ÿWPC0 Ök“¬YCRmiH*SñN»òÁZHÖÉó¨ïk/É~¾ƒ×€x\ÔÞS¤ÕŠåNô•;œ½e¹Ý´êTÓè´Àx£?&Ó}ûºg¹¿øÝ;ýÊŠ©øKVWü-yds<t±N¥'\?‰å×vÜS¿R¢ü^˜Þs圯£¢ÚFˆWùÆ8²;ç®Ɔµ÷+´<ðn‘©ÃðJ&JE\ 8x¼XS@SÂßEt[¶Ì’˜±ìŠeÙJéÿ>…3¶¶“ç=æž²hº„c½ú¿l±oh‘g‚¼;$0òS§X‘ÞAí´Wì¹Â¢Ù1}XÙ—ÀЩDuù~-°ö»õþZ1è?ûŽ´ÆrcKv0¬ÍˬàLiËmˆ›ùí|—0¨^̵"‹\³@öRÔ _÷X†¿i0iãígþÃ÷Û ¿¡cÛÃJ+WBÒ*}µËãÖ‰€Á ]`+ÊÒÎr±SzgƒÙÚ«þ³9‰LS, :ÿäFq3 +¢•ãB‘{Ÿé멉þ—5/ ¢ZpS…%;¬8àøîXêþ¨ˆ/E ˜‰Î‰"I1P ÚFvˆá“­0åKé´3l[‚z¬‹Ý~ Ö·iòÂË»¡+Ýé–ú„¿–CÚ…# F UNQ %Ÿ 0(¥ w@Í 4 ! -0 ] ìe U:Q UF‹ ìÑ U:½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ B÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ D3 0DGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG AO‹ÆÚÚ 0D  D/ä B˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ÿUUEEÓ€VîÓ€ºyj&xÔĸ Ôô3|x #Ñ#€Xÿÿd#Ñ âÔ€ XüXXXÔÔ€ èé[èX XüÔÔ Ad ÔÓ  ÓFILEDÔ€ ´¢è èé[ÔÐ  ÐÌò òMarch€29,€1999Ð  ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€CourtÏClerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular<4šÛ 9Z ‹.Courier New Regular âÔ€XüXXXÔÔ€èé[èXXüÔÔ Ad ÔÓ  ÓFILEDÔ€´¢èèé[ÔÐ  ÐÌò òMarch€29,€1999Ð  ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€CourtÏClerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d%%%%'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý›ÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€úÑÑ7€òXdðdÈ7Ñà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À ààHÔ Ô Ààò òIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À ààH''ÀàSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELˆÌññœßl€ *6&"h 8 `€€E‘tt06H¨çlߛ⠰H°H°(#°(#âññà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À ààH  ÀàKNOXVILLE,€SEPTEMBER€1998€SESSIONˆÌÌÌÌÌÌANNE€KAY€METIERà  àà h àà À à)à  àANDERSONÐ 0 € ÐCIRCUITÌâ °(#°(#°H°Hâà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà  àPlaintiff/Appellee,à  àà h àà À à)Ð P  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àNo.€03S01„9710„CV„00122Ð ð@  Ðv.à  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àÐ à0  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àAnderson€County€CircuitÐ Ð  ÐDICO€TIRE,€INC.,à ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àCourt€No.€96LA0311Ð À Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà  àDefendant/Appellant.à h àà À à)à  àHon.€James€B.€Scott,€Jr.,€ChancellorÐ  ð ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€the€Appellants:à ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àFor€the€Appellees:Ð ` ÐÌóóó óWeldon€E.€Pattersonà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àBruce€D.€FoxÐ ð@ ÐSpicer,€Flynn€&€Rudstromà  àà h àà À àà  àRidenour,€Ridenour€&€FoxÐ à0 ÐFirst€Tennessee€Plaza,€Suite€1209à h àà À àà  àP.€O.€Box€530Ð Ð  Ð800€S.€Gay€Streetà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àClinton,€Tennessee€37717„0530Ð À! ÐKnoxville,€Tennessee€37929ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À ààH4 4 Ààò òòòM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€NˆÐ à.0*- ÐÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À ààH—— ÀàMembers€of€Panel:ˆÌóóó óÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À ààH¢ ¢ ÀàœññCharles€›D.€›Susano,€›Jr.,€›JudgeññññE.