ÿWPCŠ …# VU:a %› 0û¡w@œ 4Ü ð ÿ 0J 0TQ 0^¥ 0h 0rk 0|Ý 0†Y 0ß 1uo 0däU*HB)rDC› AMÞ£+U6Îv~ B‚vÓŸ D3r 0@¥ AOåÆ4 0Dú D/> Bm˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX(Ó­$¡¡Ñ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€XXXXÔÑ7€.íXXdðXXdð7Ñ àáâDãäD啿îçDèDéÓ€ ƒØ"x¡3|xô2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€- Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ™Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òJulyÏ1,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó< Œ 9p`(Courier NewPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h dStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . 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A1-j|` à. `€€@ÿRß›KNOXVILLE,€FEBRUARY€1997€SESSIONÌÓÓÓ  ÓÌÌÓÓó óCLARK€VANN€LUNSFORD,à àà à)à àHAMILTON€CHANCERYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appelleeà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€Howell€N.€Peoples,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àChancellorÌSHAW€INDUSTRIES,€INC.,à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellantà àà à)à àNO.€œ03S01„9607„CH„00078›ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòFor€the€Appellantà àà àà àà àà àFor€the€Appellee:ÌÌó óóóC.€Douglas€Dooleyà àà àà àà àà àDavid€E.€HarrisonÌD.€Scott€Bennettà àà àà àà àà àNinth€Floor,€Republic€CentreÌThird€Floor,€Pioneer€Bank€Bldg.à àà àà à633€Chestnut€StreetÌChattanooga,€TN€€37402à àà àà àà àChattanooga,€TN€€37450ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòÓ  ÓM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÌÌÌÌMembers€of€Panel:ÌÌó óóóÌE.€Riley€Anderson,€JusticeÌJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€JudgeÌRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òÓ  ÓREVERSED€à àà àà àà àà àà àTHAYER,€Special€JudgeÌAND€REMANDEDó óÌÓÓà àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€CourtÏof€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€Ìà àThe€issue€in€this€case€involves€the€enforcement€of€payment€of€post„trialÏmedical€expenses.€€The€trial€court€found€the€employer,€Shaw€Industries,€Inc.,€inÏcontempt€for€unreasonable€delay€in€paying€post„judgment€medical€expenses.€€TheÏonly€sanction€the€court€imposed€was€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€to€the€employee,ÏClark€Vann€Lunsford,€as€the€hearing€revealed€the€medical€expenses€originally€inÏdispute€were€paid€shortly€prior€to€the€hearing.Ìà àThe€parties€originally€settled€the€workersðð€compensation€claim€by€entry€of€anÏorder€on€November€3,€1994,€which€provided€for€an€award€based€on€40%Ïpermanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€The€order€then€provided€theÏemployer€would€pay€ð ðreasonable€and€necessary€medical€expenses€for€which€it€isÍliable€to€date€and€in€the€future.ððÌà àA€petition€for€contempt€was€filed€on€October€1,€1995,€alleging€that€duringÏMarch,€1995,€the€employee€was€hospitalized€in€Bozeman,€Montana€and€incurredÏmedical€expenses€in€the€amount€of€$5,452.30€€and€that€the€employerððs€refusal€toÏpay€these€expenses€was€a€violation€of€the€courtððs€order.Ìà àAfter€a€hearing€on€this€issue,€the€Chancellor€found€there€had€been€anÏunreasonable€delay€in€paying€the€expenses€and€the€delay€violated€the€finalÏjudgment.€€The€record€indicates€that€a€hearing€had€not€been€conducted€prior€to€theÏcontempt€hearing€to€determine€whether€the€medical€expenses€were€theÏresponsibility€of€the€employer.Ìà àOn€appeal€the€employer€insists€the€employee€should€have€filed€a€motion€orÏpetition€requesting€the€court€to€determine€whether€the€medical€expenses€wereÏœcausally›€related€to€the€compensable€injury€and€œobtained€an›€order€directing€theÏpayment€of€the€expenses€before€it€would€be€proper€to€file€a€petition€for€contempt€forÏfailure€to€pay€the€expenses.Ìà àIn€response€to€this€contention,€the€employee€contends€the€courtððs€order€didÏnot€provide€or€require€the€employee€to€obtain€judicial€approval€every€time€heÏincurred€medical€expenses€and€that€the€circumstances€of€the€case€(in€incurring€theÏexpenses)€constituted€an€emergency.Ìà àSince€the€main€issue€in€the€case€involves€a€procedural€question,€we€do€notÏfind€it€necessary€to€give€a€detailed€statement€of€the€facts.€€It€is€sufficient€to€state€thatÏduring€œMarch,›€1995,€employee€Lunsford€was€in€Montana€by€reason€of€hisÏemployment€and€while€there€engaged€in€skiing€activities€for€several€days;€theÍfollowing€day€he€began€to€experience€some€pain€and€stiffness€in€his€back;€the€nextÏevening€he€awakened€with€intense€pain€in€his€legs;€and€he€spent€several€days€in€aÏhospital€because€of€these€complaints.€€The€employerððs€insurance€carrier€initiallyÏdetermined€the€expenses€were€caused€by€the€skiing€activities€and€denied€the€claimÏfor€expenses.€€Payment€of€the€expenses€occurred€shortly€prior€to€the€hearing€onÏMarch€29,€1996,€and€the€trial€court€found€there€was€no€reasonable€explanation€forÏthe€one€year€delay€in€making€payment.