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B]" A©z"˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX(Ó­$¡¡Ñ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€XXXXÔÑ7€.íXXdðXXdð7Ñ EEEEEÓ€·‚^!3|xLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5HRƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d d$$$$7Border 1dd -.&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ›Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òMarchÏ14,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h%%%%'ÿÿdxdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'ÈÈÈÈdxd -‚ƒCþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd-.:›&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÝ  Ýò òÓ  Ó›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌKNOXVILLE,€DECEMBER€1996€SESSIONÌÓ  Ó̜ـ ÙßR€'(&A1-j|ï©` à. `€€@ÿRß›ÌÌÌÌÌó óÌDAVID€K.€BURNETTE,à àà àà à)à àKNOX€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appelleeà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌTHE€TRAVELERS€INSURANCEà àà à)à àHON.€FREDERICK€D.€McDONALDÌCOMPANY,à àà àà àà àà à)à àChancellorÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àœDefendantà àà à›à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìandà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌLARRY€BRINTON,€JR.,€DIRECTORà à)à àNO.€03S01„9607„CH„00074ÌSECOND€INJURY€FUNDà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellantà àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€the€Appellant:à àà àà àà àFor€the€Appellee:ÌÌóóSandra€E.€Keithà àà àà àà àRichard€C.€MayÌOffice€of€Attorney€Generalà àà àà àWelchel,€May€&€DanielÌ1510€Parkway€Towersà àà àà àP.€O.€Box€11407Ì404€James€Robertson€Pkwy.à àà àKnoxville,€TN€37939„1407ÌNashville,€TN€37243„0499ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòÓ  ÓMEMORANDUM€OPINIONÌÌMembers€of€Panel:ÌÌó óóóE.€Riley€Anderson,€JusticeÌRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeÌJoe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌAFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIED€IN€PART;ÌREVERSED€IN€PART€ANDÌREMANDEDà àà àà àà àà àà àà àTHAYER,€Special€JudgeÌÌÓÓà àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€CourtÏof€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€Ìà àThis€appeal€has€resulted€from€a€finding€by€the€trial€court€that€plaintiff,€David€K.ÏBurnette,€was€entitled€to€100€percent€permanent€disability€benefits€as€a€result€of€hisÏinjury€on€December€18,€1994.€€Since€he€had€a€prior€award€of€disability,€the€courtÏapportioned€the€award€by€directing€his€employer,€Target€Stores,€to€pay€15€percentÏand€the€Stateððs€Second€Injury€Fund€to€pay€the€remaining€85€percent.Ìà àThe€State€has€appealed€insisting€the€evidence€is€not€sufficient€to€support€aÏ100€percent€disability€award€and€that€the€apportionment€was€not€proper€under€òòTenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ððóó€50„6„208.Ìà àWe€agree€with€this€contention€and€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€as€to€the€extentÏof€permanent€disability€is€modified€as€hereinafter€indicated.Ìà àEmployee€Burnette€was€37€years€of€age€and€dropped€out€of€school€in€theÍ11th€grade.€€He€later€obtained€a€G.E.D.€certificate€and€worked€as€a€carpenter€in€theÏconstruction€industry€for€about€thirteen€years.€€In€1988,€while€working€in€California,Ïhe€sustained€work„related€injuries€which€resulted€in€an€award€of€workersððÏcompensation€benefits€of€30€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€These€injuries€wereÏtwo€herniated€disks€in€his€neck€and€two€herniated€disks€in€his€low€back.€€AfterÏrecovering€from€surgical€procedures,€he€moved€to€Tennessee€and€worked€for€someÏperiod€of€time€with€two€different€fast€food€businesses.€€He€was€employed€as€anÏassistant€manager€œat›€each€œcompany.€€›Ìà àIn€September,€1992,€he€began€working€at€Target€Stores€testifying€he€was€stillÏhaving€pain€from€his€injuries€and€that€he€was€still€taking€pain€medication.€€WhileÏworking€at€Target,€he€attempted€to€further€his€education€by€attending€classes€atÏPellissippi€State.€€He€did€this€for€several€years,€but€had€transferred€to€the€UniversityÏof€Tennessee€by€the€time€the€case€was€heard€in€the€trial€court.€€His€goal€was€toÏobtain€a€degree€in€special€education€and€become€a€special€education€teacher.€€TheÏrecord€is€not€clear€as€to€his€status€in€this€endeavor€but€he€said€he€was€still€takingÏbasic€courses€and€had€not€been€accepted€in€the€College€of€Education.Ìà àOn€the€day€in€question,€he€was€pulling€a€large€box€of€merchandise€off€a€shelfÏœwhich€›was€over€his€head.€€As€he€pulled€and€turned,€he€felt€a€pain€in€his€back.€€HeÏtold€the€trial€court€that€his€condition€from€the€prior€injuries€had€improved€to€such€anÏextent,€he€had€stopped€taking€medication€several€months€before€the€incident€atÏTarget.