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ÝÑTR[¤ AØ'3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÒ°ÒÒ8°ÒÖ€ÿÿÖÑ  ÑÔ& ¸ ÔÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°œX<ÓÔ€¼ÖμXXH\ÔÔ€¼g·¼¼¼ÖÎÔÔ  ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÐ ° ÐÌSPECIAL€WORKERS'€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌÌñ6ñßl€*6&"h 8 `€€EŽ tt06Æ ¨élßâ ÆÆ # #âñ6ñAT€KNOXVILLEÌ(March€16,€1999€Session)ÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓCORA€McGINN,à  àà h àà À àà  à)à p àCAMPBELLÐ ŒÜ  Ðâ  # #ÆÆâCHANCERYÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ìà ` àPlaintiff„Appellee,à À àà  à)à p àHon.€Billy€Joe€White,Ð Î  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à p àChancellor.Ð ä4 Ðv.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ð úJ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à p àNo.€03S01„9807„CH„00083Ð ` ÐDENAMERICA€CORPORATIONà  à)Ð &v Ðd/b/a€DENNY'S€RESTAURANTà  à)Ð <Œ Ðand€CNA€INSURANCE€COMPANYà  àÔ'¸°÷ÔÐ  R¢Ã ÐÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ìà ` àDefendants„Appellants.à À àà  à)Ð Ü, ÐÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantsóó:à  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àòòFor€Appelleeóó:òòÐ J š ÐóóÌLinda€J.€Hamilton€Mowlesà À àà  àà p àà È àVic€PryorÐ vÆ  ÐLewis,€King,€Krieg,€Waldrop€&€Catronà p àà È àJacksboro,€TennesseeÐ ŒÜ  ÐKnoxville,€TennesseeÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àKathy€ParrottÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àLaFollette,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<ÓòòM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€NóóÐ &v ÐÌÌÌÌòòMembers€of€Panelóó:Ð ”ä ÐÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€Associate€JusticeÌHowell€N.€Peoples,€Special€JudgeÌJoe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓÌÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<ÓÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓÌÓ  ÓAFFIRMEDà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àà  àà x àLoser,€JudgeÓ {ÀÓÐ p'À"  ÐÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<ÓòòMEORANDUM€OPINIONóóÐ W)§$" ÐÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓÓ€Óà ` àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€XϯX¼¼g·ÔððÔ€¼g·¼XXϯÔÐ ß,/(& Ð50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€of€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÏlaw.€€In€this€appeal,€the€employer€and€its€insurer€insist€(1)€the€employee€did€notÏsuffer€an€injury€compensable€under€the€workers'€compensation€law€ofÏTennessee,€(2)€the€award€of€permanent€partial€disability€benefits€is€excessiveÏand€(3)€the€trial€judge€erred€in€rejecting€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Robert€E.€Ivy.€€AsÏdiscussed€below,€the€panel€has€concluded€the€judgment€should€be€affirmed.Ó {ÀÓÌà ` àÐ F8–34 Ðà ` àAfter€a€trial€of€the€issues€raised€by€the€parties,€the€chancellor€awardedÏpermanent€partial€disability€benefits€based€on€eighty€percent€to€the€body€as€aÏwhole.€€Because€the€first€two€issues€involve€factual€questions,€we€have€reviewedÏthose€issues€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€aÐ “ ã Ðpresumption€of€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact,€unless€the€preponderance€ofÏthe€evidence€is€otherwise,€as€required€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€XϯX¼¼g·ÔððÔ€¼g·¼XXϯÔ€50„6„225(e)(2).