ÿWPCO" …# VUNa %¯ 0ûµU:° 4ê þ   w@ 0?[ 0Dš 0JÞ 0T( 0^| 0hÚ 0rB 0|´ 0†0 0¶ 1uF 0d» BU><U *zU*¤B)ÎDC÷ D3: AMm½º 0@wð·²§v~YvÓ× AOª Æù 0D¿! D/" B2"˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ÓH=$¡¡Ñ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€XÎ_XXXÔÑ7€¾úXXdðXXdð7Ñ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularœZ;$/3|xÔH ¿ÁÂÃEÄEÅEÆEÇUÈUÉÓ€(ï(3Ýõ$¤¤Ý ƒH=!ÝÑ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÔ€XhÜXXXÔÑ7€U(XXdìdì7ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(%Ã$òòÚ  Ú1Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d((((7Border 1dd$$$$'ÿÿdxd€-)Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ³Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€&ÔÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌò òFebruaryÏ18,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€&ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò æÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€&ÔÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€employee€only€seeks€to€increase€the€award€by€a€4.9€multiplier€insteadÏof€the€maximum€cap€of€6€times€the€impairment.€€See€plaintiffððs€brief,€page€15.Ì ¨Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€&ÔÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌò òFebruaryÏ18,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€&ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿáùEG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€&ÔÑ#€''Xd#ÑÑ#€''Xd#ÑÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÑ À ÑÑ X Ñò òÞ ÞÌà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€›ÌÌÙ€€Ùó óœßR€+,)A1-j|` 81 `€€@ÿRß›à@ àò òIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌWORKERS'€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÌKNOXVILLE,€SEPTEMBER€1997€SESSIONó óÌÓ  Óœà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à›Ìœà à›ÌÌÌÌÌJACQUELINE€MARIE€REDDENà àà à)à àHAMILTON€CIRCUITÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àPlaintiff/Appellantà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àœHon.›€œArnold€A.€Stulce,›€œJr.›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àœSpecial€Circuit€Judge›ÌSYNTHETIC€INDUSTRIES€andà àà à)ÌTHE€HOME€INSURANCE€COMPANYà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appelleesà àà à)à àNO.€03S01„9703„CV„00025ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòFor€the€Appellant:à àà àà àà àFor€the€Appellee:Ìó óóóÌMorgan€G.€Adamsà àà àà àà àJeffrey€L.€ClearyÌ428€McCallie€Avenueà àà àà à530€Pioneer€Bank€Bldg.ÌChattanooga,€Tenn.€€37402à àà à801€Broad€StreetÌà àà àà àà àà àà àChattanooga,€Tenn.€€37402ÌÌÌÌÌœÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ›ÌÓ  Óò òòòM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌò òòòMembers€of€Panel:ÌÌó óóóE.€Riley€Anderson,€Chief€JusticeÌJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€JudgeÌRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœREVERSED.›à àà àà àà àà àà àTHAYER,€Special€JudgeÌÌÓÓà àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€CourtÏof€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€Ìà àThis€appeal€has€been€perfected€by€plaintiff,€Jacqueline€Marie€Redden,€fromÏthe€trial€courtððs€decision€in€declining€to€increase€an€original€award€of€20%Ïpermanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€after€a€reconsideration€hearingÏconducted€pursuant€to€the€provisions€of€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(a)(2).Ìà àPlaintiff€contends€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€finding€of€the€trialÏcourt.€€Defendants,€Synthetic€Industries€and€The€Home€Insurance€Company,€argueÏthe€evidence€before€the€court€was€insufficient€to€support€an€increased€award.Ìà àThe€facts€are€not€in€great€dispute.€€Employee€Redden€sustained€a€work„related€injury€on€August€9,€1992,€while€pushing€a€dolly€loaded€with€yarn.€€The€injuryÏwas€to€her€low€back.€€A€final€decree€was€entered€in€the€Circuit€Court€of€HamiltonÏCounty€on€January€19,€1995,€approving€a€settlement€agreement€providing€for€aÏ20%€permanent€partial€disability€award€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Since€the€accidentÍoccurred€shortly€after€the€effective€date€of€the€1992€amendments€to€the€WorkersððÏCompensation€Act€and€the€employee€had€returned€to€work€at€a€wage€equal€to€orÏgreater€than€that€received€before€the€accident,€the€award€was€capped€at€2€ðð€timesÏthe€medical€impairment€rating€of€8%.