ÿWPC» ž²VÊE§€W¦!ªOè"iÄJC1Ìañfý!ð'&¤¤£Z;#iZòv«ŽU¬O‚亪þKTYE¶m …P'öf$/ ëð¨Õ{çM 7ù¾9V«­2 âúÊÓ6àz0$¦)ƒr]™Œ [ë÷Ãw“0–þ› ò{*Μ^±…&1'Í‘ó£Q9´¦6㳃yP­î·OÃUÞ¸àÑìÁX»¤÷ ت»nfŒ«ænc¬Ó& Ne×÷Ÿ“]4ìÆjl©.o“7siÜ$\¿¥ &šVÖfÝK‚¦Y)»¤ Q*ar0°‹BA<á„Wѭ笊ö XgK9þȦãó×&êBƒ™TCÑÙš`—³®—‚™èNª†”‚åR´Lq.ªÕ>PæÍ™Ù4;]†p]àŒ»t?bžxWÏç9J °Ó¦·|0l€{«Ô^m¨ÛVÅnòûr[Ĥ‚uúé°Ö̼_fCݼ.š’VƒÕ”c̜ȱâpW˜]@©jç€HÈRùšé>E©mâôä±KFb2Óÿí¨óŽ<õ²vWÜ«¡8ÿô&˜åýÇÿ&4RCCÑ—³ªd:1ý=fδd!!8!’ N×_A£jqb %\UNb 0ˆ°U-N8^ †w’4– zªÒ$ ö  m #Á Æß Æ¥ Æk Æ1V÷NùNû zýEwÒyy bK ^­ 1u  € ˆ 0c ó û       #  -  7 A 0DGGG &‹‹b±¹¹¹¹¹L:::::: 72†††††††††††††††††††††††† 0븸¸¸ B ££ 0¤À D3d D-— 0KÄÄ ASÆb 0¤( 0DÌ A«»(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular{¢û(L NÞ( œGRA~ÄÀ¡ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4 Plus,ð,,,,,ð0Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt?\Appellants Attorney Name & Appellant's Name.?\Appellees Attorney Name & Appellee's Name.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)12(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à456789101112H(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó\Opinion Summary- ù- wÝ ƒR! $ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€XþkX»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔDonna€Ô_ÔThweattÔ_Ô€was€a€witness€in€this€case€and€she€also€experienced€similar€breathingÐ ° Ðproblems.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔThweattÔ_Ô€brought€a€separate€lawsuit€and€was€granted€benefits.€€That€case€is€also€beforeÐ  ð Ðthis€panel€on€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€òòDonna€Ô_ÔThweattÔ_Ô€v.€Travelers€Property€and€Casualty€Insurance€CompanyóóÐ à ÐNo.€M1999„01903„Ô_ÔWCÔ_Ô„R3„CV. BÝ ƒR! $ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€XþkX»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSpecifically,€the€chancellor€stated,€ð ðThe€Court€finds€that€Dr.€Faith€is€a€credible€witness.€€Dr.Ð ° ÐÔ_ÔEnsaladaÔ_Ô€is€not€credible€in€this€matter.ðði)(|G2! $¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€ò,»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€XþkX»»Ô d(|3ø!$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€ò,»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3ø!$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€ò,»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ò,»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€¼ò,»»»ÔÑ8€þkXXdð»»d8ÑÓ  Óà@@7 7 ìàIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÐ ° ÐSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÐ È ÐÌÔ‡XþkX»¼ò,ÔÌò òÔ#†¼ò,»XXþkz#ÔSHIRLEY€B.€RODGERSòòóó€v.€GUYS€&€GALS,€INC.,€òòet€alóó.Ô‡XþkX»¼ò,Ôó óÐ è8 ÐÌà@@¼¼ìàò òChancery€Court€for€Sumner€CountyÐ ð @ Ðà@@ôôìàNo.€98C„202Ð à 0 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<¯` AßÐ °  ÐÌNo.€M1999„01538„Ô_ÔWCÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Decided€„€July€27,€2000Ð ¯ÿ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<Ž` AßÐ ß  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÔ#†¼ò,»XXþkû#ÔÔ‡XþkX»¼ò,ÔÌÌÓèÓÓ  Óò òJUDGMENTó óÔ#†¼ò,»XXþk#ÔÔ‡XþkX»¼ò,ÔÐ n¾ ÐÌÓ  ÓÔ#†¼ò,»XXþk…#ÔÔ€XþkX»¼ò,ÔÔ‡XzðXXXþkÔà  àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,€including€the€order€of€referral€to€theÐ Nž ÐSpecial€Workersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panelððs€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forthÐ :Š Ðits€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference.Ð &v ÐÌà  àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€Memorandum€Opinion€of€the€Panel€should€beÐ þN Ðaccepted€and€approved;€andÐ ê: ÐÌà  àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panelððs€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law€are€adoptedÐ Â Ðand€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€is€made€the€judgment€of€the€Court.