ÿWPC– 7# UN %k 0ûqU:l4¦ºÉ ÉÏw@× 0? 0DV 0š 0D± 0Jõ 0T? 0^“ 0hñ 0rY 0|Ë 0†G 0Í 1u] 0dÒ AQ6Ƈ 0DM 0@‘ BÑ D/î B D3:U>mU *«U*ÕB)ÿDC( AMk̸Á„v~EvÓØHP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ÓH=$¡¡Ñ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€XÎ_XXXÔÑ7€¾úXXdðXXdð7Ñ, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular‘uŸ#øð 3|x!H å  æ Pç è  é ê Vë îí Ó€÷ Ó€!(ï(3”ù$¤¤Ý ƒH=!ÝÑ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÔ€X˜ÓXXXÔÑ7€etXXdìdì7ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(ï3™n$©©Ý ƒH=!ÝÑ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€X¸÷XXXÔÑ7€mXXdìXXdì7ÑÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ!"#&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò d(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd$$$$'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd!#1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ÂÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€.ÔÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€.ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€.XÔÌÌJanuaryÏ26,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó ó ·Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€.ÔÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€.ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€.XÔÌÌJanuaryÏ26,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿáùEG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€-ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€.ÔÑ#€//Xd#ÑÑ#€//Xd#ÑÝ  ÝÙ€!ÙÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÑ À ÑÑ X Ñò òßR€231A1-j|` 81 `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌÌó óà@ àò òIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àSPECIAL€WORKERS'€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEó óÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœANNIE€ATKINS,à àà à›à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)à à›Ìà àœPlaintiff/Appelleeà à›à àà à)à àœROBERTSON€CIRCUIT›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àœ›Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àœ)à àNO.€€01S01„9706„CV„00138›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌœYAMAKAWA€MANUFACTURINGà à)à àHON.€JAMES€E.€WALTON,ÌCORPORATION€OF€AMERICA,›à àà à)à àœJUDGE›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àœDefendant/Appellant›à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòÌFor€the€Appellant:à àà àà àà àFor€the€Appellee:ÌÌó óóóWilliam€A.€Blue,€Jr.à àà àà àà àWilliam€L.€UnderhillÌS.€Craig€Mooreà àà àà àà à509€Lentz€DriveÌConstangy,€Brooks€&€Smithà àà àMadison,€TN€37115Ì2100€West€End€Avenue,€Suite€1080ÌNashville,€TN€37203„5231òòò òÌÌÌÌÌÌÌóóó óÌÌÓ  Óò òòòM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌò òòòMembers€of€Panel:ÌÌó óóóChief€Justice€Adolpho€A.€Birch,€Jr.ÌSenior€Judge€John€K.€ByersÌSpecial€Judge€Hamilton€V.€Gayden,€Jr.ÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÔ% € ÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœAFFIRMED›€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àBYERS,€Senior€JudgeÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòò òOPINIONó óóóÌÓ  Óà àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€CourtÏof€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€Ìà àThe€plaintiff€filed€this€suit€and€alleged€she€had€developed€bilateral€carpalÏtunnel€syndrome€in€the€course€and€scope€of€her€employment€with€the€defendant.€ÏThe€trial€judge€found€the€plaintiff€had€sustained€an€anatomical€impairment€of€tenÏpercent€to€the€right€wrist€and€five€percent€to€the€left€wrist€for€an€average€of€sevenÏand€one€half€percent€to€each€wrist.