ÿWPCÓ 7# UN %k 0(qwš™43GVÆ^Æ$Æêư 0Jv 0TÀ 0^ 0hr 0rÚ 0|L 0†È 0N 1uÞ 0dS AQ· Æ 0DÎ 0@ 0DR D/– BÅ Bâ D3ÿU>2B)pDC™ AMÜU *)S)Yv~‚vÓ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡äEå æPçèIéDêIëìíÓ€ùûVü îýÓ€  D D D ED k`($3|xLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ !"#%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd&&&&'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d////7Border 1dd "0Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial üÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€2ÔÔ€2ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€2XÔÌÌò òFebruary€2,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€2ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€2ÔÔ€2ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€2XÔÌÌò òFebruary€2,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€2ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿáùEG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Ñ7€¶%XXdìdÈ7ÑÞ ÞÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌœÌÌÌÌÌÌTOMMY€FREEMAN,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff,à àà àà àà à)à àMADISON€CHANCERYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€JOE€C.€MORRIS,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àCHANCELLORÌÙ€ ÙßR€130A1-j|p ` Å `€€@ÿRßMADISON€COUNTY€SHERIFFððSà àà à)€ÌDEPARTMENT,à àà àà àà à)à àNO.€02S01„9704„CH„00034Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant.à àà àà àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiffóó:à àà àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendantóó:ÌRussell€E.€Reviereà àà àà àà àGeorge€L.€Morrison,€IIIÌRainey,€Kizer,€Butler,€Reviere€&€Bellà àP.O.€Box€182Ì209€East€Main€Street€à àà àà àà àJackson,€TN€38302ÌJackson,€TN€38302„1147à àà àà àÌÌÌÌà@ àòòMEMORANDUM€OPINIONóóÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àòòMEMBERS€OF€PANELóó:ÌÌà@ àJANICE€M.€HOLDER,€€JUSTICEÌà@ àHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌà@ àCORNELIA€A.€CLARK,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌREVERSED€AND€DISMISSEDà àà àà à€€€€€€CLARK,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThis€workersðð€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏÑ7€¶%XXdìXXdì7ÑWorkersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€with€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€of€findings€of€fact€and€conclusionsÏof€law.€€The€issues€presented€by€this€appeal€are€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€thatÏthe€statutory€presumption€created€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€7„51„201€applied€to€plaintiff€andÏwhether€or€not€the€defendantððs€medical€proof€overcame€the€presumption.€€The€panelÏconcludes€that€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€awarding€benefits€should€be€reversed€and€theÏcase€dismissed€for€the€reasons€stated€herein.Ìà àThomas€Freeman€(ð ðplaintiffðð)€was€employed€by€the€Madison€County€SheriffððsÏDepartment€in€1971.€€He€served€as€a€deputy€for€a€year€and€then€was€promoted€to€the€rankÏof€Captain.€€He€stayed€in€the€rank€of€Captain€until€1991,€when€he€was€appointed€AssistantÏChief€Deputy.€€He€had€been€appointed€to€the€position€of€Chief€Deputy€at€the€time€of€trial.€ÏIn€the€early€days€following€his€promotion€to€Captain,€plaintiff€assumed€supervisory€dutiesÏalong€with€his€regular€duties.€€However,€as€the€department€grew€he€began€to€delegate€moreÏof€the€regular€duties€and€moved€into€a€more€supervisory€role.€€With€the€promotion€toÏAssistant€Chief€Deputy,€he€assumed€even€more€of€a€supervisory€and€administrativeÏposition.