€the€searchÏimperative.ðð€€òòState€v.€Bartramóó,€925€S.W.2d€227,€229„30€(Tenn.€1996);ÏòòTerryóó,€392€U.S.€at€30,€88€S.€Ct.€at€1884.€€€ÌÌà@ àò òIVó óÌÌà àThe€conclusion€is€that€because€the€officer€had€probableÏcause€to€arrest€the€defendant,€I€agree€that€the€motion€to€suppressÏshould€be€denied.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àReid,€J.›