€€€à àÌà àThe€trial€judge€awarded€the€plaintiff€permanent€partial€benefits€based€on€aÏfinding€of€35€percent€vocational€disability€to€each€arm,€ordering€part€of€the€award€toÏbe€paid€in€a€lump€sum.€€The€trial€judge€also€awarded€the€plaintiff€the€expense€ofÏobtaining€the€Standard€Form€Medical€Report€and€deposition€of€her€treatingÏphysician€as€well€as€the€expenses€of€taking€the€depositions€of€two€evaluatingÏphysicians.Ìà àThe€defendant€says€the€plaintiff€is€not€vocationally€disabled€and€therefore€notÏentitled€to€benefits€and€expenses.€Ìà àWe€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€was€age€40€at€the€time€of€trial.€€She€is€a€divorced€mother€of€fiveÏchildren€who€has€a€high€school€degree€with€no€specialized€job€skills€or€training.€ÏHer€work€history€consists€almost€entirely€of€unskilled,€hand€intensive€labor.€€TheÏplaintiff€has€worked€for€the€defendant€as€a€machine€operator€since€early€1992.€€InÏthis€capacity,€the€plaintiff€presses€buttons€of€five€different€machines€whileÏcontinuously€loading€and€unloading€parts€from€the€machines€and€placingÏcompleted€component€parts€in€a€basket€at€her€work€station.Ìà àThe€evidence€of€whether€the€plaintiff€has€sustained€a€vocational€disability€isÏbased€upon€the€testimony€of€the€plaintiff€and€the€depositions€of€three€doctors.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€testified€she€began€having€pain€in€her€hands€as€early€as€1993.€ÏShe€saw€a€series€of€doctors€about€this€pain.€€In€May€1996,€she€selected€Dr.€Jack€M.ÏMiller,€whom€she€saw€for€examination,€treatment,€and€operation.€€The€plaintiffÏunderwent€surgery€first€on€her€right€hand€and€later€on€her€left€hand,€but€she€testifiedÏthat€she€continued€to€complain€to€Dr.€Miller€about€the€pain€and€numbness€in€herÏhands€even€after€the€surgeries.€€The€plaintiff€also€saw€Dr.€McInnis€and€Dr.€FishbeinÏfor€evaluation€purposes.€€The€plaintiff€further€testified€that€she€continues€to€haveÏpain€in€her€hands€while€working€for€the€defendant€and€while€doing€her€day„to„dayÏactivities€at€home.Ìà àDr.€Jack€Miller€was€the€plaintiffððs€treating€physician€who€performed€the€carpalÏtunnel€release€surgeries.€€After€each€surgery,€Dr.€Miller€restricted€the€plaintiff€to€lightÏduty€work€for€a€few€months,€but€he€released€her€to€regular€work€without€anyÏrestrictions€on€October€23,€1996.€€On€November€20,€1996,€Dr.€Miller€examined€theÍplaintiff€and€determined€that€she€had€good€grip€strength€and€no€loss€of€sensation€inÏher€hands.€€Dr.€Miller€testified€that€the€plaintiff€did€not€have€any€permanent€partialÏimpairment€and€issued€her€a€zero€percent€impairment€rating€based€on€the€òòAmericanÏMedical€Association€Guides€to€the€Evaluation€of€Permanent€Impairment,€4th€Ed.óó€€Ìà àDr.€John€McInnis€saw€the€plaintiff€for€evaluation€purposes.€€He€performedÏvarious€tests€and€determined€that€the€plaintiff€had€a€satisfactory€result€from€theÏsurgeries.€€Dr.€McInnis€testified€that€the€plaintiff€had€suffered€a€permanent€injury€andÏthat€she€would€retain€a€ten€percent€permanent€partial€impairment€to€her€right€armÏand€a€five€percent€permanent€partial€impairment€to€her€left€arm€based€on€the€òòAMAÏGuidesóó.Ìà àDr.€Richard€Fishbein€also€saw€the€plaintiff€for€evaluation€purposes.€€HeÏperformed€the€same€tests€that€Dr.€McInnis€performed,€and€he€relied€upon€the€sameÏinformation€that€Dr.€McInnis€relied€upon€in€making€his€determinations.€€Dr.€FishbeinÏtestified€that€the€plaintiff€sustained€a€15€percent€permanent€partial€impairment€to€theÏright€arm€and€a€ten€percent€permanent€partial€impairment€to€the€left€arm.Ìà àAfter€reviewing€all€of€the€medical€and€lay€proof€and€concluding€that€theÏplaintiff€had€sustained€an€anatomical€impairment€of€ten€percent€to€the€right€wrist€andÏfive€percent€to€the€left€wrist€for€an€average€of€seven€and€one€half€percent€to€eachÏwrist,€the€trial€judge€awarded€the€plaintiff€permanent€partial€benefits€based€on€aÏfinding€of€35€percent€vocational€disability€to€each€arm.