ÿWPC— Ô˜¹áIKb¨« ‚Y³ûˆ úf¡”“¼bg=é9i¹V½O¢5©Û‹h,ËjÆ× ?û¤î†¥¬û_¿5åÒ¹ï3\¹kzo âö›¬¸¨ÍIÞž—îòTI_¶$²Ž»[Ký­fi¸=õ/û ˜ì䢶ۯ–9GÒæSð+×׃/çç© ó7Î ¶u¨\b=«„ék¬{þ¬0MÅm!¯ü^"PSŽT5ê ´­l†•Oi+÷²ÉX4Ábdë^ÄÊæ͵+J'Ê’ÂLJí^_]Ao€b HŸ³úÚ,Ë(î„ÃÙw9H[ˆ|å9{6ß½f—ŸçsbQH|9=ÀÞ„kü»üÌ„HÅ6ryý#'š ˜vob %\UNb 0ˆ°U'N8^ †w’4– zªÒ$ ö  m #Á Æß Æ¥ Æk Æ1V÷NùNû zýEwÒyy &K bq 1uÓ H P 0cX » Ã Ë Ó Û ã  ë  õ  ÿ ^  0Dg6« ááábççsïïïïïïïïïï 72bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb 0ë”””” B  0¤œ D3@ D-s 0K   ASëÆ> 0¤ 0D¨ A«ì»(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular¢û(L NÞ(ê:i¢Ø+00 ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4 Plus,ð,,,,,ð0Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt\Opinion Summary?\Appellants Attorney Name & Appellant's Name.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)12(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à456789101112?\Appellees Attorney Name & Appellee's Name.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ,Ý ƒRáð$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€Xõ£X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMs.€Rodgers€was€a€witness€in€this€case€and€she€also€experienced€similar€breathing€problems.€Ð ° ÐShe€brought€a€separate€lawsuit€and€was€granted€benefits.€€That€case€is€also€before€this€panel€onÐ  ð Ðappeal.€€òòSeeóó€òòShirley€B.€Rodgers€v.€Guys€&€Gals,€Inc.€and€The€Travelers€Property€and€CasualtyÐ à ÐInsurance€Companyóó€No.€M1999„01538„Ô_ÔWCÔ_Ô„R3„CV.H- ù- iÝ ƒRáð$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€Xõ£X»»ÔÝ  ÝSpecifically€the€chancellor€held,€ð ðThe€Court€finds€that€Dr.€Faith€is€credible€in€his€testimony.€Ð ° ÐThe€Court€finds€a€lack€of€credibility€with€Dr.€Mills.€€So€the€Court€relies€upon€the€testimony€of€Dr.Ð  ð ÐFaith.ðði)(|G2áð$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€ý$»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€Xõ£X»»Ô d(|3¹#$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€ý$»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3¹#$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€ý$»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ý$»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€¼ý$»»»ÔÑ8€õ£XXdð»»d8ÑÓ  Óà@@7 7 ìàIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÐ ° ÐSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÐ È ÐÌÔ‡Xõ£X»¼ý$ÔÌò òÔ#†¼ý$»XXõ£z#ÔDONNA€Ô_ÔTHWEATTÔ_Ôòòóó€v.€TRAVELERS€PROPERTY€&€CASUALTY€òòóóÐ è8 ÐINSURANCE€COMPANYÔ‡Xõ£X»¼ý$Ôó óÐ  P ÐÌà@@¼¼ìàò òChancery€Court€for€Sumner€CountyÐ  X Ðà@@ôôìàNo.€98C„186Ð ø H ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<Ç` AßÐ È  ÐÌNo.€M1999„01903„Ô_ÔWCÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Decided€„€July€27,€2000Ð Ç  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<¦` AßÐ §÷  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÔ#†¼ý$»XXõ£A#ÔÔ‡Xõ£X»¼ý$ÔÌÌÓ.ÓÓ  Óò òJUDGMENTó óÔ#†¼ý$»XXõ£]#ÔÔ‡Xõ£X»¼ý$ÔÐ †Ö ÐÌÓ  ÓÔ#†¼ý$»XXõ£Ë#ÔÔ€Xõ£X»¼ý$ÔÔ‡XcðXXXõ£Ôà  àThis€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€record,€including€the€order€of€referral€to€theÐ f¶ ÐSpecial€Workersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panelððs€Memorandum€Opinion€setting€forthÐ R¢ Ðits€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€which€are€incorporated€herein€by€reference.Ð >Ž ÐÌà  àWhereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€Memorandum€Opinion€of€the€Panel€should€beÐ f Ðaccepted€and€approved;€andÐ R ÐÌà  àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panelððs€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law€are€adoptedÐ Ú* Ðand€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€is€made€the€judgment€of€the€Court.