ÿWPCN ¯Yp¯ï8j,­JVÈΙ`4VÈ N®Ìi z¥S³õÄÿ¦ ð ›l'àlp)^¨â_”ÉÚ£]è'žüÀêÁÛΜ”û@§^l¿Þ¿"JN‡}Éö:ž^²ÛÃå_ø¬åÒèú°Tôû¤‚ºvÕ7½üѼ: Û b/HvHýg9=œn¯"Xá™Yî·ÂÖ1ÉÃÆ÷°b·´›êY^`o‡ž´)®ýSÅÊð:ä²ß÷Bc%Y àBÒÊ»Á:¨î¿ áwvÓbdˆÛ“Ò£ƒá„@œSL©ÊŸ gˆÖ6ô1áÝ\õoÁÉAĆ֮/GTÏ—Nsº©ý†$én¿Îã†Âš°·®qŽ%ŒÚ}Úu…œ«:1¿U¬;GÆ9ˆ}øJrc1 üdÌ T¶>ÛÉ~ ”n? ôųX"O*<’gdù>(51ý©<^ÁÃüÖà`îüÖ å»ÿ„°`hu`ƒ äzÂe=úÜ#hA­¯ô)Å åÙ^Ö0T݆49VÉÕ§°!é'øÖÐ$1z™†RqOªùþ>ò­{!_ï<,Ž Ðpercent€permanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€The€plaintiff€suffered€a€compensableÐ *z Ðinjury,€returned€to€work€for€the€pre„injury€employer,€then€left€that€position€and€obtained€employmentÐ f Ðwith€another€employer.Ô#†X¢‹XX Xø„î#ÔÔ‡Xø„XXX¢‹ÔÔ#†¼¦˜»XXø„#ÔÔ‡Xø„X»¼¦˜Ô€€We€affirm€the€award€of€permanent€partial€disability,€reverse€the€award€ofÐ R Ðtemporary€total€disability€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€for€a€determination€of€the€amountÐ î> Ðowed€consistent€with€our€findings.Ð Ú* ÐÔ#†X¢‹XXXø„; #ÔÔ#†¼­¼»XX¢‹} #ÔÔ‡X¢‹X»¼­¼Ôûÿÿdûà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àà  àÌüÿÿdüÓUÓÌò òÓ  ÓÔ‡Xø„XXX¢‹ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)€(1999)€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Ð ¦ö ÐAffirmed€in€Part;€Reversed€in€Part;€and€Remandedó óÐ ’ â ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÓ  ÓJohn€K.ByersÔ#†¼¦˜»àXø„ñ #ÔÔ‡Xø„X.¼¦˜Ô,€Sr.€JÔ#†¼¦˜»àXø„× #ÔÔ‡Xø„X.¼¦˜Ô.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€whichòòóó€òòE.€Riley€Anderson,€C.J.Ô#†¼¦˜»àXø„ #ÔóóÔ‡Xø„X»¼¦˜Ô€andÐ j"º! ÐòòRoger€E.€Thayer,€S.J.óó,€joined.Ð V#¦" ÐÌJ.€Bartlett€Quinn,€Chattanooga,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Asplundh€Tree€Expert€Co.Ð .%~ $ ÐÌR.€Dee€Hobbs,€Chattanooga,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Peter€A.€Smith.Ð 'V"& ÐÔ#†X¢‹XXXø„µ #ÔÌÓœ ÓÓ  Óò òÔ‡Xø„XXX¢‹ÔOPINIONó óÔ#†¼¦˜»XXø„¸ #ÔÔ‡Xø„X»¼¦˜ÔÔ#†X¢‹XXXø„5#ÔÐ â(2$( ÐÌÓ  ÓÔ#†¼­¼»XX¢‹#ÔÔ‡X¢‹X»¼­¼ÔÔ‡ Xø„XXX¢‹ÔÌÓ  Óòòò òFactsó óóóÐ ª+ú&+ ÐÓGÓà  àThe€plaintiff,€forty„two€years€of€age€at€the€time€of€trial,€was€employed€by€the€defendant€whoÐ –,æ', Ðhad€a€contract€to€maintain€utility€poles€throughout€the€Chattanooga€area.€€The€work€required€diggingÐ ‚-Ò(-ý Ðaround€the€poles€and€applying€chemicals€to€inhibit€decay€and€invasion€by€termites,€etc.€€In€May€ofÐ ° Ð1992,€the€plaintiff€began€to€experience€difficulty€with€his€left€wrist€and€arm.€€Additionally,€heÐ œì Ðdeveloped€an€allergic€reaction€to€the€chemicals€used€on€the€poles.€€The€allergic€reaction€wasÐ ˆØ Ðcharacterized€by€discoloration,€€blistering€and€swelling€of€his€feet.€€In€August€of€1992,€the€plaintiffÐ tÄ Ðvoluntarily€resigned€from€his€position€with€the€defendant,€but€he€testified€he€did€so€because€theÐ `° Ðdefendant€could€provide€no€work€that€did€not€aggravate€the€condition€affecting€his€arm.