This appeal arises from a dispute between three neighbors over the nature and permissible use of an easement created through a 1983 judgment of the chancery court. The plaintiffs own the property that is burdened by the easement and argue that the trial court correctly found that the 1983 judgment created an easement in gross in favor of the landowner directly north of their property. We find that the trial court erred in finding an easement in gross and hold that the 1983 judgment created an express easement appurtenant creating a dominant and servient tenement; however, the easement appurtenant was not capable of being conveyed to landowners who were not purchasing the dominant estate. Likewise, we find that there was no prescriptive or implied easement allowing the easement to be deeded from one neighbor to another. Because the trial court’s judgment lacked findings of fact relevant to the slander of title cause of action, we remand this issue to the trial court for the entry of specific findings of fact on the elements of slander of title. We affirm the trial court’s holding that defendants are responsible for the cost of re-installing a gate that they damaged. The chancery court’s order is reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. When Congress places judicial review of certain types of agency action in the court of appeals rather than the district court, this jurisdictional allocation cannot be circumvented by suing in the district court to challenge agency procedures used (or omitted) in the proceedings leading to such actions, at least where court-of-appeals jurisdiction provides a fully effective forum to address such arguments. This venerable principle without more supports the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims in this case.

Plaintiff Polyweave Packaging, Inc. makes packaging for the safe transportation of hazardous materials. Following an investigation of Polyweave, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration—an operating administration within the Department of Transportation—issued an order finding that Polyweave had violated federal regulations and assessed a civil penalty of $14,460. In addition to seeking judicial review of that civil-penalty order in the court of appeals, Polyweave brought this action in district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the Department of Transportation from rescinding a regulation known as Subpart D. Subpart D sets forth several requirements for enforcement actions taken by DOT operating administrations, such as the enforcement proceeding against Polyweave. Polyweave argues that the DOT improperly rescinded Subpart D and alleges that Polyweave has incurred procedural injury in the underlying enforcement proceeding as a result. The district court however lacked jurisdiction over Polyweave’s claims because the court of appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction over judicial review of the underlying agency order bars Polyweave from attempting to litigate the rescission of Subpart D in the district court.

Tyler Keith Parrish, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court affirmed the jury verdict, merged the two convictions, and sentenced Defendant to a within-range sentence of 12 years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence as excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This post-divorce appeal arises from the trial court’s designation of the primary residential parent of two minor children. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must affirm.

This appeal involves a healthcare liability action. The plaintiff sued a physician who had interpreted the results of her fetal ultrasound. The physician was employed by a Tennessee state university as a professor. Her job duties included both educational responsibilities and clinical care to patients in the residency clinics. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that she had received no personal gain by her act of interpreting the ultrasound. Therefore, the physician possessed absolute immunity under the Tennessee Claims Commission Act for her actions within the scope of her state employment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. George E. Skouteris Jr. is a former college football player. Following his playing days, Skouteris moved from the stadium to the courtroom, practicing as a personal injury lawyer. His client service, however, was more in the form of a turnover than a touchdown. Case in point, he routinely settled cases without client permission, forged client signatures on settlement checks, and then deposited those checks into his own account. Complaints from angry clients mounted, as did interest by state and federal authorities.

At his jury trial for federal bank fraud, Skouteris argued that his days on the gridiron had left him with mental impairments—including possible chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE)—that cast doubt on whether he had the requisite state of mind to commit bank fraud. The jury disagreed and found Skouteris guilty of the charged offense. He was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay nearly $150,000 in restitution. On appeal, Skouteris argues that his football injuries warrant a replay of his jury trial or, in the alternative, his sentencing. We disagree and therefore affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute between unwed parents, in which the mother filed a petition to modify a parenting plan and the father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan and to modify custody. The juvenile court dismissed both the petition and counterpetition finding that modification was not in the child’s best interests. The father appeals. We affirm.

Question 1:

Does a local government have the sole authority to name a state highway or bridge?

Opinions 1:

No. Local governments do not have the sole authority to name state highways and bridges. The Genera] Assembly's power to name state highways and bridges supersedes the authority of local governments to name state highways and bridges.

Question 2:

When the General Assembly passes legislation that designates a segment of a state highway as a memorial highway in honor of a specified individual and directs the Tennessee Department of Transportation to erect signs designating that segment as a memorial highway, does a local government in which that segment of the state highway is situated have authority to override the state legislation by passing local legislation directing the removal of the signage from the right-ofway adjacent to the state highway?

Opinion 2:

No.

Question 3:

If the answer to Question 2 is "no," may the State and/or the sponsoring entity or individuals that funded the signage enforce the state legislation?

Opinion 3:

The ability of the State and/or the sponsoring entity or individuals that funded the signage to enforce the state legislation would depend on the particular facts and circumstances involved in any given situation.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Stephen J. Stanley, Jr. filed two lawsuits which together give rise to the issues before us: first, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy lawsuit and second, a civil lawsuit alleging that his former employer, FCA US, violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Stanley failed to disclose the civil lawsuit in his bankruptcy petition. And as a result of that omission, the district court never reached the merits of Stanley’s FMLA claim. Instead, the district court granted summary judgment for FCA US on judicial estoppel grounds. Stanley contends that was a mistake because he had no motive to omit this employment suit as his bankruptcy plan did not provide for a discharge of his debts. Because we find he did have motive to conceal the claim, we affirm the district court opinion.

The Defendant, Justin M. Banning, was originally sentenced to a term of four years and placed on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant committed a new criminal offense, engaged in unlawful substance use, and violated a no-contact order with the victim. As a consequence, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence and ordered that the Defendant serve the original four-year sentence in custody. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his suspended sentence in its entirety. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.