Ð ®þ ÐÌà  àCosts€will€be€paid€by€appellant,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.Ð †Ö ÐÌà  àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED.Ð ^!®  ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPER€CURIAMÐ %^ $ Ðà  àÔ#†XþkXXXzð#ÔÐ  ú%J!%ýœ ÐÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÓ  Óà@@7 7 ìàIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÐ ° ÐSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÐ È Ðà@@ƒƒìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,t #ÔÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÐ à0 ÐÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,k #ÔÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò, #ÔÌò òÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò, #ÔÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ% ‡ ÔSHIRLEY€B.€RODGERSÔ%†i Ô€v.Ô% ‡ Ô€GUYS€&€GALS,€INC.,€A€DOMESTICÐ è8 ÐCORPORATION,€AND€THE€TRAVELERS€PROPERTY€&€CASUALTYÐ  P ÐINSURANCE€COMPANYÔ%†œ ÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,J #ÔÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,h #Ôó óÐ  h ÐÌà@@¼¼ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€ChanceryÔ% ‡ Ô€Court€Ô%†÷ Ôfor€Ô% ‡ ÔSumnerÔ%† Ô€CountyÐ  p Ðà@@ôôìàNo.€Ô% ‡! Ô98C„202Ô%†!v Ô€€€€€€Ô% ‡" ÔTom€E.€Gray,€ChancellorÔ%†"¡ ÔÐ `  ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<ß` AßÐ à0  ÐÌNo.€Ô% ‡# ÔM1999„01538„Ô_ÔWCÔ_Ô„R3„CVÔ%†#ZÔ€„€Mailed€„€June€26,€2000Ð ß/  ÐÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,Ú#ÔFiled€„€July€27,€2000Ð Ï ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<®` AßÐ ¯ÿ Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThe€issues€in€this€workers'€compensation€appeal€are€whether€the€chancellor€erred€in€determiningÐ ®þ Ðthe€plaintiff€to€be€an€employee;€was€the€injury€from€inhaling€chemicals€compensable;€was€theÐ žî Ðaward€of€90%€to€the€body€as€a€whole€excessive;€and€was€commutation€to€lump€sum€appropriate.€Ð ŽÞ ÐThis€panel€affirms€the€decision€of€the€trial€judge.€€Ð ~Î ÐÌò òÔ% ‡$ ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)€(1999)€Appeal€as€of€RightÔ%†$QÔ;€Judgment€of€the€Ô% ‡% ÔChancery€CourtÐ ^® ÐAffirmed.Ô%†%»Ôó óÐ Nž ÐÌòòÓ  ÓKurtz,€Ô_ÔSp.J.Ô_ÔÔ‡¼ò,»àXþkÔÔ#†XþkX.¼ò,Y#Ôóó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòÔ% ‡& ÔBirch,€J.Ô%†&ÐÔ,óó€and€òòÔ% ‡' ÔLoser,€Ô_ÔSp.J.Ô_ÔÔ%†'Ôóó,€joined.Ð .~ ÐÌÔ% ‡ ÔDeanna€Bell€Johnson,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellants,€Guys€&€Gals,€Inc.,€and€The€TravelersÐ ^ ÐProperty€&Casualty€Insurance€CompanyÔ%†oÔ.Ð þN ÐÌC.€Tracey€Parks,€€Ô_ÔGallatinÔ_Ô,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Shirley€B.€Rodgers.Ð Þ!.  ÐÔ% ‡ ÔÔ%†ÁÔÌÌÓ!ÓÓ  Óò òMEMORANDUM€OPINIONó óÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,#ÔÐ ®$þ# ÐÓ  ÓÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,x#ÔÌÓ  Óò òòòFACTSÐ Ž&Þ!% ÐÌÓ  Óóóó óÓÓà  àÔ% ‡, ÔThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€Special€Workers'Ð n(¾#' ÐCompensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð50„6„Ð N*ž%) Ð225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€Court€of€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÐ .,~'+ Ðlaw.€€For€the€reasons€stated€below,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€granting€benefits€is€affirmed.Ô%†,ÔÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,Ý#ÔÐ ° ÐÔ‡¼ò,»XXþkÔÔ#†XþkX»¼ò,4#ÔÓ  Óà  àThis€action€by€the€employee€to€recover€workers'€compensation€benefits€arose€out€of€anÐ à Ðincident€in€which€she€was€exposed€to€a€chemical€substance€€in€the€workplace.