€Ð L œ Ðà  àIn€September€of€1992,€the€plaintiff€was€hired€by€Olson€Temporary€Services€and€beganÐ 8 ˆ Ðworking€at€Kimberly„Clark.€€In€January€of€1993,€the€plaintiff€left€Kimberly„Clark€and€returned€toÐ $ t ÐMaineð!ðhis€place€of€residence€prior€to€Chattanoogað!ðwhere€he€started€a€cleaning€business€that€lastedÐ  ` Ðfor€about€one€month,€at€which€time€he€obtained€employment€at€a€lumber€mill€in€€Maine.€€He€workedÐ ü L  Ðthe€lumber€mill€job€from€July€to€September€of€1993.€€Ð è 8  Ðà  àIn€January€1994,€the€plaintiff€obtained€a€license€to€sell€real€estate.€€He€was€notablyÐ Ô$  Ðunsuccessful€in€this€work.€€In€the€fall€of€1994,€the€plaintiff€was€employed€by€the€Maine€school€districtÐ À  Ðto€teach€computer€courses.€€Ð ¬ü  Ðà  àCurrently€the€plaintiff€is€working€on€a€Microsoft€certification,€which€could€earn€him€anÐ ˜è  Ðincome€of€between€40€and€120€dollars€per€hour.€€The€plaintiff€testified€he€has€not€made€as€much€inÐ „Ô  Ðany€year€since€his€injury€as€he€had€before€the€injury.€€He€also€testified€about€his€inability€to€use€hisÐ pÀ Ðleft€arm,€which€is€his€dominant€arm,€because€of€pain€he€experiences€in€the€arm€and€shoulder.Ð \¬ Ðà  àThe€evidence€shows€the€plaintiff€is€unable€to€come€in€contact€with€a€variety€of€ordinaryÐ H˜ Ðproducts€used€in€living€because€the€exposure€to€chemicals€has€caused€him€to€develop€a€permanentÐ 4„ Ðallergy€to€them.Ð  p ÐòòÓ  Óò òMedical€Evidenceó óóóÐ  \ ÐÓ€Óà  àCharles€Sullivan,€a€doctor€of€osteopathy,€found€the€plaintiff€to€have€epicondylitis€(tennisÐ øH Ðelbow),€€alteration€of€muscle€strength€in€the€left€side€especially€in€the€left€upper€extremity,€loss€of€aÐ ä4 Ðsignificant€degree€in€the€range€of€motion€in€the€neck,€and€allergies€as€a€result€of€exposure€to€theÐ Ð  Ðchemicals€at€work.€€Dr.€Sullivan€found€all€of€this€was€caused€by€the€plaintiffððs€work€with€theÐ ¼  Ðdefendant.€€He€found€the€plaintiff€sustained€a€twenty„five€percent€medical€impairment€to€the€body€asÐ ¨ø Ða€whole.€Ð ”ä Ðà  àDr.€William€F.€Boucher€Jr.,€an€occupational€medicine€physician,€saw€the€plaintiff€onÐ €Ð ÐNovember€5,€1996,€for€evaluation.€€He€testified€the€plaintiff€had€developed€a€ð ðchemical€burn€due€toÐ l¼ Ðsodium€methyl€dihyrocarbonate€exposure,€with€recurrent€allergic€contact€reaction.ðð€€Dr.€BoucherÐ X ¨ Ðtestified€the€condition€was€permanent€and€resulted€in€a€seven€percent€impairment€to€the€body€as€aÐ D!” Ðwhole.Ð 0"€  Ðà  àDr.€Martin€Ô_ÔRedishÔ_Ô,€orthopedic€surgeon,€treated€the€plaintiff€from€June€17,€1992,€throughÐ #l! ÐMarch€10,€1993,€for€a€sore€left€wrist.