ÿWPC9" =# fUNq %¿ 0ûÅU:À4ú  0D#gw@o 0?¯ 0Dî 0J2 0T| ÆÐ Æ– Æ\ Æ" 0^è 0hF 0r® 0|  0†œ AQ"Æs 0D9 0@} B½ 0Ú D/j 1u™ B D3+ 0d^U>ÂU*U**B)TDC} AMÀÉ îÖfľ*v~èvÓf˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ÓH=$¡¡Ñ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€XÎ_XXXÔÑ7€¾úXXdðXXdð7Ñ, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular]tÁ$3|x\)H($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó ?)e@)Ó€J)K)VL)îM)Ó€W)Z)[)\)(ï(3:u$¤¤Ý ƒH=!ÝÑ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÔ€XèéXXXÔÑ7€rXXdìdì7ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô!"# &Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò d2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(('÷ÿ dxd% ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)üÿP Pd$$$$'ÿÿdxdP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d44447Border 1dd!#5Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ¿Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€2ÔÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€2ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€2XÔÌÌJuneÏ24,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó ó äÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€2ÔÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Kwik€Sak€claims€the€injury€was€November€10,€1994.€€However,€theÏevidence€supports€the€finding€of€the€trial€judge€that€the€injury€was€on€November€9,Ï1994.Ì \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ ´Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€2ÔÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€2ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€2XÔÌÌJuneÏ24,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€1ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€2ÔÑ#€33Xd#ÑÑ#€33Xd#ÑÝ  ÝÙ€!ÙÑ  ÑÓ  Ó›œßR€675A1-j|` à. `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àò òÌIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àSPECIAL€WORKERS'€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEó óÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÔ% € ÔCHARLOTTE€HULL,à àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àRUTHERFORD€CHANCERYÌà àPlaintiff/Appelleeà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNO.€01S01„9709„CH„00201Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€DON€R.€ASH,ÌEMRO€MARKETING€COMPANY,à à)à àJUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellantà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌKWIK€SAK,€INC.,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appelleeà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌRELIANCE€INSURANCE€COMPANY,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appelleeà àà à)ÌÌÌò òòòÌÌÌFor€the€Appellant:à àà àà àà àà àFor€the€AppelleeÏ(Plaintiff):ÌÌóóó óWilliam€M.€Billipsà àà àà àà àà àSteve€C.€Norrisà àà àÌOrtale,€Kelley,€Herbert€&€Crawfordà àà à28€Middleton€StreetÌ200€Fourth€Avenue€North,€3rd€Floorà àà àNashville,€TN€€37210ÌNashville,€TN€€37219ò òòòÌóóó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòò òFor€the€Appellees:óóó óÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àRichard€E.€SpicerÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSpicer,€Flynn€&€Rudstrom,€PLLCÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à424€Church€Street,€Suite€1350Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37219„2305ÌÓ  Óò òòòÌÌÌÌÌM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌò òòòMembers€of€Panel:ÌÌó óóóJustice€Frank€F.€Drowota,€IIIÌSenior€Judge€John€K.€ByersÌSpecial€Judge€William€S.€RussellÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌREVERSED€and€REMANDEDà àà àà àà àBYERS,€Senior€JudgeÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòò òOPINIONó óóóÌÓ  Óà àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€CourtÏof€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€Ìà àThe€trial€court€found€that€the€plaintiff€suffered€an€injury€by€accident€onÏFebruary€23,€1995€and€was€entitled€to€an€award€of€22€percent€permanent€partialÏimpairment€to€the€body€as€a€whole€(€$14,080.00€for€permanent€partial€disability€andÏ$960.00€for€temporary€total€disability€payable€in€a€lump€sum),€medical€expensesÏincurred€after€March€9,€1995,€and€future€medical€treatment€caused€by€the€injury.€ÏThe€trial€court€ruled€that€Emro€Marketing€Company€(ð ðEmroðð)€was€liable€for€the€awardÏbecause€it€was€the€employer€at€the€time€of€the€most€recent€injury€that€bore€a€causalÏrelation€to€the€plaintiffððs€incapacity.Ìòòà àóóEmro€raises€the€following€issues:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ H ÒÓÓ1.à àWhether€the€Chancellor€erred€in€finding€the€subsequent€employerÏliable€à àunder€the€last€injurious€injury€rule€when€the€subsequent€injury€was€notÏà àsuffered€in€the€scope€of€the€employeeððs€employment€with€theÏà àà àsubsequent€employer.ÌÌ2.à àWhether€the€Chancellor€erred€in€applying€the€last€injurious€injury€ruleÏà àwhen€the€employeeððs€initial€injury€was€the€strongest€causal€link€to€theÏà àdisability€of€the€employee,€who€had€not€fully€recovered€from€her€initialÏà àinjury?ÌÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÌÓÓà àThe€plaintiff€contends€the€trial€court€properly€found€Emro€liable,€but€says€if€it€isÏnot€then€Kwik€Sak,€Inc.€(ð ðKwik€Sakðð)€and€Reliance€Insurance€Company€(ð ðRelianceðð)Ïare€liable.€€Kwik€Sak€and€Reliance€say€that€Emro€is€liable€as€found,€but€if€it€is€notÏthen€the€plaintiff€has€not€appealed€from€the€action€of€the€trial€judge€dismissing€themÏas€defendants.Ìà àWe€find€the€trial€judge€erred€in€applying€the€repetitive€injury€rule€and/or€theÏlast€injurious€injury€rule€in€this€case€and€find€Kwik€Sak€and€Reliance€were€theÏinsurers€at€the€time€of€the€plaintiffððs€injury.Ìà àReview€of€the€findings€of€fact€made€by€the€trial€court€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€theÏrecord€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€theÏfindings,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ïðð€50„6„225(e)(2).€€òòStone€v.€City€of€McMinnville,€óó896€S.W.2d€548,€550€(Tenn.€1995).€ÌThe€application€of€this€standard€requires€this€Court€to€weigh€in€more€depth€theÏfactual€findings€and€conclusions€of€the€trial€court€in€a€workersðð€compensation€case.€ÏòòSee€Corcoran€v.€Foster€Auto€GMC,€Inc.,€óó746€S.W.2d€452,€456€(Tenn.€1988).ÌÓ  Óò òFACTSó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€plaintiff€worked€for€Kwik€Sak,€a€convenient€store,€as€an€assistantÏmanager.€€In€this€capacity,€the€plaintiff€was€required€to€lift,€bend,€and€stoop€to€loadÏcoolers€and€stock€shelves.€€On€November€9,€1994,€the€plaintiff€was€working€aloneÏon€a€busy€day€when€she€injured€her€back€while€stocking€merchandise.€€The€nextÏday€the€plaintiff€went€to€work€and€told€her€supervisor€that€her€back€was€hurting.Ìà àOn€November€11,€1994,€the€plaintiff€went€to€see€a€chiropractor€named€Dr.ÏBridget€Most€for€back€pain€and€told€her€that€she€never€had€back€problems€beforeÏthe€injury.€€The€plaintiff€checked€on€a€form€that€her€present€problem€was€not€due€toÏany€injury,€but€she€also€told€the€chiropractor€that€the€back€injury€occurred€at€workÏand€that€she€did€not€want€to€file€a€workersðð€compensation€claim.€€The€plaintiffÏtestified€that€she€never€fully€recovered€from€this€initial€injury.