€€After€a€trial€beforeÐ pÀ Ðthe€Chancery€Court€for€Sumner€County,€the€chancellor€held€that€the€plaintiff€suffered€an€accidentÐ P   Ðarising€out€of€and€in€the€course€and€scope€of€her€employment,€and€that€the€employer€had€actualÐ 0 € Ðnotice€of€the€accident.€€The€chancellor€found€the€plaintiff€to€be€90€percent€vocationally€disabled€toÐ `  Ðthe€body€as€a€whole€and€commuted€the€award€of€periodic€benefits€to€a€lump€sum.€€The€chancellorÐ ð@  Ðfurther€ordered€that€future€medicals€remain€open.Ð Ð  Ðà  àOn€September€2,€1997,€Shirley€Rodgers€(plaintiff)€went€to€Guys€&€Gals€Beauty€Salon€("GuysÐ ° Ð&€Gals")€in€Ô_ÔGallatinÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔTennesseeÔ_Ô€after€being€called€by€a€coworker,€Donna€Ô_ÔThweattÔ_Ô.€€When€Ms.Ð à ÐRodgers€arrived€at€Guys€&Gals,€she€found€puddles€on€the€floor€of€a€clear,€colorless€liquid€with€whiteÐ pÀ Ðfoam€on€top.€€In€addition€to€the€puddles,€she€saw€either€white€foam€or€a€film€of€dried€white€powderÐ P  Ðon€nearly€all€of€the€surfaces€of€the€work€space.€€She€€then€helped€Ms.€Ô_ÔThweattÔ_Ô€with€the€clean€upÐ 0€ Ðeffort.Ô_Ô׃/×Ý ƒ)#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€While€cleaning€up€the€substance,€plaintiff€felt€her€arms€burning€and€had€a€tight€feeling€inÐ ` Ðher€throat€and€chest.€She€called€the€shop€owner,€Sue€Ô_ÔNewbyÔ_Ô,€who€arrived€shortly€thereafter.€€€Ms.Ð ð@ ÐRodgers€€remained€in€the€shop€for€approximately€6€€hours,€coming€and€going€throughout€the€day€Ð Ð  Ðin€an€effort€to€have€the€substance€cleaned€up€by€a€professional.€€Later€that€day€she€developedÐ °"  Ðhoarseness,€coughing,€and€difficulty€breathing.€€She€also€suffered€from€nosebleeds.Ð $à" Ðà  àThe€substance€to€which€Ms.€Rodgers€was€exposed€was€later€determined€to€have€Ô_ÔcomeÔ_Ô€fromÐ p&À!$ Ðthe€air€conditioning€system€that€had€been€cleaned€during€the€Labor€Day€weekend€of€Ô_Ô1997.Ô_Ô€€ThereÐ ° Ðwas€testimony€at€trial€from€Mr.€Ô_ÔDerryberryÔ_Ô,€the€owner€of€the€company€who€serviced€the€airÐ à Ðconditioner,€that€he€used€Ô_ÔAlkyfoamÔ_Ô€to€clean€the€coils€in€the€air€conditioner.€€He€testified€thatÐ pÀ ÐÔ_ÔAlkyfoamÔ_Ô€is€the€product€name€for€the€chemical€sodium€hydroxide.Ð P   ÐÔ_ÔÔ% €( ÔÔ_Ôà  àAt€the€time€of€her€exposure€to€the€chemical€substance,€Ms.€Rodgers€was€53€years€old€and€hadÐ 0 € Ðworked€at€Guys€&€Gals€since€August€1996€as€a€manager€and€cosmetologist.€€Prior€to€that,€she€hadÐ `  Ðworked€as€a€cosmetologist€at€Morrison's€Hair€Design€for€about€36€years.€€Ð ð@  Ðà  àOn€September€4,€1997,€Ms.€Rodgers€saw€her€family€doctor,€Dr.€Sid€King,€M.D.€€Dr.€KingÐ Ð  Ðreferred€her€to€Dr.€William€Faith€M.D.,€a€pulmonary€lung€specialist€shortly€thereafter.€€She€saw€Dr.Ð ° ÐFaith€from€December€3,€1997€through€February€19,€1998.€€Dr.€Faith€determined€that€Ms.€RodgersÐ à Ðhad€reached€maximum€medical€improvement€on€February€18,€1998.Ð pÀ Ðà  àMs.€Rodgers€returned€to€work€after€her€initial€exposure€to€sodium€hydroxide,€but€hadÐ P  Ðdifficulty€doing€her€job.€€Instead€of€standing,€she€sat€on€a€stool€to€do€her€work;€she€frequently€laidÐ 0€ Ðher€head€down€and€rested€when€she€had€a€break.€€By€the€end€of€the€day€she€was€so€fatigued€thatÐ ` Ðwhen€she€got€home,€she€took€a€bath€and€went€straight€to€bed.€€She€quit€working€permanently€inÐ ð@ ÐDecember€1997.€€Ð Ð  Ðà  àDr.€Faith€diagnosed€Ms.€Rodgers€as€having€chemically€induced€asthma€resulting€fromÐ °"  Ðexposure€to€sodium€hydroxide.€€Dr.€Faith€assigned€Ms.€Rodgers€an€impairment€rating€of€20„25Ð $à" Ðpercent€based€on€the€òòA.M.A.€Guidelinesóó.€€He€indicated€that€in€order€to€work,€Ms.€Rodgers€€wouldÐ p&À!$ Ðneed€a€relatively€sedentary€job€in€an€environment€that€is€dust„free,€€controlled€for€heat€and€humidity,Ð P( #& Ðand€where€she€would€not€be€exposed€to€chemicals€or€fumes.€€Ð 0*€%( ÐÐ ,`'* ÐÓ  Óò òòòTHE€ISSUES€ON€APPEALÐ ° Ðóóó óÓ  Óà  àThe€defendants€Guys€and€Gals,€Inc.