ÿWPCu 7# UL %i 0(ow@—4×ëU<ú6>ÆFÆ ÆÒƘ 0J^ 0T¨ 0^ü 0hZ 0r 0|4 0†° 06 1uÆ AQ; ÆŒ 0DR 0@– 0DÖ 0d D/~ B­ BÊ D3çB)DCC AM†U*Óý%ÿv~$vÓ¢˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ1€ÀAZ‹4Century Gothic RegularX($¡¡ `abRecedUeÓ€qVrîsÓ€WX$3|x-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT RomanLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a) !"#%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ'''÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd&&&&'ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d////7Border 1dd "0Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial øÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€2ÔÔ€2ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€2XÔÌÌò òJune€8,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€2ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€2ÔÔ€2ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€2XÔÌÌò òJune€8,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€2ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ Ô›Ñ7€¤åXXdðdÈ7ќـ ÙßR€130A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌà@ àSeptember€29,€1997ÌÌÌÌÌROBERT€LARRY€JONES,à àà à)€Chester€County€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)€No.€8942Ìà àPlaintiff,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€No.€02S01„9706„CH„00055Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€Hon.€Joe€C.€Morris,€JudgeÌMAGNETEK€CENTURY€ELECTRIC,à à)ÌINC.€and€ITT€HARTFORD,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants.à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiffóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendantsóó:ÌÌMichael€L.€Weinmanà àà àà àStephen€R.€Butler€and€ÌTatum,€Tatum€&€Weinmanà àà àFrank€S.€CantrellÌ124€East€Main€St.à àà àà àà àJackson,€Shields,€Yeiser€&€CantrellÌP.€O.€Box€293à àà àà àà à262€German€Oak€Dr.ÌHenderson,€TN€38340à àà àà àCordova,€TN€38018ÌÌÌà@ àòòMEMORANDUM€OPINIONóóÌÌà@ àÌÌÌÌà@ àòòMembers€of€Panelóó:ÌÌà@ àJANICE€M.€HOLDER,€JUSTICEÌà@ àHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌà@ àCORNELIA€A.€CLARK,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌMODIFIED€IN€PART,€REVERSEDÌIN€PART€and€AFFIRMED€IN€PARTà àà àTOMLIN,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌÑ7€¤åXXdðXXdð7ÑÓÓà àThis€workersðð€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordanceÏwith€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€of€findingsÏof€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€In€this€appeal,€the€employer,€MagnetekÏCentury€Electric,€Inc.,€(ð ðdefendantðð)€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏawarding€permanent€partial€disability€benefits€on€the€basis€of€forty„nineÏpercent€(49%)€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€as€well€as€in€commuting€theÏaward€to€a€lump€sum.€€The€panel€finds€that€the€award€should€be€modified€toÏone€based€on€twelve€and€one€half€percent€(12€ðð%)€disability€to€the€body€asÏa€whole€and€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€making€a€lump€sumÏaward.€€Ìà àIn€May,€1994,€Robert€Larry€Jones€(ð ðplaintiffðð)€was€working€forÏdefendant€when€a€work€tool€weighing€approximately€45€pounds€struckÏplaintiff€on€the€right€ankle€and€cut€it.€€He€was€taken€to€the€emergency€roomÏwhere€the€wound€was€treated€and€his€Achilles€tendon€was€sewn€up.€€As€aÏresult€of€this€injury,€plaintiff€developed€a€condition€known€as€a€Deep€VeinÏThrombosis€in€the€right€leg.€€This€is€a€blockage€of€the€flow€of€blood€throughÏa€deep€vein.€€The€emergency€room€physician€referred€plaintiff€to€Dr.€WarrenÏRamer,€who€treated€him€from€July,€1994€through€the€time€of€trial€inÏNovember,€1996.