Ìà àOn€November€10,€1994,€Emro€bought€and€took€control€of€the€store€from€KwikÏSak€pursuant€to€a€Purchase€and€Sale€Agreement.€€On€this€date,€Emro€also€becameÏresponsible€for€workersðð€compensation€matters.€€Thereafter,€the€plaintiff€wasÏemployed€by€Emro.€€By€December€19,€1994,€the€plaintiffððs€condition€had€improvedÏto€the€point€that€she€was€able€to€resume€full€time€work€and€even€increase€her€dutiesÏat€work€(50€to€60€and€occasionally€70€hours€per€week).€€She€testified€that€her€backÏpain€worsened€during€her€employment€with€Emro.Ìà àOn€the€evening€of€February€22,€1995,€the€plaintiff€heard€her€low€back€popÏand€felt€intense€pain€when€she€turned€over€in€bed€at€home.€€On€February€27,€1995,Ïthe€plaintiff€returned€to€the€chiropractor€because€her€condition€began€to€deteriorate.€ÏThe€plaintiff€continued€to€work€with€a€back€condition€so€bad€that€she€was€reportedlyÏcarried€into€the€store€and€placed€on€a€stool.€€However,€in€February€1995,€the€plaintiffÍtestified€that€her€back€pain€became€so€severe€that€she€could€not€do€her€job€anyÏlonger€and€she€then€saw€Dr.€Warren€F.€McPherson,€a€neurosurgeon.Ìà àDr.€McPherson€found€the€plaintiff€had€a€ruptured€disc€at€L4„L5€and€L5„S1.€€AÏback€surgery€was€done€on€March€16,€1995.€€The€plaintiff€returned€to€work€for€EmroÏon€May€2,€1995.€€The€plaintiff€has€since€left€employment€with€Emro€for€a€similar€jobÏthat€pays€more€money.€€ÌÓ  Óò òMEDICAL€TESTIMONYó óÌÓ  Óòòà àóóDr.€Bridget€Most,€a€chiropractor,€testified€by€deposition€that€the€plaintiffððsÏoriginal€symptoms€were€consistent€with€nerve€root€compression€and€disc€bulge.€€Dr.ÏMost€treated€the€plaintiff€conservatively€from€November€to€December€1994,€notingÏthat€she€should€not€do€any€work€from€November€11€to€November€28,€1994.€€Dr.ÏMost€opined€that€the€plaintiffððs€work€injury€in€November€1994€and€her€heavy€workÏschedule€throughout€January€and€February€1995€caused€her€back€to€pop€inÏFebruary€1995.€€Dr.€Most€referred€the€plaintiff€to€Dr.€McPherson.€Ìà àDr.€Warren€F.€McPherson,€a€neurosurgeon,€testified€by€deposition.€€On€MarchÏ9,€1995,€Dr.€McPherson€saw€the€plaintiff€and€did€an€MRI€the€next€day€whichÏindicated€spinal€stenosis€and€bulging€discs.€€His€diagnosis€was€that€the€discs€wereÏeither€bulging€or€ruptured€and€that€the€plaintiff€had€a€nerve€root€entrapped.€€Dr.ÏMcPherson€opined€that€the€plaintiffððs€back€pop€in€February€1995€was€a€naturalÏprogression€of€her€work€injury€from€November€1994€and€that€her€continued€workÏschedule€would€be€consistent€with€worsening€her€condition€to€the€point€of€requiringÏsurgery.€€On€March€16,€1995,€Dr.€McPherson€performed€lumbar€laminectomyÏsurgery€on€the€plaintiff€and€restricted€her€from€working€for€six€weeks.€€He€stated€thatÍthe€plaintiff€reached€maximum€medical€improvement€on€May€2,€1995€and€releasedÏher€to€return€to€work€with€no€restrictions.€€Dr.€McPherson€opined€that€the€plaintiff€hasÏan€11€percent€permanent€partial€impairment€to€the€body€as€a€whole.Ìà àDr.€David€Gaw,€an€orthopedic€surgeon,€also€testified€by€deposition.€€OnÏSeptember€21,€1995,€Dr.€Gaw€saw€the€plaintiff€for€an€independent€medicalÏevaluation.€€Dr.€Gaw€testified€that€the€plaintiffððs€back€problems€began€aroundÏNovember€9,€1994€and€that€this€day€was€the€most€probable€date€of€injury€becauseÏthat€is€when€she€first€experienced€back€pain.€€Dr.€Gaw€opined€that€the€plaintiffððsÏwork€injury€in€November€1994€naturally€progressed€and€worsened€to€a€disc€ruptureÏthat€required€surgery€as€a€result€of€her€long€working€hours€in€February€1995.€€Dr.ÏGaw€opined€that€the€plaintiffððs€actual€disc€rupture€occurred€a€few€days€prior€to€herÏsurgery€in€March€1995.