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ÔÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔÔ€XÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ 8 ÒÖ€-ÖÑ  ÑÔ&  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÖ€.ÖÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€¼ÔÔ€ÔÞ ÞÌIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌSPECIAL€WORKERS'€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÙ€!ÙßR€120A1-j|^ ` ç `€€@ÿRß(January€23,€1997€Session)ÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓCLARENCE€WAYNE€DUNN,€€€€€€€€€€Ô€,Ô€Ô€¼Ô€€€€€€)€€€€€BEDFORD€CIRCUITÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€XÔ€Ô€¼Ô€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Plaintiff„Appellee,€€€€€€€Ô€,Ô€Ô€ôÔ€Ô€¼Ô€€€€)€€€€€Hon.€Lee€Russell,Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€Ô€€€€€€€€Ô€¼Ô€€€€€Ô€,Ô€Ô€¼Ô€)€€€€€Judge.Ìv.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€ôÔ€Ô€¼Ô€€€€€€Ô€XÔ€Ô€¼Ô€€Ô€Ô€Ô€¼Ô€€€€€)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€ôÔ€Ô€¼Ô€€€€Ô€,Ô€Ô€¼Ô€€€)€€€€€No.€01S01„9606„CV„00121ÌSEQUATCHIE€CONCRETE€SERVICE,€)ÌINC.€and€LIBERTY€MUTUAL€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)ÌINSURANCE€CO.,€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€,Ô€Ô€¼Ô€€€€€)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€,Ô€€€€€€€€Ô€Ô€Ô€¼Ô€Ô€XÔ€Ô€,Ô€Ô€¼Ô€€€€)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Defendants„Appellees,€€€€Ô€„Ô€Ô€¼Ô)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€,Ô€Ô€¼Ô€€€€)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€and€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€,Ô€€Ô€¼Ô€€€€€€€€)ÌRDF€TRANSPORTATION,€INC.€and€€€€€Ô€,Ô€Ô€¼Ô€)ÌLUMBERMEN'S€MUTUAL€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)ÌINSURANCE,€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô€,Ô€Ô€¼Ô€€€€€€€€€€€€€)Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Defendants„Appellants.€€€€)ÌÌòòFor€Appellantsóó:€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òòFor€Appellee,€Clarence€WayneÏDunn:óóÌÌD.€Randall€Mantooth€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€C.€Kelly€WilsonÌLeitner,€Moffitt,€Williams,€Dooley€€€€€€Shelbyville,€TennesseeÌ&€NapolitanÌNashville,€Tennessee€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Thomas€F.€BloomÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Nashville,€TennesseeÌÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òòFor€Appellees,€RDFÏTransportationóóÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òòInc.€and€Lumbermen's€Mutual€Ins.:ÌóóÌÔ'  Ô€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Jerry€R.€HumphreysÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Davies,€Cantrell,€Humphreys€&ÏMcCoyÌÌòòÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€NóóÌÌòòMembers€of€Panelóó:ÌÌAdolpho€A.€Birch,€Jr.,€Chief€Justice,€Supreme€CourtÌRobert€S.€Brandt,€Senior€JudgeÌJoe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓAFFIRMED€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Loser,ÏJudgeÓ ¹ ÓÌòòÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓMEMORANDUM€OPINIONóóÓ rAÓÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓà àà àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€theÏSpecial€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€inÏaccordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€andÏreporting€of€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€The€appellant€isÏseeking€review€of€the€findings€of€the€trial€court€with€respect€to€the€followingÏissues:Ó ¹ ÓÌà0 àà àà