Ð Æ ÐÌà  àCosts€will€be€paid€by€the€appellant,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.Ð ž î ÐÌà  àIT€IS€SO€ORDERED.Ð v"Æ! ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPER€CURIAMÐ &&v!% Ðà  àÔ#†Xõ£XXXcðN#ÔÐ  'b"&ýœ ÐÔ‡¼ý$»XXõ£ÔÓ  Óà@@7 7 ìàIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÐ ° ÐSPECIAL€WORKERSðð€COMPENSATION€APPEALS€PANELÐ È Ðà@@ƒƒìàAT€NASHVILLEÐ à0 ÐÔ#†Xõ£X»¼ý$¾ #ÔÌò òÔ‡¼ý$»XXõ£ÔÔ% ‡ ÔDONNA€Ô_ÔTHWEATTÔ_ÔÔ%†í Ô€v.Ô% ‡ Ô€TRAVELERS€PROPERTY€&€CASUALTYÐ è8 ÐINSURANCE€COMPANYÔ%†; ÔÔ#†Xõ£X»¼ý$Î #Ôó óÐ  P ÐÌà@@¼¼ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€ChanceryÔ% ‡ Ô€Court€Ô%† Ôfor€Ô% ‡ ÔSumnerÔ%† 6 Ô€CountyÐ  X Ðà@@ôôìàNo.€Ô% ‡! Ô98C„186Ô%†!Œ Ô€€€€€€Ô% ‡" ÔTom€E.€Gray,€ChancellorÔ%†"· ÔÐ ø H ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<Ç` AßÐ È  ÐÌNo.€Ô% ‡# ÔM1999„01903„Ô_ÔWCÔ_Ô„R3„CVÔ%†#p Ô€„€Mailed€„€June€26,€2000Ð Ç  ÐÔ‡¼ý$»XXõ£ÔÔ#†Xõ£X»¼ý$ð #ÔFiled€„€July€27,€2000Ð ·  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<–` AßÐ —ç Ðó óÌÔ% ‡ ÔÓ  ÓÓ  ÓThe€issues€in€this€workers'€compensation€appeal€are€whether€the€chancellor€erred€in€determining€theÐ –æ Ðplaintiff€to€be€an€employee;€was€the€injury€from€inhaling€chemicals€compensable;€was€the€award€ofÐ †Ö Ð90%€to€the€body€as€a€whole€excessive;€and€was€commutation€to€lump€sum€appropriate.€€This€panelÐ vÆ Ðaffirms€the€decision€of€the€trial€judge.€€On€appeal€the€appellant€requests€costs€for€a€frivolous€appealÐ f¶ Ðwhich€this€panel€declines€to€grant.Ð V¦ ÐÔ%†·ÔÔ‡¼ý$»XXõ£ÔÔ#†Xõ£X»¼ý$#ÔÓÐÓÌò òÔ% ‡$ ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)€(1999)€Appeal€as€of€RightÔ%†$XÔ;€Judgment€of€the€Ô% ‡% ÔChancery€CourtÐ 6† ÐAffirmed.Ô%†%ÂÔó óÐ &v ÐÌòòÓ  ÓKurtz,€Ô_ÔSp.J.Ô_ÔÔ‡¼ý$»àXõ£ÔÔ#†Xõ£X.¼ý$`#Ôóó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòÔ% ‡& ÔBirch,€J.Ô%†&×Ô,óó€and€òòÔ% ‡' ÔLoser,€Ô_ÔSp.J.Ô_ÔÔ%†' Ôóó,€joined.Ð V ÐÌÔ% ‡ ÔDeanna€Bell€Johnson,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Travelers€Property€&CasualtyÐ æ6 ÐInsurance€CompanyÔ%†vÔ.Ð Ö& ÐÌGeorge€Ellis€Ô_ÔCoppleÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Donna€Ô_ÔThweattÔ_Ô.Ð ¶!  ÐÔ% ‡( ÔÔ%†(ÐÔÌÌÓ(ÓÓ  Óò òMEMORANDUM€OPINIONó óÔ‡¼ý$»XXõ£ÔÔ#†Xõ£X»¼ý$$#ÔÐ †$Ö# ÐÓ  ÓÔ‡¼ý$»XXõ£ÔÔ#†Xõ£X»¼ý$‡#ÔÌÓ  Óò òòòFACTSÐ f&¶!% ÐÌÓ  Óóóó óÓÓà  àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€Special€Workers'Ð F(–#' ÐCompensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð50„6„Ð &*v%) Ð225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€Court€of€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€ofÐ ,V'+ Ðlaw.€€For€the€reasons€stated€below,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€granting€benefits€is€affirmed.Ô‡¼ý$»XXõ£ÔÔ#†Xõ£X»¼ý$Î#ÔÐ ° ÐÔ‡¼ý$»XXõ£ÔÓ ÓÔ#†Xõ£X»¼ý$%#ÔÓ  ÓÓÓà  àThis€action€by€the€employee€to€recover€workers'€compensation€benefits€arose€out€of€anÐ à Ðincident€in€which€she€was€exposed€to€a€chemical€substance€in€the€workplace.€€After€a€trial€before€theÐ pÀ ÐChancery€Court€for€Sumner€County,€the€chancellor€held€that€the€plaintiff€suffered€an€accident€arisingÐ P   Ðout€of€and€in€the€course€and€scope€of€her€employment,€and€that€the€employer€had€actual€notice€of€theÐ 0 € Ðaccident.€€The€chancellor€found€the€plaintiff€to€be€90€percent€vocationally€disabled€to€the€body€asÐ `  Ða€whole€and€commuted€the€award€of€periodic€benefits€to€a€lump€sum.€€The€chancellor€ordered€theÐ ð@  Ðreimbursement€of€medical€bills€to€Dr.€Faith,€and€that€future€medicals€remain€open.