Ìà àThe€defendant€first€contends€that€the€ultimate€issue€is€not€the€extent€ofÏanatomical€disability€but€the€extent€of€vocational€disability.€€Based€on€the€medicalÏopinion€of€Dr.€Miller,€who€issued€the€plaintiff€a€zero€percent€impairment€rating,€theÏdefendant€argues€that€the€plaintiff€has€no€vocational€disability.€Ìà àOur€review€of€the€findings€of€fact€made€by€the€trial€court€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€theÏrecord€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€theÏfinding,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€œotherwise.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.òò›€œ€€€Ïððó󛀜50„6„225(e)(2);›€œòòStone›€v.€City€of€McMinnville,€óó896€S.W.2d€584€(Tenn.€1991).€Ìà àIn€rendering€his€decision€on€vocational€disability,€the€trial€judge€specificallyÏnoted€that:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ H ÒÓÓð ðitððs€necessary€that€I€look€at€all€the€medical€proof€and€I€realize€that€Dr.€Miller€isÏa€treating€physician,€but€I€do€believe€that€itððs€appropriate€and€required€thatÏthe€Court€exam€(sic)€all€the€medical€proof€thatððs€presented€as€it€relates€to€anyÏanatomical€impairment.€.€.€.€€I€simply€find€that€Dr.€McInnis€is€in€the€middle,€inÏhis€rating,€between€the€two€and€I€find€his€testimony€to€be€extremely€credibleÏand€competent€and€I€place€great€weight€in€the€testimony€of€Dr.€McInnis.ððÌÌÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÓÓà àThe€trial€judge€may,€when€there€is€a€difference€in€opinion€between€theÏexperts,€accept€the€opinion€of€one€expert€over€the€opinions€of€the€others.€€òòJohnsonÏv.€Midwesco,€Inc.,óó€801€S.W.2d€804€(Tenn.€1990).€€However,€where€the€medicalÏtestimony€is€presented€by€deposition,€this€Court€is€able€to€make€its€ownÏindependent€assessment€of€the€medical€proof€to€determine€where€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€lies.€€òòCooper€v.€INA,€óó884€S.W.2d€446€(Tenn.€1994).Ìà àThe€defendant€further€argues€that€Dr.€Millerððs€opinion€should€be€given€moreÏweight€than€the€opinions€of€the€two€evaluating€physicians€because€Dr.€Miller€wasÏthe€plaintiffððs€treating€physician.€€òòHughes€v.€MTD€Products,€Inc.,óó€No.€02S01„9602„CH„00019€(Tenn.€Sept.€27,€1996);€òòSmith€v.€Bruce€Hardwood€Floors,óó€No.€02S01„9512„CH„00130€(Tenn.€Aug.€30,€1996);€òòNash€v.€Old€Republic€Ins.€Co.,óó€No.€02S01„9512„CV„00123€(Tenn.€May€17,€1996).€€In€response€to€this€argument,€we€point€outÏthat€the€rule€is€that€the€trial€judge€may€give€more€weight€to€the€treating€physicianððsÏtestimony,€but€he€is€not€required€to€do€so.Ìà àThe€trial€judge€further€found€that:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ H ÒÓÓð ðNot€only€must€I€look€at€the€medical€proof€when€there€is€dispute€as€there€isÏhere€concerning€the€anatomical€impairment,€I€also€can€and€feel€I€have€theÏduty€to€look€at€lay€testimony€when€there€is€dispute€in€the€medical€proof.€€I€findÏthat€the€plaintiff€is€a€credible€and€candid€witness.ððÌÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÌÓÓà àœThe€testimony€of€the€expert€witnesses€must€be€considered€in€conjunction€withÏthe€employee€and€other€lay€witnesses.€€òòThomas€v.€Aetna€Life€Ins.€Co.,óó€812€S.W.2dÏ278€(Tenn.€1991).€€Where›€the€trial€judge€has€made€a€determination€based€upon€theÏtestimony€of€witnesses€whom€he€has€seen€and€heard,€great€deference€must€beÏgiven€to€that€finding€in€determining€whether€the€evidence€preponderates€against€theÏtrial€judgeððs€determination.€€òòSeeóó€òòHumphrey€v.€David€Witherspoon,€Inc.,€óó734€S.W.2dÏ315€(Tenn.€1987).