ÿWPC = O# bUNm %» 0DÁw@UHEb 0`• 0 Æõ 0D»4ÿ 0J" 0Tl 0^À 0D 0hb 0rÊ B< Y 0|a 0†Ý AQc Æ´ 0Dz 0@¾ D/þ D3- 0` 1uð Be 0d‚U:æU> œ^U*úB)$U*MDCw AMºCàJ´*ƒÞfaÇ˚υiDî' 2%ªY/¶4v~¹5vÓ77˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(óf$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒÀ°Ò €PP‚PƒP„P…D†U‡Ó€‘’<à09Z 0Courier (WT) Regular- ù-(83‚ª$©©Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý(8f2R•$¤¤Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àÔ€ô ÷ôXXÔÔ€2ôźôôô ÷ÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóê‚_#Ôô3|x”2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔüÿP Pd2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô!"#&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò'÷ÿ dxd,,,,'ÿÿdxd2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô* ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a) dP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman ’Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d< Œ 9p`(Times<<<<7Border 1dd!#>Cþÿ << Gÿÿ 9Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€;ÔÔ€;ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€;XÔÌÌNovemberÏ24,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó ó ÖÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝRule€37(b)(2)(i),€Tenn.€R.€Crim›.€P.,€provides€in€pertinent€part€as€follows:Ìà8 àà8 à(b)€An€appeal€lies€from€any€order€or€judgment€in€a€criminalÏproceeding€where€the€law€provides€for€such€appeal,€and€from€anyÏjudgment€of€conviction:€(2)€Upon€a€plea€of€guilty€or€noloÏcontendere€if:€œ(i)›€Defendant€entered€into€a€plea€agreement€underÏRule€11(e)€but€explicitly€reserved€with€the€consent€of€the€state€andÏof€the€court€the€right€to€appeal€a€certified€question€of€law€that€isÏdispositive€of€the€case.€.€.€.Ì ªÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝOral€arguments€were€heard€in€this€case€in€Cookeville›,€œPutnam›€County,€as€part€of€thisÏCourtððs€œS.C.A.L.E.S.›€(ò òSó óupreme€ò òCó óourt€ò òAó ódvancing€ò òLó óegal€ò òEó óducation€for€ò òSó ótudents)€project.€Ì yÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€defendant€was€also€fined€$250€and€sentenced€to€11€months€and€29€days€in€jail,€whichÏwas€suspended€upon€service€of€the€48€hour€mandatory€period€of€incarceration.€Ì \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ úÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„401€(1993).Ì úÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„50„504€(1993).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€are€aware€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„7„103(b)€(Supp.€1996),€provides€that€unlessÏprobable€cause€exists,€only€members€of€the€Tennessee€highway€patrol€have€the€authority€to€stop€aÏmotor€vehicle€for€the€sole€purpose€of€examining€or€checking€the€operator€license€of€the€driver€of€theÏvehicle.€However,€since€the€defendant€did€not€reserve€for€appeal€the€statutory€legality€of€the€stop,Ïthe€effect€of€that€statute€is€not€at€issue€in€this€appeal.Ì {Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€Fourth€Amendment€is€applicable€to€the€states€through€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€ÏòòMapp€v.€Ohioóó,€367€U.S.€643,€655,€81€S.Ct.€1684,€1691,€6€L.Ed.2d€1081€(1961).Ì :Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€balancing€test€was€first€applied€in€òòCamara›€v.€Municipal€Courtóó,€387€U.S.€523,€87€œS.Ct›.Ï1727,€18€œL.Ed›.œ2d›€930€œ(1967).€€In›€his€concurring€opinion,€Justice€œReid›€maintains€that€courts€mustÏengage€in€ð ðdetailed€balancingðð€on€a€case„by„case€basis€to€determine€the€constitutionality€of€anÏinvestigatory€stop.€That€statement€indicates€a€misunderstanding€of€the€nature€and€purpose€of€theÏbalancing€test.€The€balancing€test€is€not€a€matter€for€case„by„case€application,€but€rather€ð ðaÏtechnique€for€establishing€the€quantum€of€evidence€needed€for€certain€distinct€kinds€of€officialÏaction.ðð€Wayne€R.€œLaFave›,€4€òòSearch€&€Seizure,€A€Treatise€on€the€Fourth€Amendmentóó,€ðð€9.1(d),Ïp.13€(œ3d›€ed.€West€1996);€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€œòòChandler€v.€Milleróó,›€œ_›€U.S.€œ_,€_,›€117€œS.Ct.1295,1301,€137ÏL.Ed.2d€513€(1997);›€òòœWhren›óó,€___€U.S.€at€__,€116€œS.Ct›.€at€1776.