ÿWPCª …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ 0JH Æ’ ÆX Æ Æä 0Tª 0^þ 0h\ 0rÄ 0|6 0†² 08 1uÈ 0d=U>¡B)ß BDC% AMhU *µß D3í 0D d 0@rv~²vÓ0 AQÆT 0D D/^ B˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ „‡Vˆî‰Ó€•–—š›œ§aö"3|xœ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  ÔLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d d$$$$7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òAugust€18,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó%%%%'ÿÿdxd(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òAugust€18,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€+-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€#¼ÔÑ7€%1XdìdÈ7Ñ›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌ̜ـ€ÙßR€')&A1-j|hú` Å `€€@ÿRß›SPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELó óÌÌÌò òAT€€JACKSONó óÌ(ò òMay€23,€1997€Session)Ì__________________________________________________________________Ó  ÓGARY€KEITH€œHIGGINBOTHAM›,ÌÌà àPlaintiff„€Appellee,ÌÌvs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àChester€Chancery,€No.Ï8867Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHonorable€Joe€C.€MorrisÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNo.€œ02S01›„9611„Ch„00101Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌœGRINNELL›€CORPORATIONÌà àDefendant„€Appellant.ÌÌ____________________________________________________________________ÌÌÌFor€Appellant:à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àFor€Appellee:ÌÌP.€Allen€Phillipsà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àT.€VernerÏSmithÌœWaldrop›€and€Hall,€P.A.à àà àà àà àà àà àJackson,ÏTennesseeÌJackson,€TennesseeÌó óÌÌÌòòò òÓ  ÓÌÌÌMEMORANDUM€OPINIONó óóóÌÌMailed€June€€€€€€€€€€1997ÌÌÌòòÌÌMembers€of€Panel:ÌÌóóJanice€M.€Holder,€Associate€Justice,€Supreme€CourtÌRobert€A.€œLanier›,€Special€JudgeÌDon€R.€Ash,€Special€JudgeÌÌÓ  ÓÌAFFIRMED€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœLanier›,ÏJudgeÌÌòòÓ  ÓÌMEMORANDUM€OPINIONÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  ÓóóÔ€#XÔà àThis€workerððs€compensation€appeal€has€been€€referred€to€the€Special€Workersðð€ÏCompensation€Appeals€Panel€of€€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€with€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏðð€50„6„225€(e)€(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€of€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.Ìà àThe€first€issue€for€this€panel€to€decide€is€whether€or€not€€this€action€is€barred€by€theÏlimitations€contained€within€the€Workersðð€Compensation€Act,€€œT.C.A.›€ðð€50„6„203€and€ðð€50„6„224.€ÏThose€sections€read€as€follows:ÌÓÓà àà à50„6„203.€€Limitation€of€Time.€„€The€right€to€compensation€under€the€Ìà àà àWorkersðð€Compensation€Law€shall€be€forever€barred,€unless€withinÌà àà àone€(1)€year€after€the€accident€resulting€the€injury€or€death€occurredÌà àà àthe€notice€required€by€Section€50„6„202€is€given€the€employer€and€a€Ìà àà àclaim€for€compensation€under€the€provisions€of€this€Chapter€is€filedÌà àà àwith€the€Tribunal€having€jurisdiction€to€hear€and€determine€the€matter;Ìà àà àprovided,€that€if€€within€the€one€(1)€year€period€voluntary€paymentsÌà àà àof€compensation€are€paid€to€the€injured€person€or€the€injured€personððs€Ìà àà àdependents,€an€action€to€recover€any€unpaid€portion€of€the€œcompen›„Ìà àà àsation,€payable€under€this€Chapter,€may€be€€instituted€within€one€(1)Ìà àà àyear€from€the€time€the€employer€shall€cease€making€such€payments,Ìà àà àexcept€in€those€cases€provided€for€by€[the€provisions€on€lump€sum€Ìà àà àsettlements]€.