€€Since€1991,€his€job€duties€have€been€primarily€that€of€supervisor€and›€he€was€notÏrequired€to€go€out€on€patrol€or€do€things€such€as€working€on€accidents€as€part€of€his€regularÏjob€duties.€€Ìà àIn€November,€1994€plaintiff€begin€to€experience€symptoms€of€a€heart€attack€whileÏsitting€at€his€desk€at€work.€€Nothing€œout€of€the€ordinary€occurred›€on€the€œjob›€either€on€thatÏday€or€in€the€time€period€before€that.€€He€was€subsequently€treated€for€a€heart€attack€at€aÍlocal€hospital€and€was€diagnosed€with€coronary€artery€disease.€€He€underwent€quintupleÏbypass€surgery€thereafter.€€He€returned€to€work€on€a€gradual€basis€and€is€now€working€fullÏtime€in€his€former€position€as€Chief€Deputy.€€Plaintiff€was€fifty„one€years€old€at€the€time€ofÏhis€heart€attack.Ìà àThe€medical€proof€consisted€of€the€testimony€of€several€physicians€by€deposition,Ïwhich€testimony€is€summarized€as€follows:Ìà àDr.€James€Crenshaw,€a€cardiologist,€testified€that€he€was€called€to€the€emergencyÏroom€to€examine€plaintiff,€after€plaintiff€œwas€admitted›€complaining€of€chest€pains€andÏsuffering€from€an€acute€myocardial€infarction.€€Following€Dr.€Crenshawððs€examination,€theÏdiagnosis€of€heart€attack€was€confirmed€by€an€electrocardiogram.€€On€the€following€dayÏplaintiff€underwent€a€heart€catheterization€which€showed€severe€blockage€in€essentially€allÏof€his€vessels.€€Dr.€Crenshaw€recommended€coronary€artery€bypass€and€referred€him€toÏDr.€John€Matthews,€a€cardiovascular€surgeon.Ìà àDr.€Crenshaw€testified€that€in€his€opinion€the€three€major€causative€factors€were:€(1)Ïcigarette€smoking€(The€record€reflected€that€plaintiff€smoked€one€and€a€half€packs€per€dayÏfor€approximately€thirty€years);€(2)€his€sedentary€lifestyle;€(3)€a€mild€elevation€of€hisÏcholesterol€level.€€Dr.€Crenshaw€further€testified€that€there€is€no€direct€proof€that€stress€is€aÏcausal€factor€of€heart€disease.€€Ìà àDr.€John€Matthews€performed€œthe›€quintuple€bypass€operation.€€He€testified€that€theÏmost€likely€causes€of€plaintiffððs€heart€disease€was€his€cigarette€smoking€history.€€Dr.ÏMatthews€further€stated€that€there€was€no€good€data€that€shows€a€strong€correlationÏbetween€stress€and€heart€attack.€€Ìà àDr.€Pervis€Milnor,€Jr.,€a€Memphis€cardiologist,€did€not€treat€plaintiff,€but€reviewedÏmedical€records€developed€by€Drs.€Crenshaw€and€Matthews€as€well€as€data€supplied€byÏplaintiffððs€counsel.€€Dr.€Milnor€did€not€examine€plaintiff€nor€did€he€review€the€depositionsÏof€Drs.€Crenshaw€and€Matthews,€notwithstanding€the€fact€that€they€had€been€in€existenceÍfor€nine€months€to€a€year€and€a€half€at€the€time€Dr.€Milnor€was€supplied€data€pertaining€toÏplaintiff.€€Dr.€Milnor€testified€that€he€agreed€with€the€impact€on€heart€disease€of€the€majorÏfactors€outlined€by€Drs.€Crenshaw€and€Matthewsð"ðnamely,€substantial€cigarette€smokingÏfor€a€long€period€of€time€and€elevated€cholesterol.€€However,€Dr.€Milnor€voiced€the€opinionÏthat€the€stress€of€being€a€law€enforcement€officer€could€have€caused€a€more€ð ðrapidÏprogressionðð€of€plaintiffððs€heart€disease.€€However,€Dr.€Milnor€conceded€that€he€wasÏunable€to€cite€any€authority€or€research€that€had€been€conducted€that€would€support€thisÏspeculation.Ìà àThe€chancellor€found€that€the€proof€established€the€three€prerequisites€necessary€toÏestablish€the€presumption€that€the€coronary€artery€disease€was€an€accidental€injury€sufferedÏin€the€course€of€employment€and€that€the€presumption€had€not€been€rebutted€by€defendantððsÏmedical€proof.