Ð Õ %  Ðà ` àÌà ` àThe€employee€or€claimant,€Cora€McGinn,€is€forty„nine€years€old€with€aÏhigh€school€education€and€training€and€experience€in€the€food€service€industryÏand€experience€as€a€convenience€store€manager,€nurse's€assistant,€assistantÏlounge€manager€and€cosmetics€seller.€€She€began€working€at€Denny's€restaurantÏin€1996.Ìà ` àÌà ` àIn€April€of€the€same€year,€she€began€to€develop€pain€and€numbness€inÏboth€hands€and€wrists,€which€she€reported€to€her€employer,€Denny's.€€She€leftÏDenny's€restaurant€in€September€of€the€same€year,€because€the€pain€had€becomeÏso€severe€that€she€could€no€longer€do€her€work.€€She€testified€at€trial€that€sheÏnever€had€problems€with€her€hands€before€working€for€this€employer.€€When€herÏphysical€problems€did€not€abate,€she€requested€medical€care€and€was€referred€toÏDr.€Ivy,€an€orthopedic€surgeon.Ìà ` àÌà ` àDr.€Ivy€first€saw€the€claimant€on€November€8,€1996€and€diagnosedÏbilateral€carpal€tunnel€syndrome€and€bilateral€scapholunate€dissociation.€€HeÏtestified€the€carpal€tunnel€syndrome€was€probably€caused€by€the€claimant's€workÏat€Denny's,€but€that€the€scapholunate€dissociation€was€not€caused€but€could€haveÏbeen€aggravated€by€her€work.€€The€doctor€performed€carpal€tunnel€releaseÏsurgery€on€her€right€arm.€€Surgery€on€her€other€arm€was€later€performed€byÏanother€surgeon.€€Dr.€Ivy€released€the€claimant€to€return€to€work€on€July€1,€1997Ïwith€no€impairment.Ìà ` àÌà ` àDr.€William€E.€Kennedy,€another€orthopedic€surgeon,€examined€Ms.ÏMcGinn€on€February€13,€1998€and€diagnosed€severe€scapholunate€dissociationÏand€carpal€tunnel€syndrome.€€He€opined€that€both€injuries€were€probably€causedÐ Ð8 4@ Ðor€aggravated€by€the€work€she€did€at€Denny's€and€assigned€twenty„seven€percentÏpermanent€impairment€to€the€right€arm€and€twenty„nine€percent€permanentÏimpairment€to€the€left€arm,€from€history,€medical€records€and€grip€strengthÏtesting.Ìà ` àÌà ` àA€third€orthopedic€surgeon,€who€performed€the€second€surgery,€testifiedÏthat€scapholunate€dissociation€was€a€condition€that€was€consistent€with€workÏrelated€repetitive€trauma€and€that€the€claimant's€period€of€disability€is€indefinite.€ÏVocational€disability€experts€estimated€her€permanent€vocational€disability€atÏfrom€sixty„five€percent€to€one€hundred€percent.Ìà ` àÌà ` àUnless€admitted€by€the€employer,€the€employee€or€claimant€has€theÏburden€of€proving,€by€competent€evidence,€every€essential€element€of€his€claim.€ÏòòOster€v.€Yatesóó,€845€€S.W.2d€€215€(Tenn.€1992).€€In€the€present€case,€theÐ Ý- Ðemployer€denied€that€the€employee€suffered€an€injury€by€accident€orÏoccupational€disease€arising€out€of€the€employment€and€questioned€the€extentÏof€disability,€but€admitted€the€other€essential€elements€of€a€workers'Ïcompensation€claim.Ìà ` àÌà ` àAn€accidental€injury€is€one€which€cannot€be€reasonably€anticipated,€isÏunexpected€and€is€precipitated€by€unusual€combinations€of€fortuitousÏcircumstances.€€òòFink€v.€Caudleóó,€856€€S.W.2d€€952€(Tenn.€1993).€€It€is€theÐ å&5"* Ðresulting€injury€which€must€be€unexpected€in€order€for€the€injury€to€qualify€asÏone€by€accident.€€òòId.óó€€"Injury"€has€been€defined€as€including€"whatever€lesionÐ '*w%. Ðor€change€to€any€part€of€the€system€(that)€produces€harm€or€pain€or€lessenedÏfacility€of€the€natural€use€of€any€bodily€activity€or€capability."€€òòId.óó€€Where€aÐ i-¹(2 Ðcondition€develops€gradually€over€a€period€of€time€resulting€in€a€definite,€work„¼connected,€unexpected,€fortuitous€injury,€it€is€compensable€as€an€injury€byÏaccident.