€€œWhile›€case„by„case€balancingÏð ðmight€well€be€a€stimulating€exercise€in€the€rarefied€atmosphere€of€an€appellate€court€or€law€schoolÏclassroom,€it€is€clearly€asking€too€much€to€expect€policemen€to€make€on„the„spot€judgments€in€thisÏway€or,€indeed,€to€require€trial€judges€to€review€police€conduct€in€this€fashion.ðð€œLafave›,€ðð€9.1(d),€p.Ïœ13.›€€Unlike€Justice€œReid›,€we€decline€to€œadopt€that€approach,€which€is€both€contrary€to€well„established€law€and€unworkable€in€practice.Ì  Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€his€concurring€opinion,€Justice€Reid›€concludes€that€the€stop€in€this€case€was€invalidÏunder€òòTerryóó,€but€constitutionally€sound€because€based€upon€probable€œcause.€€It€is€well„settled€that›Ïœð ðthe›€level€of€suspicion€required€for€a€òòTerryóó€stop€is€obviously€less€demanding€than€that€for€probableÏcause.ðð€òòUnited€States€v.€œSokolow›óó,€490€U.S.€1,€7„8,€109€œS.Ct›.€1581,€1585,€104€œL.Ed›.œ2d›€1€(1989).€ÏTherefore,€Justice€œReid›ððs€conclusion€is€legally€inconsistent€and€is€a€result€of€his€erroneous€holdingÏthat€a€constitutionally€valid€investigatory€stop€requires€not€only€reasonable€suspicion,€but€alsoÏð ðexigent€œcircumstances.ðð€€Contrary›€to€Justice€œReid›ððs€concurring€opinion,€neither€òòTerryóó€nor€itsÏprogeny€articulate€a€second€ð ðexigent€circumstancesðð€requirement.€€Indeed,€the€phrase,€ð ðexigentÏcircumstancesðð€is€itself€a€term€of€art€which€denotes€an€independent€exception€to€the€warrantÏrequirement€of€the€Fourth€Amendment.€€The€cases€cited€by€Justice€œReid›€do€not€support€hisÏholding.€€In€òòState€v.€œPully›óó,€863€œS.W.2d›€29€(Tenn.€1993),€the€police€officer€initiated€the€investigatoryÏstop€œupon€an€anonymous€informantððs€tip€that€a€person€was€driving€through€a€neighborhoodÏthreatening€residents€with€a€gun.€€To€justify€police€action€under€Tennessee€law€an€informantððs€tipÏmust€be€reliable,€which€requires€a€showing€of€both€the€informantððs€credibility€and€basis€ofÏknowledge.€€òòState€v.€Jacumin›óó,€778€œS.W.2d›€430,€436€(Tenn.€1989).€€This€Court€in€òòœPully›óó€simply€heldÏthat€when€a€threat€of€impending€violence€is€involved€the€legal€test€of€reliability€of€an€anonymousÏinformantððs€tip€need€not€be€strictly€enforced.€€Since€the€stop€in€this€case€was€not€initiated€as€a€resultÏof€an€anonymous€informantððs€tip,€òòœPully›óó€is€œinapplicable›€and€does€not€support€Justice€œReid›ððsÏconclusion€that€òòTerryóó€articulated€an€ð ðexigent€circumstancesðð€requirement.€€Moreover,€Justice€œReid›ððsÏassertion€that€our€holding€ð ðwould€allow€the€detention€and€at€least€a€œpatdown›€search€of€any€personÏsuspected€of€possessing€illegal€drugs€or€other€contrabandðð€is€erroneous.€€A€frisk€is€warranted€underÏòòTerryóó€only€if€the€police€officer€has€a€reasonable€œsuspicion›€based€upon€specific€and€œarticulable›€factsÏthat€the€suspect€is€armed.€€òòIdóó.,€392€U.S.€at€27,€88€œS.Ct›.€at€1883.Ì  Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝJustice€Reid›€maintains€that€our€interpretation€is€inconsistent€with€the€language€of€òòœProuse›óó.€ÏHe€œquotes›€the€following€sentence€from€that€œcase:€ð ðWe›€hold€only€€that€persons€in€automobiles€onÏpublic€roadways€may€not€for€that€reason€alone€have€their€travel€and€privacy€interfered€with€theÏòòunbridledóó€discretion€of€police€officers.ðð€€In€fact,€that€œlanguage›€supports€our€interpretation.€€The€stopÏin€òòœProuse›óó€was€completely€random€and€not€based€upon€òòanyóó€level€of€individualized€suspicion.€€TheÏpolice€officerððs€discretion€was€unbridled.€€It€was€the€absence€of€reasonable€suspicion€whichÏinvalidated€the€stop,€not€the€absence€of€exigent€circumstances.€€òòSeeóó€òòalso€Hughes€v.€Stateóó,€588ÏœS.W.2d›€296€(Tenn.€1979)€€However,€where,€as€here,€an€investigatory€stop€is€initiated€upon€aÏreasonable€suspicion€that€a€driver€is€œunlicensed›,œ€the›€police€officer€is€not€exercising€unbridledÏœdiscretion,›€œand€the›€stop€is€œconstitutional.›Ì ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àÔ€9ôÔÔ€;ÔòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝJustice€Reid›ððs€assertion€that€the€availability€of€less€intrusive€investigatory€means€shouldÏbe€considered€by€courts€evaluating€the€constitutionality€of€investigatory€stops€is€directly€contrary€toÏòòœSokolowóó.›ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€9ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  Ý›Ñ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€,RXXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÖ€:ÖÔ€;ÔœÑ , ÑÑ õ ÑÑ  ÑÑ€< §u` ÑÑ  ÑØ ØÓ&€==XÐd&Óò òÞ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEó ó›Ìà@ à(HEARD€AT€COOKEVILLE)ÌÌÌÌÓ` °‚X.h—XÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à(à àòòò òFOR€PUBLICATIONóóà àó óÌà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Plaintiff„Appellee,à àà àà à(à àœò òFiled:ó ó€ò òNovember€24,€1997ó ó›Ìà àà àà àà àà à(€€à àÌà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àœ(à àCoffee€Criminal›Ìà àà àà àà àà àœ(›Ìà àà àà àà àà àœ(€€à àHon.€Gerald€L.€Ewell,€Sr.,›ÌœÙ€!ÙßR€?@>A1-j|6ô‘` à. `€€@ÿRß›WAYNE€LEE€YEARGAN,à àà àà àœ(à àJudge›€€à àÌà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Defendant„Appellant.à àà àà àœ(à àNo.€01S01„9604„CC„00080›ÌÌòòÔ€;&ÔÌÌÌFor€Plaintiff„Appelleeóó:à àà àœà àà à›à àòòFor€Defendant„Appellantóó:ÌÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà àà àà àà àœà àDonald›€E.€Dawsonà àÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àà àœà àBruce,›€Weathers,€Corley,ÌNashville,€Tennesseeà àà àœà àà à›à àDughman€and€LyleÌà àà àà àà àà àœà àNashville,›€TennesseeÌDaryl€J.€BrandÌSenior€CounselÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌClinton€J.€MorganÌCounsel€for€the€StateÌNashville,€Nashville,€TennesseeÌÌKimbra€R.€SpannÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌC.€Michael€LayneÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌManchester,€TennesseeÌÌKenneth€SheltonÌAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌManchester,€TennesseeÔ€;XÔÌÌ̛̜à@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌœÌÌÌÑ ` ÑÑ , Ñ›à àà àÌAFFIRMEDà àà àà àà àà àà àœ›à àà àDROWOTA,€J.ÌÓÓÓ` Ü‚Xh—XÓà àThe€certified€question€of€lawœ× ƒA ××  ×›€presented€in€this€appeal€is€whether€the€stateÏor€federal€constitutional€right€to€be€free€from€unreasonable€seizures€was€violatedÏwhen€the€motor€vehicle€which€the€defendant€was€operating€was€stopped€by€a€cityÏpolice€officer,€who€six€months€earlier,€had€arrested€the€defendant€for€drivingÏunder€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€and€had€been€present€in€court€when€theÏdefendant€was€convicted€of€that€offense€and€his€driverððs€license€revoked€for€oneÍyear.€€ÌÓ ` Ü‚X.h—X ÓÌà àThe€trial€court€denied€the€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress€the€evidence€ofÏthe€defendantððs€intoxication€obtained€during€the€stop,€and€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€decision.€€Because€we€conclude€that€theÏofficerððs€decision€to€stop€was€based€upon€reasonable€suspicion€supported€byÏspecific€and€articulable€facts€that€the€defendant€was€driving€on€a€revoked€license,Ïthe€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€is€affirmed.× ƒB ××  ×ÌÌà@ àò òòòFACTUAL€BACKGROUNDóóó óÌà àOn€Thursday,€January€28,€1993,€at€approximately€2:20€p.m.,€TullahomaÏPolice€Officer€Jason€Ferrell€observed€the€defendant,€Wayne€Lee€Yeargan,€drivingÏa€pickup€truck€on€a€public€street€in€Tullahoma.€€Previously,€Officer€Ferrell€hadÏarrested€the€defendant€for€driving€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€and€hadÏbeen€present€in€the€general€sessions€court€approximately€six€months€earlier,€onÍJuly2,€1992,€when€the€defendant€pleaded€guilty€to€the€offense€and€had€hisÏdriverððs€license€revoked€for€one€year€from€the€date€of€the€judgment.× ƒC ××  ×ÌÌà àWhen€the€officer€began€following€the€defendant's€truck,€Yeargan,Ïaccording€to€the€officer's€testimony,€"sped€up€some,€€he€wasn't€going€at€a€highÏrate€of€speed,€but€he€accelerated."€€In€the€officer's€view,€Yeargan€"attempted€toÏput€some€traffic€between€us."€€The€defendant€then€drove€into€the€parking€lot€ofÏRubyððs€Lounge,€a€local€bar.€€The€officer€followed€and€put€on€his€blue€lights.€€TheÏdefendant€parked€and€got€out€of€his€truck.€€The€officer€asked€to€see€his€driverððsÏlicense.€€Yeargan€produced€a€restricted€license€issued€pursuant€to€a€court€orderÏwhich€permitted€him€to€drive€ð ðin€Coffee€County€only€as€necessary€to€complete€jobÏtasksðð€between€the€hours€of€7€a.m.€and€7€p.m.