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Posted by: Tanja Trezise on Dec 3, 2013

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys 1:

Richard Hughes (on appeal), District Public Defender; and George Joseph Raudenbush, III (at trial), Pro Se, for the appellant, George Joseph Raudenbush, III.

Attorneys 2:

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney General; R. Steven Bebb, District Attorney General; and James H. Stutts, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Judge(s): TIPTON

The Defendant, George Joseph Raudenbush, III, was found guilty by a Monroe County Criminal Court jury of evading arrest with risk of death, a Class D felony; evading arrest, a Class A misdmeanor; two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C misdemeanor; and speeding, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2010) (evading arrest), 39-13-101 (2010) (assault), 39-13-103 (2010) (amended 2012, 2013) (reckless endangerment), 55-50-504 (2012) (driving on a suspended license), 55-12-139 (2012) (amended 2013) (violation of the financial responsibility law), 55-8-152 (2012) (speeding). The trial court merged the evading arrest convictions. The Defendant was sentenced to serve four years as a Range I, standard offender for evading arrest. For the misdemeanor convictions, he was sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment and the two assault convictions, six months for the driving on a suspended license conviction, and thirty days for the speeding conviction. Pursuant to statute, he was not sentenced for violating the financial responsibility law. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences. On appeal, he contends that the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by determining he waived the right and by requiring him to proceed pro se at the trial, during sentencing, and on appeal. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.