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Posted by: Stacey Shrader Joslin on Aug 30, 2013

Court: TN Supreme Court

Attorneys 1:

J. Houston Gordon and Amber Nicole Griffin Shaw, Covington, Tennessee, for the appellant, Aundrey Meals, as Natural Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of William Meals.

Attorneys 2:

Lawrence C. Mann, Troy, Michigan (at trial); Sandra Giannone Ezell and Michelle B. Scarponi, Richmond, Virginia (at trial); John Randolph Bibb, Jr. and Ryan Nelson Clark, Nashville, Tennessee (at trial and on appeal); Robert Francis Chapski, Nashville, Tennessee (on appeal); and Christopher T. Handman and Sean M. Marotta, Washington, D.C. (on appeal), for the appellee, Ford Motor Company.

Judge(s): LEE

A six-year-old boy’s spine was fractured in a car wreck when the force of the impact caused him to jackknife over his lap seatbelt and pushed the seatbelt into his stomach and against his spine. The child’s mother filed suit on his behalf against Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), alleging that the defective design of the seatbelt and Ford’s failure to warn of a potential danger caused the child’s permanent paralysis and other enhanced injuries. A jury returned a $43.8 million verdict for compensatory damages, finding Ford to be 15% at fault and two non-parties 85% at fault. Ford’s share of the verdict, based on its degree of fault, was $6,570,000. The jury awarded no punitive damages. Ford moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was excessive. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and affirmed the verdict in its capacity as thirteenth juror. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, ruled that the verdict was excessive and remanded to the trial court with a suggestion of remittitur from $43.8 million to $12.9 million, a 70.55% reduction. The suggested remittitur, if the plaintiff accepted it, would reduce Ford’s share of the verdict to $1,935,000. Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co., No. W2010-01493-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1264454, at *18- 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2012). We hold that the Court of Appeals had the authority to suggest a remittitur even though Ford did not request a remittitur. We further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in remitting the verdict to $12.9 million. Having taken the strongest legitimate view of all the material evidence in favor of the verdict, assuming the truth of all that supports it, allowing all reasonable inferences, and discarding any to the contrary, we hold that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence and was within the range of reasonableness. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the jury’s verdict is reinstated.