Ð Ð  Ðà  àOn€September€2,€1997,€Donna€Ô_ÔThweattÔ_Ô€(plaintiff)€reported€to€her€job€as€a€cosmetologist€€atÐ ° ÐGuys€&€Gals€Beauty€Salon€("Guys€&€Gals")€in€Ô_ÔGallatinÔ_Ô,€Tennessee.€€Upon€entering€the€business€atÐ à Ð7:00€a.m.,€she€found€puddles€on€the€floor€of€a€clear,€colorless€liquid€with€white€foam€on€top.€Ð pÀ ÐAdditionally,€she€found€either€white€foam€or€a€film€of€dried€white€powder€on€nearly€all€of€theÐ P  Ðsurfaces€of€the€work€space.€€She€began€cleaning€the€puddles€and€telephoned€her€manager,€ShirleyÐ 0€ ÐRodgers,€to€report€the€situation.€€Ms.€Rodgers€arrived€approximately€15€€minutes€later€and€helpedÐ ` Ðwith€the€clean€up€effort.Ô_Ô׃*×Ý ƒ)#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€While€cleaning€up€the€substance,€plaintiff€felt€a€burning€in€her€throat.€€SheÐ ð@ Ðremained€in€the€shop€for€five€€hours€and€left€because€she€was€feeling€ill.€€On€her€drive€home,€sheÐ Ð  Ðbegan€feeling€dizzy,€her€chest€started€hurting,€and€she€later€vomited.€€She€also€had€a€dry€powderyÐ °"  Ðmouth,€coughed€frequently,€and€had€trouble€breathing.€€Ð $à" Ðà  àThe€substance€to€which€Ms.€Ô_ÔThweattÔ_Ô€was€exposed€was€later€determined€to€have€come€fromÐ p&À!$ ÐÔ_Ôthe€air€conditioning€system€that€had€been€cleaned€during€the€Labor€Day€weekend€of€1997.Ð ° ÐÔ% €+ Ôà  àAt€the€time€of€her€exposure€to€the€chemical€substance,€Ms.€Thweatt€was€53€years€old€and€hadÐ à Ðworked€at€Guys€&€Gals€since€August€1996.€€Prior€to€that,€she€had€worked€as€a€cosmetologist€atÐ pÀ ÐMorrison's€Hair€Designs€for€13€years.€€Ð P   Ðà  àOn€September€8,€1997,€Ms.€Thweatt€saw€her€family€doctor,€Dr.€Sid€King,€M.D.€€She€beganÐ 0 € Ðseeing€Dr.€William€Faith€M.D.,€a€pulmonary€lung€specialist,€shortly€thereafter.€€She€returned€to€workÐ `  Ðintermittently€from€September€1997€through€January€1998,€taking€time€off€in€each€of€those€months€Ð ð@  Ѐat€the€recommendation€of€Dr.€Faith.€€She€returned€to€work€€January€18,€1998,€worked€for€a€week,Ð Ð  Ðand€then€stopped€working€permanently€because€she,€along€with€Dr.€Faith,€determined€she€was€unableÐ ° Ðto€continue€her€work€as€a€cosmetologist.€€She€continued€to€see€Dr.€Faith€who€diagnosed€her€asÐ à Ðhaving€chronic€asthma€after€a€chemical€exposure€which€he€also€referred€to€as€occupational€asthma.€Ð pÀ ÐDr.€Faith€assigned€Ms.€Thweatt€an€impairment€rating€of€20„25€percent€based€on€the€òòA.M.A.Ð P  ÐGuidelinesóó.€€He€indicated€that€in€order€to€work,€Ms.€Thweatt€would€need€a€relatively€sedentary€jobÐ 0€ Ðin€an€environment€that€is€dust„free,€chemical„free,€and€controlled€for€heat€and€humidity.€€Ð ` ÐÓ  Óò òòòTHE€ISSUES€ON€APPEALÐ ð@ Ðóóó óÓ  Óà  àThe€defendant€Travelers€Property€&€Casualty€Insurance€Company€("Travelers")€(the€workers'Ð Ð  Ðcompensation€carrier)€appeals€and€raises€four€issues:€(1)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€rulingÐ °"  Ðplaintiff€was€an€employee€rather€than€an€independent€contractor;€(2)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€inÐ $à" Ðholding€plaintiff's€injury€to€be€compensable;€(3)€whether€the€trial€court's€award€of€90€percent€to€theÐ p&À!$ Ðbody€as€a€whole€was€excessive;€and€(4)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€commuting€plaintiff's€awardÐ P( #& Ðto€a€lump€sum€payment.Ð 0*€%( Ðà  àThe€employee€presents€the€issue€of€whether€Travelers'€appeal€was€frivolous€within€theÐ ,`'* Ðmeaning€of€T.C.A.€ðð50„6„225(h)€and€T.C.A.€ðð27„1„122.Ð ° Ðà  àOur€review€is€de€novo€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€ofÐ à Ðthe€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.Ð pÀ ÐCode€Ann.€ðð50„6„225(e)(2).Ð P   ÐÓ  Óò òòòEMPLOYEE€VS.