€€òòBrown€Shoe€Co.€v.€Reedóó,€209€€Tenn.€€106,€350€€S.W.2d€€65€(1961).€Ð L2œ-8 ÐFor€an€injury€to€be€compensable,€it€need€not€have€been€foreseen€or€expected,Ïbut,€after€the€event,€it€must€only€appear€to€have€had€its€origin€in€a€risk€connectedÏwith€the€employment,€and€to€have€flowed€from€that€source€as€a€rationalÏconsequence€and€reasonably€have€been,€if€thought€of€at€the€time€of€employment,Ð Ð8 4@ Ðconsidered€a€risk.€€òòLawson€v.€Lear€Seating€Corp.óó,€€944€€S.W.2d€€340€(Tenn.Ð ° Ð1997).€€An€employer€takes€an€employee€as€he€is€and€assumes€the€risk€of€havingÏa€weakened€condition€aggravated€by€an€injury€which€might€not€affect€a€normalÏperson.€€òòHill€v.€Eagle€Bend€Mfg.,€Inc.óó,€€942€S.W.2d€483€(Tenn.€1997).€Ð “ ã ÐAccordingly,€we€cannot€say€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trialÏcourt's€finding€that€the€claimant€suffered€an€injury€by€accident.Ìà ` àÌà ` à"Arising€out€of"€refers€to€the€origin€of€the€injury€in€terms€of€causation;ÏòòReeser€v.€Yellow€Freight€System,€Inc.óó,€938€€S.W.2d€€690€(Tenn.€1997);€and€"inÐ ¸  Ðthe€course€of"€relates€to€time,€place€and€circumstance;€òòMcCaleb€v.€Saturn€Corp.óó,Ð Y© Ð910€€S.W.2d€€412€€(Tenn.€1995).€€Not€every€injury€by€accident€which€occurs€inÏthe€course€of€employment€is€compensable;€it€is€only€compensable€if€it€alsoÏarises€out€of€employment,€but€any€reasonable€doubt€as€to€whether€such€an€injuryÏarises€out€of€the€employment€should€be€resolved€in€favor€of€the€employee.€ÏòòReeser€v.€Yellow€Freight€Systems,€Inc.óó,€€938€€S.W.2d€€690€€(Tenn.€1997).€€TheÐ ~Î Ðproof€that€the€injury€occurred€at€work€is€established€by€the€claimant's€ownÏuncontradicted€testimony,€and€the€proof€of€the€required€causal€connection€by€theÏuncontradicted€testimony€of€three€different€physicians.€€Compensability€isÏsimply€not€a€viable€issue€in€this€case.Ìà ` àÓ {ÀÓÌà ` àOnce€the€causation€and€permanency€of€an€injury€have€been€established€byÏexpert€testimony,€the€trial€judge€may€consider€many€pertinent€factors,€includingÏage,€job€skills,€education,€training,€duration€of€disability,€and€job€opportunitiesÏfor€the€disabled,€in€addition€to€anatomical€impairment,€for€the€purpose€ofÏevaluating€the€extent€of€a€claimant's€permanent€disability.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€XϯX¼¼g·ÔððÔ€¼g·¼XXϯÔÐ -Q(2 Ð50„6„241(a)(2).€€The€opinion€of€a€qualified€expert€with€respect€to€a€claimant'sÏclinical€or€physical€impairment€is€a€factor€which€the€court€will€consider€alongÏwith€all€other€relevant€facts€and€circumstances,€but€it€is€for€the€courts€toÏdetermine€the€percentage€of€the€claimant's€industrial€disability.€€òòPittman€v.Ð …3Õ.: ÐLasco€Industries,€Inc.óó,€908€€S.W.2d€€932€(Tenn.€1995).Ð &5v0< Ðà ` àFrom€a€consideration€of€the€employee's€age,€education,€training,€durationÐ 8P3@ Ðof€disability€and€the€expert€opinions€accepted€by€the€trial€court,€we€do€not€findÏthe€evidence€to€preponderate€against€the€trial€court's€award€of€permanent€partialÏdisability€benefits.Ó {ÀÓÌà ` àÌà ` àWhen€the€medical€testimony€differs,€the€trial€judge€must€choose€whichÏview€to€believe.€€In€doing€so,€he€is€allowed,€among€other€things,€to€consider€theÏqualifications€of€the€experts,€the€circumstances€of€their€examination,€theÏinformation€available€to€them,€and€the€evaluation€of€the€importance€of€thatÏinformation€by€other€experts.€€òòOrman€v.€Williams€Sonoma,€Inc.