€€The€chancellor€concluded€by€finding€that€plaintiff€had€suffered€aÏcompensable€injury€and€had€sustained€a€fifty€percent€permanent€partial€disability€to€theÏbody€as€a€whole.Ìà àIn€workersðð€compensation€cases,€the€scope€of€review€of€this€Panel€on€issues€of€factÏis€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€in€the€trial€court.€€These€findings€of€fact€come€to€this€court€withÏa€presumption€of€correctness,€and€unless€we€find€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€isÏotherwise,€must€be€affirmed.€€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(2)€(Supp.€1997).€€However,€whereÏthe€issues€of€fact€involve€expert€medical€testimony€and€the€medical€proof€is€presented€in€theÏrecord€by€depositions,€as€in€this€case,€this€court€may€then€draw€its€own€conclusions€aboutÏthe€weight€and€credibility€of€that€testimony,€inasmuch€as€we€are€in€the€same€position€as€theÏtrial€judge€to€make€this€evaluation.€€òòOrman€v.€Williams€Sonoma,€Inc.óó,€803€S.W.2d€672,Ï676„77€(Tenn.€1991).€€Ìà@ àò òI.€€The€Statutory€Presumption€Issue.ó óÌà àPlaintiff€relies€upon€the€statutory€presumption€of€causation€contained€in€T.C.A.€ðð€7„51„201(a)(1)€in€his€efforts€to€establish€that€his€heart€disease€was€an€accidental€injury€that€heÍsuffered€during€the€course€of€his€employment€by€Madison€County.€€The€statute€establishesÏð ða€presumption€that€any€impairment€of€health€of€[a]€law€enforcement€œofficer›€caused€byÏhypertension€or€heart€disease€resulting€in€hospitalization,€medical€treatment€or€anyÏdisability,€shall€be€presumed€(unless€the€contrary€is€shown€by€competent€medical€evidence)Ïto€have€occurred€or€to€be€due€to€accidental€injury€suffered€in€the€course€of€employment.ððÌà àIn€order€to€have€the€benefit€of€this€presumption€plaintiff€is€required€to€show€that€(1)Ïhe€was€employed€by€a€regular€law€enforcement€department;€(2)€he€suffered€fromÏhypertension€or€heart€disease€resulting€in€hospitalization,€medical€treatment€or€disability€inÏthe€course€of€employment;€and€(3)€prior€to€the€injury€he€had€been€given€a€physicalÏexamination€which€did€not€reveal€the€heart€disease€or€hypertension.€€òòStone€v.€City€ofÏMcMinnvilleóó,€896€S.W.2d€548,€550€(Tenn.€1995),€òòKrick€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€945ÏS.W.2d€709,€712€(Tenn.€1997).€€After€these€prerequisites€have€been€established,€theÏpresumption€exists€and€the€burden€of€proof€shifts€to€the€defendant.€€In€order€to€overcomeÏthe€presumption,€ð ðthere€must€be€affirmative€evidence€that€there€is€not€a€substantial€causalÏconnection€between€the€work€of€the€employee€so€situated€and€the€occurrence€upon€whichÏthe€claim€for€benefits€is€based.ðð€€òòStoneóó,€896€S.W.2d€at€550.€Ìà àIn€the€case€before€us€defendant€has€conceded€that€plaintiff€in€all€likelihood€would€beÏable€to€prove€that€the€first€two€prerequisites€have€been€satisfied.€€However,€defendantÏcontends€that€plaintiff€failed€to€come€forth€with€proof€to€establish€that€he€had€undergone€aÏphysical€examination€that€showed€him€to€be€free€of€heart€disease.€€In€regard€to€this€thirdÏelement,€the€only€proof€that€plaintiff€presented€at€trial€below€was€part€of€a€medical€recordÏpertaining€to€his€hospitalization€at€Jackson„Madison€County€General€Hospital,€datedÏJanuary€24,€1979,€where€he€was€hospitalized€and€treated€for€abdominal€pain€and€diagnosedÏas€having€a€possible€duodenal€ulcer.€€The€document€presented€reflected€a€type€of€physicalÏexamination€by€his€treating€physician,€Dr.€Thomas€Ballard,€relative€to€his€complaints€ofÏstomach€pain.