€INDEPENDENT€CONTRACTORÐ 0 € ÐÓ  Óó óóóà  àThe€Tennessee€Workers'€Compensation€Act€covers€only€"employees."€€Once€the€existenceÐ `  Ðof€an€employment€relationship€is€established,€the€employer€has€the€burden€of€proving€the€worker€wasÐ ð@  Ðan€independent€contractor€rather€than€an€employee.€€òòSee€Galloway€v.€Memphis€Drum€Serv.óó,€822Ð Ð  ÐS.W.2d€584,€586€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€addition,€the€Workers'€Compensation€Law€is€to€"be€rationally€butÐ ° Ðliberally€construed€to€promote€and€adhere€to€the€Act's€purposes€of€securing€benefits€to€those€workersÐ à Ðwho€fall€within€its€coverage."€€òòSee€id.óó€€(citing€òòHodge€v.€Diamond€Container€General,€Inc.óó,€759Ð pÀ ÐS.W.2d€659€(Tenn.€1988)).€€Ð P  Ðà  àIn€the€present€case,€it€is€undisputed€that€an€employment€relationship€existed.€€Therefore,€weÐ 0€ Ðturn€to€the€factors€to€be€considered€in€determining€whether€an€individual€is€an€employee€or€anÐ ` Ðindependent€contractor.€€Under€T.C.A.€ðð50„6„102(10),€the€factors€to€consider€are€"(A)€The€right€toÐ ð@ Ðcontrol€the€conduct€of€the€work;€(B)€The€right€of€termination;€(C)€The€method€of€payment;€(D)€TheÐ Ð  Ðfreedom€to€select€and€hire€helpers;€(E)€The€furnishing€of€tools€and€equipment;€(F)€Self€schedulingÐ °"  Ðof€working€hours;€and€(G)€The€freedom€to€offer€services€to€other€entities."€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòMasiers€v.Ð $à" ÐArrow€Transfer€&€Storage€Co.óó,€639€S.W.2d€654,€656€(Tenn.€1982)€(òòcitingóó€òòJackson€Sawmill€v.€Westóó,Ð p&À!$ Ð619€S.W.2d€105€(Tenn.€1981)).ò ò€€ó óNo€one€factor€is€dispositive,€but€the€right€to€control€and€the€rightÐ P( #& Ðto€terminate€are€usually€deemed€to€be€strong€evidence€of€an€employer„employee€relationship.€€òòSeeóóÐ 0*€%( ÐòòStarflight,€Inc.€v.€Thonióó€773€S.W.2d€908,€910€(Tenn.€1989).òòò òÐ ,`'* Ðà  àóóó óIn€the€present€case,€Travelers€addressed€the€right€to€control€the€conduct€of€the€work,€theÐ ° Ðmethod€of€payment,€the€furnishing€of€tools€and€equipment,€and€self€scheduling,€with€its€emphasisÐ à Ðbeing€the€right€to€control.€€In€discussing€the€right€to€control€issue,€Travelers€indicated€that€plaintiffÐ pÀ Ðselected€and€scheduled€her€own€working€hours€and€vacation€time,€was€paid€on€a€commission€basis,Ð P   Ðand€provided€equipment€such€as€hair€dryers,€shears,€clippers,€and€rollers.€€Travelers€also€pointed€outÐ 0 € Ðthat€plaintiff€provided€most€of€her€clientele€by€bringing€them€with€her€from€her€previous€job.€Ð `  ÐTravelers€gives€great€weight€to€the€fact€that€plaintiff€had€a€right€to€supervise€or€inspect€her€ownÐ ð@  Ðwork,€and€that€the€shop€owner€did€not€supervise€or€inspect€plaintiff's€work.€€Taking€all€of€theseÐ Ð  Ðthings€into€consideration,€Travelers€argues€that€plaintiff€was€an€independent€contractor.Ð ° Ðà  àIn€support€of€its€contention,€Travelers€relied€on€òòLindsey€v.€Smith€&€Johnson,€Inc.óó,€601Ð à ÐS.W.2d€923€(Tenn.€1980)€and€òòFoster€v.€Liberty€Mut.óó,€(No€Number€in€Original)€1990€LEXIS€€413Ð pÀ Ð(Tenn.€1990).€€In€òòLindseyóó,€Mr.€Lindsey€was€a€carpenter€who€was€a€partner€in€a€subcontractingÐ P  Ðpartnership€which€was€working€for€the€defendant€general€contractor€at€the€time€of€his€injury.€€601Ð 0€ ÐS.W.2d€at€924„25.€€The€court€determined€that€right€of€control€was€maintained€in€Lindsey€and€hisÐ ` Ðpartners€in€that€the€partnership€offered€special€skills,€negotiated€contracts,€hired€and€paid€its€ownÐ ð@ Ðworkers€(and€made€the€standard€wage€deductions),€and€negotiated€payment€on€a€square€foot€ofÐ Ð  Ðcompletion€basis€with€partial€payment€in€advance€and€the€balance€due€upon€completion€of€the€work.€Ð °"  ÐòòId.