óó,€803€€S.W.2d€Ð ¸  Ð672€(Tenn.€1991).€€Moreover,€it€is€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€judge€toÏconclude€that€the€opinion€of€certain€experts€should€be€accepted€over€that€ofÏother€experts€and€that€it€contains€the€more€probable€explanation.€€òòHinson€v.Ð ›ë ÐWal„Mart€Storesóó,€654€€S.W.2d€€675,€675„7€(Tenn.€1983).€€The€chancellor€did€notÐ <Œ Ðabuse€his€discretion€by€rejecting€Dr.€Ivy's€opinion€in€favor€of€the€opinions€ofÏtwo€other€well€qualified€orthopedic€surgeons.Ìà ` àÌÓ€Óà ` àThe€judgment€is€affirmed.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€defendants„ÌÌappellants€and€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court.Ó rAÓÌÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<Ó_______________________________Ó rAÓÌÓ  Ó€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Joe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€Associate€JusticeÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌHowell€N.€Peoples,€Special€JudgeÐ  }1Í,1 ÐÒ` ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal[¤ AØ' AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÌÌà@® ® €àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEE€ˆÌñ+ñßl€*6&"h 8 `€€EŽótt06Æò¨çlßâ ` Æ` Æ`  #`  #âñ+ñà@»»"àAT€KNOXVILLEˆÌà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àà  à¼à ¸ àà  àÌà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€€à p àÐ 4 „ Ðà  àà , àà  àà ` àà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àÌCORA€McGINNà h àà À àà0  à€€€€€€€ñ%ñ€ñ%ñ)à0pÆ #àCAMPBELLÐ ` ° ÐCHANCERYÐ pÆp # Ðâ `  #`  #` Æ` Æâà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à€€€€€€€à  à€€€€€€€ñ$ñ€ñ$ñ)€€€€€à È àNo.€14,467Ð ŒÜ  ÐÒ 8Ò€€Plaintiff„Appellee,à À à€€€€€€€à  à€€€€€€€ñ#ñ€ñ#ñ)à p àà È àà  àà x àÐ ¢ò  ÐÓ àœXÿÿŒXÓà ¸ àà0  àà0h8"8"àà0Àh8"h8"àà0À8"À8"à€€€€€€€ñ"ñ€ñ"ñ)à0p8"8"àNo.03S01„9807„CH€„00083à @°! àи p8"p8" Ðv.à ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà0  à€€€€€€€€)ÐÎ 8"8" Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€€€€€€€)ÌDENAMERICA€CORPORATION€€€)€€Hon.€Billy€Joe€WhiteÌd/b/a€DENNYððS€RESTAURANT€€€€€)à p àChancellorÐ ` Ðand€CNA€INSURANCE€COMPANY)à È àà  àà x à€à Ð àÐ &v Ðà ¸ àñ&ñ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)ñ&ñÌà ¸ à€€€Defendants/Appellants,ñ'ñà p àñ'ññ(ñ€€€€€€€€€ñ(ñ)à È àÐ R¢ Ðà ¸ àà  à€€€€€€€€à h àà À àà  àñ)ñ)ñ)ñà p àÐ h¸ Ðñ*ñÌñ*ñà ¸ àà  à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à p àÓ€Óà È àà  àà x àà Ð à€€€€€€Ð ~Î Ðà@°°'ÌàJUDGMENT€ORDERˆÌÌà ¸ à€This€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,Ïincluding€the€order€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'ÏCompensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panel's€memorandumÏOpinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,Ïwhich€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference;ÌÌà ¸ àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€memorandumÏOpinion€of€the€Panel€should€be€accepted€and€approved;€andÌÌà ¸ àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€facts€andÏconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€ofÏthe€Panel€is€made€the€Judgment€of€the€Court.ÌÌà ¸ àCosts€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€Appellants,€DenamericaÏCorporation,€dba€Dennyððs€Restaurant,€CNA€Insurance€and€Linda€J.ÏMowles,€surety,€€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.€Ð Ð8 49 Ѐ€€€€€06/10/99ÌÓ0ÿÿ` çÈ xÐ (#àœX0Ó