ÌÓ  Óò òANALYSISó óÌÓ  Óà àIn€order€to€be€eligible€for€workersðð€compensation€benefits,€an€employee€mustÏsuffer€ð ðan€injury€by€accident€arising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€employment€whichÏcauses€either€disablement€or€death.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(5).€€TheÏphrase€ð ðarising€out€ofðð€refers€to€causation.€€The€causation€requirement€is€satisfied€ifÏthe€injury€has€a€rational,€causal€connection€to€the€work.€€òòReeser€v.€Yellow€FreightÏSys.,€Inc.,€óó938€S.W.2d€690,€692€(Tenn.€1997)€(citations€omitted).Ìà àThe€evidence€in€this€case€does€not€show€the€plaintiff€experienced€a€definitiveÏinjury€in€the€course€of€her€work€with€Emro.€€The€evidence€shows€that€the€occurrenceÏwhich€led€to€the€necessity€of€surgery€occurred€at€night€as€the€plaintiff€turned€over€inÏbed.€Ìà àThe€only€suggestion€that€the€plaintiff€suffered€an€injury€while€working€forÏEmro€was€that€she€continued€to€do€the€same€type€of€work€as€she€did€on€NovemberÏ9,€1994€while€working€for€Kwik€Sak€at€the€time€of€the€injury.× ƒ8 ××  ×Ìà àDr.€McPherson,€a€neurosurgeon,€and€Dr.€Gaw,€an€orthopedic€surgeon,Ïtestified€the€disc€rupture€suffered€by€the€plaintiff€was€a€natural€progression€of€theÏNovember€9,€1994€injury.€€Dr.€Most,€a€chiropractor,€related€the€disc€rupture€to€theÏwork€done€at€Emro.Ìà àThe€trial€court€has€the€discretion€to€accept€the€opinion€of€one€medical€expertÏover€another€medical€expert.€€òòJohnson€v.€Midwesco,€Inc.,€óó801€S.W.2d€804,€806Ï(Tenn.€1990).€€When€the€medical€testimony€is€presented€by€deposition,€as€it€was€inÏthis€case,€this€Court€is€able€to€make€its€own€independent€assessment€of€the€medicalÏproof€to€determine€where€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€lies.€€€òòCooper€v.€INA,Ïóó884€S.W.2d€446,€451€(Tenn.€1994);€òòLanders€v.€Firemanððs€Fund€Ins.€Co.,€óó775€S.W.2dÏ355,€356€(Tenn.€1989).Ìà àOur€reading€of€the€medical€depositions€and€our€assessment€of€the€variedÏexperience€of€the€medical€witnesses€leads€us€to€conclude€the€testimony€of€Dr.ÏMcPherson€and€Dr.€Gaw€is€most€believable€on€the€time€of€injury.Ìà àThe€issue€comes€down€to€a€question€of€whether€the€gradual€injury€ruleÏshould€apply€in€this€case.€€We€believe€the€answer€to€this€question€lies€in€the€case€ofòòÏMynatt€v.€Liberty€Mut.€Ins.€Companies,óó€699€S.W.2d€799€(Tenn.€1985).Ìà àThe€facts€in€òòMynattóó€are€remarkably€similar€to€the€facts€in€this€case.€€On€JulyÏ27,€1982,€Mynatt€suffered€a€back€injury€while€employed€by€Normak.€€At€the€time€ofÏthe€injury,€Normak€was€insured€by€Liberty€Mutual.€€On€November€1,€1982,€MynattÏreturned€to€work€for€Normak€where€he€continued€lifting€bundles€as€he€had€before.€ÏThe€work€caused€his€back€to€become€worse€and€required€him€to€stop€working€onÏFebruary€23,€1983.€€Liberty€Mutual€had€ceased€being€Normakððs€workersððÏcompensation€insurer€one€month€prior€to€this.€€The€trial€judge€held€the€plaintiffððsÏinjury€occurred€on€July€27,€1982€and€that€the€subsequent€occurrences€were€onlyÏmanifestations€of€the€injury€of€July€27.Ìà àLiberty€Mutual€asserted€at€trial€and€on€appeal€that€Normak€should€be€liableÏon€the€basis€of€the€gradual€injury€rule€and€that€the€last€day€the€plaintiff€was€able€toÏwork€should€be€February€27,€1983€when€the€plaintiff€left€work.€€The€Supreme€CourtÏheld€that€the€gradual€injury€rule€did€not€apply€in€the€case€because€there€was€aÏdefinite€incident€of€lifting€which€caused€the€plaintiff€to€be€injured€and€that€LibertyÏMutual€was€liable€because€it€was€the€insurer€on€the€date€of€injury.Ìà àThe€òòMynattóó€Court€noted€that€some€cases€had€applied€the€gradual€injury€ruleÏin€back€injury€cases€but€that€the€Supreme€Court€had€never€held€that€back€injuriesÏwere€always€gradual€injury€cases€and€that€the€application€of€the€rule€depended€onÏthe€facts€of€each€case.