óó€at€926.€€Mr.€Lindsey€indicated€that€he€never€intended€to€be€a€salaried€employee€of€the€generalÐ $à" Ðcontractor.€€òòId.óó€€Based€on€the€preceding€factors,€the€court€determined€that€Mr.€Lindsey€was€anÐ p&À!$ Ðindependent€contractor.€òòId.óóÐ P( #& ÐÓ  Óà  àIn€òòFosteróó,€the€plaintiff€obtained€a€job€hanging€cable€for€a€television€cable€company.€€1990Ð 0*€%( ÐLEXIS€413.€€As€in€òòLindseyóó,€he€hired€his€own€employees€to€help€with€the€work€and€paid€themÐ ,`'* Ðfrom€his€earnings.€€òòId.óó€€Plaintiff€furnished€his€own€truck€and€scheduled€his€own€work€hours.€€òòId.óó€Ð ° ÐHe€was€€paid€according€to€how€many€feet€of€strand€were€laid€and€reported€his€payments€as€"otherÐ à Ðincome"€on€his€tax€return€instead€of€as€"wages,€salaries,€tips,€etc."€€òòId.óó€€Based€on€the€precedingÐ pÀ Ðfactors,€the€court€determined€that€Foster€was€an€independent€contractor.€òòId.óóÐ P   Ðà  à€€Both€òòLindseyóóand€òòFosteróó€are€markedly€different€from€the€present€case.€€In€the€presentÐ 0 € Ðcase,€Ms.€Thweatt€did€schedule€her€own€work€hours€and€vacations€and€stated€that€her€customersÐ `  Ðwere€her€boss,€but€she€also€testified€that€she€had€two€managers€and€the€owner,€Sue€Newby,€is€theÐ ð@  Ð"boss€of€the€shop."€€There€was€nothing€in€the€record€to€indicate€that€Ms.€Thweatt€had€power€toÐ Ð  Ðcontrol€other€employees€or€to€hire€and€fire€other€employees.€€Therefore,€her€control€was€limited.€€Ð ° Ðà  àTravelers€also€emphasized€that€Ms.€Thweatt€provided€her€own€equipment.€€While€Ms.Ð à ÐThweatt€did€provide€hair€dryers,€shears,€clippers,€rollers,€and€some€other€miscellaneous€items,€forÐ pÀ Ðthe€most€part€she€used€equipment€and€facilities€furnished€by€Guys€&€Gals.€€€Guys€&€GalsÐ P  Ðprovided€Ms.€Thweatt€her€work€station€and€barber€chair€along€with€towels,€€shampoo€bowls,Ð 0€ Ðmirrors,€garbage€cans,€cash€registers,€hair€solutions,€dyes,€perms,€conditioners,€and€shampoos.€Ð ` ÐTennessee€case€law€is€clear€that€the€furnishing€of€tools€by€an€employee€"is€insufficient,€withoutÐ ð@ Ðmore,€to€establish€the€relationship€of€independent€contractor."€€òòSeeóó€òòCarver€v.€Sparta€Elec.€Sys.óóÐ Ð  Ð690€S.W.2d€218,€221€(Tenn.€1985).€€In€this€case€it€is€clear€that€Guys€&€Gals€provided€theÐ °"  Ðmajority€of€required€equipment.Ð $à" Ðòòò òà  àó óóóAdditionally,€Ms.€Thweatt€was€paid€on€a€commission€basis,€but€Guys€&€Gals€deductedÐ p&À!$ Ðfederal€income€tax€and€FICA€from€her€paycheck€and€paid€its€portion€of€the€payroll€taxes.€€At€theÐ P( #& Ðend€of€the€year,€Ms.€Thweatt€received€a€W„2€form€for€employees€as€opposed€to€a€1099€formÐ 0*€%( Ðissued€to€independent€contractors.€€Most€importantly,€Guys€&€Gals€purchased€workers'Ð ,`'* Ðcompensation€insurance€on€Ms.€Thweatt€as€well€as€others€working€at€the€salon.€€These€factors€allÐ ° Ðstrongly€support€Ms.€Thweatt's€claim€that€she€was€an€employee.€€In€fact,€where€an€employerÐ à Ðcarries€workers'€compensation€insurance€and€the€employee's€earnings€are€included€in€computingÐ pÀ Ðpremiums€paid€for€such€insurance,€neither€the€employer€nor€the€insurer€is€in€a€position€toÐ P   Ðquestion€the€relationship€of€the€parties€under€the€Workers'€Compensation€Law.€€òòSeeóó€òòCarter€v.Ð 0 € ÐHodgesóó,€175€Tenn.€96,€101,€132€S.W.2d€211,€213€(Tenn.€1939)€(citing€òòEmployers'€LiabilityÐ `  ÐAssurance€Corp.€v.€Warrenóó,€172€Tenn.€403,€112€S.W.2d€837,€839€(Tenn.€1938)).òòò òÐ ð@  Ðà  àó óóóFinally,€this€Court€has€consistently€emphasized€that€where€doubt€exists,€€the€WorkersððÐ Ð  ÐCompensation€Law€is€to€be€rationally€construed€in€favor€of€finding€employee€status.€€òòSeeóóÐ ° ÐòòGallowayóó€822€S.W.2d€at€586;€òòWooten€Transports,€Inc.