€RññññññILey€ANdersonññññññiley€Anderson,€Chief€Justiceññ›ˆÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À ààHÐ Ð ÀàRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeˆÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À ààH ÀàJohn€S.€McLellan,€III,€Special€JudgeˆÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àÌÌÌÐ  :p59 ÐAFFIRMEDà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àMcLELLAN,€Special€JudgeÐ ° ÐÌÌÓÓà  àThis€workerððs€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€Special€WorkersððÏCompensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð50„6„¼225€(e)€(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€Court€of€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÏlaw.Ìà  àThe€employer,€Dico€Tire,€Inc,€has€appealed€from€the€action€of€the€trial€court€and€raisesÏthree€issues.€€The€first€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff€onÏthe€issue€of€notice.€€The€second€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€on€the€finding€in€favor€of€theÏplaintiff€on€the€issue€of€statute€of€limitations.€€The€third€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€inÏawarding€the€plaintiff€30%€disability€to€her€upper€extremities.€€Ìà  àThe€complaint€was€filed€on€July€9,€1996,€contending€the€plaintiff€sustained€a€carpalÏtunnel€injury€to€her€right€wrist€on€or€about€July€12,€1995.€€During€discovery,€it€was€learned€thatÏthe€plaintiff€was€claiming€the€same€condition€with€her€left€extremity€and€an€amended€complaintÏwas€filed.€€The€compensability€of€both€extremities€was€at€issue€at€the€time€of€trial.€€The€plaintiffÏmissed€two€or€three€days€of€work€as€a€result€of€surgery€and€by€reason€of€that€period€of€timeÏstipulated€that€plaintiff€did€not€seek€temporary€total€disability€benefits.Ìà  àAs€to€the€notice€issue,€the€trial€court€held€that€although€the€employee€failed€to€giveÏwritten€notice€to€her€employer€of€her€injuries€within€thirty€days€as€required€by€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„¼201,€that€the€employer€had€actual€notice€of€the€employeeððs€injuries€and€that€under€the€factsÏwritten€notice€is€ð ðreasonablyðð€excused.€€The€plaintiff€asserts€she€gave€actual€notice€toÏmanagement€personnel€and€identifies€Mr.€Don€Henderson,€a€co„worker€and€supervisor,€NeilÏMetier€who€was€the€husband€of€plaintiff€and€who€was€deceased€at€the€time€of€trial,€Mark€Bright,€ÏThomas€Duncan€and€a€plant€nurse.€€Plaintiff€contends€some€of€these€witnesses€were€available€andÏnot€called€by€the€employer€to€refute€her€evidence€thereby€invoking€the€ð ðmissing€witness€rule.ððÌ€à  àOn€the€second€issue,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€plaintiffððs€gradual€injury€did€not€resultÐ  2ð-1 Ðin€a€disability€from€work€until€July,€1995€and€it€was€from€that€date€that€the€clock€begins€to€tickÏon€the€statute€of€limitations.€€Defendant€contends€that€although€the€plaintiff€had€surgery€on€JulyÏ12,€1995€that€this€date€was€not€shown€to€increase€of€decrease€plaintiffððs€medical€impairment€norÏplaintiffððs€own€knowledge€about€the€causal€relationship€of€her€medical€condition€and€her€work.