€€The€defendantððs€employment€wasÏlisted€on€the€order€granting€the€restricted€license€as€farming€and€"rental€propertyÏowner."€€The€officer€testified€that€when€he€asked€Yeargan€why€he€had€driven€toÏthe€bar,€the€defendant€replied€that€he€ð ðhad€come€to€the€bar€to€meet€a€guy€about€aÍcow.ðð€€Based€on€his€observations€and€a€field€sobriety€test,€the€officer€concludedÏthat€the€defendant€was€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€and€arrested€him€forÏdriving€under€the€influence€and€driving€on€a€revoked€license.€€€Ñ€DÑÇà àThe€defendant€moved€to€suppress€the€evidence€obtained€as€a€result€of€theÏstop,€arguing€that€the€officer€did€not€have€reasonable€suspicion€to€believe€a€crimeÏhad€been€committed€when€he€made€the€stop€because€the€officer€knew€of€theÏprocedure€for€obtaining€a€restricted€license€and€had€no€reason€to€believe€that€theÏdefendant€was€operating€outside€the€scope€of€his€driving€privilege.€€Testifying€atÏthe€suppression€hearing,€the€police€officer€acknowledged€that€he€was€aware€ofÏthe€availability€of€restricted€licenses€for€driving€offenders.€€However,€the€officerÏtestified€it€would€have€taken€about€15€minutes€for€the€police€radio€operator€toÏdetermine€the€status€of€the€defendantððs€license€before€the€stop.ÌÌà àUpon€consideration€of€the€proof,€the€trial€court€denied€the€defendantððsÏmotion€to€suppress.€€Thereafter,€the€defendant€pleaded€guilty€to€driving€under€theÏinfluence€of€an€intoxicant,€second€offense,× ƒE ××  ×€and€driving€a€motor€vehicle€with€aÏrevoked€driverððs€license,× ƒF ××  ×€but€reserved€the€right€to€appeal€a€certified€question€ofÍlaw€challenging€the€constitutionalityœ× ƒG ××  ×›€of€the€traffic€stop€leading€to€his€arrest€andÏsubsequent€convictions.€€The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððsÏdenial€of€the€motion€to€suppress,€finding€that€"a€prudent€officer€could€reasonablyÏhave€believed€that€the€appellant€was€driving€on€a€revoked€license"€and€holdingÏthat€the€officer€had€"probable€cause€to€conduct€an€investigative€stop."€€In€reachingÏthat€conclusion,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€relied€upon€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.Ï1,€88€S.Ct.€1868,€20€L.Ed.2d€889€(1968)€and€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€293Ï(Tenn.€1992).€€€Thereafter,€we€granted€the€defendant€permission€to€appeal€andÏfor€the€reasons€that€follow,€now€affirm€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€and€Court€ofÏCriminal€Appeals.ÌÌà@ àòòò òSTANDARD€OF€REVIEWó óóóà@ àÌà àThis€Court€recently€clarified€the€standard€of€review€under€which€a€trialÍcourtððs€findings€of€fact€on€suppression€issues€are€to€be€reviewed:ÌÓÓà8 àà àQuestions€of€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€andÏvalue€of€the€evidence,€and€resolution€of€conflicts€in€the€evidence€areÏmatters€entrusted€to€the€trial€judge€as€the€trier€of€fact.€€The€partyÏprevailing€in€the€trial€court€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€viewÏof€the€evidence€adduced€at€the€suppression€hearing€as€well€as€allÏreasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€that€may€be€drawn€from€thatÏevidence.€€So€long€as€the€greater€weight€of€the€evidence€supportsÏthe€trial€courtððs€findings,€those€findings€shall€be€upheld.€€In€otherÏwords,€a€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€in€a€suppression€hearing€will€beÏupheld€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€otherwise.€€We€alsoÏnote€that€this€standard€of€review€is€consistent€with€Tenn.€R.€œApp›.€P.Ï13(d),€which€provides€that€in€civil€cases,€findings€of€fact€by€a€trialÏcourt€are€presumed€correct€ð ðunless€the€preponderance€of€theÏevidence€is€otherwise.ðð€€Hereafter,€the€proper€standard€to€beÏapplied€in€reviewing€suppression€issues€is€the€ð ðpreponderance€ofÏthe€evidenceðð€standard.ÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18,€23€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€application€of€the€law€to€theÏfacts€found€by€the€trial€court,€however,€is€a€question€of€law€which€this€CourtÏreviews€de€novo.€€òòBeare€Co.€v.€Tennessee€Dept.€of€Revenueóó,€858€S.W.2d€906,Ï907€(Tenn.€1993).€€We€apply€these€standards€to€resolve€the€issue€in€this€appeal.