€and€€The€Travelers€Property€&€Casualty€InsuranceÐ à ÐCompany€("Travelers")€(the€workers'€compensation€carrier)€appeal€and€raise€four€issues:€(1)€whetherÐ pÀ Ðthe€trial€court€erred€in€ruling€plaintiff€was€an€employee€rather€than€an€independent€contractor;€(2)Ð P   Ðwhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€holding€plaintiff's€injury€to€be€compensable;€(3)€whether€the€trialÐ 0 € Ðcourt's€award€of€90€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€was€excessive;€and€(4)€whether€the€trial€courtÐ `  Ðerred€in€commuting€plaintiff's€award€to€a€lump€sum€payment.Ð ð@  Ðà  àOur€review€is€de€novo€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€ofÐ Ð  Ðthe€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.Ð ° ÐCode€Ann.€ðð50„6„225(e)(2).Ð à ÐÓ  Óò òòòEMPLOYEE€VS.€INDEPENDENT€CONTRACTORÐ pÀ ÐÓ  Óó óóóà  àThe€Tennessee€Workers'€Compensation€Act€covers€only€"employees."€€Once€the€existenceÐ P  Ðof€an€employment€relationship€is€established,€the€employer€has€the€burden€of€proving€the€worker€wasÐ 0€ Ðan€independent€contractor€rather€than€an€employee.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔGallowayÔ_Ô€v.€Memphis€Drum€Serv.óó,€822Ð ` ÐS.W.2d€584,€586€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€addition,€the€Workers'€Compensation€Law€is€to€"be€rationally€butÐ ð@ Ðliberally€construed€to€promote€and€adhere€to€the€Act's€purposes€of€securing€benefits€to€those€workersÐ Ð  Ðwho€fall€within€its€coverage."€€òòSee€id.óó€€(citing€òòÔ_ÔHodgeÔ_Ô€v.€Diamond€Container€General,€Inc.óó,€759Ð °"  ÐS.W.2d€659€(Tenn.€1988)).€€Ð $à" Ðà  àIn€the€present€case,€it€is€undisputed€that€an€employment€relationship€existed.€€Therefore,€weÐ p&À!$ Ðturn€to€the€factors€to€be€considered€in€determining€whether€an€individual€is€an€employee€or€anÐ P( #& Ðindependent€contractor.€€Under€Ô_ÔT.C.A.Ô_Ô€ðð50„6„102(10),€the€factors€to€consider€are€"(A)€The€right€toÐ 0*€%( Ðcontrol€the€conduct€of€the€work;€(B)€The€right€of€termination;€Ô_Ô(C)Ô_Ô€The€method€of€payment;€(D)€TheÐ ,`'* Ðfreedom€to€select€and€hire€helpers;€(E)€The€furnishing€of€tools€and€equipment;€(F)€Self€schedulingÐ ° Ðof€working€hours;€and€(G)€The€freedom€to€offer€services€to€other€entities."€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòÔ_ÔMasiersÔ_Ô€v.Ð à ÐArrow€Transfer€&€Storage€Co.óó,€639€S.W.2d€654,€656€(Tenn.€1982)€(òòcitingóó€òòJackson€Sawmill€v.€Westóó,Ð pÀ Ð619€S.W.2d€105€(Tenn.€1981)).ò ò€€ó óNo€one€factor€is€Ô_ÔdispositiveÔ_Ô,€but€the€right€to€control€and€the€rightÐ P   Ðto€terminate€are€usually€deemed€to€be€strong€evidence€of€an€employer„employee€relationship.€€òòSeeóóÐ 0 € ÐòòÔ_ÔStarflightÔ_Ô,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔThoniÔ_Ôóó€773€S.W.2d€908,€910€(Tenn.€1989).òòò òÐ `  Ðà  àóóó óIn€the€present€case,€appellants€addressed€the€right€to€control€the€conduct€of€the€work,€theÐ ð@  Ðmethod€of€payment,€the€furnishing€of€tools€and€equipment,€and€self€scheduling,€with€their€emphasisÐ Ð  Ðbeing€the€right€to€control.€€In€discussing€the€right€to€control€€issue,€appellants€indicated€that€plaintiffÐ ° Ðselected€and€scheduled€her€own€working€hours€and€vacation€time,€was€paid€on€a€commission€basis,Ð à Ðand€provided€her€own€equipment.€€Appellants€also€pointed€out€that€plaintiff€provided€most€of€herÐ pÀ Ðclientele€by€bringing€them€with€her€from€her€previous€job.€€Appellants€give€great€weight€to€the€factÐ P  Ðthat€plaintiff€had€a€right€to€supervise€or€inspect€her€own€work,€and€that€the€shop€owner€did€notÐ 0€ Ðsupervise€or€inspect€plaintiff's€work.€€Taking€all€of€these€things€into€consideration,€appellants€arguedÐ ` Ðthat€plaintiff€was€an€independent€contractor.