€Ð  :p59 ÐÑúÑÑ7€òXXdðXdð7ÑÑ  ÑññÑúÑÑ7€òXXdðXdð7ÑÑ  ÑññññÑúÑÑ7€òXXdðXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑúÑÑ#€Xÿÿd#ÑÑ  ÑññThe€plaintiff€contends€that€the€last€day€of€work€should€be€date€from€which€the€disability€isÏññÑúÑÑ7€òXXdðXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑúÑÑ7€Ü„XXdðXdð7ÑÑ  ÑññññÑúÑÑ7€Ü„XXdðXdð7ÑÑ  Ñññimputed€in€all€cases€involving€carpal€tunnel€syndrome€and€relies€upon€the€case€of€òòLawson€v.€LearÐ à ÐSeating€Corporation,óó€944€S.W.2nd€340,€342€(Tenn.€1997).€€€Ð pÀ Ðà  àAs€to€the€third€issue,€defendant€contends€that€plaintiffððs€testimony,€medical€testimony€andÏtestimony€of€Dr.€Craig€Colvin,€whose€vocational€disability€takes€into€account€Dr.€Gilbert€HydeððsÏrestrictions€as€a€non„treating€physician,€preponderates€against€the€30%€disability€award€toÏplaintiffððs€upper€extremities.€€The€trial€court€found€that€plaintiff€had€surgery€for€her€carpal€tunnelÏcondition€in€her€right€hand€in€July,€1995€and€has€been€diagnosed€with€the€same€condition€in€herÏleft€hand.€€€The€trial€court€further€found€that€the€plaintiff€was€making€only€a€fraction€of€herÏprevious€salary€and€is€restricted€on€the€repetitive€use€of€her€hands.€€The€plaintiff€contends€that€theÏemployeeððs€disability€should€not€be€diminished€due€to€the€fact€that€she€is€still€employed€in€aÏposition€in€Human€Resources€because€her€employer€accommodates€her€disability€and€sheÏcontinues€to€perform€her€jobððs€essential€functions.€€Plaintiff€asserts€that€while€it€is€correct€that€she€Ïis€employed€in€a€similar€capacity,€her€work€is€œperformed›€œwith›€pain€and€discomfort€and€with€anÏannual€reduction€in€pay€in€excess€of€$10,000.00.€€Plaintiff€contends€the€award€of€the€trial€court€isÏreasonable€under€all€the€proof€in€the€case.€Ìà  àThe€plaintiff€€worked€for€the€defendant€for€approximately€twenty€years.€€Plaintiffððs€initialÏemployment€in€1976€was€as€a€personnel€secretary€and€thereafter€as€a€combination€plant€nurse€andÏlater€benefits€administrator€which€included€matters€of€€insurance,€workerððs€compensationÏbenefits,€medical€insurance€benefits,€and€retirement€benefits.€€The€plaintiff€was€the€personÏresponsible€for€€seeing€that€employees€file€workerððs€compensation€claims,€process€their€claimsÏproperly,€and€receive€the€benefits€they€are€entitled€to.€Ì€à  àAt€the€time€of€plaintiffððs€surgery,€plaintiffððs€husband€was€the€manager€of€the€maintenanceÐ ð-@), Ðdepartment€in€1995.€€At€that€time€Mark€Bright€was€the€Human€Resources€Director€and€ThomasÏDuncan€was€the€Safety€Director.€€In€March,€1995€the€plaintiffððs€problems€increased€to€where€herÏhands€started€getting€numb€and€stinging€and€the€pain€became€unbearable€whereupon€she€wasÏexamined€by€Dr.€Archer€W.€Bishop,€Jr.€who€diagnosed€carpal€tunnel€and€recommended€surgery.€ÏPlaintiff€advised€her€husband€who€was€in€a€supervisory€or€management€position€and€to€whomÏemployees€could€report€work€related€injuries.€€The€plaintiff€discussed€her€condition€and€surgeryÐ 09€48 Ðwith€Mr.€Bright,€Mr.€Duncan€and€with€Don€Henderson€who€was€also€a€supervisor.€€Plaintiff€wentÏinto€surgery€July€12,€1995€and€missed€only€two€or€three€days€prior€to€returning€to€work.€€In€orderÏto€be€able€return€to€work,€plaintiffððs€left€hand€had€a€wad€of€gauzes€around€it€big€enough€to€fit€herÏhand€with€a€brace€around€the€bandages€that€went€almost€to€her€elbow.