€v.€Hunteróó€525€S.W.2d€858,€860€(Tenn.Ð à Ð1976);€òòArmstrong€v.€Spearsóó€393€S.W.2d€729,€731€(Tenn.€1965);€òòBarker€v.€Curtisóó€287€S.W.2d€43,Ð pÀ Ð46€(Tenn.€1956).òòò òÐ P  Ðà  àóóó óHaving€carefully€reviewed€the€record€and€considered€the€relevant€case€law,€we€affirm€theÐ 0€ Ðtrial€court's€holding€that€Ms.€Thweatt€was€an€employee€rather€than€an€independent€contractor.€€ò òòòÐ ` Ðóóó óÓ  Óà @ àò òòòCOMPENSABILITY€OF€INJURYÐ ð@ ÐÓ  Óà  àó óóóAppellant€Travelers€argues€that€Ms.€Thweatt€must€prove€that€she€has€an€occupational€diseaseÐ Ð  Ð(òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð50„6„301€òòet.óó€òòseq.óó)€in€order€to€recover€because€her€complaint€is€that€she€suffered€a€lungÐ °"  Ðinjury.€€Ms.€Thweatt,€however,€claims€that€she€suffered€an€accidental€injury€(òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð50„6„Ð $à" Ð102(12))€as€opposed€to€having€an€occupational€disease.€€òòò òÐ p&À!$ Ðóóó óà  àThe€chancellor€determined€that€Ms.€Thweatt€had€proven€by€expert€medical€testimony€thatÐ P( #& Ðher€"problem"€was€caused€by€the€"accident"€that€occurred€in€September€1997€when€she€breathedÐ 0*€%( Ðfumes€from€a€chemical€as€a€result€of€Derryberry€Air€Conditioning€either€putting€some€chemical€onÐ ,`'* Ðthe€air€conditioner's€coils€or€as€a€result€of€their€work€on€the€air€conditioner.€€€€òòò òÐ ° Ðà  àóóó óIn€òòBrown€Shoe€Company€v.€Reedóó,€350€S.W.2d€65€(Tenn.€1961),€this€Court€gave€a€definitionÐ à Ðof€the€word€"accident"€as€used€in€our€workers'€compensation€statute€in€the€following€language.Ð pÀ ÐÓÓà8  àAn€accident€is€generally€an€unlooked€for€mishap,€an€untoward€event,€which€is€notÐ P   Ðexpected€or€designed.€€Generally€in€most€such€cases€this€Court€has€repeatedly€saidÐ @  Ðthat€a€compensable€injury€should€be€the€result€of€something€happening€by€accidentalÐ 0 € Ðmeans€though€the€act€involving€the€accident€was€intentional.€€Accidental€meansÐ  p  Ðordinarily€mean€an€effect€which€was€not€the€natural€or€probable€consequence€of€theÐ `  Ðmeans€which€produced€it,€an€effect€which€does€not€ordinarily€follow€and€cannot€beÐ P  Ðreasonably€anticipated€from€the€use€of€those€means,€an€effect€which€the€actor€did€notÐ ð@  Ðintend€to€produce€and€which€he€cannot€be€charged€with€the€design€of€producing.€ItÐ à0  Ðis€produced€by€means€which€were€neither€designed€nor€calculated€to€cause€it.€€ItÐ Ð  Ðcannot€be€reasonably€anticipated,€it€is€unexpected,€it€is€produced€by€unusualÐ À Ðcombinations€of€fortuitous€circumstances€and€such€an€injury€is€an€injury€byÐ ° Ðaccidental€means.òòò òРðÐ Ð  Ðó óóó350€S.W.2d€at€69.Ð à ÐÌÓÑSÓò òòòà  àó óóóThis€Court€has€reviewed€other€matters€involving€lung€injuries€and€found€them€to€beÐ pÀ Ðcompensable€injuries€by€accident€as€defined€by€the€statute.€€òòSeeóó€òòHill€v.€Royal€Ins.€Co.óó,€937€S.W.2dÐ P  Ð873,€875€(Tenn.€1996)€(injury€by€accident€when€employee€was€exposed€to€chemicals€during€herÐ 0€ Ðemployment€and€suffered€physical€reactions);€òòEvans€v.€Olin€Corp.óó,€686€S.W.2d€76,€78€(Tenn.€1985)Ð ` Ð(employee€exposed€to€liquid€chlorine€on€three€occasions€while€at€work€held€to€have€suffered€anÐ ð@ Ðindustrial€accident);€òòManis€v.€Peterbilt€Motors€Co.óó,€(No.€01S01„9407„CV„00065)€1995€Tenn.€LEXISÐ Ð  Ð223€(worker€with€pre„existing€emphysema€attributable€to€smoking€held€to€have€sustained€a€gradualÐ °"  Ðinjury€amounting€to€an€accidental€injury€when€condition€was€exacerbated€by€repeated€exposure€toÐ $à" Ðdiesel€fumes€while€at€work).Ð p&À!$ Ðà  àThis€case€is€consistent€with€the€definition€of€"accident"€as€stated€previously€as€well€as€withÐ P( #& Ðthose€cases€in€which€lung€injuries€were€found€to€be€accidental€injuries€as€opposed€to€occupationalÐ 0*€%( Ðdiseases.