ÌÌò òà@ àòòREASONABLE€SUSPICIONóóó óÌà àIn€this€Court,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€investigatory€stop€wasÏunconstitutional€because€the€officer€did€not€have€reasonable€suspicion,Ïsupported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,€to€believe€that€the€defendant€wasÏviolating€the€law.€€In€support€of€his€claim,€the€defendant€argues€that€even€thoughÏthe€officer€knew€the€defendantððs€license€had€been€revoked€six€months€earlier,€theÏofficer€was€also€aware€of€the€availability€of€restricted€licenses,€and€therefore,€hadÏno€reason€to€believe€the€defendant€was€violating€the€law€by€operating€anÏautomobile.€€The€State€responds€that€given€the€totality€of€the€information€knownÏto€the€officer,€the€stop€was€based€upon€reasonable€suspicion.€€The€State€alsoÏmaintains€that€the€officer€was€not€required€to€check€the€status€of€the€defendantððsÏlicense€before€initiating€the€stop.ÌÌà àWe€begin€our€analysis€of€this€issue€with€the€text€of€the€Fourth€Amendment€œ× ƒH ××  ×›Ïto€the€United€States€Constitution€which€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àò òà8 àUnreasonable€searches€and€seizures.€„€ó óTheÍright€of€the€people€to€be€secure€in€their€persons,Ïhouses,€papers,€and€effects,€against€unreasonableÏsearches€and€seizures,€shall€not€be€violated,€and€noÏwarrants€shall€issue,€but€upon€probable€cause,Ïsupported€by€oath€or€affirmation,€and€particularly€Ïdescribing€the€place€to€be€searched,€and€the€personsÏor€things€to€be€seized.ÌÓÓÌSimilarly,€Article€1,€Section€7€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€guaranteesÌÓÓà8 àà8 àthat€the€people€shall€be€secure€in€their€persons,Ïhouses,€papers€and€possessions,€from€unreasonableÏsearches€and€seizures;€and€that€general€warrants,Ïwhereby€an€officer€may€be€commanded€to€searchÏsuspected€places,€without€evidence€of€the€factÏcommitted,€or€to€seize€any€person€or€persons€notÏnamed,€whose€offences€are€not€particularly€describedÏand€supported€by€evidence,€are€dangerous€to€libertyÏand€ought€not€to€be€granted.ÌÓÓÌThe€purpose€of€the€prohibition€against€unreasonable€searches€and€seizuresÏunder€the€Fourth€Amendment€is€to€ð ðsafeguard€the€privacy€and€security€ofÏindividuals€against€arbitrary€invasions€of€government€officials.ðð€€òòCamara€v.ÏMunicipal€Courtóó,€387€U.S.€523,€528,€87€S.Ct.€1727,€1730,€18€L.Ed.2d€930€(1967).€Ïð ð[A]rticle€I,€section€7€is€identical€in€intent€and€purpose€with€the€FourthÍAmendment.ðð€€òòState€v.€Downeyóó,€945€S.W.2d€102,€106€(Tenn.€1997),€quotingÏòòSneed€v.€Stateóó,€221€Tenn.€6,€13,€423€S.W.2d€857,€860€(1968).ÌÌà àConsequently,€under€both€the€federal€and€state€constitutions,€aÏwarrantless€search€or€seizure€is€presumed€unreasonable,€and€evidenceÏdiscovered€as€a€result€thereof€is€subject€to€suppression€unless€the€StateÏdemonstrates€that€the€search€or€seizure€was€conducted€pursuant€to€one€of€theÏnarrowly€defined€exceptions€to€the€warrant€requirement.€€òòCoolidge€v.€NewÏHampshireóó,€403€U.S.€443,€454„55,€91€S.Ct.€2022,€2032,€29€L.Ed.2d€564€(1971);ÏòòState€v.€Bartramóó,€925€S.W.2d€227,€229„30€(Tenn.€1996).€ÌÌà àThough€it€was€a€temporary€detention€for€a€limited€purpose,€the€stop€of€theÏdefendantððs€vehicle€in€this€case,€without€question,€constitutes€a€seizure€andÏimplicates€the€protection€of€both€the€state€and€federal€constitutions.€€€òòWhren€v.ÏUnited€Statesóó,€___€U.S.€____,___,€116€S.Ct.€1769,€1772,€___€L.Ed.2d€___Ï(1996);€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€440€U.S.€648,€654,€99€S.Ct.€1391,€1396,€59€L.Ed.2dÍ660€(1979);€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Hensleyóó,€469€U.S.€221,€226,€105€S.Ct.Ï675,€679,€83€L.Ed.2d€604€(1985);€òòColorado€v.€Bannisteróó,€449€U.S.€œ1,€4›€n.€3,€101ÏS.Ct.€42,€44€n.€3,€66€L.Ed.2d€1€(1980)€(When€an€officer€turns€on€his€blue€lights,Ïhe€or€she€has€clearly€initiated€a€stop).€€Because€it€was€not€conducted€pursuant€toÏa€warrant,€the€investigatory€stop€was€presumptively€unreasonable.€€However,€theÏlower€courts€appropriately€denied€the€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress€becauseÏthe€seizure€in€this€case€was€conducted€pursuant€to€a€narrowly€defined€exceptionÏto€the€warrant€requirement.ÌÌà àIn€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€21,€88€S.Ct.