€€Ìà àAt€the€time€Dr.€Ramer€began€treating€plaintiff,€there€was€edema€(forÏour€purposes„swelling)€of€the€lower€right€leg€and€ankle.€€Over€the€monthsÏthat€followed,€plaintiffððs€condition€continued€to€improve,€although€hisÏcondition€at€times€fluctuated€during€this€period€of€treatment.€€In€otherÏwords,€the€swelling€in€plaintiffððs€leg€was€more€pronounced€at€some€timesÏthan€it€was€at€others.€€Plaintiff€wore€an€elastic€sock€and€took€medication€forÏthe€purpose€of€controlling€the€swelling€in€his€leg.Ìà àIn€October,€1995,€at€the€request€of€defendant,€plaintiff€became€aÏpatient€of€Dr.€Jessie€Davis,€a€specialist€in€general€vascular€surgery€inÏMemphis.€€Dr.€Davis€was€requested€to€treat€as€well€as€evaluate€plaintiffððsÍcondition.€€Dr.€Davisðð€tests€revealed€a€blockage€in€plaintiffððs€right€legÏbeginning€about€three€inches€below€the€knee€and€extending€upward€aboutÏthree€inches€above€the€knee.€€Ìà àThereafter,€both€Dr.€Davis€and€Dr.€Ramer€continued€to€treat€plaintiffÏjointly€and€cooperatively,€with€Dr.€Ramer€seeing€plaintiff€about€once€aÏmonth€in€order€to€monitor€his€condition€and€medication,€and€Dr.€DavisÏevery€two€or€three€months€to€evaluate€the€status€of€plaintiffððs€leg.€€Ìà àDr.€Ramer€deferred€the€assignment€of€any€permanent€impairmentÏrating€to€Dr.€Davis,€the€vascular€specialist.€€Dr.€Davis€last€saw€plaintiff€onÏApril€16,€1996.€€In€Dr.€Davisðð€deposition€taken€for€trial,€he€voiced€theÏopinion€that€plaintiff€suffered€a€five€percent€(5%)€permanent€partialÏimpairment.€€In€addition,€Dr.€Davis€voiced€the€opinion€that€plaintiff€sufferedÏtransient€edema,€which€placed€him€within€Class€1€of€the€AMA€guidelines€forÏImpairment€of€the€Lower€Extremity€due€to€Peripheral€Vascular€Disease.Ìà àAt€the€request€of€his€counsel,€plaintiff€was€seen€by€Dr.€James€Shull,€aÏgeneral€surgeon,€for€the€purpose€of€performing€an€independent€evaluation€ofÏplaintiffððs€injury€and€condition.€€Dr.€Shull€saw€plaintiff€only€once„on€April€15,Ï1996,€the€same€day€that€Dr.€Davis€saw€plaintiff€for€the€last€time,€and€the€dayÏon€which€Dr.€Davis€based€his€disability€evaluation.€€Dr.€Shull€reviewed€theÍmedical€records€of€the€treating€physicians€and€took€a€history€of€the€injuryÏfrom€plaintiff.€€Dr.€Shull€testified€by€deposition€that€he€found€pitting€edemaÏ(significant€swelling)€in€plaintiffððs€right€ankle€and€foot€with€chronic€venousÏstasis€dermatitis.€€This€in€simple€terms€is€the€discoloration€of€the€bodyÏcaused€by€the€leakage€of€blood€underneath€the€skin.€€It€was€Dr.€ShullððsÏopinion€that€plaintiffððs€condition€fell€within€Class€3€of€the€AMA€guidelinesÏand€assessed€a€forty€percent€(40%)€permanent€impairment€to€the€right€leg€asÏa€result€of€his€injury.€€Class€3€impairment€is€signified€by€ð ðmarked€edema€thatÏis€only€partialy€controlled€by€elastic€supports.ððÌà àWe€are€constrained€to€note€that€notwithstanding€the€fact€that€theÏexaminations€by€Drs.€Shull€and€Davis€took€place€on€the€same€day,€Dr.€DavisÏnoted€that€there€was€no€edema€present€and€described€the€discoloration€asÏð ðslight€hyper„pigmentationðð,€whereas€Dr.€Shull€found€pitting€edema€inÏplaintiffððs€right€ankle€and€foot€and€described€the€discoloration€as€chronicÏvenous€stasis€dermatitis.€€These€contrasting€findings€emphasize€the€wideÏvariation€of€diagnosis€between€these€respected€physicians.Ìà àAt€time€of€trial,€plaintiff€was€55€years€of€age€and€had€an€eighth€gradeÏeducation.€€His€work€history€prior€to€being€employed€by€defendant€involvedÏmostly€physical€labor.€€Following€the€accident€and€plaintiffððs€return€to€work,Íhe€has€been€employed€in€a€different€capacity€inasmuch€as€he€can€no€longerÏperform€the€task€required€by€his€former€assignment.