Ìà àThe€case€is€to€be€reviewed€on€appeal€òòde€novoóó€accompanied€by€aÏpresumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact€unless€the€preponderance€ofÏthe€evidence€is€otherwise.€€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(2).Ìà àHowever,€the€òòde€novoóó€review€does€not€carry€a€presumption€of€correctness€toÏa€trial€courtððs€conclusions€of€law€but€is€confined€to€factual€findings.€€òòUnion€Carbide€v.ÏHuddlestonóó,€854€S.W.2d€œ87,€91›€(Tenn.€1993).Ìà àWe€first€note€that€a€provision€in€a€final€judgment€imposing€liability€on€theÏemployer€for€payment€of€future€medical€expenses€does€not€result€in€the€strict€senseÏof€requiring€the€payment€of€any€and€all€expenses.€€Neither€does€the€statutoryÏlanguage€of€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„204.€€The€employer€is€protected€against€unreasonableÏand€unnecessary€future€medical€charges€by€the€requirement€that€the€employeeÏmust€show€a€direct€œcausal›€relationship€between€the€need€for€medical€treatment€andÏthe€employeeððs€on€the€job€injury.€€òòU.S.€Fidelity€&€Guar.€Co.€v.€Morganóó,€795€S.W.2dÏ653,€656€(Tenn.€1990).€€The€emergency€circumstances€of€the€case€would€not€alterÏthese€rules€but€would€have€an€effect€on€the€general€requirement€that€the€employerÏbe€given€the€opportunity€to€provide€the€treatment€each€time€the€employeeÍreasonably€requires€additional€treatment.€€òòGreenlee€v.€Care€Inn€of€Jefferson€Cityóó,Ï644€S.W.2d€œ679,€680›€(Tenn.€1983).Ìà àA€petition€for€contempt€is€generally€the€proper€remedy€to€enforce€theÏprovisions€of€a€final€judgment€against€a€party€who€is€in€willful€disobedience€to€theÏjudgment€or€decree.€€T.C.A.€ðð€29„9„102(3).Ìà àHowever,€we€do€not€see€how€a€party€to€a€final€judgment€could€be€held€inÏcontempt€in€a€case€of€this€nature€where€there€has€been€no€determination€by€theÏcourt€that€the€medical€expenses€are€œcausally›€related€to€the€on„the„job€injury€andÏwhere€the€employer€has€not€been€specifically€ordered€to€pay€the€expenses€at€issue.€ÏUnder€these€circumstances,€we€are€of€the€opinion€the€filing€of€a€contempt€petitionÏwas€not€the€proper€remedy€and€that€the€employee€should€have€filed€a€motion€orÏpetition€seeking€a€judicial€determination€as€to€the€responsibility€of€the€partiesÏconcerning€the€post„judgment€medical€expenses€in€question.€€When€legalÏresponsibility€has€been€determined€and€the€employer€is€specifically€ordered€to€payÏand€fails€to€do€so,€then€the€remedy€for€such€failure€to€comply€with€the€provisions€ofÏan€order€or€a€judgment€would€be€the€contempt€procedure.Ìà àSince€the€post„judgment€medical€expenses€were€unknown€and€notÏascertainable€upon€the€entry€of€the€final€judgment,€we€find€the€employer€was€not€inÏviolation€of€a€provision€in€the€judgment€when€the€contempt€petition€was€filed.€€TheÏfinding€of€contempt€is€reversed€and€the€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€vacated.Ìà àThe€case€is€remanded€to€the€Chancery€court€for€such€other€proceedings€asÏmay€be€necessary.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€taxed€to€œplaintiff„employee.›ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌE.€Riley€Anderson,€JusticeÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€œJudgeÌÑ  ÑÒ € ÒÒ H ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€#ÔÔ€#&Ôà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌCLARK€VANN€LUNSFORD,à àà àà à)ÌÒ € ÒÒ h Ò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à à)Hamilton€Chancery€No.€74104ÌÒ € ÒÒ jÿ Ò€€Plaintiff„Appellee,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Hon.€Howell€N.ÏPeoples,à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ChancellorÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌV.à àà àà àà àà àà à)No.€03S01„9607„CH„00078€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€ÌSHAW€INDUSTRIES,€INC.,à àà à)€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ì€€Defendant„Appellant.à àà à)REVERSED€AND€REMANDED.Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ ² Òà@ àòòJUDGMENT€ORDERóóÌÌÌÓÓà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€motion€for€reviewÏpursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(5)(B),€the€entireÏrecord,€including€the€order€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'ÏCompensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panel's€Memorandum€OpinionÏsetting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€whichÏare€incorporated€herein€by€reference;Ìà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€motion€forÏreview€is€not€well€taken€and€should€be€denied;€andÌà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€factÏand€conclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decisionÏof€the€Panel€is€made€the€judgment€of€the€Court.€Ìà àCosts€will€be€paid€by€plaintiff„appellee,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÓÓà àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€this€___€day€of€June,€1997.ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌÌÌAnderson,€J.€„€Not€participating.ÓÓÔ€#XÔÔ€Ô›