€€Ìà àWe€find€therefore€the€gradual€injury€rule€does€not€apply€in€this€case€and€thatÏEmro€is€not€liable€for€the€plaintiffððs€injury€because€the€injury€predated€the€plaintiffððsÏemployment€with€Emro.Ìà àThe€remaining€question€is€whether€Kwik€Sak€and€Reliance€are€liable€in€thisÏcase.€€These€defendants€claim€the€plaintiff€did€not€properly€appeal€this€case€as€toÏthem€under€the€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€€However,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€briefÏwith€issues€in€response€to€the€briefs€of€each€of€the€defendants.€€Further,€Kwik€SakÏhas€asked€us€to€decide€their€liability€or€lack€thereof€to€the€plaintiff€in€the€event€weÏfind€that€Emro€is€not€liable.€€We€conclude€that€Kwik€Sak€and€Reliance€are€before€usÏand€that€we€have€jurisdiction€to€decide€the€issues€raised€by€them€and€the€plaintiff.Ìà àBased€upon€our€findings,€we€enter€judgment€for€the€plaintiff€against€theÏdefendants€Kwik€Sak€and€Reliance.€€We€find€the€plaintiff€should€be€awarded€aÏjudgment€as€entered€by€the€trial€court€as€to€the€amount€of€recovery€for€permanentÏpartial€disability€and€temporary€total€disability.€€We€find€that€notice€is€not€raised€as€aÏdefense€to€the€liability€of€Kwik€Sak€(except€previously€as€argument€that€no€injuryÏoccurred€on€November€9,€1994)€and€that€Kwik€Sak€is€liable€for€all€medicalÏexpenses€relating€to€the€plaintiffððs€injury€of€November€9,€1994.€€Ìà àThis€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€a€determination€of€the€medicalÏcosts€incurred€by€the€plaintiff.€€The€trial€court€shall€enter€a€judgment€consistent€withÏour€findings€and€the€judgment€shall€provide€for€the€medical€expenses€which€the€trialÏcourt€finds€appropriate.Ìà àThe€cost€of€this€appeal€is€taxed€to€Kwik€Sak€and€Reliance.ÌÓÓÌà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€JudgeÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,€JusticeÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌWilliam€S.€Russell,€Special€Judge€ÌœÑ€9ÑÇÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` Ñà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌCHARLOTTE€HULL,à@ à)à àRUTHERFORD€CHANCERYÌà@ à)à àà àNO.€95WC„831Ìà àPLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,à@ à)ÌßJ€6:;+'b|fI` 0* `€@ÿJßà@ à)Ìv.à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àHON.€DON€R.€ASH,€JUDGEÌEMRO€MARKETING€COMPANY,à@ à)Ìà@ à)Ìà àDEFENDANT/APPELLANT,à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àS.€CT.€NO.€01S01„9709„CH„00201ÌKWIK€SAK,€INC.€AND€RELIANCEà@ à)ÌINSURANCE€COMPANY,à@ à)Ìà@ à)Ìà àDEFENDANT/APPELLEES.à@ à)à àREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌà@ àòòò òJUDGMENTó óóóÌÌÌÓÓà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€motion€for€review€pursuant€to€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð50„6„225(e)(5)(B),€the€entire€record,€including€the€order€of€referral€toÏthe€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panel'sÏMemorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,Ïwhich€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference;Ìà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€motion€for€review€is€not€wellÏtaken€and€should€be€denied;€and€Ìà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÏlaw€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€is€made€theÏjudgment€of€the€Court.Ìà àCosts€will€be€paid€by€Defendant/Appellees,€Kwik€Sak,€Inc.€and€RelianceÏInsurance€Company,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.Ìà àIt€is€so€ordered€this€24th€day€of€June,€1998.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌDROWOTA,€J.€NOT€PARTICIPATINGš›