€Plaintiff€testified€thisÏallowed€her€to€use€a€pen€to€sign€her€name.€€€Plaintiffððs€testimony€was€not€rebutted€that€theÏHuman€Resources€Director€joked€with€the€plaintiff€because€of€the€employment€position€she€wasÏin€and€also€because€her€husband€was€working€there€suggesting€that€it€was€not€a€good€thing€to€fileÏa€compensation€claim€as€she€had€been€given€a€challenge€by€the€corporate€office€in€Quincy,ÏIllinois€to€reduce€workerððs€compensation€claims€by€50%.€€The€plaintiff€did€not€feel€she€could€fileÏa€workerððs€compensation€claim€without€causing€severe€repercussions.€€Evidence€was€also€notÏrebutted€that€Mr.€Duncan,€the€Safety€Director,€had€provided€her€with€braces€for€her€wrist,€œpads,›Ïand€œa›€œspecial€keyboard›€to€relieve€the€stress€of€carpal€tunnel.€The€trial€court€found€that€writtenÏnotice€of€the€injury€was€ð ðreasonablyðð€excused€under€the€facts€of€this€case€and€that€plaintiff€gaveÏactual€notice€of€her€injury.€€Ìà  àOur€review€of€the€findings€of€the€fact€made€by€the€trial€court€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€recordÐ ð@ Ðof€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€finding€unless€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225€(e)€(2).€€òòStone€v.€CityÐ °"  Ðof€McMinnville,óó€896€S.W.2nd€584€(Tenn.€1991).€€On€the€issue€of€notice,€the€trial€judge€found€thatÐ $à" Ðunrefuted€testimony€was€to€the€effect€that€the€plaintiff€was€conforming€with€the€managerial€andÏcorporate€policy€of€€the€defendant€in€keeping€workerððs€compensation€claims€suppressed€andÏdiscouraged€as€to€a€reasonable€explanation€for€plaintiffððs€not€filing€written€notice€of€her€claim.€ÏThe€trial€court€further€found€that€plaintiff€gave€actual€notice€of€her€injury€to€her€employer€andÏthat€the€employer€showed€no€prejudice€by€the€employeeððs€failure€to€give€written€notice€of€injury.€ÏThe€employee€was€treated€by€Dr.€Archer€Bishop€who€was€the€doctor€to€whom€the€employerÏroutinely€sent€its€employees€in€cases€involving€workerððs€compensation€claims.€€Additionally,€theÏdefendant€failed€to€produce€any€testimony€to€contradict€the€testimony€of€the€plaintiff€€insofar€as€itÏrelates€to€the€Director€of€Safety,€Thomas€Duncan,€or€as€far€as€it€relates€to€the€Human€ResourcesÏManager,€Mark€Bright,€to€the€effect€that€they€were€aware€that€she€was€suffering€from€carpalÏtunnel€syndrome€which€was€work€related.€€Both€were€still€employed€by€the€defendant€at€the€timeÐ 09€48 Ðof€trial€and€could€have€been€called€upon€to€offer€testimony€disputing€that€of€the€plaintiff.€ÏEvidence€of€actual€knowledge€of€plaintiffððs€accidental€injury€is€such€that€it€was€incumbent€uponÏthe€defendant€to€have€Mr.€Bright€and/or€Mr.€Duncan€deny€it€if€in€fact€they€had€such€knowledge.€ÏThis€issue€turns€on€the€creditability€and€weight€to€be€accorded€the€oral€testimony€given€by€theÏplaintiff€at€trial€as€well€as€having€all€the€elements€necessary€to€invoke€the€missing€witness€rule.€ÏòòSweeney€v.€State,óó€768€S.W.2nd€253,€259€(Tenn.€1989);€€òòJones€v.€The€Hartford€Accident€&Ð `  ÐIndemnity€Co.,óó€811€S.W.2nd€516,€521€(Tenn.€1991).