€1868,€1880,€20€L.Ed.2d€œ889Í(1968),›€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€applied€a€balancing€testœ× ƒI ××  ×›€to€determineÏœwhether›€the€law€enforcement€practice€of€ð ðstop€and€friskðð€violated€the€proscriptionsÏÑ  Ñœof›€the€Fourth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution.€€In€that€case,€a€policeÏofficer€became€suspicious€of€two€men€who€separately€and€repeatedly€walked€upÏand€down€a€street€peering€into€a€store€window.€After€each€trek,€the€men€talked€toÏa€third€man€up€the€street.€€The€officer,€after€observing€this€conduct€for€a€short€time,Ïfollowed€the€suspects,€stopped€and€frisked€them,€and€discovered€that€two€of€themÏwere€carrying€pistols.€€Charged€with€the€crime€of€carrying€a€concealed€weapon,ÏTerry€moved€to€suppress€the€evidence€on€the€basis€that€the€stop€and€frisk€wasÏunconstitutional.€€Balancing€the€intrusion€on€the€individualððs€Fourth€AmendmentÏprivacy€interests€against€the€promotion€of€legitimate€governmental€interests,€theÍCourt€in€òòTerryóó€determined€that€the€law€enforcement€òòpracticeóó€of€a€briefÏinvestigatory€stop€is€constitutionally€permissible€if€the€officer€has€a€reasonableÏsuspicion,€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,€that€a€criminal€offense€hasÏbeen€or€œis€about›€to€be€committed.œ× ƒJ ××  ×›€€òòIdóó.ÌÑ ` ќ̛à àEleven€years€later€in€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€the€Court€concluded€that€theÏsame€standard€applied€in€the€context€of€investigatory€automobile€stops.€€In€thatÏcase€a€police€officer€on€a€ð ðroving€patrolðð€aimed€at€detecting€unlicensed€driversÏmade€a€suspicionless€stop€of€an€automobile.€€The€purpose€of€the€stop€was€toÏcheck€the€driverððs€license€and€registration.€€The€officer€stopped€ProuseððsÏautomobile€because€he€ð ðsaw€the€car€in€the€area€and€wasnððt€answering€anyÏcomplaints.€.€.€.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€440€U.S.€at€651,€99€S.Ct.€at€1394.€€When€the€officerÏapproached€the€car,€he€smelled€marijuana€and€thereafter€seized€the€marijuana,Ïwhich€was€in€plain€view€on€the€floor€of€the€car.€€In€concluding€that€theÏsuspicionless,€random€stop€was€unconstitutional,€the€òòProuseóó€court€described€theÏbalancing€test€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€essential€purpose€of€the€proscriptions€in€theÏFourth€Amendment€is€to€impose€a€standard€ofÏððreasonablenessðð€upon€the€exercise€of€discretion€byÏgovernment€officials,€including€law€enforcementÏagents,€in€order€to€safeguard€the€privacy€and€securityÏof€individuals€against€arbitrary€invasions.€€Thus,€theÏpermissibility€of€a€particular€law€enforcement€òòpracticeóóÏis€judged€by€balancing€its€intrusion€on€the€individualððsÏFourth€Amendment€interest€against€its€promotion€ofÏlegitimate€governmental€interests.€€Implemented€inÍthis€manner,€the€reasonableness€standard€usuallyÏrequires,€at€a€minimum,€that€the€facts€upon€which€anÏintrusion€is€based€be€capable€of€measurementÏagainst€an€objective€standard,€whether€this€beÏprobable€cause€or€a€less€stringent€test.€€[footnoteÏciting€Terry]€€In€those€situations€in€which€the€balanceÏof€interests€precludes€insistence€upon€some€quantumÏof€individualized€suspicion,€other€safeguards€areÏgenerally€relied€upon€to€assure€that€the€individualððsÏreasonable€expectation€of€privacy€is€not€subject€to€theÏdiscretion€of€the€official€in€the€field.ÌÓÓÌòòIdóó.,€440€U.S.€at€653„54,€99€S.Ct.€at€1396€(emphasis€added)(internal€citations€andÏquotations€omitted).€€Utilizing€that€test,€the€òòProuseóó€Court€held€ð ðthat€òòexceptóó€in€thoseÏsituations€in€which€there€is€òòat€least€articulable€and€reasonable€suspicion€that€aÏmotorist€is€unlicensedóó€or€that€an€automobile€is€not€registered,€or€that€either€theÏvehicle€or€an€occupant€is€otherwise€subject€to€seizure€for€violation€of€law,Ïstopping€an€automobile€and€detaining€the€driver€in€order€to€check€his€license€andÏthe€registration€of€the€automobile€are€unreasonable€under€the€FourthÏAmendment.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€440€U.S.€at€663,€99€S.Ct.€at€1401€(emphasis€added).€€òòProuseóó,Ïtherefore,€stands€for€the€proposition€that€investigatory€stops€based€uponÏreasonable€suspicion€that€a€driver€is€unlicensed€are€constitutionallyÍpermissible.œ× ƒK ××  ×›€€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòChandler€v.€Milleróó,€__€U.S.