€€He€said€he€now€had€pain€again€in€his€neck€and€back€as€a€result€of€lastÏinjury.Ìà àThe€medical€testimony€consisted€of€the€deposition€from€Dr.€Gilbert€L.€HydeÍand€a€medical€report€of€Dr.€Robert€E.€Finelli.Ìà àDr.€Hyde,€an€orthopaedic€surgeon,€testified€the€event€of€December€18,€1994,Ïaggravated€his€prior€injuries€and€condition;€he€found€plaintiff€had€a€24€percentÏimpairment€to€his€neck€of€which€19€percent€was€due€to€the€prior€injury€and€5€percentÏwas€due€to€the€last€injury;€that€plaintiff€had€a€21€percent€impairment€to€his€low€backÏof€which€16€percent€was€due€to€the€prior€injury€and€5€percent€was€due€to€the€lastÏinjury.€€Thus,€Dr.€Hyde€was€of€the€opinion€his€total€medical€impairment€was€45Ïpercent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€but€only€ten€percent€of€the€impairment€was€related€toÏthe€accident€in€question.€€He€also€testified€that€plaintiff€could€return€to€work€subjectÏto€certain€restrictions€on€lifting€and€he€should€avoid€repetitive€bending,€twisting€andÏstooping€activities.Ìà àDr.€Finelli€did€not€testify€but€œsome›€of€his€conclusions€are€contained€in€aÏmedical€report€filed€in€evidence.€€This€report€was€not€a€detailed€report€from€hisÏmedical€records€as€is€normally€observed€in€cases€of€this€nature€but€was€a€copy€of€aÏform€report€for€reporting€industrial€injuries€to€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Labor.€€ItÏindicated€he€evaluated€plaintiff€on€August€23,€1995,€at€the€request€of€the€defendantÏinsurance€company;€that€he€found€an€eight€percent€impairment€to€his€neck€and€backÏas€a€result€of€a€CT€scan€and€other€tests€and€that€plaintiff€should€be€subject€toÏrestrictions€in€lifting,€pushing,€standing€and€sitting.Ìà àDr.€Norman€E.€Hankins,€a€vocational€assessment€consultant,€testified€byÏdeposition.€€He€felt€plaintiff€could€do€simple€clerical€work€from€his€educationalÏbackground€but€found€the€restrictions€imposed€by€the€two€physicians€eliminated€himÏfrom€most€jobs.€€He€said€he€could€probably€do€part„time€work€but€he€was€not€awareÍof€many€jobs€in€the€labor€market€of€this€nature.€€He€gave€a€vocational€assessment€ofÏ100€percent€vocational€disability.Ìà àOur€review€of€the€case€is€òòde€novoóó€on€the€record€of€the€trial€courtÏaccompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact€unless€weÏfind€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€òòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€50„6„225(e)(2).Ìà àWe€are€required€under€this€review€to€examine€in€depth€a€trial€courtððs€factualÏfindings€and€conclusions€and€we€are€not€bound€by€such€findings€but€must€conductÏan€independent€examination€to€determine€where€the€preponderance€of€theÏevidence€lies.€€òòœGalloway›€v.€Memphis€Drum€Service.,€óó822€S.W.2d€584€(Tenn.€1991).Ìà àAn€employee€has€the€burden€of€proving€every€element€of€the€case,€includingÏcausation€and€permanency€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòœTindall›€v.€œWaring›ÏPark€œAssððn›.€óó725€S.W.2d€935,€937€(Tenn.€1987).Ìà àIn€order€to€qualify€for€total€disability€under€our€Workersðð€Compensation€Law,Ïthe€injury€must€totally€incapacitate€the€employee€from€working€at€an€occupationÏwhich€brings€him€an€income.€€òòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€50„6„207(4)(B).Ìà àIn€deciding€whether€an€employee€is€totally€disabled€under€this€definition,€theÏcourts€must€consider€many€factors€such€as€the€employeeððs€age,€education,€workÏexperience,€local€job€opportunities,€etc.,€and€this€is€to€be€examined€in€relation€to€theÏopen€labor€market€and€not€whether€the€employee€is€able€to€return€and€perform€theÏjob€held€at€the€time€of€the€injury.€€òòœOrman›€v.€Williams„œSonoma›,€Inc.,€óó803€S.W.2d€672,Ï678€(Tenn.€1991);€òòClark€v.€National€Union€Fire€œIns›.€Co.,€óó774€S.W.2d€586,€588€(Tenn.Ï1989).Ìà àIn€the€present€case,€we€are€of€the€opinion€the€medical€testimony€must€beÏconstrued€as€recommending€the€employee€may€return€to€the€labor€market€subject€toÏrestrictions€on€certain€activities.€€In€applying€the€statutory€definition€of€whatÏconstitutes€total€disability€in€the€open€labor€market,€we€cannot€conclude€that€plaintiffÏis€totally€disabled.€€Based€on€his€educational€abilities€and€his€work€experience,€weÏbelieve€there€are€jobs€he€could€perform.€€Therefore,€we€find€the€evidence€in€theÏcase€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion€that€100€percent€permanentÏdisability€should€be€awarded.Ìà àAs€to€the€extent€of€his€permanent€disability,€we€note€the€injury€in€questionÏoccurred€after€the€adoption€of€numerous€amendments€to€our€WorkersððÏCompensation€Law€in€1992.€€Thus,€òòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€50„6„241€(which€limits€aÏrecovery€to€either€two€and€one„half€times€the€medical€impairment€or€six€times€theÏmedical€impairment)€has€application.