€€Ð ð@  Ðà  àImplicit€in€the€œtrial›€courtððs€holding€is€the€finding€that€the€plaintiffððs€testimony€wasÏsufficiently€creditable€to€carry€her€burden€of€proof€and€in€as€much€as€at€least€one€of€defendantððsÏsupervisors€attempted€to€accommodate€the€plaintiff€by€providing€pads,€braces,€and€a€differentÏcomputer€keyboard€to€relieve€the€stress€in€her€wrist€constitutes€circumstantial€evidence€of€actualÏknowledge€that€plaintiff€sustained€an€injury.€€The€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trialÏcourtððs€findings€that€the€defendant€had€actual€notice€of€plaintiffððs€work€related€injury€and€aÏreasonable€excuse€for€failure€of€the€plaintiff€to€give€written€notice.Ìà  àThe€employer€next€contends€the€trial€court€was€in€error€in€choosing€the€surgical€date€ofÏone€extremity€as€the€date€to€commence€the€statute€of€limitations.Ìà  àIn€rendering€his€Opinion,€the€trial€judge€found€that€the€gradual€injury€did€not€result€in€aÏdisability€from€work€until€July,€1995€when€the€plaintiff€had€surgery€for€her€carpal€tunnelÏcondition€on€her€right€hand€and€that€she€was€diagnosed€with€the€same€condition€in€her€left€hand.€ÏWhen€the€trial€judge€has€made€a€determination€based€upon€testimony€of€witnesses€whom€he€hasÏseen€and€heard,€great€difference€must€be€given€to€that€finding€in€determining€whether€theÏevidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€judgeððs€determination.€€òòHumphrey€v.€David€Witherspoon,Ð ,`'* ÐInc.,óó€734€S.W.2nd€315€(Tenn.€1987).€€The€plaintiff€has€testified€as€to€the€increase€of€herÐ ð-@), Ðsymptoms€to€the€point€that€the€pain€became€unbearable€and€she€sought€the€medical€advice€of€Dr.ÏBishop€who€recommended€surgery.€€€The€findings€of€the€trial€court€which€are€dependent€uponÏdetermining€the€creditability€of€witnesses€are€entitled€to€great€weight.€€òòTown€of€Alamo€v.€Ð 3à.2 ÐForcum„James€Co.,óó€327€S.W.2nd€47,€49€(1959.Ð p5À04 Ðà  àPlaintiff€contends€that€her€condition€was€such€that€she€did€not€become€unable€to€workÏuntil€July€12,€1995€when€she€had€surgery€and€that€the€accidental€injury€should€be€considered€toÐ 09€48 Ðhave€occurred€at€this€time.€€It€is€plaintiffððs€position€that€she€suffered€a€gradual€injury€and€that€herÏcase€should€be€controlled€by€decisions€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€òòBarker€v.€Home„Crest€Corp.,€óó805Ð à ÐS.W.2nd€373,€(Tenn.€1991)€and€òòBrown€Shoe€Co.€v.€Reed,óó€350€S.W.2nd€65,€(Tenn.€1961).€€WeÐ pÀ Ðconclude€the€facts€of€the€present€case€should€be€controlled€by€the€rulings€in€the€òòBarker€óóandÐ P   ÐòòBrown€Shoe€Companyóó€cases.€€Ð 0 € Ðà  àIn€òòBarkeróó€the€court€held€the€employee€had€sustained€a€gradual€injury€and€that€theÐ `  Ðaccidental€injury€occurred€during€March,€1989€when€the€plaintiff€became€unable€to€work€andÏsurgery€was€performed.€€The€plaintiff€first€had€symptoms€of€numbness€and€tingling€in€her€handsÏin€May,€1988€and€was€diagnosed€as€having€a€probable€carpal€tunnel€injury.€€Testing€in€JuneÏrevealed€a€bilateral€severe€carpal€tunnel€syndrome€and€cortisone€injections€were€given.€€In€JulyÏthe€employee€seemed€to€be€doing€better€and€visits€continued€in€August€and€October€whenÏsurgery€was€recommended.€€Finally,€the€employeeððs€condition€became€so€painful€she€could€notÏcontinue€working€and€surgery€was€performed€during€March,€1989.