€€The€trial€court€found€that€Ms.€Thweatt€proved€through€expert€medical€testimony€that€sheÐ ,`'* Ðwas€exposed€to€a€chemical€at€work€on€September€7,€1997,€that€her€employer€had€notice€of€theÐ ° Ðchemical€exposure,€and€that€exposure€to€the€chemical€resulted€in€her€occupational€asthma.€€WeÐ à Ðwould€note€that€the€chancellor€found€Dr.€Faith,€Ms.€Thweatt's€pulmonologist,€to€be€credible,€butÐ pÀ Ðfound€a€lack€of€credibility€with€Dr.€Myron€Mills,€the€doctor€Travelers€hired€to€evaluate€Ms.Ð P   ÐThweatt.׃0×Ý ƒ)#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€trial€court's€holding€on€this€issue€is€affirmed.€€ò òòòÐ 0 € ÐWHETHER€AWARD€OF€90€PERCENT€TO€BODY€AS€A€WHOLE€WAS€EXCESSIVEÐ `  Ðóóó óà  àTravelers€argues€that€the€trial€court's€determination€that€the€plaintiff€has€a€vocationalÐ ð@  Ðdisability€of€90€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€is€excessive,€claiming€that€Ms.€Thweatt€did€not€sufferÐ Ð  Ða€permanent€impairment€rating€of€20€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€according€to€the€òòA.M.A.Ð ° ÐGuidelinesóó.€€In€support€of€this€argument,€Travelers€asserts€that€Dr.€Faith€was€incorrect€in€hisÐ à Ðassessment€of€Ms.€Thweatt's€impairment€rating€in€that€he€gave€her€a€vocational€disability€rating€asÐ pÀ Ðopposed€to€a€permanent€impairment€rating.€€Travelers€relies€on€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Mills€that€Ms.Ð P  ÐThweatt€has€no€permanent€impairment€and€does€not€suffer€from€severe€asthma.Ð 0€ Ðà  àThe€chancellor,€however,€found€€Dr.€Faith€to€be€credible€and€further€found€that€he€properlyÐ ` Ðgave€Ms.€Thweatt€a€permanent€impairment€rating.€€Dr.€Faith€testified€that€he€used€Tables€8€and€10Ð ð@ Ðrespectively€found€on€pages€162€and€164€of€the€òòA.M.A.€Guidelinesóó.€€He€indicated€that€there€was€noÐ Ð  Ðspecific€impairment€rating€expressed€in€the€asthma€category€found€in€Table€10€so€he€used€Table€8Ð °"  Ðto€arrive€at€an€impairment,€and€placed€Ms.€Thweatt€in€category€2,€giving€her€an€impairment€ratingÐ $à" Ðof€20„25€percent€because€of€the€severity€of€her€symptoms€and€the€ease€with€which€her€asthma€isÐ p&À!$ Ðinvoked.Ð ° Ðà  àThe€chancellor€further€determined€that€Ms.€Thweatt€had€been€unable€to€return€to€workÐ à Ðearning€a€wage€equal€to€or€greater€than€the€wage€she€received€prior€to€the€accident.€€Ð pÀ Ðà  àOnce€causation€and€permanency€have€been€established€by€expert€medical€testimony,€the€trialÐ P   Ðjudge€may€consider€a€number€of€pertinent€factors€to€determine€the€extent€of€a€worker's€industrialÐ 0 € Ðdisability.€òòSeeóó€òòWorthington€v.€Modine€Mfg.€Co.óó,€798€S.W.2d€232,€234€(Tenn.1990)€(citing€òòHolderÐ `  Ðv.€Wilson€Sporting€Goods€Co.óó,€723€S.W.2d€104,€107€(Tenn.€1987);€òòRobertson€v.€Loretto€Casket€Co.óó,Ð ð@  Ð722€S.W.2d€380,€384€(Tenn.€1986)).€€In€this€case,€the€chancellor€looked€at€Ms.€Thweatt's€age,Ð Ð  Ðeducation,€past€work€experience,€whether€she€had€any€transferable€job€skills,€and€restrictions€placedÐ ° Ðon€her€by€her€by€Dr.€Faith.Ð à Ðà  àMs.€Thweatt€is€55€years€old.€€After€graduating€from€high€school,€she€worked€in€a€factory€forÐ pÀ Ða€short€period€of€time.€€She€then€sold€cosmetics€at€Castner„Knott€before€going€to€beauty€school€andÐ P  Ðobtaining€her€cosmetology€license€around€1984.€€She€has€no€advanced€skills.€€For€fifteen€years€priorÐ 0€ Ðto€her€chemical€exposure,€Ms.€Thweatt€worked€solely€as€a€beautician,€a€profession€she€is€no€longerÐ ` Ðable€to€perform€as€a€result€of€developing€chemically€induced€asthma.€€Dr.