€€Primarily€he€is€not€ableÏto€stand€for€long€periods€of€time.€€Plaintiff€testified€that€although€he€hadÏreturned€to€many€of€the€activities€he€enjoyed€prior€to€his€injury,€his€presentÏcondition€nonetheless€required€him€to€limit€the€time€that€he€devoted€toÏthese€activities.€€Plaintiff€further€testified€that€he€returned€to€hisÏemployment€by€defendant€at€a€higher€hourly€wage€rate€than€his€rate€ofÏcompensation€prior€to€his€injury.€€Plaintiff€states€that€nonetheless€he€hasÏearned€less€money€because€he€has€not€been€able€to€get€in€as€much€overtimeÏas€he€did€prior€to€his€injury€due€to€the€severity€of€his€injury.€€Ìà àThe€trial€court€found€that€plaintiff€suffered€a€disability€in€the€amountÏof€forty„nine€percent€(49%)€to€the€body€as€a€whole€as€a€result€of€the€injury.€ÏOur€scope€of€review€on€appeal€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,Ïaccompanied€by€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€the€findings€of€the€trialÏcourt,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(2)€(Supp.€1997).€€This€tribunal€is€required€to€conduct€anÏindependent€examination€of€the€record€to€determine€where€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€lies.€€òòWingert€v.€Government€of€SumnerÏCountyóó,€908€S.W.2d€921,€922€(Tenn.€1995).ÌÓÓà@ àò òI.€Vocational€Disability.Ìó óÌà@ àA.€Anatomical€Impairment.ÌÌÓÓà àIn€this€case€the€court€is€faced€with€conflicting€evaluations€by€twoÏmedical€experts.€€As€we€have€stated€in€prior€cases,€where€medical€testimonyÏis€by€deposition,€this€panel€ð ðis€able€to€weigh€the€testimony€in€the€sameÏmanner€as€the€trial€judge€and€may€determine€the€weight€to€be€givenÏthereto.ðð€€òòCoffey€v.€City€of€Knoxvilleóó,€866€S.W.2d€516,€519€(Tenn.€1993).€ÏDr.€Davis,€a€board€certified€vascular€surgeon€and€plaintiffððs€treatingÏphysician,€gave€plaintiff€a€five€percent€(5%)€impairment€rating.€€Dr.€Shull,€aÏgeneral€surgeon,€who€saw€plaintiff€on€only€one€occasion,€gave€plaintiff€a€fortyÏpercent€(40%)€impairment€rating.€€Ìà àDr.€Shull€found€that€plaintiffððs€condition€placed€him€in€a€Class€3Ïimpairment,€while€Dr.€Davis€found€that€plaintiffððs€injury€was€a€Class€1Ïimpairment.€€In€our€opinion€the€impairment€rating€given€by€Dr.€Davis,Ïutilizing€Table€14€of€the€AMA€guidelines,€more€closely€reflects€the€medicalÏevidence€in€the€record€regarding€plaintiffððs€injury.€€The€medical€records€ofÏDrs.€Ramer€and€Davis€clearly€demonstrate€that€plaintiffððs€edema€wasÏtransient,€i.e.,€worse€at€times€than€at€other€times.€€In€addition,€Dr.€DavisÏsaw€plaintiff€on€six€occasions€over€a€period€of€slightly€more€than€six€months,Íwhile€Dr.€Shull€saw€plaintiff€on€only€one€occasion.€€Ìà àThe€basic€conflict€which€we€have€to€resolve€is€ascertaining€whichÏmedical€opinion,€setting€forth€their€respective€anatomical€ratings,€is€theÏmore€credible€based€upon€the€evidence.€€It€is€clearly€apparent€that€theÏchancellor€relied€upon€the€anatomical€impairment€rating€of€forty€percentÏ(40%)€given€by€Dr.€Shull.€€As€we€have€noted€previously,€Dr.€Davis€and€Dr.ÏRamer€were€treating€physicians,€working€in€tandem,€while€Dr.€Shull€sawÏplaintiff€only€once€for€the€purpose€of€evaluation.€€Under€our€case€law,€it€isÏpermissible€to€give€greater€weight€to€the€testimony€of€a€treating€physicianÏthan€an€evaluating€physician.€€òòSeeóó€òòOrman€v.€Williams€Sonoma,€Inc.óó,€803ÏS.W.2d€672,€677€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€our€opinion,€the€record€clearly€supportsÏthe€evaluation€of€Dr.€Davis€that€plaintiff€suffered€from€transient€edema,Ïwhich€under€the€AMA€guidelines€is€a€Class€1€impairment.