Ìà àUpon€returning€to€work,€plaintiff€was€given€a€job€ð ðreeling€deniesðð,€which€sheÏtestified€involved€hooking€yarn€to€a€machine€and€was€lighter€duty€work.€€However,Ïthis€job€was€only€of€a€temporary€nature.€€Later€she€was€asked€if€she€could€do€officeÏwork€to€which€she€replied€she€could€perform.€€A€job€of€this€nature€neverÏmaterialized.€€She€was€later€offered€a€job€ð ðdoffingðð€and€was€told€that€this€was€all€theÏcompany€had€to€offer.€€The€job€involved€considerable€physical€activity€andÏdefendant€employer€sent€her€to€see€a€physical€therapist€for€the€purpose€ofÏdetermining€whether€she€could€perform€the€required€duties€of€bending,€lifting,€etc.€ÏThe€therapist€concluded€she€was€not€able€to€do€this€type€of€work€because€of€herÏinjury.€€Since€there€was€no€other€job€available€that€she€could€handle€with€herÏrestrictions,€she€was€eventually€terminated.€€The€record€is€silent€as€to€the€exactÏtermination€date€but€it€was€sometime€during€or€after€February,€1995.Ìà àThis€action,€asserting€a€new€claim€or€cause€of€action€for€an€increased€awardÏof€disability,€was€filed€on€August€29,€1995,€which€was€within€the€one€year€period€ofÏher€loss€of€employment.€€She€meets€all€of€the€requirements€of€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(a)(2)€for€a€rehearing€concerning€the€original€award€and€this€is€not€an€issue€inÏthe€case.Ìà àThe€trial€court€made€a€number€of€findings.€€The€court€concluded€that€theÏrecord€established€(1)€the€employee€had€sustained€a€work„related€injury,€(2)€as€aÏresult€of€the€injury,€she€had€an€8%€medical€impairment€which€capped€the€award€atÏ20%€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€(3)€the€entry€of€the€agreed€judgmentÍapproving€the€settlement€established€her€injury€was€causally€connected€to€herÏemployment€and€the€injury€was€of€a€permanent€nature,€(4)€there€was€a€causalÏconnection€between€her€injury€and€her€subsequent€loss€of€employment,€(5)€theÏemployer€had€offered€her€a€job€which€she€could€not€physically€perform€because€ofÏher€injury,€(6)€her€condition€at€the€time€of€the€reconsideration€hearing€had€notÏworsened€but€was€the€same€and€she€had€not€sought€medical€treatment€since€theÏapproval€of€the€workersðð€compensation€settlement,€and€(7)€the€original€award€ofÏ20%€disability€should€not€be€increased€under€the€evidence€submitted.Ìà àThe€review€of€the€case€is€de€novo€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€theÏcorrectness€of€the€findings€of€fact€unless€we€find€from€our€review€the€preponderanceÏof€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(2).Ìà àThe€general€rule€is€that€while€expert€testimony€is€usually€necessary€toÏestablish€causation€and€permanency€of€an€injury,€the€extent€of€the€permanentÏdisability€can€be€determined€from€both€expert€and€lay€testimony.€€òòPerkins€v.ÏEnterprise€Truck€Lines,€Inc.,óó€896€S.W.2d€123€(Tenn.€1995);€òòBond€v.€American€AirÏFilter,óó€692€S.W.2d€638€(Tenn.€1985);€òòHinson€v.€Wal„Mart€Stores,€Inc.,óó€654€S.W.2dÏ675€(Tenn.€1983).Ìà àIn€the€present€case€the€only€real€issue€is€the€extent€or€degree€of€permanentÏdisability.€€We€fully€concur€with€all€of€the€trial€courtððs€findings€except€the€decision€toÏleave€the€award€capped€at€20%€disability.€€In€this€respect,€we€are€of€the€opinion€theÏevidence,€which€is€based€upon€a€somewhat€meager€record,€preponderates€againstÏthe€decision€to€not€increase€the€award.€€We€find€the€record€is€sufficient€to€establishÏher€ability€to€find€employment€in€the€open€labor€market€has€been€affected€to€suchÏextent€that€the€multiplier€of€2€ðð€times€the€medical€impairment€should€not€control€theÏfinal€adjudication€of€her€claim€but€the€award€should€be€increased€under€and€subjectÍto€the€limitations€of€subsection€(b)€of€the€statute€(not€to€exceed€6€times€the€medicalÏimpairment).× ƒ. ××  ×Ìà àThe€record€indicates€that€after€plaintiff€was€seen€by€the€physical€therapist€atÏthe€Chattanooga€Rehabilitation€Center€for€evaluation€of€the€last€job€position,€a€letterÏdated€June€2,€1995,€was€written€to€the€employer€advising€that€her€job€restrictions€ofÏno€repetitive€bending€or€stooping,€a€maximum€lift€of€25€pounds€occasionally€and€noÏrepetitive€lifting€of€more€than€10€pounds€would€preclude€her€from€being€able€toÏhandle€the€position.