€__,€117€S.Ct.€1295,€1298,Ï137€L.Ed.2d€513€(1997)(The€Fourth€Amendmentððs€prohibition€againstÏð ðunreasonable€searches€and€seizures€ð ðgenerally€bars€officials€from€undertakingÏa€search€or€seizure€absent€individualized€suspicion.ðð);€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€€òòGriffin€v.€Stateóó,Ï604€S.W.2d€40,€42€(Tenn.€1980);€òòState€v.€McCulloughóó,€906€S.W.2d€3€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1995).ÌÌà àLikewise,€in€òòWatkinsóó,€this€Court€upheld€the€constitutionality€of€anÏinvestigatory€stop€of€a€motor€vehicle€and€the€ensuing€search,€where€the€stop€wasÏbased€upon€reasonable€suspicion.€€òòId.óó,€827€S.W.2d€at€294.€€In€that€case,€theÏofficer€initiating€the€stop€had€personal€knowledge€that€a€capias€had€been€issuedÍfor€the€defendantððs€arrest.€€Other€officers€also€had€informed€the€arresting€officersÏthat€the€defendant€often€drove€a€black€Cadillac€inscribed€with€the€words,€ð ðTheÏDuke.ðð€€When€the€officers€observed€a€car€matching€that€description,€they€ð ðdecidedÏto€stop€the€vehicle€and€investigate€the€identity€of€the€driver.ðð€òòIdóó.,€827€S.W.2d€atÏ295.€€After€stopping€the€car,€asking€for€a€driverððs€license,€and€learning€that€theÏdefendant€had€none,€the€officers€called€in€by€radio€to€verify€the€continuingÏviability€of€the€capias.€€òòIdóó.€€The€capias€was€verified€and€the€officers€arrested€theÏdefendant€and€searched€the€vehicle.€€Considering€the€totality€of€theÏcircumstances€this€Court€refused€to€suppress€the€evidence€discovered€during€theÏsearch,€holding€that€the€initial€stop€was€constitutionally€valid€because€it€wasÏbased€upon€reasonable€suspicion,€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,Ïð ðthat€the€defendant€was€the€driver€of€the€vehicle€and€that€he€was€the€personÏwanted€on€the€outstanding€capias.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€827€S.W.2d€at€295.ÌÌà àIn€so€holding,€we€observed€that€a€court€must€consider€the€totality€of€theÏcircumstances€when€evaluating€whether€a€police€officerððs€reasonable€suspicionÍis€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts.€òòIdóó.,€827€S.W.2d€at€294;€òòUnited€StateÏv.€Cortezóó,€449€U.S.€411,€417,€101€S.Ct.€690,€695,€66€L.Ed.2d€621€(1981).ÏCircumstances€relevant€to€that€evaluation€include,€but€are€not€limited€to,€theÏofficerððs€personal€objective€observations,€information€obtained€from€other€policeÏofficers€or€agencies,€information€obtained€from€citizens,€and€the€pattern€ofÏoperation€of€certain€offenders.€A€court€must€also€consider€the€rational€inferencesÏand€deductions€that€a€trained€officer€may€draw€from€the€facts€and€circumstancesÏknown€to€him.€òòWatkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€at€294;€€òòCortezóó,€449€U.S.€at€418,€101€S.Ct.€atÏ695;€òòTerryóó,€392€U.S.€at€21,€88€S.Ct.€at€1880.€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThe€officer,€of€course,€must€be€able€to€articulateÏsomething€more€than€an€inchoate€andÏunparticularized€suspicion€or€hunch.€€The€FourthÏAmendment€requires€some€minimal€level€of€objectiveÏjustification€for€making€the€stop.€€That€level€ofÏsuspicion€is€considerably€less€than€proof€ofÏwrongdoing€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€WeÏhave€held€that€probable€cause€means€a€fairÏprobability€that€contraband€or€evidence€of€a€crime€willÏbe€found€and€òòthe€level€of€suspicion€required€for€aÏòòTerryóó€stop€is€obviously€less€demanding€than€that€forÏprobable€cause.óóÌÓÓÌòòSokolowóó,€490€U.S.€at€7„8,€109€S.Ct.€at€1585€(emphasis€added)(internal€citationsÏand€quotations€omitted).ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àReasonable€suspicion€is€a€less€demanding€standardÏthan€probable€cause€not€only€in€the€sense€thatÏreasonable€suspicion€can€be€established€withÏinformation€that€is€different€in€quantity€or€content€thanÏthat€required€to€establish€probable€cause,€but€also€inÏthe€sense€that€reasonable€suspicion€can€arise€fromÏinformation€that€is€less€reliable€than€that€required€toÏshow€probable€cause.ÌÓÓÌòòAlabama€v.€Whiteóó,€496€U.S.€325,€330,€110€S.Ct.€2412,€2416,€110€L.Ed.2d€301Ï(1990);€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€29,€32€(Tenn.€1993);€òòCf.óó€òòPeters€v.€New€Yorkóó,Ï392€U.S.€40,€88€S.Ct.