Ìà àThe€record€indicates€plaintiff€returned€to€work€at€an€hourly€œrate€›of€pay€equalÏto€or€greater€than€that€received€prior€to€his€last€injury.€€However,€he€worked€lessÏhours€and€was€not€really€compensated€on€a€weekly€or€monthly€basis€as€prior€to€hisÏinjury.€€After€several€months,€his€work€hours€dropped€significantly€and€eventually€heÏhad€to€stop€work€apparently€because€of€his€condition.€€Therefore,€under€case€lawÏconstruction€of€the€statute,€his€return€to€work€was€not€meaningful€and€subsectionÏ(œa)›(1)€of€the€statute€should€not€be€imposed.€€We€do€determine€the€recovery€shouldÏbe€controlled€by€subsection€(b)€which€imposes€a€cap€of€six€times€the€medicalÏimpairment€rating.€€œIn›€fixing€the€award,€we€accept€the€ten€percent€total€medicalÏimpairment€rating€and€fix€the€permanent€partial€disability€of€60€percent€to€the€bodyÍas€a€whole.€€We€also€note€that€òòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€50„6„242,€which€creates€greaterÏbenefits€under€special€circumstances,€would€not€apply€as€the€employee€in€this€caseÏcould€not€qualify€under€any€of€the€factors€set€out€therein.Ìà àThe€last€question€is€whether€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€any€portionÏof€the€award€of€60€percent€disability.Ìà àSince€plaintiff€received€an€award€of€workersðð€compensation€benefits€for€priorÏinjuries,€we€must€apply€òòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€50„6„208(b)€rather€than€subsection€(a),Ïwhich€was€apparently€applied€in€the€trial€courtððs€order.€€The€language€of€subsectionÏ(b)€requires€the€court€to€combine€the€two€awards€and€if€the€total€exceeds€100Ïpercent,€then€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€benefits€in€excess€of€100€percent.€ÏœIn›€this€case,€the€combination€of€the€30€percent€award€and€the€60€percent€awardÏresults€in€a€total€of€90€percent.€€Thus,€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€not€liable€for€anyÏportion€of€the€award€and€the€action€as€to€it€should€be€dismissed.€€See€òòœBurris›€v.ÏCross€Mountain€Coal€Co.,€óó798€S.W.2d€746€(Tenn.€œ1990).Ìà àThe€judgment€entered€in€the€trial€Ô% € Ôcourt€is€modified€to€award€plaintiff€60Ïpercent€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€for€which€the€defendantÏinsurance€carrier€is€liable;€the€action€apportioning€liability€is€reversed€and€the€caseÏagainst€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€dismissed.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€taxed€toÏplaintiff€and€defendant€insurance€company,€jointly€and€sureties.›ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌœ›Ì________________________________ÌE.€Riley€Anderson,€JusticeÌÌœ›Ì________________________________ÌJoe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€œSpecial›€œJudgeÇÒ  ÒÒ H Òà àà àà àÌà àà àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà à€à à€€€€€€€€€AT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌÌÒ S ÒÒ H ÒDAVID€K.€BURNETTE,€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)€€€€KNOX€CHANCERYÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)€€€€€NO€.124692„1€€€€€€€à à€€€€€€à àÏà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)à à€à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€)Ìvs.€€à àà àà àà àà àà à€)€€€€€€€Hon.€Frederick€D.€McDonald€à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€)€€€€€€€ChancellorÌTHE€TRAVELERS€INSURANCEà àà à€)à àÌCOMPANY,à àà àà àà àà à€)Ìà à€€€€à àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€)à àÌà àDefendantà àà àà àà à€)à à03S01„9607„CH„00074Ìandà àà à€à àà àà àà à€)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€)ÌLARRY€BRINTON,€JR.,€DIRECTORà à€)ÌSECOND€INJURY€FUND.à àà àà à€)Ìà àà àà à€à àà àà à€)Ìà à€Defendant/Appellant.à à€€€€€€€€€€€€)à àà àà àà à€Ô€#îÔÌÌÓffÓà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€òòJUDGMENT€ORDERóóÌà àà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,Ïincluding€the€order€of€referral€to€the€Special€WorkerððÏCompensation€Panel,€and€the€Panelððs€Memorandum€OpinionÏsetting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€which€areÏincorporated€herein€by€reference;Ìà àÌà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€MemorandumÏOpinion€of€the€Panel€should€be€accepted€and€approved€;€andÌÌà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panelððs€findings€of€act€andÏconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€ofÏthe€Panel€is€made€the€Judgment€of€the€Court.ÌÌà àCosts€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€plaintiff,€David€K.€BurnetteÏand€The€Travelers€Insurance€Company€for€which€execution€mayÏissue€if€necessary.€€Ì€03/14/97à àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌÔ€#XÔà à›