à(1)€€Whether€the€employee's€claim€against€it€is€barred€byÏTenn€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„203,€a€one„year€statute€of€limitationsÑ  ÑÑ   ÑÑ  ÑÑ€/ §u` Ñ× ƒ3 ××  ×;Ó {ÀÓÌà0 àà àà à(2)€€Whether€the€claim€should€be€disallowed€for€theÏemployee's€failure€to€give€timely€written€notice€of€his€claim,€asÏrequired€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„201;Ó ¹ ÓÌà0 àà àà à(3)€€Whether€the€appellee€was€an€employee€of€the€RDF€atÏthe€time€of€the€injury;Ìà0 àà àà à(4)€€Whether€the€award€of€permanent€partial€disabilityÏbenefits€is€excessive;€andÌà0 àà àà à(5)€€Whether€the€trial€judge€abused€his€discretion€byÏcommuting€permanent€partial€disability€benefits€to€a€single€lump€sum.ÌThe€employee€contends€the€appeal€is€frivolous.€€As€discussed€below,€theÏpanel€has€concluded€the€judgment€should€be€affirmed.Ó {ÀÓÌà àà àThe€employee€or€claimant,€Dunn,€is€thirty„eight€years€old€andÏhas€an€eighth€grade€education.€€He€has€a€commercial€driver's€license€and€hasÏworked€as€a€truck€driver€for€some€ten€years.€€He€gradually€developed€aÏruptured€disk€in€his€lower€back€while€driving€a€truck€owned€by€theÏemployer,€RDF€Transportation,€Inc.€€After€back€surgery,€he€returnedÏbriefly€to€work€for€the€appellant€but€resigned€because€the€work€exceeded€hisÏmedical€limitations.Ó ¹ ÓÌà àà àAs€to€issues€(1)€through€(4),€this€appeal€turns€on€factualÏdeterminations.€€Appellate€review€is€therefore€de€novo€upon€the€record€ofÏthe€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€correctness,€unless€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„225(e)(2).€€This€tribunal€is€required€to€conduct€an€independent€examinationÏof€the€record€to€determine€where€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€lies.€ÏòòWingert€v.€Government€of€Sumner€Countyóó,€908€€S.W.2d€€921€(Tenn.€1995).Ìà àà àWhere€the€trial€judge€has€seen€and€heard€the€witnesses,Ïespecially€if€issues€of€credibility€and€weight€to€be€given€oral€testimony€areÏinvolved,€considerable€deference€must€be€accorded€those€circumstances€onÏreview.€€òòHumphrey€v.€David€Witherspoon,€Inc.óó,€734€€S.W.2d€€315€(Tenn.Ï1987).€€This€tribunal€is,€however,€as€well€situated€to€gauge€the€weight,Ïworth€and€significance€of€deposition€testimony€as€the€trial€judge.€€òòSeiber€v.ÏGreenbrier€Industries,€Inc.óó,€906€€S.W.2d€€444€(Tenn.€1995).Ó rAÓÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓ(1)ÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓà àà àAn€action€by€an€employee€to€recover€benefits€for€an€accidentalÏinjury,€other€than€an€occupational€disease,€must€be€commenced€within€oneÍyear€after€the€occurrence€of€the€injury.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„224(1).€€However,€the€running€of€the€statute€of€limitations€is€suspended€untilÏby€reasonable€care€and€diligence€it€is€discoverable€and€apparent€that€aÏcompensable€injury€has€been€sustained.€€òòHibner€v.€St.€Paul€Mercury€Ins.€Co.óó,Ï619€€S.W.2d€€109€(Tenn.€1981).Ìà àà àWhere,€as€here,€a€condition€gradually€develops€over€a€period€ofÏtime€resulting€in€a€definite,€work„connected,€unexpected,€fortuitous€injury,Ïit€is€compensable€as€an€injury€by€accident.€€òòBrown€Shoe€Co.€v.€Reedóó,€209€ÏTenn.€€106,€€350€€S.W.2d€€65€(1961).€€The€date€of€injury€for€a€gradualÏinjury€is€the€date€on€which€the€claimant€was€forced€to€quit€work€because€ofÏsevere€pain.€€òòBarker€v.€Home„Crest€Corp.óó,€805€€S.W.2d€€373€(Tenn.€1991).Ìà àà àThe€date€on€which€this€claimant€was€forced€to€quit€workÏbecause€of€severe€pain€was€in€August€of€1993.€€This€action€was€commencedÏless€than€one€year€later€on€June€2,€1994.€€However,€the€named€defendant€wasÏSequatchie,€not€RDF.€€RDF€was€added€by€amendment€on€February€3,€1995,Ïmore€than€one€year€after€the€date€on€which€the€claimant€was€forced€to€quitÏwork€because€of€pain.