STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANGELA AYERS - Articles

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Posted by: Landry Butler on Dec 13, 2016

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys 1:

M. Haden Lawyer (on appeal and at trial) and Andrew Plunk (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Angela Ayers.

Attorneys 2:

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Patience Branham and Kenya Smith, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Judge(s): MONTGOMERY

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Willie Duncan, --- S.W.3d. ---, No. W2013-02554-SC-R11-CD, 2016 WL 6024007 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2016). See State v. Angela Ayers, No. W2014-00781-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 4366633 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 16, 2015) (“Ayers I”), perm. app. filed, case remanded (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2016). Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that the State's failures to identify the underlying dangerous felony in the indictment count related to employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and to charge a separate offense that was an enumerated dangerous felony rendered the indictment count relative to the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony defective. Upon further review, we conclude that in lieu of identifying the enumerated dangerous felony in the indictment count charging employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, the indictment must charge separately at least one enumerated dangerous felony in order to provide a defendant with adequate notice of the charged offense. Under the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the count charging employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is defective because it failed to provide the Defendant adequate notice of the charged offense. We affirm the judgments of the trial court relative to the voluntary manslaughter and false report convictions, but we reverse the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony judgment, vacate the conviction, and dismiss the charge.

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