Ð ð@ Ðà  àIn€support€of€their€contention,€appellants€relied€on€òòLindsey€v.€Smith€&€Johnson,€Inc.óó,€601Ð Ð  ÐS.W.2d€923€(Tenn.€1980)€and€òòFoster€v.€Liberty€Mut.óó,€(No€Number€in€Original)€1990€LEXIS€€413Ð °"  Ð(Tenn.€1990).€€In€òòLindseyóó,€Mr.€Lindsey€was€a€carpenter€who€was€a€partner€in€a€subcontractingÐ $à" Ðpartnership€which€was€working€for€the€defendant€general€contractor€at€the€time€of€his€injury.€€601Ð p&À!$ ÐS.W.2d€at€924„25.€€The€court€determined€that€right€of€control€was€maintained€in€Lindsey€and€hisÐ P( #& Ðpartners€in€that€the€partnership€offered€special€skills,€negotiated€contracts,€hired€and€paid€its€ownÐ 0*€%( Ðworkers€(and€made€the€standard€wage€deductions),€and€negotiated€payment€on€a€square€foot€ofÐ ,`'* Ðcompletion€basis€with€partial€payment€in€advance€and€the€balance€due€upon€completion€of€the€work.€Ð ° ÐòòId.óó€at€926.€€Mr.€Lindsey€indicated€that€he€never€intended€to€be€a€salaried€employee€of€the€generalÐ à Ðcontractor.€€òòId.óó€€Based€on€the€preceding€factors,€the€court€determined€that€Mr.€Lindsey€was€anÐ pÀ Ðindependent€contractor.€òòId.óóÐ P   ÐÓ  Óà  àIn€òòFosteróó,€the€plaintiff€obtained€a€job€hanging€cable€for€a€television€cable€company.€€1990Ð 0 € ÐLEXIS€413.€€As€in€òòLindseyóó,€he€hired€his€own€employees€to€help€with€the€work€and€paid€themÐ `  Ðfrom€his€earnings.€€òòId.óó€€Plaintiff€furnished€his€own€truck€and€scheduled€his€own€work€hours.€€òòId.óó€Ð ð@  ÐHe€was€paid€according€to€how€many€feet€of€strand€were€laid€and€reported€his€payments€as€"otherÐ Ð  Ðincome"€on€his€tax€return€instead€of€as€"wages,€salaries,€tips,€etc."€€òòId.óó€€Based€on€the€precedingÐ ° Ðfactors,€the€court€determined€that€Foster€was€an€independent€contractor.€òòId.óóÐ à Ðà  à€€Both€òòLindseyóóand€òòFosteróó€are€markedly€different€from€the€present€case.€€In€the€presentÐ pÀ Ðcase,€Ms.€Rodgers€did€schedule€her€own€work€hours€and€vacations,€however,€she€had€toÐ P  Ðcoordinate€time€off€with€the€other€employees.€€Ms.€Rodgers€was€one€of€two€managers€at€GuysÐ 0€ Ðand€Gals,€but€she€directly€reported€to€the€owner,€Sue€Ô_ÔNewbyÔ_Ô.€€There€was€nothing€in€the€record€toÐ ` Ðindicate€that€Ms.€Rodgers€had€power€to€hire€and€fire€other€employees,€but€rather,€she€was€there€inÐ ð@ Ða€supervisory€role€to€insure€that€the€shop€ran€smoothly.€€The€chancellor€pointed€out€that€GuysÐ Ð  Ðand€Gals€is€a€domestic€corporation€whose€control€was€with€Ms.€Ô_ÔNewbyÔ_Ô.€€Therefore,€Ms.€Rodgers'Ð °"  Ðcontrol€was€limited€to€that€delegated€to€her€by€Ms.€Ô_ÔNewbyÔ_Ô.€€Ð $à" Ðà  àAppellants€also€emphasized€that€Ms.€Rodgers€provided€her€own€equipment.€€While€Ms.Ð p&À!$ ÐRodgers€did€provide€scissors,€rollers,€and€any€specialty€tools,€for€the€most€part€she€usedÐ P( #& Ðequipment€and€facilities€furnished€by€Guys€&€Gals€since€Guys€&€Gals€provided€all€otherÐ 0*€%( Ðmaterials€and€equipment.€€Tennessee€case€law€is€clear€that€the€furnishing€of€tools€by€an€employeeÐ ,`'* Ð"is€insufficient,€without€more,€to€establish€the€relationship€of€independent€contractor."€€òòSeeóóÐ ° ÐòòCarver€v.€Sparta€Elec.€Ô_ÔSysÔ_Ô.óó€690€S.W.2d€218,€221€(Tenn.€1985).€€In€this€case€it€is€clear€that€GuysÐ à Ð&€Gals€provided€the€majority€of€required€equipment.Ð pÀ Ðòòò òà  àó óóóAdditionally,€Ms.€Rodgers€was€paid€on€a€commission€basis,€but€Guys€&€Gals€deductedÐ P   Ðfederal€income€tax€and€FICA€from€her€paycheck€and€paid€its€portion€of€the€payroll€taxes.€€At€theÐ 0 € Ðend€of€the€year,€Ms.€Rodgers€received€a€W„2€form€for€employees€as€opposed€to€a€1099€formÐ `  Ðissued€to€independent€contractors.€€Most€importantly,€Guys€&€Gals€purchased€workers'Ð ð@  Ðcompensation€insurance€on€Ms.€Rodgers€as€well€as€others€working€at€the€salon.€€These€factors€allÐ Ð  Ðstrongly€support€Ms.