€.€.€ÌÌà àà à50„6„224.€€Limitation€of€Actions.€„€The€time€within€which€the€Ìà àà àfollowing€Acts€shall€be€performed€under€this€chapter€shall€beÌà àà àlimited€to€the€following€periods,€respectively:ÌÌà àà à(1)à àActions€or€proceedings€by€an€injured€employee€to€Ìà àà àdetermine€or€recover€the€compensation,€(1)€year€after€theÌà àà àoccurrence€of€the€injury,€except€as€provided€in€50„6„203€.€.€.€ÌÌÓÓà àThe€ambiguity€created€by€these€two€statutes,€one€of€€which€begins€the€period€of€€limitations€Ïwith€ð ðthe€accident€resulting€in€injury,ðð€and€the€other€of€€which€begins€the€period€with€ð ðtheÏoccurrence€€of€the€injury,ðð€has€been€resolved€somewhat€by€judicial€interpretation.€€Inòò€óóòòImperial€ShirtÏCompany€vs.€Jenkinsóó,€217€Tenn.€602,€299€œS.W.2d›€757€(1966),€€the€Supreme€Court€reconciledÏthe€two€statutes€by€pointing€out€that€œT.C.A.›€ðð€50„6„224€was€enacted€after€the€other€section€and,Ïtherefore,€controls,€so€that€Tennessee€considers€that€the€statute€of€limitations€begins€to€run€from€theÏdate€of€the€ð ðoccurrence€of€the€injury.ðð€€Having€settled€this€question,€one€might€be€forgiven€forÏthinking€that,€at€least€in€cases€where€there€is€a€discrete€incident€resulting€in€pain€and€medicalÏtreatment,€the€period€of€limitations€€would€run€from€the€date€when€such€an€event€occurred.€ÏHowever,€such€is€not€the€case.€€A€number€of€years€ago,€the€Supreme€Court€indicated€approval€ofÏthe€philosophy,€expressed€by€Professor€Arthur€œLarson›,€that€ð ð€€.€.€.€the€claim€period€runs€from€theÏtime€compensable€injury€becomes€apparent€.€.€.€ðð€€the€Court€further€quoted€with€approval€ProfessorÏœLarson›ððs€belief€€that€a€claimantððs€suit€should€not€be€barred€under€circumstances€in€which€theÏclaimant,€ð ðthrough€a€technicality€which€involves€no€fault€of€his€own,€could€never€at€any€time€haveÏfiled€a€valid€claim.ðð€€The€Court€pointed€out€that€the€Workersðð€Compensation€Act€contemplatesÏliberality,€not€only€in€the€admission€of€evidence,€but€also€in€the€inferences€to€be€drawn€therefrom,Ïand€in€borderline€cases€the€Court€will€endeavor€to€carry€out€the€benevolent€object€of€€the€Act€andÏresolve€doubts€in€favor€of€the€claimant.€€òòImperial€Shirt€Company€vs.€Jenkinsóóòò,€supra.€€Ìà àóóApparently€some€confusion€persisted€in€the€cases€for,€€in€1974,€the€Supreme€Court€feltÏcalled€upon€to€further€ð ðclarifyðð€the€matter€by€explaining€€the€event€which€triggers€the€running€of€theÏstatute€ofòò€óó€limitationsòò.€€óóIn€òòReed€vs.€œGenesco›,óó€512€œS.W.2d›€1€(Tenn.€1974),€€the€Court€held€that€theÏstatute€begins€to€run€ð ðwhen€disability€manifests€itself;€disability€being€synonymous€with€injury.ðð€ÍThe€Court€went€on€to€€hold€that€the€period€of€limitations€is€suspended€ð ðuntil€by€reasonable€care€andÏdiligence€it€is€discoverable€and€apparent€that€a€compensable€injury€has€been€sustained.ðð€€Of€course,Ïthis€decision€raised€the€additional€question€of€€what€a€ð ðcompensableðð€€injury€may€be.€€From€aÏreview€of€subsequent€cases,€it€appears€that€a€compensable€injury€is€one€that€requires€more€thanÏmedical€treatment.€€Apparently,€€medical€treatment€furnished€or€paid€for€by€the€employer€is€not€theÏtype€of€€ð ðcompensationðð€to€which€the€Court€is€referring.€€In€the€following€cases,€the€worker€hadÏsufficient€€problems€to€consult€and€be€treated€by€a€physician,€but€this€was€not€sufficient€to€triggerÏthe€running€€of€€the€statute€of€limitations:€òòœHibner›€vs.