€€The€Supreme€Court€notedÏthat€where€the€injury€occurs€gradually€from€repeated€work„related€incidents,€Tennessee€was€inÏaccord€with€the€majority€of€€jurisdictions€holding€the€accidental€injury€occurred€when€theÏemployeeððs€condition€reached€the€point€that€the€employee€could€no€longer€work€at€his/her€job.€€InÏthe€òòBrown€Shoe€Companyóó€case,€the€court€ruled€that€the€date€of€the€accidental€injury€was€the€dateÐ °"  Ðon€which€the€condition€finally€prevented€the€employee€from€performing€his€work.€ÌÓ  Óà  àTherefore,€we€find€and€hold€that€the€plaintiff€was€suffering€from€a€gradual€injury€due€toÏrepetitive€work„related€movements€of€her€hands€and€that€she€never€became€disabled€to€work€untilÏJuly€12,€1995,€at€which€time€the€accidental€injury€is€considered€to€have€occurred€and€that€herÏcomplaint€for€workerððs€compensation€benefits€was€filed€July€9,€1996€within€one€year€of€theÏaccidental€injury.€€Ìà  àDefendant€next€contends€that€plaintiffððs€own€testimony,€when€supported€by€the€medicalÏtestimony€and€testimony€of€Dr.€Craig€Colvin,€preponderates€against€the€disability€award€given€byÏthe€trial€court€of€a€30%€disability€to€her€upper€extremities.€€Dr.€Archer€Bishop€assigned€a€5%Ïpermanent€impairment€to€the€employeeððs€right€upper€extremity€and€due€to€his€failure€to€see€her€forÏover€a€year,€he€assigned€no€impairment€to€her€left€upper€extremity.€€Dr.€Gilbert€Hyde,€an€orthopedicÏsurgeon,€examined€the€plaintiff€and€opined€the€plaintiff€sustained€a€5%€permanent€physicalÐ 09€48 Ðimpairment€to€each€of€her€extremities€with€regard€to€the€carpal€tunnel€syndrome.€€Dr.€Hyde€placedÏrestrictions€or€limitations€on€the€plaintiff,€to€avoid€additional€injury,€in€that€she€should€avoidÏrepetitive€motion€activities€with€regard€to€her€hands€and€wrists€and€also€avoid€lifting€activities€overÏ30€„€35€pounds.€€Utilizing€an€alternative€method€other€than€the€AMA€Guides€for€calculatingÏimpairment€for€carpal€tunnel€base€injury,€Dr.€Hyde€characterized€plaintiffððs€carpal€tunnel€symptomsÏas€mild€with€median€nerve€entrapment€at€the€wrist€level€resulting€in€a€10%€impairment€to€the€upperÏextremities.€€Dr.€Hydeððs€diagnosis€of€carpal€tunnel€was€based€on€history€and€subjective€complaintsÏof€the€plaintiff€and€testing€was€negative€for€median€nerve€entrapment.€€Ìà  àDr.€Craig€Colvin,€an€associate€coordinator€and€associate€professor€at€the€University€ofÏTennessee€in€the€rehabilitation€counselor€training€program,€opined€that€the€plaintiff€has€anÏoccupational€disability€of€approximately€40%.€€Dr.€Colvin€based€his€opinion€€upon€plaintiffððs€workÏhistory€of€being€an€occupational€nurse,€highly€skilled€in€the€human€resource€section€ofÏadministration€of€two€organizations;€her€capacity€to€understand€and€carry€out€verbal€and€writtenÏinstructions€in€accordance€with€state€and€federal€laws;€carrying€out€the€mandates€of€her€employer;€Ïconsideration€of€€the€limitations€set€forth€by€Dr.€Bishop€and€Dr.€Hyde€to€avoid€repetitive€motion€ofÏthe€hands,€the€wrist€with€a€lifting€restriction€of€30€„€35€pounds;€and€all€of€the€jobs€available€to€herÏbefore€this€carpal€tunnel€and€all€jobs€available€to€her€now€with€transferable€skills.€€Dr.€Colvin€notedÏthat€the€plaintiffððs€present€employment€is€physically€less€stressful€than€her€former€employment€withÏDico.