€€Thus€the€dispositive€question€is€whether€theÏamendment€relates€back€to€some€time€within€a€year€of€that€date.Ìà àà àAn€amendment€naming€a€party€against€whom€a€claim€is€assertedÏrelates€back€to€the€date€of€the€original€pleading€(or€date€of€commencement)Ïif€the€claim€asserted€in€the€amended€pleading€arose€out€of€the€conduct,Ïtransaction€or€occurrence€set€forth€or€attempted€to€be€set€forth€in€theÏoriginal€pleading€and€if,€within€the€period€provided€by€law€for€commencingÏan€action€or€within€120€days€after€commencement€of€the€action,€the€party€toÏbe€brought€in€by€amendment€has€received€such€notice€of€the€institution€ofÏthe€action€that€the€party€will€not€be€prejudiced€in€maintaining€a€defense€onÏthe€merits,€and€if€such€party€knew€or€should€have€known€that,€but€for€aÏmistake€concerning€the€identity€of€the€proper€party,€the€action€would€haveÏbeen€brought€against€the€party.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€15.04.€€Notice€is€theÏcritical€element€involved€in€determining€whether€amendments€to€pleadingsÏrelate€back.€€òòFloyd€v.€Rentropóó,€675€€S.W.2d€€165€(Tenn.€1984).Ìà àà àIn€this€case,€it€is€not€disputed€that€the€claim€set€out€in€theÏamended€complaint€does€arise€out€of€the€occurrence€set€forth€in€the€originalÏcomplaint.€€The€two€defendants,€Sequatchie€and€RDF€are€companionÏcorporations€owned€and€operated€by€the€same€family.€€RDF€leases€trucksÏand€drivers€to€Sequatchie,€which€transports€concrete€blocks€and€bags€ofÏmortar€to€customers.€€Dunn€was€employed€by€Sequatchie€until€about€twoÏyears€before€his€injury,€when€he€became€employed€by€RDF€but€continued€toÏwork€under€a€lease€agreement€for€Sequatchie.€€Both€companies€operate€outÏof€the€same€office,€but€have€different€insurers.€€The€claimant€drove€a€truckÏwith€Sequatchie's€name€on€it.Ìà àà àFrom€those€facts,€we€are€persuaded€that€this€action€would€haveÏbeen€brought€originally€against€RDF€but€for€a€mistake,€by€a€man€with€anÏeighth€grade€education,€concerning€the€identity€of€the€proper€party.€ÏConsequently,€the€critical€element€is€whether€RDF€had€notice€of€the€originalÏcommencement€within€one€year€from€August€of€1993.Ìà àà àThe€original€complaint€and€summons€were€delivered€to€RobertÏReese€Thomas,€Jr.,€who€was€the€president€of€Sequatchie€and€the€secretary„treasurer€of€RDF,€on€June€21,€1994,€less€than€one€year€from€the€date€ofÏinjury€by€almost€two€months.€€Moreover,€Mr.€Thomas€testified€that€he€knewÏthe€claimant€was€an€employee€of€RDF,€not€Sequatchie,€a€fact€which€heÏpromptly€conveyed€to€the€corporate€attorney€for€both€corporations.€€Yet€theÏclaimant€and€his€attorney€were€not€advised€they€had€named€the€wrongÏcorporate€defendant€until€shortly€before€trial.Ìà àà àThus€the€evidence€fails€to€preponderate€against€the€trial€judge'sÏfinding€that€the€amended€pleading€relates€back€to€the€original€one€and€thatÏthe€claim€is€therefore€not€time€barred.€€We€further€find€that€the€appellant€isÏestopped€by€its€own€conduct€from€relying€on€the€statute€of€limitations.€€SeeÏòòHumphreys€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€627€€S.W.2d€€933€(Tenn.€1982).€€The€firstÏissue€is€resolved€in€favor€of€the€claimant.ÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓ(2)ÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓà àà àImmediately€upon€the€occurrence€of€the€injury,€or€as€soonÏthereafter€as€is€reasonable€and€practicable,€an€injured€employee€must,€unlessÏthe€employer€has€actual€knowledge€of€the€accident,€give€written€notice€of€theÏinjury€to€his€employer.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„201.