€€On€July€22,€1992,€he€injected€the€plaintiffððs€left€elbow€forÐ $X" Ðsoreness€after€which€the€plaintiff€made€no€further€complaint€of€elbow€pain.€€Dr.€Redish€testified€theÐ ô$D # Ðplaintiff€reached€maximum€improvement€sometime€after€March€10,€1993.€€He€found€a€one€to€twoÐ à%0!$ Ðpercent€permanent€impairment€to€the€plaintiffððs€left€arm.€€€Dr.€Redish€released€the€plaintiff€to€returnÐ Ì&"% Ðto€work€without€restrictions€on€August€5,€1992.Ð ¸'#& Ðà  àDr.€Christopher€R.€Brigham,€an€occupational€medicine€physician,€found€the€plaintiffððs€neckÐ ¤(ô#' Ðcomplaints€unrelated€to€the€plaintiffððs€work€with€the€defendant.€€However,€Dr.€Brigham€testified€theÐ )à$( Ðplaintiffððs€left€wrist€and€left€elbow€problem€did€result€from€an€injury€while€working€for€the€defendant.€Ð |*Ì%) ÐDr.€Brigham€found€the€plaintiff€reached€maximum€improvement€by€March€of€1995,€and€perhaps€hadÐ h+¸&* Ðdone€so€sometime€in€late€1993.€€Dr.€Brigham€found€the€plaintiff€to€have€a€five€percent€upper€extremityÐ ° Ð(arm)€impairment,€which€amounted€to€a€three€percent€whole€body€impairment.€€He€found€the€injuryÐ œì Ðwould€interfere€with€any€repetitive€use€of€the€arm.Ð ˆØ Ðà  àÌÓ  Óòòò òDiscussion€of€Temporary€Total€Benefitsó óóóÐ `° ÐÓ4%Óà  àThe€trial€judge€found€the€plaintiff€had€reached€maximum€medical€improvement€as€ofÐ L œ ÐNovember€22,€1995,€and€held€the€defendant€liable€for€temporary€total€benefits€from€the€date€of€injuryÐ 8 ˆ Ð(May€1992)€until€the€date€of€maximum€medical€improvement.€€During€this€time€the€defendant€had,Ð $ t Ðeither€by€order€of€the€trial€court€or€voluntarily,€paid€temporary€total€benefits€to€the€plaintiff€with€theÐ  ` Ðexception€being€the€time€when€the€plaintiff€was€employed€for€most€of€the€period€between€May€ofÐ ü L  Ð1992€and€November€of€1995,€except€for€the€time€from€May€1,€1993,€until€July€24,€1993,€and€fromÐ è 8  ÐAugust€30,€1993,€to€February€12,€1994.€€The€trial€court€also€held€the€plaintiff€entitled€to€benefitsÐ Ô$  Ðduring€that€time€either€because€he€was€unemployed€by€reason€of€his€injury€or€that€he€wasÐ À  Ðunderemployed€because€of€the€injury,€i.e.,€he€did€not€make€as€much€money€working€for€otherÐ ¬ü  Ðemployers€as€he€made€while€employed€by€the€defendant.Ð ˜è  Ðà  àThe€correctness€of€the€ruling€by€the€trial€court€on€the€issue€must€be€determined€upon€twoÐ „Ô  Ðgrounds:€(1)€when€the€temporary€total€benefits€terminate€as€a€matter€of€law;€and€(2)€if€the€benefits€Ð pÀ Ðare€once€terminated€may€they€be€again€reinstated.Ð \¬ Ðà  àThe€general€rule€is€that€the€period€of€entitlement€to€temporary€total€benefits€consists€of€theÐ H˜ Ðperiod€of€time€the€employee€is€unable€to€work.€€òòCluck€Brothers€Inc.€v.€Coffeyóó,€431€S.W.2d€756€(Tenn.Ð 4„ Ð1968).