€€The€letter€went€on€to€state€she€had€a€herniated€nucleusÏpulposus€and€she€moved€cautiously€and€slowly€at€œtimes›€due€to€pain€and€thatÏreturning€to€a€standing€position€from€even€a€partial€squat€was€difficult.€€TheÏemployer€relied€upon€this€information€in€concluding€she€was€unable€to€perform€theÏjob€and€in€reaching€the€decision€to€terminate€her.Ìà àThomas€Waymire,€a€certified€vocational€rehabilitation€counselor,€conductedÏthe€usual€study€necessary€to€give€an€opinion€concerning€vocational€disability.€€HeÏtestified€he€considered€available€medical€information€and€interviewed€plaintiff€toÏobtain€her€background,€education,€work€history,€etc.€€He€said€he€then€gave€herÏsome€tests€to€substantiate€her€educational€level.€€His€conclusion€was€that€her€injuryÏresulted€in€a€65%€loss€of€job€opportunities.Ìà àPlaintiffððs€husband,€Dale€Redden,€testified€her€ability€to€function€as€aÏhousewife€was€very€limited€as€she€could€not€perform€many€household€duties.€€HeÏsaid€she€could€not€stand€long€without€complaints€of€pain.Ìà àAt€the€time€of€trial,€plaintiff€was€working€in€the€office€of€Proffitts€departmentÏstore€where€she€was€taking€payments,€wrapping€gifts,€etc.€at€a€wage€rate€of€$6.00Ían€hour.€€Prior€to€this€work,€she€had€worked€for€awhile€in€another€department€storeÏdoing€similar€work€earning€$5.00€an€hour.Ìà àThe€record€does€not€indicate€plaintiffððs€exact€age€or€last€grade€of€educationÏshe€completed.€€However,€we€do€note€that€Mr.€Redden€testified€they€had€beenÏmarried€almost€twenty€years.€€While€the€case€could€be€remanded€back€to€the€trialÏcourt€for€precise€answers€to€these€questions,€we€are€of€the€opinion€the€wheels€ofÏjustice€should€move€faster.€€We€find€the€record€sufficient€to€hold€the€award€ofÏdisability€should€be€increased€to€39.2%€permanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€aÏwhole,€œwhich›€is€the€maximum€request€for€relief.€€The€defendants€are€to€receive€aÏcredit€for€all€prior€benefits€paid€to€the€employee.Ìà àThe€judgment€is€reversed€and€judgment€is€awarded€for€39.2%€permanentÏdisability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€taxed€to€defendants.ÌÌÓÓÔ% € Ôà àà àà àà àà àà à___________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌE.€Riley€Anderson,€Chief€JusticeÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€Judge€ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœÇÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ ` Ñà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÓ  ÓßJ€+/;+'b|` 81 `€@ÿJßAT€KNOXVILLEÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌJACQUELINE€MARIE€REDDENà àà à€€€€€)€Hamilton€Circuit€No.€95CV1626Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)€Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellantà àà à€€€€€à à€€€€€)€Hon.€Arnold€A.€Stulce,€Jr.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)€€€JudgeÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)€Supreme€Court€No.ÌSYNTHETIC€INDUSTRIES€and€€€€€€€€€€à à€€€€€)€€€03„S„01„9703„CV„00025ÌTHE€HOME€INSURANCE€COMPANYà à€€€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)€ReversedÌà àDefendants/Appelleesà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)Ìà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€ÌÌà@ àòòJUDGMENT€ORDERóóÌÓ€ÓÌà àà àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€motion€for€review€pursuant€to€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(5)(B),€the€entire€record,€including€the€order€of€referral€to€theÏSpecial€Workers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panel's€MemorandumÏOpinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€which€are€incorporatedÏherein€by€reference;ÌÌà àà àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€motion€for€review€is€not€well„taken€and€should€be€denied;€andÌÌà àà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÏlaw€are€adopted€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€is€made€the€judgment€ofÏthe€Court.ÌÌà àà àCost€will€be€paid€by€defendants/appellees,€for€which€execution€may€issueÏif€necessary.ÌÌÌà àà àIt€is€so€ordered€this€18th€day€of€February,€1998.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌÌAnderson,€C.€J.;€Reid,€J.,€not€participatingÌ›