€€In€regard€to€theÏswelling,€Dr.€Ramerððs€records€reflect€the€following€on€the€various€datesÏstated:€1994:€July€8,€ð ðmarked€swellingðð;€August€9,€ð ðless€swollenðð;€October€4,Ïð ðnot€as€swollenðð;€November€16,€ð ðleg€looks€goodðð;€December€12,€ð ðedematousððÏ(swollen);€1995:€January€27,€ð ðmuch€less€swollenðð;€April€28,€ð ðless€swollenðð;ÏMay€30,€ð ðminimally€swollenðð;€June€28,€ð ðremains€minimally€swollenðð;ÏDecember€18,€ð ðnot€swollenðð;€1996:€January€19,€ð ðminimally€swollenðð;€FebruaryÍ20,€ð ðnot€swollenðð;€April€24,€ð ðnot€swollenðð;€May€21,€ð ðminimally€swollenðð;€JulyÏ23,€ð ðreally€not€swollenðð;€August€20,€ð ðno€edema.ððÌà àDr.€Davisðð€records€reflect€as€follows:€1995:€November€7,€ð ðmild€edemaðð;Ï1996:€January€16,€ð ðno€edemaðð;€April€16,€ð ðno€edema.ðð€€Although€repetitious,Ïwe€note€that€Dr.€Shullððs€only€examination€was€April€16,€1996,€and€he€notedÏpitting€edema€to€describe€the€condition€of€plaintiffððs€leg.€€In€our€opinion,€theÏpreponderance€of€the€medical€evidence€compels€us€that€the€trial€court€erredÏin€not€following€Dr.€Davisðð€anatomical€rating€of€five€percent€(5%).Ìà@ àò òB.€The€Statutory€Cap.ó óÌà àDefendant€contends€that€the€statutory€cap€as€spelled€out€in€T.C.A.€ððÏ50„6„241(a)(1)€applies.€€This€statute€states€in€pertinent€part€that€where€ð ðtheÏpre„injury€employer€returns€the€employee€to€employment€at€a€wage€equal€toÏor€greater€than€the€wage€the€employee€was€receiving€at€the€time€of€theÏinjury,€the€maximum€permanent€partial€disability€award€that€the€employeeÏmay€receive€is€two€and€one„half€(2€ðð)€times€the€medical€impairmentÏrating.ðð€€Applying€this€cap€to€the€impairment€rating€given€by€Dr.€Davis,Ïplaintiff€would€have€a€maximum€vocational€disability€of€twelve€and€one„halfÏpercent€(12€ðð%)€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Ìà àPlaintiff€challenges€whether€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(a)(1)€should€be€appliedÍwhen€an€employee€returns€to€work€at€a€higher€pay„rate€per€hour,€but€worksÏfewer€hours€due€to€a€reduction€in€the€overtime€that€he€worked€before€hisÏinjury.€€The€record€reflects€that€prior€to€his€injury€plaintiff€workedÏapproximately€ten€hours€overtime€per€week.€€In€the€months€following€hisÏinjury,€plaintiff€has€only€worked€a€total€of€three€overtime€hours.€€Based€uponÏthis,€plaintiff€contends€that€his€total€income€has€been€reduced€by€his€injury,Ïnotwithstanding€his€being€paid€a€higher€hourly€rate.€Ìà àThe€supreme€court€has€said€that€ð ð[œt]he›€fact€that€a€workerððs€incomeÏhas€declined€is€relevant€to€the€determination€of€vocational€disability.€€TheÏstatute€allows€the€Court€to€consider€this€factor€by€allowing€an€increase€in€anÏaward€for€such€an€employee.ðð€€òòBrown€v.€Campbell€County€œBd›.€of€œEduc›.óó,€915ÏS.W.2d€407,€417€(Tenn.€1995).€€Notwithstanding,€if€the€cap€of€two€and€one„half€times€applies€to€this€case,€the€court€may€not€increase€the€award€ofÏvocational€disability€beyond€the€statutory€maximum.€€Our€supreme€courtÏhas€resolved€this€issue€in€the€unpublished€case€of€òòMace€v.€Saturn€Corp.óó,€No.Ï01S01„9504„CH„00056,€1996€WL€73827€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€court€said:ÌÓÓÌà8 àThe€claimant€argues€[50„6„241(a)(1)]€is€inapplicable€because,Ïalthough€he€has€returned€to€work€at€the€same€hourly€wage€asÏbefore€the€injury,€he€is€not€able€to€earn€as€much€because€hisÏcondition€prohibits€him€from€working€overtime.€€WeÏrespectfully€disagree.€€Our€interpretation€of€the€statute€is€thatÍwhere€an€employee€is€compensated€according€to€an€hourly€wage,Ïhis€employer€is€entitled€to€the€protection€of€the€statute€if€itÏreturns€the€employee€to€work€after€an€injury€at€the€same€hourlyÏwage€the€employee€was€earning€before€the€injury.