€€When€an€issue€hinges€on€the€credibility€of€witnesses,€the€trialÏcourt€will€not€be€reversed€unless€there€is€found€in€the€record€clear,€concrete,€andÏconvincing€œevidence,›€other€than€the€oral€testimony€of€œwitnesses,›€that€contradicts€theÏtrial€courtððs€findings.€òòGalbreath€v.€Harris,€óó811€S.W.2d€88,€91€(Tenn.€App.€1990),€òòcert.Ïdenied,óó€502€U.€S.€939€(1991).€€Ìà àOur€review€of€the€medical€and€lay€evidence€persuades€us€that€the€trial€judgeÏwas€correct€in€finding€Dr.€McInnisðð€testimony€to€be€most€compelling€and€in€findingÏthe€plaintiff€to€be€a€credible€witness.€€We€find€the€evidence€does€not€preponderateÏagainst€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€plaintiff€is€vocationally€disabled.Ìà àSecond,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€plaintiff€is€barred€from€recoveringÏexpenses€related€to€taking€Dr.€Millerððs€deposition€when€she€objected€to€the€use€ofÏhis€Standard€œForm€Medical›€(ð ðSFMðð)€Report€and€was€also€awarded€the€expenses€forÏhis€SFM€Report.€€On€September€20,€1996,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€notice€to€use€the€SFMÏReport€by€Dr.€Miller,€but€she€did€not€use€it€after€Dr.€Miller€returned€a€blank€SFMÏReport€with€only€a€ð ðn/aðð€notation€thereon€but€accepted€the€fee€for€completing€it.€ÏThen€on€December€26,€1996,€the€defendant€gave€notice€that€it€would€use€the€SFMÍReport€at€trial.€€However,€the€plaintiff€objected€to€the€use€of€the€SFM€Report€andÏdeposed€Dr.€Miller.Ìà àœTenn.›€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„235(c)€allows€a€party€to€admit€expert€medicalÏevidence€by€way€of€a€SFM€Report.€€œThe›€statute€also€says€that€the€other€party€canÏobject€to€the€use€of€a€SFM€Report€and€depose€the€doctor.€€The€statute€is€silent€onÏwhich€party€pays€for€the€costs€of€taking€the€doctorððs€deposition€upon€objection€to€theÏSFM€œReport.›Ìà àGiven€the€fact€that€Dr.€Miller€accepted€a€fee€to€complete€the€SFM€Report€andÏreturned€it€with€only€a€ð ðn/aðð€notation€on€it,€the€plaintiffððs€decision€to€object€toÏdefendantððs€use€of€the€SFM€Report€and€depose€Dr.€Miller€was€reasonable€andÏnecessary.€€Under€these€circumstances,€the€trial€judge€did€not€abuse€his€discretionÏin€awarding€these€expenses€to€the€plaintiff.Ìà àThird,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€plaintiff€should€not€be€allowed€toÏrecover€a€lump€sum€award€to€pay€for€expenses€unrelated€to€her€workersððÏcompensation€injury€when€those€expenses€could€be€paid€for€out€of€the€lump€sumÏpayment€of€accrued€benefits€and€that€the€plaintiff€has€not€proven€the€additional€lumpÏsum€award€is€in€her€best€interest€and€that€she€is€able€to€wisely€manage€it.€€The€trialÏcourt€awarded€the€plaintiff€a€lump€sum€payment€in€the€amount€of€$3,200.Ìà àThe€purpose€of€workersðð€compensation€is€to€provide€injured€workers€withÏperiodic€payments€which€are€a€substitute€for€regular€wages.€€òòHenson€v.€City€ofÏLawrenceburg,óó€851€S.W.2d€809€(Tenn.€1993).€€Periodic€payment€are€manifestly€inÏthe€best€interest€of€most€injured€workers€who€require€a€substitute€for€the€wagesÏwhich€they€are€no€longer€able€to€earn.€€Lump€sum€payments€are€considered€anÏexception€in€carrying€out€the€Workersðð€Compensation€Act.€€When€the€plaintiff€canÏdemonstrate€to€the€court€that€she€can€handle€the€lump€sum€payment€wisely€and€thatÍthe€payment€is€in€her€best€interest,€the€court€has€upheld€such€payments€as€anÏexception€to€the€general€rule.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„229(a);€òòClayton€v.ÏCookeville€Energy,€Inc.,óó€824€S.W.2d€167€(Tenn.€1992);€òòNorth€American€Royalties€v.ÏThrasher,óó€817€S.W.2d€308€(Tenn.€1991).Ìà àThe€plaintiff€testified€that€she€is€a€divorced€mother€of€five€children€and€theÏprimary€source€of€their€support.€€She€further€testified€that€she€would€use€the€partialÏlump€sum€payment€to€cover€medical€expenses€for€her€children€and€to€pay€œher›€carÏdebt.€€The€plaintiff€stated€that€she€would€prefer€to€receive€a€lump€sum€payment€soÏthat€she€could€pay€œher›€debts€at€one€time.Ìà àThe€trial€court€has€discretion€to€permit€or€refuse€commutation€of€an€award€intoÏa€lump€sum.€€The€award€of€a€lump€sum€payment€must€be€affirmed€on€appeal€unlessÏthis€Court€finds€an€abuse€of€discretion€by€the€trial€court.€€òòClayton€v.€CookevilleÏEnergy,€Inc.,óó€824€S.W.2d€167€(Tenn.€1992).€€Based€on€the€plaintiffððs€testimony,€itÏwas€reasonable€for€the€trial€judge€to€find€that€she€can€handle€the€lump€sum€paymentÏwisely€and€that€the€payment€is€in€her€best€œinterest,›€and€there€was€no€abuse€ofÏdiscretion€on€his€part.€€The€lump€sum€award€is€therefore€upheld.€€Ìà àFinally,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€plaintiff€should€not€be€allowed€toÏrecover€expenses€related€to€taking€the€depositions€of€two€evaluating€doctorsÏselected€by€her€in€addition€to€the€treating€physicianððs€œdeposition.òòÌà àóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„226(c)€addresses€this€issue.€€The€statute€says€inÏpertinent€part:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ H ÒÓÓð ðThe€fees€charged€to€the€claimant€by€the€treating€physician€or€a€specialist€toÏwhom€the€employee€was€referred€for€giving€testimony€by€oral€depositionÏrelative€to€the€claim,€shall,€unless€the€interests€of€justice€require€otherwise,€beÏconsidered€a€part€of€the€costs€of€the€case,€to€be€charged€against€theÏemployer€when€the€employee€is€the€prevailing€party.ððÌÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÌÓÓà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€judge€relied€upon€the€depositions€of€the€two€evaluatingÏphysicians€in€making€his€decision€on€the€plaintiffððs€vocational€disability.€€Therefore,Ïð ðthe€interests€of€justiceðð€do€not€require€that€these€expenses€should€be€borne€by€theÏplaintiff.€€Furthermore,€the›€trial€œjudgeððs›€award€for€these€expenses€was€strictlyÏdiscretionary€under€Rule€54.04,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€œP.€€We€find€no€error€concerning€theÏaward€of€these€discretionary€costs.€€òòSee€Miles€v.€Marshall€C.€Voss€Health€Care€Ctr.,óóÏ896€S.W.2d€773€(Tenn.€1995).›Ìà àWe€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌAdolpho€A.€Birch,€Chief€JusticeÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌHamilton€V.€Gayden,€Jr.,€Special€Judge€ÌœÇÒ  ÒÒ £ ÒòòÔ€.¼Ôà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌANNIE€ATKINS,à àà àà àà à}à àROBERTSON€CIRCUITÌà àà àà àà àà àà à}à àNo.€7994€BelowÌà àPlaintiff/Appelleeà àà àà à}Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à}à àHon.€James€E.€Walton,ÌßJ€24;+'b|M<` 81 `€@ÿJßvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à}à àJudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à}ÌYAMAKAWA€MANUFACTURINGà à}ÌCORPORATION€OF€AMERICA,à à}à àNo.€01S01„9706„CV„00138Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à}Ìà àDefendant/Appellantà àà à}à àAFFIRMED.ÌÌÌà@ àJUDGMENT€ORDERÌÌÌÓ€Óà àà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,€includingÏthe€order€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,Ïand€the€Panel's€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference.Ìà àà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€MemorandumÏOpinion€of€the€Panel€should€be€accepted€and€approved;€andÌà àà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€PanelÏis€made€the€judgment€of€the€Court.ÌÓ ` ` šXÓà àà àCosts€will€be€paid€by€Defendant/Appellant€and€Surety,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÓÓà àà àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€on€January€26,€1998.ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌóóÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ€.XÔ›