€€It€does€not€indicate€any€tests€seeking€to€ascertain€whether€or€not€plaintiff€hadÍheart€disease.€€In€light€of€this€and€in€light€of€the€fact€that€plaintiff€did€not€present€anyÏtestimony€that€he€had€been€given€a€physical€examination€upon€the€beginning€of€hisÏemployment€by€defendant,€we€hold€that€the€third€prerequisite€as€required€by€the€statute€hasÏnot€been€established.€€This€issue€is€accordingly€resolved€in€favor€of€defendant.Ìà@ àò òII.€The€Matter€of€Causation.ó óÌà àOur€disposition€of€this€issue€is€controlled€by€the€recent€opinion€of€our€SupremeÏCourt€styled€òòKrick€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€945€S.W.2d€709€(Tenn.€1997),€written€byÏnow€Chief€Justice€Anderson.€€In€that€case,€the€plaintiff,€Larry€Krick,€had€worked€as€aÏpolice€officer€for€the€City€of€Lawrenceburg€for€some€twelve€years.€€Once€during€a€routine€€Ïpatrol,€he€and€another€officer€answered€a€call€at€a€residence€where€a€woman€was€allegedlyÏbeing€held€hostage.€€The€plaintiff€was€forced€to€kick€down€the€door€in€order€to€gain€accessÏto€the€house,€not€knowing€what€œhe›€would€encounter.€€After€an€exhaustive€search€of€theÏhouse€they€found€the€woman,€uninjured€and€safe.€€Krick€became€ð ðnervousðð€and€ð ðtenseððÏfollowing€this€experience,€and€thereafter€suffered€shortness€of€breath€and€chest€pain.€€HeÏwas€later€hospitalized€and€diagnosed€with€coronary€artery€disease€and€later€underwentÏquadruple€bypass€surgery.€€Krick€sought€workersðð€compensation€benefits€from€the€City€ofÏLawrenceburg,€relying€upon€the€statutory€presumption€that€his€coronary€disease€arose€outÏof€and€in€the€scope€of€his€employment.€€Following€an€adverse€ruling€by€the€trial€court,€theÏcity€appealed€to€the€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€who€found€that€theÏevidence€preponderated€against€the€finding€that€plaintiffððs€coronary€artery€disease€arose€outÏof€his€employment.€€The€plaintiffððs€motion€for€full€court€review€was€granted€and€the€PanelÏwas€subsequently€affirmed.Ìà àWhile€we€have€already€disposed€of€the€statutory€presumption€in€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,Ïthe€òòKrickóó€court€noted€that€the€plaintiff€had€established€the€three€prerequisites€necessary€toÏcreate€the€presumption€that€the€coronary€artery€disease€was€an€accidental€injury€suffered€inÏthe€course€of€employment.€€The€court€concluded€that€the€next€issue€to€be€decided€wasÍwhether€the€record€contained€competent€medical€evidence€that€there€was€not€a€substantialÏcausal€connection€between€Krickððs€work€as€a€police€officer€and€the€coronary€artery€disease.€ÏThe€full€court€held€that€the€Special€Panel€was€correct€in€finding€that€there€was€not€aÏsubstantial€causal€connection€and€affirmed€that€defendant€had€overcome€the€presumption€ofÏcausation.€€Ìà àThe€òòKrickóó€court€stated:ÌÓÓÌà8 àAs€the€Special€Panel€recognized,€once€the€presumption€of€causationÏestablished€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€7„51„201(a)(1)€is€rebutted€by€theÏdefendant,€it€disappears,€and€the€plaintiff€must€prove,€by€a€preponderanceÏof€the€evidence,€that€his€condition€resulted€from€an€injury€by€accidentÏarising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€his€employment.€€Thus,€Krick€wasÏrequired€to€prove€that€his€heart€disease€was€an€injury€by€accident.ÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€òòKrickóó€court€held€that€the€defendant€had€successfully€rebutted€the€plaintiffððsÏoccupational€presumption€and€this€court€has€held€that€the€plaintiff€in€this€case€failed€toÏestablish€the€occupational€presumption.