Ìòòà àId.óó€at€*2.ÌÌÌThis€contention€of€plaintiff€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌà@ àò òII.€Lump€Sum.ó óÌÌÌÓÓà àWhether€or€not€to€award€a€lump€sum€is€governed€by€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„229(a)€(Supp.€1997).€€This€statute€states€in€part€that€ð ðthe€trial€court€shallÏconsider€whether€the€commutation€will€be€in€the€best€interest€of€theÏemployee,€and€such€court€shall€also€consider€the€ability€of€the€employee€toÏwisely€manage€and€control€the€commuted€award€irrespective€of€whetherÏthere€exist€special€needs.ðð€€In€òòHenson€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€851€S.W.2dÏ809,€814€(Tenn.€1993),€our€supreme€court€stated€that€ð ð[œl]ump›„sum€awardsÏare€an€exception€to€the€general€purposes€of€our€workersðð€compensation€law,Ïand€as€such,€commutation€should€occur€only€in€exceptional€circumstances,Ïand€not€as€a€matter€of€course.ðð€€In€the€case€before€us,€plaintiffððs€only€reasonÏfor€his€stated€need€for€a€lump„sum€award€was€because€of€the€debt€on€hisÏcredit€cards€which€was€accruing€interest.€€There€is€nothing€in€the€recordÏconcerning€the€ability€of€plaintiff€to€handle€these€funds.€€In€our€opinion,€thisÍevidence€is€insufficient€to€support€commutation€of€plaintiffððs€disability€toÏlump„sum.€€This€issue€is€resolved€in€favor€of€defendant.Ìà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€pertaining€to€the€amountÏof€vocational€disability€is€modified€to€twelve€and€one„half€percent€(12€ðð%).€ÏThat€portion€of€the€judgment€awarding€a€lump„sum€compensation€isÏreversed.€€œÌÌÌÌÌThe›€judgment€is€otherwise€affirmed.€€Costs€in€this€cause€on€appeal€are€taxedÏto€plaintiff,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà à__________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_______________________________________ÌJANICE€M.€HOLDER,€JUSTICE€ÌÌÌÌ_______________________________________ÌCORNELIA€A.€CLARK,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌà àÌò òÌó óœÇÒ € ÒÒ À Ò›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌÌROBERT€LARRY€JONES,à àà à)à àCHESTER€CHANCERYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€8942€BelowÌœßJ€14;+'b|]Ü` Å `€@ÿJß›à àPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€Joe€C.€Morris,Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àJudge.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€à àNo.€€02S01„9706„CH„00055ÌMAGNETEK€CENTURY€ELECTRICà à)ÌINC.€and€ITT€HARTFORD,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellant.à àà àà àà à)à àMODIFIED€IN€PART;Ïà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àREVERSEDà àINÏPART;€andÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAFFIRMED€IN€PART.ÌÌÌÌà@ àòòJUDGMENT€ORDERóóÌÌÓÓà àà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€motion€for€review€pursuantÏto€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(5)(B),€the€entire€record,€including€theÏorder€of€referral€to€the€Special€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€andÏthe€Panel's€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference;Ìà àà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€motion€for€reviewÏis€not€well„taken€and€should€be€denied;€andÌà àà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€isÏmade€the€judgment€of€the€Court.€€ò òÌó óà àà àCosts€on€appeal€are€assessed€to€the€appellee.Ìà àà àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED€this€____€day€of€œJune,›€1998.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌÌHolder,€J.€€€„€Not€participating.