€€Such€benefits€are€terminated€either€by€the€ability€to€return€to€work€or€the€attainment€ofÐ  p Ðmaximum€medical€recovery.€€òòSimpson€v.€Satterfieldóó,€564€S.W.2d€953€(Tenn.€1978).Ð  \ Ðà  àIf€the€worker€is€able€to€work€at€any€employment€permitted€by€the€nature€of€the€injuries,Ð øH Ðtemporary€total€benefits€end.€€òòAnderson€v.€Dean€Truck€Line€Inc.óó,€682€S.W.2d€900€(Tenn.€1984).Ð ä4 Ðà  àThe€application€of€these€precedents€to€the€facts€of€this€case€seems€to€lead€to€the€conclusionÐ Ð  Ðthat€the€period€for€which€the€defendant€was€entitled€to€receive€temporary€total€benefits€ended€whenÐ ¼  Ðhe€became€employed€by€Kimberly„Clark€in€September€of€1993.Ð ¨ø Ðà  àThe€plaintiff€on€the€other€hand€asserts€that€temporary€total€benefits€may€be€resumed€after€theÐ ”ä Ðtermination€as€a€matter€of€law€if€the€worker€subsequently€becomes€temporarily€and€totally€disabledÐ €Ð Ðas€a€result€of€the€injuryÐ l¼ Ðà  àThe€plaintiff€relies€upon€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€50„6„234€as€well€as€the€cases€of€òòYountÐ X ¨ Ðv.€Henrite€Products€Inc.óó,€754€S.W.2d€47€(Tenn.€1988)€and€òòWilkes€v.€Resource€Authority€of€SumnerÐ D!” ÐCountyóó,€932€S.W.2d€458€(Tenn.€1996)€in€support€of€his€claim.Ð 0"€  Ðà  àTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€50„6„234€does€deal€with€the€discontinuation€and€resumption€ofÐ #l! Ðtemporary€total€payments.€€However,€this€statute,€by€its€structure,€deals€with€the€rights€and€duties€ofÐ $X" Ða€worker€and€employer€when€the€employee€resumes€work€with€the€same€employer.€€We€do€notÐ ô$D # Ðconclude€that€it€permits€an€employee€to€accept€employment€with€a€successive€employer,€leave€thatÐ à%0!$ Ðemployment€for€a€cause€not€associated€with€the€injury€suffered€during€tenure€with€the€previousÐ Ì&"% Ðemployer,€and€then€require€the€previous€employer€to€recommence€payment€of€temporary€totalÐ ¸'#& Ðdisability€benefits.Ð ¤(ô#' Ðà  àIn€the€cases€of€òòYount€óóand€òòWilkesóó,€the€workers€returned€to€employment€with€the€employers€forÐ )à$( Ðwhom€they€worked€when€their€compensable€injuriesòò€óóoccurred.€€In€each€case,€the€employee€requiredÐ |*Ì%) Ðsurgery€to€correct€or€alleviate€the€injury€sustained.€€The€supreme€court€in€those€cases€held€the€workersÐ h+¸&* Ðwere€entitled€to€resumption€of€temporary€total€disability€benefits€during€the€time€they€were€unableÐ ° Ðto€work€because€they€were€recuperating€from€the€surgery€that€resulted€from€their€compensable€work„Ð œì Ðrelated€injuries.Ð ˆØ Ðà  àIn€this€case,€the€plaintiff€testified€he€was€released€to€return€to€work€on€August€5,€1992,€withÐ tÄ Ðthe€defendant€and€stated€he€was€able€to€do€the€work€required€by€the€defendant.€€He€quit€work€with€theÐ `° Ðdefendantð!