€€The€employer€has€presented€no€evidence€to€contradict€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Colvin.€€In€makingÏdeterminations€of€vocational€disability,€the€court€shall€consider€all€pertinent€factors,€including€layÏand€expert€testimony,€employees€age,€formal€education,€skills€and€training,€local€job€opportunities,Ïand€capacity€to€work€in€types€of€employment€available€in€claimantððs€disabled€condition.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€50„6„241€(a)€(1).€€The€preponderance€of€the€evidence€supports€the€trial€judgeððs€award€of€30%Ïdisability€to€her€upper€extremities.Ìà  àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€with€costs€assessed€to€the€appellant.€€Ìà  àà ` àÌÓÓà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h à______________________________________________Ìà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àJohn€S.€McLellan,€III,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌœñÿñÌñÿñññ›ññññÐ  :p59 Ðññññ‡ñññÿñÌñÿñ›ÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ______________________________________Ìññœññ€œE.€Riley€Andersonñþñ,€Chief€Justiceñþñ›ÌÌÌ______________________________________Ì€Roger€E.€Thayer,€Special€œJudgeññÐ  `  Ðññññ›ññññÔ‡ XLXXXÔññññññññññññßl€ *6&"h 8 `€€E±tt06H°¨çlßâ °H°H°(#°(#âññññà@ÀÀ|àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° ÐÌÓ  ÓAT€KNOXVILLEÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌANNE€KAY€METIER€€€€à  àà h àà À à)à  àAnderson€CountyÐ ´  ÐCircuitÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àNo.€96LA0311Ð ` ° Ðâ °(#°(#°H°Hâà  àPlaintiff/Appelleeà h àà À à)Ð 6 †  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àHon.€James€B.€Scott,€Jr.,Ð  \  Ðv.à  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àChancellorÐ â 2  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ÌDICO€TIRE,€INC.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)à  àS.€Ct.€No.€03„S„01„9710„CV„00122Ð ŽÞ  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà  àDefendant/Appellantà h àà À à)à  àAFFIRMEDÐ :Š  ÐÌà@¤¤#ìàòòJUDGMENT€ORDERóóˆÐ æ6 ÐÌÓÓà  àà ` àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€defendantsðð€motion€forÏreview€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(5)(B),€the€entireÏrecord,€including€the€order€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'ÏCompensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panel's€Memorandum€OpinionÏsetting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€whichÏare€incorporated€herein€by€reference;ÌÌà  àà ` àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€motion€forÏreview€is€not€well„taken€and€should€be€denied;€andÌÌà  àà ` àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€ofÏfact€and€conclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€theÏdecision€of€the€Panel€is€made€the€judgment€of€the€Court.ÌÌà  àà ` àCosts€will€be€paid€by€defendant„appellant€and€surety,€forÏwhich€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.Ìà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPER€CURIAMÌÌAnderson,€C.J.,€not€participatingšÔ#†XòXX XLuR#Ôññ›Ð ª2ú-7 Ð