€€Benefits€are€notÏrecoverable€from€the€date€of€the€accident€to€the€giving€of€such€notice€and€noÏbenefits€are€recoverable€unless€such€written€notice€is€given€within€thirtyÏdays€after€the€injurious€occurrence€unless€the€injured€worker€has€aÏreasonable€excuse€for€the€failure€to€give€the€required€notice.€€òòIdóó.Ìà àà àWhether€or€not€the€excuse€offered€by€an€injured€worker€forÏfailure€to€give€timely€written€notice€is€sufficient,€depends€on€the€particularÏfacts€and€circumstances€of€each€case.€€òòA.€C.€Lawrence€Leather€Co.€v.€Brittóó,Ï220€€Tenn.€€444,€€414€€S.W.2d€€830€€(1967).€€The€presence€or€absence€ofÏprejudice€to€the€employer€is€a€proper€consideration.€€òòMcCaleb€v.€SaturnÏCorp.óó,€912€€S.W.2d€€412€(Tenn.€1995).€€Where€the€employer€denies€that€aÏclaimant€has€given€the€required€notice,€the€claimant€has€the€burden€ofÏshowing€that€the€employer€had€actual€knowledge,€or€that€the€employee€hasÏeither€complied€with€the€requirement€or€has€a€reasonable€excuse€for€hisÏfailure€to€do€so,€for€notice€is€an€essential€element€of€his€claim.€€òòAetnaÏCasualty€and€Surety€Company€v.€Longóó,€569€€S.W.2d€€444€(Tenn.€1978).Ìà àà àThe€reasons€for€the€thirty€day€statutory€notice€requirement€areÏ(1)€to€give€the€employer€an€opportunity€to€make€an€investigation€while€theÏfacts€are€accessible,€and€(2)€to€enable€the€employer€to€provide€timely€andÏproper€treatment€for€the€injured€employee.€€òòIdóó.€€In€determining€whether€anÏemployee€has€a€reasonable€excuse€for€failure€to€give€timely€written€notice,Ïcourts€will€consider€the€following€criteria€in€light€of€the€above€reasons€forÏthe€rule:€€(1)€the€employer's€actual€knowledge€of€the€employee's€injury,€(2)Ïlack€of€prejudice€to€the€employer€by€an€excusal€of€the€notice€requirement,Ïand€(3)€the€excuse€or€inability€of€the€employee€to€timely€notify€theÏemployer.€€òòMcCaleb€v.€Saturnóó,€supra.Ìà àà àDelay€in€asserting€a€compensable€claim€is€reasonable€andÏjustified€if€the€employee€has€limited€understanding€of€his€condition€and€hisÏrights€under€the€workers'€compensation€law.€€òòUnderwood€v.€Zurich€Ins.ÏCo.óó,€854€€S.W.2d€€94€(Tenn.€1993).€€It€is€significant€that€written€notice€isÍunnecessary€in€those€situations€where€the€employer€has€actual€knowledge€ofÏthe€injury.€€òòRaines€v.€Shelby€Williams€Industriesóó,€814€€S.W.2d€€346€(Tenn.Ï1992).Ìà àà àBy€the€claimant's€own€testimony,€he€called€his€immediateÏsupervisor€within€a€few€hours€of€his€own€discovery€of€the€nature€of€hisÏinjury€to€give€oral€notice€of€his€condition€and€the€fact€that€it€was€workÏrelated.€€Thus€the€employer€had€actual€knowledge€of€the€accident€and€wasÏnot€prejudiced€by€the€lack€of€timely€written€notice.€€The€record€also€clearlyÏreflects€that€the€claimant€had€limited€understanding€of€his€condition€and€hisÏrights€under€the€workers'€compensation€law.€€The€second€issue€is€resolved€inÏfavor€of€the€claimant.ÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓ(3)ÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓà àà àUnless€expressly€excluded,€every€employee€of€a€coveredÏemployer,€under€an€actual€or€implied€contract€of€hire€or€apprenticeship,€isÏentitled€to€the€benefits€of€the€Tennessee€Workers'€Compensation€Act.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€section€50„6„102(3).€€It€is€undisputed€that€at€the€time€of€hisÏaccident,€the€claimant€was€operating€a€truck€owned€by€RDF€and€wasÏreceiving€wages€from€RDF.€€Additionally,€RDF€has€not€pointed€to€anyÏprovision€in€the€Act€which€expressly€excludes€the€claimant€from€its€benefits.€ÏIt€is€also€undisputed€that€RDF€is€a€covered€employer.Ìà àà àThe€third€issue€is€resolved€in€favor€of€the€claimant.ÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓ(4)ÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓà àà àWhen€an€injured€employee€is€adjudged€to€be€permanentlyÏdisabled,€he€is€entitled€to€benefits€based€on€a€percentage€of€disability.€ÏòòCorcoran€v.€Foster€Auto€GMC,€Inc.óó,€746€€S.W.2d€€452€(Tenn.€1988).€€ForÏinjuries€occurring€after€August€1,€1992,€in€cases€where€an€injured€worker€isÍentitled€to€permanent€partial€disability€benefits€to€the€body€as€a€whole€andÏthe€pre„injury€employer€returns€the€employee€to€employment€at€a€wageÏequal€to€or€greater€than€the€wage€the€employee€was€receiving€at€the€time€ofÏthe€injury,€the€maximum€permanent€partial€disability€award€the€employeeÏmay€receive€is€two€and€one„half€times€the€medical€impairment€rating.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€section€50„6„241(a)(1).Ìà àà àIf€the€offer€of€the€employer€is€not€reasonable€in€light€of€theÏcircumstances€of€the€employee's€physical€disability€to€perform€the€offeredÏemployment,€then€the€offer€of€employment€is€not€meaningful€and€the€injuredÏemployee€may€receive€benefits€up€to€six€times€the€medical€impairment.€ÏòòNewton€v.€Scott€Health€Care€Centeróó,€914€€S.W.2d€€884€(Tenn.€1995).€€OnÏthe€other€hand,€an€employee€will€be€limited€to€disability€benefits€of€not€moreÏthan€two€and€one„half€times€the€medical€impairment€if€his€refusal€to€returnÏto€work€is€unreasonable.€€òòIdóó.€€The€resolution€of€what€is€reasonable€must€restÏon€the€facts€of€each€case€and€be€determined€thereby.€€òòIdóó.Ìà àà àAs€already€noted,€the€claimant€did€return€to€his€pre„injuryÏemployment€but€was€forced€to€quit€because€the€work€exceeded€his€medicalÏlimitations€and€caused€disabling€pain.€€He€has€since€accepted,€for€less€money,Ïwork€as€a€bus€driver€for€the€county€highway€department,€where€his€dutiesÏdo€not€exceed€his€medical€limitations.€€The€panel€finds€therefore€that€theÏevidence€fails€to€preponderate€against€the€trial€judge's€finding€that€the€offerÏof€employment€was€not€meaningful,€that€the€employee's€decision€to€quitÏbecause€of€disabling€pain€was€reasonable,€and€therefore€the€multiplier€of€twoÏand€one„half€times€the€impairment€rating€does€not€apply.Ìà àà àThe€operating€surgeon€estimated€the€claimant's€permanentÏimpairment€at€ten€percent€to€the€whole€body.€€Another€orthopedic€surgeonÏestimated€his€permanent€impairment€at€fifteen€percent€to€the€whole€body.€ÏBoth€physicians€used€appropriate€guidelines€in€making€their€assessments.€ÏOnly€the€non„operating€doctor€prescribed€working€restrictions.Ìà àà àIn€determining€the€extent€of€a€claimant's€permanent€industrialÏdisability,€the€courts€will€consider,€in€addition€to€the€medical€or€anatomicalÍimpairment€rating,€the€claimant's€age,€education,€skills€and€training,€localÏjob€opportunities€and€capacity€to€work€at€types€of€employment€available€inÏthe€claimant's€disabled€condition.€€Tenn€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„241(c).€ÏFrom€our€independent€examination€of€the€record,€particularly€with€respectÏto€the€facts€relevant€to€the€above€factors,€the€panel€finds€the€evidence€fails€toÏpreponderate€against€an€award€of€benefits€based€on€fifty„five€percent€to€theÏbody€as€a€whole.€€The€fourth€issue€is€resolved€in€favor€of€the€claimant.Ìà àà àÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓ(5)ÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓà àà àOrdinarily,€disability€benefits€are€payable€periodically.€ÏHowever,€they€may€be€commuted€to€one€or€more€lump€sum€payments€onÏmotion€of€any€party€subject€to€the€approval€of€the€court.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïsection€50„6„229(a).€€In€determining€whether€to€commute€an€award,€theÏcourts€may€consider€(1)€whether€the€commutation€will€be€in€the€best€interestÏof€the€employee€and€(2)€the€ability€of€the€employee€to€wisely€manage€andÏcontrol€the€award.