The petitioner, Marcus Terrell Church, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Kevin LaMont Buford, Sr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for facilitation to commit felony murder and attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery and his effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The employee sustained a compensable injury to her right knee. While recovering from surgery, she reinjured the knee. Her employer asserted the reinjury was an intervening event which absolved the employer of further liability for medical care or temporary disability benefits. The trial court found the reinjury was not an intervening event, ordered medical benefits, and awarded additional temporary disability benefits. The employer has appealed, asserting the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding.

A Madison County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Travarious Dejaun White, on one count of carjacking, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of felony evading arrest. The incident leading to the Defendant’s arrest occurred on August 26, 2007. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of all charged offenses. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight years for carjacking, eight years each for both counts of aggravated robbery, and one year for felony evading arrest.

Appellant, Connie Lavell Tate, was indicted on three alternative counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. The State dismissed one count prior to trial, and she was convicted of the remaining two counts. After merger, the trial court sentenced appellant to six years as a Range I, standard offender. It suspended the sentence to probation and placed appellant on supervised probation. In this appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Deborah Wen Yee Mark, was convicted of one count of first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, four counts of aggravated child abuse, and four counts of child abuse. The trial court sentenced appellant to life for the murder conviction, twenty years at 100% release eligibility for each of the aggravated child abuse convictions, and three years as a Range I, standard offender for each of the child abuse convictions. The trial court aligned each of the aggravated child abuse sentences consecutively to each other and consecutively to the life sentence.

The defendant, David Lewis, entered pleas of guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a handgun while intoxicated. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of four years at 30% for the first count of aggravated assault, three years and six months at 30% for the second count, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of a handgun while intoxicated. The trial court denied his request for judicial diversion or a suspension of his sentences, and his sole issue on appeal is that the court erred in these determinations.

Joshua Dunn (“the Petitioner”) appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post- conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Austin F. Busha, filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion contesting the legality of his sentence in case number 13492. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to correct appellant’s expired sentence. Appellant submits that the trial court’s ruling was error, and the State concedes. Because the award of pretrial jail credits lies strictly within the jurisdiction of the trial court, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of two motions to dismiss in favor of Appellees. With regard to the State of Tennessee, the trial court found that the State and its employees were immune from liability under the doctrines of sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and prosecutorial immunity. With regard to Madison County, the trial court held that Appellant’s complaint was time barred. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.