€Faith€testified€that€Ms.Ð ð@ ÐThweatt€is€now€limited€to€a€sedentary€job€in€a€€working€environment€that€is€as€much€as€possibleÐ Ð  Ðclimate„controlled,€dust„free,€chemical„free,€fume„free,€temperature„controlled,€and€humidity„Ð °"  Ðcontrolled.€€Ð $à" Ðà  àBased€on€the€foregoing,€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trialÐ p&À!$ Ðcourt's€award€of€€a€90€percent€vocational€disability.€€Therefore,€the€trial€court's€holding€on€this€issueÐ P( #& Ðis€affirmed.ò òòòÐ 0*€%( ÐÓ  ÓCOMMUTATION€TO€LUMP€SUM€PAYMENTÐ ,`'* ÐÓ  Óó óóóà  àTravelers€argues€that€lump€sum€commutation€in€this€case€is€inappropriate€because€Ms.Ð ° ÐThweatt€has€not€€supplied€proof€of€special€needs€or€exceptional€circumstances.€€Travelers€relies€onÐ à ÐòòDavenport€v.€Taylor€Feedmillóó,€784€S.W.2d€923€(Tenn.€1990)€in€support€of€this€argument.€Ð pÀ ÐUnfortunately,€Travelers'€reliance€on€this€case€is€misplaced€since€the€commutation€statute€wasÐ P   Ðamended€in€1990,€after€the€òòDavenportóó€decision€was€issued.€€The€statutory€amendment€eliminated€theÐ 0 € Ðrequirement€that€an€employee€must€show€proof€of€special€needs.òòò òÐ `  Ðó óóóà  àAn€award€of€workers'€compensation€benefits€may€be€commuted€to€one€or€more€lump€sumÐ ð@  Ðpayments€upon€motion€of€a€party€subject€to€the€approval€of€the€trial€court.€€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð50„6„Ð Ð  Ð229(a).€€The€controlling€statute,€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð50„6„229(a),€says,Ð ° ÐÓÓà8  àIn€determining€whether€to€commute€an€award,€the€trial€court€shall€consider€whetherÐ à Ðthe€commutation€will€be€in€the€best€interest€of€the€employee,€and€such€court€shallÐ €Ð Ðalso€consider€the€ability€of€the€employee€to€wisely€manage€and€control€the€commutedÐ pÀ Ðaward€irrespective€of€whether€there€exist€special€needs.Ð`°Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓUnder€this€two„prong€test€(best€interest€and€wise€management€of€the€commuted€award),€courts€mustÐ @ Ðexercise€their€discretion€on€an€òòad€hocóó€basis€since€the€amendment€does€not€specify€the€factors€to€beÐ  p Ðconsidered.€€òòSeeóó€òòNorth€Am.€Royalties,€Inc.€v.€Thrasheróó,€817€S.W.2d€308€(Tenn.€1991).€Ð P Ðà  àIn€this€case,€Ms.€Thweatt€testified€that€she€plans€to€invest€the€lump€sum€award€in€order€to€liveÐ à0 Ðoff€it€for€the€remainder€of€her€life.€€The€chancellor€found€that€Ms.€Thweatt€met€the€two„prong€test,€Ð À! Ðand€stated€that€she€has€the€ability€to€manage€her€money€wisely.€Ð  #ð! Ðà  àUnder€the€statute,€the€trial€court€has€the€discretion€to€permit€or€refuse€commutation€of€anÐ €%Ð # Ðaward€to€a€lump€sum.€€òòSeeóó€òòClayton€v.€Cookeville€Energy,€Inc.óó,€824€S.W.2d€167,€168€(Tenn.€1992).€Ð `'°"% ÐUnless€the€reviewing€tribunal€finds€that€the€trial€court€has€abused€its€discretion,€the€award€of€a€lumpÐ @)$' Ðsum€payment€must€be€affirmed€on€appeal.€€òòId.óó€€There€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€to€suggest€that€theÐ  +p&) Ðtrial€court€abused€its€discretion,€and€therefore,€the€lump€sum€award€is€affirmed.ò òòòÐ ° ÐÓ  ÓSTATUTORY€FRIVOLOUS€APPEAL€PENALTYóóó óÐ à ÐÓ  Óà  àThe€plaintiff€contends€that€she€should€be€awarded€frivolous€appeal€damages€because€thereÐ pÀ Ðwas€no€reason€for€the€appeal€other€than€as€a€delay€tactic.€€We€cannot€say€that€the€appeal€in€this€caseÐ P   Ðwas€so€devoid€of€merit€as€to€justify€the€imposition€of€a€penalty.€€Therefore,€in€our€discretion€weÐ 0 € Ðdecline€to€assess€appellant€with€fees€and€damages€for€a€frivolous€appeal.€€Ð `  Ðà  àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€are€taxed€to€the€appellant.ÓÓÐ ð@  Ðà  à