€St.€Paulóó,€619€œS.W.2d›€109€(Tenn.€1981);òò€€ÏJones€vs.€Homeóó,€679€œS.W.2d›€445€(Tenn.€1984);€òò€Blocker€€vs.€Regional€Medicalóó,€722€€œS.W.2d›Ï660€(Tenn.€1987);€òòSmith€vs.€Smithððs€Transferóó,€735€œS.W.2d›€221€(Tenn.€1987);€€òòœHawkins›€€vs.ÏConsolidated,óó€742€œS.W.2d›€253€(1987);€€òòWhite€€vs.€United,óó€742€œS.W.2d›€635€(Tenn.€1987);€€òòÏImperial€Shirt€Company€vs.€Jenkins,óó€òòsupraóó;€òòMurray€Ohio€vs.€Vines,óó€498€œS.W.2d›€897€(Tenn.Ï1973).€€Even€receipt€of€€temporary€total€disability€benefits€is€apparently€not€sufficient€to€put€a€Ïclaimant€upon€notice€that€he€has€sustained€a€ð ðcompensableðð€injury.€€See€òòBlocker€vs.€RegionalÏMedicalóó,€722€œS.W.2d›€660€(Tenn.€1987);€òòMurray€€Ohio€vs.€Vines,óó€498€œS.W.2d›€897€(Tenn.Ï1973)].Ìà àWhat,€€then,€€constitutes€a€ð ðprobable€compensable€injury,ðð€so€as€to€trigger€the€running€ofÏthe€statute€of€€limitations?€€Despite€some€indications€to€the€contrary€œ€(e.g.,›€òòTaylor€vs.€œClaytonóó,›€516ÏœS.W.2d›€72€(Tenn.€1974),€€where€the€worker€sues€for€permanent€disability,€it€€is€apparently€the€lawÏthat€the€worker€is€not€charged€with€knowledge€which€will€begin€the€running€of€the€statutory€period€Ï(in€the€absence€of€obvious€conditions,€€such€as€amputations)€€until€he€knows€both€the€ultimateÏdiagnosis€and€that€the€condition€is€probably€permanent.€€òòJones€vs.€œHomeóó,›€679€œS.W.2d›€445€(Tenn.Ï1984);€òò€œMcLerran›€vs.€Mid„Southóó,€695€œS.W.2d›€€181€(1985);€òòSmith€vs.€Smithððs€Transferóó,€735ÏœS.W.2d›€221€(1987);€òòOsborne€vs.€œBurlingtonóó,›€672€œS.W.2d›€757€(Tenn.€1984);€òòMurray€Ohio€vs.ÏVinesóó,€498€œS.W.2d›€897€(Tenn.€1973);€òòUnion€Carbide€vs.€Cannonóó,€523€œS.W.2d›€360€(Tenn.Ï1975).Ìà àLet€us€apply€€these€rules€€to€even€the€facts€€urged€upon€this€€Court€by€the€employer:€€TheÏclaimant€in€this€case€was€advised€by€the€treating€physician€on€July€6,€1994,€€€that€he€had€a€ð ðtornÏrotator€cuff.ðð€€€The€doctor€did€not€testify,€but€there€is€nothing€in€his€notes€stating€that€he€advisedÏthe€claimant€at€that€time€of€any€permanent€disability€from€his€condition.€€The€doctorððs€notes€indicateÏthat€he€wrote€to€claimantððs€employers€€that€he€should€be€able€to€work,€but€cautioned€claimant€toÏwatch€for€ð ðsigns€and€symptoms€€of€€worsening€problems€.€.€.ðð€€if€€he€did€not€improve.€€TheÏdoctorððs€notes€on€June€22,€1995,€€state€that€the€doctor€explained€to€him€that€his€problems€wereÏð ðcommon€with€rotator€cuff€strain€œtendonitis›.ðð€€On€that€date€the€doctor€also€noted€for€his€records€thatÏð ðit€is€possible€that€he€has€a€partial€tear.€€I€donððt€think€€he€has€a€complete€tear€clinically€.€.€.ðð€€He€didÏnot€feel€at€that€time€that€symptoms€were€enough€to€€warrant€surgical€€intervention.€€This€opinionÏwas€repeated€on€August€24,€1995,€although€the€doctor€said€then€that€ð ðhe€may€need€something€doneÏin€the€future.ðð€€The€treatment€up€to€that€time€had€been€ð ðconservative.ðð€€On€October€26,€1995,€€theÏdoctor€repeated€his€opinion€that€no€complete€tear€of€the€rotator€cuff€€was€visualized€on€an€œMRI›€testÏand€he€was€unable€even€to€make€a€definitive€diagnosis€of€a€partial€tear€of€the€rotator€cuff.€€He€wasÏunable€to€fit€the€claimantððs€condition€into€the€AMA€guidelines€specifically€€and€released€the€claimantÏwith€no€restrictions.€€However,€because€of€the€findings€on€the€œMRI›€€which€had€recently€takenÏplace,€the€doctor€gave€his€opinion€that€the€claimant€had€sustained€a€5%€permanent€€impairment€toÏð ðthe€shoulder.