€Ô_ÔRodgerÔ_Ô's€claim€that€she€was€an€employee.€€In€fact,€where€€an€employerÐ ° Ðcarries€workers'€compensation€insurance€and€the€employee's€earnings€are€included€in€computingÐ à Ðpremiums€paid€for€such€insurance,€neither€the€employer€nor€the€insurer€is€in€a€position€toÐ pÀ Ðquestion€the€relationship€of€the€parties€under€the€Workers'€Compensation€Law.€€òòSeeóó€òòCarter€v.Ð P  ÐHodgesóó,€175€Tenn.€96,€101,€132€S.W.2d€211,€213€(Tenn.€1939)€(citing€òòEmployers'€LiabilityÐ 0€ ÐAssurance€Corp.€v.€Warrenóó,€172€Tenn.€403,€112€S.W.2d€837,€839€(Tenn.€1938)).òòò òÐ ` Ðà  àóóó óFinally,€this€Court€has€consistently€emphasized€that€where€doubt€exists,€€the€WorkersððÐ ð@ ÐCompensation€Law€is€to€be€rationally€construed€in€favor€of€finding€employee€status.€€òòSeeóóÐ Ð  ÐòòÔ_ÔGallowayÔ_Ôóó€822€S.W.2d€at€586;€òòÔ_ÔWootenÔ_Ô€Transports,€Inc.€v.€Hunteróó€525€S.W.2d€858,€860€(Tenn.Ð °"  Ð1976);€òòArmstrong€v.€Spearsóó€393€S.W.2d€729,€731€(Tenn.€1965);€òòBarker€v.€Curtisóó€287€S.W.2d€43,Ð $à" Ð46€(Tenn.€1956).òòò òÐ p&À!$ Ðà  àóóó óHaving€carefully€reviewed€the€record€and€considered€the€relevant€case€law,€we€affirm€theÐ P( #& Ðtrial€court's€holding€that€Ms.€Rodgers€was€an€employee€rather€than€an€independent€contractor.€€ò òòòÐ 0*€%( ÐÐ ,`'* Ðóóó óÓ  Óà @ àò òòòCOMPENSABILITY€OF€INJURYÐ ° ÐÓ  Óà  àó óóóAppellants€argue€that€Ms.€Rodgers€must€prove€that€she€has€an€occupational€disease€(òòSeeóóÐ à ÐÔ_ÔT.C.A.Ô_Ô€ðð50„6„301€òòet.óó€òòseq.óó)€in€order€to€recover€because€her€complaint€is€that€she€suffered€a€lungÐ pÀ Ðinjury.€€Ms.€Rodgers,€however,€claims€that€she€suffered€an€accidental€injury€€(òòSeeóó€Ô_ÔT.C.A.Ô_Ô€ðð50„6„Ð P   Ð102(12))€as€opposed€to€having€an€occupational€disease.€€òòò òÐ 0 € Ðóóó óà  àThe€chancellor€determined€that€Ms.€Rodgers€had€proven€by€expert€medical€testimony€theÐ `  Ðnexus€between€the€action€of€breathing€the€fumes€on€and€after€September€2,€1997€and€her€respiratoryÐ ð@  Ðproblems.€€The€chancellor€found€that€Ms.€Rodgers€suffered€an€"accident"€arising€out€of€and€in€theÐ Ð  Ðcourse€and€scope€of€her€employment.òòò òÐ ° ÐÔ_ÔÔ_Ôà  àóóó óIn€òòBrown€Shoe€Company€v.€Reedóó,€350€S.W.2d€65€(Tenn.€1961),€this€Court€gave€a€definitionÐ à Ðof€the€word€"accident"€as€used€in€our€workers'€compensation€statute€in€the€following€language.Ð pÀ ÐÓÓà8  àAn€accident€is€generally€an€unlooked€for€mishap,€an€untoward€event,€which€is€notÐ P  Ðexpected€or€designed.€€Generally€in€most€such€cases€this€Court€has€repeatedly€saidÐ @ Ðthat€a€compensable€injury€should€be€the€result€of€something€happening€by€accidentalÐ 0€ Ðmeans€though€the€act€involving€the€accident€was€intentional.€€Accidental€meansÐ  p Ðordinarily€mean€an€effect€which€was€not€the€natural€or€probable€consequence€of€theÐ ` Ðmeans€which€produced€it,€an€effect€which€does€not€ordinarily€follow€and€cannot€beÐ P Ðreasonably€anticipated€from€the€use€of€those€means,€an€effect€which€the€actor€did€notÐ ð@ Ðintend€to€produce€and€which€he€cannot€be€charged€with€the€design€of€producing.€ItÐ à0 Ðis€produced€by€means€which€were€neither€designed€nor€calculated€to€cause€it.€€ItÐ Ð  Ðcannot€be€reasonably€anticipated,€it€is€unexpected,€it€is€produced€by€unusualÐ À! Ðcombinations€of€fortuitous€circumstances€and€such€an€injury€is€an€injury€byÐ °"  Ðaccidental€means.òòò òР#ð!Ð Ð  Ðó óóó350€S.W.2d€at€69.Ð $à" ÐÌÓàXÓÔ_Ôò òòòÔ_Ôà  àó óóóThe€Special€Workers€Compensation€Appeals€panel€€has€reviewed€other€matters€involvingÐ p&À!$ Ðlung€injuries€and€found€them€to€be€compensable€injuries€by€accident€as€defined€by€the€statute.€€òòSeeóóÐ P( #& ÐòòHill€v.€Royal€Ins.€Co.óó,€937€S.W.2d€873,€875€(injury€by€accident€when€employee€was€exposed€toÐ 0*€%( Ðchemicals€during€her€employment€and€suffered€physical€reactions);€òòEvans€v.