€€In€either€case€the€burden€shifts€to€the€plaintiff€toÏprove€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€that€his€condition€resulted€from€an€injury€arisingÏout€of€and€in€the€course€of€his€employment.Ìà àThe€summary€of€the€medical€evidence€in€this€case€has€already€been€recited.€€We€areÏof€the€opinion€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€a€finding€that€plaintiffððs€heart€diseaseÏin€the€case€at€bar€arose€in€the€course€and€scope€of€his€employment.€€The€medical€evidenceÏfails€to€establish€a€causal€connection€between€the€conditions€of€plaintiffððs€work€and€hisÏcoronary€artery€disease.€€The€evidence€that€we€have€reviewed€above€establishes€that€hisÏdisease€was€primarily€caused€by€smoking€one€and€a€half€packs€of€cigarettes€per€day€for€atÏleast€twenty€if€not€thirty€years,€a€sedentary€lifestyle,€and€a€mild€elevation€of€cholesterolÏlevel.€€The€physician€who€thought€that€stress€might€be€a€factor€stated€that€he€had€noÏknowledge€of€any€study€that€suggested€a€correlation€between€the€development€ofÏarteriosclerotic€process€and€stress€in€jobs€like€or€similar€to€law€enforcement.Ìà àFurthermore,€in€cases€where€plaintiff€asserts€that€an€emotional€stress€caused€theÏheart€attack,€the€disabling€condition€must€be€immediately€precipitated€by€a€specific€acute€orÏsudden€stressful€event.€€òòStoneóó,€896€S.W.2d€at€552,€quoting€òòBacon€v.€Severe€Countyóó,€808ÏS.W.2d€46,€49„52€(Tenn.€1991).Ìà àAccordingly,€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€evidence€and€the€record€preponderatesÏagainst€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€plaintiff€sustained€a€compensable€injury€by€accident.€ÏThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed€and€the€case€is€dismissed.€€Costs€in€this€cause€onÏappeal€are€taxed€to€plaintiff€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.€€€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€_____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€CORNELIA€A.€CLARK,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌJANICE€M.€HOLDER,€JUSTICE€ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SENIOR€œJUDGEÇÑ ` ÑÔ€2Ôà@ àÔ€2¼ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÔ€2XÔÌÌÌÓ#` p…X LÐ X#ÓTOMMY€FREEMAN,à àà à)à àMADISONÏCHANCERYÌÓ#` p` LÐ X#Óà à)à àNO.€49999ÌÓ` p` ¸ ’XÓà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à à)à àÌÓ#` p` ¸ LÐ X#Óà àà à)à àHon.€Joe€C.€Morris,Ìvs.à àà à)à àChancellorÌà àà à)ÌMADISON€COUNTY€SHERIFF'S,à à)à àNO.€02S01„9704„CH„00034ÌDEPARTMENTà à)Ìà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à à)à àREVERSED€ANDÌà àà à)à àDISMISSED.ÌßJ€14;+'b|7à` Å `€@ÿJßÌÌÌà@ àÔ€2¼ÔJUDGMENT€ORDERÔ€2XÔÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓÌÓ` p`  ’XÓà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,€including€theÏorder€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€theÏPanel's€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusionsÏof€law,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference.Ìà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€Memorandum€OpinionÏof€the€Panel€should€be€accepted€and€approved;€andÌà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€andÍconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€isÏmade€the€judgment€of€the€Court.Ìà àCosts€will€be€paid€by€Appellant,€and€Surety,€for€which€executionÏmay€issue€if€necessary.Ìà àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€this€2nd€day€of€February,€1998.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌ(Holder,€J.,€not€participating)ÌÌÌÌÔ€.Ô›