ðð€€Suit€was€filed€on€August€7,€1995.€€For€some€reason,€the€trial€court€sustained€anÏobjection€at€trial€to€testimony€to€what€information€the€doctor€had€given€the€claimant€regardingÏwhether€or€not€his€condition€was€permanent.€€Such€testimony€would€be€admissible,€and€not€subjectÏto€a€€hearsay€objection,€as€it€was€clearly€offered€not€for€the€truth€of€the€doctorððs€statement€but€toÏshow€what€information€the€claimant€had€about€his€condition€and€when€he€had€it.€€Tennessee€RuleÏof€€Evidence€801€(c).€€Claimant€testified€that€his€physician,€€who€saw€him€in€July€of€1994,€€neverÏindicated€to€him€that€he€had€a€permanent€condition.€€He€was€allowed€to€return€to€work€after€twoÏweeks€and€did€not€miss€any€time€from€work€after€that.Ìà àApplying€the€€rules€extracted€from€the€cases€cited€above,€and€applying€them€to€theÍundisputed€facts€in€this€case,€we€see€that€the€claimant€sustained€an€injury€which€was€not€definitelyÏdiagnosed€even€after€an€œMRI›€examination€and€which€€caused€him€to€miss€little€time€from€work.€€InÏaddition,€the€record€does€not€indicate€that€any€permanent€impairment€was€opined€or€communicatedÏto€the€claimant€earlier€than€October€26,€1995,€a€few€months€òòafteróó€suit€was€filed.€€Therefore,€theÏfiling€of€this€suit€was€timely.€€Ìà àIn€view€of€our€ruling€above,€it€is€not€necessary€to€discuss€€the€somewhat€€arcane€andÏconfused€question€of€€whether€claimantððs€last€treatment,€€or€the€last€payment€for€that€treatment,€Ïtolls€the€running€of€the€statute.Ìà àNo€question€is€raised€as€to€the€appropriateness€of€€the€amount€of€€the€disability€award€byÏthe€trial€court.€€Therefore,€€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€areÏtaxed€to€the€defendants„appellants.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àROBERT€A.€œLANIER›,€€œÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSPECIAL€JUDGE›Ìà àÌœ›ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ_________________________________________ÌJanice€M.€Holder,€Associate€Justice,€Supreme€CourtÌÌÌ__________________________________________à à€ÌDon€R.€Ash,€œSpecial›€€JudgeÌÓÓœÇÑ ` ÑÓÓÔ€(Ôà@ àÔ€(¼ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÔ€(XÔÌÌÌÓ#` p…X LÐ X#ÓGARY€KEITH€HIGGINBOTHAM,à à)à àCHESTER€CHANCERYÌÓ#` p` LÐ X#Óà à)à àNO.€8867ÌÓ` p` ¸ ’XÓà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à à)à àÌÓ#` p` ¸ LÐ X#Óà àà à)à àHon.€Joe€C.€Morris,Ìvs.à àà à)à àChancellorÌà àà à)ÌGRINNELL€CORPORATION,à à)à àNO.€02S01„9611„CH„00101ÌßJ€',;+'b|y` Å `€@ÿJßà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellant.à à)à àAFFIRMED.ÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€(¼ÔJUDGMENT€ORDERÔ€(XÔÌÌÓ  ÓÌÓÓÓ` p`  ’XÓà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,€including€the€orderÏof€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panel'sÏMemorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€whichÏare€incorporated€herein€by€reference.Ìà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€Memorandum€Opinion€of€theÏPanel€should€be€accepted€and€approved;€andÌà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÏlaw€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€is€made€the€judgment€ofÏthe€Court.Ìà àCosts€will€be€paid€by€Appellant,€and€surety,€for€which€execution€mayÍissue€if€necessary.Ìà àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€this€18th€day€of€August,€1997.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌÌ(Holder,€J.,€not€participating)ÌÌÌÌÌÔ€#Ô›