€Ô_ÔOlinÔ_Ô€Corp.óó,€686€S.W.2dÐ ,`'* Ð76,€78€(Tenn.€1985)€(employee€exposed€to€liquid€chlorine€on€three€occasions€while€at€work€held€toÐ ° Ðhave€suffered€an€industrial€accident);€òòManis€v.€Ô_ÔPeterbiltÔ_Ô€Motors€Co.óó,€1995€Tenn.€LEXIS€223€(workerÐ à Ðwith€pre„existing€emphysema€attributable€to€smoking€held€to€have€sustained€a€gradual€injuryÐ pÀ Ðamounting€to€an€accidental€injury€when€condition€was€exacerbated€by€repeated€exposure€to€dieselÐ P   Ðfumes€while€at€work).€Ð 0 € Ðà  àThis€case€is€consistent€with€the€definition€of€"accident"€as€stated€previously€as€well€as€withÐ `  Ðthose€cases€in€which€lung€injuries€were€found€to€be€accidental€injuries€as€opposed€to€occupationalÐ ð@  Ðdiseases.€€The€trial€court€found€that€Ms.€Rodgers€proved€through€expert€medical€testimony€that€sheÐ Ð  Ðwas€exposed€to€a€chemical€(sodium€hydroxide)€at€work€on€September€7,€1997,€that€her€employer€hadÐ ° Ðnotice€of€the€chemical€exposure,€and€that€exposure€to€the€chemical€resulted€in€her€respiratoryÐ à Ðproblems.€€We€would€note€that€the€chancellor€found€Dr.€Faith,€Ms.€Ô_ÔRodgerÔ_Ô's€Ô_ÔpulmonologistÔ_Ô,€to€beÐ pÀ Ðcredible,€but€found€a€lack€of€credibility€with€Dr.€Ô_ÔEnsaladaÔ_Ô,€the€doctor€Travelers€hired€to€evaluate€Ms.Ð P  ÐRodgers.Ô_Ô׃4×Ý ƒ)#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€The€trial€court's€holding€on€this€issue€is€affirmed.€€ò òòòÐ 0€ ÐWHETHER€AWARD€OF€90€PERCENT€TO€BODY€AS€A€WHOLE€WAS€EXCESSIVEÐ ` Ðóóó óà  àAppellants€argue€that€the€trial€court's€determination€that€the€plaintiff€has€a€vocationalÐ ð@ Ðdisability€of€90€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€is€excessive,€claiming€that€Ms.€Rodgers€did€not€sufferÐ Ð  Ða€permanent€impairment€rating€of€20€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€according€to€the€òòA.M.A.Ð °"  ÐGuidelinesóó.€€In€support€of€this€argument,€appellants€assert€that€Dr.€Faith€was€incorrect€in€hisÐ $à" Ðassessment€of€Ms.€Rodgers'€impairment€rating€in€that€he€gave€her€a€vocational€disability€rating€asÐ p&À!$ Ðopposed€to€a€permanent€impairment€rating.€€Appellants€rely€on€Dr.€Ô_ÔEnsaladaÔ_Ôððs€testimony€that€Ms.Ð P( #& ÐRodgers€did€not€have€occupational€related€asthma€and€whatever€injury€she€may€have€had,€she€hadÐ ° Ðno€permanent€impairment.€Ð à Ðà  àThe€chancellor,€however,€found€€Dr.€Faith€to€be€credible€and€further€found€that€he€properlyÐ pÀ Ðgave€Ms.€Rodgers€a€permanent€impairment€rating.€€Dr.€Faith€testified€that€he€used€Tables€8€and€10Ð P   Ðrespectively€found€on€pages€162€and€164€of€the€òòA.M.A.€Guidelinesóó.€€He€indicated€that€there€was€noÐ 0 € Ðspecific€impairment€rating€expressed€in€the€asthma€category€found€in€Table€10€so€he€used€Table€8Ð `  Ðto€arrive€at€an€impairment,€and€placed€Ms.€Rodgers€in€category€2,€giving€her€an€impairment€ratingÐ ð@  Ðof€20„25€percent€because€of€the€severity€of€her€symptoms€and€the€ease€with€which€her€asthma€isÐ Ð  Ðinvoked.Ð ° Ðà  àThe€chancellor€further€determined€that€Ms.€Rodgers'€skills€as€a€hairdresser€are€notÐ à Ðtransferable€skills,€and€that€her€employment€options€are€severely€limited.€€Ð pÀ Ðà  àOnce€causation€and€permanency€have€been€established€by€expert€medical€testimony,€the€trialÐ P  Ðjudge€may€consider€a€number€of€pertinent€factors€to€determine€the€extent€of€a€worker's€industrialÐ 0€ Ðdisability.€òòSeeóó€òòÔ_ÔWorthingtonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔModineÔ_Ô€Mfg.€Co.óó,€798€S.W.2d€232,€234€(Tenn.1990)€(citing€òòHolderÐ ` Ðv.€Wilson€Sporting€Goods€Co.óó,€723€S.W.2d€104,€107€(Tenn.€1987);€òòRobertson€v.€Ô_ÔLorettoÔ_Ô€Casket€Co.óó,Ð ð@ Ð722€S.W.2d€380,€384€(Tenn.€1986)).€€In€this€case,€the€chancellor€looked€at€Ms.