€€òòHuddleston€v.€Hartford€Accident€and€IndemnityÏCompanyóó,€858€€S.W.2d€€315€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€decision€whether€toÏcommute€to€a€lump€sum€is€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€judge.€€òòBailey€v.ÏColonial€Freight€Systems,€Inc.óó,€836€€S.W.2d€€554€(Tenn.€1992).Ìà àà àBecause€virtually€all€of€the€claimant's€disability€benefits€haveÏaccrued,€the€lump€sum€issue€is€moot.€€Nevertheless,€we€respectfully€declineÏto€make€a€finding,€under€the€circumstances,€that€the€trial€judge€abused€hisÏdiscretion€by€making€the€commutation.Ìà àà àWhen€it€appears€that€an€appeal€in€a€workers'€compensation€caseÏis€frivolous€or€taken€solely€for€delay,€the€reviewing€tribunal€may,€uponÏmotion€of€either€party€or€on€its€own€initiative,€award€damages€against€theÏappellant€and€in€favor€of€the€appellee€without€remand,€for€a€liquidatedÏamount.€€Where,€as€here,€an€appeal€requires€a€careful€review€of€hotlyÏdisputed€issues€of€fact,€this€panel€does€not€consider€the€appeal€to€beÍfrivolous.Ìà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€accordingly€affirmed€in€allÏrespects€and€the€cause€remanded€to€the€Circuit€Court€for€Bedford€CountyÏfor€such€further€proceedings€as€may€be€necessary.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxedÏto€RDF€Transportation,€Inc.€and€Lumbermen's€Mutual€Insurance€Company.Ìà àà àÓ *bÓÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ` ‹XÓ_______________________________Ó ÓÌÓ  Ó€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Joe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€JudgeÌÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌAdolpho€A.€Birch,€Jr.,€Chief€JusticeÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌRobert€S.€Brandt,€JudgeÌÑ€4ÑÇÒ  ÒÒ £ Òòòà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌßJ€15;+'b|ÿ5` ç `€@ÿJßÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌCLARENCE€WAYNE€DUNN,à àà à}à àBEDFORD€CIRCUITÌà àà àà àà àà àà à}à àNo.€6993€BelowÌà àPlaintiff/Appelleeà àà àà à}Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à}à àHon.€Lee€Russell,Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à}à àJudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à}ÌSEQUATCHIE€CONCRETEà àà à}ÌSERVICE,€INC.€and€LIBERTY€à àà à}ÌMUTUAL€INSURANCE€CO.,à àà à}à àNo.€01S01„9606„CV„00121Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à}Ìà àDefendants/Appellees,à àà à}Ìandà àà àà àà àà àà à}Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à}ÌRDF€TRANSPORTATION,€INC.€andà à}ÌLUMBERMENððS€MUTUAL€à àà à}ÌINSURANCE,à àà àà àà à}à àAFFIRMED.à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à}Ìà àDefendants/Appellants.à àà à}ÌÌà@ àJUDGMENT€ORDERÌÌÌÓ€Óà àà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,€including€theÏorder€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€theÏPanel's€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusionsÏof€law,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference.Ìà àà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€Memorandum€OpinionÏof€the€Panel€should€be€accepted€and€approved;€andÌà àà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€isÏmade€the€judgment€of€the€Court.ÌÓ ` ` šXÓà àà àCosts€will€be€paid€by€RDF€Transportation,€Inc.€and€LumbermenððsÏMutual€Insurance€Company,€Principals,€and€Surety€for€which€execution€mayÏissue€if€necessary.ÌÓÓà àà àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€on€May€13,€1997.ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌóóÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