€1889,€20€L.Ed.2d€917€(1968)(companion€case€to€òòTerryóó€inÏwhich€the€Court€held€it€was€unnecessary€to€discuss€reasonable€suspicion€sinceÏthe€officer€had€probable€cause€for€the€arrest).€€€ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€availability€of€other€less€intrusive€investigatory€techniques€isÏnot€relevant€to€the€constitutional€validity€of€an€officerððs€decision€to€initiate€theÏinvestigatory€stop,€if€an€investigatory€stop€is€based€upon€specific€and€articulableÍfacts€giving€rise€to€a€reasonable€suspicion.€€Indeed,€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€in€òòSokolowóó€expressly€rejected€the€notion€that€law€enforcement€officials€areÏobligated€to€use€the€least€intrusive€means€to€verify€or€dispel€their€suspicions.€ð ðTheÏreasonableness€of€the€officerððs€decision€to€stop€a€suspect€does€not€turn€on€theÏavailability€of€less€intrusive€investigatory€techniques.ðð€€òòId.óó,€490€U.S.€at€11,€109ÏS.Ct.€at€1581.€œ× ƒL ××  ×›€In€òòWatkinsóó,€this€Court€implicitly€rejected€that€argument€byÏupholding€the€stop€even€though€the€police€officers€did€not€verify€the€capias€untilÏafter€the€automobile€was€stopped€and€the€defendant€identified.ÌÌà àConsidering€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€of€this€case€in€light€of€theÏwell„settled€principles€of€law€set€forth€above,€we€conclude€that€the€officerððsÏdecision€to€initiate€the€investigatory€stop€was€based€upon€reasonable€suspicion,Ïsupported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,€that€the€defendant€was€driving€on€aÏrevoked€license.€€Ñ 4 ÑThe€officer€had€previously€arrested€Yeargan,€so€he€wasÏacquainted€with€the€defendant€and€could€identify€the€defendant€by€sight.€€InÍaddition,€the€officer€had€personal€knowledge€that€Yearganððs€driverððs€license€hadÏbeen€revoked€for€a€period€of€one€year,€and€that€only€six€months€had€passedÏsince€the€revocation.€€When€the€officer€observed€Yeargan€driving€the€automobile,Ïtherefore,€he€had€a€reasonable€suspicion€based€upon€articulable€and€specificÏfacts€that€Yeargan€was€committing€a€criminal€offense,€driving€on€a€revokedÏlicense.€€òòProuseóó,€òòsupraóó;€òòMcCulloughóó,€òòsupraóó;€òòRoberson€v.€Metro.€Govððt€of€NashvilleÏ&€Davidson€Coóó.,€56€Tenn.€App.€729,€412€S.W.2d€902,€905€(Tenn.€App.€1966)Ï(police€officer€who€arrests€a€man€for€drunk€driving€and€testifies€at€trial€against€theÏman€who€was€convicted€and€whose€license€was€revoked€for€one€year,€may€arrestÏhim€when€he€observes€the€man€driving€the€following€day).€€Contrary€to€theÏdefendantððs€assertions,€the€officer€had€no€constitutional€obligation€to€verify€theÏstatus€of€the€defendantððs€license€before€making€the€stop.€€Indeed,€the€availabilityÏof€less€intrusive€investigatory€techniques€does€not€vitiate€the€constitutionalÏvalidity€of€a€stop€which€is€supported€by€reasonable€suspicion.ÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONó óóóÌà àœIn›€his€concurring€opinion€Justice€œReid›€contends€that€the€investigatory€stopÍin€this€case€was€invalid€because€it€was€not€supported€by€exigent€circumstancesÏas€well€as€reasonable€suspicion.€€Rather€than€embarking€on€a€path€fraught€withÏunknown€consequences,€we€adhere€to€the€well„settled€principle€of€law,€that€to€beÏconstitutionally€valid€under€either€the€Fourth€Amendment€or€Article€I,€Section€7,€aÏbrief€investigatory€stop€simply€must€be€based€upon€reasonable€suspicion€whichÏis€supported€by€specific€and€œarticulable›€facts.€€œBecause›€the€investigatory€stop€inÏthis€case€was€based€upon€reasonable€suspicion,€it€was€valid€under€both€theÏfederal€and€state€constitutions.€€Accordingly,€the€lower€courts€properly€refused€toÏsuppress€the€evidence€of€intoxication€derived€from€field€sobriety€tests€and€theÏofficerððs€personal€observation€of€the€defendant€after€the€stop.€€The€judgment€ofÏthe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€upholding€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€defendantððsÏmotion€to€suppress€is€affirmed.€ÌÌ€€ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA€III,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJUSTICEÌÓÓÌÌò òÓÓConcur:ó óÌAnderson,€C.J.,ÌBirch,€J,€and€OððBrien,€Sp.J..ÌÓÓÌÓÓœò òSeparate€Opinion€Concurring›€in€œResultsó ó€›ÌReid,€J.€€€€€€ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœ