ÿWPC‡ 5# öUN %O 0(Uw@}4½Ñ à è ðøU<< 0J< 0T† 0^Ú 0h8 0r  0| 0†Ž 0 1u¤ 0d AQ} ÆÎ 0D” 0@Ø 0D D/\ B‹ B¨ D3Å U>ø B)6 DC_ AM¢ U*ï ý  v~6vÓ´˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ë Uì Uð Dñ Uò *îó Dô Dõ Dö D÷ D§ƒt!x3|x÷ b1b3b4-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d----7Border 1dd!#.Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial óÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€0XÔÌÌNovember€25,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€0XÔÌÌNovember€25,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtfHHÚ(ÿáÿáùE1À˜ýHHŽxЀxh'dHStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  inion Geneva ÒÒ  inion Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€,ÔÝ  Ý›Ñ\R AØ'\ќـ!ÙÙ€!ÙÔ€ ÔÔ€ ŠÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑßR€/1.A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›à@ àÞ ÞÌIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌà@ à(June€25,€1996€Session)ÌÌÌÌÔ% ‡ ÔROBERT€DENNIS€DAVIDSONÔ%†Ô,à@ à)à àà àMAURY€CIRCUITÌà@ à)Ìà àà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à@ à)à àà àHon.€œWilliam›€B.€œCain›Ìà@ à)Ìvs.à@ à)à àà àNo.€Ô% ‡ Ô01S01„9601„CV„00014Ô%† rÔÌà@ à)ÌLOWEððS€HOME€CENTER,€INC.,à@ à)Ìà@ à)Ìà àà àDefendant„Appellant.à@ à)ÌÌÌÌòòÒ€X€ÒFor€Appellantóó:ÌÌœJ.€Frank›€œThomas,€IIÌLeitner,€Warner,€Moffitt,€Williams,ÏDooley,€Carpenter€&€Napolitan›ÌNashville,€TnÉòòFor€Appelleeóó:ÌÌRichard€œT.€MatthewsÌMatthews€&€Tisher›ÌColumbia,€TnÌÌÌÉÒÒÌà@ àòòÔ% ‡ ÔMEMORANDUM€OPINIONÔ%† Ôóớ̜ÌÌÌÌà@ àMembers€of€Panel:ÌÌà@ àFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,€Associate€Justice,€Supreme€CourtÌà@ àJoe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌà@ àHamilton€V.€Gayden,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌ̛̜ÌÌÌÌœÌAFFIRMED›€AND€MODIFIEDà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€œ€€€€€GAYDEN,ÏJUDGEÇÑ7€fXXdìXXdì7ÑÓÓ›Ó  Óà àœThis›€workersðð€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordanceÏwith€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€œðð50„6„225(e)(3)›€for€hearing€and€reporting€of€findingsÏof€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€In€this€appeal,€the€defendant€contends€thatÏthe€trial€court€erred€in€applying€the€six€times€the€medical€impairment€ratingÏcap€œto›€the€returning€œclaimantððs€award€of€permanent€partial€disability€benefits.ÏThe€trial€court€utilized€the€six€times€the€medical€impairment›€rating€capÏœ(hereafter€the€ð ðsix€times€capðð)rather›€than€two€and€one„half€times€the€medicalÏœimpairment›€rating€œcap€(hereafter€the€ð ðtwo€and€one„half€times€capðð).›€€InÏaddition,€the€defendant€contends€the€œtrial€courtððs€final›€anatomical€rating€wasÏœexcessive.€€The›€defendant€also€contests€the€trial€courtððs€lump€sum€award€ofÏbenefits.€The€panel€concludes€that€the€award€should€beò ò€ó ógoverned€by€the€twoÏand€one„half€œtimes›€cap€and€reduces€the€anatomical€rating;€œhowever,€the›€panelÏaffirms€the€lump€sum€award.̛̜à àClaimant€suffered€an€injury€to€his€left€shoulder€in€the€scope€of€hisÏemployment€at€Loweððs€Home€Center€and€was€treated€by€Dr.€RandallÏDavidson€for€the€injury.€€Dr.€Davidson€diagnosed€claimant€with€a€torn€rotatorÍcuff€and€operated€to€repair€the€œtear.›€œClaimant›€œattained›€maximum€medicalÏœimprovement€and›€returned€to€work€at€Loweððs.̛̜à à€€Dr.€Davidson€opined€that€œclaimant›€had€suffered€a€twenty„threeÏpercent€(23%)€impairment€of€his€left€upper€extremity,€or€fourteen€percentÏ(14%)€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€He€œalso€imposed€lifting€restrictions€uponÏclaimant€which€included€the€prohibition€of›€overhead€work€with€the€leftÏshoulder.€€œClaimant›€was€also€examined€by€two€additional€physicians,€Dr.€JohnÏC.€McInnis€and€Dr.€Richard€E.€Fishbein.€€Dr.€McInnis€assigned€a€twentyÏpercent€(20%)€permanent€impairment€rating€to€the€left€shoulder,€or€twelveÏpercent€(12%)€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Dr.€Fishbein€assigned€the€appellee€aÏthirty„one€percent€(31%)€impairment€rating€to€the€left€shoulder,€or€nineteenÏpercent€(19%)€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Both€of€these€physicians€also€placedÏrestrictions€upon€claimantððs€physical€abilities.̛̜à àClaimant€returned€to€work€at€Loweððs€on€September€6,€1994,Ïapproximately€six€months€after€his€injury,€and€was€placed€in€charge€of€creatingÏa€ð ðkitchen€design€area.ðð€At€the€time€of€the€injury,€œclaimant›€had€been€earning€aÍwage€of€$8.00€per€hour.€€After€his€return€to€work€œclaimant›€earned€someÏamount€between€$8.35€and€$9.54€per€hour;€however,€he€did€not€receive€œasÏlarge€a€pay€increase€as›€he€claimed€œhe€had€been€promised›€before€the€injury.€ÏConsequently,€he€began€to€seek€other€employment,€namely€at€Home€Depot,€aÏdirect€competitor€of€the€defendantððs.€€On€June€5,€œ1995,›€claimant€ceasedÏworking€at€Loweððs.€€There€is€a€dispute€as€to€whether€claimant€€left€voluntarilyÏor€was€terminated.€òờ̜à àóóThe€trial€court€took€the€case€under€advisement€and€rendered€judgmentÏin€favor€of€the€claimant.€€œFinding€that›€the€claimantððs€ð ðtermination€ofÏemployment€subsequent€to€the€injury€was€a€mutually€satisfactoryÏdiscontinuance€of€employment€since€he€was€seeking€other€employment,€but€heÏdid€not€voluntarily€leave€his€œposition,ðð€the€trial€court€ruled›€that€œthe€case€wasÏgoverned€by€the›€œsix€times›€cap€œof›€œT.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(b).òò›ÌœÌ›à àóóThe€scope€of€review€is€found€in€T.C.A.€œðð50„6„225(e)(2),›€which€states:Ìð ðReview€of€findings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court€shall€be€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€recordÏof€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€theÍfinding,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.ðð̛̜à àThe€threshold€issue€in€this€appeal€is€whether€the€two€and€œone„half›€œtimes›Ïcap€found€in€œT.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(a)(1),›€or€the€six€œtimes›€cap€found€in€œT.C.A.Ïðð50„6„241(b),›€applies€to€this€case.€œT.C.A.€ðð50„6„241(a)(1)›€states€that€whereÏð ðthe€pre„injury€employer€returns€the€employee€to€employment€at€a€wage€equalÏto€or€greater€than€the€wage€the€employee€was€receiving€at€the€time€of€injury,Ïthe€maximum€permanent€partial€disability€award€that€the€employee€mayÏreceive€is€two€and€one„half€times€the€medical€impairment€œrating.ð𛀜Both›Ïsections€state€that€œin€making€determinations€the€court€should€consider›€ð ðallÏpertinent€factors,€including€lay€and€expert€testimony,€employeeððs€age,Ïeducation,€skills€and€training,€local€job€opportunities,€and€capacity€to€work€atÏtypes€of€employment€available€in€claimantððs€disabled€condition.ðð̛̜à àDefendant€œcontends›€that€the€trial€court€erred€œby›€not€applying€the€twoÏand€one„half€times€cap€œto€the€award,›€since€claimant€returned€to€work€for€anÏequal€or€greater€wage€and€his€later€departure€was€unrelated€to€his€œdisability.€ÏDefendant›€maintains€œthat€there›€was€no€causal€connection€between€the€injuryÍand€the€œclaimantððs€departure€from€employment›€œand€therefore›€the€two€andÏone„half€times€cap€œapplies.ÌÌ›à àClaimant€œcontends›€that€the€applicable€statute€is€œT.C.A.€ðð50„6„241(b)›Ïœwhich€imposes›€a€six€times€œcap€on€the€award€of€permanent€partial€benefits.›€ÏœClaimant€argues›€that€œT.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(a)(1)›€does€not€apply€since€claimantÏenjoyed€no€ð ðmeaningful€return€to€work.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòBailey€v.€Kreuger€Ringier,€Inc.óó,ÏNo.€02S01„9409„CH„00061€(May€17,€1995).€€Claimant€œasserts›€that€hisÏsudden€termination€was€involuntary,€unjustified€and€unreasonable,€since€heÏhad€done€no€more€than€express€some€unhappiness€with€his€employerððs€policies.€ÏThis€argument€is€rooted€in€claimantððs€contention€that€the€increase€in€salaryÏwas€promised€to€him€before€the€injury€but€this€promise€was€not€honored€uponÏhis€return.̛̜à àIn€òòBrown€v.€Tennesseeóó,€No.€01S01„9502„BC„00020€(Aug.€29,€1995)€aÏmaintenance€worker€injured€his€back€on€the€job€on€two€different€occasions€andÏwas€forced€to€undergo€surgery€and€extensive€treatment.€€After€returning€toÏwork€at€a€wage€greater€than€or€equal€to€his€previous€wage,€he€œvoluntarily›Íresigned.€€The€court€held€that,€in€order€to€activate€subsection€(a)(2),€ð ðthereÏmust€be€a€causal€connection€between€the€injury€and€the€subsequent€loss€ofÏemployment,€and€that€an€injured€worker€may€not€activate€that€section,€afterÏbeing€re„employed,€by€voluntarily€resigning,€unless€he€becomes€disabled€toÏwork€and€such€disability€is€causally€related€to€the€injury.ðð€€òòBrownóó,€òòsupraóó€œat›€5.€ÏClaimant€œasserts›€that€the€pertinent€question€is€whether€he€enjoyed€aÏð ðmeaningful€return€to€work.ðð€€In€òòBailey€v.€Kreuger€Ringier,€Inc.óó,€the€courtÏruled€that€an€injured€employee€who€attempted€his€job€for€three€weeks€andÏthen€had€to€stop€because€of€intense€pain€did€not€enjoy€a€ð ðmeaningful€return€toÏwork.ðð€€òòBaileyóó,€òòsupraóó€at€8.€€The€court€in€that€case€found€that€the€employeeððsÏreturn€to€work€was€merely€for€the€purpose€of€evaluating€his€ability€to€workÏand€that€the€two€and€one„half€times€cap€therefore€did€not€apply.€€œÌà àClaimant›€in€the€present€case€argues€that€his€return€to€work€likewise€wasÏnot€meaningful,€and€that€the€œsix€times›€cap€is€therefore€appropriate.€€However,Ïthe€record€shows€that€claimant€worked€at€his€job€for€several€months€at€fullÏcapacity,€evidently€to€the€satisfaction€of€his€employers.€€He€was€not€forced€toÏstop€because€of€pain€or€inability€to€perform€his€required€tasks,€and€his€re„employment€was€not€accomplished€on€a€trial€basis€to€check€his€ability€to€work.€ÍClaimantððs€situation€is€factually€different€from€the€situation€in€òòBaileyóó.€In€thisÏcase€the€claimant€œwas›€physically€œable€to€perform›€the€higher€paying€job€toÏwhich€he€returned.€€The€panel€finds€claimant€quit€voluntarily€due€to€œa›€salaryÏdispute€that€is€unrelated€œto€any€medical›€œdisability€and€that€he€enjoyed€aÏmeaningful€return€to€work.€Thus,›€in€light€of€the€fact€that€claimant€did€returnÏto€work€for€a€time€and€performed€his€duties€to€the€full€satisfaction€of€hisÏemployers,€œthe€panel›€œconcludes›€that€œthe€two€and€one„half€times€cap€ofÏsubsection›€(a)(1)€œgoverns€this€case.›€ÌœÌ›à àThe€next€question€is€whether€the€€trial€courtððs€award€of€permanentÏpartial€disability€benefits€based€œbased€upon€an›€industrial€disability€rating€ofÏsixty€percent€(60%)€to€the€body€as€a€whole€was€appropriate.€€DefendantÏasserts€that€the€actual€award€should€be€less€than€the€maximum€amountÏestablished€by€the€two€and€one„half€times€cap.€€Defendant€œcontends›€that€theÏcourt€should€take€into€account€œclaimantððs›€many€job€skills€and€degree€ofÏeducation€(factors€mentioned€in€the€statute)€in€determining€the€œpercentage€of›Ïdisability.€€Defendant€œasserts›€that€since€several€of€plaintiffððs€skills€and€hisÏdegree€of€training€are€not€affected,€the€award€should€be€œlowered.Ì›Ìà àœClaimant›€argues€that€the€60%€award€was€entirely€appropriate€since€theÏtrial€court€had€ample€evidence€of€the€claimantððs€job€skills€and€training.€ÏClaimant€contends€that€the€fact€that€he€has€failed€to€find€other€employmentÏsince€his€termination€at€Loweððs,€a€predicament€which€has€allegedly€beenÏbrought€about€by€his€injury€and€limitations,€supports€his€assertion€that€theÏaward€is€appropriate.€€As€further€support€for€his€contention,€claimant€pointsÏto€the€fact€that€his€interior€design€business,€his€only€current€source€of€income,Ïbrings€him€only€about€$6000.00€per€year.€ÌœÌ›à àBased€on€the€record€the€panel€awards€an€anatomical€permanent€partialÏdisability€rating€of€thirty€(30%)€per€cent€to€the€body€as€a€whole.ÌÓ ` ÜŽX)0*ŒX Ӝ̛€à àFinally,€defendant€argues€that€claimant€did€not€carry€his€burden€ofÏestablishing€that€an€award€of€a€lump€sum€was€appropriate,€contending€thatÏthe€evidence€did€not€establish€that€the€claimant€needed€a€lump€sum€forÏrehabilitative€purposes.€T.C.A.€Sec.€50„6„229€provides:€ð ðIn€determiningÏwhether€to€commute€an€award,€the€trial€court€shall€consider€whether€theÍcommutation€will€be€in€the€best€interest€of€the€employee,€and€such€court€shallÏalso€consider€the€ability€œof›€the€employee€to€wisely€manage€and€control€theÏcommuted€œaward.ðð€›€Defendant€cites€òòNorth€American€Royalties€v.€Thrasheróó,Ï817€S.W.2d€308,€310€(Tenn.€1991),€for€the€proposition€that€the€key€factorÏin€determining€the€employeeððs€best€interests€is€the€relevance€of€commutation€toÏthe€rehabilitation€of€the€worker.€€Defendant€argues€that€there€is€no€proof€thatÏthe€money€in€this€case€is€going€to€any€rehabilitative€purpose,€and€thus€theÏlump€sum€is€not€necessary.€€This€panel€does€œnot€agree›€with€this€assessment.ÏThe€case€relied€upon€by€defendant€does€not€indicate€that€rehabilitation€is€theÏonly€factor€in€determining€the€appropriateness€of€commutation.€€The€caseÏmerely€stands€for€the€proposition€that€rehabilitation€is€one€factor€in€theÏanalysis.€There€certainly€are€other€relevant€considerations€as€well.̛̜à àœClaimant›€has€named€a€number€of€acceptable€uses€for€the€money€and€hasÏeven€indicated€that€it€might€go€toward€education€for€a€new€career.€ÏFurthermore,€he€seems€reasonably€able€to€manage€funds,€as€indicated€by€hisÏpast€jobs,€current€position€as€a€partner€in€a€business,€and€even€his€position€asÏthe€head€of€a€project€at€Loweððs.€€Claimant€testified€that€he€has€had€experienceÍhandling€money€through€prior€business€ownership€and€managementÏexperience.€€He€also€indicated€that€he€planned€to€use€the€award€to€put€a€newÏroof€on€his€house,€pay€off€part€of€his€mortgage€and€pay€off€credit€cards,€butÏthat€he€was€not€behind€on€any€payments.€€Claimant€testified€that€he€wasÏð ðattempting€to€rehabilitateðð€himself€by€going€to€real€estate€school,€but€he€didÏnot€indicate€whether€he€needed€the€lump€sum€award€to€pay€for€tuition.€€HeÏstated€that€the€lump€sum€would€relieve€pressures€on€him,€thus€amelioratingÏstress€and€blood€pressure€problems.€€Claimant€and€a€partner€own€and€operateÏan€interior€design€business.€€He€is€also€a€commercial€artist.€€Past€experienceÏand€education€include€a€high€school€diploma,€ten€years€in€the€United€StatesÏAir€Force,€including€training€in€management€and€personnel,€several€courses€atÏthe€University€of€Tennessee,€and€a€Dale€Carnegie€management€course.€ÏClaimant€was€a€minister€for€eight€years,€owned€and€operated€his€own€floristÏbusiness,€worked€as€a€furniture€salesman€in€a€department€store,€and€workedÏmanagement€in€a€restaurant.€€Claimant€also€ran€a€construction€company,Ïincluding€planning€and€daily€operation€of€the€business€in€addition€to€actualÏconstruction,€before€opening€the€interior€design€business.̛̜à àBased€on€the€proof€in€this€case€the€panel€is€of€the€opinion€that€a€lumpÏsum€award€was€appropriate.̛̜à àThe€œjudgment›€of€the€trial€court€is€therefore€affirmed€and€modified.€ÏCosts€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€defendant.ÌÌœ›à àà àà àà àà àà àÓÓÔ€ XÔ____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àHamilton€V.€Gayden,€Jr.,€Special€œJudgeÌÌÌCONCUR:Ì____________________________________ÌFrank›€F.€Drowota,€III,€Associate€JusticeÌÌÌ____________________________________ÌJoe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€œJudgeÔ€ ŠÔ›ÌÌœÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÒ 4 ÒÒ ° ÒÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒßJ€/2;+'b|` ç `€@ÿJßà0 àà àà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌÌROBERT€DENNIS€DAVIDSON,à à)à àMaury€CircuitÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€€6514Ìà àà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€William€B.€Cain,€JudgeÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€€01„S„01„9601„CV„00014ÌLOWE'S€HOME€CENTER,€INC.,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àDefendant/Appellant.à à)à àAffirmed€and€Modified.ÌÌÌÌò òòòà@ àJUDGMENT€ORDERó óóóÌÌÓÓà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€a€motion€for€review€pursuant€toÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(5)(B),€the€entire€record,€including€theÏorder€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,Ïand€the€Panel's€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€factÏand€conclusions€of€law,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference;Ìà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€motion€for€review€isÏnot€well„taken€and€should€be€denied;€andÌà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€theÏPanel€is€made€the€judgment€of€the€Court.Ìà àCosts€will€be€paid€by€the€defendant/appellant,€Lowe's€HomeÏCenter,€Inc.,€and€its€surety,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.Ìà àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€this€25th€day€of€November,€1996.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌÓÓÌDrowota,€J.,€Not€Participating›