ðaccording€to€him€because€he€could€not€do€the€work€with€his€left€arm€injury.€Ð L œ Ðà  àIf€we€were€to€determine€the€time€at€which€the€temporary€total€benefits€ended€based€upon€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðtestimony€of€Dr.€Brigham,€we€would€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€on€this€issue.€€However,Ð $ t Ðwe€are€of€the€view€the€right€to€receive€temporary€total€benefits€is€controlled€by€the€return€to€work€ofÐ  ` Ðthe€plaintiff.Ð ü L  Ðà  àThe€plaintiff€returned€to€work€with€the€defendant,€as€shown€in€the€record,€on€July€22,€1992,Ð è 8  Ðand€left€because€he€could€not€do€the€work.€€The€plaintiff€then€began€to€work€for€Kimberly„Clark€inÐ Ô$  ÐSeptember€of€1992.€€We€conclude€that€the€right€to€temporary€total€benefits€terminated€on€that€date.Ð À  ÐÓ  Óòòò òÌDiscussion€of€Permanent€Disabilityó óóóÐ ˜è  ÐÓ™;Óà  àThe€medical€evidence€in€this€case€is€highly€divergent€on€the€issue.€€The€trial€judge€found€aÐ „Ô  Ðcausal€connection€between€the€work€performed€by€the€plaintiff€and€the€wrist€injury;€from€the€medicalÐ pÀ Ðand€lay€testimony,€the€trial€judge€found€a€causal€connection€between€the€contact€dermatitis€and€theÐ \¬ Ðexposure€to€the€chemicals€used€in€the€employment.€€The€record€supports€this€finding.Ð H˜ Ðà  àThe€trial€court€was€disconcerted€by€the€wide€divergence€of€the€medical€testimony€on€theÐ 4„ Ðmatter€of€disability€by€Dr.€Sullivan€and€Dr.€Brigham.€€Dr.€Sullivan€found€the€plaintiff€had€a€twenty„Ð  p Ðfive€percent€medical€impairment€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Dr.€Brigham€found€the€plaintiff€had€a€fiveÐ  \ Ðpercent€medical€impairment€to€the€arm€but€did€not€evaluate€the€impairment€as€a€result€of€the€footÐ øH Ðproblem.Ð ä4 Ðà  àThe€trial€judge€considered€the€medical€testimony€of€Drs.€Sullivan€and€Brigham€in€conjunctionÐ Ð  Ðwith€the€lay€testimony€of€the€plaintiff€and€concluded€the€plaintiff€had€sustained€a€forty€percentÐ ¼  Ðpermanent€partial€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€We€find€no€reason€to€disagree€with€that€finding.€Ð ¨ø Ðà  àWe€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€on€the€issue€of€the€disability€of€the€plaintiff.Ð ”ä Ðà  àWe€reverse€that€portion€of€the€judgment€that€addresses€the€issue€of€temporary€total€disabilityÐ €Ð Ðbenefits€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€for€a€determination€of€the€amount€owed€consistent€withÐ l¼ Ðthis€opinion.Ð X ¨ Ðà  àThe€costs€are€taxed€equally€between€the€plaintiff€and€the€defendant.Ð D!” Ðà  à€Ô#†X¢‹XX Xø„'#ÔÔ#†¼­¼»XX¢‹#ÔÔ‡X¢‹X»¼­¼ÔÐ 0"€  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_____________________________________Ð ì%