€Rodgers's€age,Ð Ð  Ðeducation,€past€work€experience,€whether€she€had€any€transferable€job€skills,€and€restrictions€placedÐ °"  Ðon€her€by€her€by€Dr.€Faith.Ð $à" Ðà  àMs.€Rodgers€is€55€years€old.€€After€graduating€from€high€school,€she€attended€beauty€schoolÐ p&À!$ Ðand€obtained€her€cosmetology€license€around€1963.€€She€has€no€advanced€skills.€€For€37€years€priorÐ P( #& Ðto€her€chemical€exposure,€Ms.€Rodgers€€worked€solely€as€a€beautician€(she€worked€as€beautician€andÐ 0*€%( Ðbeauty€shop€manager€from€1996„1997),€a€profession€she€is€no€longer€able€to€perform€as€a€result€ofÐ ,`'* Ðdeveloping€chemically€induced€asthma.€€Dr.€Faith€testified€that€Ms.€Rodgers€is€now€limited€to€aÐ ° Ðsedentary€job€in€a€€working€environment€that€is€as€much€as€possible€climate„controlled,€dust„free,Ð à Ðchemical„free,€fume„free,€temperature„controlled,€and€humidity„controlled.€€Ð pÀ Ðà  àBased€on€the€foregoing,€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trialÐ P   Ðcourt's€award€of€€a€90€percent€vocational€disability.€€Therefore,€the€trial€court's€holding€on€this€issueÐ 0 € Ðis€affirmed.ò òòòÐ `  ÐÓ  ÓCOMMUTATION€TO€LUMP€SUM€PAYMENTÐ ð@  ÐÓ  Óó óóóà  àAppellants€argue€that€lump€sum€commutation€in€this€case€is€inappropriate€because€Ms.Ð Ð  ÐRodgers€has€not€supplied€proof€of€special€needs€or€exceptional€circumstances.€€Travelers€relies€onÐ ° ÐòòDavenport€v.€Taylor€Ô_ÔFeedmillÔ_Ôóó,€784€S.W.2d€923€(Tenn.€1990)€in€support€of€this€argument.€Ð à ÐUnfortunately,€Travelers'€reliance€on€this€case€is€misplaced€since€the€commutation€statute€wasÐ pÀ Ðamended€in€1990,€after€the€òòDavenportóó€decision€was€issued.€€The€statutory€amendment€eliminated€theÐ P  Ðrequirement€that€an€employee€must€show€proof€of€special€needs.òòò òÐ 0€ ÐÔ_Ôó óóóÔ_Ôà  àAn€award€of€workers'€compensation€benefits€may€be€commuted€to€one€or€more€lump€sumÐ ` Ðpayments€upon€motion€of€a€party€subject€to€the€approval€of€the€trial€court.€€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð50„6„Ð ð@ Ð229(a).€€The€controlling€statute,€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð50„6„229(a),€says,Ð Ð  ÐÓÓà8  àIn€determining€whether€to€commute€an€award,€the€trial€court€shall€consider€whetherÐ °"  Ðthe€commutation€will€be€in€the€best€interest€of€the€employee,€and€such€court€shallÐ  #ð! Ðalso€consider€the€ability€of€the€employee€to€wisely€manage€and€control€the€commutedÐ $à" Ðaward€irrespective€of€whether€there€exist€special€needs.Ѐ%Ð #Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓUnder€this€two„prong€test€(best€interest€and€wise€management€of€the€commuted€award),€courts€mustÐ `'°"% Ðexercise€their€discretion€on€an€òòad€hocóó€basis€since€the€amendment€does€not€specify€the€factors€to€beÐ @)$' Ðconsidered.€€òòSeeóó€òòNorth€Am.€Royalties,€Inc.€v.€Thrasheróó,€817€S.W.2d€308€(Tenn.€1991).€Ð  +p&) Ðà  àIn€this€case,€Ms.€Rodgers€testified€that€she€plans€to€invest€the€lump€sum€award€in€order€to€liveÐ ° Ðoff€it€for€the€remainder€of€her€life.€€The€chancellor€found€that€Ms.€Rodgers€met€the€two„prong€test,€Ð à Ðand€stated€that€she€has€the€ability€to€manage€her€money€wisely.€Ð pÀ Ðà  àUnder€the€statute,€the€trial€court€has€the€discretion€to€permit€or€refuse€commutation€of€anÐ P   Ðaward€to€a€lump€sum.€€òòSeeóó€òòClayton€v.€Ô_ÔCookevilleÔ_Ô€Energy,€Inc.óó,€824€S.W.2d€167,€168€(Tenn.€1992).€Ð 0 € ÐUnless€the€reviewing€tribunal€finds€that€the€trial€court€has€abused€its€discretion,€the€award€of€a€lumpÐ `  Ðsum€payment€must€be€affirmed€on€appeal.€€òòId.óó€€There€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€to€suggest€that€theÐ ð@  Ðtrial€court€abused€its€discretion,€and€therefore,€the€lump€sum€award€is€Ô_Ôaffirmed.ò òòòÔ_ÔÐ Ð  ÐÔ_Ôóóó óÔ_Ôà  àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€are€taxed€to€the€Ô_Ôappellant.Ô_ÔÔ_ÔÔ_Ô